Monthly Archives: October 2006

06ASTANA353, NEW HEALTH MINISTER CALLS FOR CONTINUED COOPERATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA353 2006-10-31 03:11 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4623
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0353/01 3040311
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310311Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7474
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/DTRA CT WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ATSD-NCB-CD-TR//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ASD-ISP/TSP-CP/CTR//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000353 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/GAC KARINA RAPPOSELLI 
USAID FOR E&E/DGST PAUL HOLMES E&E/EA BOB WALLIN GH/HIDN/ID CHERI 
VINCENT 
DTRA FOR CTB 
NSC FOR M.A. HAYWARD 
 
E.O. 12958: N.A. 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KHIV PINR CASC TSPL KZ
SUBJECT: NEW HEALTH MINISTER CALLS FOR CONTINUED COOPERATION 
 
REF: ASTANA 2051 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In his introductory meeting with newly appointed 
Minister of Health Anatoliy Dernovoy, the Ambassador reaffirmed that 
close cooperation in the health sector remains an important Embassy 
priority.  Dernovoy reacted positively, stating that he hopes for 
continued collaboration.  Dernovoy, who replaced Yerbolat Dosayev as 
Minister of Health after 76 children in Shymkent were infected with 
HIV due to an unsafe blood supply and poor transfusion practices, 
said that Kazakhstan is committed to ensuring that its blood centers 
meet international standards.   The Ambassador informed Dernovoy 
that two of the infected children from Shymkent were adopted by 
Americans, and that one of the adopting families was criminally 
denied necessary information about the health of their child. 
Turning to DTRA health-related projects, Minister Dernovoy asked his 
staff to help expedite a long-delayed strain transfer.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (U) The Ambassador, accompanied by Embassy representatives from 
USAID, CDC, and DTRA, told newly appointed health minister Anatoliy 
Dernovoy during their introductory meeting on October 28 that the 
USG values the close relationship it has established with the 
Ministry of Health.   The Ambassador, noting the excellent 
partnership between the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and 
Kazakhstan, told Dernovoy that post hoped to get funding to create a 
new regional center for disease control in Kazakhstan.  Dernovoy 
thanked the Ambassador for the USG's long history of support.  He 
added that he hopes that the cooperation will continue, even if USG 
funding decreases. 
 
------------------------------------- 
HIV/AIDS: Preventing Future Outbreaks 
------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (U) HIV/AIDS was a primary topic of discussion; Dernovoy 
replaced Yerbolat Dosayev as Minister of Health after one of 
Kazakhstan's worst-ever health tragedies, an HIV/AIDS outbreak in 
Shymkent in which 76 children were infected as a result of poor 
blood safety and infection control practices (reftel).  CDC Director 
for Central Asia Michael Favorov summarized CDC efforts in Shymkent. 
 He told Dernovoy that he is confident that the outbreak has been 
localized.  According to Favorov, all children in the targeted risk 
group have been tested and the rate of new incidence should not 
exceed five percent. 
 
4. (SBU) Dernovoy acknowledged that Kazakhstan blood safety and 
security practices need to improve.  The recent inspection of all 
Kazakhstan blood centers has demonstrated that the facilities are in 
poor shape and badly equipped, he said.  Kazakhstan's 2007-2008 
health program, according to Dernovoy, will address these issues in 
order to ensure that Kazakhstani blood centers meet international 
standards.  He also noted that the Ministry of Health will release a 
statement affirming that all necessary steps have been taken in 
Shymkent to prevent the further spread of HIV/AIDS and that the 
deaths of eight HIV-infected children was caused by pre-existing 
conditions and not by AIDS. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
HIV-Positive Children Adopted by American Citizens 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that American citizens have adopted 
two of the children infected with HIV.  In one of the cases, the 
child's infection was not revealed to the adopting parents.  They 
were instead told that the child was in good health, even though the 
child had tested positive for HIV.  The Ambassador called the 
actions criminal and gave to Minister Dernovoy materials connected 
with the case. 
 
-------------------- 
USAID Health Program 
-------------------- 
 
6. (U) Kerry Pelzman, USAID Central Asia Director of Health and 
Education, described the role of USAID's ZdravPlus II program in 
assisting to develop and implement Kazakhstan's 2004 State Program 
for Health Reform and Development.  She also highlighted USAID's 
support for Kazakhstan's tuberculosis control programs, including 
multi-drug resistant tuberculosis.  The Ambassador assured Dernovoy 
that these projects will remain key priorities for the Embassy, 
despite a likely reduction in funding. 
 
ASTANA 00000353  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
DTRA Programs, Strain Transfer 
------------------------------ 
 
7.  (SBU) The Ambassador then briefed Dernovoy on Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency's (DTRA's) heightened focus on health sector 
projects.  The ambassador pointed out that a plague s
train transfer 
between the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the 
Kazakh Scientific Center for Quarantine and Zoonotic Disease 
(KSCQZD) has been long delayed due to a misperception that the U.S. 
Government had not performed work under the Biological Threat 
Reduction program (BTRP).  He said that the USG has taken several 
steps to demonstrate its commitment,   including the construction of 
a laboratory for the Ministry of Agriculture in Astana. 
 
8. (SBU) DTRA Office Chief Laura Smiley also urged the Minister to 
help facilitate the strain transfer, noting that the project had 
been delayed for two years, and that it was not a DOD program, but a 
collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services and KSCQZD. Anatoliy Belonog (Chief 
Sanitary-Epidemiological Doctor for GOK) said that a political 
decision regarding specifically export licenses must be made on the 
strain transfer and that he would brief the Minister.  The 
Ambassador reminded Belonog that Minister of Industry and Trade 
Vladimir Shkolnik had promised during Senator Lugar's August visit 
to facilitate any export license applications that would be 
submitted.  Dernovoy asked Belonog to expedite the paperwork. 
 
9. (SBU) Smiley informed Dernovoy that the Joint Requirements 
Implementation Plan (JRIP) for the BTRP was still awaiting 
Kazakhstani government signature.  (Note: the JRIP is a non-binding 
agreement between USG and GOK acknowledging roles and 
responsibilities for the BTRP.) Belonog replied that additional 
interagency coordination was required on the 2007 schedule. 
Dernovoy instructed Belonog to ensure that an updated plan would be 
ready for signature by the time the U.S. BRTP team arrives in 
mid-December.  Belonog asked Smiley to participate in upcoming 
meetings with the interagency working group in November to ensure 
that all JRIP edits and comments would be passed to the USG team 
before their visit.  Smiley mentioned that the U.S. Government was 
on track to award several laboratory construction contracts in the 
coming months, including Almaty, Uralsk, and Kyzylorda.  She asked 
that the Ministry of Health expedite its decision regarding the U.S. 
Government's request to build a joint veterinary-human 
epidemiological monitoring station in Kyzylorda.  Minister Dernovoy 
asked Belonog brief him on the topic after the meeting. 
 
10. (SBU) Biographical Note: Anatoliy Dernovoy served as Director of 
the Presidential Medical Center from 1996 to 2006.  He previously 
served as Deputy Minister of Health and State Chief Sanitary Doctor 
(1994 - 1996) and Chief Sanitary Doctor of Almaty Oblast 
(1991-1994).  Dernovoy was born in Karaganda in 1951 and holds a PhD 
in Medical Sciences from the Karaganda Medical Institute. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA351, KAZAKHSTAN: NEW TRANSPORT MINISTER FOCUSED ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA351 2006-10-31 02:56 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4612
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0351 3040256
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310256Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7472
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000351 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EAIR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NEW TRANSPORT MINISTER FOCUSED ON 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
 
1. (SBU) On October 30, Ambassador Ordway met the new Minister of 
Transport and Communications Serik Akhmetov.  Akhmetov expressed an 
intention to continue developing transport infrastructure to 
capitalize on Kazakhstan's advantageous geographic position as a 
natural land bridge between China and Europe.  He said the Ministry 
is seeking to bring competition to heretofore monopolistic sectors, 
citing the state-owned railroad company, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy as 
an example.  Akhmetov emphasized building additional railroad links 
"to connect central and southern Kazakhstan to the west" and 
mentioned inaugurating a four-lane Astana-Karagandy-Almaty highway 
in 2008.  Also in the works are plans for refurbishing the airports 
of Aktube, Shymkent, and Pavlodar as well as building a new terminal 
at the Aktau Airport. 
 
2. (SBU) Akhmetov, 48, replaces Askar Mamin (now Akim of Astana) and 
comes to the Ministry after heading the "Atameken" National Union of 
Entrepreneurs and Employers.  He holds a doctorate in Economics and 
brings experience of working in the Presidential Administration, the 
Astana City Akimat, and as the Akim of Temirtau, his native city in 
the Karaganda Oblast. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA283,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA283 2006-10-24 08:04 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0352
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0283/01 2970804
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZDK
R 240804Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7416
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0271
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2087
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0393
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1638
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2146

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CACEN (MO'MARA), SCA/PPD (JKAMP), EUR/ACE 
(ESMITH/JMCKANE), DRL/PHD (CKUCHTA-HELBLING) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KPAO KDEM KZ
SUBJ:  KAZAKHSTAN A WORTHY STRATEGIC PARTNER - MEDIA COVERAGE ON 
NAZARBAYEV VISIT 
 
 
ASTANA 00000283  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  Reporting by mostly pro-government and official 
Kazakhstani media on President Nazarbayev's September 27-29 visit to 
the United States was basically uncritical and emphasized that 
Kazakhstan, as the most stable and economically prosperous nation in 
Central Asia, was a worthy strategic partner for the U.S.  Many 
analysts commented that the visit would push the relationship to "a 
new level" of mutual trust and cooperation.  Most media accredited 
for the visit were pro-government or official.  Progressive 
newspapers reprinted factual reports from accredited wire services 
and opposition papers mined criticism published in websites or 
Western publications for their assessments of the visit.  Praise for 
Nazarbayev's leadership, particularly in nuclear disarmament, 
dominated the reporting.  U.S. support for democratic reform was 
reported in the context of quotes from U.S. Government officials, 
including the joint statement and President Bush's remarks September 
29.  END SUMMARY. 
 
No Criticism from Accredited Media 
---------------------------------- 
 
2.  Almost all the dozen media accredited for Nazarbayev's visit 
were official or pro-government, with the exception of the 
independently owned Channel 31 and Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency. 
Some papers not accredited, like the progressive high circulation 
Vremya avoided commentary and instead reprinted factual reports from 
Interfax.  Opposition papers mined Western news reports and online 
sources for their assessment of the visit.  Reporting from 
accredited media was almost uniformly uncritical, laudatory, and 
included numerous quotes from American officials praising Nazarbayev 
and Kazakhstan. 
 
15 Years of Bilateral Relations - Joint Achievement 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
3.  Scene setters on the eve of the visit focused on the long term 
strategic partnership and the strong economic basis of relations.  A 
lengthy report in the official Kazakh language daily Yegemen 
Kazakhstan September 27 headlined "Hello America! How Are You, Great 
Country?" praised both countries for building mutual trust over a 
15-year relationship and for becoming "strategic partners with 
mutual interests," particularly in oil and gas trade. 
Pro-government Liter September 26 commented, "Kazakhstan is one of 
the few countries with great potential to further develop its energy 
resources.  The U.S. now views Kazakhstan as a prospective, 
strategic partner in Central Asia, a significant region in the 
international security system." 
 
New Level of Cooperation and Trust 
---------------------------------- 
 
4.  The September 30 headline in Yegemen Kazakhstan - "Collaboration 
To Reach New Level After President's U.S. Visit" - was echoed by 
many analysts before and after the visit.  In discussing the 
possibility of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline, Johns Hopkins' Central 
Asia expert Fred Starr said such an agreement could provide "a new 
impetus to long term cooperation, not only in energy, but other 
areas as well" (official Khabar TV, September 26).  Commentary in 
Liter cited "the consistency and effectiveness of projects already 
implemented by Kazakhstan" as "the basis for the transition of 
Kazakhstani-American relations to a new level."  Analyst Murat 
Laumulin of the Kazakhstani Institute for Strategic Studies 
commented in Liter October 5 that the visit had indeed "elevated 
relations with the U.S. to a new level of trust and mutual 
understanding," while noting "the burdens of bilateral relations" 
were "attempts by the U.S. to constantly push for democratization, 
human rights, media freedom and NGO development."  He held up 
Kazakhstan as "a moderate, secular, and pro-Western" role model not 
only for Central Asia, but for all Muslim countries. 
 
Nazarbayev Praised as Nonproliferation Leader 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  Pro-government and official media highlighted Nazarbayev's 
successful leadership, particularly in non-proliferation efforts. 
The pro-government municipal station Almaty TV on September 27 
quoted Kazakhstani diplomats in Washington commenting that 
Nazarbayev's warm reception by President George H. W. Bush in 
Kennebunkport was "a sign of respect" for Nazarbayev personally and 
that Nazarbayev's visit "was more about the future than the past." 
Five television stations and several newspapers reported on 
Congressman Tom Lantos' resolution congratulating Nazarbayev on the 
15th anniversary of closing the Semipalatinsk testing ground and on 
 
ASTANA 00000283  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Congresswoman Eni Faleomavaega's comment that he deserved the Nobel 
Prize for his contributions to world peace. 
 &#x0
00A;Democratic Reform Not in Headlines, but Not Ignored 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
6.  While democratic reform did not make headlines, it was 
nevertheless included in comments reported from U.S. government 
officials.  The official Russian language daily Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda and Yegemen Kazakhstan printed the full text of the September 
29 joint statement.  (Note:  full coverage in official media of 
statements by U.S. officials on support for democratic reform is not 
a given.  Khabar removed comments on democracy from Assistant 
Secretary Boucher's September 10 interview.)  Primetime scene 
 
SIPDIS 
setters reported the visit agenda as laid in the September 12 White 
House announcement of the visit - democracy promotion, the war on 
terror, energy diversification.  On the day of the visit September 
29, official broadcasters quoted President Bush thanking President 
Nazarbayev for "his contribution to helping a new democracy in 
Iraq," and for "his concerns about democracy in Afghanistan." 
Independent Channel 31 provided a fuller account of President Bush's 
comments including the two sides' discussion of "our commitment to 
institutions that will enable liberty to flourish." 
 
7.  President Nazarbayev's emphasis on security in his September 29 
remarks was clearly reported in the weekend broadcast news on 
highest rated tabloid KTK TV, official Khabar and Channel 31. 
(Note:  because of time zones, coverage of the September 29 meeting 
only started appearing the next day in Kazakhstan).  KTK commented 
that Kazakhstan and the U.S. were long term strategic partners and 
therefore the heads of state had to discuss a wide range of 
economic, political and security issues, the last of which drew the 
president's "special attention." 
 
Opposition Media Mine Internet for Dissenting Views 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8.  Opposition weekly Taszhargan on October 5 incorporated criticism 
from the October 4 "Voice of Democracy" electronic newsletter 
disseminated by the International Eurasia Institute website, 
believed to be affiliated with Nazarbayev's rival from the 1999 
presidential elections, Akezhan Kazhegeldin.  The article cited a 
quote from Senator Russ Feingold:  "'Many know Nazarbayev as a 
corrupt dictator and as a person who does not respect the law, who 
trampled a rising democracy and wiped out free press.  This is not a 
leader who should be accepted in the White House on an official 
visit.'"  It also mentioned Senator Carl Levin's September 26 floor 
testimony challenging President Bush to prosecute the president of 
Kazakhstan as a "kleptocrat."  The Voice of Democracy newsletter 
commented that Nazarbayev failed to achieve his number one priority, 
endorsement for Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the OSCE in 2009. 
 
9.  Opposition Respublika published comment October 20 from 
political scientist Nikolai Kuzmin on the lack of critical analysis 
in media coverage of the visit, and characterizing the visit as a 
publicity tour.  "There was no information about this visit in the 
media. . .  A high level visit should be like a national foreign 
policy event aimed at protecting our national interests. . .  This 
visit was a one-man triumph for the head of state." 
 
Ordway

Wikileaks

06ASTANA280, KAZAKHSTAN: FOREIGN MINISTER KEEPS COURSE FOR 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA280 2006-10-24 07:34 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8076
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #0280/01 2970734
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 240734Z OCT 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7411
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1636
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO (A/S BOUCHER), SCA/CEN (SPRATLEN, O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2015 
TAGS: OSCE PREL PHUM PGOV KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: FOREIGN MINISTER KEEPS COURSE FOR 2009 
OSCE CIO 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Kevin Milas; Reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  On October 23, Foreign Minister Tokayev 
told Ambassador Ordway that the GOK would not accept the OSCE 
CiO compromise laid out in the October 4 USG "non paper." The 
existence of "pre-conditions" to the Kazakhstani 
chairmanship, he said, "would embarrass us."  Tokayev 
informed the Ambassador that he intended to address the 
non-paper proposal in his October 27 speech to the OSCE 
Permanent Council in Vienna. The GOK, Tokayev said, "would 
continue to insist" on the 2009 chairmanship.  However, he 
added, if no consensus on the issue could be achieved during 
the December OSCE Ministerial, the GOK would prefer that a 
decision be postponed until 2007, when Kazakhstan's political 
reforms could once again be evaluated.  In explaining the GOK 
resolve to press forward with its 2009 bid, Tokayev 
emphasized that, of the OSCE countries, "only the U.S." had 
proposed 2011 as an alternative. End Summary. 
 
Non-Paper Approach "Embarrassing" to Kazakhstan 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
2. (C) Asked by Ambassador Ordway for the GOK's views on the 
USG non-paper on Kazakhstan's OSCE CiO candidacy (delivered 
to the Kazakhstani Embassy in Washington on October 4), 
Tokayev told the Ambassador that the "memo was taken very 
seriously, but to us it isn't a case of implementing 
benchmarks."  He termed the proposal that Kazakhstan would 
delay its CiO bid until 2011, with OSCE member support 
conditional upon GOK implementation of agreed-upon democratic 
reforms,  "unacceptable to Kazakhstan...preconditions would 
embarrass us." 
 
3. (C) Ambassador Ordway told Tokayev that his main concern 
was not to debate Tokayev on the CiO issue, but rather to 
understand and convey the GOK's position to Washington. 
However, he emphasized, the non-paper proposals for 
democratic reform had been taken from Deputy Foreign Minister 
Aliyev's own remarks.  Thus, the USG was not attempting to 
impose benchmarks, but rather to react to, and even accept, 
what the GOK itself had proposed. 
 
Tokayev: "Only the U.S." Has Proposed 2011 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) Several times during the conversation Tokayev 
reiterated that Kazakhstan's bid had the support of a 
"majority" of OSCE members, even an "overwhelming" majority. 
"We have no right to reject the support of the countries that 
have offered it," he said, and "we still believe Kazakhstan 
deserves to be supported in 2009."  The Executive Secretariat 
of the CIS, he mentioned, would "make another appeal in 
December" supporting Kazakhstan's candidacy.  Tokayev also 
emphasized that "only the U.S." had proposed 2011 as an 
alternative to 2009.  "No other OSCE country has done so," he 
observed. Summing up the GOK position, Tokayev said that 
"there is no reason for us to renounce our application (for 
the 2009 CiO)." 
 
Tokayev to Address Non-Paper in Vienna 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Tokayev informed the Ambassador "in a friendly way" 
that he intended to "address" the non-paper proposal in his 
October 27th address to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna. 
 (Note: Tokayev plans to depart Kazakhstan for Vienna on 
October 26. End Note.) 
 
 
December OSCE Ministerial: Better to Defer than Disagree? 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
6. (C) Tokayev acknowledged that, despite what he termed 
"overwhelming" OSCE-member support for Kazakhstan's 2009 bid, 
 OSCE rules made it clear that "we need a consensus" to 
resolve the issue.  At the December OSCE Ministerial meeting, 
he said, there would be "only two options -- 2009 and 2011." 
While the GOK would "continue to insist" on 2009, he 
explained, if no consensus could be reached, "the whole issue 
can be postponed until 2007," at which time a final decision 
could be made based on an evaluation of Kazakhstan's 
intervening progress on political reform.  In the case of 
continued opposition to Kazakhstan's candidacy, he concluded, 
"the best decision is no decision." 
 
GOK Will Not Veto Another Country's Candidacy 
 
ASTANA 00000280  002 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Tokayev mentioned that the GOK "had heard of" Greece's 
possible candidacy for the 2009 CiO.  That proposal "wouldn't 
be so good," Tokayev remarked, citing the fact that Greece 
had not mounted a campaign for the CiO.  However, although 
the GOK had the right to block any country's candidacy, he 
said, we "won't do it."  On the CiO issue, Tokayev reported 
to Ambassador Ordway, he had told Belgian Foreign Minister 
Karel de Gucht that "we are not interested in creating fault 
lines" within the OSCE. 
 
Affirming the Need to Implem
ent Political Reform 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
8. (C) Tokayev affirmed that, notwithstanding the GOK 
objection to preconditions to its CiO bid, "we strongly 
believe we have to make progress in political reforms." 
Toward that end, President Nazarbayev would make a "special 
statement" on democratic reform, perhaps early in 2007.  At 
roughly the same time, the GOK would begin to undertake 
reforms, to include "changing the role of Parliament," and 
"changing the function of Deputies." 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA204, KAZAKHSTAN: EXXONMOBIL UPDATES AMBASSADOR ON CPC

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06ASTANA204.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA204 2006-10-19 06:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7341
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0204/01 2920643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190643Z OCT 06 ZDK(TAO)
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7332
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000204 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2015 
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: EXXONMOBIL UPDATES AMBASSADOR ON CPC 
PIPELINE, KCTS PROJECT 
 
REF: A. ALMATY 1086 
 
     B. MOSCOW 11079 
     C. ALMATY 2273 
 
ASTANA 00000204  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Kevin Milas; Reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  In an October 18 meeting with Ambassador 
Ordway, ExxonMobil Country Manager David Willis described 
steps taken by his company to assert itself in the process of 
developing a Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS) 
to carry Kashagan (and now possibly Tengiz) crude to market. 
Willis also described how ExxonMobil had secured Chevron a 
place in the KCTS Host Government Agreement (HGA) 
negotiations -- a move which appears to signal both 
producers' interest in using the KCTS "Eskene to Kuryk" 
pipeline to ship Tengiz crude, at least during the time 
period between the pipeline's construction and CPC expansion. 
 On the subject of CPC expansion, Willis acknowledged that a 
generally-acceptable possible compromise on the CPC 
governance issue had recently emerged, but told the 
Ambassador that ExxonMobil needed assurances that it had the 
backing of Russia's decision-makers before the company 
subjected the package deal to final scrutiny.  Willis 
repeated his March comment (Ref A) that ExxonMobil had no 
interest in participating in a Burgos-Alexandropolis (B-A) 
Bosphorus bypass, stating that the company preferred to run 
the risk of an interruption in Bosphorus tanker traffic 
rather than incur the estimated $1 per barrel cost of a B-A 
bypass. End Summary. 
 
 
KCTS HGA Negotiations Underway 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (C) Willis informed the Ambassador on October 18 that the 
KCTS HGA discussions had recently been launched in London. 
While TOTAL had led the IGA negotiations to date, Willis 
explained, with ExxonMobil playing a more passive role, 
ExxonMobil had decided to play a more active role henceforth, 
and had insisted on being a signatory to an eventual 
agreement. While the KCTS system had been originally designed 
for Kashagan production, Willis explained, the  delays in 
both Kashagan production and CPC expansion meant that it made 
sense to build the Eskene (onshore from Kashagan) to Kuryk 
pipeline "early" -- rather than to time its completion to 
coincide with Kashagan production -- and to "anchor" it with 
Tengiz production. Counting both its Kashagan and its Tengiz 
shares, Willis noted, ExxonMobil "will be the biggest shipper 
of all" in the KCTS system.  In recognition of Chevron's 
interest in moving Tengiz oil to market, Willis added, 
ExxonMobil had "brought Chevron" into the KCTS discussions as 
well.  (Asked by the Ambassador whether exporting Tengiz's 
second-generation oil by the KCTS route would lessen the need 
for CPC expansion, Willis replied "no."  By the time Kashagan 
and Tengiz reached full production, he said, Kazakhstani 
shippers would need four pipeline systems: KCTS/BTC, an 
expanded CPC, an expanded Atyrau-Samara pipeline, and a 
"completely new pipeline across Russia.") 
 
3. (C) Willis explained that the KCTS project would likely 
end up consisting of two joint ventures.  The Kazakhstanis, 
he said, wanted to build, own, and operate the Eskene to 
Kuryk pipeline. ExxonMobil, he said, would suggest that they 
also assume ownership of the storage tanks on the Kazakhstani 
shore, since the storage tanks need to be operationally 
integrated into the pipeline system, as well as to avoid the 
possibility that a private, profit-sapping partner might 
enter into the transportation chain.  A different joint 
venture, he said, would likely build and operate the 
trans-Caspian portion (tankers and terminals) of the project. 
 Willis indicated that the Azeris were interested in owning 
and operating the shipping portion of the project -- 
something ExxonMobil was keen to avoid. 
 
4. (C) Willis also noted that ExxonMobil had approached KMG 
to propose that ExxonMobil represent the Kazakhstan-based oil 
producers in their negotiations with the BTC Corporation for 
onward shipment via the BTC pipeline.  ExxonMobil and KMG had 
a unique alignment of interests in all of this, Willis 
explained.  Not only did both companies own shares in both 
Kashagan and Tengiz, they (along with Shell) were the only 
Kashagan partners who did not also own shares in the BTC 
Corporation.   Thus, ExxonMobil had argued to KMG, it made 
sense for ExxonMobil to represent the Kazakhstan-based 
producers in their negotiations with BTC Corporation. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000204  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
CPC Negotiations: New Governance Proposal on Table 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5. (C) Willis informed the Ambassador that a recent, new 
proposal on CPC corporate governance held some promise for 
unblocking the long-stalled expansion negotiations (Ref B). 
The proposal would arrange voting rights to ensure that the 
GOR d
id not have the ability to change the structure of the 
venture over the objections of the non-governmental 
shareholders.  However, he said, before moving forward 
ExxonMobil needed assurances that the proposal had high-level 
Russian backing, and was not merely the creation of the 
working level team.  If ExxonMobil received a signal however, 
that high-level Russian decision-makers backed the 
compromise, the company would "engage and go forward," with 
the remaining economic issues unlikely to present a serious 
obstacle to agreement. 
 
6. (C) Willis assured the Ambassador that, on the issue of 
governance, at least, the major CPC partners were in sync. 
Willis explained that, of all the CPC partners, British 
Petroleum (BP -- with only a 2.5% share) was most ready to 
give in to Russia's demands, because BP was seeking to sell 
its share of both CPC and TengizChevroil (5%, held as a joint 
venture with Lukoil) and wanted a CPC deal in order to 
enhance the value of its holdings. 
 
ExxonMobil Not Interested in Bosphorus Bypass 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Continuing the conversation about CPC expansion 
negotiations, Willis told the Ambassador that ExxonMobil 
had no interest in participating in any Bosphorus bypass 
project, including Burgos-Alexandropolis.  "We just can't see 
the economics," he said, suggesting that any company which 
joined the project would pay an additional $1 per barrel of 
oil to ship crude to the Black sea, while those which did not 
sign up would "just sail through the Bosphorus, waving."  The 
Ambassador suggested that $1 per barrel seemed like a very 
reasonable "insurance premium" against the possibility that 
an accident or terrorist act might close the Bosphorus. 
Willis disagreed, replying that ExxonMobil "doesn't assess 
the risk as that great." 
 
8. (C) Comment:  We find it interesting that ExxonMobil is 
preparing to assert itself in KCTS negotiations -- both 
within the HGA process and, potentially, by leading 
negotiations between the Kazakhstan-based producers and the 
BTC Co. -- after playing only a passive role in the 
recently-completed BTC IGA negotiations.  ExxonMobil, at 
least, seems to have seized on the future Eskene-Kuryk 
pipeline as a lower-cost way to ship second generation Tengiz 
production to market than the railroad-based route currently 
being negotiated and constructed (Ref C).  Whether the HGA 
negotiations proceed rapidly enough to make KCTS a 
cost-saving alternative for Tengiz may depend on whether KMG 
-- as a Tengiz partner -- buys into ExxonMobil's (and, 
presumably, Chevron's) vision, and whether the Tengiz parties 
can impose their sense of urgency on other negotiating 
parties more habituated to the (receding) deadline of 
Kashagan's first production.  End Comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA, KAZAKHSTAN: EXXONMOBIL UPDATES AMBASSADOR ON CPC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA 2006-10-19 06:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7344
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0204/02 2920643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190643Z OCT 06 ZDK(TAO)
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7333
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ASTANA 00 
 
SIPDIS 
0204 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2015 
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: EXXONMOBIL UPDATES AMBASSADOR ON CPC 
PIPELINE, KCTS PROJECT 
 
 
*********************** 
* Missing Section 001 * 
*********************** 
 
 
ASTANA 00000000  002 OF 002 
 
 
CPC Negotiations: New Governance Proposal on Table 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5. (C) Willis informed the Ambassador that a recent, new 
proposal on CPC corporate governance held some promise for 
unblocking the long-stalled expansion negotiations (Ref B). 
The proposal would arrange voting rights to ensure that the 
GOR did not have the ability to change the structure of the 
venture over the objections of the non-governmental 
shareholders.  However, he said, before moving forward 
ExxonMobil needed assurances that the proposal had high-level 
Russian backing, and was not merely the creation of the 
working level team.  If ExxonMobil received a signal however, 
that high-level Russian decision-makers backed the 
compromise, the company would "engage and go forward," with 
the remaining economic issues unlikely to present a serious 
obstacle to agreement. 
 
6. (C) Willis assured the Ambassador that, on the issue of 
governance, at least, the major CPC partners were in sync. 
Willis explained that, of all the CPC partners, British 
Petroleum (BP -- with only a 2.5% share) was most ready to 
give in to Russia's demands, because BP was seeking to sell 
its share of both CPC and TengizChevroil (5%, held as a joint 
venture with Lukoil) and wanted a CPC deal in order to 
enhance the value of its holdings. 
 
ExxonMobil Not Interested in Bosphorus Bypass 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Continuing the conversation about CPC expansion 
negotiations, Willis told the Ambassador that ExxonMobil 
had no interest in participating in any Bosphorus bypass 
project, including Burgos-Alexandropolis.  "We just can't see 
the economics," he said, suggesting that any company which 
joined the project would pay an additional $1 per barrel of 
oil to ship crude to the Black sea, while those which did not 
sign up would "just sail through the Bosphorus, waving."  The 
Ambassador suggested that $1 per barrel seemed like a very 
reasonable "insurance premium" against the possibility that 
an accident or terrorist act might close the Bosphorus. 
Willis disagreed, replying that ExxonMobil "doesn't assess 
the risk as that great." 
 
8. (C) Comment:  We find it interesting that ExxonMobil is 
preparing to assert itself in KCTS negotiations -- both 
within the HGA process and, potentially, by leading 
negotiations between the Kazakhstan-based producers and the 
BTC Co. -- after playing only a passive role in the 
recently-completed BTC IGA negotiations.  ExxonMobil, at 
least, seems to have seized on the future Eskene-Kuryk 
pipeline as a lower-cost way to ship second generation Tengiz 
production to market than the railroad-based route currently 
being negotiated and constructed (Ref C).  Whether the HGA 
negotiations proceed rapidly enough to make KCTS a 
cost-saving alternative for Tengiz may depend on whether KMG 
-- as a Tengiz partner -- buys into ExxonMobil's (and, 
presumably, Chevron's) vision, and whether the Tengiz parties 
can impose their sense of urgency on other negotiating 
parties more habituated to the (receding) deadline of 
Kashagan's first production.  End Comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA188, KAZAKHSTAN: COUNTER-NARCOTICS GOES UPTEMPO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA188 2006-10-18 10:25 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2683
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0188/01 2911025
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181025Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7319
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2//
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP EURASIA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-SOLIC-CN//
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC//IET//
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000188 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL SNYDER, CARROLL, ALTON; SCA/CEN FOR OMARA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM KCOR PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: COUNTER-NARCOTICS GOES UPTEMPO 
 
REF: Astana 131 
 
ASTANA 00000188  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. Summary:  Kazakhstan is increasing its anti-narcotics efforts in 
the capital and increasingly throughout the country.  The "Astana - 
Drug-Free City" program was a key issue at the Security Council 
Session chaired by President Nazarabayev on September 20.  The 
intensified counter-narcotics operations may increase arrest numbers 
but likely will affect only small users. 
 
-------------------------- 
THE PRESIDENT PROCLAIMS... 
-------------------------- 
 
3.  President Nazarbayev stated in a September 20 meeting of the 
Security Council that the commitment of the capital city to combat 
narcotics should set an example for the rest of Kazakhstan.  With 
the president's public backing, the akimat (city hall) of Astana in 
consultation with the MVD developed a 2006-2008 program entitled 
"Astana - Drug-Free City," to tackle demand reduction, treatment of 
addiction, and drug trafficking.  According to the official internet 
news site "Kazinform," on September 29 the Government decided to 
allot one billion tenge ($8 million) to implement the program. 
 
------------ 
AND PRODS... 
------------ 
 
4.  In his speech at the Security Council Session President 
Nazarbayev prodded the Committee for National Security (KNB) and the 
MVD to crack down on drug use and the drug trade.  Claiming officers 
knew all the distribution networks in the city, he instructed law 
and security officials to raid nightclubs and discotheques to curb 
drug use in the capital.  Nazarbayev advocated publicizing the raids 
on TV in order to get the message out to the population that drug 
use is unacceptable.  Finally, he proposed that students themselves 
should speak out against drug use. 
 
------------------------------------ 
...AND THE GOOD TIMES COME TO AN END 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.  After the President's remarks to the Security Council, 
law-enforcement bodies reacted swiftly to implement the program. 
According to an MVD contact, there are 35 entertainment 
establishments in Astana.  Even though KNB and MVD officers 
previously regularly conducted raids in the night clubs they were 
considered superficial efforts.  In the earlier raids most young 
people were caught unawares by the police forces but none had reason 
to be afraid since they were in possession of marijuana weighing 
less than 50 grams.  In his interview on "Khabar" channel on 
September 21, Chairman of the Committee of Combating Drug 
Trafficking and Drug Circulation Control Anatoly Vyborov said that 
50 grams of marijuana is a significant amount and would be 
sufficient to "fumigate" half of a school.  (Note: Three years ago 
the Parliament reduced the penalty for possession of a small amount 
of marijuana and as a result marijuana is distributed everywhere 
especially in universities and schools.  Therefore, any student who 
knows the law can safely carry 50 grams in his pocket and if caught 
by the police pay the administrative penalty of 2,060 tenge ($16). 
End note.) 
 
-------------------------- 
MVD MINISTER LEADS THE WAY 
-------------------------- 
6.  According to a September 22 broadcast on "Khabar" television 
channel, Astana police conducted a series of raids concentrating 
their attention at entertainment establishments and "shady" 
apartments.  Unlike the past, every patron in the nightclubs was 
carefully searched.  It is a commonly accepted belief that night 
clubs are focal points for drug dealers and that even some owners 
are involved in the trade.  However, that night the Minister of 
Internal Affairs Baurzhan Mukhamedzhanov personally ran the special 
operation along much stricter guidelines.  The raids intercepted six 
drug related crimes including two cases of drug dealing, 33 people 
were detained for variety of reasons including drugs.  The First 
Deputy Head of the Astana city Internal Affairs Department Marat 
Demeuov stated the raids will continue on a weekly basis. 
7.  The Head of the Astana city Internal Affairs Department, 
Serimzhan Dosumov, in an interview on "Khabar" said he had closed 
one disco-club and may close others should investigation show that 
drug sales are linked to a particular establishment.  Additionally, 
he continued, if found complicit in the drug use or sales, 
 
ASTANA 00000188  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
night-club owners may be arrested and/or fined.  In response, 
according to "Mir" Television and Radio Company news, the nightclub 
and other entertainment establishment owners formed a Union of 
Owners of Nights Clubs and Entertainment Centers to counter the 
spread of drugs in their businesses. 
 
-------------------------------- &#x000
A;PUTTING BIG NUMBERS ON THE BOARD 
-------------------------------- 
 
8. The "Astana - Drug-Free City" program was designed for the 
capital; however law-enforcement agencies have begun to apply it to 
the whole country.  After five days, the program eliminated 30 drug 
dens and checked 455 entertainment establishments around the 
country.  Officers seized 10 kilos of illegal drugs, including more 
than 3 kilos of heroin.  Police announced they had uncovered 64 
cases of drug trafficking.  On October 3 the officers of the KNB 
revealed a farm for growing high quality Afghan quality marijuana in 
village of Romanovka, 30 km from Astana.  The owners of the farm set 
up an entire process to produce drugs.  KNB officers seized 100 
kilos of marijuana and 77 grams of heroin in this operation. 
 
--------------------------------- 
THE KNB MAKES SIGNIFICANT ARRESTS 
 -------------------------------- 
 
9. To implement the President's wishes as stated at the Security 
Council session, KNB divisions began operations against large drug 
groups.  The KNB press service reported that early morning on 
October 6 at the last stage of a "controlled delivery" operation the 
officers of Almaty KNB Department detained a five-person 
international criminal drug ring.  The members came from Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and were trying to smuggle drugs through 
the territory of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan inside a load of grapes. 
As a result of the operation, officers seized high 66.5 kilos of 
high quality afghan heroin and 197 kilos of opium.  Since September 
20 the bodies of national security seized 69 kilos of heroin and 200 
kilos of opium in the country. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. Kazakhstan law enforcement is definitely stepping up its 
activities to attack illegal narcotics.  Whether this is a permanent 
effort or a production made for television is uncertain.  Note: On 
December 4 in Washington, INL is sponsoring a U.S.-Kazakhstan 
discussion of the GOK counter-narcotics strategy and lessons which 
can be learned from U.S. experience. End note. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA90, KAZAKHSTAN: CANADIAN OIL COMPANY WEATHERS LEGAL

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA90 2006-10-16 08:56 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9977
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0090/01 2890856
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160856Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7227
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ CA
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: CANADIAN OIL COMPANY WEATHERS LEGAL 
ASSAULT 
 
REF: A. ALMATY 603 
 
     B. 05 ALMATY 3857 
     C. ALMATY 2301 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kevin Milas; Reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Canada-based "NationsEnergy" oil 
company, whose Kazakhstani subsidiary, "Karazhambasmunai JV" 
(KBM), owns a 50,000 barrel per day oil field, recently won 
an appeal in Kazakhstani court against an individual claiming 
nearly 50% of KBM by virtue of a dispute with former 
NationsEnergy shareholders.  Nations Energy Vice President 
Patrick O'Mara recently told Econoff that he believes the 
claimant, Zoran Savicic, is cooperating with well-placed 
Kazakhstanis in a plot to either win 50% of KBM in court, or, 
failing that, to drive down NationsEnergy's price before an 
acquisition bid.  With a rumored asking price of $2 billion, 
NationsEnergy is entertaining numerous potential buyers, both 
Kazakhstani and international.  End Summary. 
 
Anatomy of the Legal Assault 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) NationsEnergy won an August 19 decision in Mangistau 
Oblast Appeals Court which reversed an April ruling, by a 
Specialized Economic Court, granting Zoran Savicic, a Serbian 
citizen, 17.9% of KBM.  Savicic's claim arose out of a 1994 
agreement with individuals who later became NationsEnergy 
shareholders.  Savicic's claim appears to have survived to 
date against long odds.  Court documents suggest that, not 
only does Savicic appear not to have fulfilled his side of 
the 1994 agreement, but he also managed to void a 1998 
settlement agreement by arguing that he had been coerced into 
signing.  In 2006, Savicic managed to secure a default 
judgment against the defendants in Nevada court, allegedly by 
providing process servers with an incorrect address for the 
principal defendant.  Rather than seek collection of the 
judgment in U.S. courts, however, Savicic chose to transfer 
the case to Kazakhstan (convincing a Kazakhstani judge to 
accept jurisdiction by switching his target from the 
Nevada-registered NationsEnergy to KBM) -- where, 
NationsEnergy lawyers maintain, he helped secure the 
favorable April verdict by misrepresenting the significance 
of the Nevada court's judgment, even after being enjoined 
from doing so.  Savicic's legal victories, however, came to a 
halt in August in the Mangistau Court of Appeals. 
 
Accusations of Kazakhstani Insider Involvement 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (C) On September 16, O'Mara told Econoff that he is 
convinced that a group of well-placed Kazakhstani insiders, 
including Timur Kulibayev (the president's son-in-law), Askar 
Balzhanov (General Director of "KazMunaiGaz (KMG) Exploration 
and Production", Zhakyp Marabayev (Managing Director of KMG), 
and Adilbek Dzhaksybekov (Head of the Presidential 
Administration), were behind Savicic's assault on KBM in 
Kazakhstani courts.  O'Mara suspects that the idea to 
transfer the case to Kazakhstani courts took form in 2004, 
when rumors began to break that NationsEnergy was available 
for sale (ref A).  O'Mara surmises that the aim of the plot 
was first and foremost to win 50% of KBM with the help of 
corrupt judges and, failing that, to drive down 
NationsEnergy's asking price for a potential acquisition bid. 
 
 
CNPC Refuses to Cooperate with Plot 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) O'Mara told Econoff that, in November 2005, in the 
midst of NationsEnergy's negotiations to sell the company to 
the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC), CNPC officials 
forwarded him text messages from Marabayev and Balzhanov 
aimed at convincing the Chinese to hold-off buying 
NationsEnergy (for a reported $2 billion), in order to give 
Kulibayev's group time to "knock $700-$800" off the price 
"with fines and legal actions."  The Kazakhstanis would then 
buy NationsEnergy and re-sell at least part of the company to 
the Chinese.  O'Mara also claimed that Kulibayev has a 
history of dealing with Savicic (whom, he says, was a subject 
of interest in the Serbian War Crimes Tribunals), having 
partnered with the Serbian to profit from illegal sales of 
oil under embargo of Saddam Hussein's regime. 
 
Ace in the Hole: Threatening to Go Public 
----------------------------------------- 
 
ASTANA 00000090  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
5. (C) O'Mara credits NationsEnergy's success in the appeals 
court both to the overwhelming weight of legal evidence in 
the company's favor and to his own efforts to tacitly warn 
the Kazakhstani insiders that he was aware of their actions 
and would denounce them publicly if faced with losing a large 
share of the company.  (The case has thus far not entered the 
Kazakhstani media.  The threat of publicity, O'Mara believes, 
is what will keep Savicic from appealing the August court 
decision, though he has a year in which to do so.)  O'Mara 
told Econoff that he had communicated most of his suspicions 
and warnings to
 Deputy Prime Minister Masimov -- who, O'Mara 
recounted, eventually confirmed O'Mara's claims of insider 
involvement (without naming names), and then professed to 
have put an end to the plot.  Smiling, O'Mara told Econoff 
that, in what he termed "Kulibayev's revenge," the financial 
police had raided NationsEnergy's offices on September 11, 
and the Subsoil User's Inspection Office had come calling two 
days later. 
 
Suitors Still Flocking to Buy NationsEnergy 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Meanwhile, O'Mara said, potential buyers continued to 
court NationsEnergy.  Since November, he said, several groups 
had shown up unannounced at NationsEnergy's Almaty offices, 
some to bluff, others to threaten, and a few to make 
legitimate offers.  While the Chinese continued to make the 
best offer, O'Mara said, he had the increasing feeling that 
the GOK would prefer a different buyer.  Masimov, he said, 
was trying to set up a sale to Vladimir Kim of Kazakhmys (a 
London-based copper mining company) -- but so far the offer 
was too low.  BankTuranAlem had made the best offer among 
Kazakhstani buyers, O'Mara noted, while Occidental Petroleum 
(a U.S.company) appeared to be putting together an attractive 
offer in conjunction with a Dubai sheikh.  Asked about news 
reports of an offer by India's ONGC-Mittal Energy 
Corporation, O'Mara waved it off, telling Econoff that, while 
Kulibayev was pushing a deal with the Mittal group, ONGC "had 
not given the slightest indication that they knew how to do 
business." 
 
7. (C) Comment: O'Mara's thesis -- that predatory buyers are 
using Kazakhstan's legal system to drive down the purchase 
price of an attractive oil and gas asset -- is a familiar 
one. (See Ref B on PetroKazakhstan, and Ref C on Parker 
Drilling, for recent cases which share this element in common 
with the NationsEnergy case.)  Although NationsEnergy has 
managed so far to keep its legal problems out of the press, 
it will be interesting to see if the company can succeed in 
finalizing its sale prior to the expiration of Savicic's 
year-long appeal period.  While we cannot vouch for the 
veracity of O'Mara's accusations -- and suspect that he would 
be hard-pressed to offer any proof of his allegations -- we 
view him as a generally credible individual. End Comment. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA88, KAZAKHSTAN: INL QUARTERLY REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA88 2006-10-15 14:14 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0570
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #0088/01 2881414
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151414Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7223
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2//
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP EURASIA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-SOLIC-CN//
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC//IET//
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL SNYDER, CARROLL, ALTON; SCA/CEN FOR OMARA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM KCOR PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: INL QUARTERLY REPORT 
 
REF: A) ASTANA 0032, B) ALMATY 0892 
 
1. Summary:  INL conducted activities in anti-money laundering, 
border security, anti-trafficking, crime statistics, and 
counter-narcotics through the calendar quarter that ended September 
30.  Also during this period, Ambassador Ordway and MVD Minister 
Mukhamedzhanov signed the FY2005/2006 ALOA and DCM Milas and 
Minister Mukhamedzhanov signed an amendment to the Financial Face 
Sheet for FY 2003/2004. End summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Anti-Money Laundering 
--------------------- 
 
2.  On July 24-28 INL and the Financial Police Academy sponsored a 
continuing professional education course on Financial Investigative 
Techniques (FIT) for financial police officers.  Experts of the 
Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the U.S. 
Treasury conducted the course.  The FIT course is a part of the 
ongoing mutual work aimed at the improvement of the methods of 
financial investigation in the Republic of Kazakhstan, and money 
laundering in particular.  23 financial police officers (16 
investigators and seven policemen) successfully passed the course. 
More sessions are planned for the end of this year to cover officers 
in other regions of the country. 
 
3.  American experts co-taught the course with the Kazakhstani 
specialists from the Procurator General's Office of the RK, Ministry 
of Internal Affairs of the RK, Supreme Court of the RK, Agency on 
Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (Financial Police), as well 
as professors and teachers from the Financial Police Academy.  This 
approach is a new avenue of cooperation between INL and the Academy. 
 The course is also remarkable because the educational material was 
incorporated into the official curriculum of the Academy approved by 
the Agency on Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (Financial 
Police) of the RK. 
 
4.  Among other topics, the instructors introduced to the FinPol 
Officers to use of various sources of information, international 
cooperation in the sphere of combating money laundering, Kazakhstani 
legislation on anti-money laundering and the structure of the future 
FIU, special investigative techniques and methods of proof.  An 
essential part of the course was practical exercises on the above 
mentioned topics. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
STRENGTHENING THE BORDER WITH UZBEKISTAN 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5. International Organization for Migration (IOM) is implementing an 
INL-funded Project "Enhancing Immigration Inspection and Border 
Control on the Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani Border".  One of the main 
elements of the project is to train Border Guard Officers and staff 
in how to identify fraudulent documents and use controller's mobile 
work station for registering passenger documents and identifying the 
forged documents "Berkut".  On May 22-27 IOM, in cooperation with 
the Military Institute of the Committee for National Security (KNB), 
conducted two training sessions on Fraudulent Document 
Identification and Border Control Techniques for the border guard 
staff on the Kazakhstani-Uzbek border.  Training was delivered in 
two locations "Kazygurt" and "Gani Muratbayeva" and covered 25 
people from different border checkpoints. 
 
-------------------------- 
KNB NARCOTICS INTERDICTION 
-------------------------- 
 
6. As part of U.S. efforts to assist Kazakhstan in the fight against 
drug trafficking, INL provided the KNB Military Institute with 
equipment to be used in specialized training sessions on drug 
identification and the search of vehicles.  The equipment provided 
will permit cadets to be trained to use equipment at posts they will 
be assigned.  Ambassador Ordway officially handed over the equipment 
to KNB Military Institute Director Baurzhan Yelubayev during a 
ceremony at the Institute on June 20. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
IMPROVING THE COLLECTION OF CRIME STATISTICS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
7. INL and the Statistics Division of the Procurator General's 
Office co-sponsored a conference "Improvement of Collection of State 
Legal Statistics and Legislation in Sphere of Combating Drug 
Addiction and Drug Trafficking," which was held in the city of 
Uralsk (Western - Kazakhstan oblast) on June 27. 
 
8. At the conference, 24 participants from the Ministry of Education 
and Science, the Procurator General's Office, the Committee for 
National Security, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs worked out draft recommendations on improvement of 
collection of statistics, pertaining to narcotics-related crimes and 
the number
of drug addicts.  One of the main issues was 
strengthening interagency cooperation in the effort to effectively 
combat drug trafficking.  The fourth conference is scheduled to take 
place in Borovoye (Northern Kazakhstan) on October 27.  This is part 
of a three-year program to improve the collection, analysis, and 
distribution of statistical information on crime and narcotics in 
Kazakhstan. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
ANTI-TIP TRAINING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND JUDGES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9.  The International Organization for Migration (IOM) implemented 
INL-funded training session on anti-trafficking issues for law 
enforcement officers and judges.  The training aimed at 
strengthening professional capacity of the participants in 
detection, investigation, prosecution and conduction of hearings of 
human trafficking cases. 
 
10.  During first session for policemen and investigators on July 
24-26, 19 officers successfully completed the course. 
Anti-trafficking experts from IOM and Kazakhstani NGO's co-taught 
with an expert from the U.S.  Participants discussed the issue of 
trafficking in persons in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, established 
contact with various NGOs that assist trafficking victims, and 
learned about U.S. experience in combating human trafficking.  At 
the end of the seminar, officers developed recommendations to 
improve their counter-trafficking work. 
 
11.  INL sponsored an anti-TIP training session for judges on July 
27-29.  19 judges from around 10 different regions of the country 
completed the training.  IOM updated participants on the recent 
amendments to the anti-trafficking legislation (ref A).  The program 
mainly focused on judicial investigation and prosecution of 
trafficking cases.  The U.S. expert shared the experiences of U.S. 
law enforcement agencies in prosecution of human trafficking.  The 
judges developed recommendations for conducting a trial for human 
trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced 
labor.  Next session for law enforcement officers and judges is 
scheduled for the beginning of 2007. 
 
-------------------------- 
RAISING ANTI-TIP AWARENESS 
-------------------------- 
 
12.  INL provided a grant to IOM to design, print and disseminate 
anti-trafficking in persons information materials.  These materials 
are designed for law enforcement officers and contain information 
about main characteristics of TIP-related crimes, recommendations on 
detection and investigation of such crimes, as well as reference to 
organizations and agencies that provide assistance to trafficking 
victims.  IOM disseminates the materials (plastic cards, posters, 
notepads, coffee cups, T-shirts, etc. to the participants in 
INL-funded training for law enforcement officers and judges. 
 
13.  The police divisions in charge of counter-trafficking in 
Kazakhstan are lacking specialized materials which would contain 
information about the methods of detection and investigation of 
trafficking in persons crimes.  There is also a need for guidelines 
focused on the current counter-trafficking legislation and 
trafficking situation specific to the various regions of the 
country.  To address this need INL funded the development and 
distribution of guidelines.  Within this grant IOM has printed 1,000 
brochures containing the necessary information and is disseminating 
them to counter-trafficking police divisions, police academies and 
law schools. 
 
---------------------------------- 
ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS CENTER 
---------------------------------- 
 
14.  In July 2005, at the request of the GOK, INL assisted in the 
establishment of a Center for Training Specialists on Combating 
Illegal Migration and Trafficking in Persons (Anti-TIP Center) at 
the Karaganda Legal Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
(ref B) 
 
15.  Renovation of two auditoriums and two offices for the Anti-TIP 
Center are underway.  INL anticipates completion of refurbishments 
by the end of October 2006, in time for the beginning of the next 
class of 30 practicing migration policemen.  Upon completion of 
renovation INL will provide new equipment and furniture. 
 
16.  The Anti-TIP Center is a joint U.S.-GOK project.  The GOK is 
constructing a five-story dormitory for students studying at the 
Center.  Completion of the dorm is scheduled for the end of 2006. 
INL will provide equipment and furniture for the dorm where students 
will live when attending courses at the Center.  MVD is hopeful that 
the Center will receive international status in the future.  In that 
case, the Center will provide an opportunity for officers from 
Central Asian countries to improve their professional skills, as 
well as improve cooperation between the countries in combating human 
trafficking. 
 
------------------- 
LETTER OF AGREEMENT 
------------------- 
 
17.  On August 28 Ambassador Ordway and MVD Minister Baurzhan 
Mukhamedzhanov signed the Amended Letter of Agreement (#3) which 
obligated FY 2005/2006 INL funds totaling $680,000.  The funds will 
be used to continue programs in counter-narcotics, border security, 
anti-TIP, and AML.  Additionally, on September 28 DCM Milas and 
Minister Mukhamedzhanov signed an amendment to the FY 2003/2004 ALOA 
(#4) Face Sheet providing an additional $65,000 for CN and border 
security programs. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA78, EXBS: KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR’S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA78 2006-10-13 11:55 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0157
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0078/01 2861155
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131155Z OCT 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7209
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUCQAAA/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0381
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7730
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7696
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0727
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1892
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7041

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000078 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC PVANSON, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC-AMT LSPRINGER 
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE RBUCK 
DEPT FOR SCA/RA JSCHLOSSER 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN MO'MARA 
CBP/INA FOR CDONOFRIO AND RWATT 
USDOE/NNSA CWALKER, TPERRY AND EDESCHLER 
DOC FOR DCREED AND GPETERSEN-BEARD 
USCG FOR BGOLDEN 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT, BISHKEK, BAKU, DUSHANBE AND ASHGABAT FOR EXBS 
ADVISORS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP KZ
SUBJECT:  EXBS: KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR'S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE 
(SEPTEMBER 2006) 
 
 
ASTANA 00000078  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS: 
 
       1. Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program 
Advisor Larry Adkins concluded his temporary duty assignment with 
EXBS Astana on October 2.  Larry's numerous and invaluable 
contributions to the EXBS office during his two-month-plus sojourn 
in Kazakhstan are highly appreciated. 
 
       2. September marks the EXBS program office's final month in 
the interim Embassy Branch Office facility.  Beginning next month 
the program will operate from its office in the new embassy. 
 
       3. The EXBS program office took receipt of three new 
workstations in September. 
 
 4. EXBS Advisor Jim Kelly arrived in Astana on September 26 on a 
one-month TDY assignment. 
 
 5. EXBS program staff composed a letter from Ambassador Ordway to 
Kazakhstani Customs Committee Chairman Askar Shakirov to gauge his 
interest in the State Department's Voluntary Visitor Program.  The 
letter was sent to Mr. Shakirov in late September; a response has 
not yet been received. 
 
 6. The US Customs and Border Protection survey of the 
Kazakhstani-Russian frontier scheduled for November 6-17 has been 
postponed until late spring or summer 2007. 
 
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS CONDUCTED 
 
 1. September 6-8 - EXBS Advisors Larry Adkins and Andrew 
Offenbacher drove the office's Nissan Pathfinder several hundred 
miles east to Sherbakty and Kosak, two border posts in neighboring 
Pavlodar region, to assess customs and border control procedures, 
and evaluate inspection techniques and equipment.  A report with a 
detailed summary of the findings is available upon request. 
 
 2. September 12-19 - Two contractors working on the National 
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Second Line of Defense 
(SLD) program conducted surveys at seven ports of entry on 
Kazakhstan's border with Krygyzstan and Uzbekistan.  The information 
from the survey will be used to develop a scope of work that will be 
used to guide the future installation of portal monitors at rail, 
vehicular and pedestrian crossings.  On September 12, the EXBS 
Advisor met with the two SLD contractors, representatives from 
Kazakhstani Customs, and other interested parties to discuss the 
project. 
 
The SLD implementing arrangement was signed on May 5, 2006, after 
approximately four years of negotiations.  The EXBS program office 
has been designated the embassy point of contact for the 
implementation stage of the SLD program and acts as a liaison 
between NNSA/SLD and Kazakhstan's Customs Control Committee. 
 
 3. September 12 - EXBS Advisors Larry Adkins and Andrew Offenbacher 
met with General Alexei Artemchuk of Kazakhstan's Border Service to 
discuss the details of modular shelter and Ural truck procurements. 
 
 
       4. September 22 - EXBS Advisor joined Political / Economic 
Section Chief Deborah Mennuti for a meeting with Talap Sakhtapov and 
Alexandra Vozhakova of Kazakhstani Customs to discuss the SLD 
 
ASTANA 00000078  002 OF 003 
 
 
project. 
 
 5. September 26 - Commonwealth Trading Partner's (CTP) Molly Pyle 
visited the EXBS program office to discuss the next days' meetings 
on the Administrative Enforcement (AE) project.  The AE project was 
first proposed to Kazakhstan at a preparatory conference in July 
2005, and aims to improve the knowledge and skills of government 
officials in investigating and taking administrative action on 
non-criminal export control violations.  For several reasons--not 
the least of which was a change in CTP's local contractor--the 
project has not yet entered the implementation phase. 
 
 6. September 27-28 - AE project meetings were held in Astana, 
during which a preliminary a
greement was reached on target dates for 
the project's four stages, including the development of the course 
materials and instructor training.  Participants included CTP's 
Molly Pyle, several representatives from Kazakhstan's Customs 
Committee, a representative from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
CTP's Kazakhstani subcontractor, and Vladimir Sidorenko of the 
Moscow-based Center on Export Controls.  Mr. Sidorenko's 
participation in the meetings was particularly beneficial - his NGO 
was responsible for the customization of the materials for the AE 
and Product Identification Tool projects in Russia and this allowed 
him to provide many valuable insights. 
 
B.  TRAINING DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
 1. None. 
 
C. EQUIPMENT DELIVERED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
       1. On September 12 the EXBS office granted surplus computer 
equipment and furniture valued at $14,610 to the Border Control 
Management Faculty of the Military Institute in Almaty. 
 
       2. Fast Response "Safe" Boat: replacement parts for a faulty 
air conditioning control card and a defective voltmeter were 
received by EXBS Astana in late September.  The parts will be 
delivered to the Border Guard's Maritime Division in Aktau during 
the meeting there scheduled for October 10. 
 
D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT STATUS UPDATE 
 
 1. October 3-5 - The Department of Energy/National Nuclear 
Administration's (DOE/NNSA) International Nonproliferation Export 
Control Program (INECP) will hold a workshop on export controls for 
biological research institutes.  The workshop aims to help the 
institutes better understand and comply with Kazakhstan's export 
control regulations.  Representatives of Kazakhstani nuclear 
enterprises will also attend the workshop; large companies such as 
Kazatomprom and the Ulba Metallurgical Plant will share their 
experience in implementing internal compliance programs with the 
less export-control savvy bio institutes. 
 
 2. October 10 - EXBS Regional Maritime Advisor Mike Taffe will join 
EXBS Program Coordinator Gulnara Abildaeva and EXBS TDY Advisor Jim 
Kelly for a meeting with Kazakhstan's Maritime Border Guard Division 
to discuss a range of maritime issues related to pending deliveries 
and procurements, as well as the maintenance of EXBS-provided 
assets, including the three 42-foot fast response "safe" boats 
provided to Kazakhstan by the EXBS program earlier this year.  The 
team will also travel approximately 100 miles north of Aktau to the 
port of Bautino to visit the location of the three Safe Boats. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000078  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 3. October 9-10 - The Monterey Institute's Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) will host a two-day workshop in 
Almaty to discuss the implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540 in Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
 
 4. October 31-November 2 - The DOE/NNSA's INECP will conduct a 
regional Internal Compliance Program workshop in Almaty. 
 
 5. October 31-November 1 - EXBS Program Coordinator Gulnara 
Abildaeva will attend the second annual EXBS Program Workshop for 
Locally Employed Staff in Bratislava, Slovkia. 
 
 6. November 6-10 - The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (DTRA WMD-PPI) 
will conduct a "Combating WMD Proliferation at Maritime Ports" 
training. 
 
 7. Two $400,000 task orders for the procurement of four modular 
shelters and 11 high-clearance Ural trucks are in the process of 
being finalized.  The items will be provided to Kazakhstan's Border 
Service. 
 
E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT CONTROLS, NONPROLIFERATION, OR 
RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
 
       1. The world's fifth nuclear-weapon-free zone was established 
in Central Asia on September 8, 2006 with the signing of a treaty by 
the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian states. 
 
F. CASPIAN SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
       1. Please see paragraph C, item 2 and paragraph D, item 2 
above. 
 
III. RED FLAG ISSUES. 
 
       1. None. 
 
The point of contact for this report is Andrew S. Offenbacher, EXBS 
Advisor, OffenbacherAS@state.gov, tel: +7(3172)70-21-00, ext. 2420; 
cell: +7(333)225-1156. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA35, KAZAKHSTAN REACTION TO NORTH KOREAN ANNOUNCEMENT: “YOU CAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA35 2006-10-10 12:04 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4138
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0035 2831204
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101204Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7163
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ASTANA 000035 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
DEPT FOR ISN, EAP, AND IO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KZ KN
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN REACTION TO NORTH KOREAN ANNOUNCEMENT: "YOU CAN 
RELY ON US" 
 
REF:  STATE 169418 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary.  Charge delivered reftel points to Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kairat Abdrakhmanov on October 10, taking the opportunity 
to thank Abdrakhmanov for the Government of Kazakhstan's (GOK) 
October 9 statement (paragraph 4) denouncing North Korea's 
announcement of a nuclear weapon test.   Abdrakhmanov termed the 
presumed test "inexcusable" and "clearly provocative."  "You can 
rely on us," Abdrakhmanov vowed, telling the Charge that the GOK was 
prepared to stand "shoulder-to-shoulder" with its international 
partners on this issue.  The GOK, he added, "would be ready to join 
further international actions," potentially including the 
implementation of Chapter VII UNSC sanctions, once it had "examined 
the situation thoroughly."   End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU)  Responding to the Charge's thanks for the GOK's "strong 
and timely" statement denouncing the North Korean announcement, 
Abdrakhmanov commented that, "as a responsible member of the 
international community, Kazakhstan is striving to add its voice to 
the strong position of the world community in order to condemn such 
'provocative' actions."   The presumed test was "inexcusable," the 
Deputy Foreign Minister continued, and there existed no doubt that 
"we need to take decisive steps" to prevent similar future actions, 
not only on behalf of North Korea, but "other critical regimes." 
Abdrakhmanov told the Charge that, in his view, North Korea had 
timed its nuclear test "deliberately and provocatively" to coincide 
with the announcement  that South Korea's Foreign Minister is to 
become the next UN Secretary-General. 
 
3. (SBU) In response to the Charge's request for GOK support in 
adopting a Chapter VII UNSC resolution, Abdrakhmanov stated the GOK 
"would be ready" to join further international actions, potentially 
including the adoption of a Chapter VII UNSC resolution, once the 
GOK had "examined the situation thoroughly."   Regarding the 
possibility of implementing "other defensive measures," against 
North Korea, Abdrakhmanov told the Charge that the GOK had already 
begun to assess existing financial and commercial ties with North 
Korea, with an eye toward imposing "sanctions or other actions." 
While the issue of fairness toward any Kazakhstan companies doing 
business with North Korea would have to be considered, he continued, 
the GOK's steps would be "sustained and clear."  "We have no biases, 
no prejudices toward the North Korean regime," Abdrakhmanov 
concluded.  "We will go alongside the international community on 
this, shoulder-to-shoulder with our partners.  You can rely on us." 
 
 
4. (U)  Text of the October 9, 2006 statement of the Kazakhstani 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs follows (Embassy translation): 
 
"As a state that closed a nuclear test site and as a participant in 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty and the Agreement on creation of a nuclear-free zone in 
Central Asia, the Republic of Kazakhstan considers the DPRK's 
decision to test a nuclear weapon a wrong one and denounces this act 
executed on October 9 of this year. 
 
We are confident that this step will aggravate the overall crisis in 
the sphere of non-proliferation and cause serious damage to global 
security. 
 
Kazakhstan urges North Korea to resume the talks on the nuclear 
problem in the six-country format with the participation of China, 
Russia, USA, South Korea, and Japan and to abandon nuclear 
ambitions." 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA3, LEADING KAZAKHSTANI POLITICAL COMMENTATOR DIES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA3 2006-10-06 13:08 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2418
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0003 2791308
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061308Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7160
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KZ
SUBJECT: LEADING KAZAKHSTANI POLITICAL COMMENTATOR DIES 
 
REF: 05 ALMATY 3284 
 
1. (SBU) Nurbulat Masonov, a well-known political commentator and 
one of the founders of Kazakhstan's International Bureau for Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law, died suddenly on October 5.  Initial 
press reports indicate that Masonov died as a result of a severe 
reaction to a food allergen. Masonov (age 52 and asthmatic) fell ill 
soon after returning home from eating lunch at an Almaty restaurant. 
 As his condition quickly worsened, he experienced severe breathing 
problems and he died minutes after a doctor arrived at his home, 
without an oxygen bag, and attempted to treat him with an injection 
of an unidentified substance. 
 
2.  (SBU) According to Sergey Duvanov, a free lance journalist, 
director of the Polyton Discussion Club and close personal friend of 
Masonov, Masonov has suffered severe allergic reactions in the past. 
 As a result, he sees no reason to suspect foul play, but instead 
believes that the attending doctor was incompetent and inexperienced 
and likely did not provide the right treatment for Masonov's 
condition.  Masonov's family does not know what medicine the doctor 
provided him, as she took the ampule and syringe with her when she 
left   Duvanov also reported that eight doctors participated in the 
autopsy, performed on October 6, instead of the normal two or three. 
 The police ordered the autopsy filmed, to foreclose any speculation 
from the political opposition. 
 
3.  (SBU) Comment:  In addition to founding Kazakhstan's 
International Bureau for Human Rights, Masonov was a member of the 
Soros Foundation and a former general director of the Polyton 
Discussion Club.  In recent years, Masonov had muted his criticism 
of the government, culminating with his acceptance of a position 
created by the presidential administration and his support for 
Kazakhstan's OSCE chairmanship bid.  Given his health problems and 
weakened links to Kazakhstan's opposition, there is no reason to 
suspect foul play at this time.  End Comment. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA158, KAZAKHSTANI SURVEY TEAM IDENTIFIES PRIORITIES IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA158 2006-10-03 11:37 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7801
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHAST #0158/01 2761137
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031137Z OCT 06
FM USOFFICE ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0282
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ASTANA 0303
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0036
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0005
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 0244

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000158 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS, DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), SCA/A (N. SINGH) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECIN EINV MARR NATO AF KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI SURVEY TEAM IDENTIFIES PRIORITIES IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: ALMATY 3296 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Kazakhstan will focus on humanitarian 
assistance, participation in investment projects, and broadening 
commercial ties with Afghanistan, according to the Deputy 
Foreign Minister who led the recent survey team to Kabul and two 
northern provinces.  As a regional leader, Kazakhstan needs to 
participate in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.  It is not 
able to participate militarily or to lead a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team at this time, however.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) The Charge met with Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat 
Abdrakhmanov on October 3 to discuss the conclusions of the 
Kazakhstani survey team which visited Afghanistan the week of 
September 24.  Abdrakhmanov, who led the team, expressed 
appreciation for U.S. and ISAF support for the team's visits to 
Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Maimana. 
 
3. (SBU) Kazakhstan needs to be represented in Afghanistan in a 
way that corresponds to Kazakhstan's status as a regional 
leader, Abdrakhmanov said.  The team's meetings with national 
and local leaders had revealed great demand for both assistance 
and investment.  As a result, Abdrakhmanov stated, Kazakhstan 
would focus on three tracks of engagement:  humanitarian 
assistance, participation in investment projects, and commercial 
ties. 
 
4. (SBU) Kazakhstani military participation "is impossible at 
this point," according to the Deputy Foreign Minister, because 
of threats by the Taliban and Al Qaeda against Muslim nations 
that send troops to Afghanistan.  Abdrakhmanov added that 
Kazakhstan was not ready to consider leading a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT), in part due to the significant cost. 
He noted that the GOK would look at the possibility of 
implementing certain projects via PRTs, as well as through UNOPS. 
 
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Forms of Engagement 
 
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5. (SBU) With regard to humanitarian assistance, Abdrakhmanov 
mentioned that Kazakhstan was considering helping to train 
Afghanistan's police, armed forces, and medical personnel. 
 
6. (SBU) Kazakhstan would also consider upcoming tenders for 
copper, iron ore, oil, and gas exploration, he said. 
Abdrakhmanov speculated that the opportunities in Afghanistan 
were probably too small for a Western oil major like Chevron, 
but might be a good fit for Kazakhstani firms.  Abdrakhmanov 
mentioned that the survey team had seen the Kabul Grain Elevator 
project as a potential investment opportunity.  He cautioned 
that Kazakhstani economic engagement would depend on the final 
form of Afghan legislation now under consideration to create the 
legal framework for tenders and foreign investment.  He added 
that the team's conversations with Afghan leaders had given them 
confidence that the government was on the right track toward 
creating a solid legal framework. 
 
7. (SBU) Abdrakhmanov said that the survey team had seen 
opportunities to expand commercial ties between Kazakhstan and 
Afghanistan, despite significant competition from other 
suppliers in the region.  He mentioned possible sales of grain 
for human consumption and animal feed, as well as leasing of 
agricultural machinery. 
 
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Next Steps 
 
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8. (SBU) The next step will be to obtain interagency agreement 
on allocating budget money for the various areas of engagement, 
Abdrakhmanov said.  He expressed confidence that funding 
approval would be forthcoming, given President Nazarbayev's 
personal engagement on the issue.  Abdrakhmanov added that he 
understood that Kazakhstan's engagement in Afghanistan had been 
discussed during President Nazarbayev's recent meeting with Vice 
President Cheney in Washington, as well as during Foreign 
Minister Tokayev's meeting with Secretary Rice.  The Charge told 
Abdrakhmanov that Embassy Astana was ready to help facilitate 
Kazakhstan's engagement with Afghanistan.  The Deputy Foreign 
Minister cautioned that the GOK's decision-making might take a 
little time, as Kazakhstan had to be certain that it could 
 
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fulfill any obligations it takes on. 
 
9. (SBU) Abdrakhmanov concluded by saying that the survey trip 
had been the beginning of what would be long-lasting cooperation 
between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan.  He added that the team had 
been quite impressed with the professionalism, vision of the 
future, and knowledge of the national and regional leaders with 
whom the team met in Afghanistan.  The visit had left the survey 
team quite optimistic about the potential for Kazakhs
tan's 
involvement, while at the same time aware of the many problems 
Afghanistan still faces in the form of security threats, 
narcotics trafficking, and corruption. 
MILAS

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