Monthly Archives: November 2006

06ASTANA689, KAZAKHSTAN: DEFACTO DELAY IN AML LAW?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA689 2006-11-29 09:36 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1098
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0689 3330936
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290936Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7804
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2//
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP EURASIA//
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC//IET//

UNCLAS ASTANA 000689 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE AND INL/C; SCA/CEN (O'Mara) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR ASEC KCOR KCRM PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DEFACTO DELAY IN AML LAW? 
 
Ref: A) 05 Almaty 4353 B) Almaty 1437 
 
1. Summary: Enactment of an extension of the Property Legalization 
Law until April 1, 2007 is likely to create similar delay in the 
enactment of the anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorism 
financing law currently under consideration in the Kazakhstani 
Mazhilis (lower house of parliament).  Should this prognosis hold 
true, the AML law delay will push off an already twice delayed 
strengthening of the AML regime and creation of the Kazakhstani 
Financial Intelligence Unit.  End summary. 
 
2.  On November 17, President Nazarbayev signed into law a three 
month extension of the Property Legalization Law originally enacted 
on July 5, 2006. Nazarbayev originally called for the extension of 
the term of the property legalization law at the opening of the fall 
session of the Mazhilis on September 1, claiming the original 
measure was passed hastily, contained errors, and provided too 
little notification to the public or the terms of compliance.  The 
Property Legalization law was enacted to legalize a wide range of 
property and assets, including real property, capital assets, 
movable property, and securities.  It will regularize the status 
these assets which were obtained since independence and, it is 
widely believed, which were acquired illegally during the 
privatization period. 
 
3. Observers believe that this extension is likely to cause a delay 
in enactment of AML legislation, because once the AML legislation 
becomes law, attempts to register previously unrecorded assets would 
be considered prima facie evidence that some type of financial 
malfeasance took place which could put the owner of those assets at 
risk of prosecution. 
 
4.  The AML draft legislation was originally introduced to the 
Mazhilis in September 2005 but was immediately delayed.  It first 
ran into resistance from deputies who claimed the structure of the 
legislation required further review (Ref A).  Subsequently, during a 
study tour by members of the Mazhilis AML Working Group to 
Copenhagen, post heard concerns about the powerful role in AML and 
the FIU accorded to the Procurator General's Office (Ref B). 
 
5. Comment:  While it is still unclear whether the AML Working Group 
will modify the draft AML law, it appears the implications of the 
law were sufficiently understood so that the necessity for the 
Property Legalization law became apparent.  End comment. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA669, KAZAKHSTAN: INITIAL INTEREST IN GPOI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA669 2006-11-27 05:21 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8610
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #0669 3310521
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270521Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7779
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000669 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA),PM/PPA (R. FEATHERSTONE) 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPKO MARR MASS KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: INITIAL INTEREST IN GPOI 
 
REF: STATE 170904 
 
1. (SBU) Pol-Econ Chief conveyed reftel points and fact sheet to 
Murat Tashibayev, director of the MFA's Department of International 
Organizations and Security Issues, on November 2.  Olzhas Togyzbayev 
from the Security Affairs office also participated in the meeting. 
Tashibayev expressed interest in the possibility of expanding 
cooperation on peacekeeping, noting that a contingent of KazBat 
soldiers is on the ground in Iraq.  He added that Kazakhstani forces 
are formally part of the UN's reserve. 
 
2. (SBU) Tashibayev promised to forward the information for 
appropriate review within the MFA.  He noted that the opinion of the 
Ministry of Defense would also be a key factor in Kazakhstan's 
response to the proposal. 
 
3. (SBU) The Ministry of Defense has expressed interest in 
cooperation through GPOI to post's Office of Military Cooperation. 
In fact, they have requested that GPOI be on the agenda during the 
December 6-8 Five Year Plan conference to be held in Tampa.  MOD but 
is waiting for a specific proposal before responding definitively, 
however. OMC is coordinating with DSCA on the proposal. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA668, KAZAKHSTAN: AMBASSADOR’S NOVEMBER 25 MEETING WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA668 2006-11-27 04:24 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8587
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0668/01 3310424
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270424Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7776
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0276
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1650
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1872
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2156
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000668 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016 
TAGS: KDEM PARM PHUM PREL PTER AF KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: AMBASSADOR'S NOVEMBER 25 MEETING WITH 
FM TOKAYEV 
 
REF: A. STATE 185480 
 
     B. STATE 185757 
     C. ASTANA 651 
     D. ALMATY 1210 
 
Classified By: Amb. John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  In a November 25 meeting with Foreign 
Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev in Astana, the Ambassador 
proposed policy discussions on the permanent disposition of 
BN-350 spent fuel, expressed disappointment at Kazakhstan's 
voting record in the Third Committee, and offered expanded 
training opportunities for Kazakhstani diplomats at the 
Marshall Center.  Tokayev indicated that Kazakhstan would 
support the resolution on Myanmar in the UNGA, and expressed 
interest in sending mid-level diplomats to the Marshall 
Center. The Ambassador also commended Kazakhstan's readiness 
to take back its citizens detained at Guantanamo and to 
expand its engagement with Afghanistan.  Tokayev, who now has 
the interagency lead on cooperation with Afghanistan, 
described plans to pursue a variety of economic projects in 
2007.  Tokayev informed the Ambassador that President 
Nazarbayev would call for sweeping reform of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States at the organization's November 28 
summit in Minsk, despite Russian opposition.  Tokayev 
promised to look into the status of an agreement to permit 
political party training by U.S.-funded NGOs.  The Foreign 
Minister agreed that the November 21 demolition of Hare 
Krishna homes had been conducted in a cruel and ill-advised 
manner, and informed the Ambassador that the Security Council 
would discuss the issue in the near future.  Finally, Tokayev 
shared his concerns regarding China's aggressive push to 
invest in Kazakhstan.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Permanent Disposition of BN-350 Spent Fuel 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) The Ambassador told FM Tokayev that during President 
Nazarbayev's September 28 meeting in Washington with 
Secretary of Energy Bodman, Nazarbayev had agreed to discuss 
 
SIPDIS 
options for the permanent disposition of the spent fuel from 
the BN-350 reactor once it is moved to Kurchatov.  The U.S. 
would like to hold policy discussions on this issue in Astana 
in January, to be followed by technical discussions (Refs A 
and B).  The Ambassador told Tokayev that he would also 
discuss the matter with Security Council Chairman Murat 
Tazhin and Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bakhyt 
Izmukhambetov.  Tokayev indicated that the proposal was 
reasonable. 
 
-------------- 
UN Resolutions 
-------------- 
 
3. (C) The U.S. had hoped for greater cooperation from 
Kazakhstan on a series of human rights resolutions in the 
UNGA's Third Committee, the Ambassador noted.  While we were 
pleased that Kazakhstan had supported the resolution on the 
DPRK, we were disappointed that Kazakhstan supported a number 
of no-action motions on other important resolutions and 
abstained on the Myanmar resolution.  FM Tokayev said that 
Kazakhstan would support the Myanmar resolution in the UNGA, 
but found it impossible to break ranks with fellow CIS 
members Uzbekistan and Belarus.  He claimed that Uzbek 
President Karimov refused to attend the recent summit of 
Turkic nations primarily because Turkey had supported UN 
resolutions on Uzbekistan in the past. 
 
---------- 
CIS Summit 
---------- 
 
4. (C) Tokayev said that the GOK was preparing intensively 
for the November 28 summit of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) in Minsk, as Kazakhstan currently chairs the 
organization.  President Nazarbayev will speak about the need 
to reform the organization, make it more compact and 
efficient, and focus it more clearly on core issues. 
Initiatives such as the proposed free trade area were a waste 
of time, according to Tokayev.  Kazakhstan did not agree with 
Belarusian President Lukashenko's recent call to disband the 
organization, but did believe serious reform was necessary. 
 
ASTANA 00000668  002 OF 003 
 
 
Kazakhstan would pursue reform despite the fact that Russia 
is opposed and is urging fellow CIS members to avoid 
"radical" changes.  Tokayev described current CIS Secretary 
General Rushaylo as "destructive."  Tokayev argued that the 
fact that all heads of state except for Turkmenbashi were 
planning to attend the upcoming summit, despite their 
bilateral differences, underscored the important role of the 
organization as a forum for dialogue. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Kazakhstani Engagement in Afghanistan 
-----------------------------------
-- 
 
5. (SBU) The Ambassador asked Tokayev about his role as the 
interagency lead on Kazakhstan's engagement with Afghanistan. 
 Tokayev said that much progress had already been made, in 
part thanks to encouragement from the U.S., and Kazakhstan 
planned to continue to expand its contacts.  Tokayev noted 
that Nazarbayev had briefed UK Prime Minister Blair on 
Kazakhstan's plans during their November 20 meeting in 
London.  At this stage, according to Tokayev, the focus is on 
investment and economic projects.  From a political and 
financial point of view it is "early" to discuss 
participation in a PRT, he added.  Tokayev said that many 
experts from Kazakhstan will visit Afghanistan in 2007 to 
discuss cooperation in areas such as oil, gas, and copper. 
He noted that some Afghanis had told him that, because they 
found it difficult to work with large U.S. oil and gas firms 
and did not want to work with Russian firms, they were eager 
for cooperation with Kazakhstani firms.  He had already heard 
from several firms that were eager to explore options in 
Afghanistan. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Training of Kazakhstani Diplomats 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The Ambassador proposed increasing the number of 
junior and mid-level Kazakhstani diplomats who are trained 
each year at the Marshall Center.  He noted that the 12-week 
National Security course, offered three times per year, would 
be an excellent preparation for diplomats who would have a 
role in an eventual OSCE chairmanship.  Tokayev said that he 
was quite interested in the proposal and that the MFA would 
definitely send staff to the Marshall Center for training. 
 
7. (C) He informed the Ambassador that Kazakhstan receives 
significant pressure from both Russia and China not to 
participate in Marshall Center activities because of the 
organization's alleged work to undermine the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization.  Kazakhstan realizes that the 
allegations are baseless and will continue to work with the 
Marshall Center, Tokayev said. 
 
-------------------- 
Guantanamo Detainees 
-------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) The U.S. was very pleased to have received 
Kazakhstan's diplomatic note containing the necessary 
assurances to permit the return of its citizens held at 
Guantanamo, the Ambassador said.  We will work with 
Kazakhstan to coordinate their transfer.  The Ambassador 
noted that we had heard that Kazakhstani security forces 
wanted to visit Guantanamo once more before the transfer 
takes place; if that is still the case, the Kazakhstani 
Embassy in Washington should contact the Department of 
Defense through established channels.  Tokayev said he would 
follow up on the issue. 
 
------------------------ 
Political Party Training 
------------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) Despite the apparent good will of the Presidential 
Administration and the Ministry of Justice, not to mention 
the commitment expressed in the joint statement issued during 
President Nazarbayev's visit to Washington, no progress has 
been made on an agreement to permit U.S.-funded NGOs to 
provide training to Kazakhstani political parties, the 
Ambassador said.  Tokayev promised to check on the status of 
interagency approval of the draft memorandum of understanding. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000668  003 OF 003 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
Demolition of Hare Krishna Homes 
-------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) The Ambassador noted that the legal status of the 
Hare Krishna commune outside of Almaty had been the subject 
of a protected court battle, and that the Ministry of Justice 
had established a special commission to review the situation 
and propose an equitable resolution.  The U.S. was therefore 
puzzled and disappointed by the local authorities' decision 
to carry out the demolition orders before the special 
commission had issued any recommendations (Ref C).  We were 
also shocked by the harsh way in which the demolitions were 
carried out on less than 24 hours notice, during severe 
winter weather.  Tokayev described the demolitions as 
"cruel," noting that he had taken a question on the incident 
from a CNBC reporter during a press conference in London. 
Tokayev said that while the court's decision was clear, the 
way the demolitions were carried out had raised many 
questions in the government.  Security Council Chairman 
Tazhin, who had also been briefed on the incident while in 
London with Nazarbayev, planned to hold a special Security 
Council session with all law enforcement agencies to instruct 
them "not to be so stupid" in how they handle such cases in 
the future. 
 
----- 
China 
----- 
 
11. (C) In a one-on-one conversation following the main 
meeting, FM Tokayev told the Ambassador that Kazakhstan was 
concerned about China's very aggressive push to invest in a 
wide range of projects.  As a result, Nazarbayev would sign 
only very general framework agreements during his December 
trip to Beijing.  Kazakhstan fears both Chinese economic 
pressure and the potential for large numbers of migrants, 
Tokayev said.  In large projects such as the Ekibastuz power 
plant (Ref D), Tokayev said, Kazakhstan would be more 
comfortable with U.S. than Chinese investors.  (Note: 
Tokayev's comments largely echoed the concerns that Deputy 
Prime Minister Masimov, who like Tokayev is also an expert on 
China, expressed to the Ambassador on November. 18.  End 
note.) 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA651, KAZAKHSTAN: AUTHORITIES EXECUTE SURPRISE DEMOLITION OF HARE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA651 2006-11-24 02:38 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7386
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0651/01 3280238
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240238Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7761
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0400
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0432
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1647

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000651 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DRL/PHD (C. KUCHTA-HELBLING) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: AUTHORITIES EXECUTE SURPRISE DEMOLITION OF HARE 
KRISHNA HOMES 
 
REF: ALMATY 3143 
 
ASTANA 00000651  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (U) Summary:  On the afternoon of November 21, local officials in 
the Karasai district near Almaty blockaded a Hare Krishna commune, 
forcibly evicted residents from their homes, seized their personal 
possessions, beat and arrested several Hare Krishna followers, and 
demolished 13 homes.   Karasai district officials carried out the 
demolitions despite the fact that a special Ministry of Justice 
commission organized to evaluate the situation has yet to issue its 
findings.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
AUTHORITIES AGGRESSIVELY EXECUTE SURPRISE DEMOLITION 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
2. (U) The Karasai district akim and his officials escalated their 
long-running land dispute with the Hare Krishnas on November 20, 
when an unidentified official served court documents on a security 
guard at the Hare Krishna commune.  The documents were from the 
Karasai District Court, and demanded that the owners of 13 homes in 
the commune destroy their homes, or they would be destroyed by the 
government at the expense of the owners.  The documents did not 
specify a deadline. 
 
3. (SBU) The next afternoon at approximately 1 p.m., several 
bulldozers, trucks, and three buses full of riot police arrived at 
the commune.  The Karasai district akim and several court officials 
were also present.  Govinda Swami, a leader of the Hare Krishna 
community, told Poloff that the police blocked all outside access to 
the area and cut electricity.  The police were instructed by the 
court officials not to speak with the residents. (Note: Govinda 
Swami, an American citizen, leads the Hare Krishnas' effort to 
defend their land.  On November 8, he left Kazakhstan on a short 
trip to India to generate support for their cause and conduct other 
business.  His Kazakhstani visa expired a few days ago, and he 
expects to have difficulty obtaining a new one.  He has maintained 
close telephone contact with his fellow Hare Krishnas at the 
commune. End note.) 
 
4. (U) The police then began aggressively removing people from the 
targeted homes.  According to Govinda Swami, several Hare Krishnas 
were beaten or roughed up by police when they resisted or protested, 
though none was seriously injured.  He reported that two or three 
commune residents were arrested for resisting, and taken away by 
police.  The police removed furniture and large possessions from the 
homes and put them in trucks, informing the residents that the items 
would be destroyed.  Clothing and other smaller possessions were 
tossed into the snow.  Thirteen houses were then demolished. 
 
5. (SBU) Ninel Fokina, head of the Almaty Helsinki Committee, and 
Andrey Grishin, a reporter associated with the Kazakhstani 
International Bureau of Human Rights, evaded the police blockade and 
witnessed some of the demolitions.  Both Fokina and Grishin 
confirmed the account from Govinda Swami.  Grishin said that he 
personally witnessed the police attacking a few Hare Krishnas with 
their fists when the Krishnas resisted the eviction. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
AUTHORITIES BLOCK, THREATEN JOURNALIST 
--------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Grishin took multiple photos of the incident.  When police 
spotted him taking photos, they chased him and seized his camera and 
journalist credentials.  They returned his camera a half-hour later, 
minus its flash card and batteries.  Nonetheless, most of Grishin's 
photographs survived in the camera's internal memory, and he plans 
to publicly release them.  Grishin reported that after the police 
returned his camera, the Karasai district akim approached him and 
said he would "gouge out your eyes" if he saw Grishin taking 
photographs again.  Grishin reported that the police also seized 
several cameras owned by commune residents. 
 
7. (U) The authorities completed their work around 6 p.m., and 
lifted the blockade at approximately 7 p.m.  The surviving homes 
remain without power and heat as a result of the demolition 
activity. 
 
------------------------ 
ACTION SURPRISES ASTANA 
------------------------ 
 
8. (U) The Hare Krishnas were surprised by the police action in part 
because a special commission appointed by the Ministry of Justice to 
evaluate the situation had not yet published its findings (reftel). 
Amanbek Mukhashev, deputy chairman of the Religious Issues Committee 
 
ASTANA 00000651  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
in the Ministry of Justice, is chairman of the commission, and 
promised that all legal actions against the Krishnas' property would 
be suspended pending publication of the commission's findings. 
 
9. (SBU) The Ministry of Justice created t
he commission after the 
Kazakhstani Supreme Court ruled against the Hare Krishnas on August 
24 (reftel).  At the time, the Hare Krishnas charged that the 
commission was a mere smokescreen to deflect criticism of the 
government on the eve of the highly publicized Congress of World 
Religions, held in Astana on September 12-15.  Nevertheless, the 
Hare Krishnas agreed to participate in the commission process. 
 
10.(SBU) In subsequent conversations with Poloff, Govinda Swami 
characterized the commission as incompetent and subjective, and said 
that he did not expect a positive result.  According to Govinda 
Swami and several media reports, Mukhashev stated publicly during 
some of the commission meetings that he already believed the dispute 
was purely legal in nature, and had nothing to do with the religious 
beliefs of the Hare Krishnas. (Note: Though most observers believe 
the Karasai district government's long campaign against the commune 
is essentially a heavy-handed attempt to confiscate valuable real 
estate, various local officials have criticized and attempted to 
undermine the Hare Krishnas as an illegitimate and threatening 
religious group.  End note.)  Despite their doubts about the 
sincerity of the commission, the Hare Krishnas believed that Karasai 
district officials would not take action pending the outcome of the 
commission process, and even then the Krishnas were planning further 
legal appeals. 
 
11. (SBU) According to Govinda Swami, Mukhashev denied any knowledge 
of the planned demolitions when called by Krishna representatives 
during the incident, acknowledged that the commission had not yet 
publicized its findings, and expressed anger about being bothered 
while on vacation.  Pol FSN contacted Kayrat Tolesov, another deputy 
chairman of the Religious Issues Committee, about the demolitions. 
Tolesov indicated he knew nothing about the issue, but was currently 
studying it.  Swami reported that Krishna supporters made efforts to 
contact other Religious Issue Committee officials, but none of them 
were aware of the planned demolitions, and in fact asked the 
Krishnas to talk to Karasai akimat officials and then report back to 
the Religious Issues Committee. 
 
-------------- 
THE AFTERMATH 
-------------- 
 
12. (SBU) The Hare Krishnas reported that government officials did 
not return to the commune on November 22, and residents were in a 
process of trying to salvage their possessions and clean up the 
mess.  Govinda Swami reports that the Hare Krishnas plan an 
aggressive public relations campaign both within and outside of 
Kazakhstan.  The Hare Krishnas have already contacted the human 
rights ombudsman and other human rights activists in Kazakhstan. 
Supporters outside of the country plan to approach Kazakhstani 
embassies in various capitals, and in some cases planned protest. 
Swami said he expects several hundred protesters to greet President 
Nazarbayev when he opens the London Stock exchange on November 22 in 
London. 
 
13. (SBU) Rumors persist that Bulat Nazarbayev, brother of President 
Nazarbayev, is behind the land-grab.  The Nazarbayev's native 
village of Chemulgan is located nearby. 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
14. (SBU) Comment:  The heavy-handed tactics of the Karasai district 
authorities will likely cause embarrassment to the national 
government in Astana, and were likely conducted without Astana's 
full knowledge.  Karasai authorities clearly acted without regard to 
the special commission,  bolstering allegations that the commission 
was intended only as a smokescreen during the recent Congress of 
World Religions.  The local authorities' willingness to take such 
reckless action, without regard to the impact on Kazakhstan's 
international image, will also fuel speculation that a powerful 
figure is behind the effort to take the Hare Krishnas' land. End 
comment. 
 
------------------- 
SUGGESTED STATEMENT 
------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) Posts suggest the following language for any statement or 
comment issued by the State Department: 
 
 
ASTANA 00000651  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
The United States is disappointed by the decision of Karasai 
district authorities to demolish several homes at the Hare Krishna 
commune outside of Almaty on November 21. 
 
Homeowners were left in the cold, and many of their possessions were 
destroyed.  The remaining residents are still without electricity 
and heat. 
 
We have several concerns regarding the legal basis for the actions 
against the Hare Krishna community.  Regardless of the merits of the 
underlying case, however, the sudden and forceful eviction of 
homeowners in freezing temperatures, and the destruction of their 
possessions, is inconsistent with principles of due process and 
fairness.  It is particularly disturbing that the authorities chose 
to take such drastic action before the special commission charged 
with finding an equitable solution to the situation had issued its 
recommendations. 
 
The United States government urges the Karasai district authorities 
to refrain from any further aggressive actions against the Hare 
Krishnas, and to work toward a fair, lawful, and peaceful resolution 
of the ongoing legal dispute. 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA631, PARLIAMENTARY HEARINGS ON KAZAKHSTAN’S WTO ACCESSION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA631 2006-11-22 01:49 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6263
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0631/01 3260149
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220149Z NOV 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7736
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1994

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000631 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTR - ELIZABETH HAFNER 
ANKARA FOR AG COUNSELOR R. GIFFORD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD WTO PREL KZ
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARY HEARINGS ON KAZAKHSTAN'S WTO ACCESSION 
PROCESS 
 
ASTANA 00000631  001.4 OF 003 
 
 
1.  Summary:  Kazakhstan's Parliament held an Open Hearing on WTO 
Accession on October 20, in which key ministers summarized 
outstanding WTO issues and outlined the potential benefits and 
drawbacks of WTO accession.  Both the ministers and parliamentarians 
passionately defended Kazakhstan's agricultural sector and 
subsidies.  Experts from the textile sector painted a pessimistic 
picture of the sector's future in the face of "contraband" imports 
from abroad.  Lead WTO negotiator Aitzhanova closed the hearing by 
reassuring the members of parliament that Kazakhstani producers 
already lived under WTO-like conditions; thus, fear of WTO accession 
was unwarranted.  End summary. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN AND THE WTO: PROS AND CONS 
------------------------------------- 
 
2.  On October 20, Kazakhstan's Parliament conducted its first-ever 
Open Hearing on WTO Accession, assembling key ministers, industry 
experts, business association representatives, and scholars to 
discuss Kazakhstan's progress toward accession.  The DCM attended 
the high-profile event, which marked the first time during the 
accession process that a WTO General Secretary has visited 
Kazakhstan. 
 
3.  Deputy Prime Minister Karim Masimov opened the session by 
listing the benefits which WTO accession will bring Kazakhstan:  the 
"Most Favored Nation" principle will help Kazakhstan get equal 
access to foreign markets; quotas levied on Kazakhstan's 
metallurgical exports will be disallowed; trade disputes will be 
resolved in accordance with WTO rules and regulations; the cost of 
transportation by land would be reduced, since member states will 
adopt uniform transportation tariffs; and custom procedures will 
become more transparent, thus reducing "gray" imports and 
increasing budget revenues.  Speaking of possible negative 
consequences of accession, Masimov noted that they would fall mostly 
on the agricultural sector. 
 
4.  Ambassador Vessa Himanen, Chief of Kazakhstan's Working Party 
for Accession, cast Kazakhstan's prospects in a regional context by 
underscoring that Kazakhstan could be an engine of economic growth 
for the whole Central Asian region.  Economic conditions for WTO 
accession are better than ever before, he declared, adding that 
Kazakhstan's negotiation process was on the right track and "allows 
us to look forward with optimism." 
 
5.  Deputy WTO General Secretary Alexandro Jara encouraged 
Kazakhstan to conclude the negotiation process as soon as possible. 
He noted that each economy was unique and thus required a different 
timetable for WTO accession.  Jara stressed that a country's overall 
rate of growth or economic reform did not influence the speed of WTO 
accession; rather, such decisions depended on progress made toward 
implementing - and enforcing - WTO-compliant legislation. 
 
POSITION OF PARLIAMENTARIANS 
---------------------------- 
 
6.  Sergey Diachenko, the Mazhilis Deputy Chairman, remarked that 
WTO membership might pose a real threat to domestic industries, 
especially agriculture, and poor rural households might not be able 
to adjust themselves to new conditions.  Domestic agriculture needs 
to be subsidized, he argued, since much of it takes place in 
"high-risk" agricultural areas.  Further, Diachenko said, 
Kazakhstan's existing level of subsidies was relatively low in 
comparison with developed countries.  Mazhilis Deputy Satypaldy 
Ibragimov compared Kazakhstan's average level of agricultural 
subsidies ($17 per hectare of cultivated land) to those of the 
United States ($107), Canada ($830), the EU ($855), and Switzerland 
($4210). 
 
7.  Ibragimov provided a metaphor to describe the accession process. 
 "If the WTO is a team led by United States," he said, "Kazakhstan 
would be a young player on this team.   As the coach of the team, 
the United States should create favorable conditions for 
inexperienced, but prominent, players, such as Kazakhstan." 
Ibragimov suggested that, taking into account the breadth of the 
Kazakhstani economy, the global terrorism threat, and Kazakhstan's 
role in regional security, Kazakhstan's sustainable development was 
"not only in the national interest, but in the interests of the 
whole world." 
 
AGRICULTURE AND TEXTILES: KEY ISSUES 
------------------------------------ 
8.  Minister of Industry and Trade Vladimir Shkolnik assured the 
audience that WTO membership would not harm the GOK's policy of 
diversifying the economy.  Further, the GOK intended to continue to 
protect producers of local goods, especially agricultural products, 
by means of custom tariffs.  Kazakhstan's trade regime was one of 
 
ASTANA 00000631  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
the most liberal among CIS countries, Shkolnik said; in fact, 
Kazakhstani tariffs were comparable with tariffs of &#
x000A;developed-country WTO members. In defense of this assertion, 
Shkolnik cited some comparative statistics: in Kazakhstan tariffs 
for agricultural products averaged 12.4%, and for industrial goods, 
6.7%; for the EU,15.7% and 4.7%; for the U.S., 10.9% and 4%;, and 
7.7% and 5.7% for Canada.  Therefore, Shkolnik concluded, Kazakhstan 
should not go further in reducing tariffs. 
 
 
9.  Vice Minister of Agriculture Lilia Musina pointed out that 
Kazakhstan's agricultural subsidies were quite small, as a 
percentage of GDP, compared to other countries: in 2003-2005 
Kazakhstan's subsidies amounted to about 2% of GDP, while in Norway 
they reached 47% of GDP, in EU countries - 23% of GDP, and in United 
States - 16%. (Comment: For these numbers to accurately reflect the 
intensity of agricultural subsidies, they would have to adjusted for 
the differing shares of agricultural production in GDP.  End 
comment.)  Musina also defended Kazakhstan's use of "yellow box" 
subsidies (domestic support subsidies which are considered 
trade-distorting), arguing that Kazakhstan's subsidies were not only 
within legal limits, but were extremely important to the national 
economy.  According to Musina, out of Kazakhstan's average subsidy 
of $17 per hectare, $12.20 is for "green box" measures (those which 
don't distort trade and are allowed by WTO), and only $4.90 are 
"yellow box."  Speaking of export subsidies, Musina argued that, 
because land-locked Kazakhstan faced high transportation costs to 
market, the GOK was justified in defending its negotiating position 
in this area. 
 
10.  The Head of the Textile Enterprises' Association, Lubov 
Khudova, painted a pessimistic picture of Kazakhstan's textile and 
apparel industries.  The processing industry's share of total 
industrial output in Kazakhstan dropped from 2% to 0.6% over the 
2000-2005 period, she noted, and in general the industry faced 
decreasing prospects, as existing enterprises were now closing 1.5 
times faster than new ones were opening.  Furthermore, she said, 
domestically produced goods were gradually being supplanted on the 
local market by imported goods: the share of domestic textiles and 
apparel in the local market was only 8%, and that of shoes, 1%. The 
volume of declared imports exceeded exports by a multiple of 24, she 
declared, with the growing needs of the population being met by 
undeclared counterfeit imports. 
 
11.  Khudova characterized this situation as a threat to the 
country's economic security, and insisted on a transition period 
after accession to the WTO.  Moreover, in her opinion, the Security 
Council and the GOK needed to undertake measures to restrict the 
import of counterfeit goods and support the development of local 
textile and apparel industries. 
 
STEPS TOWARD THE WTO 
-------------------- 
 
12.  Finance Minister Korzhova expressed the GOK's readiness to 
harmonize customs legislation and simplify custom procedures.  Her 
suggestions for doing so included the following: unification of 
excise duties for imported and domestic goods (for instance, oil 
products); simplification of custom administration and custom 
clearance processes, especially for small individual entrepreneurs; 
and the provision of ex-officio right to custom authorities in the 
future.  In addition, she stated that beginning January 1, 2007, 
customs officials would minimize bureaucratic requirements for 
transaction passports, all registration functions would be forwarded 
to currency authorities gradually, and registration periods would be 
extended an additional 180 days. 
 
AITZHANOVA SUMS UP THE PROCESS 
------------------------------ 
 
13.  Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Zhanar Aitzhanova 
summarized major steps that needed to be done to finalize the 
accession process: unify railway tariffs; unify excise duties for 
imported and domestic products; decrease customs tariffs; limit the 
number of licensed activities; and address demands for legislative 
amendments concerning genetically modified products. 
 
14.  Aitzhanova told the audience that the United States and 
European Union were very active in the negotiations, particularly on 
questions related to market access for qualified laborers; textiles; 
access to the telecommunication, financial, and transport services 
markets; and on the issue of visitor access to the country and 
length of allowed stay.  Aitzhanova also informed the audience that 
Kazakhstan would join the sectoral initiative. In conclusion, 
Aitzhanova stressed that there was nothing frightening about 
accession to the WTO; in fact, Kazakhstan's domestic producers 
 
ASTANA 00000631  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
already lived under WTO conditions. 
 
15.  Comment:  Given the importance of the WTO accession, post has 
created a Trade Policy Working Group to coordinate our activities. 
End comment. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA629, KAZAKHSTAN: ALMATY NOTES, NOVEMBER 20

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA629 2006-11-21 10:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4920
RR RUEHAST RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0629/01 3251026
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211026Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7732
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1645
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7780
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7741
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7060
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1941
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1344
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2154

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000629 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: ALMATY NOTES, NOVEMBER 20 
 
 
1. This is the second in a series of bi-weekly roundup cables on 
political developments in Almaty, Kazakhstan's "southern capital." 
The series is intended to maintain focus on developments in civil 
society, the media, and the opposition following the Embassy's move 
to Astana.  Items were drawn primarily from the local press and 
media. 
 
Opposition Journalist on Trial 
------------------------------ 
 
2. The Almaty procurator's office has launched a criminal case 
against opposition journalist Kazis Toguzbayev for insulting 
President Nazarbayev's dignity and honor.  In July, the Almaty 
Committee for National Security (KNB) initiated a probe into two 
cases related to Toguzbayev's articles "Mafia Regime Covers up 
Murderers of Altynbek Sarsenbayev" and "Pope of Rome and Pope of 
Astana - Feel the Difference!" published on the www.kub.kz website 
on May 3, 2006 and April 2, 2006 respectively.  The probe found that 
in both cases, Toguzbayev had insulted President Nazarbayev's 
dignity and honor in the mass media, which may lead to up to three 
years imprisonment (Criminal Code, article 318, part 2).  The two 
cases were combined and passed to the city procurator's office.  The 
trial began on November 20. 
 
3. Two NGOs, Adil Soz and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for 
Human Rights and Rule of Law, issued a statement in support 
Toguzbayev.  Convicting someone who criticizes a political figure 
would prevent journalists from participating in public disputes on 
urgent problems of society, the statement stressed.  Adil Soz and 
the Bureau called on the authorities to stop the prosecution of the 
journalist and to withdraw the provisions on insulting the 
president's dignity and honor from the Criminal Code.  (kub.kz, 
October 30) 
 
Round Table Discussion of Public Television 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  On October 31 in Almaty, journalists and representatives of 
political parties and NGOs organized a second round table to present 
their concept of public television.  According to the concept, 
public television will broadcast news, cultural, educational and 
entertainment programs contributing to the integrity of society and 
urging people to be involved in social, political and cultural 
activities.  The group's concept statement reads "Public television 
and state television are identical terms.  The state should own only 
one television channel and one radio station.  Other state 
television channels should be privatized." 
 
5. Many participants criticized the proposal that there be a single 
state television channel.  Different opinions were expressed 
regarding the financing of public television and the membership of 
the proposed supervisory body.  Opposition leaders Bulat Abilov and 
Asylbek Kozhakhmetov rejected the idea of state financing for public 
television because it would make public television dependent on the 
government.  They also objected to state officials and members of 
parliament being members of the future public television supervisory 
board.  Ganiy Kasymov of the Party of Patriots insisted on state 
financing and on two seats in the supervisory body for 
representatives of the Mazhilis and Senate. 
 
6. Despite the many areas of disagreement, the participants decided 
to convey their proposal to Parliament the following week.  Two 
Mazhilis members, Dariya Klebanova and Tokhtar Aubakirov, agreed to 
participate in the public television working group.  It is hoped 
that Mazhilis deputies will initiate a draft law on public 
television based on the concept.  Kasymov predicted that if the 
government supports the draft, Parliament could consider it as early 
as mid-2007. 
 
Discussion of the "Infantilism" of Kazakhstani Society 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
7. On November 1, about a dozen activists from several youth 
organizations discussed the "Infantilism of Kazakhstani Society" at 
the Polyton Discussion Club in Almaty.  The speakers underscored 
what they called the "infantile" behavior of Kazakhstani society, 
which they said is not used to making its own decisions and being 
responsible for its own deeds.  Several speakers expressed hope that 
in the future, mature small and medium size businesses will 
facilitate building strong civil society.  Representatives of NDI 
and Counterpart Consortium offices in Almaty attended the meeting. 
 
Youth Movement in Defense of Labor Rights 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
ASTANA 00000629  002 OF 002 
 
 
8. The "Bolashak" youth movement intends to set up a committee in 
defense of Kazakhstani labor, Kazakhstan Today news agency reported 
on October 31, citing the chairman of the movement Farkhad Kasenov. 
The same day at a press conference in Almaty, Kasenov said the new 
committee would review legislation on labor rights and examine how 
foreign enterprises observe social and labor norms.
  Kasenov 
believes "the conflict between Kazakhstan and Turkish workers at the 
Tengiz oilfield was the logical result of the accumulated animosity 
and unfairness at enterprises owned by foreign businesses."  The 
committee plans to appeal to Parliament and Prime Minister Akhmetov 
to resolve the problems.  In addition, they plan to organize 
inspections of foreign enterprises to attract public attention to 
what they claim are existing problems. 
 
The Future of the Party System? 
------------------------------- 
 
9. "In the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that Kazakhstan will 
have a two-party system based on two political parties competing for 
power," acting chairman of the pro-presidential Otan party B. 
Zhumagulov said in a November 3 interview with Liter newspaper.  "It 
is more likely that Kazakhstan will have a one and a half party 
system, with one party which will dominate Parliament and form the 
government.  Other parties will be on periphery of the political 
field.  Their goal will not include the fight for power, but 
preventing the ruling party from stagnation." 
 
People's Communist Party Defends Abilov 
--------------------------------------- 
 
10. On October 31, the People's Communist Party of Kazakhstan issued 
a statement in support of opposition leader Bulat Abilov.  The 
statement alleged that True Ak Zhol co-chairman Abilov was being 
prosecuted because of his active political stand.  The communists 
demanded that the authorities stop the prosecution.  (zonakz.net, 
November 7) 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA607, KAZAKHSTAN: MFA WILL PUSH FOR ACTION ON CWC, BWC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA607 2006-11-20 09:51 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0607 3240951
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200951Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7717
INFO RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0278
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0941

UNCLAS ASTANA 000607 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR M. O/MARA 
ISN/CB FOR K. FARMER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW BWC KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: MFA WILL PUSH FOR ACTION ON CWC, BWC 
 
REF: STATE 184057 
 
1. (SBU) Poloff delivered reftel points to MFA International 
Security Section Advisor Kayrat Sarzhanov on November 16. 
Sarzhanov stated that the GOK understands the necessity of 
implementing measures to uphold its obligations under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.  Other agencies have caused 
delay, said Sarzhanov, but the MFA will push to resolve all 
outstanding issues. 
 
2. (SBU) Sarzhanov also called Kazakhstan's failure to ratify 
the Biological Weapons Convention a "big concern." The MFA 
supports ratification, but Parliament has been slow to act, 
according to Sarzhanov.  Nevertheless, Sarzhanov remains 
optimistic, telling Poloff that he expects Kazakhstan to 
ratify the Convention in the near future.  He promised that 
the MFA will again urge the Parliament to take the steps 
necessary for ratification. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA605, KAZAKHSTANI POSITIONS AT ITU PLENIPOTENTIARY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA605 2006-11-20 09:47 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0605 3240947
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200947Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7715

UNCLAS ASTANA 000605 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC ECPS ITU KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI POSITIONS AT ITU PLENIPOTENTIARY 
CONFERENCE 
 
REF: STATE 168720 
 
1. (SBU) In response to diplomatic notes prepared according 
to reftel instructions, the Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) informed the Embassy on November 7 that 
Kazakhstan would support the U.S. candidacy to the 
International Telecommunications Union Council (ITU) at the 
ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in Antalya, Turkey.  The MFA 
also indicated that Kazakhstan would support Ms. Julia Napir 
Zoller's candidacy for the ITU Radio Regulation Council, 
while asking, in turn, that the U.S. support Kazakhstan's 
candidate. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA591, KAZAKHSTAN: 2006-2007 INSCR, PART II, FINANCIAL CRIMES AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA591 2006-11-17 06:56 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1882
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0591/01 3210656
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170656Z NOV 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7700
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2//
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP EURASIA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-SOLIC-CN//
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC//IET//
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1287

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000591 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE (ALTON) AND INL/C (WILLIAMS); SCA/CEN FOR O'MARA; 
JUSTICE FOR AFMLS, OTA, AND OPDAT; TREASURY FOR FINCEN, EB/ESC/TFS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR EFIN PGOV KCRM KCOR KTFN KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: 2006-2007 INSCR, PART II, FINANCIAL CRIMES AND 
MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
REF: STATE 157136 
 
ASTANA 00000591  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1. In response to reftel instructions, the text of Part II of the 
2006-2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INSCR), 
Financial Crimes and Money Laundering for Kazakhstan follows. 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2. Kazakhstan, with its developed and modern banking system, has 
become a financial center in Central Asia.  Kazakhstan's economic 
success along with its geographic location, however, also make 
fighting organized crime, extremism, narcotics trafficking, and 
terrorist financing more challenging.  Despite the challenges, 
Kazakhstan is taking proactive measures to police financial crimes. 
The Government of Kazakhstan has developed a draft law on Anti-Money 
Laundering and is planning to establish a Financial Intelligence 
Unit.  In general, the GOK remains a willing partner in the fight 
against narcotics and terrorism.  End summary. 
 
----------------- 
GENERAL QUESTIONS 
----------------- 
 
------------------------- 
REGIONAL FINANCIAL CENTER 
------------------------- 
 
3. On June 5, 2006 the Parliament enacted and the President signed a 
law establishing a regional financial center in Almaty (RFCA), 
thereby achieving one of the strategic goals that President 
Nazarbayev established in November 2004.  The RFCA is to develop the 
Kazakhstani securities market, facilitate Kazakhstan's integration 
into international markets, attract investments into the local 
economy, and introduce Kazakhstani assets into the global securities 
market.  In addition, currently under discussion is the 
establishment of a specialized financial court within the RFCA to 
adjudicate disputes arising from activity in the market there. 
 
--------------------------- 
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS 
--------------------------- 
 
4. Kazakhstan is not an offshore financial center. There are no 
offshore companies or banks in the country.  Existing legislation 
does not favor offshore banks and offshore financial centers.  There 
are foreign banks in the country, including Dutch, Turkish, and 
Russian-based financial institutions. 
 
----------------- 
FREE TRADE ZONES 
----------------- 
 
5. Based on the Free Trade Zone Agreement signed by the Heads of CIS 
countries in Moscow on April 15, 1994, Kazakhstan has signed 
separate Free Trade Zone agreements with Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.  The main 
function of the Free Trade Zones is to create an easy flow of goods 
and services between CIS countries, to stabilize internal economies, 
and to balance mutual trade on mutually advantageous terms.  It is 
not known whether these free trade zones are being used in 
trade-based money laundering schemes or by those who finance 
terrorism. 
 
6.  According to a March 2006 Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency 
report, China opened the Maikapchagai-Zimunai cross border shopping 
area on the border with East-Kazakhstan oblast (EKO).  The EKO 
Department for Entrepreneurship and Industry announced that that the 
shopping center was officially opened on March 28 under the 
agreement signed between the administration of the Altay district of 
the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China and the EKO akimat 
(administration) on January 26, 2006.  Kazakhstani citizens do not 
need a visa for a one-day visit to the shopping area.  Kazakhstani 
shoppers may carry goods under 50 kilos and less than $1,000 in 
value duty-free back to Kazakhstan.  At the same time, residents of 
Kazakhstan may bring goods to the Chinese border marketplace valued 
less than 50,000 tenge ($400) duty-free, or goods worth 80,000 tenge 
 
ASTANA 00000591  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
at a reduced customs rate.  If the value of goods is above 80,000 
tenge ($630) they are subject to all Chinese taxes and duties. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
LAW AND REGULATIONS TO PREVENT MONEY LAUNDERING 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
7. Kazakhstan has ratified the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in 
December 2000 the country signed the UN Convention against 
Transnational Crime.  On February 24, 2003, Kazakhstan ratified the 
UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism.  Kazakhstan is also a signatory to the Central Asian 
Agreement on the Joint Fight Agai
nst Terrorism, Political and 
Religious Extremism, Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Drug 
Trafficking, signed in April 2000 by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
 
8. Money laundering is criminalized in Kazakhstan by Article 193 of 
the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  The definition of 
money laundering used in the act, however, is narrow and the 
sanctions against it relatively light (a maximum of three years 
imprisonment, increased to five for multiple offences).  A further 
limit to the effectiveness of the law is that bank records may not 
be examined until after a criminal case has been initiated. 
However, a draft of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering 
Financing of Terrorism legislation (AML/CFT) states that all banks 
will be legally required to send information on all suspicious 
transactions to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) for analysis. 
 
 
9. Kazakhstan is gradually making steps towards the adoption of the 
draft AML/CFT law and the establishment of an empowered FIU.  The 
adoption of the AML/CFT legislation was made a high priority by 
President Nazarbayev last year, and the Procurator General's Office 
took the lead on drafting the AML/CFT legislation and in 
establishing the proposed Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).  The 
Procurator General's Office expects the legislation on AML/CFT, 
introduced in September 2005, to be passed sometime in 2007. 
 
10.  However, the Parliament postponed consideration of the draft 
law until completion of implementation of the Law "On Amnesty 
related to legalization of property" adopted July 5, 2006.  The 
delay is to give citizens the opportunity to legalize property from 
the "shadow economy."  According to news reports from October 27, 
the amnesty period has been extended until April 2007.  Under the 
terms of the amnesty legislation, citizens seeking to legalize 
property must pay a duty of 10% of its cost.  This rule does not 
apply to residential homeowners, whose property is legalized at no 
cost. 
 
11. The fact that the Procurator General's Office, the most powerful 
and influential law enforcement body in the country, coordinated the 
drafting of the AML/CFT legislation indicates that Kazakhstan has a 
vested interest in controlling money laundering.  The Procurator 
General's Office has taken on the responsibility within the GOK to 
ensure that the provisions of the AML/CFT law and the function of 
the FIU will meet international standards and become effective means 
of combating money laundering and related financial crimes. 
 
12. According to the draft AML/CFT law, a Kazakhstani FIU, entitled 
the "Committee on Financial Monitoring," will be established within 
and controlled by the Procurator General's Office.  The Procurator's 
Office received funding from the GOK budget for 60 employees who 
will work at the central FIU in Astana, and for another 30 employees 
who will work in the regions.  The FIU personnel will be chosen from 
existing procurators as well as from elsewhere in the government, 
including the Financial Police, the Ministry of Finance, and 
Customs.  A unified reporting system among various governmental 
agencies, including the Financial Police and the Ministry of 
Finance, will be established to funnel the information received from 
these agencies to the FIU.  Additionally, the Procurators's Office 
intends to supply Kazakhstani banks and the FIU with the names of 
individuals and organizations identified in terrorist watch lists. 
There is a plan to establish a separate restricted-access FIU 
building in Astana.  In the interim, however, the FIU will be 
located in the Procuracy building in Astana. 
 
----------------- 
FINANCIAL SECTOR 
 
ASTANA 00000591  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
----------------- 
 
13. The Presidential Decree of February 25, 2005 re-organized the 
Agency on Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption into a separate 
governmental agency reporting directly to the President. 
 
14. Presently, the Agency on Combating Economic Crimes and 
Corruption, the Procurator General's Office, and the Agency for the 
Regulation and Inspection of the Financial Market and Financial 
Organizations are authorized to supervise all aspects of financial 
institutions.  In the future, the supervision and examination of 
financial institutions for compliance with AML/CFT laws and 
regulations will be the responsibility of the Procurator General's 
Office. 
15. Currently, banks and other financial institutions are not 
required to know, record, or report the identity of customers 
engaged in significant transactions. It is hoped that the new 
AML/CFT law will remedy this problem by requiring all banks to send 
any information regarding suspicious transactions to the FIU. 
16. The Agency for the Regulation and Inspection of the Financial 
Market and Financial Organizations, in conjunction with a new 
regulation adopted on August 27, 2005 defines the requirements for 
maintaining adequate time records necessary to reconstruct 
significant transactions through financial institutions. 
Second-tier banks, for example, are required to keep records for 
five years on correspondence regarding the opening of currency 
accounts and investment activities, deals made through export and 
import operations, and documents related to payments made to foreign 
and international banks and organizations. 
17. Statutory requirements for limiting and monitoring the 
international transportation of currency and monetary instruments, 
as well as all cross-border currency reporting requirements, are 
governed by the Rules on Currency Transactions of April 20, 2001, 
and by the Rules on Declaring Foreign and National Currency by 
Individuals Entering and Leaving the Republic of Kazakhstan of May 
13, 2004. According to the Rules, a Kazakhstani resident is required 
to fill out a declaration form if he/she is planning to leave the 
country with more than $3,000 equivalent in foreign currency and 
must provide supporting documents verifying the source of funds if 
taking more than $10,000 out of the country.  Non-residents leaving 
Kazakhstan are also allowed a maximum of $3,000 without submitting a 
declaration form. The amount of national currency that may leave the 
country with Kazakhstani residents or non-residents is unlimited, 
and there are no reporting requirements.  There are no limitations 
or reporting requirements on the amounts of national or foreign 
currency being transported into the country by either residents or 
non-residents. 
-------------------- 
TERRORIST FINANCING 
-------------------- 
 
18. Kazakhstan acceded to the "International Convention on 
Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism" in October 2002.  Kazakhstan 
is also considering accession to the Strasbourg Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from &#x000
A;Crime. 
 
--------------- 
CASH SMUGGLING 
--------------- 
 
19. Article 209 on Economic Contraband of the Criminal Code of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan stipulates that any illegal contraband 
(including currency) that crosses the borders of Kazakhstan under 
false pretext with falsified documentation may result in the 
confiscation of property, a fiscal penalty, arrest, and/or a jail 
sentence of up to three years.  The severity of the punishment is 
based on several factors including whether the action is a repeat 
offence or if it is connected to the activities of an organized 
crime group. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
ASSET FORFEITURE AND SEIZURE LEGISLATION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
20. Criminal and civil forfeitures are defined by the Criminal and 
Civil Codes of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  Article 31 of the Law on 
Combating Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, and Precursors 
stipulates that narcotics or psychotropic substances and precursors 
 
ASTANA 00000591  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
as well as the means of producing illegal narcotic substances, 
including property and finances, are subject to seizure by the 
government. 
 
-------------------------- 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
-------------------------- 
 
21. In 2005, the U.S. Government assisted Kazakhstan's anti-money 
laundering and crime efforts in several ways through the Embassy 
office of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
(INL). 
 
22. In March 2005, INL funded a computer laboratory at the Financial 
Police Academy in Astana.  The Academy specializes in training 
future financial police and customs officers in the skills required 
to recognize and investigate money laundering schemes as well as to 
combat corruption and other economic crimes.  The computer 
laboratory is an important resource for future INL trainings as well 
as for the Academy itself.  Enhancement of the Financial Police 
Academy provides a long-term impact on the GOK's ability to 
effectively police its financial system and to control money 
laundering related to terrorism, narcotics trafficking, tax evasion, 
and corrupt activities by GOK officials. 
 
23. In September 2005, under the auspices of INL, personnel from the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Agency (FLETC) trained the faculty 
of Kazakhstan's Financial Police Academy on investigative techniques 
related to financial crimes.  This training will enhance the ability 
of the Academy's faculty to teach such techniques to its students. 
 
 
24. In May and September 2005, INL, in cooperation with the 
Procurator General's Office, held a series of four seminars at the 
Procurator General's Offices in both Almaty and Astana on the draft 
AML/CFT legislation and the establishment of a Financial 
Intelligence Unit.  The goal of these seminars was to help the GOK 
develop the regulatory structure needed to enforce the provisions of 
the AML/CFT legislation, to prepare the GOK to enter various 
FATF-related organizations, to train second-tier banks to meet 
AML/CFT requirements, and to help the GOK establish an effective 
FIU.  The lead training agency was the Office of Technical 
Assistance of the United States Department of Treasury (OTA). 
 
25. Training and equipment was provided to the Statistics Division 
of the Procurator General's Office, which targets drug trafficking 
organizations operating in Kazakhstan.  In November 2005, computer 
equipment was distributed throughout Kazakhstan to 17 different 
branches within the Statistics Division.  This commodities handover 
was part of a larger project aimed at improving the collection of 
criminal statistics in Kazakhstan, especially those germane to the 
evaluation of INL projects related to the GOK's efforts to combat 
narcotics trafficking and anti-money laundering activities. 
 
26. The GOK is a willing partner in the fight against terrorism, and 
it is making major strides to identify potential money laundering 
activities connected to international terrorism and narcotics 
trafficking. If adopted and implemented, the draft AML/CFT 
legislation and the establishment of an FIU will help Kazakhstan 
become an active member in the Egmont Group and the Eurasian Group 
(EAG). 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA590, KAZAKHSTAN: 2006-2007 INSCR, PART I

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA590 2006-11-17 06:54 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1872
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0590/01 3210654
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170654Z NOV 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7695
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2//
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP EURASIA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-SOLIC-CN//
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC//IET//
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ASTANA 000590 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL SNYDER, CARROLL, ALTON; SCA/CEN FOR OMARA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM KCOR PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: 2006-2007 INSCR, PART I 
 
REF: STATE 154928 
 
ASTANA 00000590  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
1.  In response to reftel instructions, the text of Part 1 of the 
2006-2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INSCR) 
for Kazakhstan follows. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2.  In 2006, Kazakhstan significantly increased counter-drug 
operations.  President Nazarbayev declared a national effort against 
drug use and drug traffickers.  The government encouraged law 
enforcement agencies, NGOs, political parties and media to join 
together to combat drugs.  The number of people who committed drug 
related crimes this year increased 13.4% year on year.  President 
Nazarbayev announced two big programs on combating corruption and 
drug trafficking.  Strengthening the borders, especially in the 
south, is a priority for Kazakhstan as well.  Officially the number 
of young drug addicts under 17 years old increased 9.3% in 
comparison with the same period last year. 70% of the drug addicts 
in the country consume heroin.  The GOK is devoting more attention 
and resources to interagency cooperation in the fight against drug 
supply and demand.  Law enforcement services acknowledge that 
without the assistance of society, NGOs and mass media they will not 
be able to effectively combat drug distribution. 
 
------------------- 
STATUS OF COUNTRY 
------------------- 
 
3. The UN reported that the 2006 harvest of opium in Afghanistan 
will be around 5,000 tons.  Reserves of ready heroin are more than 
500 tons, approximately one third of which is destined for export to 
Russia and European countries through Kazakhstan.  While sources 
differ, the UN reports that that about 11% of the drugs transiting 
the country remain in Kazakhstan.  Importation of synthetic drugs 
such as ecstasy and LSD from Russia and Europe is increasing. 
 
4.  However, more recent estimates provided by the Deputy Head of 
the Division on Combating International Drug Trafficking of the 
Committee for National Security showed that of the 100-120 tons of 
drugs expected to transit Kazakhstan in 2006 about 15-20 tons will 
stay in the country.  In addition, there is an existing marijuana 
growing area in the Chu valley on the Kazakhstani-Kyrgyzstani 
border.  Most of cases of sale, transit, and consumption of drugs 
occur in the southern regions of the country. 
 
5. According to the local press, the Deputy Head of the Division on 
Combating International Drug Trafficking of the Committee for 
National Security announced that criminal activity related to the 
production of Afghanistani opiates presents the most serious problem 
for Kazakhstan.  He stated that the problem of drug trafficking 
became much more acute when Russian border guards left the border of 
Tajikistan with Afghanistan.  Another newspaper, Komsomolskya 
Pravda, reported that in Kazakhstan one kilo of high quality "999" 
type heroin costs around $18,000, while in Europe the price would 
increase to $60,000 and in the U.S. to $120,000. 
 
------------------------------ 
COUNTRY ACTIONS AGAINST DRUGS 
------------------------------ 
 
A.  Policy Initiatives 
 
6.  In November 2005 President Nazarbayev signed the Decree on 
Approval of the Strategy on Combating Drug Addiction and Drug 
Trafficking in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2006-2014.  The aim of 
the Strategy is to counter drug addiction and drug trafficking in 
Central Asia.  In an effort to ensure the gradual development of the 
process of combating drug addiction and drug trafficking, the 
Strategy was divided into three stages: 2006-2008, 2009-2011, and 
2012-2014.  The goal of the first stage is to stop the increase in 
drug consumption and the illegal drug trade.  The second stage 
focuses on stopping the growth of addiction to psychoactive 
substances among the Kazakhstani population.  The third stage aims 
to further develop a complete and effective system of state and 
public counteraction to drug addiction and the drug trade. 
 
7.  In addition to the Strategy, in September 2006 President 
Nazarbayev stated to the Security Council that the commitment of the 
capital city to combat narcotics should set an example to the rest 
 
ASTANA 00000590  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
of Kazakhstan.  With the public backing of President Nazarbayev, the 
Akimat (City Hall) of Astana in consultation with the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD) developed a 2006-2008 program entitled 
"Astana - Drug Free City."  It covers three main themes: demand 
reduction, treatment of drug addiction, and combating drug 
trafficking.  According to local internet news site "Kazinform," on 
September 29 the government
decided to allot one billion tenge ($8 
million) to implement the program. 
 
8.  In remarks to the Security Council, the President authorized the 
Committee for National Security (KNB) and MVD to join forces to 
combat drug use and drug trade.  Nazarbayev advocated publicizing 
the counter-narcotics push on TV in order to get the message out to 
the population that drug use is unacceptable.  Notwithstanding that 
the program "Astana - Drug Free City" was designed for the capital, 
law enforcement agencies have begun to apply it to the whole 
country.  The MVD Minister, Baurzhan Mukhamedzhanov, mentioned that 
in the near future similar projects will be developed in other 
cities with serious drug problems. 
 
9.  The "Kazakhstan Today" newspaper reported that owners of night 
clubs in Almaty and Astana met with the leaders of the MVD to 
discuss measures to counteract the spread of drugs in night clubs 
and prevent drug addiction among their clients.  As a result of the 
meeting the parties came to the unanimous decision to join forces 
with government law enforcement and security services to combat drug 
distribution, and ensure the security of night clubs.  In addition, 
the businessmen proposed that MVD officers train the security guards 
working in night clubs in basic knowledge and skills of drug 
detection. 
 
10.  In July and again in October the Committee for National 
Security publicly burned seized Afghanistan heroin.  In July, 43 
kilos were burned and in October 67 kilos of heroin and 217 kilos of 
opium. 
 
11.  In 2006, the MVD Minister suggested toughening punishment for 
drug-related crimes.  In an interview in "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" in 
September, he said that the MVD prepared draft legislative 
amendments to the Criminal Code stipulating tougher punishment for 
drug-related crimes, including the death penalty. 
 
12.  The Procurator General's Office suggested establishing an 
interagency information center for the exchange of legal information 
to be used by law enforcement bodies and special services of CIS 
member countries.  Deputy Procurator General Georgy Kim stated at a 
CIS conference of the heads of law enforcement information services 
that the center should be not just a data base, but a unified 
analytical complex, where information about transnational crime 
received from customs, border guard, law enforcement, prisons and 
other agencies would be accumulated and analyzed.  He said that 
Kazakhstan was ready to provide the Center with available software 
and the necessary legal basis, and would assist in the development 
of data security measures for shared information. 
 
13.  In 2006, Kazakhstan devoted more attention to drug demand 
reduction programs in addition to law enforcement efforts.  The 
Ministry of Information and Culture, Ministry of Tourism and Sport, 
Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
Ministry of Health and NGOs all have begun efforts to reduce demand 
for illegal narcotics in Kazakhstani society.  One of the aims is to 
involve youth as much as possible in other activities such as 
sports, social events.  In one case, a member of the Mazhilis 
(Parliament), Tanirbergen Berdongarov, explained that after the 
launch of "Astana-drug free city "Zhas Otan", the youth wing of the 
"Otan" political party joined in the effort to reduce drug demand. 
Recently the Committee on Combating Drugs of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs organized a media forum and proposed to the 
assembled journalists that they actively cooperate in combating drug 
addiction.  MVD representatives pointed out to the journalists the 
necessity of increasing social advertisements in mass media directed 
against drug addiction. 
 
B.  Accomplishments 
 
14.  Kazakhstan continues to comply with UN conventions on combating 
illicit narcotics cultivation and production within its borders. 
 
15.  The Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Center 
(CARICC) will be based in Almaty.  Foreign Ministers of the member 
states of the Memorandum on Understanding and Cooperation on Control 
over Illegal Production, Circulation, Abuse of Narcotics, 
 
ASTANA 00000590  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
Psychotropic Substances and Precursors decided to locate CARICC in 
the former capital of Kazakhstan on February 8 at the seventh 
meeting of MOU parties in Tashkent.  The Center will be the focal 
point for communication, analysis and exchange of operations 
information on transnational crime and will assist in organization 
and support on coordination of joint operations to combat narcotics. 
 According to official information from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 50 specialists will work in CARICC.  The President of 
Uzbekistan Islam Karimov proposed the idea of CARICC during the 
visit of the Secretary General Kofi Annan to the Republic of 
Uzbekistan in October 2002. 
 
C.  Law Enforcement Efforts (seizure statistics) 
 
--- 
KNB 
--- 
 
16.  The GOK continues to actively combat narcotics. 
During the KNB's 2006 "Operation Trap," a lengthy joint operation 
between Kazakhstani agencies, Russian special services, and Tajik 
law enforcement bodies, KNB officers stopped the activity of a 
criminal drug group which controlled significant part of drug 
trafficking, transiting through Central Asia.  Experts of the 
Kazakhstani special service successfully identified the money 
laundering mechanisms for drug trafficking proceeds.  Isatai 
Sabetov, Deputy Head of KNB Division on Combating International Drug 
Trafficking, stated that in order to launder the proceeds of drug 
sales, the criminal group created several businesses in Kazakhstan, 
Europe and offshore zones.  In only one of these, KNB officers 
discovered $1.6 million. 
 
17.  In October 2006, Almaty KNB officers intercepted an 
international drug ring of five people at the final stage of a 
controlled delivery operation.  The criminals transported drugs 
through the territory of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan inside a truck 
carrying grapes.  The consignment of narcotics was destined for the 
European Union.  Also in October, the Almaty city KNB Department 
burned 67 kilos of heroin and 217 kilos of opium in front of TV 
cameras. The packages of heroin were stamped with a sign "999" 
showing that it was produced in Afghanistan and was of the highest 
quality.  The drugs were seized in a June 2005 special operation. 
 
18.  In the first 10 months of 2006, the KNB detected and eliminated 
20 international drug distribution and transit networks and eight 
criminal rings, instituted criminal proceedings against 135 people, 
and seized over 800 kilos of opium and heroin. 
 
--- 
MVD 
--- 
 
19.  As a result of a special operation from September 21
to October 
1, MVD officers detected 577 incidents of drug use, seized over two 
tons of drug substances (including four kilos of heroin), and 
discovered 154 drug sales. 
 
20.  Law enforcement agencies seized 22,549 kilos of drugs in the 
first nine months of 2006, compared with 21,635 kilos last year. 
The MVD seized the largest amount of drugs with 19,753 kilos; the 
KNB - 2,598 kilos; and the  Customs Control Committee of the 
Ministry of Finance - 198 kilos. 
 
21.  Head of the Committee on Combating Narcotics Anatoliy Vyborov 
announced that as a result of the work of law enforcement agencies, 
7,900 drug-related crimes were registered in the country; this is 
5.6% higher than the same period last year.  In nine months, the 
officers of the Committee on Combating Narcotics eliminated ten 
organized criminal groups trafficking drugs. 
 
22.  According to "Liter" newspaper, the increased seizure rates 
show that law enforcement agencies and security services were more 
efficient in 2006.  This is attributed to increased collaboration 
with the neighboring countries in Central Asia and the regular 
exchange of information with them.  "Liter" newspaper also reported 
that Russian special services are the most effective in 
collaborating on regional anti-narcotics work because they have 
maintained contacts in Afghanistan since Soviet times. 
 
23.  Law-enforcement agencies seized 3,665 liters of liquid 
precursors in the first nine months of 2006, versus 89 liters for 
the same period last year. 
 
ASTANA 00000590  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
---------- 
Corruption 
---------- 
 
24.  While it is difficult to determine the extent to which 
corruption is associated with narcotics trafficking, corruption in 
Kazakhstan is a factor hampering the country's war on drugs.  On 
December 28, 2005, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
signed the decree "On the State Program of Combating Corruption for 
2006-2010."  All state agencies were mandated to take measures to 
combat corruption internally.  As a result, from January to 
September 2006, the Agency on Combating Economic Crimes and 
Corruption registered 1,225 corruption crimes - an increase of 20.2% 
over the same time last year.  Criminal cases were brought against 
378 people, among them 44 employees of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. 
 
25.  According to the "Express-K" newspaper, a senior officer of the 
Department of Internal Affairs (DVD) of Zhambulskaya oblast 
(southern Kazakhstan) was sentenced to 10 years in prison.  The 
officer, a police major, dealt drugs; he used his position to charge 
drug addicts a price three times higher than the street rate.  One 
drug addict who had to pay 4,000 tenge ($32) for 1.5 grams of heroin 
reported the Major to the Committee for National Security. 
 
----------------------- 
Agreements and Treaties 
----------------------- 
 
 
26.  ALOA:  The U.S. and Kazakhstan signed the fourth Supplementary 
Protocol to the Memorandum of Understanding on Narcotics Control and 
Law Enforcement in August 28, 2006. 
 
27.  Kazakhstan is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and has 
signed the Central Asian counter-narcotics Memorandum of 
Understanding with UNODC.  The Kazakhstan national anti-narcotics 
law, passed in 1998, specifically gives provisions of international 
anti-narcotics agreements precedent over national law (Article 3.2). 
 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an 
agreement in September 1999 on cooperation in combating 
transnational crime, including narcotics trafficking. 
 
---------------------- 
Cultivation/Production 
---------------------- 
 
28.  On October 3, officers of Astana Department of the KNB 
discovered an area for the cultivation of the high quality Afghan 
strain of marijuana in the village of Romanovka, 30 kilometers from 
Astana.  The owners of the land set up an entire process to produce 
and package the drugs.  KNB officers seized 100 kilos of marijuana 
and 77 grams of heroin in the operation. 
 
29.  KNB officers in Zhambulskaya oblast discovered a workshop for 
the production of drugs in the cellar of a secondary school in the 
Chu region.  A physical education teacher from the school had 
established the workshop to produce and package drugs for a drug 
ring which specialized in large quantities.  A search of the 
teacher's home revealed 90 kilos of dried hemp and a nine-kilo sack 
of hashish. 
 
----------------- 
Drug Flow/Transit 
----------------- 
 
30.  The main flow of drugs, including heroin and opium, enters 
Kazakhstan from the Central Asian region (Afghanistan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan).  Drug couriers are mainly 
residents of Central Asian countries.  One main reason for this is 
poverty and high unemployment rates.  Couriers rely on vehicles and 
trains to smuggle the majority of the narcotics into Kazakhstan. 
 
31.  In 2006, drug smugglers responded to the increased counter-drug 
operations by law enforcement and security agencies by devising new 
methods and new routes.  Increased operations on the south-central 
border forced the smugglers to look for other routes to the east and 
west to avoid interception. 
 
32.  According to the KNB, during the last year officers detained 
several passengers on an Almaty - Beijing flight at the Almaty 
 
ASTANA 00000590  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
airport when they tried to smuggle 10 kilos of heroin.  The couriers 
were two Russian citizens, one citizen of Kazakhstan, and one 
citizen of Azerbaijan.  Six months later, special service officers 
arrested the leader of the group.  When arrested, he had over 3,000 
tablets of ecstasy in his possession. 
 
33.  Local newspapers report that Almaty, the former capital in the 
south of Kazakhstan, stopped being a terminal point for transiting 
drugs from Afghanistan to Europe.  Today criminals transport drugs 
directly through Karaganda (located in the center of Kazakhstan) to 
the north of the country.  Drugs are transported to Almaty only for 
local market, since the demand for drugs has not decreased. 
 
34.  Couriers developed or borrowed new methods to avoid detection. 
Some couriers cover packed drugs with wolf adipose tissue in order 
to escape detection by drug dogs.  One case was unusual for the 
officers working at the auto checkpoints.  According to 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, "Aul" post customs and border guard officers 
found drugs in a propane gas cylinder.  Propane is often used to 
power vehicles and heat homes in Kazakhstan.  During this inspection 
of a car traveling from Uzbekistan to Russia, over 230 grams of 
heroin were seized.
 
 
35.  Train passengers also resort to novel approaches.  The usual 
method for concealing illegal narcotics is to hide them in big 
suitcases or bags with false bottoms.  One unusual method is to put 
heroin in walnut shells and then glue them back together. 
 
----------------- 
Domestic Programs 
----------------- 
 
36.  According to official statistical data for the first nine 
months of 2006, there are 54,705 people using drugs and psychotropic 
substances in Kazakhstan.  This represents a 4.9% increase from last 
year (52,137 registered last year).  The figure includes 4,890 
women, 4,652 minors (including 1,331 children under 14), 29,629 
young people aged 18-30 years old, and 20,424 who are 30 and older. 
 
37.  The Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Tourism and 
Sport, Ministry of Information and Culture, Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, and local government bodies conduct sport events, cultural 
events, and competitions to keep young people away from drugs.  The 
Government of Kazakhstan has promised to build more sport clubs for 
youngsters.  The government reports that NGOs must go though 
professional training to be able to effectively conduct demand 
reduction programs. 
 
------------------------------------- 
U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES AND PROGRAMS 
------------------------------------- 
 
38.  The overall USG goal is to develop a long-term cooperative 
relationship between law enforcement bodies and special services of 
the United States and those of Kazakhstan.  This relationship will 
enhance the professional skills of officers and improve the 
organization and management of GOK law enforcement services, thereby 
improving the results in the fight against illegal narcotics and 
terrorism. 
 
39.  The USG will conduct a Counter Narcotics Bilateral Strategy 
meeting with Kazakhstan in December 2006 to improve collaborative 
efforts to combat narcotics.  The purpose of the session is to 
convey to the GOK the best practices the U.S. learned from its 
efforts to combat illegal narcotics including interdiction, demand 
reduction, and rehabilitation. 
 
40.  To allow for the more effective search of trucks and trains, 
the USG provides technical assistance and training to GOK law 
enforcement and security services, including search equipment for 
border posts, interior checkpoints, and patrolling the green border. 
 The USG is working with law enforcement and security service 
training academies to improve curriculum and training methods. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA585, KAZAKHSTAN: ANOTHER OPPOSITION LEADER FACES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA585 2006-11-16 11:52 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0761
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0585/01 3201152
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161152Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7685
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1643
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2152

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000585 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DRL/PHD (C. KUCHTA-HELBLING) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  ANOTHER OPPOSITION LEADER FACES 
CRIMINAL CHARGES 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Financial Police have launched a series 
of civil and criminal charges against popular opposition 
leader Bulat Abilov related to an investment fund that he 
founded in the 1990s.  Abilov, who faces up to ten years in 
prison, believes that the prosecution is politically 
motivated.  He alleges that members of President Nazarbayev's 
inner circle view him as a threat and are orchestrating the 
case to remove him from the political arena.  Abilov claims 
that presidential insider Bulat Utemuratov informed him that 
one of Abilov's enemies even told President Nazarbayev that 
Abilov had asked Vice President Cheney to finance a 
"revolution" in Kazakhstan.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Criminal Charges with Possible Ten Year Sentence 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2. (SBU) Opposition activist Bulat Abilov, co-chairman of the 
True Ak Zhol party, is facing up to ten years in prison on 
criminal charges related to an investment fund he created in 
the mid-1990s.  The Financial Police have charged Abilov and 
two associates in the Butya-Kapital investment fund, Baurzhan 
Karabekov and Ualikhan Bekbosyn, with large-scale 
misappropriation and embezzlement, inflicting damages, tax 
evasion, and abuse of power by a manager of a commercial 
organization.  The charges relate to business activities from 
1996-1998 and carry a maximum sentence of ten years. 
 
3. (C) The criminal trial against Abilov, Karabekov, and 
Bekbosyn is scheduled to begin on November 22 in the 
Almalinskiy district court of Almaty.  In a November 14 
conversation with Pol-Econ Chief, Abilov said that he planned 
to do everything possible to delay the proceedings.  He had 
just replaced his legal team and would move for a one-month 
continuance so that the new lawyers can familiarize 
themselves with the case.  Abilov explained that President 
Nazarbayev is widely expected to announce sweeping political 
reforms in a December address to the Democratization 
Commission.  Such a move would presumably lead to a softening 
of the authorities' efforts to constrain the opposition, 
Abilov said, and create a more favorable environment for the 
trial. 
 
------------------------------ 
Charges Politically Motivated? 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) In a related civil trial on November 2, Karabekov 
argued that the statute of limitations had long expired.  He 
stated that when the Butya-Kapital fund was liquidated in 
December 2004, 1.2 billion tenge ($9.4 million) was 
distributed to its 500,000 shareholders, making it the only 
one of the 167 funds set up to privatize state assets to pay 
any money to its shareholders.  After the Almaty City Court 
rejected Karabekov's appeal, his lawyer alleged in a 
television interview that the Financial Police had put 
together the case in retaliation for Bulat Abilov's political 
activities.  The lawyer said that the Financial Police had 
called numerous Butya-Kapital shareholders around the country 
to inform them of the alleged violations and encourage them 
to file a lawsuit; the seven individuals who agreed to do so 
had never appeared in court or asked for financial 
compensation.  The authorities were seeking a ruling to use 
as a precedent in upcoming criminal proceedings, he alleged. 
 
5. (C) When asked why the authorities were focusing on him, 
rather than other opposition leaders who were even more 
outspoken, Abilov told Pol-Econ Chief that many in 
Nazarbayev's inner circle saw him as a threat because of his 
popularity with the public, the strong support he receives 
from major businesses, his ability to unite disparate forces 
within the opposition, and his financial wherewithal.  Abilov 
said that he had personally financed Zharmakhan Tuyakbay's 
2005 presidential campaign, and had co-financed the 
opposition's 2004 parliamentary campaign with 
Kazkommertsbank.  (Note: In addition to the factors Abilov 
mentioned, his frequent intemperate public statements have 
undoubtedly attracted unfavorable attention from Astana.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Abilov Alleges High-Level Campaign to Discredit Him 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
6. (C) Someone in Nazarbayev's inner circle was now using the 
Financial Police to try to remove him from the political 
arena, Abilov alleged.  He claimed that key Presidential 
 
ASTANA 00000585  002 OF 002 
 
 
Administration figure Bulat Utemuratov had informed him that 
someone in a power ministry (i.e. the Procuracy, the KNB, or 
the MVD) had told Nazarbayev that during Vice President 
Cheney's May 6 breakfast with members of the opposition, 
Abilov had asked for funding to "organize a revolution" and 
unseat Nazarbayev.  Abilov said that Nazarbayev had repeated 
the allegation to Tuyakbay during a September 22 meeting. 
(Note: Abilov made no such request during the meeting with &#x000A
;the Vice President.) 
 
8. (C) Abilov told Pol-Econ Chief that Nazarbayev had 
personally tried to convince him to leave politics on several 
occasions, offering him his choice of natural resources, 
banks, or private firms as inducement.  He had refused each 
time.  Someone in Nazarbayev's inner circle had made him a 
similar offer recently, Abilov said; if he would go on 
television and acknowledge the validity of the December 2005 
presidential elections, the charges against him would be 
dropped.  Abilov was adamant that he would not betray his 
principles by taking a "deal" when he had done nothing 
against the president. 
 
9. (SBU) Abilov said that he planned to visit Washington in 
December, probably with Zharmakhan Tuyakbay.  His goal was to 
preserve contacts between the opposition and influential 
thinkers in Washington, as well as to obtain visible "moral 
support" during his trial.  Abilov will have to obtain 
permission from the court examining his case and from the 
Procuracy in order to travel.  Pol-Econ Chief promised to 
assist with visa referrals and appointment requests at the 
State Department. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (C) Comment:  It is impossible to know at this stage 
whether the charges against Abilov and his business 
associates have any basis in fact, given that the 
transactions in question took place eight to ten years ago at 
a time when Kazakhstani law was rapidly changing and 
frequently imprecise.  The fact that Butya-Kapital was the 
only investment fund known to have paid dividends to its 
shareholders would seem to indicate that it was one of the 
best managed of the 167 funds created to privatize state 
assets, however, rather than a dishonest enterprise.  Indeed, 
Abilov's popularity with the Kazakhstani public is due in 
part to the fact that he helped many of them profit from 
their privatization vouchers.  The intensity of the Financial 
Police in pursuing Abilov does not therefore seem to be based 
on any genuine shareholder dissatisfaction with 
Butya-Kapital, but rather on political grounds.  Post sees 
the charges against Abilov as similar to the selective 
prosecution that Galymzhan Zhakiyanov experienced in 2002. 
If the authorities manage to prevent Abilov from financing 
his political allies, the Kazkakhstani opposition will be 
even further weakened. End comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA580, KAZAKHSTAN: AES UPDATES AMBASSADOR ON IPO,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA580 2006-11-15 11:41 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9420
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0580/01 3191141
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151141Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7677
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000580 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016 
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ PGOV PREL RS
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: AES UPDATES AMBASSADOR ON IPO, 
REGIONAL INVESTMENTS 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 379 
 
     B. ALMATY 2052 
 
Classified By: Amb. John Ordway, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: AES's Dale Perry briefed the Ambassador on 
November 7 on AES's preparations for an IPO of its regulated 
Kazakhstani assets; the company's efforts to buy three CHP 
(combined heat/power) plants in Omsk, Russia; and several 
avenues of possible cooperation with Samruk, Kazakhstan's 
holding company for state-owned assets.  On the subject of 
regional electricity integration, Perry reported that he had 
signed an MOU with Kyrgyz Prime Minister Kulov on November 6 
governing the construction of a 220kV transmission line 
across Kyrgystan.  AES's Ekibastuz Gres I plant had produced 
a record volume of electricity in October, Perry reported, 
and with prices trending upward, new long-term supply 
contracts on the horizon, and signs of further GOK regulatory 
reform, business in Kazakhstan has never been better for AES. 
End summary. 
 
Planned IPO of Regulated Assets 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Perry, AES's Regional Director for Eastern Europe and 
the CIS, informed the Ambassador that AES's planned IPO of 
40-45% of its regulated Kazakhstani assets (including two CHP 
plants and a trading company) had "stalled," due to 
complications in harmonizing international accounting 
systems.  Perry estimated that the IPO -- expected to raise 
$500-$600 million -- would take place in May or June 2007. 
Samruk, Perry explained, was likely to buy a 15-20% stake in 
the regulated companies as a "strategic partner." 
 
Further Cooperation with Samruk? 
-------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Perry explained that AES and Samruk were discussing 
other areas of potential partnership, including possible AES 
investment in a series of joint stock companies which had 
been transferred to Samruk, effective October 24.  (Note: 
Nine of the seventeen new companies incorporated into Samruk 
are energy companies, including three hydropower stations 
which AES operates on a concession from the GOK. Other 
notable companies incorporated into Samruk include Air 
Astana, Kazmortransflot, and the Astana, Pavlodar, and Aktobe 
airports.)  The state-owned electricity assets needed new 
investment, Perry explained, and AES would be a logical 
partner. 
 
4. (C) Perry also described AES's discussions with Samruk 
about possible cooperation in regional electricity projects. 
Samruk subsidiary KEGOC (the national grid company) would be 
a natural partner in AES's regional transmission line 
investments, Perry told Energy officer after the meeting, 
while KazMunaiGaz subsidiary "KMGEnergy" appeared interested 
in co-investing in a new Tajikistan hydropower project. 
However, Perry cautioned, Samruk was insisting that there be 
"Kazakhstani clients" for the hydropower project -- a demand 
which theoretically fit AES's desire to have a "backup sales 
plan" for the investment should selling power to Pakistan 
prove impossible.  Further on the subject of regional 
electricity, Perry informed the Ambassador that he had just 
signed an MOU with Kyrgyz Prime Minister Kulov granting AES 
24-month exclusivity to build the trans-Kyrgyz portion of the 
planned 220kV line stretching from the Kazakhstan/Kyrgystan 
border to the Tajikistan/Afghanistan border. 
 
 
AES Looks to Enter Russian Market 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Perry told the Ambassador (in confidence) that AES was 
"close" to acquiring a majority share in three CHP  plants 
(2000 combined MW) and "two old boilers" in the Omsk region 
of Russia.  AES had already reached agreement with SUEK 
(Siberian Coal Energy Company) to purchase a "blocking share" 
of the assets, Perry indicated; now the company was 
negotiating with UES to acquire sufficient additional shares 
to constitute a majority.  UES had been "nervous" about 
transferring a stake in a "strategic asset" to AES, Perry 
admitted, but AES had received a verbal "okay" on the deal 
from the Russian Anti-Monopoly Committee, and prospects 
looked good.  If the deal went through, Perry added, AES 
would be the first U.S. power generation company to enter the 
Russian market. 
 
ASTANA 00000580  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
"How Things Have Changed in Two Years..." 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) In addition to the IPO, prospective investment in 
Russia and growing cooperation with Samruk, Perry outlined 
other reasons to be upbeat about AES's regional business. 
The company's Ekibastuz Gres I coal-fired plant had set a 
plant record in October, he said, generating one billion kW 
of electricity.  The plant had run its four operating 500 MW 
blocks around the clock, he said, without suffering any 
break-downs -- proof that AES's investment in plant 
main
tenance had been effective.  Plans were moving forward to 
rehabilitate the first of AES's idle 500 MW blocks, based on 
AES's recent success in securing long-term generation 
contracts.  The company had recently signed two ten-year 
contracts for 90 MW, Perry explained.  More importantly, 
negotiations were underway on contracts for another 1600 MW, 
including a 1000 MW contract with "Russian Aluminum," the new 
entity created from the merger of SUAL, Rusal, and Glencore 
(Ref A).  Asked about AES's possible involvement in a Chinese 
investment to build what would be the world's largest power 
plant (7200 MW) in NE Kazakhstan (Ref B), Perry replied that 
he had no update, but was expecting news to emerge from 
Nazarbayev's December trip to Beijing. 
 
7. (C) Perry reported two other positive news items:  in a 
November 6 ministerial meeting, he said, KEGOC President 
Kanat Bozumbayev had acknowledged that Kazakhstan would face 
electricity shortages by 2008, and had admitted that 
regulatory reform -- and a rise in prices to 4 cents / kwH -- 
would be necessary to attract necessary investment. 
Furthermore, said, AES appeared close to securing a 
three-year distribution tariff from the government -- a 
breakthrough deal which would allow AES's distribution 
companies, at long last, to make planned investments and 
upgrades.  Reacting to Perry's long list of good news, the 
Ambassador remarked how dramatically things had changed for 
AES in the two years he had been in Kazakhstan.  Perry agreed 
that the change had been dramatic, adding that AES corporate 
management would never have approved AES's entry into the 
Russian market (para. 4) if things had not smoothed out for 
AES in Kazakhstan. 
 
...And How They've Stayed the Same 
---------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Laughing, Perry noted that despite his optimism and 
AES's growing regional business, in many ways things had 
stayed the same for AES.  The local financial police in 
Ust-Kamenogorsk, he said, had recently opened a tax case 
against AES, claiming that the company owed the tax 
liabilities of the bankrupt CHPs it had acquired in 1997. 
Further, AES had recently lost an environmental case 
concerning its Maikuben coal mine, and now faced a $4 million 
fine.  AES could have avoided the fine, Perry explained, by 
buying $150,000 worth of overpriced spare parts from the 
environmental inspector who carried out the investigation -- 
but had chosen not to pay the bribe and fight the case in 
court instead. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA573, KAZAKHSTANI PRESIDENT DISCUSSES REGIONAL AND

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA573 2006-11-15 01:53 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8933
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0573 3190153
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150153Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7671
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0071
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2091
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0275
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0397
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2151
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1642
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0014

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000573 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EINV AF IZ KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI PRESIDENT DISCUSSES REGIONAL AND 
DOMESTIC POLICY 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  In a 45-minute discussion following the 
dedication of the new embassy in Astana, President Nazarbayev 
expressed frustration with the misguided policies of Uzbek 
president Karimov, pledged Kazakhstani investment in 
Afghanistan, warned against any precipitous withdrawal of 
U.S. troops from Iraq, conveyed a warning from Hosni Mubarak 
that executing Saddam Hussein would cause mass unrest in the 
Middle East, and stated that Kazakhstan would implement 
significant political reforms in 2007.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) The Ambassador hosted President Nazarbayev at a 
lunch following the November 14 dedication of the new embassy 
in Astana.  Deputy Prime Minister Karim Masimov, Presidential 
Administration chief Adylbek Dzhaksybekov, Security Council 
secretary Marat Tazhin, chief of administrative affairs of 
 
SIPDIS 
the Presidential Administration Bulat Utemuratov, Foreign 
Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev, Astana akim Askar Mamin, 
presidential interpreter Magzhan Ilyasov, OBO Director 
Charles Williams, Amb. Elizabeth Jones, DCM, and Pol-Econ 
Chief (notetaker) also participated. 
 
3. (C) Nazarbayev expressed frustration with President 
Karimov of Uzbekistan's policies, concurring with the 
Ambassador that Uzbekistan would be the leading country in 
the region today if managed properly.  The Kazakhstani leader 
said that he had tried on numerous occasions to convince 
Karimov to lift restrictions on trade between the two 
countries, sign an agreement on guest workers, and allow 
Kazakhstani investment in the Uzbek economy, all to no avail. 
 "He sees terrorists everywhere" and therefore won't loosen 
up any of the rules, Nazarbayev said.  He added that he had 
even sent his leading economic advisor Grigoriy Marchenko to 
Uzbekistan to try to convince them to adopt wiser economic 
policies. 
 
4. (C) The Ambassador explained that with the reorganization 
of the State Department's geographic bureaus, the U.S. now 
looked at stable and relatively prosperous nations such as 
Kazakhstan and India to serve as pillars of the region. 
Nazarbayev agreed that it was in Kazakhstan's interest to 
promote integration and development in Central and South 
Asia, adding that Kazakhstan had recently sent a survey team 
to Afghanistan to look for investment opportunities. 
Motioning toward FM Tokayev as the lead on the issue, 
Nazarbayev said that the team had identified several 
potential investment projects. 
 
5. (C) Nazarbayev asked about the foreign policy impact of 
the recent congressional elections in the U.S., adding 
quickly that he hoped that the changes in the Congress would 
not result in an abrupt withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. 
Such a course of action, Nazarbayev stressed, would lead to 
civil war.  Iran would then take advantage of the power 
vacuum to invade.  In a separate conversation with the 
Ambassador, Nazarbayev said that Egyptian president Hosni 
Mubarak had recently told him that if Saddam Hussein is 
executed it will touch off a wave of unrest throughout the 
Sunni world.  Nazarbayev asked the Ambassador to convey 
Mubarak's warning to the White House. 
 
6. (C) Turning to Kazakhstan's own development, Nazarbayev 
stated that large-scale political reforms would be 
implemented in 2007.  He reminded his interlocutors that he 
had always insisted that the tasks of building the state 
structure and creating a strong economy should be fulfilled 
before moving on to political reform.  That point has now 
been reached, Nazarbayev said, and it is time to move forward 
with reform of the political system. 
 
Minimize Considered 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA569, EXBS: KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR’S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA569 2006-11-14 02:05 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7672
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0569/01 3180205
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140205Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7666
INFO RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC//NSAA//
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUCQAAA/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0387
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7772
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7735
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0730
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1937
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7056

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000569 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC PVANSON, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC-AMT LSPRINGER 
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE RBUCK 
DEPT FOR SCA/RA JSCHLOSSER 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN MO'MARA 
CBP/INA FOR CDONOFRIO AND RWATT 
USDOE/NNSA CWALKER, TPERRY AND EDESCHLER 
DOC FOR DCREED AND GPETERSEN-BEARD 
USCG FOR BGOLDEN 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT, BISHKEK, BAKU, DUSHANBE AND ASHGABAT FOR EXBS 
ADVISORS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP KZ
SUBJECT:  EXBS: KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR'S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE 
(OCTOBER 2006) 
 
I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS: 
 
       1. The Kazakhstan EXBS Program office completed its move 
across town from the interim Embassy Branch Office to the New 
Embassy Compound in October and is now fully operational, with 
brand-new computers and a beautiful new office space. 
 
 2. Andrew Offenbacher concluded his tenure with the EXBS Program in 
Kazakhstan on November 3.  New EXBS Program Advisor Michael Seguin 
arrived at post October 26 and has assumed charge of the office. 
 
 3. In a letter sent to the embassy in October, Kazakhstan's Customs 
Control Committee Chairman Askar Shakirov confirmed his interest in 
visiting the United States to learn about, among other things, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection's automated systems that help 
facilitate the flow of passengers and commercial goods.  Chairman 
Shakirov proposed that the visit take place during the first half of 
2007.  The trip is anticipated to be arranged within the framework 
of the State Department's Voluntary Visitor Program. 
 
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS CONDUCTED 
 
 1. October 3-5 - EXBS Program advisor conducted meetings with 
Kazakhstani officials from the Atomic Energy Committee and the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade on the margins of an export control 
workshop in Almaty. 
 
 2. October 10 - Baku-based EXBS Regional Maritime Advisor Mike 
Taffe joined EXBS Program Coordinator Gulnara Abildaeva and EXBS TDY 
Advisor Jim Kelly for meetings with representatives of Kazakhstan's 
Maritime Border Guard Division in the Caspian coastal cities of 
Aktau and Bautino.  In Bautino, Mike Taffe installed navigation 
software for the three fast response boats that were provided to 
Kazakhstan by the EXBS Program earlier this year.  A possible future 
boat ramp site was also identified, and a date was set for the 
painting of the three boats' hulls with anti-fouling paint.  Jim 
Kelly (EXBS TDY Advisor) and Gulnara Abildaeva (EXBS LES) met 
briefly with Major General Berkaliyev (First Deputy of the Border 
Service responsible for maritime and land border matters in 
Kazakhstan) at the Airport in Atyrau. The Major General advised us 
that President Nazarbayev had expressed his satisfaction with the 
SAFE boats donated by the U.S. He also advised us that the BG could 
use 3 additional SAFE boats, as well as a large vessel (with 
armaments and the capability of carrying 30 sailors) to patrol the 
Caspian near Atyrau; modular shelters for piers/border check points; 
large trucks; and tool kits. He also said that he will upon request 
provide EXBS with statistics demonstrating the effectiveness of the 
BG's patrolling activities. 
 
B.  TRAINING DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
 1. October 3-5 - The Department of Energy/National Nuclear 
Administration's (DOE/NNSA) International Nonproliferation Export 
Control Program (INECP) held a workshop in Almaty on export controls 
for biological research institutes.  The workshop achieved its goal 
of providing the bio institutes with information on Kazakhstan's 
national export control system, and was rather innovative in that it 
accomplished this by providing a forum for Kazakhstani nuclear firms 
such as Kazatomprom to share their extensive experience in 
establishing internal compliance programs.  The Almaty-based Nuclear 
Technology Safety Center (NSTC) NGO did an excellent job of 
organizing the event, upon conclusion of which all participants were 
 
ASTANA 00000569  002 OF 003 
 
 
provided with a copy of their recently-published "Model Internal 
Compliance Program Guide." 
 
 2. October 9-10 - The Monterey Institute's Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies hosted a two-day workshop in Almaty 
dedicated to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 
1540 in Central Asia and the Caucasus.  Embassy Astana Political 
Officer John Cooney attended the event. 
 
 3. October 31-November 1 - EXBS Program Coordinator Gulnara 
Abildaeva attended the second annual EXBS Program Workshop for 
Locally Employed Staff in Bratislava, Slovakia. 
 
C. EQUIPMENT DELIVERED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
       1. A replacement air conditioning control card and a 
voltmeter were transferred to the Border Guard's Maritime Division 
during the October 10 meeting. 
 
 2. As mentioned above, three navigation software packages were 
installed on the Maritime Border Guard Division's three 
EXBS-provided boats. 
 
D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT STATUS UPDATE 
 
 1. The NNSA INECP's Regional Internal Compliance Program workshop, 
originally scheduled for October 31-November 2 in Almaty, has been 
postponed and is now expected to be held in early 2007. 
 
 2. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Weapons of Mass 
Destruction / Proliferation Prevention Initiative (DTRA WMD-PPI) 
"Combating WMD Proliferation at Maritime Ports" training referred to 
in the September report has also been postponed from its original 
October 31-November 2 dates. 
 
 3. Representatives of the NNSA's Second Line of Defense Program 
will meet with Kazakhstani Customs and other agencies in Astana on 
November 15 and 16 to discuss the program's implementation schedule, 
roles and responsibilities, and other issues. 
 
 4. Department of Commerce contractor Commonwealth Trading Partners 
will send a representative to conduct an Internal Control Program 
follow-up Product Classification Workshop in Astana on November 23 
and 24. 
 
 5. The NNSA's INECP will hold a Commodity Identification Training 
in Almaty from December 4-8.  For the first time, the course will 
cover materials and equipment related to the production of not only 
nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological, as well as 
missile technology. 
 
 6. In the month of November or December, INECP will send a 
representative of the NSTC to three posts on Kazakhstan's border 
with China to Russify the software and operating system used to 
power the three x-ray fluorescence metal analyzers that were 
provided to Kazakhstani Customs earlier this year.  The NTSC 
representative will also review how the units are being used at the 
ports of entry. 
 
 7. U.S. Customs and Border Protection has scheduled an 
International Seaport Interdiction Training for Kazakhstan from 
February 12-16 in Charleston, North Carolina. 
 
 8. The EXBS Program's chosen contractor is currently working on 
 
ASTANA 00000569  003 OF 003 
 
 
Task Order 79, which includes the procurement of four modular 
shelters and high-clearance Ural trucks for transfer to Kazakhstan's 
Border Service. 
 
E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT CONTROLS, NONPROLIFERATION, OR 
RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
 
       1. BBC reports October 5: First Deputy Director of the 
Federal Security Service (Russia) and head of the Border Guard 
Service, Army General Vladimir Pronichev announced plans to allocate 
$160 million in 2007 for improved border control infrastructure. 
Gen. Pronichev indicated the $160 million is roughly the same amount 
allocated for Kazakhstani-Russian border enhancement for 2006 
(totaling roughly $320 million).  Funds are specifically intended 
for 20 facilities including administrative buildings and service 
housing.  EXBS Advisor will attempt to confirm these initiatives in 
upcoming Kazakh Border Guard meetings. 
 
       2. SKRIN Newswire reports October 24: President Putin of 
Russia and President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan signed six documents 
on October 3 regarding the establishment of an international nuclear 
center on Russian territory.  An agreement on joint construction of 
additional car check-points at borders, as well as the 
simplification of border crossings for residents was also signed. 
EXBS Advisor will attempt to confirm these initiatives as they 
relate to enhanced border crossing infrastructure in upcoming Kazakh 
Border Guard meetings. 
 
F. CASPIAN SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
       1. Please see paragraph A, item 2 and paragraph C, item 1 and 
2 above. 
 
III. RED FLAG ISSUES. 
 
       1. None. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA567, KAZAKHSTAN: ALMATY NOTES, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA567 2006-11-14 02:02 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7667
RR RUEHAST RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0567/01 3180202
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140202Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7662
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1640
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7770
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7733
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7054
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1935
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1338
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2149

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000567 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: ALMATY NOTES, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 
 
 
1. This is the first in a series of bi-weekly roundup cables on 
political developments in Almaty, Kazakhstan's "southern capital." 
The series is intended to maintain focus on developments in civil 
society, the media, and the opposition following the Embassy's move 
to Astana.  Items were drawn primarily from the local press and 
media. 
 
Rally Following Riot in Shanyrak district in Almaty 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2.  On September 23, the Alga political party and the Committee in 
Support of Shanyrak district residents organized a sanctioned rally 
on the outskirts of Almaty, behind the Saryarka cinema.   The rally 
was organized to support Almaty residents whose houses had been 
demolished or faced demolition.  According to Aynur Kurmanov of 
Socialist Resistance, about 600 people, including residents of Bakay 
and Shanyrak, participated in the peaceful rally.  However, 
according to correspondent of Taszhargan newspaper Bakhytgul 
Makembay, three buses carrying Bakay and Shanyrak residents to the 
rally site were stopped by the road police and detained for 
technical reasons.  The residents had to use other vehicles to get 
to the site.  According to noted Kazakh nationalist Dos Koshim, the 
head of the Shanyrak committee, 16 people accused of organizing the 
July 14 Shanyrak riot and taking a hostage are currently under 
arrest.  Three other participants of the skirmish were set free upon 
their written promise not to leave the city.  A national-level 
commission was set up to investigate the situation. 
 
3.  According to Kurmanov, on September 20 the Turksib district 
court in Almaty tried two young residents of Bakay, Ilyas Tompakov 
and Nurkhat Mukazhanov, who resisted the police during the July 7 
demolitions.  The young people, charged with using violence against 
a representative of the authorities, were sentenced to two years in 
prison and fined 100,000 tenge ($800) each. 
 
 
Activists Hold Unauthorized Rally 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.  On October 6, five activists from Socialist Resistance were 
detained in Almaty while picketing the Almaty City Police office. 
According to the movement's October 11 press release, the young 
people were delivering a protest petition about repression of the 
residents of the Shanyrak district.  The five participants of the 
protest action were taken to the city administrative court, which 
sentenced "Epokha" journalist Daniyar Yenikeyev to 10 days in jail. 
The other participants were fined.  According to the press release, 
the judge denied the detainees' requests for lawyers and several 
journalists were not allowed in the courtroom. 
 
5.  The police reportedly detained several of Yenikeyev's associates 
who gathered near the detention center on October 14, holding them 
for three hours.  When Yenikeyev was released on October 16, the 
police reportedly detained four of his colleagues who came to meet 
him.  They were held overnight; the following day, the Interdistrict 
Economic Court sentenced Socialist Resistance leader Aynur Kurmanov 
to five days detention. 
 
Almaty Akim Says Illegal Buildings "Should be Burned" 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6.  "Illegal buildings in Almaty should be burned down. Instead of 
doing this we are appealing to courts and procurators.  It takes 5-6 
months.  We have no time.  If it is an illegal building and there 
are no documents, heavy vehicles should be brought in to demolish 
it.  Afterwards, let them go to court," Almaty City Akim 
Tasmagambetov stated at a seating of the city administration on 
October 18.  According to data from the city administration, 140 
illegal buildings under construction were discovered between July 17 
and October 17.  58 cases on illegal construction have been sent to 
the city administrative court, which has issued a demolition ruling 
in only two cases to date.  (Interfax, October 18) 
 
 
Ak Zhol Leader Takes Seat in Parliament 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7.  On September 24, the Ak Zhol party held a congress in Almaty. 
In addition to the political situation in the country, concerns 
about draft labor code, and recommendations on how to raise 
Kazakhstan's competitiveness, the congress discussed the issue of 
the vacant seat in the Mazhilis that the party won in 2004.  (At 
that time, party leaders refused to take the seat in protest against 
the falsified election results.)  The congress decided to send a 
representative to the Mazhilis, but did not specify who that person 
 
ASTANA 00000567  002 OF 002 
 
 
would be.  On October 3, the Central Election Commission announced 
that it had registered party leader Alikhan Baymenov, who was number 
one on the party list in 2004, as a member of the Mazhilis. 
 
8.  No opposition papers criticized the move.  Otan parliamentary 
leader Amzebek Zholshibekov was quote as "hailing
" Ak Zhol's 
decision, saying that Baymenov's "desk is ready and all the 
committees are ready to accept him."  Independent journalist Valeriy 
Surganov, in his report on the Ak Zhol congress (www.zonakz.net, 
September 27), commented that taking the seat should be merely a 
technical issue since the party appeared to have consulted with the 
Presidential Administration in advance.  Surganov also commented 
that Ak Zhol is a party of and for ethnic Kazakhs, as 90% of its 
members are Kazakhs.   "Following Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, who in his 
program speech had promised to defend interests, first of all, of 
ethnic Kazakhs, the chairman of Ak Zhol stated almost the same using 
different language.  For example, he recommended that K Cell and K 
Mobile companies extend their services covering especially the rural 
areas, Kazakh villages." 
 
Opposition Supports Kazakhstan's OSCE Bid 
----------------------------------------- 
 
9. At a September 26 round table organized by Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, 
the opposition made a joint statement on Kazakhstan's bid to chair 
the OSCE.  The majority of opposition activists decided to support 
the bid if Kazakhstan introduces amendments providing for basic 
political rights and freedoms proclaimed by the constitution.  These 
include: the right to hold meetings, rallies, marches and picketing 
through a system of notification rather than permission; the right 
to free distribution of information and the revocation of media law 
amendments adopted in May; the introduction of the draft mass media 
law prepared by journalists; implementation of OSCE/ODIHR 
recommendations on election legislation; a halt to politically 
motivated prosecutions and the freeing of political prisoners. 
Zhakiyanov, in his comments on the statement, said: "In this case we 
are talking about [getting] at least minimal changes and 
improvements in the country."  According to political leaders, in 
the current situation Kazakhstan has no right to the chairmanship. 
However, the withdrawal of the bid would limit the political 
maneuvering of dissidents.  Alga and Ak Zhol issued similar 
statements of support.  (Channel-31, September 26, and Svoboda 
Slova, September 28) 
 
 
 
 
NGOs Propose Creation of Public TV 
---------------------------------- 
 
10.  On October 17 in Almaty, representatives of the Union of 
Journalists, True Ak Zhol, and the Adil Soz media freedom NGO 
organized a round table to discuss the concept of public television. 
 Participants discussed whether public TV will function along with 
general state TV channels, what the requirements are for members of 
the board of directors of the public TV, who will elect or appoint 
the board of directors, whether the legislation on public TV should 
include specific guiding criteria like objectivity, and who will 
finance public TV. 
Opinions were varied, with Patriots Party leader Ganiy Kasymov 
opining that the government should establish public television.  The 
participants agreed to set up a working group on the public TV 
concept.  (Interfax, October 17 and zonakz.net, October 20) 
 
 
True Ak Zhol protests detention of its activists 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
11.  On October 27, the True Ak Zhol political party issued a 
statement protesting the illegal detention of party activists in 
Atyrau Oblast.  The police in Atyrau Oblast detained six activists 
of the party on October 25 and 27.  The activists were accused of 
making and disseminating leaflets calling for unsanctioned rally on 
October 27 and calling for the resignation of oblast akim B. 
Ryskaliyev.  According to the statement, the police could produce no 
official documents specifying the grounds for the arrests.  The 
police allegedly did not allow the detainees to see their relatives, 
lawyers, or associates. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA563, KAZAKHSTANI GOVERNMENT REACTS TO HIV/AIDS SCANDAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA563 2006-11-13 09:12 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5984
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0563 3170912
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130912Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7660
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1993
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000563 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/GAC KRAPPOSELLI 
USAID FOR E&E/DGST PHOLMES, E&E BWALLIN; GH/HIDN/ID CVINCENT 
CDC FOR SBLOUNT, EMCCRAY AND PSIMONE 
TASHKENT FOR EPUTNAM 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV KHIV KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI GOVERNMENT REACTS TO HIV/AIDS SCANDAL 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 353, B. ASTANA 251 
 
1. Summary: The HIV/AIDS scandal in Shymkent continues to receive 
high-level attention.  On October 9, President Nazarbayev instructed 
Umurzak Shukeyev, the new Akim of the Southern Kazakhstan Oblast 
(SKO), to provide all necessary treatment to the 78 children 
infected with HIV as a result of contaminated blood transfusions and 
unsafe injection practices. On October 10, Minister of Health 
Anatoliy Dernovoy announced that the HIV outbreak in SKO has been 
contained.  President Nazarbayev visited Shymkent on October 25, 
where he demanded that those responsible for the outbreak be 
identified and punished.  End summary 
 
2. On October 10 Health Minister Anatoliy Dernovoy announced that 
the HIV/AIDS outbreak in Southern Kazakhstan (SKO) has been 
contained.  Seventy-eight children have been infected due to the 
reuse of disposable medical instruments, improper infection control 
practices in the hospital setting, or through contaminated blood 
transfusions. 
 
3. Minister Dernovoy visited the Southern Kazakhstan Oblast on 
October 15-16.  He stated that the quality of medical services in 
SKO is the worst in the country.  The equipment at the blood donor 
center in Shymkent, the largest city in SKO, is outdated and 
incapable of meeting all necessary safety requirements, said 
Dernovoy.  He added that most hospitals lack basic necessities, from 
hot water to linens.  Dernovoy noted that many medical personnel are 
poorly qualified. 
 
4. The Minister also condemned bribery in the regional hospitals and 
the misuse of budgetary funds.  Patients have to pay for everything 
- medical preparations, blood transfusions and treatment, said 
Dernovoy, and he asked where the twenty billion tenge ($156.6 
million) allocated annually for the oblast had been spent. 
 
5. Dernovoy called for better blood safety in Kazakhstan.  He stated 
that the government has allocated 65 million tenge ($500,000) to 
repair the existing blood center in Shymkent and 120 million tenge 
($940,000) to purchase disposable medical instruments and new 
equipment.  The GOK has also allocated 1.4 billion tenge ($10.9 
million) to build a new blood center in Shymkent. 
 
6. In his introductory meetings as new Akim of the Southern 
Kazakhstan Oblast, Umirzak Shukeyev learned that most hospitals are 
legally categorized as communal facilities, which permits them to 
require payment for services even in cases where free medical 
services are guaranteed by the state.  Shukeyev recommended that all 
children's hospitals and maternity clinics be registered as state 
organizations, thus ensuring that all services will be free. 
(Comment: This reaction reflects an unfortunate shift away from 
USG-supported health finance reforms in Kazakhstan, and disregards 
the fact that informal and under-the-table payments always have 
occurred in the inefficient Soviet system.  End comment.) 
 
7.  In reaction to the HIV outbreak in Shymkent, Kazakhstani 
authorities have examined blood centers throughout the country. 
Activities at blood centers in Zhezkazgan, Temirtau and Balkhash 
were suspended because of equipment degradation.  The Akmola 
Procurator has also recommended the suspension of activities at 
blood centers in Stepnogorsk and Atbasar, after discovering that the 
centers were using outdated equipment, including refrigerators 
manufactured 40 years ago. 
 
8. President Nazarbayev arrived in Shymkent on October 25 to discuss 
the HIV outbreak with oblast officials. Nazarbayev declared that 
urgent measures must be taken to revitalize the health care sector 
of the oblast.  He also urged procurators to quickly complete their 
investigation and to punish those guilty for the HIV outbreak. 
Kazakhstani authorities have already charged 17 doctors with 
negligence and investigators are now attempting to identify who 
recommended and performed the faulty blood transfusions and 
injections. 
 
9. Comment: The USG continues to assist the Ministry of Health with 
the reforms required above and beyond replacing old refrigerators. 
USAID and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
continue to provide technical assistance in Shymkent and input to 
the draft National Blood Safety Program, which should clarify roles 
and responsibilities of stakeholders, including the quality 
monitoring of blood bank services.  Many of the deeper flaws 
revealed by the Shymkent tragedy, however, will take years of 
continued health sector reforms to address. End comment

Wikileaks

06ASTANA561, KAZAKHSTAN SUBMITS START QUARTERLY COST LIST.

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA561 2006-11-13 06:13 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0561/01 3170613
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130613Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7657
INFO RUEAADN/DTRA DULLES WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHDC//OSS//
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0939
RUEHMO/USDAO-DTRO MOSCOW RS
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0004
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0652
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1336

UNCLAS ASTANA 000561 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
MOSCOW FOR DTRO-M/ACID; GENEVA FOR JCIC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM KTIA START KZ KREL KACT
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN SUBMITS START QUARTERLY COST LIST. 
 
1. On 2 November 2006, DTRO Astana (DTRO-A) received the START 
Quarterly Cost List for the period of 1 July through 30 September 
2006 from Lieutenant Colonel A. Aubakirov of the Ministry of Defense 
Arms Reduction Control and Inspection Activities Support Center. 
 
2. Unofficial Translation follows: 
U.S. Embassy Almaty 
ATTN: Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
Washington D.C. 20041-0498 
 
Summary List of the Categories of Goods and Services, Provided by 
the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Period 1 July through 30 
September 2006 
 
A summary list containing all categories of goods and services 
provided by the Republic of Kazakhstan and the estimated overall 
cost of the goods and services provided in each category, is as 
follows: 
 
A.   Inspections pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 
     of Article XI of the START-1 Treaty: 
 
1.  Fuel for inspection aircraft:               None 
2.  Servicing of inspection aircraft:           None 
3.  Meals and lodging at the P.O.E.:            None 
4.  Transportation of inspectors and equipment: None 
5.  Emergency medical assistance:               None 
 
Detailed lists, by category, of goods and services for the period 1 
July through 30 September 2006, are provided in the enclosures. 
 
Enclosures: As stated, on 2 Pages. 
 
 
Authorized Representative: 
Colonel   //signature//   A. Aubakirov 
 
//Begin enclosure// 
 
ITEMIZED LIST - A1 
 
FOR: Fuel for inspection aircraft for the period 1 July through 30 
September 2006 
 
For the period 1 July through 30 September 2006, goods and services 
in this category were not provided. 
 
ITEMIZED LIST - A2 
 
FOR: Servicing of inspection aircraft for inspections for the period 
1 July through 30 September 2006 
 
For the period 1 July through 30 September 2006, goods and services 
in this category were not provided. 
 
ITEMIZED LIST - A3 
 
FOR: Meals and lodging at the Point of Entry (POE) and at the 
inspection site for the period 1 July through 30 September 2006 
 
For the period 1 July through 30 September 2006, goods and services 
in this category were not provided. 
 
ITEMIZED LIST - A4 
 
FOR: Transportation of inspectors and their equipment for the period 
1 July through 30 September 2006 
 
For the period 1 July through 30 September 2006, goods and services 
in this category were not provided. 
 
ITEMIZED LIST - A5 
 
FOR: Emergency medical assistance, including emergency evacuation of 
inspectors from the inspection site to the Point of Entry for the 
period 1 July through 30 September 2006 
 
For the period 1 July through 30 September 2006, goods and services 
in this category were not provided. 
 
//end enclosure// 
End of Unofficial Translation 
 
3. POCs for this action are DTRO-A Staff Laura Smiley and Marcus 
Smith; Office Tel. (from the U.S.) 011-7-3172-702-100; 
011-7-333-223-0864; E-mail: AlmatyDTRO@state.gov 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA559, INL TRAINING, OCTOBER 30 – NOVEMBER 2, FRANKFURT RSC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA559 2006-11-13 04:59 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5780
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0559/01 3170459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130459Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 6566
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7653
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0385
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0131
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7052
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7767
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1933
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0002
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1334
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7730
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 2232

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000559 
 
SIPDIS 
 
POSTS FOR INL AND FMO 
 
DEPT FOR INL/AAE, INL/RM, SCA/CEN, EUR/EX, EUR/RUS 
 
FROM THE REGIONAL INL OFFICER ASTANA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM AMGT AFIN ASEC
SUBJECT: INL TRAINING, OCTOBER 30 - NOVEMBER 2, FRANKFURT RSC 
 
REF: ASTANA 097 
 
1.  Summary:  INL/RM, INL Regional Officer, and INL/AAE conducted 
training for INL personnel and financial management staff from 
missions in Central Asia, Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine at 
the Frankfurt Regional Support Center (RSC) October 30-November 2. 
 
 
2.  The training introduced participants to INL's new Local 
Financial Management System (LFMS); introduced new employees (and 
refreshed the memory of the experienced officers) to INL procurement 
procedures and policies; provided an overview of INL funding and 
budgeting; included a round table discussion on vetting which will 
be reported septel; updated all participants on changes to the new 
foreign assistance funding "F" process; generated enthusiasm for 
regular training continuum for INL Officers and in particular LES 
employees; and generated thanks and praise for RSC Frankfurt's 
facilities and staff.  End summary. 
 
------------------------- 
LFMS, PROCUREMENT, BUDGET 
------------------------- 
 
3.  Russ Hugo, Paul Schindwolf, Saowanee Wannawichya, and Wanlabha 
Kumhaeng from INL/RM Bangkok guided all participants through the new 
LFMS application.  Attendees reacted positively to the options it 
provides and look forward to implementing it at their posts. 
Participants requested INL Washington issue guidance on how to 
distribute LFMS data entry workload between ICASS service providers 
and INL personnel. 
 
4.  Mary Pat Hayes-Crow from INL/RM/MS provided a comprehensive 
overview of procurement and even arranged for extra sessions from 
RPSO Frankfurt and the Defense Logistics Agency.  Suggestions by 
participants on procurement included exploring the possibility of a 
blanket waiver for countries of the former Soviet Union to purchase 
Russian language/manufacture computers, other equipment, and 
vehicles. 
 
5.  Ellen Winchester and Dabriun Swain from INL/RM/BUD briefed the 
participants on the movement of funds.  All participants now have a 
better idea of processes that result in funds arriving at post from 
Congressional appropriations.  It is expected that the mechanics of 
the funding process that distributes funds from the Department to 
post will be simplified once LFMS is fully implemented. 
 
6.  INL/AAE's Aaron Alton, Andrew Buhler and Elizabeth Carroll 
briefed post personnel on the new F budgeting process and on INL's 
role in the core teams and the decision making on funding levels for 
INL programs. 
 
------- 
VETTING 
------- 
 
 
7. Vetting was the subject of a group discussion that revealed many 
frustrations with the process, although absolutely no disagreement 
about the need to implement the law.  All agreed with the necessity 
of vetting police/security/law enforcement participants receiving 
INL funded assistance, but similarly agreed that there were too many 
gray areas in the policy guidance.  In particular, participants 
noted lack of clarity regarding vetting of police officers receiving 
assistance through third party implementers such as the United 
Nations or the International Organization for Migration or 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  INL/AAE attendees offered to 
consolidate the numerous questions and clarify the uncertainties via 
front channel cable to all posts. 
 
-------- 
TRAINING 
-------- 
 
8.  Many participants advocated improving the quantity and quality 
of training for INL American and LES employees.  The ongoing session 
(and its two previous iterations for Central Asian posts in June 
2006 and October 2005) were viewed as excellent venues to develop 
 
ASTANA 00000559  002 OF 002 
 
 
project proposals, improve employee skills, and disseminate 
information about new programs and policy.  Suggestions were raised 
that training could further be improved by establishing regular INL 
courses/modules at FSI on procurement, budget, project design and 
implementation, end-use monitoring, vetting, etc, especially for INL 
LE staff members as they are the continuity for all INL overseas 
programs.  A regular training continuum would be useful so that 
newly hired employees would be trained in introductory courses, 
while those with several years of experience would progress through 
a series of higher level courses to provide the necessary knowledge 
to properly and effectively fulfill the INL mission. 
 
----------------------- 
KUDOS FOR RSC FRANKFURT 
----------------------- 
 
9.  Participants unanimously offered kudos to RSC Annett Jurkutat 
who made all arrangements
for use of training rooms at the RSC and 
requested hotel reservations for the participants.  Ms. Jurkutat was 
organized, logical, and efficient and participants appreciated her 
flexibility in the face of numerous changes to the participant list. 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA508, KAZAKHSTAN ENVIRONMENT UPDATE, OCTOBER 31

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA508 2006-11-08 09:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2953
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0508/01 3120945
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080945Z NOV 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7607
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1991
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000508 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TASHKENT FOR EPUTNAM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON SENV ENRG EPET KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN ENVIRONMENT UPDATE, OCTOBER 31 
 
 
ASTANA 00000508  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Summary:  This information is drawn primarily from the 
Kazakhstani press and has not been verified.  The opinions expressed 
in this report, therefore, should not be interpreted as official 
positions and/or policy of the U.S. Government. 
 
-- Khrunichev Center Wins Tender for Creation of Kazsat-2 
-- Spread of HIV quickens in Kazakhstan in 2006 
-- Memorandum on Conservation of Saiga Signed 
-- EC to Help Kazakhstan Develop National Environmental 
   Programs 
-- Nazarbayev Calls for Science Reforms in Kazakhstan 
-- Chinese-Kazakh Commission Discusses Border River      Protection 
-- New Complex for Storing Dangerous Waste Will Be Opened 
-- Students from India Sick with Enteric Fever 
-- Ecological Code Has Been Approved by Mazhilis 
-- Buarbai-Schuchye Resort Area To Be Developed 
 
 
Khrunichev Center Wins Tender for Creation of Kazsat-2 
 
2. Russia's state-owned Khrunichev Space Center has won a tender for 
a second communication satellite Kazsat-2, worth $115 million, which 
is planned to be launched between June and August 2009.  According 
to Gabdullatif Murzakulov, deputy director of Kazakhstan's Center 
for Space Communications and Electromagnetic Compatibility of 
Electronic Devices, the technical characteristics of the Kazsat-2 
are similar to those of the Kazsat-1. Kazsat-2 will be sent into an 
orbit of 32-33,000 kilometers over the equator and oriented for 
providing television and telecommunication services 
(Interfax-Kazakhstan, September 25, 2006). 
 
Spread of HIV quickens in Kazakhstan in 2006 
 
3. Minister of Health Care Anatoly Dernovoy announced that as of 
October 1, Kazakhstan has registered a total of 6,943 HIV infected 
individuals, including 426 AIDS cases. The number of new HIV-cases 
in 2006 almost doubled from 2005 and totaled 1,266, including 86 
children under 14. In terms of HIV, Kazakhstan ranks fifth in CIS, 
keeping behind Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Belarus. 
(Interfax-Kazakhstan October 10, 2006) 
 
Memorandum on Conservation of Saiga Signed 
 
4. On September 25 in Almaty, representatives from the Agriculture 
Ministries of Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and 
experts from international environmental protection agencies met to 
discuss the conservation of the saiga antelope, which has decreased 
in number from 1.2 million in the 1990s to 21,000 at present. 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan signed a memorandum which 
obliges them to take measures to protect the saiga antelope. Russia 
refrained from signing the memorandum.   Poaching and uncontrolled 
mass shooting are the main reasons for the decrease of saiga 
population. An intergovernmental agreement on saiga protection is to 
be developed within the framework of the international meeting 
(Interfax-Kazakhstan, September 29, 2006). 
 
 
EC to Help with National Environmental Programs 
 
5. The European Commission intends to help three Central Asian 
states to develop national environmental strategies.  On October 11 
in Almaty it presented the project "Development of National 
Ecostrategies for Sustainable Development of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan." The EC will help Kazakhstan to identify and address 
its environmental problems.  (TV News, October 11, 2006; Channel 31, 
October 11, 2006; Panorama, October 13, 2005). 
 
Nazarbayev Calls for Science Reform 
 
6. On October 13, President Nazarbayev congratulated the National 
Academy of Sciences on its 60th anniversary. In his address he 
announced that a special state program would be adopted to 
strengthen Kazakhstani science programs.  Science financing will be 
increased 25 times. A science foundation will be established. The 
foundation will be engaged in selection, expert evaluation, 
financing and monitoring of engineering development. Two billion 
tenge ($16 million) will be allocated for scientific and technical 
activity in 2007 through the Science Foundation, which is equal to 
10% of all funds allocated to science in the country. A university 
focused on science will be opened in Astana.  Priority directions of 
scientific and technical development will be nanotechnology, 
biotechnology, nuclear technology, space activity, 
information-and-communication technology and new technology for 
hydrocarbon and mining-and-metallurgical industry (Liter, October 
14, 2006; Express K, October 14, 2006). 
 
Chinese-Kazakh Commission on Border River Protection 
 
7. The fourth meeting of the Kazakhstani-Chinese commission on the 
 
ASTANA 00000508  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
use and protection of cross-border rivers opened in Almaty on 
October 16. The commission discussed the use and protection of 
cross-border water resources. The Kazakhstani-Chinese commission was 
set up in 2003. (Interfax-Kazakhstan, October 16, 2006). 
 
Top of Form 
New Complex for Dangerous Waste Will Be Opened in Atyrau 
 
8. A new complex for storage of dangerous waste will soon be opened 
in Atyrau.  The complex will allow companies involved in development 
and processing of hydrocarbon raw materials to store waste without 
harming the environment. (Express K, October 17, 2006). 
 
Students from India Sick with Enteric Fever 
 
9. KTK announced that three students from India who had returned to 
Karaganda to continue studies at the Karaganda Medical Academy have 
enteric fever. This disease has not recently been registered in 
Kazakhstan. Preventive measures were taken at hostels and at the 
Academy. (KTK, October 26, 2006) 
 
Ecological Code Has Been Approved by Mazhilis 
 
10. A new ecological code was approved by Mazhilis on October 26. 
The code determines basic ecological requirements for many types of 
economic activity. The code does away with provisions that had 
permitted selling part of quotas of some natural users to others, 
and reduces the types of activities allowed in the sphere of 
environment. It also adopts a norm according to which the payment 
rate for emissions into environment should be established by the 
Government. (Interfax-Kazakhstan ,October 26). 
 
The Buarbai-Schuchye Resort Area Being Developed 
 
11. A Burabai-Schuchye health resort zone is being designed in the 
Akmola Oblast.  The program will be implemented in 2007-2010.  The 
program is intended to reconstruct the Kokshetau airport, build 
entertainment complexes, casinos and golf clubs and health resort 
facilities and a center for primary health care in the Burabai 
settlement.  Construction of an international level skiing complex 
has started.  Extending the route of fast electric trains from 
Almaty to Astana and Burabai and from Omsk to Petropavlovsk and 
Burabai is under consideration. A new water supply system will also 
be provided (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, October 28, 2006). 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA503, KAZAKHSTAN TO CONSIDER US POSITION ON UNGA HUMAN RIGHTS AND

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA503 2006-11-08 06:03 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2763
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #0503 3120603
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080603Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7601
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1871

UNCLAS ASTANA 000503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/UNP (BETTS) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL KTIA UNGA UN CU KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN TO CONSIDER US POSITION ON UNGA HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
CUBA EMBARGO RESOLUTIONS 
 
REF: A) State 182267 B) State 182099 
 
1. (U) Pol Chief and Poloff delivered reftel demarches to Murat 
Tashibayev, director of the MFA's Department of International 
Organizations and Security Issues, on November 7. 
 
2. (SBU) Tashibayev concurred that Kazakhstan and the U.S. would be 
most likely to find common ground on the resolutions dealing with 
Iran, Burma, and the DPRK.  The annual Cuba resolution is always 
tricky for Kazakhstan, he noted, due to the former USSR's ties with 
Cuba.  Tashibayev said that he would brief Deputy Foreign Minister 
Abdrakhmanov on the U.S. position, but did not make any commitments 
as to how his government would vote. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA502, KAZAKHSTAN: ASSURANCES FOR RETURN OF KAZAKHSTANI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA502 2006-11-08 02:21 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2731
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0502/01 3120221
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080221Z NOV 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7599
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000502 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI (STAMILIO), L/PM (AHAINES), SCA/CEN (M. 
O'MARA), DOD/OGC (BEAVER), OUSD/DETAINEE POLICY (LIOTTA), NSC 
(CAMPONOVO) 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER KAWC PINR PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  ASSURANCES FOR RETURN OF KAZAKHSTANI 
DETAINEES 
 
REF:  A. State 146996, B. Almaty 3086 
 
ASTANA 00000502  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Kazakhstan has agreed to the return of three 
citizens held at Guantanamo, and has provided written assurances 
regarding human rights and security issues.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On November 7, Poloff met with Ualikhan S. Sanginkhanov, 
Head of the MFA's Division of Europe and America, Department of 
Consular Services to further discuss the Kazakhstani detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay.  Sanginkhanov had requested the meeting in order to 
pass Poloff the official Kazakhstani diplomatic note providing the 
human rights and security assurances requested in Ref A in order to 
initiate the process of the repatriation of three Kazakhstani 
detainees. 
 
3. (SBU) The original Russian-language text of the diplomatic note 
will be scanned and sent via email to SCA/CEN Marty O'Mara.  Post 
translation of the text follows. 
 
Begin text: 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the 
Embassy of the United States of America in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and in reply to the Embassy's diplomatic note No. 0976/06 
of September 18, 2006, has the honor to inform the Embassy of the 
following. 
 
The Kazakhstani side, having considered the proposal of the United 
States Government regarding the return to Kazakhstan of Kazakhstani 
citizens who are currently under the control of the U.S. Department 
of Defense at the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, agrees to 
accept A.B. Abykhanov, S.T. Arupov and I.T. Batayev on the territory 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
 
The Kazakhstani side, pursuant to the agreement with the American 
side of September 14, 2006, will accept Kazakhstani citizen D.I. 
Kerimbakiyev if he is not found guilty by the competent authorities 
of the United States of America. 
 
Upon acceptance of transferred persons, in order to ensure that 
there is no continued threat to the international community, the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, or the United States, the Kazakhstani side 
will take, as far as possible, all necessary and appropriate steps 
consistent with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan to 
prevent the above-named Kazakhstani citizens from engaging in 
terrorist activity. 
 
Additionally, the Kazakhstani side notes that in accordance with the 
legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan a capable citizen of 
Kazakhstan should himself bear all responsibility for his actions 
and conduct, including criminal responsibility. 
 
The Kazakhstani side will carry out necessary actions for 
identifying the transferred persons and will inform the United 
States Government in case the transferred persons seek to leave 
Kazakhstan or succeed in doing so. 
 
At the same time the Kazakhstani side notes that under Kazakhstani 
law, it would be possible to enter the transferred persons into 
appropriate national or international watch lists, restrict their 
travel outside the country, confiscate their passports or deny them 
permission to travel only in case of their prosecution in accordance 
the established procedures for committing criminal act and under the 
preventive punishment restricting their constitutional rights, 
including freedom of movement. 
 
The Kazakhstani side is ready to provide information received from 
the stated persons or in regard to them in case it poses a threat to 
the interests of the United States of America or is connected to the 
terrorist activity. The Republic of Kazakhstan will assist the 
American side in granting access to A.B. Abykhanov, S.T. Arupov, 
I.T. Batayev in case of their consent with the representative of the 
American side. 
 
The Kazakhstani side will treat transferred persons in accordance 
with the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan and its international 
obligations including the Convention against Torture. 
 
Additionally, the Kazakhstani side is addressing a request to the 
American side to submit as soon as possible legalized and 
operational documents regarding the circumstances of detention of 
the above-named citizens of Kazakhstan in Afghanistan, their 
statements during interrogations, as well as other available 
 
ASTANA 00000502  002.4 OF 002 
 
 
information confirming their implication in terrorist activity. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this occasion to 
renew to the Embassy of the United States of America the assurance 
of its highest consideration. 
 
Astana 
November 6, 2006 
 
End text. 
 
4. (SBU) Kazakhstani security officials also expressed interest in 
interviewing the detainees again before a transfer.  They have been 
informed to make their request through their embassy in Washington. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA501, KAZAKHSTAN: ‘THE TENGIZ BRAWL’ HIGHLIGHTS UNDERLYING

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06ASTANA501.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA501 2006-11-08 02:20 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2663
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0501/01 3120220
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080220Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7597
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1989
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 1036

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000501 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ENRG ELAB PREL KZ TU
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: 'THE TENGIZ BRAWL' HIGHLIGHTS UNDERLYING 
PROBLEMS 
 
 
ASTANA 00000501  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  A recent fight between Turkish and Kazakhstani 
workers at the Tengiz oilfield involved over 400 people and has 
received widespread public attention.  Despite isolated press 
reports that as many as a dozen Turkish workers were killed during 
the fight, our TengizChevroil (TCO) contacts have assured us there 
were no fatalities or life-threatening injuries.  While reactions 
have varied widely, the incident has helped stir Kazakh nationalism 
and led many to pose questions about wage inequalities and possible 
discrimination against Kazakh laborers.  End summary. 
 
--------- 
The Fight 
--------- 
 
2.  (U) On Friday, October 20, a brawl broke out at the Tengiz oil 
field in Atyrau oblast between Kazakh and Turkish workers.  (Note: 
Kazakhstani workers at Tengiz tend to be ethnic Kazakhs.  The Tengiz 
oil field is operated by Tengizchevroil, a joint venture between 
Chevron (50%), ExxonMobil (25%), KazMunaiGaz (20%) and LukArco (5%). 
 Nearing the end of a labor-intensive expansion phase, the field 
currently employees 14,000 workers.  End note.)  The official 
investigation conducted by the procuracy and the National Security 
Committee ("KNB") determined that the brawl started with an argument 
between a Kazakh worker and two Turkish workers, when the latter 
refused to sign the former's work authorization form.  According to 
the investigation, a heated exchange followed, leading to the two 
Turkish workers striking their Kazakh counterpart.  Witnessed by a 
large number of employees - both Kazakh and Turkish - the incident 
quickly grew into a mass brawl.   Early reports of fatalities have 
been refuted. 
 
------------- 
The Aftermath 
------------- 
 
3. (SBU) TCO General Director Todd Levy announced on November 2 that 
196 individuals had been injured in the fight, including 193 Turks, 
two Kazakhs, and one Indian.  TCO's Government Relations Director, 
Antonio Palmeirim, told Econoff later the same day that the true 
number of Kazakhs injured in the melee was not known, as many had 
left the site with minor injuries and received treatment at home. 
Palmeirim reported that, contrary to the more lurid press reports, 
no one had been killed or received a life-threatening injury during 
the melee.  One Turkish worker, he said, had undergone minor surgery 
for a concussion. 
 
4. (SBU) Ted Etchison, Chevron's Deputy Managing Director for the 
company's Eurasia Business Unit, called Ambassador Ordway on October 
22, seeking an introduction to the Turkish Ambassador in order to 
solicit the latter's help in calming Turkish workers and averting a 
threatened walk-off of nearly 1000 Turkish contract employees.  (At 
that time, Etchison estimated that nearly 400 Turks had already left 
the field, mostly to seek medical attention.)  Etchison reported 
later that the Turkish employees, as well as the Turkish Ambassador, 
were demanding that security measures at Tengiz be bolstered in 
order to avoid similar incidents in the future.  Etchison told the 
Ambassador that TCO would make every effort to meet the demands. 
 
5. (SBU) Palmeirim reported on October 31 that TCO had successfully 
averted a massive walk-off, and that work activities at the field 
were gradually returning to normal. 
He later spelled out some of the specific security measures that 
were being put into place at the field, including the assignment of 
nearly 200 Kazakhstani police to the site, the installation of 
surveillance cameras and identification checks at working and 
accommodation sites, and the temporary segregation of employees in 
their living quarters.  Palmeirim noted that a new, global security 
plan, negotiated by TCO, its contractors, and Atyrau oblast 
officials, would soon be implemented. 
 
--------------- 
Public Reaction 
--------------- 
 
6. (U) While the Tengiz brawl is not unprecedented, its scale has 
attracted a great deal of attention from both politicians and the 
media.  The remarks of the Turkish Ambassador to Kazakhstan - that 
the Turkish workers are "guests" in Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan, 
therefore, bears the responsibility - were perceived negatively by 
many Kazakhstani observers.  Mazhilis Deputy Nurpeis Makhashev, an 
Otan-affiliated representative of a district in the Atyrau oblast 
and former president of an oil company, was quoted in the 
pro-government "Megapolis" newspaper as blaming unspecified "forces 
in the world" that "do not want stability in Muslim countries."  The 
article goes on to conclude that "what is left to do is find an 
 
ASTANA 00000501  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
obvious American trace."  Opposition "Svoboda Slova", on the other 
hand, chose to search for causes of the Tengiz brawl deep within. 
The fight, it opined, represents a "revolt of national 
consciousness," "a splas
h of ancestral memory," and a "revival of 
the genetic code developed over several centuries" of "glorious 
battles defending the Kazakh steppes." 
 
7. (U) The reaction of the government and high-profile officials has 
been much more tempered.  A spokesman for the Kazakhstani MFA said 
in a news conference that the Tengiz incident "was caused by routine 
problems," will not harm Kazakhstani-Turkish ties, and "by no means 
reflects the spirit and content of the bilateral cooperation between 
the brotherly peoples of Kazakhstan and Turkey."  Dariga 
Nazarbayeva, leader of the Aimak faction in the Parliament, has 
called on the Foreign Investors' Council to "take measures for 
resolving conflicts at enterprises with foreign participation." 
(Note: The Foreign Investors' Council is an advisory body 
established in 1998 by Presidential order to promote dialogue 
between the GOK and foreign investors.  End note.)  Nazarbayeva 
remarked that the main causes behind the growing trend of conflicts 
at foreign-owned enterprises are violations of labor regulations and 
worker safety guidelines, lack of attention to social problems, and 
a discrepancy between wages of local and foreign workers.  She added 
that the government needs to pay more attention to preparing more 
skilled workers from the midst of the local population. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment:  Although the proximate cause of the 'Tengiz 
brawl' was a garden-variety fight, the incident highlights 
underlying issues.  One is Kazakhstan's lack of skilled workers, a 
deficit that commonly leads foreign investors to hire a volatile mix 
of higher-paid skilled foreigners alongside unskilled Kazakh 
laborers.  This contributes to a nationalist undercurrent, further 
fueled by simmering disaffection over the failure of Kazakhstan's 
economic boom to significantly improve the lot of much of its 
regional population.  The occasional result, as in the case of the 
Tengiz brawl, is an outpouring of moderate populist anger against 
foreigners perceived to benefit from Kazakhstan's natural riches at 
the Kazakhstanis' expense.  End comment. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA495, KAZAKHSTAN: NEW CENTER-RIGHT “ATAMEKEN” PARTY HOLDS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA495 2006-11-07 10:31 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1682
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0495/01 3111031
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071031Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7593
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000495 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NEW CENTER-RIGHT "ATAMEKEN" PARTY HOLDS 
FOUNDING CONGRESS, BEGINS REGISTRATION PROCESS 
 
 
ASTANA 00000495  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  On October 27, the organizers of a new political 
party called "Atameken" (Fatherland) held their founding congress in 
Almaty.  The party is styled as a center-right party committed to 
championing the middle class and small and medium-size 
entrepreneurs.  Although presidential son-in-law Timur Kulibayev is 
purportedly backing the party, no well-known business leaders or 
other officials were visible at the congress, and the event received 
very little attention in the media.  The party must now collect 
50,000 petition signatures and open offices in each oblast in order 
to complete registration as a political party.  End summary. 
 
------------------ 
THE PARTY PLATFORM 
------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) On October 27, Poloff and PolFSN attended the legally 
required founding congress of the new Atameken party, held at the 
Kazakh-British University in Almaty.  Poloff also met with party 
organizers after the congress.  According to party documents and the 
organizers, the party is intended to emulate the conservative 
parties in the United Kingdom and Canada, the Republican Party in 
the United States, and the Union of Right Forces in Russia, among 
others. 
 
3. (U) The party plans to champion the interests of the middle 
class, particularly the owners of small and medium-sized businesses. 
 Party leaders condemned the systemic corruption in Kazakhstan, 
which hinders small and medium-sized entrepreneurs in the 
development of the middle class.  The party's declaration of 
principles advocates economic reforms to strengthen the free market, 
judicial independence, tax cuts for small and medium-size 
businesses, and greater media freedom, among other things.  The 
leaders of two groups of disabled citizens endorsed the party, and 
several speakers pledged to fight for the rights of disabled people. 
 Overall, the party leadership was careful to indicate their support 
for President Nazarbayev, and much of the party's ideas were 
presented in the context of supporting the president's vision for 
Kazakhstan. 
 
------------------ 
THE PARTY CHAIRMAN 
------------------ 
 
4. (U) The public driving force behind the new party is Yerzhan 
Dosmukhamedov, a western-educated political activist, consultant, 
and member of the Presidential Council on Entrepreneurship. 
Dosmukhamedov is an advisor to presidential son-in-law and 
KazMunaiGaz president Timur Kulibayev, and has held a number of 
government and advisory positions in recent years.  In a series of 
articles and published interviews in the year leading up to the 
founding congress, Dosmukhamedov laid out his vision for a party of 
entrepreneurs and the reforms it would advocate.  The collection of 
articles and interviews was available in book form at the congress, 
and included a complimentary letter from Margaret Thatcher.  The 
delegates unanimously elected Dosmukhamedov chairman of the new 
party. 
 
--------------------- 
THE FOUNDING CONGRESS 
--------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) At the congress, Dosmukhamedov announced that 1,112 
delegates from 12 oblasts were present.  (Note: Kazakhstani law 
requires new political parties to hold a founding congress with at 
least 1000 delegates, representing at least two-thirds of the 
oblasts in the country.  End note.)  Poloff and Pol FSN observed 
several hundred fewer people in the congress hall.  The congress 
started late, and in general seemed disorganized and low-budget. A 
large segment of the attendees were university students who were 
given the day off from class to attend.  They were prohibited from 
leaving early.  Many were attentive and interested, but several did 
not know why they were there.  Likewise, a number of disabled 
citizens were transported to the congress, but several did not know 
the purpose of the gathering. 
 
6. (SBU) No well-known business leaders or other officials were 
visible at the congress.  Approximately 10 journalists attended a 
press conference after the event, but the congress received very 
little coverage in the press.  On the day before the congress, 
Poloff met with opposition leaders Tulegen Zhukeyev, cochairman of 
the True Ak Zhol Party, and Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, chairman of the 
Civil Society foundation.  Neither was aware of the impending 
founding congress, and both predicted that President Nazarbayev 
would not allow a new political party associated with Timur 
Kulibayev, given recent moves to merge pro-presidential parties with 
the dominant Otan Party. 
 
7. (U) In order to become a registered party, Atameken leaders must 
 
ASTANA 00000495  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
register 50,000 members in the next two months, with at least 700 
members from each oblast and the cities of Astana and Almaty. 
Within six months of registration, the party must open and register 
branch offices in each oblast and the cities of Astana and Almaty. 
 
----
--- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: Dosmukhamedov's writings and public comments 
reveal a consistent and articulate vision of political reforms 
designed to fight corruption, help the middle class, and promote 
small and medium-sized businesses.  Dosmukhamedov is clearly a savvy 
political operator with close ties to first son-in-law Timur 
Kulibayev.  Despite his organizational and public relations efforts, 
however, the Atameken founding congress was an unimpressive event 
that received little public attention.  The founding congress 
nevertheless served its legal purpose, and assuming the party is 
registered it may prove to be a useful vehicle for Kulibayev's 
future political ambitions.  In the meantime, the party's success or 
failure in Kazakhstan's complex party registration process will shed 
light on whether it has sufficient high-level consent to survive in 
a political landscape that has recently seen the dominant Otan Party 
swallow other pro-presidential parties. End comment. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA492, KAZAKHSTAN: NATIONAL OIL FUND MECHANISM CHANGED

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06ASTANA492.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA492 2006-11-07 10:30 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1662
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0492/01 3111030
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071030Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7589
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000492 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON PGOV ENRG EPET KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NATIONAL OIL FUND MECHANISM CHANGED 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  In July 2006, the government of Kazakhstan 
implemented a new mechanism governing contributions to the National 
Fund, altering the rules for state use of oil revenues.  Under the 
new mechanism, all oil-sector revenues are steered directly to the 
National Fund and invested abroad, with the budget receiving back a 
legislated amount earmarked for "development projects." 
Non-development expenditures, meanwhile, are to be funded 
exclusively via the "non-oil budget." The new mechanism reinforces 
the GOK's overall objective of stimulating diversification.  In 
implementing the new mechanism, the GOK followed World Bank 
recommendations closely, and appears to have taken another solid 
step in legislating prudent spending limits and responsible 
management of Kazakhstan's oil revenues.  End summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
2. (U) The GOK established the National Fund by presidential decree 
in August 2000.  The National Fund, invested entirely abroad, was 
designed both to save oil revenues for future generations and to 
reduce the national budget's dependence on world commodity prices 
and the economy's vulnerability to inflationary pressures caused by 
inflows of excess petrodollars.  As of September 2006, the National 
Fund had accumulated $11.8 billion, achieving an average annualized 
return of just over 5%. 
 
Old Mechanism: Oil in Economy's Veins 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) The "old system" functioned by accumulating in the National 
Fund all marginal state revenue generated from oil enterprises when 
oil prices exceeded $19/barrel.  Revenues from the first $19/barrel 
entered the national budget. Criticism of the "old" mechanism 
focused on three primary weaknesses: (a) the definition of "oil 
enterprise" was non-inclusive and frequently changed; (b) successful 
application of the formula - and hence budgetary planning - depended 
on a complicated estimation of anticipated oil revenues; and (c) the 
old concept allowed the government to simultaneously contribute to 
the NF and issue new debt, thus undermining the sense in which 
contributions to the NF represented "net savings."  (The 
presidential decree establishing the new mechanism emphasizes 
another flaw in the "old mechanism" - the fact that government oil 
revenue is dependent on the concept of taxable income, and thus on 
various accounting tactics which vary greatly from year-to-year.) 
 
4. (SBU) There is indirect empirical support for the notion that the 
old mechanism was a faulty safety valve for limiting the flow of NF 
money into the national budget.  Although the GOK does not currently 
provide budget data differentiating its oil revenues from non-oil 
revenues, there is evidence that the government's 2005 spending 
splurge in the run-up to the presidential election was largely 
fueled by oil revenue.  According to official statistics, the 
overall budget revenues (national and local) grew from 22.2% of the 
GDP in 2004 to 28.2% in 2005, a radical rise that can not be 
explained by increases in non-oil revenue.  The year offered plenty 
of other economic signs of more petrodollars finding their way into 
the economy: rapidly rising money supply (48% growth from January to 
September 2006), inflationary pressures (evident as inflation ticked 
up from 7.5% in December 2005 to 8.7% in August 2006), and the 
steeply appreciating tenge (rising 12.9% against the dollar and 8.3% 
against the euro in the year ending July 2006). 
 
The New Mechanism: Fiscal Discipline in the Air 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5. (U) The new mechanism transfers all oil revenues directly to the 
National Fund.  A defined quantity, established by a formula with 
legislatively set variables, is then transferred back to the budget 
every year.  This amount is restricted to funding "development 
programs."  This implies that general government expenditures are 
financed solely by non-oil revenues.  This, according to the 
government's plan, is an important limitation on spending as well as 
an incentive for developing the non-oil sector, since general 
government expenditures can only be increased by boosting budgetary 
revenues from the non-oil sector.  The new NF mechanism thus 
reinforces the general GOK ambition to diversify the economy away 
from hydrocarbons. 
 
6. (U) The new mechanism contains features designed to address the 
criticisms levied against the "old" system.  For example, the 
definition of "oil revenues" is made broader and more explicit. 
(Comment: A logical next step in protecting the national budget from 
fluctuations in commodity prices might be to include in the National 
Fund government revenues from other important commodities such as 
copper.  End comment.)  Furthermore, the guaranteed transfer from 
the NF in any given year is subject to a ceiling of one-third of the 
National Fund's total assets.  Most importantly, perhaps, the new 
mechanism introduces a "budget deficit limitation," which sets the 
maximum level of government borrowing to fina
nce the overall budget 
deficit at 1% of the GDP (measured as the annual average value over 
 
ASTANA 00000492  002 OF 002 
 
 
a 5-year period); this is meant to prevent the government from 
engaging in a borrowing binge while ostensibly stashing oil revenues 
into the NF. 
 
7. (SBU) The new mechanism was designed with significant input from 
the World Bank, and, predictably, local World Bank representative 
Loup Brefort lauded the mechanism, telling Econoff that the GOK had 
essentially adopted the World Bank's recommendations.   However, 
Brefort downplayed the importance of limiting NF spending to 
"development programs."  The fungibility of money, he said, negated 
much of the distinction's efficacy. 
 
The Tenge Connection? 
--------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Some observers believe that the recent reversal in the 
long-standing trend of tenge appreciation is a result of the new 
mechanism, which serves to ease upward pressure on the domestic 
currency by investing more of the government's petrodollars abroad. 
(Note: after peaking against the dollar at 117.25/$1 on July 23 
2006, the tenge has retreated to 127.84/$1 as of November 1.  End 
note.)    However, another observer, claiming access to inside 
information, told post that the tenge reversal is a result of the 
National Bank's current dollar-buying campaign aimed to "flush out 
offshore speculators" betting on further tenge appreciation. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment:  The new mechanism represents a clear improvement 
over its predecessor, and the GOK deserves credit for 
institutionalizing limits to its own discretionary spending.  Having 
said that, it is difficult to dispute Brefort's caveat that the 
fungibility of money undercuts the limitation of the use of Fund 
monies only on "development programs."  Ultimately, the 
effectiveness of the mechanism will depend on the government's 
commitment to control the non-oil budget deficit and resist the 
political pressures to legislate parameters which greatly expand the 
size of the "guaranteed transfer." Given the GOK's ongoing grandiose 
plans to further develop Astana, create a "financial center" in 
Almaty, and spur economic diversification through 
government-financed projects, such pressures are likely.  End 
comment. 
 
ORDWAY

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06ASTANA456, KAZAKHSTAN WILL SUPPORT U.S. CANDIDACY AT ITU

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA456 2006-11-03 11:21 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8698
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #0456 3071121
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031121Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7564
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000456 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC ECPS ITU KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN WILL SUPPORT U.S. CANDIDACY AT ITU 
PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE 
 
REF: STATE 168720 
 
1.  Econoff delivered reftel demarche October 31 to Rizat 
Nurshabekov, Deputy Chairman of the Agency for Informatization and 
Communications.  Nurshabekov was receptive to the message and said 
that Kazakhstan will support the U.S. election to the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) Council and consider Ms. Julie Napier 
Zoller's candidacy to the ITU Radio Regulation Board.  Nurshabekov, 
in turn, asked the United States to support Kazakhstan's election to 
the Council. 
 
2.  Separately, the Agency for Electronic Communications has 
informed post that the Kazakhstani delegation to the ITU 
Plenipotentiary Conference will be headed either by Nurshabekov or 
by the Head of International Cooperation Department, Azilkhan 
Karegulovich Abeuov. 
 
ORDWAY

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