Monthly Archives: December 2006

06ASTANA973, KAZAKHSTAN: DELIVERY OF IRAN DEMARCHE ON UNSCR 1737

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA973 2006-12-28 11:53 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0011
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0973 3621153
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281153Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8064

UNCLAS ASTANA 000973 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), ISN/RA (R. NEPHEW), IO/T (H. VON 
BEHREN), AND NEA/IR 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP IR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DELIVERY OF IRAN DEMARCHE ON UNSCR 1737 
 
REF: STATE 202585 
 
1. (U) Pol-Econ Chief conveyed reftel demarche to Daniyar Sarekenov 
of the MFA's Middle East division on December 28. 
 
2. (SBU) Sarekenov expressed appreciation for the non-paper and text 
of the resolution, which he said the MFA had not yet received 
through normal channels.  He stated that the MFA would carefully 
study the resolution in order to fully implement the requirements. 
He also promised to coordinate with the ministry's non-proliferation 
experts. 
 
MILAS

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06ASTANA966, KAZAKHSTAN READY FOR BN-350 TALKS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA966 2006-12-28 09:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0966 3620926
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280926Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8061
INFO RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000966 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA) 
DOE/NNSA FOR C. KENNEDY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MNUC PARM KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN READY FOR BN-350 TALKS 
 
REF: A. STATE 185480 B. STATE 185757 
 
1. (SBU) Almaz Tulebayev, Director of the Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources (MEMR) Department of Nuclear Energy and 
International Affairs, told Pol-Econ Chief on December 22 
that Kazakhstan is prepared to hold talks on the final 
disposition of BN-350 spent fuel on or after January 20. 
According to Tulebayev, the Kazakhstan delegation will be led 
by Timur Zhantikin, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee. 
He expects that the delegation will also include 
representatives from MEMR, Kazatomptrom, the KNB, the 
National Nuclear Center, and the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Interior, Environment, and Emergency Situations. 
 
2. (SBU) Tulebayev said that the fuel must be taken from 
Aktau quickly, calling the current location unsatisfactory. 
He agreed that it would be useful to have a discussion of 
permanent disposition options.  Tulebayev told Pol-Econ Chief 
that Kazakhstan will begin to compile a list of suggested 
agenda items. He also asked Pol-Econ Chief for the U.S. 
agenda and a list of U.S. participants.  Pol-Econ Chief 
informed Tulebayev that the U.S. will soon send Kazakhstan a 
Terms of Reference document. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA934, CHINA – KAZAKHSTAN: WILL WATER DAMPEN THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA934 2006-12-26 10:50 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3690
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0934/01 3601050
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261050Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8033
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7081
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1292
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7819
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1975
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7768

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000934 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
DEPARTMENT FOR OES/ETC 
DEPARTMENT FOR OES/PCI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: CHINA - KAZAKHSTAN: WILL WATER DAMPEN THE 
RELATIONSHIP? 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Kazakhstan, already coping with its 
shrinking water sources, now faces a new challenge as a 
result of western China's rapid development.  Two of 
Kazakhstan's primary water sources, the Ili and Irtysh 
rivers, begin in China, and China has already admitted to the 
Kazakhstanis that some pollution of the rivers is inevitable. 
 Moreover, the two countries have not reached an agreement on 
water use. One Kazakhstani official stated publicly that 
"China is reluctant to discuss strategic water use issues 
with Kazakhstan."  This reluctance was reaffirmed during 
President Nazarbayev's recent trip to China, with the two 
sides again failing to reach an agreement on the use and 
protection of transboundary water resources. End Summary 
 
Blessed with Oil, but Not Water 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Kazakhstan's water resources, never ample, continue to 
shrink.  In the last five decades, water resources have 
decreased by 16.6%, from 120 billion cubic meters of 
available water in the 1950s to not more than 100 billion 
cubic meters today.  Poor water management practices and 
wasteful internal consumption have contributed to the 
problem, but Kazakhstan is also heavily dependent on 
effective regional cooperation - 50% of its water resources 
begin outside the country's borders. 
 
3.  (SBU) While Kazakhstan has in recent years focused 
primarily on productive management of the Syr Darya basin, 
shared with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, two of 
Kazakhstan's major water sources, the Ili and Irtysh Rivers, 
originate in China.  The Ili River provides Lake Balkhash, 
the 15th largest lake in the world, with 80% of its water. 
The Irtysh River supplies a number of lakes and the 
Irtysh-Karaganda Canal. Anatoliy Ryabtsev, Chairman of 
Kazakhstan's Committee on Water Resources, told ESTH Officer 
that China's use of the Irtysh adheres to international norms 
but admitted that Kazakhstan lacks full information on 
China's use of the Ili. 
 
Nazarbayev Returns Home Empty-Handed on Water-Sharing 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4. (SBU) Kazakhstan has failed to achieve an agreement on 
water-sharing with China, and Kazakhstani officials have not 
hidden their displeasure in public statements.  Ryabtsev 
stated on Kazakhstani television on December 4 that "China 
consumes more and more water as its economy grows. The amount 
of industrial pollutants discharged into the river by China 
has also increased.  They keep violating our requirements." 
Deputy Water Chairman Amirkhan Kenshimov, speaking at a UNDP 
Human Development Report presentation on November 16, 
complained that "China is reluctant to discuss strategic 
water use issues with Kazakhstan." 
 
5. (SBU) In a recent meeting with ESTH Officer, Ryabtsev 
reported that Kazakhstan - China water cooperation is 
improving.  The two sides have already concluded three 
water-related agreements on information sharing and water 
quality, he said.  Even achieving a dialogue with China is a 
great achievement, Ryabtsev believes. 
 
6. (SBU) Nevertheless, Ryabtsev admitted to ESTH Officer that 
his strong statement on Kazakhstani television accurately 
reflects his views.  Kazakhstan is particularly worried about 
the Ili, he said, with public reports that China intends to 
divert more water from the river to develop its oil industry. 
 Moreover, Kazakhstan has information that China has started 
to build a new water use facility for the Ili.  The Chinese 
have already admitted to Kazakhstan that the country's 
industrial growth is surpassing its ability to prevent the 
Ili's pollution. Ryabtsev told ESTH Officer that Kazakhstan 
will be "firm and decisive" on water-sharing, and that China 
"fears sanctions" by Kazakhstan. Thus far, he added, the 
Chinese, rather than the Kazakhstanis, have made concessions 
on water issues. 
 
7. (SBU) Ryabtsev believes that the water use question must 
be resolved at the highest level.  According to press 
reports, President Nazarbayev raised the issue during his 
December 19-21 visit to Beijing.  Although agreements were 
signed on the exchange of hydrological information and 
scientific and research cooperation on transboundary rivers, 
 
ASTANA 00000934  002 OF 002 
 
 
the two sides again failed to reach accord on transboundary 
water use.  Referring to this failure, Nazarbayev said that 
"we cannot say that Kazakhstani-Chinese cooperation is 
developing in a completely positive way." 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: While China-Kazakhstan relations remain 
healthy, China's growing thirst for natural resources is a 
potential cause of discord.  In recent months, Kazakhstani 
politicians and media have criticized China's 
"overparticipation" in Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector. &
#x000A;Transboundary water use is also of great concern, with 
Kazakhstan's existing vulnerabilities likely to worsen if 
China overuses the Ili and Irtysh rivers. Kazakhstan may use 
the levers it has with China - access to energy and trade 
routes - if pushed on the water issue.  End comment. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA927,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA927 2006-12-26 09:07 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3605
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0927/01 3600907
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260907Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8028
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2000
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0281
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0408
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000927 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
DEPT PASS TO OPIC - BALLINGER 
DEPT PASS TO TDA FOR STEIN, EXIM FOR GLAZER 
DEPT PASS TO AID - EE-PHILLIPS/RUSHING 
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/MAC/MLONDON, 4201/BISNIS 
USDOC FOR ...

Wikileaks

06ASTANA924, KAZAKHSTAN: TRANSFER OF THREE DETAINEES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA924 2006-12-26 01:37 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0924 3600137
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 260137Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8024
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T ASTANA 000924 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/WCI (M. STAMILIO), S/WCI (A. MORRISON), L/PM 
(AHAINES), SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DOD/OGC (BEAVER), 
OUSD/DETAINEE POLICY (LIOTTA), NSC (CAMPONOVO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016 
TAGS: PTER KAWC PHUM PREL PINR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TRANSFER OF THREE DETAINEES 
 
REF: STATE 194431 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Deborah Mennuti, reasons 1.4 (B) 
and (D). 
 
1. (S) On December 16, three Kazakhstani detainees were 
transfered to the custody of Kazakhstan.  Poloff and Embassy 
Astana DAO officer met with Ualikhan Saginkhanov of the MFA's 
Consular Department at the Almaty international airport to 
facilitate the transfer.  Five individuals who declined to 
introduce themselves, likely security officials, accompanied 
Saginkhanov. 
 
2. (S) One member of the Kazakhstani delegation filmed the 
detainees leaving the aircraft.  After the transfer, the 
Kazakhstani authorities escorted the detainees to an airport 
terminal where the detainees' parents were waiting.  Upon 
receiving a positive identification from the parents, 
Saginkhanov called Poloff (who remained at the airplane) and 
the aircraft was released. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA919, KAZAKHSTAN: ALMATY NOTES, DECEMBER 2006

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA919 2006-12-22 05:53 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2065
RR RUEHAST RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0919/01 3560553
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220553Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8016
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1660
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7815
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7765
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7078
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1971
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1358
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2163

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000919 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: ALMATY NOTES, DECEMBER 2006 
 
1. The "Almaty Notes" series is intended to maintain focus on 
developments in civil society, the media, and the opposition in 
Kazakhstan's "southern capital" following the move of the Embassy to 
Astana. 
 
Opposition Journalist on Trial 
------------------------------ 
 
2. On November 23, the Bostandyk district court in Almaty held the 
first hearing of the criminal case against opposition journalist 
Kazis Toguzbayev.  Toguzbayev is accused of insulting President 
Nazarbayev's dignity and honor in his articles "Mafia Regime Covers 
up Murderers of Altynbek Sarsenbayev" and "Pope of Rome and Pope of 
Astana - Feel the Difference!" published on the kub.kz opposition 
web site in May and April. 
 
3. Pol FSN observed the proceedings.  About forty opposition 
activists came to support Toguzbayev.  Everyone was allowed in the 
courtroom.  The judge allowed videotaping, photography, and audio 
recording.  Toguzbayev's lawyer made several motions:  to allow 
Tamara Kaleyeva of the AdilSoz mass media NGO to participate in the 
case as a public defender; to invite several KNB officers involved 
in the investigation to testify; to invite three state experts who 
examined the articles to testify; and to invite a professor from 
Kazakh State University to participate in the proceedings as an 
independent language expert.  The judge granted all the motions 
except the independent language expert. 
 
4. Under questioning, Toguzbayev stated that he had no motive and no 
intention of insulting President Nazarbayev.  His articles 
criticized the president as a public servant, and his policies.  The 
judge scheduled the next hearing for December 25.  Three state 
language experts will be invited to present their interpretation of 
Toguzbayev's articles. 
 
Human Rights Organizations to monitor Alga Registration 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
5. Representatives of human rights organizations will monitor the 
process of registration of Alga Party, which has been seeking 
registration since September 2005.  The working group for monitoring 
will include representatives of the Kazakhstan International Bureau 
for Human Rights, Almaty Helsinki Committee, "Zashchita" Fund, 
AdilSoz, Union of Journalists, and Charter for Human Rights. 
According to Ninel Fokina of the Helsinki Committee, the working 
group is neutral and was set up not because they favor this party 
and its program.  (Azat weekly, November 30) 
 
Sixth Eurasian Media Forum to be held in Almaty 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
6. The sixth Eurasian Media Forum will be held in Almaty from April 
19 to April 21, 2007, the general director of the forum, Vladimir 
Rerikh, announced at a press briefing on November 23.  The media 
forum program will include Middle East problems, including the trial 
of Saddam Hussein, military conflict in Lebanon, the nuclear 
policies of Iran and North Korea, and energy security policy of 
Eurasian countries.  In addition, organizers have told post that the 
forum plans to discuss freedom of speech in CIS and the "Borat" 
phenomenon. 
 
 
Criticism of Demolition of Krishna Houses 
----------------------------------------- 
 
7. "The demolition of Krishna community houses in the suburbs of 
Almaty may damage the international reputation of Kazakhstan," 
Yevgeniy Zhovtis of the Kazakhstani International Bureau for Human 
Rights and Ninel Fokina of Almaty Helsinki Committee stated at a 
press conference in Almaty on November 28.  Fokina said that the 
court rulings to this effect were not based on the law.  Zhovtis 
mentioned that the demolition was selective: only houses of Krishna 
devotees have been demolished.  According to Zhovtis' sources, five 
additional lawsuits on demolition of Krishna devotees' houses have 
been filed with the court.  (Interfax, November 28) 
 
NGOs against Demolition Campaign 
-------------------------------- 
 
8. At a November 28 conference in Almaty, the Alga party and a 
number of NGOs discussed the problems of Almaty residents facing 
demolition of their houses.  According to MP Amalbek Tshan, who 
participated in the discussion, "in demolishing 'illegal' houses, 
the city administration is guided by interests of construction 
companies, but not the city residents."  Yevgeniy Zhovtis of 
 
ASTANA 00000919  002 OF 003 
 
 
Kazakhstani International Bureau for Human Rights added: "what is 
taking place in the country is 'forced eviction', though there is no 
such a term in Kazakhstan legislation."  According to Alga party 
leader Asylbek Kozhakhmetov, half of the more than 80 families of 
the Shanyrak district who applied for legalization of their houses, 
were turned down.  "Now the authorities are not demolishing their 
houses using bulldozers, but are driving the residents out of the 
district by cutting off water and electricity supply and by not 
enrolling their child
ren in local schools."  The participants of the 
conference decided to set up Shanyrak Public Committee to defend the 
families in Almaty facing the demolition.  (Interfax, November 28) 
 
Opposition Leader Abilov Stands Trial 
------------------------------------- 
 
9. On December 4, the Almalinskiy district court in Almaty began 
hearing the criminal case filed against the well-known politician 
Bulat Abilov and two his former business companions, Baurzhan 
Karabekov and Ualikhan Bekbosyn.  All three defendants were charged 
with large-scale misappropriation and embezzlement of the property 
they were entrusted with. 
 
10. The defendants were accused of committing these crimes during 
the period from 1996 to 1998 when Abilov was the chairman of the 
Butya-Capital Investment Fund (BCIF) Supervising Board and Karabekov 
and Bekbosyn were the executive directors of the fund.  BCIF, along 
with other 167 investment funds, participated in the coupon 
privatization of Kazakhstan enterprises. 
 
11.  At the December 4 hearing, the judge rejected all of the 
defendant's motions, including to dismiss the case because of lack 
of crime, to invite more plaintiffs to testify, to give the 
defendants' lawyers two months to study the case, and to allow 
videotaping.  The small courtroom could hold only about 40 persons, 
including 13 plaintiffs.  Only journalists and a dozen observers 
(including Pol FSN) were allowed in.  About a hundred of Abilov's 
supporters wearing yellow scarves waited in the lobby of the court 
building. 
 
12. The judge announced that more than 700 shareholders of BCIF had 
filed complaints against Abilov and his colleagues, accusing them of 
misappropriating their assets.  Only 13 plaintiffs were present in 
the courtroom on December 4.  According to the judge, the rest could 
not attend for various reasons.  He read aloud about a dozen letters 
from plaintiffs confirming their claims and apologizing for failing 
to attend the hearing.  Surprisingly, several letters the judge read 
aloud were from plaintiffs who retracted their claims, and four 
plaintiffs present in the courtroom renounced their previous claims. 
 The defendants asked the judge to invite to the court at least 200 
shareholders to find out their reasons for complaining.  The judge 
rejected this request, as well as the defendants' motion for a 
continuance until January in order to study the 125 volumes of 
evidence. 
 
13.  At the December 20 hearing, the judge adjourned the proceedings 
until January 10 due to the absence of defendant Baurzhan Karabekov. 
 (Karabekov's lawyer said his client was hospitalized on December 18 
with severe high blood pressure after learning that some of the 
plaintiffs in the case were seeking millions of dollars in damages.) 
 Abilov's new lawyer asked for a continuance until February to 
familiarize himself with the 125 volumes of evidence but was denied. 
 Only journalists were allowed into the small courtroom.  About 200 
Abilov supporters gathered peacefully outside the courthouse for 
about 30 minutes, holding posters saying "Stop Prosecuting Abilov" 
and "Article 39 of the Constitution Prohibits Politically Motivated 
Limitation of Human Rights and Freedoms." 
 
 
Concerns about Draft Law on Publishing Activities 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
14. On December 6, a number of mass media NGOs, including Adil Soz 
and the Union of Journalists, made a statement expressing their 
concerns about a new draft law on publishing activities.  The 
statement asserted that some draft provisions were aimed at 
curtailing the publishing service market and introducing tight 
political censorship.  For example, the draft would require 
licensing for printing houses dealing with mass media, which 
observers believe would increase the dependence of printing 
facilities on state bodies. 
 
15. The statement noted that this summer, Mazhilis deputies already 
rejected the licensing proposal.  It warns that Minister of 
Information Yertesbayev's statement about controlling the Internet 
and this licensing requirement are not "empty promise," but rather a 
 
ASTANA 00000919  003 OF 003 
 
 
real threat to freedom of speech. The mass media advocates called on 
MPs to be objective and be men of principle.  (Respublika weekly, 
December 8) 
 
 
Proposals on Constitutional Reforms 
----------------------------------- 
 
16. On December 7 in Almaty in the Presidential Institute for 
Strategic Studies, the working group of the State Commission for 
Democratization held a conference on constitutional reforms. 
Yerkin Ongarbayev, Co-Chairman of Adilet Party and a member of the 
working group, gave a report on their proposals, which included the 
right of Parliament to discuss candidates for cabinet of ministers' 
positions, the right of Parliament to form the Budget Committee, to 
conduct investigations, to appoint the Ombudsman, the election of 
half of Mazhilis deputies from party nominee lists, financing 
political parties from the state budget and the right of Parliament 
to interpret the laws. 
 
17. According to the head of the working group, Alikhan Baymenov, 
the State Commission was wrapping up its work.  Early next year 
President Nazarbayev is likely to participate in the last meeting of 
the State Commission on Democratization and to announce "step by 
step" constitutional reforms based on the recommendations of the 
state commission. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA903, KAZAKHSTAN: NO PROGRESS IN HARE KRISHNA SITUATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA903 2006-12-21 07:08 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0798
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0903/01 3550708
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210708Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8005
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0405
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0443
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1657

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000903 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DRL/PHD (C. KUCHTA-HELBLING) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NO PROGRESS IN HARE KRISHNA SITUATION 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 651, B. ASTANA 668 
 
ASTANA 00000903  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  There has been no progress in resolving the 
dispute surrounding the Hare Krishna community near Almaty, where 13 
homes were demolished on November 21.  On November 26, legal 
proceedings were launched against an additional five homes.  Despite 
assurances by the Foreign Minister that the GOK fully understood the 
damage the situation was causing to Kazakhstan's international 
reputation, the MFA on December 14 protested the embassy's statement 
on the matter, which was provided to media and human rights 
organizations that contacted the embassy press office.  The MFA also 
passed along a "decision" of the Ministry of Justice commission 
charged with resolving the situation, purportedly issued before the 
demolitions.  The commission is scheduled to hold its final meeting 
December 22.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
MFA Protests our Statement 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On December 14, Serzhan Abdykarimov, head of the MFA's 
Europe and Americas division, requested a meeting with Pol-Econ 
Chief to protest the Embassy's comments to the press regarding the 
November 21 demolition of Hare Krishna homes (Ref A).  Abdykarimov 
handed over a non-paper describing the Embassy's statement as 
"inappropriate" because it raised questions about the legal basis 
for the proceedings.  The non-paper noted that "The decision made by 
the highest judicial authority of the Republic of Kazakhstan is 
final and cannot be subjected to official comments or appraisal by 
representative offices of foreign states accredited to the Republic 
of Kazakhstan.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs... points out that 
the decisions of the judicial authorities of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan should be observed and respected." 
 
3. (SBU) The non-paper also asserted that because there are ten 
registered Krishna Consciousness associations in Kazakhstan, there 
is no religious motivation to the land issue.  (Comment:  An 
interesting denial given that post has never asserted that religious 
discrimination lies at the root of the problem.  End comment.) 
 
4. (SBU) Pol-Econ Chief noted that in discussing the incident with 
the Ambassador, Foreign Minister Tokayev had been quite frank 
regarding the ill-advised nature of the decision and the way it was 
carried out (Ref B).  Abdykarimov denied that the protest 
represented any change in the MFA's position on the matter, 
underscoring his ministry's position that judicial decisions may not 
be questioned or criticized. 
 
5. (U) Following is the text of the embassy statement, which the 
press office provided in response to queries from the Associated 
Press, Reuters, Radio Free Europe, the Kazakhstani International 
Bureau for Human Rights, and the Krishnas. 
 
"The U.S. Embassy is concerned that Karasai district authorities are 
continuing their aggressive campaign against the Hare Krishna 
commune outside of Almaty.  On November 21, Karasai district 
authorities demolished several homes at the commune.   Homeowners 
were left in the cold, and many of their possessions were destroyed. 
 The remaining residents were left without electricity and heat. 
 
The embassy has several concerns regarding the legal basis for the 
actions against the Hare Krishna community.  Regardless of the 
merits of the underlying case, the forceful eviction of homeowners 
in freezing temperatures and the destruction of their possessions, 
contradicts principles of due process and fairness.  It is 
particularly disturbing that the authorities took such action before 
the special commission charged with finding an equitable solution to 
the situation had issued its recommendations. 
 
It is unfortunate that more than a week later, the authorities have 
done nothing to remedy the situation.  The situation in fact appears 
to be deteriorating; authorities this week scheduled new court 
hearings on additional properties in the commune. 
 
The embassy urges the Karasai district authorities to refrain from 
any further aggressive actions against the Hare Krishnas, and to 
work toward a fair, lawful, and peaceful resolution of the ongoing 
legal dispute." 
 
------------------------------------------- 
And Provides Puzzling Commission "Decision" 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Pol-Econ Chief drew Abdykarimov's attention to the key 
point in the statement, the fact that the demolitions were carried 
out before the commission established by the Ministry of Justice had 
 
ASTANA 00000903  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
acted.  Kazakhstani authorities had assured both the Hare Krishnas 
and the international community (including in a November 23 
diplomatic note) that no action would be taken until the commission 
had reached a decision.  Abdykarimov handed over an undated document 
entitled "Decision of the Comm
ission on Issues Connected with Land 
Disputes of the Religious Association 'International Society for 
Krishna Consciousness' in the Karasay District of Almaty Oblast," 
signed by commission chair Amanbek Mukhashov.  Abdykarimov was 
unable to say when the document had been produced, but claimed that 
it had been finalized before the November 21 demolitions.  (Note: 
Post has been in regular contact with Mukhashov, deputy chairman of 
the MOJ's Religious Issues Committee, but was never informed that a 
decision had been reached.  On December 20, however, Mukhashov 
claimed to Pol FSN that the document had been issued October 2.  End 
note.) 
 
7. (SBU) Post shared the document on December 15 with the local OSCE 
Centre and the Hare Krishna community, neither of which had seen it 
before.  The Krishnas and the Almaty Helsinki Committee (AHC) 
immediately issued public statements criticizing both the content of 
the document and the fact that members of the Commission such as the 
AHC, the Kazakhstani International Bureau for Human Rights, and the 
Krishnas themselves had no input on the document. 
 
8. (U) Embassy translation of Commission's decision: 
 
Having studied the current situation connected with land disputes of 
the religious society (hereafter - RS) "Society for Krishna 
Consciousness" in the Karasai district of the Almaty oblast and 
having listened to members of the producers' cooperative (hereafter 
- PC) "Sadovodcheskoye Tovarischestvo Ptitsevod," "Sadovodcheskoye 
Tovarischestvo Priozerye," members of RS "Society for Krishna 
Consciousness" as well as representatives of Karasai district 
Akimat, territorial bodies on the management of Almaty oblast land 
resources and the coordinator of RS "Society for Krishna 
Consciousness" in Central Asia, Mr. Govinda Swami, the Commission 
decided: 
 
1.  To recommend the Akim of the Karasai district: 
1) To solve disputable points on the use of land plots and summer 
cottages on the territory of the Eltai rural district in accordance 
with the procedures established by the legislation of the RK; 
2) Take measures to exclude further defects in land privatization in 
the Eltai rural district and control carrying out of requirements of 
the land and  architectural-town-planning legislation of the RK; 
3) Continue suspension of privatization of cottages and 
horticultural plots of land taking into account requirements of the 
land and architectural-town-planning legislation of the RK; 
2. Recommend the management of RS "Society of Krishna 
Consciousness": 
1) To appeal to local bodies of the Karasai district in accordance 
with the procedures established by legislation to allocate a land 
plot for the construction of religious facilities; 
2) Carry out divine services, religious rites and ceremonies 
according to the requirements of the Law of the RK "On the Freedom 
of Confession and Religious Associations." 
3) Lay out objectively the current problems in their appeals to 
state bodies, international organizations and mass media on issues 
of interaction with local bodies. 
3. Recommend members of RS "Society for Krishna Consciousness" and 
PC "Sadovodcheskoye Tovarischestvo Priozerye" to solve disputable 
issues on the use of land plots and cottages on the territory of the 
Eltai rural district of the Karasai district in accordance with the 
procedures established by the legislation of the RK. 
4. [Recommend] that the Department of Justice of Almaty Oblast and 
the Council on ties with religious organizations of the Almaty 
Oblast, in light of the situation that has developed, control the 
observance of legislation on the freedom of confession and religious 
associations by local bodies, religious associations, and other 
legal and physical entities in the Karasai district. 
 
End translation. 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
9. (SBU) The Krishnas informed post that they have been invited by 
Mukhashov to a December 22 meeting of the Commission in Astana. 
They do not yet know who will represent them as Govinda Swami 
remains in India with little likelihood of receiving a new 
Kazakhstani visa.  Mukhashov told Pol FSN that the meeting would 
finalize the issues related to the land dispute. 
 
10. (SBU) On December 20, Krishna leader Govinda Swami (an Amcit) 
wrote to Ambassador Ordway and Ambassador John Hanford to request 
 
ASTANA 00000903  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
that the U.S. "directly mediate or otherwise help negotiate a fair 
and reasonable solution."  The Krishnas are still awaiting the court 
hearing on cases launched November 26 against five additional homes 
in their settlement. 
 
11. (SBU) Comment:  While it would not be appropriate for post to 
act as a mediator in this situation, we will continue to press this 
issue with the GOK at all levels.  Post believes there is still a 
chance that the Kazakhstani authorities might decide to resolve the 
dispute equitably rather than further undermine their OSCE CiO bid 
and reputation as a government that protects both religious 
minorities and property rights.  End comment. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA901, KAZAKHSTAN: COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA901 2006-12-21 01:41 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0601
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0901/01 3550141
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210141Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8002
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7076
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7812
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1356
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1966
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7763
RUEHJK/NCC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000901 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PASS TO NCTC 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), S/CT (R. SHORE), NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC KRCM EFIN KHLS KPAO KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF:  STATE 175925 
 
1.  Included is Post's submission for the 2006 Annual Terrorism 
Report for Kazakhstan, as well as point of contact information as 
requested in reftel. 
 
2.  Embassy point of contact is: 
Douglas Monk 
+7(3172) 70-24-79 
monkd@state.gov 
 
3.  Note:  Post requests that the term "Kazakhstani" not be changed 
to "Kazakh" for final publication, as was the case in last year's 
submission.  The term "Kazakh" is not correct in this context as it 
refers to a person's ethnicity, whereas "Kazakhstani" refers to 
citizenship. 
 
4.  Suggested report language:  "In 2006, Kazakhstan continued to 
aggressively combat terrorism and extremism locally, as well as to 
improve cooperation with other states and international 
organizations, including the United States.  There has been little 
movement, however, on counterterrorism legislation.  The draft law 
on money laundering that the GOK has been working on since 2005 sat 
stalled in parliament all year.  This law, if passed, would 
establish a financial intelligence unit and make it easier for the 
procuracy to secure convictions in terrorist financing cases. 
 
In January, authorities arrested a number of individuals from two 
extremist cells in Almaty on terrorism charges.  Eight of those 
arrested remain in prison with on-going trials.  In November, 
authorities arrested eleven people from a terrorist group in 
Stepnogorsk and confiscated arms, explosives, and extremist printed 
materials.  Press reports claim that the members of the terrorist 
group were planning hostage sieges, lethal attacks on state 
employees, and several explosions.  In December, three Kazakhstani 
nationals were returned to Kazakhstan from the Guantanamo Bay 
detention facility. 
 
Kazakhstan continues to have a growing problem with the Islamic 
extremist group Hizb'ut Tahrir (HT), an extremist political movement 
advocating the establishment of a borderless, theocratic Islamic 
state throughout the entire Muslim world.  HT remains outlawed as an 
"extremist" organization through the Law on Extremism and continues 
to be the only group so designated under this law.  Although there 
are extremist organizations in Kazakhstan, there is no evidence that 
Kazakhstan is used by terrorists or terrorist organizations as a 
sanctuary or safe haven. 
 
In November, the GOK added the East Turkistan Liberation 
Organization and Aum Shinrikyo to the national list of banned 
terrorist organizations, accusing these groups of using terrorist 
means in an attempt to achieve an independent state in China and 
Central Asia.  The list of banned groups also includes Al-Qa'ida, 
the East Turkistan Islamic Party, the Kurdish People's Congress, 
Asbat al-Ansar, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban, the Boz Gurd, 
Jamaat of Central Asian Mujahadins, Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Social 
Reform Society, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and its splinter 
group, the Islamic Jihad Union. 
 
In July, Kazakhstan became an Initial Partner Nation in the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.  Kazakhstan was one of the 
first countries to endorse and participate in the Global Initiative 
after its inception earlier this year. 
 
Kazakhstan is a founding member of the Conference on Interaction and 
Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), a nascent international 
forum aimed at improving security in Asia, which was launched by 
Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev and includes Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, "State of Palestine," Russia, South 
Korea, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.  In June, CICA 
held a summit in Almaty which was attended by heads of states and 
top government officials from throughout Asia. 
 
Kazakhstan, along with China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan, is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
which has established a Regional Antiterrorism Center in Tashkent. 
Kazakhstan is also a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty 
Organization and the Eurasia Group -- a regional anti-money 
laundering organization or Financial Action Task Force-style 
regional body whose objective is to integrate Kazakhstan, along with 
Belarus, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Uzbekistan into 
the global system on anti-money laundering and combating the 
financing of terrorism.  Kazakhstani cooperation and timeliness in 
 
ASTANA 00000901  002 OF 002 
 
 
sharing information with the USG continues to strengthen." 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA900, Kazakhstan: Economy Minister Comments on Tengiz Brawl

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA900 2006-12-21 01:40 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0600
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0900 3550140
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210140Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8001
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ASTANA 000900 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON PGOV ENRG EPET KZ
SUBJECT: Kazakhstan: Economy Minister Comments on Tengiz Brawl 
 
REF: A: Astana 501; B: Astana 737 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  In a December 6 meeting with the Ambassador, 
Economy Minister Musin identified the inadequacy of Kazakh workers' 
wages as a key contributor to the recent "Tengiz brawl."  Even 
though an oil company might allocate funds for a decent wage, Musin 
explained, by the time a contractor and sub-contractor took their 
cut, only a fraction of that wage reached the workers - a result the 
Minister termed a "social injustice."  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) In a December 6 meeting with the Ambassador,  new Economy 
Minister Aslan Musin added to our insight on the economic context of 
what has become known as the "Tengiz brawl" (Ref A).  A key problem, 
Musin said, is the inadequacy of Kazakh workers' wages.  While the 
oil company pays a significant wage to its own employees, Musin 
explained, contractors and subcontractors take a disproportionate 
amount of the funds the oil company allocates for wages in its 
contracts.  As a result, only a small portion of the intended wage 
actually gets to the worker, a result which the new minister called 
a "social injustice."  (Musin suggested that if a company allocates 
$8 an hour, only $1.50 of that amount might reach the worker.) 
.Musin, who as the former akim of the Atyrau Oblast is familiar with 
the issue, said that he has tried to convince Tengiz Chevroil (TCO) 
to "take this under its control."  He added that the idea of 
imposing a solution at the local government level ran into legal 
obstacles.  (Note:   The minimum construction wage at TCO was 
recently doubled, to approximately $4,200 / year. Ref B incorrectly 
quoted TCO General Manager Todd Levy as stating that the minimum 
construction wage was $420. End note.) 
 
3. (SBU) Musin also shed some light on the dynamics of the Tengiz 
brawl.  The reason nearly all the victims of the violence were 
Turkish workers, he said, was that three Turks had initiated the 
conflict by beating up a Kazakh worker.  Furthermore, he said, 
70-80% of the workers are Kazakh.  TCO, Musin continued, needs to 
take control of the situation by handing over security from an 
internal force to the local police. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA899, KAZAKHSTAN: SAMRUK’S NEW BOARD CHAIRMAN DEALS WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA899 2006-12-20 11:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9857
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0899/01 3541132
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201132Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7998
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000899 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON PGOV ENRG EAIR ETRD EPET KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SAMRUK'S NEW BOARD CHAIRMAN DEALS WITH 
EXPANSION, GOVERNANCE 
 
REF: A) ALMATY 3278, B) Almaty 3178, C) Astana 147 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On December 8, Sir Richard Harry Evans, the newly 
appointed Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Samruk State 
Holding Company, discussed with the Ambassador his uphill battle in 
establishing proper corporate oversight over the Samruk companies, 
working with the GOK, and plans for Air Astana.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Background:  Samruk, the national holding company based on 
Singapore's Temasek, was established in January to provide 
state-owned companies with professional management (Ref A).  The 
appointment of Evans as Chairman of the Board in November roughly 
coincided with the announcement that another 17 companies would join 
the original five in Samruk's fold.  Evans has a prior indirect 
connection to Samruk: he is the former chairman of BAE Systems, a 
British giant with a 49% stake in Air Astana.  Air Astana, the de 
facto national airline in which the GOK currently holds a 51% stake, 
is one of Samruk's 17 "new arrivals." 
 
3. (SBU) The seventeen "new arrivals," along with their state 
ownership share, are: 
 
In Power Generation and Distribution: 
- KazKuat  (100%) 
- Ekibastuz Energy Center (100%) 
- Kazakhstan Electrical Energy & Capacity Operator (100%) 
- Mangistauskaya Electrical Distribution & Grid Company (94.25%) 
- Shulbinskaya Hydro Power Station (92.13%) 
- Bukhtarminskaya Hydro Power Station (90%) 
- Ust-Kamenogorskaya Hydro Power Station (89.99%) 
- Astana Energy Service (61.72%) 
- Kazakh Scientific Research Institute of the Power Sector (50%) 
 
In Transportation: 
- Pavlodar Airport (100%) 
- Aktobe International Airport (100%) 
- Astana International Airport (100%) 
- Air Astana (51%) 
- National Sea Shipping Company "KazMorTransFlot" (50%) 
 
In Mining and Metals: 
- Akbakai Mining & Metals Combine (33%) 
- Maikainezoloto (25%) 
 
In Engineering: 
- National Company "Kazakhstan Engineering (100%) 
 
4. (SBU) The original five companies subsumed under Samruk's 
authority are KEGOC (100%), KazMunayGas (100%), KazPochta (100%), 
Kazakhstan TemirZholy (100%), and KazakhTelecom (55.6%).  Ulf 
Wokurka, Samruk's Deputy Chairman and CFO, told us that there were 
originally three more candidates for inclusion in Samruk.  One of 
them, KazAtomProm, has been temporarily set aside due to concerns 
that its Russian partners would object. 
 
"Board Members Are Violating Their Fiduciary Duties" 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
5. (SBU) Evans told the Ambassador that Samruk has three strategic 
objectives: 
- Professional management: operating "like a real company," adopting 
international accounting standards, and achieving proper corporate 
governance; 
- Improved performance, derived from better governance; and 
- IPO flotations, private placements, etc. 
Evans, whose involvement with the company will be part-time, said "I 
am clear on these goals.  I am not sure other people in the 
organization want the same." 
 
6. (SBU) The focus, Evans said, must be on governance, which means 
"getting everyone at Samruk on the same page" and implementing a 
proper accounting system.  He stated that there has been no 
presentation of financial data to the board, leading him to conclude 
that "all the board members are violating their fiduciary duties." 
Evans stressed Samruk's need to overcome the Soviet mentality that 
fails to pursue minimization of inputs in relation to output.  "Good 
governance," he continued, requires bringing into Samruk and its 
corporate components "truly independent directors." 
 
7. (SBU) The picture painted by Evans of an almost total  lack of 
effective corporate oversight tracks with what we have heard from 
some other westerners with insight into the inner workings of large 
Kazakhstani corporations.  These observers have privately expressed 
great skepticism regarding the sustainability of Kazakhstani 
companies' listings on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  Other 
foreigners who have worked on the IPOs, however, have claimed that 
there has been substantial progress in accounting and disclosure 
during the process of due diligence, a process that took a 
considerable period of time to meet the LSE's minimal standards. 
 
ASTANA 00000899  002 OF 003 
 
 
(Note: Of the Kazakhstani companies trading on the LSE, only one - 
KMG E&P, the Exploration & Production subsidiary of KazMunaiGas, is 
in Samruk.  Ref B.  End note.)  According to these observers, the 
Kazakhstani IPOs on the LSE have not been accompanied by a 
significant level of disclosure.  At best, this view goes, the 
London IPOs have failed to force the Kazakhstani companies to 
reform; at worst, the limited flotations represent little more than 
a short-term vehicle for company insiders to access the prestige and &#x000
A;the capital provided by an LSE listing without introducing proper 
business practices or significantly diluting their ownership. 
 
Dealing with the GOK: It's a Cultural Thing 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Evans stressed Samruk's need for directors who are "totally 
independent but know something about these businesses," and asked 
whether the Ambassador could help in this regard.  Evans 
acknowledged that attracting such talent will be problematic.  The 
government, he said, "has got itself into a corner" by orchestrating 
the so-called "bonus scandal" (Ref C).  As a result, Samruk finds 
itself unable to provide the salaries necessary to recruit quality 
management talent, foreign or domestic.  The problem, Evans said, is 
particularly acute in the oil and gas sector: "we provide them with 
training, they go to foreign companies." 
 
9. (SBU) Evans considers it crucial to establish a proper 
relationship with the GOK.  He said he asked President Nazarbayev 
"to give Samruk a free hand on remuneration" and "to get rid of the 
[unbearable] procurement laws." (Note: Wokurka told us earlier of 
the stifling effect of the state's procurement bureaucracy, which 
imposes huge administrative burdens "just to get paperclips." End 
note.)  GOK control over Samruk, Evans said, rests with Deputy Prime 
Minister Karim Masimov, whom he called "the de facto owner."  The 
GOK, according to Evans, is serious about bringing about "a 
transparent way of government."  But this "won't sit well with the 
way some of these companies are run."  "There is already some 
discomfort," Evans continued, "in areas like audit and debate on how 
it should be done.  The government has excessive expectations on how 
fast the results will come.  Some of this is cultural." 
 
Samruk Becomes an "Investor" 
---------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) "All of the five [original] companies have pretty 
substantial growth prospects," said Evans.  He acknowledged that 
with the current round of expansion, Samruk is considering adopting 
an investment strategy.  (Note: Samruk's initial focus was only on 
the management of state assets.  End note.)  However, he added, 
Samruk already has its hands full and should limit its investment 
activity to the core areas of its original five companies.  Another 
problematic issue here, he said, is the possibility of competing 
with Kazyna, which "makes no sense."  (Note: The Kazyna Fund for 
Sustainable Development is the GOK's other holding company, 
encompassing a number of state-owned institutions charged with 
realizing the GOK's goal of economic diversification away from 
energy.  End note.)  "My feeling," Evans continued, "is that 
eventually, there needs to be some sort of co-existence with Kazyna. 
 Not a merger but a superstructure." 
 
The Plan for Air Astana: Hire Crews, Lease Planes 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
11. (SBU) Addressing Air Astana, Evans said he believes the airline 
should continue to lease, not buy, its aircraft.  He also stated 
that the decision should rest with professional managers, not the 
government.  Between now and fall 2007, he said, the airline needs 
to hire an additional 600 to 700 crew members, adding to the current 
total of 2,300.  Air Astana is also considering a long-term training 
program for pilots, Evans said.  (Note: Another Samruk insider tells 
us that there is a plan for the GOK and BAE Systems to draw down 
their ownership of Air Astana in parallel; the resulting shares will 
be distributed to the airline's employees.  End note.) 
 
12. (SBU) On the choice between Boeing and Airbus aircraft, Evans 
said "in narrow-body aircraft, the products are very similar; what 
swings the decision is advantages in maintenance.  In wide bodies, 
Boeing is better. The 777 is probably the best product." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
13. (SBU) Comment:  Samruk's current expansion, which its executives 
have told us will not be the last, signals growth not only in the 
company's size but also its mandate.  Towering over 22 state-owned 
companies, Samruk looks quite different from its original 
incarnation as the holding company dedicated merely to professional 
management of "strategic state assets."  Notably, with the arrival 
of "the new 17," Samruk already finds itself as a minority 
shareholder in two companies; the number is likely to increase as 
 
ASTANA 00000899  003 OF 003 
 
 
the GOK sheds shares through planned IPOs and privatizations.  It is 
still unclear whether Samruk will become primarily a stepping stone 
for privatizing state-owned companies or a de facto investment 
vehicle for the GOK.  In a sign that Samruk may not be too quick to 
relinquish to the market much of its newly acquired holdings, one 
insider told us that a new government resolution will soon formalize 
Samruk's mandate not only as a "management company" but an 
"investment company" as well.  End comment. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA891, KAZAKHSTAN: UPDATE OF WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06ASTANA891.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA891 2006-12-20 06:44 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9568
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0891 3540644
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 200644Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7993
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0946

UNCLAS ASTANA 000891 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
DOL/ILAB FOR TINA MCCARTER 
DRL/IL FOR TU DANG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB EIND ETRD PHUM SOCI USAID KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: UPDATE OF WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR 
INFORMATION 
 
REF: A) STATE 184972, B) 05 ALMATY 3112, C) 04 ALMATY 3206 
 
1. (U) Summary:  In accordance with Ref A, this telegram provides 
updated data on Kazakhstan's compliance with international norms on 
the prevention of the worst forms of child labor.  This cable 
updates Refs B and C.  This information is provided to assist in the 
determination of Kazakhstan's continued eligibility for benefits 
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).  Post concludes 
that the GOK is meeting its obligations under the relevant ILO 
Conventions to prevent and punish illegal child labor practices. 
There is currently no justification for altering Kazakhstan's 
eligibility for GSP on the basis of child labor issues.  End 
summary. 
2. (U) Note:  The request for this information in Ref A makes no 
mention of the update provided by post in 2005.  Post did provide a 
2005 update (Ref B) to the information submitted in 2004 (Ref C). 
Since information has been submitted in the past two years, this 
telegram is intended to provide another update (per Ref A).  End 
note. 
 
3. (SBU) The Ministry of Education works in conjunction with local 
authorities to prevent absenteeism in schools.  Schools closely 
monitor attendance and contact students absent for an extended 
period of time.  Ministry of Education officials conduct limited 
"raids," together with the Interior Ministry and local authorities, 
on markets, private farms, and other places where school dropouts 
are likely to be employed. 
 
4. (SBU) The problem of children missing school due to employment 
remains concentrated in the country's South, where tobacco and 
cotton farms attract, respectively, Kyrgyz and Uzbek migrants. 
These cross-border migrant laborers, the vast majority of whom are 
adults, are part of Kazakhstan's growing shadow economy.  While 
local authorities do make schooling available to migrant children, 
the school drop-out problem exists and adds to the government's 
growing challenge of dealing with its expanding migrant population. 
 
5. (SBU) In December 2005, a new statute was added to the Criminal 
Code criminalizing "recruitment for exploitation" and aimed at 
protecting minors from victimization in industries such as sex 
trade.  The Ministry of the Interior works to identify at-risk 
children (such as runaways, abused children, and children involved 
in gangs) and, in some cases, places them in "temporary detention 
and rehabilitation centers."  These centers, which provide classes 
and counseling, can serve as a stepping stone to a return home or a 
transfer to an orphanage.  The Interior Ministry also works to 
transfer those exploited children who are foreign nationals to their 
countries of origin. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment:  Post is satisfied that the Government of 
Kazakhstan takes the issue of child labor seriously.  While 
Kazakhstan is facing some challenges in this respect due to a 
growing problem of illegal migrants, the government is making 
credible efforts to deal with the migrant situation in general and 
the child labor problem in particular.  Post recommends against any 
change in Kazakhstan's GSP eligibility on the basis of child labor 
issues.  End comment. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA885, KAZAKHSTAN: DELIVERY OF GICNT INFORMATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA885 2006-12-17 09:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7084
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #0885 3510932
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 170932Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7984
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1999
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1291
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0396
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0068
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0442
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0265
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0225
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0008
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0358
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0760
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1355
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0002
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0048
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1875
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000885 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), ISN/WMDT, 
AND T (T. KATSAPIS) 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PINR KGIC MCAP PINR PINS PTER KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DELIVERY OF GICNT INFORMATION 
 
REF: STATE 198296 
 
1. (U) Pol-Econ Chief, along with Counselor Gennadiy Spiglazov from 
the Russian Embassy, conveyed reftel information to Kairat Sarzhanov 
of the MFA's international security section on December 14. 
 
2. (SBU) Sarzhanov indicated that the GOK would carefully consider 
the proposed plan of work and other documents.  He explained that 
due to the upcoming celebration of 15 years of Kazakhstani 
independence, the government would be closed December 18-19.  It was 
therefore highly unlikely that the MFA would be able to provide 
comments by the first deadline; a response would be forthcoming by 
the January deadline, however. 
 
3. (SBU) Sarzhanov noted that during the Rabat GICNT meeting there 
had been discussion "in the corridors" regarding Kazakhstan hosting 
the third meeting in Astana in June.  He said that he expected the 
Kazakhstani delegation to make an announcement on this point during 
the February 12-13 meeting in Ankara.  Sarzhanov said the leadership 
and composition of the Kazakhstani delegation was still under 
review. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA882, KAZAKHSTAN WILL PARTICIPATE IN UAE/UN GLOBAL ANTI-TIP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA882 2006-12-15 11:36 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6280
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0882 3491136
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151136Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7980
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000882 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR INL (ALTON), SCA/CEN (OMARA), SCA/RA (LEE), G/TIP 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KCRM PREL PHUM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN WILL PARTICIPATE IN UAE/UN GLOBAL ANTI-TIP 
CONFERENCE 
 
REF: STATE 197226 
 
1. (SBU) On December 15, INL Officer delivered reftel points to 
Daniyar Erikovich Aimambetov of the International Organizations and 
Security Issues Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). 
 A copy of the points was left as a non-paper. 
 
2. (SBU) Aimambetov had no questions about the conference, saying 
that the MFA had already received an invitation and had circulated 
it to the appropriate ministries for consideration.  When queried 
about the composition and head of the GOK delegation, Aimambetov 
said that those decisions had not been made.  He did offer that the 
MFA would participate. 
 
3. (U) Aimambetov said he had been working on TIP issues at the MFA 
for the last year and a half after transferring from the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA847, DELIVERY OF REQUEST FOR KAZAKHSTANI RESPONSE ON JOINT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA847 2006-12-15 02:09 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0847 3490209
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 150209Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7949
INFO RUEAADN/DTRA DULLES WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHDC//OSS//
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0945
RUEHMO/USDAO-DTRO MOSCOW RS
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0007
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0655
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1354

UNCLAS ASTANA 000847 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR JCIC 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM JCIC START KZ KACT PREL
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF REQUEST FOR KAZAKHSTANI RESPONSE ON JOINT 
STATEMENT ON LENINSK 
 
REF: STATE 194495 
 
1. (SBU) On December 1, DTRO-A delivered reftel request for 
statement to COL Aubakirov from the Astana office of the Kazakhstani 
MOD Treaty Verification Agency. COL Aubakirov had no immediate 
comments, but promised that the GOK will deliver an official answer 
to the USG via diplomatic note. COL Aubakirov also offered to send 
an unofficial copy of the note through back-channels once it is 
prepared. 
 
2. (U) POCs for this action are DTRO-A Staff Laura Smiley and Marcus 
Smith; Office Tel. (from the U.S.) 011-7-3172-702-100; 
011-7-333-223-0864; E-mail: AlmatyDTRO@state.gov 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA824, KAZAKHSTAN: PREPARING FOR FUTURE ROUND OF OFFSHORE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA824 2006-12-12 12:04 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2719
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0824/01 3461204
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121204Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7925
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000824 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016 
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PREPARING FOR FUTURE ROUND OF OFFSHORE 
OIL TENDERS? 
 
REF: ASTANA 738 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Deborah Mennuti; reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  In early 2006, the Government of Kazakhstan 
granted a small geophysical company, Caspian Veritas LLP, 
exclusive rights to acquire seismic data over the entire 
"open" (unassigned) acreage of the Kazakhstani sector of the 
Caspian Sea.  The company -- and at least one major 
prospective client -- believe this data will be used to 
launch Kazakhstan's first-ever round of "open" tenders for 
offshore fields, perhaps as early as late 2007.  Moving to an 
open tender system would be consistent with the 2005 
Production Sharing Agreement Law, which grants priority to an 
open tender system. In the current system, individual 
companies are invited to negotiate their participation in a 
project with KazMunaiGaz (KMG), the national oil and gas 
company.  Energy Minister Izmukhambetov, however, has spoken 
publicly of delaying new tenders indefinitely, focusing the 
GOK's resources instead on developing existing fields and 
finalizing contracts already under negotiation.  A Shell 
executive, experienced in competing -- and winning -- in the 
current system, believes the "direct negotiation" approach is 
well-suited to Kazakhstan and unlikely to change in the near 
future.  End summary. 
 
Kazakhstani Law -- and Current Practice 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Kazakhstan's July 2005 Production Sharing Agreement 
(PSA) Law was the first legislation to systematically outline 
a process for assigning offshore rights.  (Of course, PSAs 
had been signed prior to passage of the law, at Kashagan, 
Karachaganak, Tyub-Karagan, and Kurmangazy.)  The law 
specifies three ways in which offshore blocks can be 
assigned.  The "primary" method is by open or closed tender 
-- though, to date, none have been held.  The PSA Law also 
grants the GOK the right to assign blocks, without tender, if 
provided for by treaty or to "fulfill other obligations" of 
the State.  (This process was used in creating the Kurmangazy 
PSA.  Kurmangazy straddles the Kazakhstani/Russian Caspian 
boundary line, and thus presented treaty implications.) 
Finally, the PSA Law allows the "national company" 
(KazMunaiGaz) to obtain fields by "direct negotiations" with 
MEMR, and then subsequently to seek a "strategic partner" 
(without tender) to participate in field development.  This 
process, in fact, has been pursued in all of the offshore 
projects currently being negotiated with foreign oil 
companies. 
 
3. (C) The passage of the PSA Law spurred much speculation 
that, with the fundamental tender rules outlined and 
codified, the GOK would soon prepare an open tender for an 
offshore field. On several occasions since the passage of the 
law, however, Energy Minister Izmukhambetov has announced the 
GOK's intent to indefinitely postpone the tender process, in 
favor of concentrating on concluding ongoing negotiations and 
developing existing projects -- notably, Kashagan -- in which 
KMG is already a partner.  Many oil executives here subscribe 
to the theory, implicit in Izmukhambetov's statements, that 
KMG lacks the institutional capacity to manage more offshore 
projects, and/or the finances to uphold its share of further 
offshore projects. 
 
Shell Articulates Advantages of Direct Negotiations 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
4. (C) With a share in Kashagan and offshore Zhemchuzhnaya, 
and an apparent lock on participation in the "N Block" 
project (reftel), Shell has arguably had more recent success 
in securing offshore Kazakhstani prospects than any other 
company.  On December 8, Martin Ferstl, Shell's Country 
Chairman, shared his impressions of the process with Econoff. 
 Ferstl suggested that the GOK preferred having companies 
negotiate directly with KMG, rather than conducting open 
tenders, because the former process allowed KMG to negotiate 
with several companies at once.  This benefited KMG early in 
the process, he said, because it allowed KMG to see each 
company's seismic data set -- and thus compensate for the 
fact that the GOK often did not have independent access to 
the best data in existence.  After seeing each company's data 
set, Ferstl continued, KMG would acquire the technical 
knowledge of the block in question well enough to conduct 
intelligent negotiations over the financial terms for access 
to the process.  Finally, he said, KMG benefited from having 
 
ASTANA 00000824  002 OF 003 
 
 
two or more project finalists bid against one another, 
because KMG was more likely to receive a fair bid that way 
than if it had to evaluate a series of tender bids against 
the technical baseline of a project that it did not 
understand very well. 
 
5. (C) To succeed in the current system, Ferstl continued, a 
company had to establish good personal relationships with 
Kazakhstani energy insiders.  Over time, he explained, the 
Kazakhstani offshore had come to be divided into separate 
"fiefdoms" associated informall
y with the one (or more) 
companies which had demonstrated persistent interest.  These 
companies tended to be the ones invited into negotiations 
with KMG.  This relationship-oriented process, Ferstl argued, 
fit Kazakhstan's culture better than the "objective," 
bureaucratic approach of a formal tender -- one reason, he 
said, why the GOK was unlikely to adopt the open tender 
process in the near future. 
 
6. (C) At the same time, Ferstl described the Kazakhstani 
system of direct negotiation with KMG as "immensely 
frustrating." Shell had spent four-and-a-half years 
negotiating access to the "N Block," he cited by way of 
example, while in most countries "a tender process would be 
concluded in six months."  Part of the reason for the long 
process, he said, was that the GOK was in no hurry to develop 
the offshore Caspian.  Ferstl cited the shortage of 
institutional resources (para. 3) as one example, along with 
the idea that the GOK's cash flow from current projects meets 
the GOK's development goals. 
 
Seismic Data Acquisition Project 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Despite the GOK's established preference to assign 
blocks via direct negotiation, there are those who believe an 
open tender process is on the horizon.  In early 2006 the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) concluded an 
agreement with Veritas Caspian LLP (a 50/50 joint venture 
between Salt Lake City-based Caspian Services, Inc., and 
Veritas DCG of Houston) giving Veritas Caspian an exclusive 
right to obtain seismic data over the entire open 
(unassigned) acreage of the Kazakhstani sector of the 
Caspian.  Veritas Caspian also secured the right to market 
the data for ten years on behalf of the GOK, which it will do 
by creating a seismic data database available for purchase by 
interested oil companies.  Veritas Caspian recently completed 
its first season of work, shooting approximately 660 
kilometers of 2D seismic data in the "Chagala" area of the 
Caspian -- just South of the super-giant Kashagan field. 
Veritas Caspian has largely funded its seismic acquisition 
project by offering "subscriptions" to oil companies.  In 
return for an upfront, one-time payment, subscribers are 
allowed input into which sectors of the sea Veritas Caspian 
will shoot first and most comprehensively, along with 
preferential access to the finished data, which will 
eventually be distributed to any interested buyer. 
 
8. (C/NF) Terrance Powell, Caspian Services' Vice President 
for Investor Relations, told Econoff that oil companies had 
eagerly paid to become "subscribers" to the service, and at 
least one oil major had "screamed bloody murder" after being 
told they had missed the deadline to participate.  Peter 
Claypoole, ExxonMobil's Manager for New Business Development, 
told Econoff that his company was an eager "subscriber" to 
the process, and expected that the seismic data would be used 
to launch future rounds of open tenders for offshore blocks. 
ExxonMobil, he added, was extremely interested in the 
"Primorsk" block (estimated 2 billion barrels) of the Chagala 
area, and was eagerly awaiting the completed data package and 
an anticipated tender.  Powell told Econoff that his company 
had been told that the seismic data would be used as the 
basis for an "open tender" round, perhaps as early as 
year-end 2007, but acknowledged that MEMR had sent 
conflicting signals about its intent. 
 
9. (C) Comment:  While the seismic data database being built 
could, presumably, give KMG the technical expertise it 
currently lacks to conduct an open tender, it would not 
appear to necessitate a change in the current process for 
assigning offshore blocks.  If, as Ferstl indicated, the GOK 
is comfortable linking the assignments process to various 
"soft" considerations, including interpersonal relationships 
and, presumably, Kazakhstan's broader geopolitical concerns, 
then a continuation of the status quo might be the most 
likely outcome.  End comment. 
 
ASTANA 00000824  003 OF 003 
 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA817, KAZAKHSTAN: PETROKAZAKHSTAN LEGAL CASE WINDS DOWN

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA817 2006-12-12 04:07 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2328
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0817/01 3460407
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 120407Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7922
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000817 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2015 
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ CASC
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PETROKAZAKHSTAN LEGAL CASE WINDS DOWN 
 
REF: A. 05 ALMATY 3150 
 
     B. 05 ALMATY 3857 
     C. ASTANA 90 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Deborah Mennuti; reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  On November 14, an Almaty district court 
convicted three expatriate former executives (two AmCits) of 
PetroKazakhstan (PK) of criminal violations of Kazakhstan's 
anti-monopoly law.  The judge simultaneously granted the 
defendants amnesty and lifted a travel ban that had been in 
place since the criminal charges were filed in April 2005. 
The only AmCit defendant remaining in Kazakhstan, Tom Dvorak, 
plans to depart Kazakhstan on December 17. 
 
2. (C) Summary (continued):  PK's controversial October 2005 
sale to the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) 
recently came two steps closer to closure, as Kazakhstan's 
national oil and gas company, KazMunaiGaz (KMG), finalized a 
deal on November 16 to purchase 50% of PK's Shymkent 
refinery; and Lukoil won an October 30 arbitration ruling 
granting it a preemptive right to acquire PK's half of the 
Turgai oil field (at the price paid by CNPC).  An argument 
can be made that the legal case of the PK executives was 
manipulated to enhance the GOK's leverage in its post-sale 
negotiations with CNPC to acquire a share of the PK assets. 
While PK's ten-year experience in Kazakhstan has arguably 
been unique, it nevertheless offers several perspectives from 
which to evaluate Kazakhstan's investment climate. End 
summary. 
 
PK Executives Convicted -- and Amnestied 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) On November 14, after an intermittent 8-month trial, 
an Almaty district court convicted three former expatriate 
executives of the Canadian oil company PetroKazakhstan (PK) 
of criminal violations of the anti-monopoly law, sentencing 
them to three years' imprisonment.  (In addition to the two 
American citizens, Tom Dvorak and Robert Goldsmith, and a 
Canadian, Clayton Clift, the court also convicted twelve 
Kazakhstani PK employees.)  All the PK employees were then 
granted amnesty under a January 2006 "Independence Day" 
Amnesty Law, and the court lifted a travel ban in place since 
April 2005.  (Note: Of the three expatriates, only Dvorak 
remained in Kazakhstan through the trial's end. Dvorak told 
Econoff on November 29 that he plans to leave Kazakhstan on 
December 17.  End note.)  The defendants have appealed the 
conviction. 
 
4. (SBU) Note: Another AmCit PK employee, Dan Hermann, was 
granted amnesty in January 2006 in what was, legally, an 
unrelated case.  Hermann was charged with violating the terms 
of PK's exploration license (Ref A). 
 
Origin of the Criminal Charges 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) The criminal charges stem from activities PK 
undertook, beginning in 2002, to sell refined products from 
PK's Shymkent refinery at prices higher than those 
established by Kazakhstan's Agency for the Regulation of 
Natural Monopolies.  PK executives attempted to avoid the 
application of the Monopoly Law by dividing the sales of its 
refined products, previously undertaken by a single business 
entity, among seven newly-created companies.  Each of the 
seven companies allegedly managed the volumes of its regional 
sales, selling into one another's respective regions, to 
avoid establishing the 35% market share required to apply the 
monopoly price ceilings. 
 
6. (C) Dvorak told Econoff on November 29 that, 
notwithstanding the conviction, the Procurator's case "was 
full of holes." One example, he explained, was the fact that 
he, Dvorak, did not even begin working for PK until August 
2003, and thus could hardly have contributed to the alleged 
"conspiracy" begun in 2002 to evade the law.  Further, he 
argued, the refinery's privatization agreement, drafted in 
the late 1990's when the State first sold its interest in the 
refinery, guaranteed that the refinery's products would not 
be subject to future price controls.  And finally, Dvorak 
said, the Procurator had never established in court that PK's 
distribution scheme had resulted in higher prices for the 
refined products. 
 
7. (C/NF) However, Dvorak admitted, in retrospect PK "clearly 
should have done things differently."  The defendants' case 
 
ASTANA 00000817  002 OF 003 
 
 
had been undermined, he noted, by the exposure of an internal 
memo, written by PK's lawyers, warning that creating the new 
distribution companies would make the company vulnerable to 
charges of anti-monopoly violations. 
 
"Why Us?" -- Making Sense of the Past 
------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C/NF) In seeking to explain the cause ("why us?") of 
their legal problems, the PK executives have favored 
different hypotheses at different times. Prior to the 
company's announced sale to CNPC, Dvorak and Goldsmith often &#
x000A;defended the thesis that PK's legal problems were the result 
of a GOK plot (perhaps in collusion with Lukoil) to drive 
down PK's share price prior to a planned bid to buy the 
company.  According to this theory, KMG had long coveted the 
Shymkent refinery.  Dvorak and Goldsmith tended to see most 
of the company's legal problems in this light, including 
several legal disputes with its joint venture partner Lukoil, 
and the GOK's enforcement of gas flaring restrictions which 
forced a 30% cut in PK's 2005 oil production. 
 
9. (C/NF) Following the announcement of PK's sale to CNPC, 
Goldsmith and Dvorak found hope that the legal case against 
them would be dropped -- after all, as they argued at the 
time, there was no further reason for the GOK to target PK's 
stock price.  As the legal case against them moved forward, 
however, they adopted a different hypothesis: that the GOK, 
taken by surprise by the sale, was using the legal case as 
leverage in post-sale negotiations to acquire key PK assets 
from the Chinese.  (Note:  Much evidence points to the fact 
that the GOK was caught unprepared by the sale, the most 
dramatic of which was a series of amendments which the GOK 
rushed into law before the deal was finalized (Ref B), which 
extended the GOK's "preemptive rights" and thus strengthened 
its negotiating position with CNPC.  A KazMunaiGaz (KMG) 
contact told us at the time that the GOK had been 
unpleasantly surprised by the high price paid by CNPC -- a 
price KMG would have to match, under the preemptive right 
legislation, to acquire the PK assets.  End note.) 
 
Refusing Amnesty and Other Legal Oddities 
----------------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) The guilt or innocence of the executives aside, the 
anti-monopoly case took more than one questionable turn in 
the Winter and Spring of 2005-06, which fed the executives' 
sense that they were pawns in a bigger game. The most curious 
of these was the Procurator's refusal to apply the Amnesty 
Law in January and February 2006, before the case went to 
trial, despite PK's repeated legal appeals and Embassy 
requests for close consideration.  (The Embassy also voiced 
concern about the tendency, present both in this case and in 
recent AES  disputes, of the authorities to file criminal 
charges in what are essentially civil cases.)   In Spring 
2006, the trial judge also refused, during pre-trial motions, 
to dismiss the case on the basis of the amnesty -- only to do 
so at trial's end. 
 
11. (C/NF) As further evidence that his case was being 
manipulated for larger purposes, Dvorak cites the fact that 
the list of alleged victims of PK's "monopolistic" activities 
-- companies which allegedly overpaid for refined products -- 
grew in apparent synchrony with the reported intensity of the 
GOK's negotiations with CNPC.  (The dollar amount of these 
alleged damages reached, at one point, approximately $750 
million, before shrinking throughout the summer of 2006, 
under examination of the court, to approximately $55 million. 
 These damages represent PK liabilities which CNPC legally 
assumed upon purchasing the company.  Dvorak, who remained on 
PK's payroll even after the company's sale to CNPC, told 
Econoff that this (inflated) dollar figure was being used as 
a bargaining chip in the GOK-CNPC negotiations.)  Dvorak also 
asserts that the list of alleged victims of the crime was 
populated by numerous brand-new companies created, 
presumably, in order to file claims and make a buck from PK's 
legal problems. PK's lawyers, Dvorak claims, were able to 
establish that fourteen of the allegedly unrelated victimized 
companies, in fact, shared a single bank account.  Dvorak 
believes that the courts may have refused to grant amnesty in 
January 2006 in order to allow these "victimized" companies 
the opportunity to collect in court.  (In denying application 
of the Amnesty Law, the Procurator's office cited a need to 
gain the consent of all injured parties before applying the 
amnesty.)  And, finally, Dvorak believes that his own 
conviction may have been "necessary" as evidence in the 
ongoing legal case to collect the $55 million from CNPC. 
 
ASTANA 00000817  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
12. (C/NF) Comment:  While it is easy to blame Kazakhstan's 
weak judicial system for many of the recent legal cases 
involving Western investors -- and we readily do so, here, in 
the instance of the non-applied amnesty -- it is worth 
pointing out that companies take on different level of "legal 
risk," by virtue of adopting conservative or aggressive legal 
and accounting practices, just as they take on differing 
levels of financial risk in making their investments. 
PetroKazakhstan, it appears to us, may have pushed the legal 
envelope.  Even without taking a hard position on the justice 
of the anti-monopoly verdict, however, we clearly decry one 
of the more insidious aspects of the current investment 
climate in Kazakhstan -- the discretion of authorities to 
file criminal charges in cases which are essentially civil in 
nature, without meeting Western standards for establishing 
criminal intent. 
 
13. (C) Comment (continued):  With the recent sale of PK and 
Nelson Resources, the ongoing CITIC bid to buy NationsEnergy 
(Ref C), and growing rumors of a Chinese bid for 
MangistauMunaiGas, we may be witnessing the end of the 
ownership of Kazakhstan's mid-sized oil fields by private 
investors and mid-sized foreign companies.  As these 
investors move out, cashing in on high oil prices, KMG is 
likely to exercise its preemptive rights to take a share of 
the assets, thus expanding its onshore presence in parallel 
with its legislatively-prescribed requirement to take part in 
all offshore projects.  Perhaps paradoxically, KMG's growing 
presence is likely to improve the investment climate for 
project partners.  As KMG's Kashagan partners tell us, having 
KMG as a partner is helpful when addressing legal or fiscal 
issues raised by the GOK.  While KMG's new role, onshore and 
off, is usually seen as a means to develop the national 
company, and gradually expand State ownership and control 
over Kazakhstan's hydrocarbon reserves, it may also serve as 
means to institutionalize, and thus tame, the "Wild West" 
characteristics of Kazakhstan's oil patch.  End comment. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA816, KAZAKHSTAN: TERRORIST LIST

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA816 2006-12-11 16:58 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0816 3451658
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111658Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7921

UNCLAS ASTANA 000816 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EB/ESC/TFS, S/CT (PATTY HILL), IO/PCS 
(JOHN SANDAGE), SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER KTFN KVPR PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TERRORIST LIST 
 
REF:  STATE 193615 
 
1. In response to reftel, post submits the following list of banned 
terrorist organizations in Kazakhstan: Al-Qaida, Islamic Party of 
Eastern Turkistan, Kurdish People's Congress, Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan, Asbat al-Ansar, Muslim Brotherhood, Taliban Movement, 
Boz Gurd, Jamaat of Central Asian Mujahadins, Lashkar-e-Toiba, 
Social Reforms Society, Organization for Liberation of Eastern 
Turkistan, and AUM Sinrikyo.  Hizb'ut Tahrir is also banned under a 
separate designation as an "extremist organization." 
 
2. This list is published by both the Procurator General's Office of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan and the KazInform National Information 
Agency and can be found at their internet sites 
http://www.procuror.kz/?iid=5&type 
=news&lang=ru&nid=1063  and http://www.inform.kz/ 
showarticle.php?lang=rus&id=162626 respectively. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA814, KAZAKHSTAN AGREES TO RECEIVE DETAINEES IN DECEMBER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA814 2006-12-11 12:45 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0814/01 3451245
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY TEXT - WSC2141 - AD59CF1C - 555)
O 111245Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7917
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T ASTANA 000814 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/WCI (STAMILIO, MUBANGU), L/PM (A. HAINES), 
SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DOD/OGC (BEAVER), OUSD/DETAINEE POLICY 
(LIOTTA), NSC (CAMPONOVO) 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - TEXT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM PINS KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN AGREES TO RECEIVE DETAINEES IN DECEMBER 
 
REF: A. STATE 194431 
 
     B. ASTANA 502 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Deborah Mennuti, reasons 1.4 
(B) and (D). 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary:  The Kazakhstani government has agreed to 
accept the return of its citizens from Guantanamo in 
December, and wants the transfer to take place in Almaty 
rather than Astana as proposed by the U.S.  The MFA maintains 
that the KNB insists on receiving records of interrogations 
of the three individuals at Guantanamo, in addition to the 
summary reports already received.   End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Pol-Econ chief met with Ualikhan Saginkhanov, head 
of the Europe and Americas division of the MFA's Consular 
Department, on December 11 to discuss the Ref A message on 
transfer of Guantanamo detainees.  Saginkhanov presented a 
diplomatic note agreeing to receive the individuals during 
the December 10-17 timeframe. 
 
3. (S) Informal embassy translation of diplomatic note 
4-13-1-1-10017, dated December 11, 2006: 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States 
of America in the Republic of Kazakhstan and, in response to 
the Embassy's note No. 1180/06 of December 4, 2006, has the 
honor to report that the Kazakhstani side is ready to receive 
on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan A. B. 
Abykhanov, S.T. Arupov, and I.T. Batayev during the December 
10-17 timeframe at the Almaty airport. 
 
As a result of this, the Kazakhstani side requests the U.S. 
side to provide, no later than December 14, 2006, information 
about the date and time of arrival of the above-mentioned 
citizens. 
 
Representatives of the Consular Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as well as 
competent agencies of the Republic of Kazakhstan, will be 
present during the transfer of the above-named citizens of 
Kazakhstan. 
 
The individuals transferred by the American side will be 
documented and escorted to their place of residence, with 
subsequent registration and recording. 
 
With regard to the transfer of the above-named citizens of 
Kazakhstan "to the exclusive custody of the Government of 
Kazakhstan," as mentioned in the U.S. Embassy's note No. 
1180/06 of December 4, 2006, the Kazakhstani side kindly 
calls attention to the note of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. I-13-1-1/1921 of 
November 6, 2006, in which it was reported that "in 
accordance with national legislation, it would be possible to 
enter the transferred persons into appropriate national or 
international watch lists, restrict their travel outside the 
country, confiscate their passports or deny them permission 
to travel only in case of their prosecution for the 
commission of criminal acts, in accordance with the 
established procedures, and the imposition of preventive 
punishment restricting their constitutional rights, including 
freedom of movement." 
 
In addition, "in accordance with the legislation of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan a capable citizen of Kazakhstan should 
himself bear all responsibility for his actions and conduct, 
including criminal responsibility." 
 
Along with this, the Kazakhstani side repeats its request 
that the American side, in the shortest possible time frame, 
provide legalized and operative materials about the 
circumstances under which the above-named Kazakhstani 
citizens were detained in Afghanistan, testimony during 
questioning, and any other information confirming their 
involvement in terrorist activity. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
avails itself of the opportunity to renew to the U.S. Embassy 
the assurances of its highest consideration. 
 
End text of translation. 
 
4. (S/NF) Saginkhanov emphasized several times the importance 
of receiving detailed records from the interrogations at 
Guantanamo.  The KNB needed this information in order to 
 
fully understand the threat that the individuals might pose, 
he said.  He acknowledged that the U.S. had already provided 
a significant amount of information about the three 
individuals in question, but maintained that after detaining 
the three Kazakhstanis for so long U.S. authorities must have 
much more detailed records from numerous interrogations. 
Pol-econ chief promised to convey the urgency of the request 
to Washington but cautioned that additional documents might 
simply not exist.  Saginkhanov said that the Kazakhstani 
government considered it "imperative" that additional 
information be conveyed through intelligence channels either 
in advance of the transfer, or simultaneously.  "Kazakhstan 
is meeting the U.S. halfway on this," Saginkhanov said.  "If 
the U.S. declines to share additional information, it will be 
percei
ved very badly." 
 
5. (S/NF) Saginkhanov highlighted the fact that Kazakhstan 
wants the transfer to take place at the Almaty airport, 
rather than in Astana as proposed by the U.S.  (Note:  Post 
will modify the pending overflight request accordingly.  End 
note.)  He also requested that the U.S. provide two 3 cm x 4 
cm photos of each detainee upon arrival, to facilitate the 
immediate issuance of identity documents. 
 
6. (S/NF) Comment:  In the interest of sustaining good 
cooperation with Kazakhstan on the return of detainees, 
including the fourth Kazakhstani citizen who will presumably 
be returned in the future, post urges Washington agencies to 
give full consideration to the Kazakhstani request for 
interrogation records with a view toward maximum possible 
transparency.  If it is determined that no additional 
information can be shared, post requests advance warning in 
order to be equipped to resolve any conflicts that may arise 
during the transfer process.  End comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA795, KAZAKHSTAN: DISCUSSION ON RETURN OF DETAINEES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA795 2006-12-08 01:44 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0795 3420144
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 080144Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7899
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T ASTANA 000795 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/WCI (M. STAMILIO), S/WCI (A. MORRISON), L/PM 
(AHAINES), SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DOD/OGC (BEAVER), 
OUSD/DETAINEE POLICY (LIOTTA), NSC (CAMPONOVO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016 
TAGS: PTER KAWC PHUM PREL PINR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DISCUSSION ON RETURN OF DETAINEES 
 
REF: STATE 194431 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Deborah Mennuti, reasons 1.4 (B) 
and (D). 
 
1.  (S) On December 5, Poloff delivered reftel demarche on 
the proposed return of three Kazakhstani detainees to 
Ualikhan Saginkhanov of the MFA's Consular Department. 
Saginkhanov appeared surprised at the proposed mid-December 
time frame.  Saginkhanov said that he would send the 
information up the chain and would attempt to get a resoponse 
to Poloff as soon as possible, but that it was an 
inter-agency process and would not have an immediate turn 
around.  He said he would contact Poloff with the Kazakhstani 
response, as well as to inform him as to who would be the 
Kazakhstani POC as soon as he had the information. 
 
2.  (S) The embassy point of contact for the transfer is: 
Lt Col Richard H. Lee, Jr. 
Air Attache 
USDAO Astana, Kazakhstan 
Mobile: 7-701-757-5155 
Office: 7-3172-70-22-93 
Fax: 7-3172-70-22-57 
Email:  LeeRH@state.gov; please also info DAOAstana@state.gov 
SIPR mail: diLeeRH@dia.smil.mil; please also info 
DAOAstana@dia.smil.mil 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA781, EXBS: KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR’S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA781 2006-12-07 01:53 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8499
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0781/01 3410153
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070153Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7883
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC//NNSA//
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUCQAAA/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0390
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7801
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7753
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0733
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1956
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7070

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000781 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC PVANSON, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC-AMT LSPRINGER 
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE RBUCK 
DEPT FOR SCA/RA JSCHLOSSER 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN MO'MARA 
CBP/INA FOR CDONOFRIO AND RWATT 
USDOE/NNSA CWALKER, TPERRY AND EDESCHLER 
DOC FOR DCREED AND GPETERSEN-BEARD 
USCG FOR BGOLDEN 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT, BISHKEK, BAKU, DUSHANBE AND ASHGABAT FOR EXBS 
ADVISORS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP KZ
SUBJECT:  EXBS: KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR'S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE 
(NOVEMBER 2006) 
 
I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS: 
 
       1. Michael Seguin, new Kazakhstan EXBS Advisor, completed 
turnover of the EXBS program office from outgoing Advisor Andrew 
Offenbacher.  A thorough review of program priorities, the 
diplomatic landscape in Kazakhstan and appropriate posture to take 
with government agencies, and initiatives, was discussed in detail 
with Ambassador Ordway and the DCM, Kevin Milas.  Program focus 
discussions on current events as well as budget plans, past, 
present, and future for the EXBS program was also covered.  A number 
of administrative areas such as EXBS property inventory, and Gulnara 
Abildaeva's (EXBS FSN/LES) grade classification was also discussed. 
(Note: Michael Seguin has projected Christmas leave 19-30 December, 
Gulnara Abildaeva will be in charge of the EXBS office until Mike 
Seguin's return on 12/30.) 
 
 2. November 14 - The formal dedication of the Embassy opening was 
completed.  Embassy contacts to include Border Guard and Customs 
officials as well as Kazakhstan's Head of State, President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev were in attendance for the ceremony.  This was the new 
EXBS advisor's first opportunity to meet some of the key Border 
Guard and Customs officials.  Several hundred people attended. 
After the dedication Ambassador Ordway expressed his thanks to the 
Embassy staff for a successful ceremony. 
 
 3. Kazakhstan's Customs Control Committee Chairman Askar Shakirov's 
proposed visit to the United States under the Volunteer Visitor 
Program (VVP) is progressing through the planning stage.  A 
diplomatic note was sent by the EXBS office to the Chairman in 
November stating that a proposed itinerary would be presented to him 
before the first of the year for his, and two additional candidates, 
visit.  Presently, the EXBS office is waiting for word from the VVP 
office in D.C. that the EXBS proposal, with Ambassador Ordway's 
approval, is acceptable before presentation to the Chairman.  It is 
the EXBS Advisor's intent to accompany the Chairman and his 
delegation on this visit together with one EXBS LES. 
 
 4.  EXBS Advisor conducted interviews to fill the new EXBS LES 
position and hired Oxana Limareva.  The EXBS office welcomes the 
needed addition of Oxana, a talented, tried, and experienced U.S. 
Embassy employee who will make a significant contribution to the 
success of the office. 
 
 5.  Other administrative activities accomplished:  Country 
clearances for Erik Deschler (DOE), Elizabeth Smiraldo (DOC/CTP), 
Chris Walker (DOC).  Diplomatic Notes for Chairman Askar Shakirov 
(Customs VVP) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dates for software 
upgrades). 
 
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS CONDUCTED 
 
 1. No site assessments were conducted during November due to the 
transition of the EXBS office advisor.  However, an annual calendar 
for FY07 was developed for presentation to the Kazakhstani Border 
Guard and Customs agencies indicating one week each month to be 
dedicated to EXBS office site surveys.  The EXBS office is prepared 
to initiate a site survey schedule, beginning in January, that will 
touch all quadrants of Kazakhstan's borders in FY07.  This scheduled 
approach will aid in deconflicting site assessments with other U.S. 
agencies and the Kazakhstani government. 
 
 2. As of the end of November Baku-based EXBS Regional Maritime 
 
ASTANA 00000781  002 OF 004 
 
 
Advisor Mike Taffe reported that planned hull anti-fouling paint for 
the donated SAFE boats (3-each) in Aktau, Kazakhstan did not occur - 
specifics for the delay were not noted.  A new date for the painting 
is yet to be determined. EXBS advisor Mike Seguin is planning a 
visit to Aktau to meet with Border Guard officials to better 
understand the state of the SAFE Boat program.  While in the area 
conducting site surveys and a planned joint Office of Military 
Cooperation / EXBS meeting with MoD and Border Guard officials, 
Specific areas of concern regardi
ng the SAFE boat project, noted in 
the October report, will be addressed. 
 
 3.  EXBS advisor met with DTRA, OMC, and INL to discuss FY07 
engagement plans for FY07 to deconflict proposed activities.  This 
effort was in support of the creation of a proposed FY07 budget and 
activity plan prepared for Jeff Hartshorn's review (Kazakhstan's 
Central Asian EXBS Program Manager). 
 
 4.  November 8 - Laura Smiley, DTRA Program Manager, hosted a DTRA 
/ USCG planning event that included officials from the MoD, Border 
Guard, Customs, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the 
planning steps to execute a body of training on Maritime 
interdiction.  The group in attendance identified the timeline and 
activities proposed for the joint WMD-PPI (Prevention Proliferation 
Program). Next steps are for the Kazakhstani agencies in attendance 
to agree on a timeline for scheduling the initial planning stages 
for this multi-part and multi-week event which will focus on 
Maritime Interdiction equipment, training, and doctrine as well as 
train-the-trainer techniques. 
 
 5.  November 15-16 - Erik Deschler, DOE, hosted an event in Astana 
with Kazakhstan Customs, Contractors, and the EXBS office to discuss 
the status of the Second Line of Defense Program (SLD).  After four 
years of planning, the SLD program is in the final contracting 
stages to begin installation of 31 Portal Monitors at 9 Kazakhstan 
Border Sites.  This "Phase I" part of the SLD Program is a 
multimillion dollar (DOE funded - not EXBS funded) program which is 
projected to be completed by the end of August 2007.  EXBS plays a 
central role in supporting the project to assist in project 
communication and to help deconflict other border initiatives. 
 
B.  TRAINING DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
 1. November 1 - EXBS Program Coordinator Gulnara Abildaeva 
completed the second annual EXBS Program Workshop for Locally 
Employed Staff in Bratislava, Slovkia. 
 
 2. November 23-24 - The Department of Commerce/Commonwealth Trading 
Partners (CTP) conducted an extremely well done Internal Control 
Program (ITP) workshop geared toward orienting various Kazakhstani 
agencies - most notably the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoI&T) - 
with customized Kazakhstani software for use in commodity 
identification.  This software will be used to support Kazakhstan's 
industry outreach efforts and standardize the method used for 
Nuclear Commodity Identification.  This event was extremely 
beneficial for the new EXBS advisor as Elizabeth Smiraldo (CTP) was 
prepared with a complete engagement history on DOC's engagement and 
efforts in supporting Licensing, control lists, and legislation 
since the early 1990's.  After the event, Mike Seguin (EXBS) 
received positive feedback on the event from Dina Akpanbayeva (Head 
of Licensing, MoI&T) who indicated the value of this effort to her 
agency as well as a desire for continued support for this workshop 
throughout Kazakhstan.  Ms. Akpanbayeva also indicated a need for 
other related support in both hardware / software including focus on 
Biological and Chemical commodities in the future.  Also discussed 
 
ASTANA 00000781  003 OF 004 
 
 
was the "Tracker" program.  Ms. Akpanbayeva (MoI&T) indicated that 
Tracker was no longer an area of engagement Kazakhstan was 
interested in as they have developed their own software and moved 
beyond what Tracker can offer.  EXBS Advisor asked for a formal 
diplomatic note to document this. 
 
C. EQUIPMENT DELIVERED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
       1. No equipment delivered during this reporting period. 
 
D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT STATUS UPDATE 
 
 1. Diplomatic note sent to the MFA for dates for DOE to conduct 
installation and necessary software upgrades to 3-each portable 
X-ray Florescence (XRF) metal analyzers used at various border 
locations.  As of the end of November, still waiting for a response. 
INECP will send a representative of the NSTC to the three concerned 
border posts near China to update the software and operating system 
used to power the three x-ray analyzers that were provided to 
Kazakhstan Customs earlier in June of 2006.  The NTSC representative 
will also review how the units are being used at the ports of 
entry. 
 
 2. EXBS office is in preliminary planning stages for USCBP 
sponsored 5-day ISIT training event to be held February 12-16 in 
Charleston, S.C. for 18 mid-level and senior Border Guard officers. 
Purpose is to conduct training (Train-the-Trainer) in "Hands-On" 
Interdiction techniques and practices. 
 
 3. December 4-8 - EXBS office will attend planned DOE sponsored 
Commodity Identification Training Seminar in Almaty.  The course 
will cover materials and equipment related to the production of not 
only nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological, as well as 
missile technology. 
 
 4. December 7-8 - EXBS Advisor will present EXBS program 
orientation overview to USAID seminar on Customs control in Almaty. 
 
 5. December 14-15 - DOC/CTP workshop on Internal Control Program 
(ICP) for Industry will be held in Almaty.  EXBS Office will attend 
this event which is the mirror image of the November 23-24 ICP held 
in Astana.  However this workshop will be attended by Industry 
administrators verse government administrators.  This Ministry of 
Industry and Trade (MoI&T) oriented event focuses on licensing and 
Nuclear Commodities Identification and associated software designed 
for the MoI&T by the DOC. 
 
 8. The EXBS Program's chosen contractor is currently working on 
Task Order 79, which includes the procurement of four modular 
shelters and high-clearance Ural trucks for transfer to Kazakhstan's 
Border Service.  Dates of distribution TBD. 
 
E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT CONTROLS, NONPROLIFERATION, OR 
RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
 
       1. Several mid-level Kazakhstan Customs officials were 
detained the week of November 20 in Almaty when Kazakhstani 
authorities discovered 12.5 kilos of cocaine on board the Lufthansa 
flight to Frankfurt the officials had boraded.  Investigation is on 
going and it is not clear whether the Customs officials were 
directly involved with the smuggling.  However, at least one 
mid-level Customs official dismissed. 
 
       2. October's EXBS report made reference to a BBC news release 
 
ASTANA 00000781  004 OF 004 
 
 
regarding a $160 mn Russian appropriation that is allocated in 2007 
for improved border control infrastructure for the Kazakh / Russian 
border.  The EXBS office, in dialogue with Kazakhstani Border Guard 
General Officers, was unable to confirm the accura
cy of this 
appropriation and plan.  Follow-up will continue to determine the 
substance behind this report along with the SKRIN Newswire report 
(October 24) that Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan 
Nursultan Nazarbayev signed "six documents" on October 3, agreeing 
to terms associated with joint participation in the establishment of 
an international nuclear center in Russian territory. 
 
F. CASPIAN SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
       1. Please see paragraph II, item A and paragraph 2, above. 
 
III. RED FLAG ISSUES. 
 
       1. None. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA738, KAZAKHSTAN: CONOCOPHILLIPS UPDATES AMBASSADOR ON

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA738 2006-12-06 07:04 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7376
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0738/01 3400704
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060704Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7847
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000738 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
COMMERCE FOR ADVOCACY CENTER: BLOPP AND DBLOOM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015 
TAGS: BTIO ENRG EPET KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: CONOCOPHILLIPS UPDATES AMBASSADOR ON 
"N" BLOCK, KASHAGAN 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 204 
     B. ALMATY 2157 
     C. ALMATY 1085 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway; Reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  ConocoPhillips (CP) Executive Vice President 
Bill Berry told the Ambassador on the morning of December 1 
that rival Shell had recently approached CP with a proposal 
to split the offshore "N" Block.  CP had declined the offer, 
Berry said, pending an anticipated meeting with Kazakhstani 
Deputy Prime Minister Karim Masimov, whom President 
Nazarbayev had chosen to broker a final "N" Block deal. 
Following a meeting later that afternoon in which Berry 
received unspecified "bad news" from Energy Minister 
Izmukhambetov and KazMunaiGaz President Karabalin, CP 
urgently requested Ambassador's assistance in contacting 
Masimov in the U.S.  Masimov and CP Chairman Jim Mulva spoke 
later in the day, but as of December 2 CP reported no 
progress in clarifying the status of their bid. 
 
2. (C) Summary (continued):  Speaking of Kashagan, Berry 
reported that project partners had recently selected a new 
design for an offshore platform judged to pose safety risks; 
the corresponding first-stage infrastructure will accommodate 
production of 300,000 barrels/day (b/d), rather than the 
450,000 b/d initially planned.  Berry confirmed reports (Ref 
A) that Chevron was seeking a role in the ongoing Kazakhstan 
Caspian Transportation System (KCTS) discussions, with an eye 
toward using the planned Eskene-Kurik pipeline to ship 
"second-generation" Tengiz oil.  End summary. 
 
 
"N" Block: CP's Status Unclear 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador opened the meeting by briefing Berry on 
his recent conversation with Masimov on the status of CP's 
bid to participate in the development of the offshore "N" 
Block. Masimov he explained, had confirmed that President 
Nazarbayev had assigned him to sort out Shell and CP's 
competing offers.  Masimov had noted that Shell had recently 
improved its offer, making the two companies' bids virtually 
equal.  The best outcome, Masimov had concluded, would be a 
shared deal. The Ambassador suggested that Masimov was 
probably hoping that Shell and CP would reach agreement on a 
joint proposal, thus sparing Masimov and the GOK a difficult 
decision. Speculating that Shell had likely received the same 
message from Masimov Berry informed the Ambassador that Shell 
had approached CP "two weeks ago" with a proposal to split 
the block.  CP had declined, Berry said, pending an 
anticipated meeting with Masimov which he had hoped to hold 
that day, but which had been rescheduled for December 15. 
 
4. (C) Berry told the Ambassador that, during an afternoon 
meeting with Izmukhambetov, he expected to be pressured to 
build a petrochemical facility as part of the "N" Block deal, 
as Mulva had been pressured in June (Ref B).  However, he 
added, "no one," including Shell, would commit to building a 
petrochemical facility in Kazakhstan, least of all before the 
quantity and quality of available gas was determined.  Not 
only was the Caspian 3,000 miles away from prospective 
markets -- China and Europe -- but the end products would 
compete with higher-value crude for limited railway capacity. 
 Kazakhstan would do better to liquefy the feedstocks for 
shipment by pipeline, Berry concluded, rather than add 
transport costs by transforming them into solids such as 
polyethelene.  (Note: Post will report septel on GOK efforts 
to gain TengizChevrOil's cooperation in a petrochemical 
project.  End note.) 
 
5. (C) CP called back after the meeting with Izmukhambetov 
and Karabalin, reporting that Izmukhambetov had delivered 
"bad news" on the "N" Block.  CP asked for the Ambassador's 
assistance in urgently reaching Masimov who was visiting the 
U.S.  Ambassador reached Masimov shortly thereafter, and 
Masimov called Mulva later on December 1, but as of the 
morning of December 2 CP had not received a clear sense 
whether Izmukhambetov's "bad news" had been authoritative. 
(Note: Due to concerns about cell phone security, CP did not 
elaborate on what the "bad news" was.  A journalist told 
Energy Officer on December 2 that Izmukhambetov had told a 
colleague on December 1 that Shell would be given 35% of "N", 
and CP 15%, but his rumor is unconfirmed.  End note.) 
 
 
ASTANA 00000738  002 OF 002 
 
 
Kashagan:  Coping with the Design Flaw 
-------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Berry reported that Kashagan partners had recently 
selected a new design and development plan to correct flaws 
discovered a year ago in the design of an offshore platform 
(Ref C).  The new plan, he said, called for the construction 
of an initial 300,000 barrel/day production train, rather 
than the 450,000 barrel/day train initially planned.  (Berry 
did not specify when "fi
rst oil" was expected.  On November 
29, however, an ExxonMobil representative told Energy Officer 
that the new plan entailed a delay in "first oil" "at least 
until 2011 -- and maybe longer.")  Berry told the Ambassador 
that he expected the GOK to launch a fierce battle to recoup 
revenues lost due to the delays and cost overruns.  While the 
Kashagan partners were "okay" from a contract perspective, no 
oil company can win "going toe-to-toe with a sovereign 
nation," and a pay-off of some magnitude seemed inevitable. 
 
7. (C) Berry told the Ambassador that the other project 
partners had largely succeeded in diluting operator AGIP's 
management responsibilities, in response to partner 
perception that AGIP was to blame, at least in part, for the 
delays and cost overruns. The other companies had seconded 
"thirty to forty" additional managers to the project, he 
said, and now occupied not only the "Project Director" 
position but four "key" Deputy Director slots. 
 
KCTS Process: Chevron Wants In 
------------------------------ 
 
8. (C) CP's Country Manager, Nick Olds, confirmed 
ExxonMobil's earlier report (Ref C) that Chevron was seeking 
to join the ongoing Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System 
(KCTS) discussions, with an eye toward shipping 
second-generation Tengiz volumes through a planned 
Eskene-Kurik pipeline in the years before CPC expansion. 
Project investors were hoping to finalize an MOU with the GOK 
before year's end, Olds said, in order to pave the way for 
Host Government Agreement (HGA) negotiations during 2007. 
 
9. (C) Berry told the Ambassador that at least some of 
Kashagan's European partners appeared inclined to ship their 
Kashagan volumes through Iran, while ExxonMobil and CP were 
still focused on the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.  With 
production from Azerbaijan's Azeri-Chirac-Guneshli (ACG) oil 
field now expected to prolong Azerbaijan's production 
plateau, he said, BTC shareholders (including CP) were 
already talking about BTC expansion.  Berry expressed 
interest in the USTDA-financed Trans-Caspian pipeline 
feasibility study, commenting that, with its projected 
"sizable" gas reserves, the "N" block might "be the starting 
point" for discussions about Kazakhstan's available gas 
supplies. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA737, TENGIZ UPDATE: RIOT DELAYS PRODUCTION INCREASE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA737 2006-12-06 02:55 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7229
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0737/01 3400255
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060255Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7845
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000737 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015 
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ
SUBJECT: TENGIZ UPDATE: RIOT DELAYS PRODUCTION INCREASE 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 501 
 
     B. ALMATY 2273 
 
Classified By: DCM Kevin Milas; Reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: TengizChevrOil (TCO) General Director Todd 
Levy told DCM on November 27 that the October 20 riot at 
Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil field (Ref A) -- and the subsequent 
exodus of site workers -- would likely delay "second 
generation" Tengiz production from 4-6 months, until year-end 
2007.  Levy was more sanguine about TCO's ongoing dispute 
with the GOK about sulfur disposal, reporting that the GOK 
appeared satisfied with work being done on the subject by a 
recently-created Joint Task Force.  Levy described how, 
following a request from President Nazarbayev to Chevron 
Chairman David O'Reilly, TCO had entered into negotiations to 
supply ethane (on "uneconomic terms") to a planned 
petrochemical plant near Atyrau.  The negotiations, Levy 
predicted, would fail absent renewed high-level political 
pressure.  TCO has identified several other promising oil and 
gas fields within its license area; however, with production 
"limited by surface facilities," development of these fields 
is unlikely until Tengiz is in decline.  Levy's comments on 
TCO's oil transportation vision reported septel by Embassy 
Moscow.  End summary. 
 
Brawl Delays Second-Generation Production 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Astana DCM and Energy Officer, along with Moscow 
Energy Officer, called on Levy in Atyrau on November 27. 
Levy informed the DCM that the recent riot at Tengiz would 
likely delay the start-up of "second generation" Tengiz 
production "four to six months" from the target date of June 
2006 (Ref B).  (Note: the production increase, which will 
roughly double TCO's current output of 270,000 barrels/day, 
will occur in two stages, with an additional 100,000 b/d 
added in 2007, and another 130,000 b/d added in 2008. End 
note.)  The brawl had not interrupted current production, 
Levy explained -- TCO would meet 98.5% of its targeted 2006 
output.  However, the construction project was suffering from 
the absence of workers who had left the site after the 
incident.  (TCO Government Relations Director Anthony 
Palmeirim later specified that 1600 expatriate workers -- the 
vast majority Turks -- had left the site and had yet to 
return.  On December 1, ExxonMobil's Government Relations 
Director, Patty Graham, told Energy Officer that a total of 
4000 workers were absent, many of them Kazakhstani workers 
finding themselves without supervision.) 
 
3. (C) Levy explained that, as a consequence of the incident 
and pressures from both the central and the oblast 
governments, TCO had doubled the minimum construction wage at 
the site to roughly 54,000 tenge a year (USD 420).  Levy 
noted that TCO was actively seeking to replace Turkish 
workers on site with those of other nationalities, 
"particularly Poles and Hungarians," as the site's 
Kazakhstani workers were more accepting of non-Turkish 
supervisors. TCO was also taking a general (and much-needed, 
Levy admitted) look at the overall living conditions at the 
contractor work camps.  While the local akim would 
undoubtedly continue to get "political mileage" out of the 
incident, and made occasional threats about withholding 
low-skilled work permits, Levy was optimistic that the 
political aspects of the crisis were under control, leaving 
him to wrestle with the issue of labor supply. 
 
4. (C) Note: On November 28, Richard Fritz of AGIP KCO (the 
Kashagan field operator), told DCM that AGIP had suffered 
labor unrest a few days after the Tengiz incident.  Turkish 
workers had complained that they "felt threatened," he 
explained, and 3-4,000 Turkish workers had refused to report 
to work.  In the end, he said, AGIP had managed to get the 
vast majority back to work, losing only 200 permanently. 
ExxonMobil's Graham worried about another consequence of the 
riot in a November 29 conversation, telling Energy Officers 
that the Ministry of Education had recently published a 
document in response to the riot which called on greatly 
increased private sector (read: oil company) financing of 
vocational education programs.  The document, she said, would 
likely be a topic of conversation at the upcoming Foreign 
Investor Council meeting, where it would likely draw 
Nazarbayev's attention.  End note.) 
 
Sulfur Disposition On Track 
--------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Levy told DCM that, notwithstanding the GOK's very 
 
ASTANA 00000737  002 OF 002 
 
 
vocal late-summer criticism of TCO's sulfur stockpiles, the 
issue seemed to be under control.  TCO had formed a Joint 
Task Force with various government ministries on the issue 
two months previous, he said, which seemed to have satisfied 
the GOK of TCO's intent to resolve the problem.  TCO, Levy 
explained, was working through the Task Force to fund an 
environmental impact assessment, and to otherwise ground the 
discussion on the real (scientific) impact of the stored 
sulfur.  Levy emphasized th
at TCO was continuing to meet its 
contractual obligations to dispose of sulfur -- in 2006, he 
said, TCO would likely sell 104% of the sulfur it produced, 
while working on a sales expansion project that would 
eventually raise that rate to 125%.  Levy pointed out that, 
by the time the "Second Generation Production / Sour Gas 
Injection" project was completed, Tengiz alone would produce 
15% of the world's supply of sulfur.  Selling the 
newly-produced sulfur would be a daunting task in itself, he 
concluded, even without working to reduce the estimated 8 
million tons of sulfur stored on site. 
 
Petrochemicals -- With Political Pressure 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Asked about reports that TCO had agreed to supply 3 
billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually to a planned 
petrochemical complex in Atyrau (to be built by "Kazakhstan 
Petrochemical Industries (KPI)" -- which, in turn, is owned 
by Basell, SAT & Co., and KMG E&P), Levy confirmed that 
negotiations were ongoing.  Nazarbayev had "pressed" 
Chevron's Chairman "to be supportive" of the venture, Levy 
said, adding that "the only reason we are doing this is 
politics -- just to support the President." 
 
7. (C) Levy explained that TCO and KPI had already agreed on 
a sales price, "$30-40 / thousand cubic meters," which was 
roughly half of what KPI would pay to draw gas from the 
nearby Central-Asia-Center pipeline.  In the short-term, Levy 
said, KPI would sell the unused gas fractions (once the 
ethane and/or propane was extracted) on the market.  However, 
in the medium term TCO would need the gas for re-injection, 
and so would require KPI to "backfill" the volumes it 
received, purchasing additional gas on the open market, if 
necessary, to replace the extracted fractions.  All of this, 
Levy concluded, meant that the project was probably 
"uneconomic."  KPI would likely ask for a lower gas price and 
relief from the backfill obligations, he said, "but we're 
unlikely to reach agreement" -- unless the issues resolved at 
a political level; i.e., between Nazarbayev and Chevron 
Chairman David O'Reilly. 
 
Other Promising Oil Fields 
-------------------------- 
 
8. (C) DCM met separately with a team of TCO geologists, who 
reviewed the characteristics of eight additional "prospects" 
within the license area, including "Ansagan," which had 
excited Levy during conversation in June (Ref B). All of the 
prospects appeared to have between 200 million and 1 billion 
barrels of oil, "not enough to warrant the construction of 
stand-alone facilities."  Tengiz production, in turn, was 
already limited by surface facilities ("and not by reservoir 
performance"), making it unlikely that the Tengiz facilities 
would be used to process oil from a new find.  (Note: Oil 
from Korolev, a field 10 kilometers from Tengiz, is already 
being produced using Tengiz facilities.) Meanwhile, TCO was 
under pressure from regulators to either develop more fields 
or to allow other operators in the area. TCO is contractually 
obligated to relinquish percentages of its license area over 
time -- 50% by 2008, for example.  While TCO was yet to 
relinquish acreage it thought was promising, the challenges 
of "managing the exploration license" would grow with time. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA721, AVIAN INFLUENZA CONFERENCE AIMS TO STRENGTHEN CENTRAL

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06ASTANA721.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA721 2006-12-04 01:49 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4864
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0721 3380149
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 040149Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7830
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000721 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR M. O'MARA 
AIAG FOR H. SUMMERS 
DEPT PASS TO USAID 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV EAGR TBIO KFLU KZ
SUBJECT: AVIAN INFLUENZA CONFERENCE AIMS TO STRENGTHEN CENTRAL 
ASIA'S PREPAREDNESS 
 
1. Summary: On December 4-6 in Almaty, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), through its partners the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Winrock 
International, will hold a regional conference on technical aspects 
of Avian Influenza surveillance.  The goal of the conference is to 
operationalize country-specific influenza pandemic preparedness 
plans by developing practical guidelines for epidemiology, 
laboratory, health care, and veterinary practices.  Close to 150 
participants, primarily from the five Central Asian nations, will 
participate, and Ambassador Ordway will open the conference.  End 
summary. 
 
2. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
through its partners the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) and Winrock International, will host in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan an Avian Influenza conference focused on surveillance and 
response practices in Central Asia.  Currently, all of the Central 
Asian nations have developed National Pandemic Preparedness Plans, 
although they vary greatly in detail.  The conference hopes to 
assist Central Asian experts to develop the methodological 
procedures needed for routine influenza surveillance practices, 
detection, and containment of an outbreak.  The conference 
organizers believe that with such developed guidelines the Central 
Asian nations will be better prepared to respond promptly and 
adequately should an outbreak/epidemic occur. 
 
3. The three day conference will bring together over 100 technical 
experts working under Ministries of Health and Ministries of 
Agriculture in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan.  These laboratory specialists, clinicians, 
veterinarians, and epidemiologists will review, discuss, and revise 
area-specific guidelines. CDC has also invited international experts 
to disseminate information and to make presentations during working 
group sessions.  The organizers expect that these expert group 
meetings will help spur each country to strengthen its surveillance 
and preparedness guidelines. 
 
4.  The conference is part of broader USG efforts to assist the 
Central Asian nations with Avian Influenza preparedness.  USAID is 
working with the governments of Central Asia to prevent the spread 
of Avian Influenza among animals and to help prepare for a possible 
human pandemic.  Winrock International and CDC will implement 
regional programs - Winrock focusing on communications and 
veterinary issues, and the CDC on preparing for surveillance and 
response to a human pandemic. 
 
5. Comment: Central Asian countries are located on main wild bird 
flyways from South-East Asia where Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
is endemic.  Recent poultry outbreaks in Kazakhstan and Russia have 
demonstrated the threat posed to Central Asia.  The large 
delegations scheduled to participate from the Central Asian states 
represent a hopeful sign of their commitment to prevent and prepare 
for pandemic influenza.  Post will report on the results of the 
conference.  End comment. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

06ASTANA712, KAZAKHSTANI OPPOSITION FIGURES SKEPTICAL ON

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06ASTANA712.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA712 2006-12-01 12:09 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0712/01 3351209
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011209Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7822

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000712 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR M. O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI OPPOSITION FIGURES SKEPTICAL ON 
CHANCES FOR POLITICAL REFORM 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. John Ordway for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings with the Ambassador on 
November 27, opposition figures Galymzhan Zhakiyanov and 
Zharmakhan Tuyakbay stated that they do not expect near-term 
political reforms in Kazakhstan.  Neither could predict 
whether President Nazarbayev will alter Kazakhstan's current 
political system.  Despite his skepticism, Tuyakbay said that 
his party, the Social Democrats, will attend the last meeting 
of Kazakhstan's Democratization Commission.  Zhakiyanov 
suggested that Nazarbayev is losing touch with the views of 
ordinary citizens, pointing to three recent proposals that he 
categorized as mistakes - banning right-hand drive cars, 
restricting gambling to two provincial cities, and shifting 
the Kazakh language from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. 
End summary. 
 
2. (C) In separate meetings with the Ambassador on November 
27, Galymzhan Zhakiyanov and Zharkmakhan Tuyakbay, leader of 
the Social Democrat Party, expressed their doubts that 
President Nazarbayev will fulfill recent promises of 
democratic reform.  Zhakiyanov believes that the GOK will 
feel no pressure to press for reforms if it fails in its bid 
to chair the OSCE in 2009.  Tuyakbay warned that each time 
President Nazarbayev travels to the U.S., he makes promises 
that he does not keep.  According to Tuyakbay, Kazakhstan's 
Democratization Commission has also proven a failure.  He 
told the Ambassador that most suggestions made by the 
Commission's working group have been rejected.  He expects 
minimum reforms will result, but he did add that the 
Commission should not be disbanded and that his party will 
attend the group's final meeting (Comment: Among the 
opposition, only Alikhan Baymenov of Ak Zhol has participated 
in previous sessions of the Democratization Commission. End 
comment) 
 
3.(C) Both Zhakiyanov and Tuyakbay were uncertain as to 
whether President Nazarbayev will seek to alter Kazakhstan's 
political system.  Tuyakbay believes that Nazarbayev merged 
the pro-government parties to provide them time to develop 
and in order to manage them more effectively.  He thinks that 
Nazarbayev may choose to create a party-list system similar 
to Russia's, believing that the ruling coalition will be able 
to take 80 to 90 percent of the seats.  Zhakiyanov feels that 
Nazarbayev will wait for results of elections in Russia 
before proposing any reforms, and that any changes will 
mirror those made in Russia.  Both mentioned Singapore as a 
political model attractive to Nazarbayev. 
 
4. (C) Tuyakbay discussed the status of the Social Democrat 
Party, which recently had its registration suspended by the 
Ministry of Justice soon after submitting a party list with 
127,000 supporters (and another 50,000 waiting to join, 
according to Tuyakbay)(Note: 50,000 signatures are required). 
 The Ministry claimed it could take longer to verify the 
signatures.  Tuyakbay said he had an additional 20,000 
signatures ready to submit to overcome the disqualifications 
of the ones he had submitted.  He also reported that 
President Nazarbayev promised to register the party if 
Tuyakbay promised not to criticize him personally. 
Nevertheless, Tuyakbay believes the party will ultimately be 
registered.  The party's support is strongest in southern 
Kazakhstan and in the country's regional centers, he said, 
but the party has activists and an established network 
throughout the country. (Comment: Tuyakbay stated that one of 
the party's principal goals is to improve the standard of 
living of ethnic Kazakhs.  This emphasis is likely to lessen 
the party's popularity in northern Kazakhstan.  End Comment) 
 
5. (C) Tuyakbay believes that Kazakhstan needs a unified 
opposition, and he told the Ambassador he may seek to create 
a union of opposition parties.  The future of "For a Just 
Kazakhstan," however, is unclear, he said.  The group "lacks 
unity" and he is undecided as to whether it should be 
disbanded.  He does not believe that the death of 
Sarasenbaiuly affected the block, as he sought its 
dismantlement and favored the strengthening of individual 
parties. 
 
6. (C) Zhakiyanov told the Ambassador that President 
Nazarbayev has made three decisions that indicate that he 
lacks "sufficient contact with the people." First, he 
proposed limiting all gambling to two provincial cities, 
Kapchagay and Shchuchinsk, as of January 1, 2007. (Note: 
Kazakhstan currently has 132 casinos and 2,000 other gambling 
parlors, slot halls, and bookmakers.)  Next, he banned the 
import of right-hand drive cars from the beginning of 2007 
and the use of such cars from 2010, setting off organized 
protests in Almaty and in other regions of the country. 
Finally, he has advocated shifting the Kazakh language from 
the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet.  Zhakiyanov believes that 
 
these decisions, which he called mistakes, demonstrate that 
President Nazarbayev is not receiving adequate information. 
 
 
7. (C) Comment: Zhakiyanov and Tuyakbay's skepticism is 
shared by many in the opposition and pro-government camps. 
There are clearly various groups within the elite
 pushing for 
and against reform. President Nazarbayev has not yet tipped 
his hand, but most observers expect him to make a major 
announcement early next year on the country's political 
future.  End comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks