Monthly Archives: March 2007

07ASTANA753, KAZAKHSTAN TO BUILD COAL-FIRED POWER PLANT IN THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA753 2007-03-28 02:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7127
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0753/01 0870226
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 280226Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8883
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0105
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2109
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0308
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0437
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000753 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA), SCA/FO (DEUTSCH) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2017 
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN TO BUILD COAL-FIRED POWER PLANT IN THE 
SOUTH? 
 
REF: A. 06 ALMATY 602 
     B. 06 ASTANA 899 
 
Classified By: Political-Economic Chief Deborah Mennuti, 
reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Spurred by recent analysis forecasting a 
significant electricity deficit in Southern Kazakhstan by 
2015, the Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) has reportedly 
decided to build a 2000 MW coal-fired plant at the southern 
tip of Lake Balkhash.  Energy Ministry sources report that 
President Nazarbayev's mention of the project in his February 
28 Annual Address confirmed that the GOK will follow the 
recommendations of a soon-to-be-released Samruk (the national 
holding company for state-owned assets) study, which ranked a 
Balkhash coal plant ahead of other options -- including the 
construction of a nuclear power plant at the same site -- for 
expansion of the country's generation capacity. On March 7, 
newly-appointed Energy Vice Minister Satkaliyev told Energy 
Officer that the Balkhash plant, along with a constellation 
of planned hydro projects, will greatly enhance Kazakhstan's 
potential electricity exports to the South, and asked to be 
included in future discussions concerning regional 
electricity integration.  While the GOK is still pursuing the 
idea of constructing a nuclear plant in Aktau (Ref A), the 
project may have suffered a setback with Prime Minister 
Akhmetov's departure from office and funding for a 
pre-feasibility study reportedly still awaiting government 
budgetary approval. End summary. 
 
Nazarbayev Tips Scales Toward Balkhash Coal Plant 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2. (C) Recently-appointed Vice Minister of Energy and Mineral 
Resources Almasadam Satkaliyev told Energy Officer on March 7 
that, in his February 28 annual address to the Nation, 
President Nazarbayev called for the construction of a 
coal-fired combined heat-and-power (CHP) plant at the 
southern tip of Lake Balkhash. (Satkaliyev explained that, 
although the word "Balkhash" had not entered into the 
official transcripts of the speech, Nazarbayev's words had 
been unmistakable.)  Nazarbayev's "instruction," Satkaliyev 
said, anticipated the results of a soon-to-be-released $2 
million, Samruk-sponsored pre-feasibility study which he, 
Satkaliyev, had overseen in his previous job as head of the 
"KEGOC" (electricity transmission) group within Samruk.  The 
Samruk study, he explained, had ranked three alternative 
projects: the Balkhash coal plant; a nuclear plant at the 
same location; and increased coal-fired capacity in Northeast 
Kazakhstan (achieved either by renovation of existing 
facilities or new construction), linked to the South by means 
of an additional (third) high-voltage transmission line. 
 
Coal Instead of Nuclear: Simple Economics...or More? 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3. (C) On March 16, Yevgeniy Ryaskov, Deputy Director of the 
Energy Ministry's Office for Management of State Assets, 
provided Energy Officer with additional insight into why the 
GOK favors the construction of a thermal plant in Balkhash 
rather than a nuclear plant.  The Kazakhstan Institute of 
Energy, Ryaskov explained, recently completed an influential 
study suggesting that Kazakhstan would face an electricity 
deficit in the South by 2015.  The study, he added, reversed 
the Institute's previous research, which had suggested that 
supply would keep pace with demand through 2025.  The Balkash 
CHP, Ryaskov continued, could be built by 2015 (in 
Satkaliyev's estimation, the plant will generate 500 MW by 
2012 and 2000 MW by 2015), while construction of a nuclear 
plant would take a decade or more.  Thus, Rysaskov concluded, 
it was logical to favor a coal plant over a nuclear one. 
 
4. (C) Satkaliyev hinted that former Prime Minister Daniyal 
Akmetov's departure from office had contributed to a 
fundamental shift among Kazakhstani decision-makers toward 
coal power and away from nuclear power.  In December, while 
still at Samruk, Satkaliyev told Energy Officer that "there 
are no fans of nuclear energy at Samruk," opining then that 
Kazakhstan's future lay with "clean coal" technology.  Asked 
in March what had become of Akhmetov's well-publicized drive 
to advance the nuclear agenda, Satkaliyev replied that 
Akhmetov's program had been "stopped in the pre-feasibility 
 
ASTANA 00000753  002 OF 002 
 
 
stage" of the GOK budgetary process.  The GOK was still 
considering financing a pre-feasibility study for the 
construction of two 300 MW nuclear-powered turbines in Aktau, 
he explained, but the project was "not very advanced or very 
certain."  (As reported in Ref B, the GOK seriously 
considered moving KazAtomProm, the national atomic energy 
company, under Samruk management in late 2006.  Samruk's 
current head of the "KEGOC" group, Esbergen Abitayev, hinted 
to Energy Officer that the move -- which KazAtomProm had 
rebuffed -- had been, in effect, a hostile takeov
er attempt 
by Samruk.) 
 
5. (C) Ryaskov, by contrast, defended the economic 
feasibility of a nuclear power station sited in Aktau. Given 
the prices Kazakhstan currently receives for its natural gas 
on the Russian border ($145 per thousand cubic meters, by his 
estimation), he explained, it would be cheaper, in the long 
run, to build and operate a nuclear plant in Aktau rather 
than continue to generate electricity from gas. 
 
Balkash CHP to Facilitate Kazakhstani Electricity Exports? 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
6. (C) Satkaliyev told Energy Officer that the forecasts of 
an electricity deficit in the South had been incorporated 
into a new "action plan" for the development of the 
electricity sector to the year 2015, which was currently in 
the GOK approval process.  Satkaliyev explained that the 
document -- which, according to press reports, calls for $15 
billion in near-term electricity investments -- envisages a 
"constellation" of hydroelectricity projects which, anchored 
by the Balkhash CHP, will eventually create an exportable 
surplus of electricity in Kazakhstan's South.  Reminded of 
the USG's initiative to promote regional electricity trade 
and integration, Satkaliyev responded enthusiastically, 
stating that the Balkash project made such a regional outlook 
necessary for the first time.  Satkaliyev added that he 
personally would like to participate in future discussions of 
regional electricity integration. 
 
7. (C) Comment:  Satkaliyev is the first senior Energy 
Ministry official we have met who appears to grasp the 
potential for Kazakhstan of a regional approach to 
electricity generation.  While his track record is still 
short, Satkaliyev's reputation as a market-oriented, 
progressive thinker (and, it is rumored, a Timur Kulibayev 
protege) gives hope that he may bring greater reliance on 
market principles to Kazakhstan's energy policy and be a 
reliable, useful interlocutor on regional issues. End comment. 
ORDWAY

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07ASTANA741, KAZAKHSTAN: “OPERATION RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM” NETS BAPTISTS,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA741 2007-03-26 00:49 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4880
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0741/01 0850049
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260049Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8862
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0102
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1704

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000741 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DRL/IRF (B. CATES) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: "OPERATION RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM" NETS BAPTISTS, 
EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANS 
 
REF: Astana 654 
 
ASTANA 00000741  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (U) Summary: From February 12-21, law enforcement services in the 
Northern Kazakhstan Oblast conducted a preventative sweep entitled 
"Operation Religious Extremism," purportedly as part of a CIS-wide 
program to combat terrorism and violent extremism. Authorities 
detained the leaders of eight Christian groups for operating without 
the mandatory legal registration. No terrorists or violent 
extremists were detected during the operation.  End summary. 
 
------------- 
THE OPERATION 
------------- 
 
2.  (U) From February 12-21, law enforcement authorities in the 
Northern Kazakhstan oblast swept the region looking for religious 
groups and individuals operating in violation of the law.  According 
to press reports, the police conducted a press briefing to announce 
that "Operation Religious Extremism" had resulted in the arrest of 
several leaders of Christian groups, primarily Baptists, for 
violating Kazakhstani law requiring the registration of religious 
groups. 
 
3.  (SBU) Post contacted a number of government authorities, 
including the Ministry of Interior (MVD) and the Religious Issues 
Committee (RIC) of the Ministry of Justice, in order to verify the 
press reports.  An MVD representative claimed little knowledge of 
the operation, though she acknowledged it existed and stated that it 
was being coordinated through Moscow as part of a CIS-wide program 
to combat religious extremism. 
 
4. (SBU) Amanbek Mukhashov, deputy chairman of the RIC, was 
initially unaware of the operation, though he followed up Post's 
inquiry with an internal report detailing the results of the 
operation. According to the document, "Operation Religious 
Extremism" is a coordinated and comprehensive operation aimed at the 
prevention and detection of terrorist attacks and other extremist 
actions.  The program is part of the "2005-2007 Program of 
Cooperation of CIS Member-States in Combat against Terrorism and 
Violent Extremism." The law enforcement action in the Northern 
Kazakhstan oblast was Kazakhstan's first action under the program 
(Note: As detailed in the annual Human Rights Report and 
International Religious Freedom Report, Kazakhstani authorities 
regularly detain and fine the leaders of unregistered Baptist 
groups, many of whom refuse to register as a matter of principle. 
However, Post is unaware of a previous, broadly-coordinated law 
enforcement campaign against such groups.  End note.) 
 
----------- 
THE RESULTS 
----------- 
 
5.  (SBU) According to press reports and the document provided by 
the RIC, authorities took action against eight unregistered 
religious groups during the sweep.  The press reports and confirming 
document reveal no violent tendencies or terrorist links among the 
groups. 
 
6. (U) On February 14, police detained 43-year-old Evangelical 
Christian Baptist pastor Alexander Kerker in the northern Kazakhstan 
town of Taiynsha.  His group was not registered, and he did not have 
legal documents permitting him to preach. The RIC document reports 
that law enforcement officers have repeatedly spoken to the pastor 
and explained his registration obligations under the law, though he 
consistently refused to comply.  The authorities submitted evidence 
of the violation to the Taiynsha city administrative court. The 
court imposed a fine in the amount of 109,200 tenge ($873) under 
article 374-1 of the Administrative Code entitled "Running or 
participating in an unregistered organization." 
 
7. (U) The second unregistered group was the Grace Church in Iakor 
village, Kyzyl-zhar district in northern Kazakhstan. Police detained 
its leader, 42-year-old Yevgeniy Semerenko, on February 17. He did 
not have any documents to support his group, such as a charter or 
registration certificate, though he had practiced his faith for six 
years. The police press service stated that he held religious 
devotions and services at his mother's house. Materials on this 
group were forwarded to the Kyzyl-zhar district administrative 
court. 
 
8. (U) On February 17, in the Kishkene-kol village, Ualikhanov 
district in northern Kazakhstan, Evangelical Christian Baptist 
pastor R. Pugachov was detained by police during a church service. 
The basis for the detention was once again that the group was not 
registered and the pastor did not have permission to preach. The 
same day materials on his case were filed with the Ualikhanov 
district administrative court. He was fined 109,200 tenge ($873) 
 
ASTANA 00000741  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
under article 374-1 of the Administrative Code entitled "Running or 
participating in an unregistered organization." 
 
9. (U) On February 19, the police detained the leader of a small 
group
of Evangelical Christian Baptists, Lubov Furdakova, in the 
Kyzyl-zhar district. She practiced her religion in her house. 
Furdakova's group was not registered, although she claims she filed 
registration documents with the local office of the Ministry of 
Justice. Police forwarded materials on her case to the Kyzyl-zhar 
administrative court. 
 
10. (U) Also on February 19, the police targeted the 
"Transformation" Church of Evangelical Christian Baptists in 
Nalobino village in the same Kyzyl-zhar district in northern 
Kazakhstan, detaining 64-year-old pastor Vasiliy Hotko. Hotko is a 
resident of Petropavlovsk, though he comes to Nalobino village 
regularly to hold services for the Pentecostal Baptists 
congregation. The group has a prayer house in Nalobino village, but 
police claim that they do not have a charter and are not formally 
allowed to operate in Kyzyl-zhar district. Police forwarded 
materials on this group to the Kyzyl-zhar district administrative 
court. 
 
11. (U) On February 20, the leader of New Life Church, Ludmila 
Poltavtseva, was detained in Mamlutsky district in northern 
Kazakhstan. Though the group has a church building in  Mamlutka, it 
does not have registration documents, and Poltavtseva does not have 
legal permission to preach. Materials were forwarded to the local 
court. 
 
12. (U) On February 20, police detained the leader of Grace Church, 
Oleg Voropayev, in the Mamlutsky district. The group does not have a 
charter, and is not registered. Materials were forwarded to the 
local court. 
 
13. (U) Finally, on February 21, the leader of the Church of Great 
Martyr and Healer Panteleimon, Ali Ismagilov, was detained in 
Voskresenka village in the Mamlutsky district for conducting 
religious activities without registration. Materials were forwarded 
to the local court. (Note: This church is affiliated with the 
Orthodox faith. End note.) 
 
------------- 
MORE TO COME? 
------------- 
 
14. (U) Post was unable to learn further details of the operation or 
whether the government will continue such sweeps in other parts of 
the country.  Nevertheless, Operation Religious Extremism is 
consistent with recent indications that some in the government seek 
to tighten control over unregistered and/or minority religious 
groups.  On September 15, 2006, deputy chief commander of the KNB 
Counter-terrorism Center Askar Amerkhanov stated in a press 
interview that the KNB was drafting legislative proposals to address 
so-called destructive sects and organizations. Amerkhanov named the 
Grace Church, Scientologists, and Jehovah's Witnesses as 
organizations that should be banned in Kazakhstan. More recently, 
the RIC revealed that it is preparing draft amendments to 
Kazakhstan's religion law that would tighten government control over 
the registration process and significantly restrict the activities 
of groups with less than 50 members (reftel). 
 
 
15. (U) In mid-December 2006, the "Megapolis" weekly newspaper 
published interviews with a representative of the Spiritual 
Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan and a priest of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan. Both clergymen supported banning 
Scientologists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Ahmadi Muslims, Hare Krishnas, 
Tabligi Jamaat, White Brothers, and Satan's Church from Kazakhstan. 
They favored tightening Kazakhstan's policy against non-traditional 
religions and welcomed draft amendments to prevent destructive sects 
and strengthen the privileged status of the two major faiths - Islam 
and Orthodox Christianity. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
16. (SBU) It is puzzling that the police chose to trumpet the 
results of an anti-extremism operation that netted only unregistered 
religious groups with no evident ties to extremism.  It is highly 
unlikely that Northern Kazakhstan oblast is actually devoid of 
extremist groups; rather, it appears that this type of law 
enforcement operation is simply not an effective way to detect 
groups that actually pose a risk to Kazakhstan's security.  This 
operation, the pending draft amendments to the religion law, and the 
comments of the KNB counter-terrorism official point to a growing 
 
ASTANA 00000741  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
tendency to define as extreme any group that runs afoul of 
registration laws or falls outside of mainstream Kazakhstani culture 
and society.  Post will continue to monitor the actions of law 
enforcement officials and encourage the Kazakhstani government to 
uphold its oft-stated commitment to religious freedom.  End 
comment. 
 
ORDWAY

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07ASTANA723, KAZAKHSTAN: DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO RELIGION LAW SPARK CONCERN

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA723.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA723 2007-03-20 02:43 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0723 0790243
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 200243Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8848

UNCLAS ASTANA 000723 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DRL/PHD, DRL/IRF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO RELIGION LAW SPARK CONCERN 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The Religious Issues Committee (RIC) of the 
Ministry of Justice recently acknowledged that it is drafting 
amendments to "modernize" and "update" Kazakhstan's law on religion. 
 According to a draft of the amendments circulating among the human 
rights community, the new amendments would increase the role of the 
RIC in registering and monitoring religious groups and severely 
restrict the activities of any religious group with less than 50 
members.  An RIC official confirmed that some of these ideas were 
under consideration, but stated that the amendments were still in 
the draft stage, and that outside groups and religious confessions 
would ultimately have the opportunity to comment on the proposed 
legislation before it is submitted to the legislature. 
Nevertheless, human rights activists are very concerned about the 
threat to religious freedom posed by these amendments, and are 
mobilizing to oppose them. End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
AMENDMENTS WOULD TIGHTEN CONTROL OVER RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
2. (SBU) On February 1, Ninel Fokina, chairwoman of the Almaty 
Helsinki Committee, distributed copies of draft religion law 
amendments to PolOff, the OSCE human dimension officer, and several 
diplomats from OSCE member states.  Fokina acknowledged that the 
document was a draft, but in her view it was substantially complete 
based on her past experience with the legislative drafting process. 
 
3. (SBU) According to the draft, Kazakhstan's religion law would be 
amended in a number of areas.  The provision that has drawn the most 
attention thus far is the sharp restriction on the activities of any 
group with less than 50 members.  Such groups would be subject to a 
mandatory, though simplified, registration process.  Among other 
things, they would be prohibited from publishing, producing, 
exporting, or importing religious literature or materials designed 
for religious purposes; setting up facilities for the production of 
religious literature and other religious products; building and 
maintaining facilities for religious services, meetings, and 
worship; and soliciting or receiving financial donations.  Although 
the draft text is not entirely clear, this provision appears to 
apply to both local, independent religious groups and local branches 
of nationally registered groups. 
 
4. (SBU) In addition, the proposed text appears to increase the 
power of the RIC, empowering it to register religious associations 
and all of their branch and representative offices; keep a database 
on religious associations; oversee implementation of religious 
freedom legislation; coordinate operation of foreign religious 
organizations in Kazakhstan, including the appointment of their 
leaders; and coordinate the construction of buildings for worship. 
As part of the registration process, religious groups would be 
required to provide the RIC with basic information on their faith 
and their worship practices, including the history of the faith and 
of the particular religious organization.  The registration 
materials will then be subjected to an "expert analysis," on which 
the RIC will base its registration decision.

Wikileaks

07ASTANA693, KAZAKHSTAN: DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO RELIGION LAW SPARK CONCERN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA693.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA693 2007-03-19 03:57 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0013
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0693 0780357
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190357Z MAR 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8815

UNCLAS ASTANA 000693 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DRL/PHD, DRL/IRF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO RELIGION LAW SPARK CONCERN 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The Religious Issues Committee (RIC) of the 
Ministry of Justice recently acknowledged that it is drafting 
amendments to "modernize" and "update" Kazakhstan's law on religion. 
 According to a draft of the amendments circulating among the human 
rights community, the new amendments would increase the role of the 
RIC in registering and monitoring religious groups and severely 
restrict the activities of any religious group with less than 50 
members.  An RIC official confirmed that some of these ideas were 
under consideration, but stated that the amendments were still in 
the draft stage, and that outside groups and religious confessions 
would ultimately have the opportunity to comment on the proposed 
legislation before it is submitted to the legislature. 
Nevertheless, human rights activists are very concerned about the 
threat to religious freedom posed by these amendments, and are 
mobilizing to oppose them. End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
AMENDMENTS WOULD TIGHTEN CONTROL OVER RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
2. (SBU) On February 1, Ninel Fokina, chairwoman of the Almaty 
Helsinki Committee, distributed copies of draft religion law 
amendments to PolOff, the OSCE human dimension officer, and several 
diplomats from OSCE member states.  Fokina acknowledged that the 
document was a draft, but in her view it was substantially complete 
based on her past experience with the legislative drafting process. 
 
3. (SBU) According to the draft, Kazakhstan's religion law would be 
amended in a number of areas.  The provision that has drawn the most 
attention thus far is the sharp restriction on the activities of any 
group with less than 50 members.  Such groups would be subject to a 
mandatory, though simplified, registration process.  Among other 
things, they would be prohibited from publishing, producing, 
exporting, or importing religious literature or materials designed 
for religious purposes; setting up facilities for the production of 
religious literature and other religious products; building and 
maintaining facilities for religious services, meetings, and 
worship; and soliciting or receiving financial donations.  Although 
the draft text is not entirely clear, this provision appears to 
apply to both local, independent religious groups and local branches 
of nationally registered groups. 
 
4. (SBU) In addition, the proposed text appears to increase the 
power of the RIC, empowering it to register religious associations 
and all of their branch and representative offices; keep a database 
on religious associations; oversee implementation of religious 
freedom legislation; coordinate operation of foreign religious 
organizations in Kazakhstan, including the appointment of their 
leaders; and coordinate the construction of buildings for worship. 
As part of the registration process, religious groups would be 
required to provide the RIC with basic information on their faith 
and their worship practices, including the history of the faith and 
of the particular religious organization.  The registration 
materials will then be subjected to an "expert analysis," on which 
the RIC will base its registration decision.

Wikileaks

07ASTANA692, KAZAKHSTAN: DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO RELIGION LAW SPARK CONCERN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA692.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA692 2007-03-19 03:55 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0692 0780355
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190355Z MAR 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8814

UNCLAS ASTANA 000692 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DRL/PHD, DRL/IRF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO RELIGION LAW SPARK CONCERN 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The Religious Issues Committee (RIC) of the 
Ministry of Justice recently acknowledged that it is drafting 
amendments to "modernize" and "update" Kazakhstan's law on religion. 
 According to a draft of the amendments circulating among the human 
rights community, the new amendments would increase the role of the 
RIC in registering and monitoring religious groups and severely 
restrict the activities of any religious group with less than 50 
members.  An RIC official confirmed that some of these ideas were 
under consideration, but stated that the amendments were still in 
the draft stage, and that outside groups and religious confessions 
would ultimately have the opportunity to comment on the proposed 
legislation before it is submitted to the legislature. 
Nevertheless, human rights activists are very concerned about the 
threat to religious freedom posed by these amendments, and are 
mobilizing to oppose them. End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
AMENDMENTS WOULD TIGHTEN CONTROL OVER RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
2. (SBU) On February 1, Ninel Fokina, chairwoman of the Almaty 
Helsinki Committee, distributed copies of draft religion law 
amendments to PolOff, the OSCE human dimension officer, and several 
diplomats from OSCE member states.  Fokina acknowledged that the 
document was a draft, but in her view it was substantially complete 
based on her past experience with the legislative drafting process. 
 
3. (SBU) According to the draft, Kazakhstan's religion law would be 
amended in a number of areas.  The provision that has drawn the most 
attention thus far is the sharp restriction on the activities of any 
group with less than 50 members.  Such groups would be subject to a 
mandatory, though simplified, registration process.  Among other 
things, they would be prohibited from publishing, producing, 
exporting, or importing religious literature or materials designed 
for religious purposes; setting up facilities for the production of 
religious literature and other religious products; building and 
maintaining facilities for religious services, meetings, and 
worship; and soliciting or receiving financial donations.  Although 
the draft text is not entirely clear, this provision appears to 
apply to both local, independent religious groups and local branches 
of nationally registered groups. 
 
4. (SBU) In addition, the proposed text appears to increase the 
power of the RIC, empowering it to register religious associations 
and all of their branch and representative offices; keep a database 
on religious associations; oversee implementation of religious 
freedom legislation; coordinate operation of foreign religious 
organizations in Kazakhstan, including the appointment of their 
leaders; and coordinate the construction of buildings for worship. 
As part of the registration process, religious groups would be 
required to provide the RIC with basic information on their faith 
and their worship practices, including the history of the faith and 
of the particular religious organization.  The registration 
materials will then be subjected to an "expert analysis," on which 
the RIC will base its registration decision.

Wikileaks

07ASTANA691, KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, February 25 – March

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA691 2007-03-19 01:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8555
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0691/01 0780132
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190132Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8812
INFO RUCPCIM/CIMS NTDB WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0100
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2033
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0306
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0435
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000691 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
DEPT PASS TO OPIC - BALLINGER 
DEPT PASS TO TDA FOR STEIN, EXIM FOR GLAZER 
DEPT PASS TO AID - EE-PHILLIPS/RUSHING 
TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTRI 
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/MAC/MLONDON, 4201/BISNIS 
USDOC FOR 6110/ITA/TD/BI/RHALPERN 
ANKARA FOR CFC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET EFIN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, February 25 - March 
10, 2007 
 
 
ASTANA 00000691  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Summary: This information is drawn primarily from the 
Kazakhstani local press, and has not been checked for accuracy.  The 
opinions and policies expressed in this report are those of the 
authors, not the U.S. Government. 
 
-- Kazakhstani-Israeli WTO Protocol Signed 
-- New Deputy CEO in Nurbank 
-- New Independent Director of Kazpost JSC 
-- Agricultural Statistics 
-- KTG Invests in Georgia; Eyes European Market 
-- Kazakhstan to Build Refinery in Georgia 
-- KMG Sells KazGerMunay's 50% Share to Its Subsidiary 
-- Oil, Gas, Coal Production in Jan-Feb 2007 
Kazakhstani-Israeli WTO Protocol Signed 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
2.  According to the Government's press service, a bilateral 
protocol on accession of Kazakhstan to the WTO was signed on 
February 27 by Israel's Deputy Prime Minister - Minister of 
Industry, Trade, and Labor Eliyahu Yishai and Kazakhstan's Vice 
Minister of Industry and Trade Zhanar Aitzhanova.  Prior to signing, 
the two sides discussed access to the Kazakhstani market for Israeli 
producers of high-tech equipment, chemicals, and processed foods as 
well as investment policy toward computer service providers.  (Press 
Service of the Government of Kazakhstan, February 28) 
 
New Deputy CEO in Nurbank 
------------------------- 
 
3.  Nurali Aliyev was appointed the First Deputy Chief Executive 
Officer of Kazakhstan-based commercial Nurbank JSC, the bank's press 
service reported on February 27.  An early January shareholder 
meeting had elected Aliyev to the Board of Directors.  The 
22-year-old Nurali is a son of Presidential daughter and Mazhilis 
deputy Dariga Nazarbayeva and Kazakhstani Ambassador to Austria and 
former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Rakhat Aliyev.  According 
to the Interfax-1000 Ranking of CIS Banks, Nurbank was as of June 
2006 the 60th largest bank in the CIS and the 8th largest in 
Kazakhstan by assets.  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, February 28) 
 
New Independent Director of Kazpost JSC 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4.  Kalle Tarien, Director for development of postal communication 
of Finland PostGroup, was appointed an independent director of 
Kazpost JSC.  Kazpost is a state-owned company, which became part of 
the Samruk State Holding in early 2006.  According to Samruk's 
Deputy Executive Director Ulf Wakurka, "the work of Kalle Tarien 
will raise corporate management of the Kazakhstani postal service to 
the world standards."  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, March 5) 
 
Agricultural Statistics 
----------------------- 
 
5.  Kazakhstan completed the first nationwide farm census, reports 
the National Statistics Agency.  The agricultural census covered 
2,500 districts, 7,500 villages and towns; more than 9,500 
agricultural enterprises; about 194,000 farm units; and over 535,700 
dachas on a total area of 81.1 million hectares.  The following 
results were reported: more than 5.7 million heads of cattle, 12.9 
million heads of sheep, 1.3 million heads of swine, 1.2 million 
heads of horse, 140,000 heads of camel, and 28.3 million heads of 
poultry.  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, March 5) 
 
6.  Kazakhstani farm exports for the first time reached $1.3 billion 
in 2006.  According to Minister of Agriculture Akhmetzhan Yesimov, 
"grain and flour constitute the largest portion of Kazakhstan's 
agricultural exports."  Kazakhstan is now the world's 7th largest 
exporter of grain and 3rd largest exporter of flour.  In 2006, the 
country's gross agricultural output amounted to KZT 838 billion 
(approx. $6.7 billion), a 7% increase from 2005.  (Interfax - 
Kazakhstan, March 5) 
 
KTG in Georgia; Eyes European Market 
------------------------------------ 
 
ASTANA 00000691  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
7.  KazTransGas (KTG), a subsidiary of national oil and gas company 
KazMunayGas (KMG), has invested $50 million in the Tblisi 
gas-distribution system, according to KTG Director General Serik 
Sultangaliyev.  (KTG bought the Georgian company "Tbilgas" in 2006.) 
 In total, KTG plans to invest over $80 million in Tbilisi over the 
next four years.  The company also plans to enter the European UCTE 
energy market (Union of the Coordination of Transmission of 
Electricity) through joint energy projects with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  According to Sultangaliyev, Kazakhstan is planning to 
begin selling its natural gas to European countries an
d Georgia in 
the near future.  "Kazakhstan is currently carrying out work to 
develop the appropriate infrastructure -- the construction of gas 
refining enterprises without which it would be impossible to carry 
out this task," he said.  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, March 5) 
 
Kazakhstan to Build Refinery in Georgia 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8.  Kazakhstan is considering building an oil refinery in Georgia's 
Black Sea port of Batumi, President Nazarbayev announced after a 
meeting with Georgian President Saakashvili in Astana on March 5. 
"The Caucasian corridor that provides an outlet to Europe (and) the 
Mediterranean Sea is becoming important for us," Nazarbayev said. 
"Georgia is our active partner in that area."  KazMunayGas is in a 
process of buying a controlling stake in the Batumi port, the 
President added.  According to President Saakashvili, the 
construction of an oil refinery in Batumi, a "huge project worth 
about $1 billion" is very important,   "not only for Georgia's 
economy, but for the entire (Caspian) region."  (Kazakhstan 
Newsline, March 11) 
 
KMG Sells KazGerMunay's 50% Share to Its Subsidiary 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
9.  On March 5, KazMunayGas subsidiary "KMG Exploration and 
Production" (KMG E&P), announced an agreement to purchase 50% of 
KazGerMunay from its parent company for KZT 133.3 billion (approx. 
$1.1 billion).  The deal is KMG E&P's first significant step in 
implementing the growth strategy which was announced during the 
company's IPO in 2006.  The transaction will make KMG E&P the second 
largest oil producer in Kazakhstan.  The deal, which will be 
financed from the company's own sources, will be voted upon at an 
April 12 shareholder meeting.  KazGerMunay is a joint venture 
between KMG and PetroKazakhstan.  (KMG press-center, Kazakhstan, 
March 5) 
 
Oil, Gas, Coal Production in Jan-Feb 2007 
----------------------------------------- 
 
10.  In January-February 2007, oil and gas condensate production in 
Kazakhstan reached 10.8 million tons, 12.4% higher than during the 
same period in 2006. 
 
11.  In January-February 2007, gas production in Kazakhstan totaled 
4.56 billion cubic meters, 15.7% higher compared to the same period 
in 2006, including 2.68 billion cubic meters of natural gas, up 
25.7% year-on-year. 
 
12.  In January-February 2007, Kazakhstan produced 15.8 million tons 
of coal, 4.8% less compared to the same period the previous year. 
(Interfax - Kazakhstan, March 6) 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA689, KAZAKHSTAN OFFERS TO HOST THIRD GICNT MEETING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA689 2007-03-19 01:11 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8552
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #0689 0780111
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190111Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8810
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2032
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1304
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0417
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0069
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0461
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0266
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0229
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0009
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0361
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0761
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1383
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0003
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0049
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1876
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000689 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), ISN/WMDT (J. WARDEN), 
AND T (T. KATSAPIS) 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER KGIC MCAP PINR PINS PTER KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN OFFERS TO HOST THIRD GICNT MEETING 
 
1. (SBU) On March 13, post received a diplomatic note from the 
Kazakhstani MFA dated March 5 formalizing the GOK's offer to host 
the next meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism.  Informal embassy translation: 
 
No. 10-2-2/632 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of 
America and has the honor to confirm that the Kazakhstani side is 
ready to organize the third meeting of the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism on June 11-12 in Astana. 
 
2. (SBU) Sergey Savelyev of the MFA's security affairs division told 
Pol-Econ Chief on March 15 that Kazakhstan was eager for the U.S. 
and Russia to confirm the date and begin discussions of the agenda 
for the meeting. 
 
3. (U) Post requests Department guidance on responding to the note. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA684, KAZAKHSTAN: GOK CONFIRMS “N BLOCK” PROCESS DELAYED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA684 2007-03-16 10:37 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7483
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0684/01 0751037
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161037Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8805
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0098
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000684 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
COMMERCE FOR ADVOCACY CENTER: BLOPP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: GOK CONFIRMS "N BLOCK" PROCESS DELAYED 
 
REF: ASTANA 562 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Deborah Mennuti; reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: On March 15, ConocoPhillips (CP) executives 
briefed Energy Officer on CP CEO Jim Mulva's March 5 meetings 
in Astana, during which GOK officials reiterated the recent 
bad news about CP's "N Block" bid due to a GOK desire to 
re-evaluate "N Block" reserves, all commercial negotiations 
have been suspended for at least 4-6 months.  Furthermore, 
Mulva was told, the GOK could not guarantee that CP and Shell 
would retain their current negotiating exclusivity when (and 
even "if") discussions resumed.  While all of Mulva's 
interlocutors explained that a desire to reassess "N Block" 
reserves had driven the GOK's decision to suspend 
negotiations, Prime Minister Masimov also suggested to Mulva 
that the GOK would use the 4-6 months to assess "N Block" 
transportation options -- leading the CP executives to 
speculate that CPC expansion delays may have contributed to 
the "N Block" decision.  The executives advanced other 
hypotheses as well -- that Kashagan delays and cost overruns 
have convinced the GOK that it must do more to extract 
maximum value from future Production Sharing Agreements 
(PSAs); that the GOK might be trying to slow the pace of 
offshore development in the face of a shortage of skilled 
Kazakhstani executives and laborers; and that the GOK is 
determined to better leverage the competition for offshore 
blocks to achieve economic diversification.  The CP 
executives concluded, however, that the GOK reversal remains, 
fundamentally, a mystery, and asked for "high-level" USG 
help, both to discover the full reasons for the "N Block" 
policy shift -- and, if possible, to reverse it.  End 
summary. 
 
Delays of 4-6 Months "Or More" 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (C) Arne Holhjem (Caspian Region President), Tim Wallace 
(Russia/Caspian Exploration Manager), and Nick Olds 
(Kazakhstan Country Manager) briefed Energy Officer on CEO 
Jim Mulva's March 5 meetings with Prime Minister Masimov, 
Energy Minister Izmukhambetov, and KazMunaiGaz (KMG) 
President Karabalin.  Both Karabalin and Izmukhambetov had 
repeated the basic bad news:  all "N Block" negotiations had 
been suspended, pending the completion of an "internal" (KMG) 
study of the "N" block reservoir (reftel).  Karabalin told 
Mulva that the study would take 4-6 months to complete; 
Izmukhambetov had warned that the process could take "a year 
or two."  "Don't get your hopes up," he warned Mulva. 
Masimov had sounded an even more ominous note, suggesting 
that, given transportation limitations, he could see no way 
to monetize "N" hydrocarbons quickly.  "I can't see the near 
term value of 'N Block'," he said, adding that, in addition 
to reassessing "N Block" reserves, the GOK would also be 
taking a close look at available oil and gas transportation 
alternatives. Masimov told Mulva that, in the face of all 
these issues, "we may keep "N" for future generations." 
 
3. (C) Karabalin and Izmukhambetov warned Mulva that CP 
should not assume that, once resumed, the "N Block" 
negotiation process would take up where it had left off. 
Neither CP nor Shell were guaranteed preferential negotiating 
rights; the GOK might decide to open up the process to 
outside bidders.  (Note: the CP executives told Energy 
Officer that they were not aware of any new competitors 
whose interest might have sparked the GOK's decision.  While 
the German company Wintershall was rumored to be interested, 
the company had bid unsuccessfully on "N" years ago, and 
didn't appear to bring much to the table.  National Oil 
Companies were a bigger potential threat, but CP had no 
evidence that any were pursuing "N."  End Note.)  Finally, 
Mulva was told, KMG might decide to develop "N" all by 
itself. 
 
Speculating on GOK Motives 
-------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Wallace told Energy Officer that, while the GOK 
appeared to have shifted its stance in "late December, it 
wasn't clear why.  CP, he said, had no evidence the KMG had 
acquired new seismic data; their "internal study" would 
likely only reinterpret existing data.  Wallace speculated 
that perhaps the intensity of Shell / CP competition for "N" 
had spooked the Kazakhstani government into thinking that the 
companies knew something about "N" reserves that it did not. 
In general, the CP executives said, Kazakhstan's oil-and-gas 
 
ASTANA 00000684  002 OF 002 
 
 
decision-makers appeared afraid to sign any deal that might 
later be seen has having conceded too much to an 
international oil company.  The GOK had long seen the Tengiz 
deal in that light, Holhjem said, and the current Kashagan 
delays and cost-overruns had focused the GOK's attention on 
the fact that, given the cost-recovery provisions of the 
Kashagan Production Sharing Agreement (PSA), it would not 
receive substantial profits from the project for a decade or 
more. 
 
5. (C) Wallace explained that Mulva had also come away from &#x00
0A;his Astana meetings, and subsequent consultations in Moscow, 
with the impression that the Kazakhstanis were increasingly 
troubled by CPC expansion delays and the effect failed 
negotiations would have on Kazakhstan's oil transportation 
plans. Masimov (para. 2) had raised the issue in terms of 
"N's" oil output, while both Izmukhambetov and Karabalin had 
placed new, strong emphasis on CP's need to develop "gas 
transportation options" as part of any future "N" bid.  While 
Karabalin had noted that the Kazakhstanis supported the 
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline initiative, Wallace explained, the 
Kazakhstanis clearly were not focused solely on that project, 
and had asked CP to look at Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) and 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) options as possible means to 
transport "N" Block gas.  "They are clearly very motivated to 
get gas to market," Wallace concluded. 
 
6. (C) Holhjem suggested that the GOK might be trying to slow 
down the overall development of its offshore sector, in the 
face of a shortage of not only skilled laborers and 
engineers, but also of skilled managers and executives within 
KMG and KazMunaiTeniz, its offshore operating subsidiary. The 
Kashagan project alone was currently short "a couple of 
thousand workers," he noted, and the Tengiz riots had made 
the GOK authorities more loathe than ever to try to meet the 
shortfall by bringing in foreign workers. 
 
7. (C) Olds explained that, even in the best-case scenario, 
CP would likely have to submit an entirely new, improved 
proposal for "N" block development once KMG's reservoir study 
was completed.  Mulva's interlocutors had encouraged CP to 
take a "holistic" approach in its future bids,  "in line with 
the President's recent address."  Thus, CP's bid should 
address the issues of economic diversification (principally, 
but not exclusively, by means of a petrochemical proposal), 
technology transfer, and the creation of infrastructure which 
would benefit other, non-hydrocarbon, industries.  As a 
consequence, Olds said, CP would likely re-evaluate its 
approach to the petrochemical issue. Olds reported that, to 
Mulva's surprise, Karabalin had also underscored Kazakhstan's 
interest in biofuel. 
 
8. (C) Comment:  While the CP executives -- clearly dejected 
by this turn of events -- give the impression that the GOK 
decision to suspend "N Block" negotiations is hard and fast, 
we will, of course, use every suitable opportunity to remind 
our GOK interlocutors of the high-level assurances we (and 
CP) received in December.  End comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA654, CORRECTED COPY: KAZAKHSTAN: DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO RELIGION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA654 2007-03-14 03:38 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4559
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0654/01 0730338
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140338Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8789
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0095
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1699

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000654 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DRL/PHD, DRL/IRF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: KAZAKHSTAN: DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO RELIGION 
LAW SPARK CONCERN 
 
ASTANA 00000654  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The Religious Issues Committee (RIC) of the 
Ministry of Justice recently acknowledged that it is drafting 
amendments to "modernize" and "update" Kazakhstan's law on religion. 
 According to a draft of the amendments circulating among the human 
rights community, the new amendments would increase the role of the 
RIC in registering and monitoring religious groups and severely 
restrict the activities of any religious group with less than 50 
members.  An RIC official confirmed that some of these ideas were 
under consideration, but stated that the amendments were still in 
the draft stage, and that outside groups and religious confessions 
would ultimately have the opportunity to comment on the proposed 
legislation before it is submitted to the legislature. 
Nevertheless, human rights activists are very concerned about the 
threat to religious freedom posed by these amendments, and are 
mobilizing to oppose them. End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
AMENDMENTS WOULD TIGHTEN CONTROL OVER RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
2. (SBU) On February 1, Ninel Fokina, chairwoman of the Almaty 
Helsinki Committee, distributed copies of draft religion law 
amendments to PolOff, the OSCE human dimension officer, and several 
diplomats from OSCE member states.  Fokina acknowledged that the 
document was a draft, but in her view it was substantially complete 
based on her past experience with the legislative drafting process. 
 
3. (SBU) According to the draft, Kazakhstan's religion law would be 
amended in a number of areas.  The provision that has drawn the most 
attention thus far is the sharp restriction on the activities of any 
group with less than 50 members.  Such groups would be subject to a 
mandatory, though simplified, registration process.  Among other 
things, they would be prohibited from publishing, producing, 
exporting, or importing religious literature or materials designed 
for religious purposes; setting up facilities for the production of 
religious literature and other religious products; building and 
maintaining facilities for religious services, meetings, and 
worship; and soliciting or receiving financial donations.  Although 
the draft text is not entirely clear, this provision appears to 
apply to both local, independent religious groups and local branches 
of nationally registered groups. 
 
4. (SBU) In addition, the proposed text appears to increase the 
power of the RIC, empowering it to register religious associations 
and all of their branch and representative offices; keep a database 
on religious associations; oversee implementation of religious 
freedom legislation; coordinate operation of foreign religious 
organizations in Kazakhstan, including the appointment of their 
leaders; and coordinate the construction of buildings for worship. 
As part of the registration process, religious groups would be 
required to provide the RIC with basic information on their faith 
and their worship practices, including the history of the faith and 
of the particular religious organization.  The registration 
materials will then be subjected to an "expert analysis," on which 
the RIC will base its registration decision. 
 
5. (SBU) The proposed amendments would also limit the distribution 
of religious materials to officially recognized worship buildings, 
places of pilgrimage, buildings where religious organizations are 
located, cemeteries, crematoria, and in citizens' apartments and 
houses.  The current religion law does not expressly limit the 
distribution of religious materials. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
TIMELINE FOR DRAFT AMENDMENTS 
----------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Amanbek Mukhashov, deputy chairman of the RIC, told Poloff 
on February 15 that Kazakhstan's religion law is long overdue for an 
update, and that the current amendments are being drafted pursuant 
to a larger government legislative plan.  He said that a working 
group of Ministry of Justice lawyers, representatives from five or 
six religious groups, scholars, and theologians was currently 
assimilating different proposals, and that it would offer draft 
amendments for public discussion at the end of March.  He expects 
that the draft amendments will be presented to the Cabinet in April, 
undergo an interagency approval process, and be submitted to the 
parliament in June.  He stated that the RIC is very open to outside 
input, and would invite the OSCE and human rights organizations to 
comment on the proposed amendments. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
GOVERNMENT WARY OF MINORITY RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) During the conversation, Mukhashov expressed frustration 
 
ASTANA 00000654  002.2 OF 003 
 
 &#x
000A;that religion law amendments offered in 2002 were rejected as 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Council, because they 
required any Islamic group seeking registration to get the approval 
of the Spiritual Association of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK), the 
nominally independent though "official" coalition of mosques and 
clergy.  The 2002 amendments were also found unconstitutional 
because they vested the SAMK with authority to approve the 
construction of mosques.  (Note: In general, the 2002 religion 
amendments would have significantly tightened government control 
over religious groups.  End note.)  Mukhashov noted that he is not 
alone in disagreeing with the 2002 Constitutional Council ruling, 
and he believes that the government should enforce a hierarchy for 
Islam in Kazakhstan similar to the strict hierarchy for the Orthodox 
and Catholic churches.  He finds it unacceptable that under the 
current law, Muslim groups with as few as 10 members can be 
registered without the SAMK's knowledge, leading to public confusion 
about the identity and alignment of the different groups. 
 
 
8. (SBU) On February 27, the RIC held a hearing on the proposed 
amendments.  The hearing included representatives from several 
traditional faiths, including Islam, the Orthodox Church, the 
Catholic Church, and Judaism, as well as two members of parliament 
very concerned about minority religious groups in Kazakhstan.  Bjorn 
Halvarsson, deputy head of the OSCE's mission in Kazakhstan, also 
attended.  (Note: The RIC also invited Ninel Fokina of the Almaty 
Helsinki Committee, though with only two days notice, she was unable 
to travel to Astana.  End note.) According to Halvarsson, Amangeldy 
Aitaly, an ultra-nationalist deputy in the Mazhilis (lower house of 
parliament), strongly criticized minority religious groups in 
Kazakhstan, and said that they threaten the destruction of local 
culture.  The representatives of Islam and the Orthodox Church spoke 
out in favor of stricter registration requirements and tighter 
government control over non-traditional groups, while the 
representatives from the other faiths were more moderate in their 
comments.  Halvarsson reported that evangelical churches and groups 
with a missionary component were the clear targets of the criticism, 
and he noted that none of these groups were represented at the 
meeting. 
 
9. (SBU) Halvarsson said that in a private conversation after the 
hearing, Yeraly Tugzhanov, chairman of the RIC, was clearly 
convinced of the need for more control over religious groups in 
Kazakhstan, though his views were more moderate than those of some 
of the other participants.  Tugzhanov expressed interest in learning 
the OSCE's perspective, and asked the OSCE to submit comments and 
"best practices" to the RIC for their consideration. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY MOBILIZING TO OPPOSE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) In a meeting with Poloff, Fokina said that the new 
amendments are being developed by the KNB, with assistance from the 
RIC, the SAMK, and the Orthodox Church.  She strongly condemned the 
proposed amendments, and said they will severely restrict the 
freedom of minority religious groups in Kazakhstan, such as smaller 
evangelical Christian groups and Muslim groups unaffiliated with the 
SAMK.  Fokina said that the human rights community is mobilizing to 
oppose the amendments, and she plans to raise the issue with the 
Presidential Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights 
Ombudsman. 
 
11. (SBU) Yevgeniy Zhovtis, director of the Kazakhstan International 
Bureau for Human Rights, also sharply criticized the proposed 
amendments during a meeting with Poloff.  He called the amendments 
"exactly the wrong direction for Kazakhstan," and said that they 
reflect the government's ideology of increasing control over civil 
society.  He predicted that if the government succeeds in tightening 
control over religious groups, it will next move to impose stricter 
controls over NGOs.  Zhovtis asserted that the government is 
exaggerating the threat from extremist groups such as Hizb'ut-Tahrir 
in order to frighten the public and justify the new amendments.  He 
said that the amendments violate constitutional protections for 
religious freedom, and called on Western governments to oppose the 
proposed amendments. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
12. (SBU)  Although the RIC characterizes the draft amendments as a 
much-needed modernization of Kazakhstan's law on religion, and 
promises an open drafting process, human rights and religious 
freedom advocates have valid grounds for concern.  The government 
has not made a convincing national security argument for the 
amendments, or even explained what specific threats it is seeking to 
 
ASTANA 00000654  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
address.  Post will monitor the legislative process and encourage 
the Kazakhstani government to uphold its oft-stated commitment to 
religious freedom. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA653, EXBS: KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR’S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA653 2007-03-14 00:53 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4458
RR RUEHAST RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0653/01 0730053
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140053Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8782
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0012
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUCQAAA/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0410
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7888
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7828
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0752
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2031
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7121
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 ASTANA 000653 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC PVANSON, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC-AMT LSPRINGER 
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE RBUCK 
DEPT FOR SCA/RA JSCHLOSSER 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN MO'MARA 
CBP/INA FOR CDONOFRIO AND RWATT 
USDOE/NNSA CWALKER, TPERRY AND EDESCHLER 
DOC FOR DCREED AND GPETERSEN-BEARD 
USCG FOR BGOLDEN 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT, BISHKEK, BAKU, DUSHANBE AND ASHGABAT FOR EXBS 
ADVISORS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP KZ
SUBJECT:  EXBS: KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR'S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE 
(FEBRUARY 2007) 
 
 
I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS: 
 
      1. EXBS Advisor Mike Seguin departs post on March 15, due to 
receipt of military orders to Active Duty. 
      Embassy welcomes on board TDY EXBS Advisor Larry Adkins 
assigned to post from March 7 to April 26, 2007, as the first of a 
series of temporary advisors who will manage the office until a 
permanent replacement can be installed. 
 
      2. Trip to Aktau and Bautino (Feb.4-7). The EXBS Team traveled 
from the Embassy in Astana, Kazakhstan February 4 through February 
7, 2007, to conduct site assessments at both the Segendy Border 
Monitoring Station and Bautino Border Guard and Customs facilities. 
The EXBS team was accompanied by INL and OMC representatives. The 
purpose of the trip involved four areas of focus: a. Resolution of 
outstanding Safe-Boat maintenance issues and tasks required to get 
the boats back in operation; b. Site Survey of the Segendy 
Monitoring Facility; c. Bautino Port Site Survey; and d. Assessment 
of the Office of Military Cooperation interest in working with the 
Border Guard on Counter Narcotics programs. 
      The EXBS team, INL, and OMC met with the Border Guard at their 
Headquarters in the City of Aktau.  The objective of the mission was 
to establish a clear way forward in getting the three Safe Boats 
back in operational condition and serviced as soon as possible.  The 
key issues involved hull painting, winterization, and maintenance. 
 
      The meeting was also designed to establish whether there was a 
Border Guard Counter-Narcotics (CN) mission in order to justify the 
use of an Office of Military Cooperation's $5 mn CN funding 
proposal.  The $5 mn represents a significant opportunity for the 
Border Guard to enhance not only CN security in the region; it also 
represents the possibility of enhancing the counter proliferation 
mission supported by the EXBS program. 
      In Bautino Port the EXBS team inspected the state of equipment 
previously donated and resolved a variety of operational issues 
associated with the three Safe-Boats. 
      The Border Post Survey was conducted at Segendy Border 
Monitoring Station - the site of an EXBS Border Guard shelter 
donated in 2003. 
      The team inspected the state of equipment previously donated 
and resolved a variety of operational issues associated with the 
donation of three Safe Boats at a meeting with the Border Guard 
regional Headquarters personnel in Aktau, Kazakhstan. 
       Recommendation: Assessments in the region should continue, 
EXBS donations should continue in places where the greatest impact 
can be made, and synergies for leveraging and multiplying the 
efforts of adjacent engagement entities should continue, as was the 
example in this case with OMC and INL participation. 
 
 3.  Department of Energy Software Upgrades.  The Department of 
Energy (DOE) will send a representative from the Nuclear Technology 
Safety Center (NTSC) to the Dostyk and the Bakhty Border Control 
Posts from March 19-23 and the Maikapshagai Border Control Post from 
April 9-13, to conduct necessary software installation and upgrades 
to 3-each portable X-ray Florescence (XRF) metal analyzers that were 
provided to Kazakhstan Customs in June 2006.  EXBS, together with 
the NTSC representative, will also review how the units are being 
used at the ports of entry. 
 
 4. Annual EXBS Financial Plan for Kazakhstan. - 
A  February 2 telcon was conducted with EXBS in Washington to settle 
the 2007 EXBS Plan and obtain guidance.  Though the U.S. budget 
continues to operate under a continuing resolution, a clear 
 
ASTANA 00000653  002 OF 007 
 
 
way-forward was established with priorities and estimated funding 
thresholds.  This plan will allow the EXBS Advisor to meet in March 
with key Customs and Border Guard leadership to discuss value-added 
joint activities and present the EXBS office's desired Border Survey 
Schedule for 2007, which resumed in February. 
 
 5. EXBS Presentation.  EXBS Presentation - DRAFT Power Point 
Presentation detailing the EXBS Astana Office activities was

completed and forwarded to ISN/ECC office for evaluation. 
 
 6. Annual EXBS questionnaire. This activity remains incomplete with 
status unchanged from the January report.  The EXBS Advisor will 
contact the appropriate EXBS personnel in Washington to gauge the 
relevance of an annual questionnaire to be given to the host 
government to gauge the state of Customs and Border Control efforts. 
 Prior to issuing the questionnaire on-hand, a number of questions 
were noted by the EXBS Advisor regarding the methodology associated 
with completing the questionnaire.  It is noteworthy to point out 
that due to the realignment of some ministerial positions in 
Kazakhstan's government, the unsettled nature of leadership 
positions may or may not impact Customs.  The present governmental 
situation relative to Customs should become clearer throughout the 
month of March 
 
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS CONDUCTED 
 
 1. Volunteer Visitor Program. On February 26, the EXBS team again 
had a meeting with the Customs Control Committee Chairman Askar 
Shakirov to discuss the proposed agenda for the upcoming Volunteer 
Visitor Program and the timing - May 11-20. Mr. Shakirov expressed 
his consent with the program outline and itinerary and tentatively 
agreed on the dates for the event. However, due to the RK Government 
restructuring, he would need to get the GOK final approval both for 
the dates and the names of the rest of the delegation's 
participants. EXBS will follow up on the status with customs 
officials by mid-March. 
 
B.  TRAINING DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
 1.  International Seaport Interdiction Training, February 9-18 in 
Charleston.  Eighteen representatives of the Kazakhstani Border 
Guard and Customs agencies participated in ISIT in South Carolina 
February 9-18 (including travel).  The training was hosted by U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), under the U.S. Department of 
State funded EXBS Program. The ISIT Course is designed to provide 
hands-on training for customs, border guard and coast guard officers 
in the detection, identification and interdiction of contraband, 
with an emphasis on countering the cross-border proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conventional arms, and related 
materials. The course was geared toward line officers and included 
practical exercises, with a focus on the type of high and low-tech 
equipment and tools included in program plans for the region. 
Participants received instruction on tactical radio communications, 
false document identification, detecting hidden compartments in 
private and commercial vessels, behavioral analysis and 
anti-terrorism as well as a range of inspection and detection 
techniques applicable to all types of contraband.  This training is 
a key to training junior and mid-level officers on systems and 
methods associated with identifying and interdicting suspected WMD 
movement in the vicinity of Kazakhstan's seaports on the Caspian 
Sea. 
 
ASTANA 00000653  003 OF 007 
 
 
 Gulnara Abildaeva, EXBS Program Manager, accompanied the group and 
reported that training went very well, except for the mishaps in the 
travel to and from the training destination.  However, in spite of 
all the hardships the team had to overcome (flight delays due to 
inclement weather conditions, many hours of layover, lost luggage in 
the airport of destination) everyone made it back home safely. The 
training was a good event. 
 The EXBS advisor is concerned by the fact that the group of 19 
travelers (18 GOK officials and the EXBS Program Manager) were stuck 
at the airport in Kazakhstan over the weekend without the necessary 
contact information for the POC in Charleston or information about 
the hotel in the U.S. 
 Recommendations: Future efforts will require complete information 
prior to departure. It is recommended that definite policy be 
explored to allow the accompanying EXBS representative to be able to 
commit funding in the event of unforeseen circumstances. 
 It is also recommended that clarification on the Authority to make 
financial commitments be provided.  EXBS Advisor requests guidance 
on permission for emergency authorizations.  When things such as 
airline delays happen, the escorting EXBS officer should have 
authority to make a prudent decision to incur the expense of an 
additional hotel night stay and not feel exposed personally for that 
expense. 
 
 2. Internal Export Control Compliance Programs Seminar -  February 
19-22 in Almaty.  As part of the Department of State funded EXBS 
program, the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security 
Administration's (DOE/NNSA) International Nonproliferation Export 
Control Program (INECP) conducted a seminar on export controls in 
Almaty on Feb. 20 and 21 for the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) 
and Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE). The specific thrust of the 
seminar was establishing and executing internal export control 
compliance programs.  The training was conducted by DOE contractors 
Kenneth Cross, Export Control Analyst, Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory; Tatyana Colgan, Project Manager, Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory; and Anupam Srivastava, Ph.D., Director of the 
Center for International Trade and Security, the University of 
Georgia. 
 This was one of the series of workshops held by INECP for 
Kazakhstan's state-owned and/or controlled nuclear institution, 
commercial enterprises as well as government agencies (such as the 
Ministry of Education and Science). The workshop targeted 
Kazakhstan's two aforementioned nuclear research institutes.  The 
workshop topics included: US internal compliance programs, 
technology transfer, and substantial information on Kazakhstan's 
national export control regulations. Kazakhstan's Atomic Energy 
Committee (KAEC) and Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) also 
substantially contributed to the workshop. 
 The training was a very good event. The participants highly valued 
the training and dialogue, they reiterated their interest in a 
Commodity Information Center initiative and support for a web-based 
solution as licensing protocols are rolled out to the effected 
community.  They were especially interested in having a Central 
Asian workshop that would allow neighboring counterparts to network 
and learn from one another, which post sees as a very good idea. 
The participants were from the Ministry of Education and Science as 
well as the Government Nuclear Research Institute.  They were 
lively, engaging, and uncharacteristically open to two-way 
communication.  Dr. Srivastava's and Mr. Cross's contributions were 
particularly good.  These gentlemen are simply treasure troves of 
current information in world affairs and threats.  Their 
participation clearly helped open up and stimulate dialogue and 
offered many suggestions to both our EXBS Program and Kazakhstan 
 
ASTANA 00000653  004 OF 007 
 
 
government efforts to control proliferation among those in the 
technical and academic communities. &#
x000A; The event gave the opportunity for EXBS Advisor Mike Seguin to 
discuss the future focus on UNSCR 1540 support for training and 
engagement with those involved in investigation and intelligence 
services designed to monitor, investigate, and proactively detect 
illicit traffic - a key focus for the EXBS program to pursue. 
 It is recommended that effort be made to continue this training and 
integrate it in some congruent format with the DOC's CTP training 
events associated with Administrative Enforcement and other 
compliance related training as well as Risk Management and enhancing 
intelligence and investigation techniques.  During the question and 
answer portion of the event, recommendations were made to engage the 
National Security Committee (KNB), and other intelligence, 
investigation and enforcement institutions to enhance Kazakhstan's 
capacity to proactively interdict efforts at illicit smuggling. 
 
 3. Administrative Enforcement training (AE) Training.  Molly Pyle 
and Doug Evans (DOE/Commonwealth Trading Partners) conducted AE 
training in Astana February 26 through March 2.  The training 
involved 20 Kazakhstani Customs Law Enforcement Officials.  The 
training was conducted in one of the Astana Customs Committee 
Headquarters conference rooms. 
      The focus of the event was on training Customs personnel to 
"train" their colleagues in the outlaying Kazakhstan regions on AE 
policy, concepts, and techniques.  Methodology included interactive 
case studies and presentations by each of the participants - a very 
effective means of training. 
      The training was positively received by those attending as 
relevant to enhancing AE techniques.  It was requested by the 
attendees that the workshop be conducted four more times this year 
in outlying regions with the USG's participation.  The training was 
particularly well done because of Doug Evans' background and 
presentation skills as a former Customs Investigation Officer. 
Areas of instruction not only included training techniques 
associated with AE concepts and principals, but also criminal 
investigation techniques.  Particular focus was on proactive WMD 
investigation methods and the importance of Government Outreach, 
making industry contacts, intelligence gathering and proactive 
investigation - all areas of present particular interest to the EXBS 
programs immediate direction.  It is noteworthy to point out that in 
the experience of those present, no examples of AE had ever occurred 
in Kazakhstan.  This is a problem. 
      Recommendations: This training should continue in the regions 
and should be accompanied by "Risk Management" training to augment 
the AE events.  All EXBS training should include, as was effectively 
done in this workshop, a format where the instruction is interactive 
- meaning the participants should be involved and have a chance to 
present how they conduct business so that the USG can better tailor 
the exchange to what is most relevant to the audience as well as 
better assess Kazakhstan's needs. 
The upcoming Volunteer Visitor Program should be used as an 
opportunity to impress on the Customs Chairman (Mr. Askar Shakirov) 
that AE should be exercised diligently to at least the point where 
"actual violations" are reported and prosecuted. The location for 
the previously mentioned AE training was unsuitable because of the 
inherent distractions associated with conducting training in the 
working environment.  Facilities used by USG agencies are in the 
opinion of the Advisor often deficient.  This is routinely 
experienced, perhaps due to money concerns.  However the quality of 
the instructional environment should always be considered.  Bluntly, 
the cost of contracting a decent and fully equipped conference room 
in a hotel or other suitable place outside of the participants' 
 
ASTANA 00000653  005 OF 007 
 
 
working area should be policy.  Training events in substandard 
working areas should not be allowed because they detract from both 
the learning experience and level of participation.  State 
Department contractors should know that selection of a decent 
conference room is a requirement, and, the EXBS Advisor may need to 
start having some say in where events are planned to avoid this 
problem. 
 
 
C. EQUIPMENT DELIVERED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
      1. No equipment delivered during this reporting period. 
 
D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT STATUS UPDATE 
 
 1.  Product Identification Training (PIT) April 3-5.  Department of 
Commerce (DOC) is planning to conduct Product Identification Tool 
Training (PIT) in Almaty. This training focuses on the 
identification of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials, the 
use of Kazakhstan's software and licensing systems to identify 
materials, what to do if questionable materials are suspected at 
Border Crossings, as well as methods of processing licensing 
applications. 
EXBS office is expecting to get CCC Request from DOC. 
 
 2. Bucharest Export Control Conference.  Kazakhstan's delegation to 
the 8th Annual Export Control Conference in Bucharest, Romania 
(March 6-8) consists of two officials: Sergey Savelyev, representing 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ernar Bakenov, representing the 
Customs Control Committee under the Ministry of Finance. At this 
time, all preparations have been made and the event is scheduled to 
take place as planned. 
 
 3. Task Order 79 Donation.  Task Order 79 for the EXBS donation of 
Ural Trucks and Border Guard Shelters is nearing fruition.  It is 
expected that these donations will occur in March or April; however, 
definite delivery dates have not yet been determined. 
Additionally, EXBS-DC has approved modifying the Task Order to 
include "complete" shelter installation rather than "partial" 
installation.  EXBS has also requested the supplying contractor to 
change the ship point of the Ural trucks.  These changes are 
considered very desirable and are recommended by the EXBS office in 
Kazakhstan.  Due to the significance of this donation, EXBS Office 
intends to solicit the participation of the Ambassador at the 
dedication ceremony. 
 
 7. X-Ray Van Repairs. The Department of Energy (DOE) will send a 
technician to maintain the donated X-Ray Van at the Korday Customs 
Post on the Kazakhstan - Kyrgyzstan Border April 14-16, and to 
Shymkent city on the Kazakhstan - Uzbekistan border on April 18-20. 
The EXBS team is planning to support the X-Ray van team and conduct 
Border Site Assessments at the above mentioned customs posts. 
 
 8.  Preliminary Second Line of Defense site survey. The Second Line 
of Defense (SLD) program team will conduct construction and 
integration efforts in the placement of radiation detection 
equipment and portal monitors to vehicle crossing sites throughout 
Kazakhstan during April 2007 (Apr.1-30). Country Clearance Cable was 
sent to the SLD team. 
 
 9.  Fiber Scope Repairs.
 Status unchanged. EXBS Office will 
continue to contact Carla D'Onofrio of DHS/CBP to determine whether 
funding to repair various EXBS donated equipment, such as the 
 
ASTANA 00000653  006 OF 007 
 
 
previously donated fiber scopes is available.  In February 
Kazakhstani Customs requested EXBS to support these repairs. 
 
E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT CONTROLS, NONPROLIFERATION, OR 
RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
 
 1.  UNSCR 1718. Review of Mr. Tobey's visit. At the Feb. 26 meeting 
with Mr. Shakirov, EXBS Advisor reviewed the visit of William Tobey, 
Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, and 
accompanying delegation on January 24, 2007.  Mr. Tobey had a 
meeting with the Kazakhstani Customs leadership representatives to 
discuss UNSCR 1718 and reinforce the urgency of interdicting North 
Korean attempts to proliferate WMDs. Since Mr. Shakirov was unable 
to attend this meeting, the EXBS office reinforced Mr. Tobey's 
message to Mr. Shakirov. 
 
F. CASPIAN SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
      1. None. 
 
III. RED FLAG ISSUES. 
 
 1. EXBS Advisor requests guidance on the authority to make 
financial commitments in emergency situations.  When unexpected 
emergencies arise, like airline delays as previously mentioned, the 
escorting EXBS officer should have some kind of authority to make a 
prudent decision on the ground to incur the expense of an additional 
hotel night stay and not feel exposed personally for that expense. 
 
 2. During the Export Control Seminar in Almaty (Feb. 19-22), the 
participants discussed the possibility of creation/establishment of 
international toll-free number, similar to one existing in the U.S. 
Customs, or web site for anonymous reporting of any suspicious cases 
related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This may become an 
additional tool in the interdiction of contraband and countering the 
proliferation of WMD, conventional arms, and related materials. 
 
 3. Donor Agreements.  When donations are transferred to a receiving 
government the Donor Agreement should be very clear on where the 
host government and USG responsibilities start and stop.  Two cases 
in point include the Safe-Boat Donation to Kazakhstan in Spring 2006 
and the pending Shelter / Ural truck donation scheduled to occur in 
spring 2007.  The Advisor recommends that Statements of 
Understanding or Agreement should be very clear and in both of the 
latter cases this clarity is not present.  Unclear responsibilities 
will lead to misunderstanding and potential strained relationships 
between the EXBS Program and host government.  This is an issue of 
attention-to-detail and solid communications.  This situation should 
be a topic for discussion at the Annual EXBS Conference in June 
2007. 
 
 4.  EXBS Program Mission.  A meeting was held March 9 with the 
Embassy Security Assistance Working Group and a number of visitors 
from Central Command and DoD.  The question of how EXBS is different 
in terms of host government engagement from other DOD and INL 
activities was raised by the visitors.  The question was asked 
because DoD, DTRA, OMC, DOE, INL, etc. all do many similar things 
with, for example in this case, Kazakhstan's Border Guard.  Of 
course the response included the narrow focus of EXBS has on WMD 
UNSCR 1540 and NADR funding, but the answer seemed to fall short. 
This question of role and coordination could be another topic for 
the June Conference. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000653  007 OF 007 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA652, KAZAKHSTANI JOURNALISTS DEMAND RESIGNATION OF INFORMATION

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA652.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA652 2007-03-13 10:44 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3648
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #0652/01 0721044
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131044Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8780
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1697
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2188

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000652 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INR/R/MR, SCA/CEN (MO'MARA), SCA/PPD (JKAMP), DRL/PHD 
(CKUCHTA-HELBLING) 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KPAO KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTANI JOURNALISTS DEMAND RESIGNATION OF INFORMATION 
MINISTER 
 
Ref:  A) Astana 295; B) 06 Almaty 1750 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  A dispute between Kazakhstani journalists and 
Minister of Information Yermukhamet Yertysbayev boiled over the week 
of March 5 when prominent media advocates demanded the minister's 
resignation for his adversarial attitude toward the media.  On March 
2, as TV cameras rolled, Yertysbayev dismissed a crew from an Astana 
municipal TV station from a huddle of reporters waiting for the 
minister's comments on the president's annual address to the nation. 
 Yertysbayev said the Era TV station had "squealed" on him in a 
letter to the head of the presidential administration criticizing 
his handling of the January frequency tender (ref A).  The 
information ministry has filed a suit seeking to suspend Era's 
broadcast license for the station's alleged violation of the "50/50" 
law requiring equal Russian and Kazakh language programming.  Era 
has filed its own lawsuits to annul the tender and for inhibiting 
the lawful activity of its correspondent.  The Prime Minister has 
asked Yertysbayev for an explanation of the dispute by March 13. 
Some analysts see connections to an ongoing struggle between the 
president's eldest daughter and the minister for influence over 
Kazakhstan's media.  End summary. 
 
Minister Dismisses Era TV Journalists from Pull-Aside 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
2.  (U) After a March 2 government meeting in Astana on implementing 
items from the president's annual address to the nation, a group of 
journalists were waiting for comment from Minister of Culture and 
Information Yermukhamet Yertysbayev.  Centrist independently owned 
Channel 31 recorded for their evening news Yertysbayev's astonishing 
outburst when he spotted a crew from the Astana municipal station, 
Era TV.  "Who is that?  Get Era out of here, now!  Get them out!  We 
won't give Era any comments, they squealed on me.  They wrote a 
letter about how I conducted the tender illegally, without a quorum, 
etc.  That's a lie!"  (See ref A regarding the letter to the head of 
the presidential administration criticizing the January frequency 
allocations).  In discussing the incident later, the minister said 
he excluded Era TV from covering his remarks because the journalist 
arrived late, an assertion disputed by the journalist. 
 
Journalist Organizations Demand Minister's Resignation 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
3.  (U) The government-affiliated Kazakhstan Union of Journalists 
and the National Association of TV and Radio Broadcasters, along 
with the independent media defense foundation Adil Soz, demanded 
Yertysbayev's resignation during a press conference March 5.  In 
their joint statement, the nationally known leaders of these 
organizations stated that the minister violated legislation 
guaranteeing media unrestricted access to information.  Seitkazy 
Matayev, chairman of the journalists' union, was quoted in the March 
6 issue of the progressive newspaper Vremya (circulation 180,000) 
saying, "Yertysbayev's obnoxious and high handed treatment of 
journalists started a long time ago.  He defiantly expels 
journalists from press rooms. . . Yertysbayev behaves like a guard 
in a third rate bazaar.  I've worked with seven ministers of 
information, and no one has permitted such behavior before." 
 
Yertysbayev Refuses to Resign, Takes Era to Court 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
4.  (U) Newswire Interfax-Kazakhstan reported March 5 that 
Yertysbayev refused to resign, even though some journalists "had 
been demanding this for a whole year."  The next day Era reported 
that the station had received a subpoena notifying them that the 
information ministry had filed suit in the economic court of Astana 
against them for providing only 38% Kazakh language programming 
instead of 50% as required by the Law on Languages and Law on Mass 
Media.  The ministry is asking the court to suspend Era's 
broadcasting license for three months.  According to the subpoena 
the court hearing will start in two weeks.  Era TV reported March 5 
that Kazakhstan's Union of Journalists promised to provide both 
legal and financial support for their defense in court.  The station 
argues that the RIA Arna, the regional TV station in Pavlodar that 
received seven broadcast frequencies in the January tender, provides 
only 6% Kazakh language programming. 
 
Era Journalist and Station File Lawsuits 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (U) On March 7 several media reported that Era TV journalist 
Yuliya Isakova filed a suit in the Almatinskiy district court of 
Astana against the minister of information for impeding journalism 
activities guaranteed to her under the law.  According to the 
reports, Isakova said she seeks only 1 tenge in moral damages from 
 
ASTANA 00000652  002 OF 002 
 
 
the minister for "the principle" of upholding journalists' rights to
 
report.  On March 11, the station filed a lawsuit asking for the 
results of the January frequency tender to be annulled.  Yertysbayev 
had already commented on the tender in his March 8 interview with 
the weekly pro-government Central Asia Monitor (circulation 
14,000/week).  "We don't intend to resolve the situation regarding 
the tender, since there was no violation of the law.  The procurator 
general did not uncover any violation and if this case is brought to 
court, we can quite easily prove we're right.  It's possible we 
could initiate a countersuit for slander." 
 
Prime Minister Asks Yertysbayev for Explanation 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
6.  (SBU) Interfax and other media reported on March 11 that Prime 
Minister Karim Masimov raised the issue at a government meeting that 
day and asked Yertysbayev to provide him a written explanation of 
the conflict by March 13.  Masimov said that media had asked him 
about the conflict, so he wanted a fuller assessment from 
Yertysbayev "of all questions" that were being posed to Masimov.  In 
a conversation with emboff March 12, Isakova (protect) said Era TV 
director general Mirbulat Kunbayev sent his own memo to the prime 
minister explaining the sequence of events.  She said unnamed 
"sources" told the station that Yertysbayev spoke with 
editors-in-chief of print media on March 12 and asked them to 
publish articles critical of Era TV. 
 
Vremya Files Suit Against Yertysbayev 
------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (U) On March 13 the independently owned Vremya, Kazakhstan's 
most popular newspaper, published an article about an official 
inquiry they sent March 9 to Prime Minister Masimov, asking him how 
he assessed Yertysbayev's behavior and what he intended to do about 
the conflict between the Ministry of Information and Kazakhstan's 
community of journalists.  Vremya also complained that Yertysbayev 
had accused their own reporter of writing "dirty, completely 
provocative articles directed against employees of our ministry." 
The paper says that after consulting with lawyers "we decided to 
file suit against Mr. Yertysbayev to defend the business reputation 
of our paper and to demand a public apology on the air of Channe1 31 
and in the Respublika and Vremya newspapers." 
 
Dispute Reveals Fault Lines with Dariga Nazarbayeva 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8.  (U) Only four television stations covered the news that national 
media organizations were demanding the information minister's 
resignation:  Era TV, Channel 31, and national broadcasters KTK and 
Rakhat TV, both owned by the president's son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev, 
the husband of media entrepreneur and member of parliament Dariga 
Nazarbayeva.  Aliyev's wire service Kazakhstan Today and Interfax 
provided regular updates, and by March 13, the prominent 
independently owned, pro-government newspapers Liter and its Kazakh 
language version Aikyn were also reporting on the conflict.  The 
official broadcasters Kazakhstan 1 and Khabar did not report on the 
dispute. 
 
9.  (SBU) Some analysts see the current conflict as part of an 
ongoing struggle between Dariga Nazarbayeva and Yertysbayev for 
dominance over Kazakhstan's media.  Last summer the Congress of 
Journalists, chaired by Nazarbayeva, demanded Yertysbayev's 
resignation after he fired the management of Kazakhstan 1 and 
announced intentions to take government control over Khabar, of 
which Nazarbayeva supposedly owns 49% (ref B).  The Union of 
Journalists, one of the three organizations now demanding 
Yertysbayev's resignation, is also associated with Nazarbayeva and 
chairman Matayev is considered a close confidante. 
 
10.  (SBU) Comment:  It is unclear why Yertysbayev has not taken any 
action against Channel 31, whose executive director co-authored the 
letter asking for the annulment of the January tender.  Some 
analysts claimed Yertysbayev was carrying out Masimov's bidding in 
the allocation of frequencies (ref A).  Others claim that 
Yertysbayev does not want to cross Bulat Utemuratov, the head of 
management affairs for the presidential administration and reputedly 
a majority stakeholder in Channel 31.  The conflict appears to have 
reached a new level of brinksmanship with Vremya entering the 
litigious fray.  Masimov's response, expected after Yertysbayev 
submits his memorandum on the conflict, may provide some clues to 
the patrons supporting media players in this latest act. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA618, KAZAKHSTAN: DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO RELIGION LAW SPARK CONCERN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA618 2007-03-12 01:36 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2008
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0618 0710136
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 120136Z MAR 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8737
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0094
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1696

UNCLAS ASTANA 000618 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DRL/PHD, DRL/IRF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO RELIGION LAW SPARK CONCERN 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The Religious Issues Committee (RIC) of the 
Ministry of Justice recently acknowledged that it is drafting 
amendments to "modernize" and "update" Kazakhstan's law on religion. 
 According to a draft of the amendments circulating among the human 
rights community, the new amendments would increase the role of the 
RIC in registering and monitoring religious groups and severely 
restrict the activities of any religious group with less than 50 
members.  An RIC official confirmed that some of these ideas were 
under consideration, but stated that the amendments were still in 
the draft stage, and that outside groups and religious confessions 
would ultimately have the opportunity to comment on the proposed 
legislation before it is submitted to the legislature. 
Nevertheless, human rights activists are very concerned about the 
threat to religious freedom posed by these amendments, and are 
mobilizing to oppose them. End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
AMENDMENTS WOULD TIGHTEN CONTROL OVER RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
2. (SBU) On February 1, Ninel Fokina, chairwoman of the Almaty 
Helsinki Committee, distributed copies of draft religion law 
amendments to PolOff, the OSCE human dimension officer, and several 
diplomats from OSCE member states.  Fokina acknowledged that the 
document was a draft, but in her view it was substantially complete 
based on her past experience with the legislative drafting process. 
 
3. (SBU) According to the draft, Kazakhstan's religion law would be 
amended in a number of areas.  The provision that has drawn the most 
attention thus far is the sharp restriction on the activities of any 
group with less than 50 members.  Such groups would be subject to a 
mandatory, though simplified, registration process.  Among other 
things, they would be prohibited from publishing, producing, 
exporting, or importing religious literature or materials designed 
for religious purposes; setting up facilities for the production of 
religious literature and other religious products; building and 
maintaining facilities for religious services, meetings, and 
worship; and soliciting or receiving financial donations.  Although 
the draft text is not entirely clear, this provision appears to 
apply to both local, independent religious groups and local branches 
of nationally registered groups. 
 
4. (SBU) In addition, the proposed text appears to increase the 
power of the RIC, empowering it to register religious associations 
and all of their branch and representative offices; keep a database 
on religious associations; oversee implementation of religious 
freedom legislation; coordinate operation of foreign religious 
organizations in Kazakhstan, including the appointment of their 
leaders; and coordinate the construction of buildings for worship. 
As part of the registration process, religious groups would be 
required to provide the RIC with basic information on their faith 
and their worship practices, including the history of the faith and 
of the particular religious organization.  The registration 
materials will then be subjected to an "expert analysis," on which 
the RIC will base its registration decision.

Wikileaks

07ASTANA614, KAZAKHSTAN SUBMISSIONS FOR 2007 TIP REPORT

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA614.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA614 2007-03-07 12:06 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8373
OO RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0614/01 0661206
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071206Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8716
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0076
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 16 ASTANA 000614 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR G/TIP (MHALL), G, SCA/CEN (O'MARA), 
SCA/RA (LEE), INL/AAE (ALTON), DRL, PRM, AND IWI 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCRM PHUM KWMN SMIG KFRD ASEC PREF ELAB
PREL, KZ 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN SUBMISSIONS FOR 2007 TIP REPORT 
 
REF: 06 STATE 202745 
 
ASTANA 00000614  001.2 OF 016 
 
 
1. SUMMARY: Post is pleased to submit the following 
information in response to reftel request. 
 
------------------- 
OVERVIEW (PARA. 27) 
------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) (27A) Kazakhstan is a destination, transit, 
and source country for people traffQked for the 
purposes of forced labor and sexual exploitation. 
Kazakhstan serves as destination country for young and 
middle-age men trafficked for labor purposes from 
neighbouring countries, primarily Uzbekistan, but also 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and sometimes from other 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. 
 
3. (SBU) (27A) Kazakhstan is a destination country for 
young women trafficked for sexual exploitation from 
neighbouring countries, mainly Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan.  According to data provided by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), in 
2006, 34 female and 26 male victims from Uzbekistan, 
and one male from Ukraine via Russia were trafficked 
to Kazakhstan.  In some cases, the victims suffered 
from both sexual and labor exploitation.  There were 
also cases Qen sexually exploited victims or (more 
rarely) forced laborers were involved in other 
criminal activities organized by their traffickers 
(pick pocketing, drug dealing, etc.) 
 
4. (SBU) (27A) Kazakhstan serves as transit country 
for victims recruited in neighbouring countries, 
mainly Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and 
transported through Kazakhstan to Russia for either 
sexual or labor exploitation or to the Middle East for 
sexual exploitation.  Transit includes from Uzbekistan 
by land to South Kazakhstan, from South Kazakhstan by 
air to United Arab Emirates; from Tajikistan by land 
to Kazakhstan, from Kazakhstan to Russia. 
 
5. (SBU) (27A) Kazakhstan also serves as a country of 
origin for male and female victims trafficked to 
Russia for labor and sexual exploitation and young 
women recruited in Kazakhstan and trafficked to 
Turkey, UAE, Greece, and Israel for sexual 
exploitation.  According to IOM, in 2006 one female 
from Kazakhstan was trafficked to Turkey, three 
females to Thailand, and seven to the UAE (four of 
them transiting via Kyrgyzstan, and one of them via 
Azerbaijan).  One female was trafficked from 
Kazakhstan to Germany, two females and one male victim 
to Russia, and one female to Uzbekistan. 
 
6. (SBU) (27A) IOM registered 24 female victims and 
one male victim of in-country trafficking in 2006. 
Over the reporting period IOM provided assistance to 
104 people who requested assistance because of 
trafficking concerns (75 female and 29 male).  IOM 
registered and monitored each trafficking case 
reported to IOM by the victims, their families, 
police, or through hotlines within and outside of 
Kazakhstan. 
 
7. (SBU) (27A) Compared to previous years, 
international experts reported a slight decrease in 
the number of cases of citizens being trafficked 
abroad for sexual or labor exploitation and an 
increase in labor trafficking into and within the 
country.  Experts believed the economic growth of the 
country, especially in relation to its neighbours, 
contributed directly to both trends.  Similarly, the 
relative economic prosperity in the capital Astana, 
the largest city Almaty, and the western oil field 
cities of Aktau and Atyrau, has drawn job-seeking 
Kazakhstanis from rural villages, some of whom become 
victims of labor trafficking within the construction 
industry.  Open borders between Kazakhstan and other 
CIS countries, growth of migration flows between 
 
ASTANA 00000614  002.2 OF 016 
 
 
neighbouring countries and within Kazakhstan, and 
globalization of organized crime create bigger 
opportunities for criminals to establish reliable 
routes for smuggling human beings. 
 
8. (SBU) (27A) Socioeconomic conditions, rather than 
ethnic patterns, are the most common indicator for 
trafficking risk groups within Kazakhstan.  The 
analysis shows that women in the age group from 16 to 
25 are most vulnerable to being trafficked for sexual 
exploitation; men in the age group from 20 to 35 and 
teenage boys aged 14-19, mainly from Central Asian 
countries, comprise the majority of victims of 
trafficking for labor exploitation.  Labor trafficking 
is primarily focused on providing workers for the 
construction business and agriculture.  Adolescents &#x00
0A;raised in orphanages, or in the families of alcoholics 
and drug abusers, regardless of gender, were 
particularly vulnerable to being trafficked due to a 
lack of a solid support network.  Illegal migrant 
laborers were also at high risk of becoming victims of 
trafficking. 
 
9. (SBU)(27 A&B) Small trafficking rings, often 
involving employment and travel agencies, facilitated 
trafficking of individuals out of Kazakhstan.  There 
were multiple cases involving small trafficking rings 
consisting of recruiters located in Kazakhstan, some 
of whom were former victims of sex trafficking, linked 
to brothel operators located in the destination 
country.  In several of these cases, the traffickers 
had family ties and exploited those outside the family 
group.  Domestic NGOs reported some instances in which 
sexual exploitation and domestic labor traffickers 
victimized their own family members, usually teenaged 
girls.  In the majority of cases, the victims were 
offered lucrative jobs through close relatives or 
friends and in some rare cases were sold by their 
mothers who were usually alcoholics.  Traffickers 
often escorted the victim or the group of victims and 
assisted them in crossing the border.  After crossing 
the border, traffickers pass the recruited individual 
or group to an intermediary who escorted the victims 
to the exploiters. 
 
10. (SBU) (27 A&B) False documents were often used to 
move the victims, from Kazakhstan to the UAE or 
Israel.  On routes from Kazakhstan to Turkey or 
Russia, victims were trafficked under valid documents. 
However, after crossing the border or upon arrival at 
the destination, the exploiters took the victims? 
identity and travel documents.  Labor traffickers 
commonly held victims' identity documents and strictly 
controlled their movements, provided substandard 
communal housing and meals, and isolated the victims 
to prevent discovery.  To move victims to Kazakhstan, 
traffickers often used the porousness of the borders 
especially those between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
In some cases, victims did not have any documents at 
all when they crossed the border under the 
traffickers? escort. Agricultural and construction 
laborers often began working under the false belief 
that the trafficker was a legitimate employer.  IOM 
and NGOs reported that it was common practice for 
exploitative employers to withhold payment of wages 
until the end of a project, paying less than what had 
been agreed, if at all. 
 
11. (SBU)(27B&C) Over the past several years, the 
government has shown the political will to address 
trafficking in persons from all angles - as a law 
enforcement challenge, as a social protection issue, 
as a labor issue, and as a component of the country's 
international relations.  However, lack of practical 
experience in dealing with TIP cases, unwillingness of 
victims to cooperate with law enforcement due to 
security reasons, as well as the transnational nature 
of the crime and the attendant complex and time- 
consuming investigation make it difficult to address 
this problem. 
 
ASTANA 00000614  003.2 OF 016 
 
 
 
12. (SBU) (27B&C) President Nazarbayev signed a new 
law amending existing TIP legislation on March 2, 
2006.  It addressed the most serious limitations to 
the government's ability to address trafficking.  The 
legislation covers serious legislative gaps that 
impeded the pace of Kazakhstan's progress, most 
significantly in terms of law enforcement and 
prosecution efforts.  Overall, corruption remains a 
problem; it affects anti-TIP efforts as well as other 
law enforcement efforts.  Law enforcement authorities 
uncovered 33 percent more corruption related crimes in 
2006 than in 2005. 
 
13. (SBU) (27B&C) Although most of the anti-TIP 
training provided by international experts was funded 
by other sources, the Government of Kazakhstan (the 
Government) demonstrated a consistent commitment to 
devoting law enforcement, Procuratorial, labor, 
education, information, and social welfare personnel 
and other resources to address the problem of 
trafficking in persons. 
 
14. (SBU) (27D) In 2006, the Government developed a 
procedure to collect and track data on crimes, 
including those related to human trafficking, that 
allows users to systematically monitor its anti- 
trafficking efforts.  The Procurator General?s Office 
(PGO) maintains an integrated card catalogue of 
adjudications and the Integrated Unified Statistical 
System (IUSS) in which statistical data is stored. 
 
15. (SBU) (27D) In order to further improve 
information support to law enforcement and other 
public authorities, the Statistics Committee of the 
PGO created a new computer based Information Service 
system, which allows all concerned public agencies to 
have on-line access to the Committee?s crime databases 
beginning in the first quarter of 2007.  In addition, 
the Government is discussing the possibility of 
establishing a separate information data section, 
where the information on human trafficking would be 
extractable from the Committee?s database.  Remote 
access to the data would be provided to those 
supervising the investigative compliance, detective 
force compliance, and criminal trial compliance 
departments, as well as to the internal affairs and 
national security agencies. 
 
--------------------- 
PREVENTION (PARA. 28) 
--------------------- 
 
16. (SBU) (28A&B) The Government acknowledges that 
trafficking is a problem in Kazakhstan, and is taking 
steps to address it.  The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) is 
the lead agency in coordinating anti-TIP efforts in 
the government.  An interagency TIP Working Group (the 
"Working Group") led by the Minister of Justice (MOJ), 
includes representatives of the Ministries of Internal 
Affairs (MVD); Foreign Affairs (MFA); Labor and Social 
Welfare(MOL); Education and Science(MOES); and Culture 
and Information (MCI). Also represented are the 
Committee for National Security (KNB), which 
supervises the Border Guards; the office of the 
Procurator General (PGO); and the National Commission 
on Family and Gender Policy.  All of these ministries 
and agencies have responsibilities for combating 
trafficking. 
 
17. (SBU) (28C) Previous trafficking prevention 
campaigns have resulted in increased overall awareness 
of the issue, especially in the media (see para. 73). 
In 2006, as a result of the active engagement of the 
Government, NGOs, IOs and diplomatic missions with 
the editorial boards of newspapers, information 
agencies and national TV and radio companies, 
electronic mass media published 800 stories and videos 
concerning TIP; over 1,000 articles were published in 
the national newspapers; regional newspapers published 
 
AS
TANA 00000614  004.2 OF 016 
 
 
approximately 900 articles.  Newspaper articles 
totalled about 677 printed pages. 
 
18. (SBU) (28C) In addition, the MOES prepared the 
second and third volumes of a periodical summary 
report on implementing the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child in Kazakhstan, which discusses further 
strengthening of the fight against illicit trafficking 
in minors.  This report has been posted on the MOES 
web-site and published in the national journal 
Zhastar. 
 
19. (SBU) (28C) Furthermore, Procurators from the 
capital city, Astana, provided a thorough analysis of 
relevant TIP laws and potential punishments for 
committing the crime of trafficking in a weekly 
television news program called Hard Talk.  Almaty 
Procurators also explained on TV the liabilities and 
potential punishment for illicit human trafficking. 
 
20. (SBU) (28C) Law enforcement officials also met 
with community groups to discuss TIP.  For example, 
authorities conducted a series of presentations at 
selected educational institutions and universities to 
discuss the protection of victims' constitutional 
rights in the context of trafficking in people, 
preventive measures aimed at curbing trafficking, and 
criminal code provisions related to liability for 
trafficking. 
 
21. (SBU) (28C) IOM's multiyear educational campaign, 
financed through a grant from USAID, is linked to a 
network of hotlines staffed by TIP NGOs that provide 
information for those contemplating working abroad and 
assistance for trafficking victims and their families. 
Through a project "Combating Trafficking in Persons in 
Central Asia" funded by USAID, partner NGOs operating 
the hotlines were trained by IOM.  During the period 
from January 1 through December 31 the 12 hotlines 
throughout Kazakhstan received 9,059 calls.  131 
people with concerns about trafficking were assisted. 
 
22. (SBU) (28C) Within Post?s INL funded anti-TIP 
program, IOM developed and distributed almost 4,500 
pieces of informational materials (TIP guidelines, 
posters, notepads, and plastic cards) and 
paraphernalia (t-shirts, coffee/tea mugs) containing 
counter-trafficking information.  INL and IOM 
disseminated this material among the divisions of law 
enforcement agencies in the cities and oblasts of 
Kazakhstan, to participants of all anti-TIP training 
sessions conducted by IOM, including those conducted 
in the MVD Legal Institute in Karaganda where future 
MVD lawyer-officers are trained. 
 
23. (SBU) (28D) The government recognizes that its 
relative economic prosperity, especially in relation 
to its neighbours, contributes to increased in- 
trafficking.  During the first ten months of 2006, 
1,665,848 foreigners visited Kazakhstan.  Migration 
authorities found 80,141 individuals had committed 
administrative violations, which could include failing 
to register visas, while 63,689 individuals were found 
in violation of various other migration rules.  10,952 
individuals were deported from the country.  In order 
to control labor migration and protect the domestic 
labor market, the Government established annual quotas 
for foreign labor, which are designed to limit and 
properly distribute foreign labor based on the market 
situation and the economic demand for skilled labor. 
According to local MOL officials, about 33,200 foreign 
specialists were working in Kazakhstan within the 
labor quota as of January 1, 2007. 
 
24. (SBU) (28D) In 2006 as a result of a now expired 
one-time law on the amnesty of illegal migrants, 
144,227 labor migrants were legalized.  The migrants 
came from Uzbekistan (71.5%), Kyrgyzstan (14%), Russia 
(6.7%), Tajikistan (2.9%), and other countries (4.7%). 
The bulk of the legalized labor immigrants work in the 
 
ASTANA 00000614  005.2 OF 016 
 
 
civil construction sector (99,858 persons); 19,632 in 
the services sector; 13,082 in the agricultural 
sector; 4,668 in other sectors of the economy; and 
6,110 in the informal market sector (domestic 
service).  Over one third of those legalized were 30 
to 45 years old. 
. 
25. (SBU) (28E) The Government of Kazakhstan 
cooperated with IOM, the OSCE, domestic NGOs and 
foreign embassies in anti-TIP efforts.  The following 
examples demonstrate the cooperation. 
26. (SBU) (28E) 17 Uzbek victims of trafficking were 
rescued in August because of joint efforts of IOM, a 
local NGO, and the Anti-Organized Crime Unit of the 
West Kazakhstan Transportation Police Department in 
Aktobe.  (Note: Uzbekistani police and NGOs also 
cooperated in prosecution of this case.  End note.) 
The criminal case was initiated by the police in 
August 2006 and the court hearings began in late 
December.  Interested individuals, including some 
observing the court hearings, wore T-shirts with the 
logo "Stop Trafficking in People" which were produced 
by IOM through an INL grant to increase public 
awareness of the crime of trafficking.  The case was 
widely publicized and the t-shirt wearing participants 
were even shown on national television.  IOM and its 
partner NGO in Aktobe have been providing medical, 
psychological and legal assistance to the victims. 
27. (SBU) (28E) In mid-December the same West 
Kazakhstan Transportation Police department referred 
three women rescued from a clandestine brothel to an 
IOM NGO partner in Aktau.  IOM reported to EmbOffs 
that they always receive strong support and 
cooperation in trafficking cases from the police 
department in Aktobe. 
28. (SBU) (28E) In November the South Kazakhstan 
Oblast Police Department referred four victims who had 
been trafficked from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan to IOM?s 
NGO partner in Shymkent. 
29. (SBU) (28E) Two Uzbek victims of labor 
exploitation were rescued by the police in Astana in 
May.  The case was detected by an NGO partner in 
Nukus, Uzbekistan and referred to an NGO in Astana. 
As a result of the close cooperation, the victims were 
rescued by the police and the NGO, and temporary 
accommodation was arranged by IOM for the period of 
investigation. 
30. (SBU) (28E) In addition, the Government actively 
participated in all counter-trafficking events 
organized by foreign embassies, international 
organizations and domestic NGOs.  During the reporting 
period, 90 police and migration police officers and 
judges received training under an IOM program funded 
by Post?s INL program.  The Kazakhstani Government 
supported public training sessions provided by 
domestic NGOs to schools, colleges, youth clubs, penal 
colonies, summer camps, polyclinics, etc.  Between 
April 1 and December 31, an IOM program funded by 
USAID trained 8,294 people. 
31. (SBU) (28F) Border monitoring has not been widely 
utilized in anti-trafficking efforts to date, in part 
due to the challenges the country faces in securing 
land borders of more than 12,000 km, in addition to 
almost 1900 km of Caspian Sea coastline.  Population 
density along Kazakhstan's borders is relatively low, 
making it difficult to detect illicit migration 
without advanced technology or a large border force. 
 
32. (SBU) (28F) Through its training center, the 
Border Guard Service offers training for passport 
control officers assigned to the 150 official points 
of entry.  The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
Migration Police acknowledge that capacity for TIP 
border screening is limited, with resources 
prioritized for detection of WMD materials, 
terrorists, narcotics and dangerous contraband. 
Notwithstanding resource and other challenges, the 
Government required that the Border Guards and the 
Migration Police, which are separate law enforcement 
entities under the KNB and MVD respectively, develop a 
 
ASTANA 00000614  006.2 OF 016 
 
 
plan to collect and analyze data related to 
trafficking as well as forms of irregular migration. 
 
33. (SBU) (28F) In 2006 the KNB and MVD continued 
installation of a unified information system called 
Berkut which will allow them to control those entering 
and exiting the country, and over resident foreigners. 
To identify illegal migration routes, Border Guard and 
Customs authorities developed a joint program named 
"Migrant" at border-crossings and railway stations to 
screen international passenger trains and check 
foreigners detained for illegal entry into Kazakhstan. 
"Migrant" has now become a regular detection and 
prevention operation focusing at supervising compliance 
with the Guidelines for Foreigners Residing in 
Kazakhstan, and detection and prosecution of illegal 
migration. 
 
34. (SBU) (28F) A joint operation was conducted from 
May 20 through June 5, 2006, by member-countries of 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
aimed at detecting and closing illegal migration 
routes and at curbing transnational organized crime 
along the most active migration routes for foreigners 
travelling from third countries to the CSTO member- 
countries.  Per the 2006 Action Plan of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, an ad-hoc headquarters was 
established to counteract illegal migration in the 
village of Kordai, Zhambyl Region, from June 5 through 
September 18, 2006. 
 
35. (SBU) (28F) Additionally, during patrol 
inspections conducted in residential areas of the city 
of Ust Kamenogorsk, about 70 Uzbek citizens were found 
working illegally.  Just one patrol inspection carried 
out in the South Kazakhstan Region found over 500 
Uzbek citizens working illegally.  These facts are not 
isolated incidents; illegal workers are found in all 
parts of the country.  In 2006, the Government 
detected 842 employers having a total of 2148 illegal 
labor migrants. 
 
36. (SBU) (28F) TIP detection operations conducted in 
2006 resulted in the discovery and closure of four 
international illegal migration routes; opening and 
prosecution of three criminal cases under Article 330- 
2 of the Criminal Code (Organizing Illegal Migration); 
and detention of 620 illegal migrants.  Of these, the 
authorities brought charges under the Administrative 
Code against 548 individuals; 513 were deported and 24 
foreigners were denied entry to the country.  In 
addition, the Committee for National Security 
conducted 18 pre-emptive operations in 2006 to 
forestall illegal border transit by residents of 
border regions and disrupt the organization of illegal 
migration routes. 
 
37. (SBU) (28G) Agencies and ministries coordinate 
anti-trafficking efforts through the Working Group 
(see para.16), in addition to well-established 
protocols for general interagency cooperation.  The 
MVD and PGO work together on a regular basis to 
investigate trafficking cases, and the MCIS and the 
MOJ cooperate to produce trafficking education 
publications.  The Minister of Justice, Zagipa 
Baliyeva, serves as the Trafficking Coordinator within 
the GOK, and she delegates day-to-day monitoring of 
TIP efforts to Elvira Azimova, Head of the 
International Law Department within the MOJ.  The 
Government also has an anti-corruption task force in 
place. 
 
38. (SBU) (28H) In April the Government approved a 
National Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in 
Persons ("National Plan") for 2006-2008 that was 
drafted by the MOJ with input from members of the 
Working Group and other stakeholders and interested 
parties, including the USG.  The National Plan 
includes revision of laws and regulations, 
introduction of TIP training courses into training 
 
ASTANA 00000614  007.2 OF 016 
 
 
curricula, development of mechanisms for social 
rehabilitation of trafficking victims, creation of 
crisis centers etc.  The National Plan provides 
financial assistance to Kazakhstani citizens who were 
illegally trafficked to foreign countries and who 
became victims of trafficking, as well as those who 
became victims of other crimes and who appeared to be 
in force majeure circumstances abroad.  The plan was 
disseminated through oblast administrations. Post 
notes that the GOK is working to fulfill most Plan 
elements. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TRAFFICKERS (PARA 29) 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
39. (SBU) (29A) A new law, "Changes and Amendments to 
Legislation on Human Trafficking" was enacted March 2, 
2006.  Changes were made to the Criminal Code, 
Criminal Procedural Code, Administrative Code, and the 
Decree of the President having the force of law on 
foreign citizens.  The new changes brought national 
legislation into accordance with the provisions of 
Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the UN Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime.  The new law covers 
both internal and transnational forms of trafficking. 
 
40. (SBU) (29A) The most significant change to 
existing legislation was the strengthening of victim 
protection and clarification and strengthening of 
penalties for trafficking crimes.  The Parliament and 
Government amended the criminal code to expand the 
actions that constituted trafficking to include not 
only recruitment of victims, but also sale, purchase, 
transportation, and transfer of victims.  Any act 
facilitating trafficking by hiding or lodging 
trafficked persons, or undertaking any other 
commercial transaction that contributed to 
exploitation, was also prohibited. &#
x000A; 
41. (SBU) (29A) As a result, where a conviction under 
old Article 128 of Criminal Code "Recruitment of or 
facilitating movement of individuals out of or through 
the country for the purpose of exploitation" was 
punishable by a fine and up to eight years in prison, 
a conviction under new Article 128 of Criminal Code 
"Human Trafficking" is punishable by a fine and up to 
15 years in prison and possible confiscation of 
assets. 
 
42. (SBU) (29A, B & C) In addition to Article 128 
noted above, the government investigates and 
prosecutes traffickers under other articles of the 
criminal code.  Specifically, charges are brought 
under: 
 
a) Article 113 (forced removal of human organs and 
tissues), punishable by five - ten years of 
imprisonment with possible employment/activity 
restrictions for up to an additional three years; 
 
b) Article 125 (Kidnapping), punishable by ten - 15 
years in prison; 
 
c) Article 126 (Illegal deprivation of freedom, other 
than kidnapping), punishable by five - ten years in 
prison; 
 
d) Article 133 (Trafficking in minors), punishable by 
5-15 years in prison (Note: Previously trafficking in 
minors was punishable by two to 15 years in prison. 
End note.); 
 
e) Article 270 (Facilitation of prostitution or 
recruitment of an individual into prostitution), 
punishable by a fine and by three - seven years in 
prison; 
 
 
ASTANA 00000614  008.2 OF 016 
 
 
f) Article 271 (Establishment or managing brothels or 
acting as a pimp), punishable by a fine and up to five 
years in prison; 
 
g) Article 330 (Intentional illegal migration into the 
country, (other than as a trafficking victim), 
punishable by a fine and up to five years in prison; 
and 
 
h) Article 330-3 (Repeated violations of regulations 
for importation and employment of foreign labor), 
punishable by a fine and up to one year in prison. 
 
i) A new Article 275-1 was inserted into the Criminal 
Code (Illegal removal of human organs and tissues from 
a human corpse), and violations are punishable by five 
to seven years in prison and the possibility of up to 
three years of employment/activity restriction. 
 
j) An amendment to Article 399 of the Administrative 
Code prohibits the use of deceptive advertising to 
recruit citizens of Kazakhstan to work abroad. 
 
k) Amended Article 56 of the same law provides for 
immediate suspension of deportation proceedings where 
a potential deportee alleges that he or she has been 
the victim of a serious crime, including trafficking 
crimes.  Deportation proceedings will not proceed 
until criminal investigations and prosecutions are 
completed.  However, in order for an illegal immigrant 
to be considered a victim of a serious crime, law 
enforcement authorities must initiate a case against 
the purported assailant on the basis of an alleged 
crime.  Often in practice, authorities do not initiate 
a criminal case due to lack of evidence, corruption, 
or other reasons.  Therefore, frequently the immigrant 
cannot be considered a victim and becomes liable for 
prosecution or deportation. 
 
l) However, under the amended Article 396 of the 
Administrative Code, trafficking victims are exempted 
from definitions of illegal immigrants. 
 
m) Accordingly, the presidential decree on the legal 
status of foreign citizens was amended to classify 
foreign victims of trafficking as protected under the 
law and to accord them special temporary residence 
rights. 
Post?s analysis finds that all these articles taken 
together are adequate to cover the full scope of 
trafficking in persons. 
 
43. (SBU) (29D) A rape conviction carries a sentence 
of three to 15 years in prison, depending on the age 
of the victim and the combination of charges filed. 
Under Criminal Code Article 120, a conviction for rape 
is punishable by three - five years in prison.  A 
conviction for sexual violence under criminal code 
Article 121 is also punishable by three - five years 
in prison.  Per Criminal Code Article 122, the penalty 
for sexual relations with a person under 16 is up to 
five years in prison.  A separate conviction for 
battery, including sexual battery, can lead to up to 
an additional eight years in jail and a fine.  By 
comparison, the prison term for violations of Articles 
270 and 271 (see above) regarding prostitution and 
brothels are three ? seven years. 
 
44. (SBU) (29E) Prostitution is not prohibited by law, 
although forced prostitution, prostitution connected 
to organized crime, and acts facilitating 
prostitution, such as operating a brothel or 
prostitution ring, are illegal.  The minimum age of 
consent for a person to engage in prostitution is 16. 
The penalty for sexual relations with a person under 
16 is punishable by up to five years in prison. 
 
45. (SBU) (29E) To prevent prostitution and expose 
procuring, human trafficking, managing brothels, 
kidnapping, facilitation of prostitution or 
 
 
*********************** 
* Missing Section 009 * 
*********************** 
 
 
ASTANA 00000614  010.2 OF 016 
 
 
off the record: 2 (0); Number of people convicted to 
date: 0. 
 
d) Registered crimes under Article 270 (Facilitation 
of prostitution or recruitment of an individual into 
prostitution): Number of crimes on which criminal 
cases were prosecuted: 13 (10) 30% increase; Number of 
crimes registered: 8 (8) no change from 2005; Number 
of criminal cases investigated: 10 (2) 400% increase; 
of these 9 were sent to court, and 1 discontinued due 
to non-exonerative circumstances; Number of cases 
discontinued and taken off the record: 0 (2); 
Suspended: 2 (3); 33% decrease; Number of crimes that 
were discontinued due to expiration of statue of 
limitations: 0 (1); Number of people convicted to 
date: 5. 
 
e) Registered crimes under Article 271 (Prostitution, 
operating brothels, procuring): Number of crimes on 
which criminal cases were prosecuted: 335 (336); 0.3% 
decrease; Number of crimes registered: 292 (305) 4.3% 
decrease; Number of criminal cases investigated: 278 
(272) 2.2% increase; out of them 242 sent to court, 
and 36 discontinued due to non-exonerative 
circumstances; Number of cases discontinued and taken 
off the record: 17 (29); Suspended due to sickness: 2 
(3); Suspended: 21 (18) 16.7% increase; Number of 
crimes that were discontinued due to expiration of 
statue of limitations: 11 (10); Number of people 
convicted to date: 158. 
 
48. (SBU) (29G) Criminal gangs and small criminal 
groups engage in both labor and sexual exploitation 
trafficking.  In sexual exploitation trafficking 
cases, the most commonly reported pattern involved 
small rings of traffickers spread between the source 
location and destination.  Women were lured by 
promises of lucrative employment at restaurant
s, 
retail stores, or nightclubs.  NGOs reported that 
agricultural labor trafficking victims were recruited 
in the source countries by locals who were paid by the 
Kazakhstani farm owner who will employ them.  The 
traffickers were mainly young or middle-aged men and 
women who often run legal businesses.  According to 
IOM, very often employment, travel, tourism agencies, 
or marriage agencies are fronting for traffickers or 
small crime groups to traffic individuals.  Sometimes 
government officials were involved with trafficking 
especially when dealing with fraudulent documents and 
illegal border crossing. 
 
49. (SBU) (29G) Law enforcement units regularly 
conducted inspections to check operations of agencies 
that advertise employment opportunities abroad for 
girls and women and organizations that help 
individuals obtain permanent residence permits in 
other countries.  In 2006, joint law enforcement 
operations inspected 235 tour agents, 20 recruitment 
agencies, 15 agencies offering assistance in 
emigration, ten matrimonial agencies, six modeling 
agencies, and 102 agencies offering assistance in 
completing documents for travel abroad.  The 
inspectors demanded and obtained client lists and 
focused on examining cases of 20-35 year-old women, as 
they are most likely targets for traffickers.  There 
were no reports on where profits from trafficking were 
being channelled. 
 
50. (SBU) (29H) The Government actively investigates 
cases of trafficking, especially in the last two 
years.  However, during the reporting period, the 
government did not actively use all investigative 
techniques in trafficking investigations.  According 
to local legislation, techniques such as electronic 
surveillance can be used.  However, law enforcement 
officials reported that they often do not have enough 
funding to conduct these types of technical 
operations.  Domestic law does not prohibit the police 
from engaging in covert operations but it requires 
that participation in such operations be strictly 
 
ASTANA 00000614  011.2 OF 016 
 
 
controlled by the PGO. 
 
51. (SBU) (29I) The MVD provides regular training to 
police officers on techniques for investigating 
trafficking.  In 2006 over 80 different events were 
arranged to increase legal awareness of officers of the 
MVD, to work with victims of trafficking, to execute 
the required procedural documents, and to study the 
best practices of foreign law enforcement agencies and 
social institutions.  The MVD in cooperation with 
Post's INL office established an anti-TIP Study Center 
within the MVD Legal Academy in Karaganda. 
 
52. (SBU) (29I) In 2006 the anti-TIP Study Center 
provided training to mid-career operations officers, 
investigators, and migration police officers of the 
MVD dealing with human trafficking.  The Center 
together with Post?s INL office is currently 
developing training plans and instruction material to 
support the training process.  In future sessions, the 
Center will train personnel of the operations, 
investigative and administrative police services.  The 
Government has expressed interest in using the Center 
to upgrade the professional qualifications of policemen 
from all Central Asian countries and using foreign 
experts to provide the training. 
 
53. (SBU) (29J) The Government cooperates with other 
governments in the investigation of TIP crimes.  An 
example of such cooperation is the Aktobe case (see 
para. 26).  Kazakhstani law enforcement officers also 
conducted joint operations with counterparts from 
Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Turkmenistan.  They conducted operations on prevention 
of illegal migration in the zones near the border. 
 
54. (SBU) (29J) In 2006 five cases of trafficking in 
the UAE were investigated through the concerted 
efforts of the National Interpol Bureau and the 
Consular Service of the Kazakhstani MFA.  In order to 
advance the Government?s capability to prevent and 
combat illegal migration, 20 international treaties 
and agreements have been signed, both bilateral and 
multilateral.  In 2006 Kazakhstan signed agreements on 
labor migrants and protection of rights of migrants 
with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
 
55. (SBU) (29J) Kazakhstan will shortly sign similar 
agreements with Qatar, Thailand, Poland, Czech 
Republic, and Hungary.  Kazakhstan is reviewing draft 
treaties on rendering legal assistance and 
extradition, which potentially will be signed with 
Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and 
Latvia.  Agreements are under discussion with France, 
Germany, Belgium, Greece, and Romania.  Kazakhstan 
sent a similar draft agreement to the government of 
China for consideration.  CIS member-countries have 
signed a Cooperation Treaty to control illicit 
migration and hazardous migration processes in the 
CIS, as well as to prevent illegal migration.  A Task 
Force has revised and finalised the draft Agreement on 
Key Guidelines for CIS migrants, and it has been sent 
to the CIS Executive Committee for review. 
 
56. SBU) (29K) The Government is forbidden under the 
constitution from extraditing its own citizens to face 
criminal charges abroad.  However, the Government can 
try a citizen for a crime that occurred abroad based 
upon a criminal investigation undertaken by foreign 
authorities. The Government can extradite foreigners 
facing trafficking charges to another country for 
prosecution. 
 
57. (SBU) (29L&M) There is evidence of complicity of 
local officials in trafficking, usually in the form of 
accepting bribes from traffickers.  Although there is 
no evidence of conspiracy within the Border Guards and 
Migration Police to facilitate trafficking, press 
reports of individual officers accepting bribes are 
common.  Corruption is a problem in Kazakhstan, and 
 
ASTANA 00000614  012.2 OF 016 
 
 
public opinion polls show that the Border Guards and 
Customs officials are perceived as the most corrupt 
law enforcement officials.  Based on incidents of 
extortion and bribery, a number of criminal cases were 
initiated against 12 officers working in regional 
offices of the MOJ and Migration Police.  A total of 
20 officers and leaders of the Migration Police were 
disciplined for issuing illegitimate documents and 
failure to properly supervise subordinates. 
 
58. (SBU) (29N) Kazakhstan does not have an identified 
child sex tourism problem, either as a source or 
destination country.  Although the country's child 
sexual abuse laws currently do not have 
extraterritorial coverage, the Government is exploring 
options to strengthen its legal framework before child 
sex tourism becomes a problem. 
 
59. (SBU) (29N) As a measure to prevent
abuse of 
children, the PGO and the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade proposed an amendment to legislation regulating 
procedures for foreigners adopting orphans or children 
left without parental support.  In the amendment, a 
new provision was added to the Matrimonial Act to 
limit the adoption of Kazakhstani children to 
foreigners who are nationals of the countries with 
which Kazakhstan has signed and ratified the 
international treaties providing protection of 
children and cooperation in the area of inter-country 
adoption. 
 
60. (SBU) (29N) The Mazhilis (lower house of 
Parliament) is now discussing a bill drafted by the 
Government to accede to the Hague Convention of 29 May 
1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
respect to Inter-country Adoption.  In addition, the 
Ministries of Education and Science, Foreign Affairs, 
Justice, and Internal Affairs adopted a joint order on 
the Efficient Exchange of Information on Children 
Adopted by Foreigners.  The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs also adopted an order on Approval of 
Instruction on Registering Kazakhstani Children 
Adopted by Foreigners.  In January 2006, MFA amended 
the Registration Rules for Foreigners Willing to Adopt 
Kazakhstani Children.  The amended Rules require that 
potential adoptive parents shall also submit documents 
showing whether they have conviction records and that 
officers of the consular department shall monitor the 
status of adopted Kazakhstani children.  In January 
the Government passed a resolution stipulating that a 
Committee for the Protection of Children's' Rights be 
established under the Ministry of Education and 
Science and that it should include a subdivision to 
deal with adoption issues. 
 
61. (SBU) (29 N) In March, the press published 
allegations of the involvement of the Juno Orphans? 
Relief Fund (Juno) in the trafficking of children. 
Both the PGO and Kazakhstani branches of Juno 
conducted investigations regarding Juno?s compliance 
with legislation related to child adoption.  The 
investigation showed that Juno facilitated the 
adoption of 122 Kazakhstani children by U.S. nationals 
and one child by a Belgian national.  However, no 
evidence was found in either investigation that the 
Juno Fund had been involved in trafficking of 
children.  However, given that the existing 
legislation is vague as to the activities of 
international agencies dealing with adoption of 
children, the PGO forwarded a letter to the Government 
suggesting the legal role of adoption agencies be 
clarified. 
 
62. (SBU) (29O) 
 
a) The Government ratified ILO Convention 182, on the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, on 
February 26, 2003.  To implement this Convention in 
2005 the Government began a three-year Program on 
elimination of the worst forms of child labor. 
 
ASTANA 00000614  013.2 OF 016 
 
 
Implementation continued in 2006.  One of the 
priorities of the program was to study the commercial 
sexual exploitation of children, trafficking of 
minors, and the development of the methods of 
rehabilitation of minors engaged in prostitution and 
other anti-social activities. 
 
b) ILO Convention 29 and 105 on forced or compulsory 
labor was ratified on May 18, 2001. 
 
c) The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) on the sale of children, 
child prostitution, and child pornography was ratified 
on August 24, 2001. 
 
d) The Government has signed but not ratified the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.  The 
Government has stated it plans to sign and to ratify 
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons simultaneously with 
ratification of the underlying convention.  Even 
though the Convention is not ratified, the amended 
Articles 128 and 133 of the Criminal Code fully meet 
the requirements of the Protocol. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS (PARA 30) 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
63. (SBU) (30A&C) Under the new TIP law, recognized 
trafficking victims are granted temporary residence 
status and relief from deportation to ensure their 
safe repatriation or participation in criminal 
proceeding against their traffickers.  However, 
temporary residence is granted only after the criminal 
case is initiated and a person is recognized as a 
victim within this case.  Local law enforcement has a 
mechanism to refer victims to crisis centers and 
shelters based on formal agreements with NGOs, which 
provide a range of legal and psychological assistance 
and arrange for medical care as needed.  Repatriated 
Kazakhstani TIP victims are referred to TIP NGOs for 
assistance and support upon arrival in the country. 
Currently there are about 30 crisis centers for 
victims of domestic violence which are sometimes used 
for victims of trafficking.  There are only two 
shelters specifically designated for trafficking 
victims.  One is in Almaty and one in Shymkent; both 
are managed by NGOs under grants from USAID and other 
foreign donors.  NGOs report that collocation of 
victims of trafficking with victims of domestic 
violence resulted in negative attitude from the 
latter. 
 
64. (SBU) (30B) The Government is discussing the idea 
of establishing a pilot Government-funded shelter for 
TIP victims in Almaty.  The National Commission on 
Family and Gender Policy under the President of 
Kazakhstan, the National Center for Human Rights, the 
Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning, the Ministry 
of Justice, and the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Protection suggested that the shelter be created on 
the basis of the existing crisis centers, which have 
already been fully staffed, have skilled personnel, 
and have acquired certain experience.  The National 
Center for Human Rights also suggested that the 
shelter for victims of trafficking be co-financed from 
the national budget, international organizations, and 
other off-budget sources. 
 
65. (SBU) (30D) According to IOM, the rights of 
victims are generally respected.  However, there were 
cases when victims were detained from a few days to a 
few weeks or months, or they were fined or deported. 
Victims were sometimes prosecuted for violations of 
immigration law.  IOM has no reports of TIP victims 
being jailed in Kazakhstan.  Law enforcement awareness 
of sexual exploitation trafficking has increased over 
the past several years, and NGOs report a general 
recognition of the victims' status by local law 
 
ASTANA 00000614  014.2 OF 016 
 
 
enforcement.  Labor trafficking victims, on the other 
hand, are less likely to be identified as such.  While 
there is recognition at the highest levels of the GOK 
that labor trafficking is an increasingly serious 
problem, awareness at the local working level of the 
factors distinguishing illegal labor mi
gration and 
labor trafficking lags behind. 
 
66. (SBU) (30E) The Government encourages victims to 
assist in the investigation and prosecution of 
trafficking.  Victims may file civil suits or seek 
legal action against traffickers.  TIP NGOs report 
that victims are often unwilling to cooperate with 
investigations, either for fear of reprisal by family 
members of the traffickers or from a not unrealistic 
hope that the trafficker will bribe the victim not to 
testify.  NGOs report cases where law enforcement and 
procurators are suspected of taking bribes from 
traffickers.  There are few legal tools that 
authorities can use to encourage victim cooperation. 
However, although it is not technically legal to do 
so, officials routinely promise victims immunity from 
immigration or criminal charges if the victim 
testifies against the trafficker.  There is no victim 
restitution program. 
 
67. (SBU) (30F) Under the Law on the State Protection 
of Persons Involved in Criminal Proceedings adopted 
in 2000, the government may offer a wide range of 
protection for crime victims and prosecution 
witnesses, including providing pre-trial safe houses 
and security services.  Victim protection is to be 
provided by the MVD.  Authorities may help a victim 
or a witness change residences, find another job, and 
change his or her physical appearance.  In practice, 
local law enforcement lack sufficient financial and 
manpower resources to provide all of these services 
on a regular basis.  Child victims are places in 
juvenile justice detection centre for the 
investigation and trial period. 
 
68. (SBU) (30G) As mentioned in paras 30 and 51, in 
addition to in-house training provided by the MVD to 
its officers, INL conducted two training sessions for 
personnel from the Procuracy, Border Guards and 
judiciary.  The program, conducted by IOM through a 
grant from INL, highlighted counter trafficking and 
protection of victims.  Under another grant from INL, 
IOM conducted a liaison meeting of mid-level 
government officials from Kazakhstan and South Korea 
aimed at developing an open and free dialogue between 
source and destination countries, and to facilitate 
the return of trafficked victims.  In addition, in 
October 2006 IOM and INL jointly conducted a round 
table discussion for mid-level government officials 
and NGO representatives from throughout Kazakhstan to 
discuss implementation of the new anti-TIP law adopted 
in March. 
 
69. (SBU) (30H) In 2006 the MFA, as the implementer of 
the national program on "Financial Support to 
Kazakhstani Citizens Trafficked into Foreign Countries 
as Objects of Trade", received an appropriation of 
12,920,000 tenge (about $104,000) to provide financial 
support to Kazakhstanis trafficked to other countries, 
as well as to other crime victims and people in force 
majeure situations.  When implementing this program, 
Kazakhstani institutions abroad rendered assistance 
costing 3,229,000 tenge (about $26,000) to 60 
Kazakhstani citizens. 
 
70. (SBU) (30I) The lead international organization 
for trafficking issues in Kazakhstan is the 
International Organization for Migration, based in 
Almaty.  In addition to serving as an implementing 
partner for USAID and INL, IOM works closely with the 
GOK and other international organizations interested 
in combating trafficking in persons.  In addition, 
over the last year, the OSCE Center in Almaty has 
increased its anti-TIP programs and engagement with 
 
ASTANA 00000614  015.2 OF 016 
 
 
the GOK and with Post.  The Union of Crisis Centers 
(UCC), a coalition of TIP NGO crisis centers and 
shelters across Kazakhstan, is one of the strongest 
local NGO networks in the country.  In addition to 
providing victim assistance and protection services 
through the referral system mentioned above, UCC- 
member NGOs operate hotlines and conduct public 
information campaigns.  The leaders of two UCC-member 
NGOs participated in interagency working group 
meetings, providing frank feedback and suggestions 
about GOK counter-TIP efforts, many of which were 
included in the new TIP Law. 
 
-------------- 
BEST PRACTICES 
-------------- 
 
71. (SBU) Post would like to highlight the MVD's 
establishment of a regional anti-TIP law enforcement 
training center.  Incorporating in-service training of 
mid-level officers into the MVD's flagship academic 
center is a significant step to improving the 
professional knowledge of police, changing attitudes 
of the police regarding trafficking as a crime, and 
improving the combating of trafficking in persons in 
the MVD.  The Government's intention of taking the 
extra step to look at the Center as a possible 
regional training center shows vision that could 
result in regional cooperation to combat trafficking. 
 
72. (SBU) Post officers and staff spent more than 150 
hours compiling information and drafting this report. 
Pol-Econ, INL, USAID, and PAS offices contributed to 
this report.  All of these offices cooperate in Post's 
efforts to combat TIP and collect information on TIP 
throughout the year.  Post's point of contact on 
trafficking is Astana Political Officer Jeffrey Scott 
Waldo.  He may be reached by phone at +7-3172-70-22- 
96, or by fax at +7-3172-70-22-87. After hours, he may 
be reached by mobile phone at +7-777-232-9941. 
 
---------------------- 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
---------------------- 
 
73. In December 2006, USAID conducted a public opinion 
survey in 19 major cities in Kazakhstan to measure 
public awareness of TIP.  The survey sample represents 
Kazakhstani citizens residing in cities with more than 
one hundred thousand people.  The total survey sample 
represented 1200 respondents.  37.3% of them said they 
are aware of TIP cases in Kazakhstan involving 
Kazakhstanis; 30.2% are aware of TIP cases involving 
Kazakhstanis that happened abroad; 13.2% are aware of 
TIP cases involving foreign citizens in Kazakhstan; 
26.4% were not aware of TIP problem; and 7.7% could 
not answer. 
 
74. 36.3% of respondents thought that law enforcement 
agencies provided assistance to victims of trafficking 
in Kazakhstan; 23.3% thought assistance was provided 
by international organizations; 21% by special 
government institutions; 8.4% by civil society 
organizations; and 34.5% could not answer. 
 
75. Out of 791 respondents, 97.2% knew that some job 
opportunities abroad could result in either forced 
labor or prostitution; 1.9% were not aware of this 
threat and 0.8% could not answer. Out of 769 
respondents who are aware of fake jobs, 90.3% learned 
about this problem from TV channels; 53% from 
newspapers and magazines; 30.8% heard this information 
from acquaintances; 15.2% from the radio; and 4.1%
 
from the internet. 
 
76. Post's Public Affairs Section administered 
Democracy Commission provided the following grants: 
 
a) to the Women?s Support Center from Petropavlovsk, 
which conducted an information campaign in North 
 
ASTANA 00000614  016.2 OF 016 
 
 
Kazakhstan on the counter trafficking amendments to 
the Criminal Code and other legislation.  The NGO 
conducted two seminars for 37 local social workers and 
teachers, four training sessions for 48 policemen, 50 
Procurators, and 29 judges to enable them to put the 
new amendments into practice. 
 
b) to the Bolashak NGO from Taraz, which conducted an 
anti-TIP information campaign including distribution 
of booklets with hotline info and meetings with target 
audience such as 500 youth and unemployed.  The NGO 
also conducted 30 seminars in 10 rayons of Zhambyl 
oblast for 300 secondary school teachers, local 
government officials, journalists and 200 law- 
enforcement officials. 
 
c) to the Union of Crisis Centers of Kazakhstan to 
create regular exchange of information on domestic 
violence and trafficking in persons through 
establishment of two electronic periodicals: the 
Electronic Bulletin (36 issues per year, 6 pages) on 
problems of domestic violence and the Electronic 
Bulletin (12 issues per year, six pages) on human 
trafficking.  Bulletins are distributed to local 
government officials and police officers, members of 
Maslikhats (City Councils), officials representing the 
National Committee on Women and Family Affairs, local 
and international non-governmental organizations, and 
international organizations. 
 
d) to the Phoenix Center for Development and 
Adaptation from Ust-Kamenogorsk to provide education 
and services to 200 orphans in East Kazakhstan through 
12 educational seminars on the dangers of trafficking 
in persons, violence, and conflict prevention; the 
creation of a trainer group of orphans, which will 
consist of 20 of the most active students; operation 
of a hotline telephone service as well as legal and 
psychological consultations for orphans; provision of 
basic computer and Internet awareness training; and 
production of brochures and pamphlets for general 
distribution. 
 
e) to a Public Affairs Speaker program entitled 
"Specifics of Media Coverage of the Trafficking in 
Persons."  A U.S. speaker discussed with local 
journalists and NGO members in Aktobe and Ust- 
Kamenogorsk how the media covers trafficking. 
 
ORDWAY 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA613, KAZAKHSTAN SUBMISSIONS FOR 2007 TIP REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA613 2007-03-07 12:05 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8340
OO RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0613/01 0661205
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071205Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8700
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0060
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 16 ASTANA 000613 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR G/TIP (MHALL), G, SCA/CEN (O'MARA), 
SCA/RA (LEE), INL/AAE (ALTON), DRL, PRM, AND IWI 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCRM PHUM KWMN SMIG KFRD ASEC PREF ELAB
PREL, KZ 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN SUBMISSIONS FOR 2007 TIP REPORT 
 
REF: 06 STATE 202745 
 
ASTANA 00000613  001.2 OF 016 
 
 
1. SUMMARY: Post is pleased to submit the following 
information in response to reftel request. 
 
------------------- 
OVERVIEW (PARA. 27) 
------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) (27A) Kazakhstan is a destination, transit, 
and source country for people trafficked for the 
purposes of forced labor and sexual exploitation. 
Kazakhstan serves as destination country for young and 
middle-age men trafficked for labor purposes from 
neighbouring countries, primarily Uzbekistan, but also 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and sometimes from other 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. 
 
3. (SBU) (27A) Kazakhstan is a destination country for 
young women trafficked for sexual exploitation from 
neighbouring countries, mainly Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan.  According to data provided by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), in 
2006, 34 female and 26 male victims from Uzbekistan, 
and one male from Ukraine via Russia were trafficked 
to Kazakhstan.  In some cases, the victims suffered 
from both sexual and labor exploitation.  There were 
also cases when sexually exploited victims or (more 
rarely) forced laborers were involved in other 
criminal activities organized by their traffickers 
(pick pocketing, drug dealing, etc.) 
 
4. (SBU) (27A) Kazakhstan serves as transit country 
for victims recruited in neighbouring countries, 
mainly Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and 
transported through Kazakhstan to Russia for either 
sexual or labor exploitation or to the Middle East for 
sexual exploitation.  Transit includes from Uzbekistan 
by land to South Kazakhstan, from South Kazakhstan by 
air to United Arab Emirates; from Tajikistan by land 
to Kazakhstan, from Kazakhstan to Russia. 
 
5. (SBU) (27A) Kazakhstan also serves as a country of 
origin for male and female victims trafficked to 
Russia for labor and sexual exploitation and young 
women recruited in Kazakhstan and trafficked to 
Turkey, UAE, Greece, and Israel for sexual 
exploitation.  According to IOM, in 2006 one female 
from Kazakhstan was trafficked to Turkey, three 
females to Thailand, and seven to the UAE (four of 
them transiting via Kyrgyzstan, and one of them via 
Azerbaijan).  One female was trafficked from 
Kazakhstan to Germany, two females and one male victim 
to Russia, and one female to Uzbekistan. 
 
6. (SBU) (27A) IOM registered 24 female victims and 
one male victim of in-country trafficking in 2006. 
Over the reporting period IOM provided assistance to 
104 people who requested assistance because of 
trafficking concerns (75 female and 29 male).  IOM 
registered and monitored each trafficking case 
reported to IOM by the victims, their families, 
police, or through hotlines within and outside of 
Kazakhstan. 
 
7. (SBU) (27A) Compared to previous years, 
international experts reported a slight decrease in 
the number of cases of citizens being trafficked 
abroad for sexual or labor exploitation and an 
increase in labor trafficking into and within the 
country.  Experts believed the economic growth of the 
country, especially in relation to its neighbours, 
contributed directly to both trends.  Similarly, the 
relative economic prosperity in the capital Astana, 
the largest city Almaty, and the western oil field 
cities of Aktau and Atyrau, has drawn job-seeking 
Kazakhstanis from rural villages, some of whom become 
victims of labor trafficking within the construction 
industry.  Open borders between Kazakhstan and other 
CIS countries, growth of migration flows between 
 
ASTANA 00000613  002.2 OF 016 
 
 
neighbouring countries and within Kazakhstan, and 
globalization of organized crime create bigger 
opportunities for criminals to establish reliable 
routes for smuggling human beings. 
 
8. (SBU) (27A) Socioeconomic conditions, rather than 
ethnic patterns, are the most common indicator for 
trafficking risk groups within Kazakhstan.  The 
analysis shows that women in the age group from 16 to 
25 are most vulnerable to being trafficked for sexual 
exploitation; men in the age group from 20 to 35 and 
teenage boys aged 14-19, mainly from Central Asian 
countries, comprise the majority of victims of 
trafficking for labor exploitation.  Labor trafficking 
is primarily focused on providing workers for the 
construction business and agriculture.  Adolescents &#x
000A;raised in orphanages, or in the families of alcoholics 
and drug abusers, regardless of gender, were 
particularly vulnerable to being trafficked due to a 
lack of a solid support network.  Illegal migrant 
laborers were also at high risk of becoming victims of 
trafficking. 
 
9. (SBU)(27 A&B) Small trafficking rings, often 
involving employment and travel agencies, facilitated 
trafficking of individuals out of Kazakhstan.  There 
were multiple cases involving small trafficking rings 
consisting of recruiters located in Kazakhstan, some 
of whom were former victims of sex trafficking, linked 
to brothel operators located in the destination 
country.  In several of these cases, the traffickers 
had family ties and exploited those outside the family 
group.  Domestic NGOs reported some instances in which 
sexual exploitation and domestic labor traffickers 
victimized their own family members, usually teenaged 
girls.  In the majority of cases, the victims were 
offered lucrative jobs through close relatives or 
friends and in some rare cases were sold by their 
mothers who were usually alcoholics.  Traffickers 
often escorted the victim or the group of victims and 
assisted them in crossing the border.  After crossing 
the border, traffickers pass the recruited individual 
or group to an intermediary who escorted the victims 
to the exploiters. 
 
10. (SBU) (27 A&B) False documents were often used to 
move the victims, from Kazakhstan to the UAE or 
Israel.  On routes from Kazakhstan to Turkey or 
Russia, victims were trafficked under valid documents. 
However, after crossing the border or upon arrival at 
the destination, the exploiters took the victims? 
identity and travel documents.  Labor traffickers 
commonly held victims' identity documents and strictly 
controlled their movements, provided substandard 
communal housing and meals, and isolated the victims 
to prevent discovery.  To move victims to Kazakhstan, 
traffickers often used the porousness of the borders 
especially those between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
In some cases, victims did not have any documents at 
all when they crossed the border under the 
traffickers? escort. Agricultural and construction 
laborers often began working under the false belief 
that the trafficker was a legitimate employer.  IOM 
and NGOs reported that it was common practice for 
exploitative employers to withhold payment of wages 
until the end of a project, paying less than what had 
been agreed, if at all. 
 
11. (SBU)(27B&C) Over the past several years, the 
government has shown the political will to address 
trafficking in persons from all angles - as a law 
enforcement challenge, as a(1MPnt due to 
security reasons, as well as the transnational nature 
of the crime and the attendant complex and time- 
consuming investigation make it difficult to address 
this problem. 
 
ASTANA 00000613  003.2 OF 016 
 
 
 
12. (SBU) (27B&C) President Nazarbayev signed a new 
law amending existing TIP legislation on March 2, 
2006.  It addressed the most serious limitations to 
the government's ability to address trafficking.  The 
legislation covers serious legislative gaps that 
impeded the pace of Kazakhstan's progress, most 
significantly in terms of law enforcement and 
prosecution efforts.  Overall, corruption remains a 
problem; it affects anti-TIP efforts as well as other 
law enforcement efforts.  Law enforcement authorities 
uncovered 33 percent more corruption related crimes in 
2006 than in 2005. 
 
13. (SBU) (27B&C) Although most of the anti-TIP 
training provided by international experts was funded 
by other sources, the Government of Kazakhstan (the 
Government) demonstrated a consistent commitment to 
devoting law enforcement, Procuratorial, labor, 
education, information, and social welfare personnel 
and other resources to address the problem of 
trafficking in persons. 
 
14. (SBU) (27D) In 2006, the Government developed a 
procedure to collect and track data on crimes, 
including those related to human trafficking, that 
allows users to systematically monitor its anti- 
trafficking efforts.  The Procurator General?s Office 
(PGO) maintains an integrated card catalogue of 
adjudications and the Integrated Unified Statistical 
System (IUSS) in which statistical data is stored. 
 
15. (SBU) (27D) In order to further improve 
information support to law enforcement and other 
public authorities, the Statistics Committee of the 
PGO created a new computer based Information Service 
system, which allows all concerned public agencies to 
have on-line access to the Committee?s crime databases 
beginning in the first quarter of 2007.  In addition, 
the Government is discussing the possibility of 
establishing a separate information data section, 
where the information on human trafficking would be 
extractable from the Committee?s database.  Remote 
access to the data would be provided to those 
supervising the investigative compliance, detective 
force compliance, and criminal trial compliance 
departments, as well as to the internal affairs and 
national security agencies. 
 
--------------------- 
PREVENTION (PARA. 28) 
--------------------- 
 
16. (SBU) (28A&B) The Government acknowledges that 
trafficking is a problem in Kazakhstan, and is taking 
steps to address it.  The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) is 
the lead agency in coordinating anti-TIP efforts in 
the government.  An interagency TIP Working Group (the 
"Working Group") led by the Minister of Justice (MOJ), 
includes representatives of the Ministries of Internal 
Affairs (MVD); Foreign Affairs (MFA); Labor and Social 
Welfare(MOL); Education and Science(MOES); and Culture 
and Information (MCI). Also represented are the 
Committee for National Security (KNB), which 
supervises the Border Guards; the office of the 
Procurator General (PGO); and the National Commission 
on Family and Gender Policy.  All of these ministries 
and agencies have responsibilities for combating 
trafficking. 
 
17. (SBU) (28C) Previous trafficking prevention 
campaigns have resulted in increased overall awareness 
of the issue, especially in the media (see para. 73). 
In 2006, as a result of the active engagement of the 
Government, NGOs, IOs and diplomatic missions with 
the editorial boards of newspapers, information 
agencies and national TV and radio companies, 
electronic mass media published 800 stories and videos 
concerning TIP; over 1,000 articles were published in 
the national newspapers; regional newspapers published 
 
ASTANA 00000613  004.2 OF 016 
 
 
approximately 900 articles.  Newspaper articles 
totalled about 677 printed pages. 
 
18. (SBU) (28C) In addition, the MOES prepared the &#x
000A;second and third volumes of a periodical summary 
report on implementing the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child in Kazakhstan, which discusses further 
strengthening of the fight against illicit trafficking 
in minors.  This report has been posted on the MOES 
web-site and published in the national journal 
Zhastar. 
 
19. (SBU) (28C) Furthermore, Procurators from the 
capital city, Astana, provided a thorough analysis of 
relevant TIP laws and potential punishments for 
committing the crime of trafficking in a weekly 
television news program called Hard Talk.  Almaty 
Procurators also explained on TV the liabilities and 
potential punishment for illicit human trafficking. 
 
20. (SBU) (28C) Law enforcement officials also met 
with community groups to discuss TIP.  For example, 
authorities conducted a series of presentations at 
selected educational institutions and universities to 
discuss the protection of victims' constitutional 
rights in the context of trafficking in people, 
preventive measures aimed at curbing trafficking, and 
criminal code provisions related to liability for 
trafficking. 
 
21. (SBU) (28C) IOM's multiyear educational campaign, 
financed through a grant from USAID, is linked to a 
network of hotlines staffed by TIP NGOs that provide 
information for those contemplating working abroad and 
assistance for trafficking victims and their families. 
Through a project "Combating Trafficking in Persons in 
Central Asia" funded by USAID, partner NGOs operating 
the hotlines were trained by IOM.  During the period 
from January 1 through December 31 the 12 hotlines 
throughout Kazakhstan received 9,059 calls.  131 
people with concerns about trafficking were assisted. 
 
22. (SBU) (28C) Within Post?s INL funded anti-TIP 
program, IOM developed and distributed almost 4,500 
pieces of informational materials (TIP guidelines, 
posters, notepads, and plastic cards) and 
paraphernalia (t-shirts, coffee/tea mugs) containing 
counter-trafficking information.  INL and IOM 
disseminated this material among the divisions of law 
enforcement agencies in the cities and oblasts of 
Kazakhstan, to participants of all anti-TIP training 
sessions conducted by IOM, including those conducted 
in the MVD Legal Institute in Karaganda where future 
MVD lawyer-officers are trained. 
 
23. (SBU) (28D) The government recognizes that its 
relative economic prosperity, especially in relation 
to its neighbours, contributes to increased in- 
trafficking.  During the first ten months of 2006, 
1,665,848 foreigners visited Kazakhstan.  Migration 
authorities found 80,141 individuals had committed 
administrative violations, which could include failing 
to register visas, while 63,689 individuals were found 
in violation of various other migration rules.  10,952 
individuals were deported from the country.  In order 
to control labor migration and protect the domestic 
labor market, the Government established annual quotas 
for foreign labor, which are designed to limit and 
properly distribute foreign labor based on the market 
situation and the economic demand for skilled labor. 
According to local MOL officials, about 33,200 foreign 
specialists were working in Kazakhstan within the 
labor quota as of January 1, 2007. 
 
24. (SBU) (28D) In 2006 as a result of a now expired 
one-time law on the amnesty of illegal migrants, 
144,227 labor migrants were legalized.  The migrants 
came from Uzbekistan (71.5%), Kyrgyzstan (14%), Russia 
(6.7%), Tajikistan (2.9%), and other countries (4.7%). 
The bulk of the legalized labor immigrants work in the 
 
ASTANA 00000613  005.2 OF 016 
 
 
civil construction sector (99,858 persons); 19,632 in 
the services sector; 13,082 in the agricultural 
sector; 4,668 in other sectors of the economy; and 
6,110 in the informal market sector (domestic 
service).  Over one third of those legalized were 30 
to 45 years old. 
. 
25. (SBU) (28E) The Government of Kazakhstan 
cooperated with IOM, the OSCE, domestic NGOs and 
foreign embassies in anti-TIP efforts.  The following 
examples demonstrate the cooperation. 
26. (SBU) (28E) 17 Uzbek victims of trafficking were 
rescued in August because of joint efforts of IOM, a 
local NGO, and the Anti-Organized Crime Unit of the 
West Kazakhstan Transportation Police Department in 
Aktobe.  (Note: Uzbekistani police and NGOs also 
cooperated in prosecution of this case.  End note.) 
The criminal case was initiated by the police in 
August 2006 and the court hearings began in late 
December.  Interested individuals, including some 
observing the court hearings, wore T-shirts with the 
logo "Stop Trafficking in People" which were produced 
by IOM through an INL grant to increase public 
awareness of the crime of trafficking.  The case was 
widely publicized and the t-shirt wearing participants 
were even shown on national television.  IOM and its 
partner NGO in Aktobe have been providing medical, 
psychological and legal assistance to the victims. 
27. (SBU) (28E) In mid-December the same West 
Kazakhstan Transportation Police department referred 
three women rescued from a clandestine brothel to an 
IOM NGO partner in Aktau.  IOM reported to EmbOffs 
that they always receive strong support and 
cooperation in trafficking cases from the police 
department in Aktobe. 
28. (SBU) (28E) In November the South Kazakhstan 
Oblast Police Department referred four victims who had 
been trafficked from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan to IOM?s 
NGO partner in Shymkent. 
29. (SBU) (28E) Two Uzbek victims of labor 
exploitation were rescued by the police in Astana in 
May.  The case was detected by an NGO partner in 
Nukus, Uzbekistan and referred to an NGO in Astana. 
As a result of the close cooperation, the victims were 
rescued by the police and the NGO, and temporary 
accommodation was arranged by IOM for the period of 
investigation. 
30. (SBU) (28E) In addition, the Government actively 
participated in all counter-trafficking events 
organized by foreign embassies, international 
organizations and domestic NGOs.  During the reporting 
period, 90 police and migration police officers and 
judges received training under an IOM program funded 
by Post?s INL program.  The Kazakhstani Government 
supported public training sessions provided by 
domestic NGOs to schools, colleges, youth clubs, penal 
colonies, summer camps, polyclinics, etc.  Between 
April 1 and December 31, an IOM program funded by 
USAID trained 8,294 people. 
31. (SBU) (28F) Border monitoring has not been widely 
utilized in anti-trafficking efforts to date, in part 
due to the challenges the country faces in securing 
land borders of more than 12,000 km, in additio
n to 
almost 1900 km of Caspian Sea coastline.  Population 
density along Kazakhstan's borders is relatively low, 
making it difficult to detect illicit migration 
without advanced technology or a large border force. 
 
32. (SBU) (28F) Through its training center, the 
Border Guard Service offers training for passport 
control officers assigned to the 150 official points 
of entry.  The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
Migration Police acknowledge that capacity for TIP 
border screening is limited, with resources 
prioritized for detection of WMD materials, 
terrorists, narcotics and dangerous contraband. 
Notwithstanding resource and other challenges, the 
Government required that the Border Guards and the 
Migration Police, which are separate law enforcement 
entities under the KNB and MVD respectively, develop a 
 
ASTANA 00000613  006.2 OF 016 
 
 
plan to collect and analyze data related to 
trafficking as well as forms of irregular migration. 
 
33. (SBU) (28F) In 2006 the KNB and MVD continued 
installation of a unified information system called 
Berkut which will allow them to control those entering 
and exiting the country, and over resident foreigners. 
To identify illegal migration routes, Border Guard and 
Customs authorities developed a joint program named 
"Migrant" at border-crossings and railway stations to 
screen international passenger trains and check 
foreigners detained for illegal entry into Kazakhstan. 
"Migrant" has now become a regular detection and 
prevention operation focusing at supervising compliance 
with the Guidelines for Foreigners Residing in 
Kazakhstan, and detection and prosecution of illegal 
migration. 
 
34. (SBU) (28F) A joint operation was conducted from 
May 20 through June 5, 2006, by member-countries of 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
aimed at detecting and closing illegal migration 
routes and at curbing transnational organized crime 
along the most active migration routes for foreigners 
travelling from third countries to the CSTO member- 
countries.  Per the 2006 Action Plan of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, an ad-hoc headquarters was 
established to counteract illegal migration in the 
village of Kordai, Zhambyl Region, from June 5 through 
September 18, 2006. 
 
35. (SBU) (28F) Additionally, during patrol 
inspections conducted in residential areas of the city 
of Ust Kamenogorsk, about 70 Uzbek citizens were found 
working illegally.  Just one patrol inspection carried 
out in the South Kazakhstan Region found over 500 
Uzbek citizens working illegally.  These facts are not 
isolated incidents; illegal workers are found in all 
parts of the country.  In 2006, the Government 
detected 842 employers having a total of 2148 illegal 
labor migrants. 
 
36. (SBU) (28F) TIP detection operations conducted in 
2006 resulted in the discovery and closure of four 
international illegal migration routes; opening and 
prosecution of three criminal cases under Article 330- 
2 of the Criminal Code (Organizing Illegal Migration); 
and detention of 620 illegal migrants.  Of these, the 
authorities brought charges under the Administrative 
Code against 548 individuals; 513 were deported and 24 
foreigners were denied entry to the country.  In 
addition, the Committee for National Security 
conducted 18 pre-emptive operations in 2006 to 
forestall illegal border transit by residents of 
border regions and disrupt the organization of illegal 
migration routes. 
 
37. (SBU) (28G) Agencies and ministries coordinate 
anti-trafficking efforts through the Working Group 
(see para.16), in addition to well-established 
protocols for general interagency cooperation.  The 
MVD and PGO work together on a regular basis to 
investigate trafficking cases, and the MCIS and the 
MOJ cooperate to produce trafficking education 
publications.  The Minister of Justice, Zagipa 
Baliyeva, serves as the Trafficking Coordinator within 
the GOK, and she delegates day-to-day monitoring of 
TIP efforts to Elvira Azimova, Head of the 
International Law Department within the MOJ.  The 
Government also has an anti-corruption task force in 
place. 
 
38. (SBU) (28H) In April the Government approved a 
National Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in 
Persons ("National Plan") for 2006-2008 that was 
drafted by the MOJ with input from members of the 
Working Group and other stakeholders and interested 
parties, including the USG.  The National Plan 
includes revision of laws and regulations, 
introduction of TIP training courses into training 
 
ASTANA 00000613  007.2 OF 016 
 
 
curricula, development of mechanisms for social 
rehabilitation of trafficking victims, creation of 
crisis centers etc.  The National Plan provides 
financial assistance to Kazakhstani citizens who were 
illegally trafficked to foreign countries and who 
became victims of trafficking, as well as those who 
became victims of other crimes and who appeared to be 
in force majeure circumstances abroad.  The plan was 
disseminated through oblast administrations. Post 
notes that the GOK is working to fulfill most Plan 
elements. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TRAFFICKERS (PARA 29) 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
39. (SBU) (29A) A new law, "Changes and Amendments to 
Legislation on Human Trafficking" was enacted March 2, 
2006.  Changes were made to the Criminal Code, 
Criminal Procedural Code, Administrative Code, and the 
Decree of the President having the force of law on 
foreign citizens.  The new changes brought national 
legislation into accordance with the provisions of 
Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the UN Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime.  The new law covers 
both internal and transnational forms of trafficking. 
 
40. (SBU) (29A) The most significant change to 
existing legislation was the strengthening of victim 
protection and clarification and strengthening of 
penalties for trafficking crimes.  The Parliament and 
Government amended the criminal code to expand the 
actions that constituted trafficking to include not 
only recruitment of victims, but also sale, purchase, 
transportation, and transfer of victims.  Any act 
facilitating trafficking by hiding or lodging 
trafficked persons, or undertaking any other 
commercial transaction that contributed to 
exploitation, was also prohibited. 
 
41. (SBU) (29A) As a result, where a conviction under 
old Article 128 of Criminal Code "Recruitment of or 
facilitating movement of individuals out of or through 
the country for
 the purpose of exploitation" was 
punishable by a fine and up to eight years in prison, 
a conviction under new Article 128 of Criminal Code 
"Human Trafficking" is punishable by a fine and up to 
15 years in prison and possible confiscation of 
assets. 
 
42. (SBU) (29A, B & C) In addition to Article 128 
noted above, the government investigates and 
prosecutes traffickers under other articles of the 
criminal code.  Specifically, charges are brought 
under: 
 
a) Article 113 (forced removal of human organs and 
tissues), punishable by five - ten years of 
imprisonment with possible employment/activity 
restrictions for up to an additional three years; 
 
b) Article 125 (Kidnapping), punishable by ten - 15 
years in prison; 
 
c) Article 126 (Illegal deprivation of freedom, other 
than kidnapping), punishable by five - ten years in 
prison; 
 
d) Article 133 (Trafficking in minors), punishable by 
5-15 years in prison (Note: Previously trafficking in 
minors was punishable by two to 15 years in prison. 
End note.); 
 
e) Article 270 (Facilitation of prostitution or 
recruitment of an individual into prostitution), 
punishable by a fine and by three - seven years in 
prison; 
 
 
ASTANA 00000613  008.2 OF 016 
 
 
f) Article 271 (Establishment or managing brothels or 
acting as a pimp), punishable by a fine and up to five 
years in prison; 
 
g) Article 330 (Intentional illegal migration into the 
country, (other than as a trafficking victim), 
punishable by a fine and up to five years in prison; 
and 
 
h) Article 330-3 (Repeated violations of regulations 
for importation and employment of foreign labor), 
punishable by a fine and up to one year in prison. 
 
i) A new Article 275-1 was inserted into the Criminal 
Code (Illegal removal of human organs and tissues from 
a human corpse), and violations are punishable by five 
to seven years in prison and the possibility of up to 
three years of employment/activity restriction. 
 
j) An amendment to Article 399 of the Administrative 
Code prohibits the use of deceptive advertising to 
recruit citizens of Kazakhstan to work abroad. 
 
k) Amended Article 56 of the same law provides for 
immediate suspension of deportation proceedings where 
a potential deportee alleges that he or she has been 
the victim of a serious crime, including trafficking 
crimes.  Deportation proceedings will not proceed 
until criminal investigations and prosecutions are 
completed.  However, in order for an illegal immigrant 
to be considered a victim of a serious crime, law 
enforcement authorities must initiate a case against 
the purported assailant on the basis of an alleged 
crime.  Often in practice, authorities do not initiate 
a criminal case due to lack of evidence, corruption, 
or other reasons.  Therefore, frequently the immigrant 
cannot be considered a victim and becomes liable for 
prosecution or deportation. 
 
l) However, under the amended Article 396 of the 
Administrative Code, trafficking victims are exempted 
from definitions of illegal immigrants. 
 
m) Accordingly, the presidential decree on the legal 
status of foreign citizens was amended to classify 
foreign victims of trafficking as protected under the 
law and to accord them special temporary residence 
rights. 
Post?s analysis finds that all these articles taken 
together are adequate to cover the full scope of 
trafficking in persons. 
 
43. (SBU) (29D) A rape conviction carries a sentence 
of three to 15 years in prison, depending on the age 
of the victim and the combination of charges filed. 
Under Criminal Code Article 120, a conviction for rape 
is punishable by three - five years in prison.  A 
conviction for sexual violence under criminal code 
Article 121 is also punishable by three - five years 
in prison.  Per Criminal Code Article 122, the penalty 
for sexual relations with a person under 16 is up to 
five years in prison.  A separate conviction for 
battery, including sexual battery, can lead to up to 
an additional eight years in jail and a fine.  By 
comparison, the prison term for violations of Articles 
270 and 271 (see above) regarding prostitution and 
brothels are three ? seven years. 
 
44. (SBU) (29E) Prostitution is not prohibited by law, 
although forced prostitution, prostitution connected 
to organized crime, and acts facilitating 
prostitution, such as operating a brothel or 
prostitution ring, are illegal.  The minimum age of 
consent for a person to engage in prostitution is 16. 
The penalty for sexual relations with a person under 
16 is punishable by up to five years in prison. 
 
45. (SBU) (29E) To prevent prostitution and expose 
procuring, human trafficking, managing brothels, 
kidnapping, facilitation of prostitution or 
 
ASTANA 00000613  009.2 OF 016 
 
 
recruitment into prostitution, and the illegal seizure 
of people for the purpose of sexual exploitation, 
during the reporting period the police conducted 
series of operations called Souteneur (Pimp).  During 
the course of this operation police checked casinos, 
night clubs, saunas, hotels, sanatoriums, etc. for 
violations of the relevant articles of the criminal 
code.  As a result of this operation the officers 
uncovered nine incidents of recruitment into 
prostitution, registered 60 incidents of procuring and 
brothel ownership, initiated 27 criminal cases, and 
registered 65 pimps and 982 prostitutes.  Five non- 
Kazakhstani prostitutes were deported from Kazakhstan. 
In total for the eight months of the operation, 194 
criminal cases were initiated for brothel ownership 
and procuring and four for forcing individuals into 
prostitution. 
 
46. (SBU) (29E) In 2006 the Border Guards identified 
11 suspicious persons among the passengers in Almaty 
and Astana airports (four persons from Uzbekistan, 
three from Kyrgyzstan, two from Kazakhstan, one from 
Russia, one from Turkmenistan).  Though no clear 
association with trafficking was discovered, the 
Border Guards discovered that the persons were 
travelling to the UAE for the purposes of 
prostitution.  While passing through passport control 
some of the travellers used false identity documents. 
The detainees were transferred to the MVD departments 
of the cities of Almaty and Astana for continued 
investigation.  Information on the respective cases 
was shared with Russian and Kyrgyzstani national 
security services. 
 
47. (SBU) (29F) During the reporting period, the 
government prosecuted traffickers under a variety of 
charges.  Although prosecutions for trafficking were 
still rare, the number of prosecuted trafficking cases 
increased after adoption of the amendments to the law. 
Statistics provided by the Government shows that 16 
human trafficking cases were initiated in Kazakhstan 
in 2006, a 77% increase over 2005.  Other TIP rela
ted 
crimes were prosecuted under other articles of the 
Criminal Code as shown in 2006 statistics below 
(January-December). (Note: The number in brackets 
shows 2005 statistics for comparison. End note.) 
 
a) Registered crimes under Article 125 (Kidnapping). 
Total number of crimes on which criminal cases were 
prosecuted: 104 (111),6.3% decrease; Number of crimes 
registered: 84 (92) 8.7% decrease; Number of criminal 
cases investigated: 44 (55) 20% decrease; of these 43 
were sent to court, and one discontinued due to non- 
exonerative circumstances; Number of cases 
discontinued and taken off the record: 9 (16); 
Suspended: 28 (34) 17.6% decrease; Number of crimes 
that were discontinued due to expiration of statue of 
limitations: 5 (3); Percentage of cleared cases 
(disclosed): 57.1% (59.8%); Number of people convicted 
to date: 25. 
 
b) Registered crimes under Article 128 (Human 
trafficking): Number of crimes on which criminal cases 
were prosecuted: 20 (12) 66.7% increase; Number of 
crimes registered: 16 (9) 77.8% increase; Number of 
criminal cases investigated: 10 (4) 150% increase; of 
these 4 were sent to court, and 6 discontinued due to 
non-exonerative circumstances; Number of cases 
discontinued and taken off the record: 0 (2); 
Suspended: 8 (5) 60% increase; Number of crimes that 
were discontinued due to expiration of statue of 
limitations: 0 (1); Number of people convicted to 
date: 0. 
 
c) Registered crimes under Article 133 (Trafficking in 
minors): Number of crimes on which criminal cases were 
prosecuted: 4 (1) 300% increase; Number of crimes 
registered: 4 (1) 300% increase; Number of criminal 
cases investigated: 3 (1) 200% increase; of these 3 
sent to court; Number of cases discontinued and taken 
 
ASTANA 00000613  010.2 OF 016 
 
 
off the record: 2 (0); Number of people convicted to 
date: 0. 
 
d) Registered crimes under Article 270 (Facilitation 
of prostitution or recruitment of an individual into 
prostitution): Number of crimes on which criminal 
cases were prosecuted: 13 (10) 30% increase; Number of 
crimes registered: 8 (8) no change from 2005; Number 
of criminal cases investigated: 10 (2) 400% increase; 
of these 9 were sent to court, and 1 discontinued due 
to non-exonerative circumstances; Number of cases 
discontinued and taken off the record: 0 (2); 
Suspended: 2 (3); 33% decrease; Number of crimes that 
were discontinued due to expiration of statue of 
limitations: 0 (1); Number of people convicted to 
date: 5. 
 
e) Registered crimes under Article 271 (Prostitution, 
operating brothels, procuring): Number of crimes on 
which criminal cases were prosecuted: 335 (336); 0.3% 
decrease; Number of crimes registered: 292 (305) 4.3% 
decrease; Number of criminal cases investigated: 278 
(272) 2.2% increase; out of them 242 sent to court, 
and 36 discontinued due to non-exonerative 
circumstances; Number of cases discontinued and taken 
off the record: 17 (29); Suspended due to sickness: 2 
(3); Suspended: 21 (18) 16.7% increase; Number of 
crimes that were discontinued due to expiration of 
statue of limitations: 11 (10); Number of people 
convicted to date: 158. 
 
48. (SBU) (29G) Criminal gangs and small criminal 
groups engage in both labor and sexual exploitation 
trafficking.  In sexual exploitation trafficking 
cases, the most commonly reported pattern involved 
small rings of traffickers spread between the source 
location and destination.  Women were lured by 
promises of lucrative employment at restaurants, 
retail stores, or nightclubs.  NGOs reported that 
agricultural labor trafficking victims were recruited 
in the source countries by locals who were paid by the 
Kazakhstani farm owner who will employ them.  The 
traffickers were mainly young or middle-aged men and 
women who often run legal businesses.  According to 
IOM, very often employment, travel, tourism agencies, 
or marriage agencies are fronting for traffickers or 
small crime groups to traffic individuals.  Sometimes 
government officials were involved with trafficking 
especially when dealing with fraudulent documents and 
illegal border crossing. 
 
49. (SBU) (29G) Law enforcement units regularly 
conducted inspections to check operations of agencies 
that advertise employment opportunities abroad for 
girls and women and organizations that help 
individuals obtain permanent residence permits in 
other countries.  In 2006, joint law enforcement 
operations inspected 235 tour agents, 20 recruitment 
agencies, 15 agencies offering assistance in 
emigration, ten matrimonial agencies, six modeling 
agencies, and 102 agencies offering assistance in 
completing documents for travel abroad.  The 
inspectors demanded and obtained client lists and 
focused on examining cases of 20-35 year-old women, as 
they are most likely targets for traffickers.  There 
were no reports on where profits from trafficking were 
being channelled. 
 
50. (SBU) (29H) The Government actively investigates 
cases of trafficking, especially in the last two 
years.  However, during the reporting period, the 
government did not actively use all investigative 
techniques in trafficking investigations.  According 
to local legislation, techniques such as electronic 
surveillance can be used.  However, law enforcement 
officials reported that they often do not have enough 
funding to conduct these types of technical 
operations.  Domestic law does not prohibit the police 
from engaging in covert operations but it requires 
that participation in such operations be strictly 
 
ASTANA 00000613  011.2 OF 016 
 
 
controlled by the PGO. 
 
51. (SBU) (29I) The MVD provides regular training to 
police officers on techniques for investigating 
trafficking.  In 2006 over 80 different events were 
arranged to increase legal awareness of officers of the 
MVD, to work with victims of trafficking, to execute 
the required procedural documents, and to study the 
best practices of foreign law enforcement agencies and 
social institutions.  The MVD in cooperation with 
Post's INL office established an anti-TIP Study Center 
within the MVD Legal Academy in Karaganda. 
 
52. (SBU) (29I) In 2006 the anti-TIP Study Center 
provided training to mid-career operations officers, 
investigators, and migration police officers of the 
MVD dealing with human trafficking.  The Center 
together with Post?s INL office is currently 
developing training plans and instruction material to 
support the training process.  In future sessions, the 
Center will train personnel of the operations, 
investigative and administrative police services.  The 
Government has expressed interest in using the Center 
to upgrade the professional qualifications of policemen 
from all Central Asian countries and using foreign 
experts to provide the training. 
 
53. (SBU) (29J) The Government cooperates with other 
gover
nments in the investigation of TIP crimes.  An 
example of such cooperation is the Aktobe case (see 
para. 26).  Kazakhstani law enforcement officers also 
conducted joint operations with counterparts from 
Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Turkmenistan.  They conducted operations on prevention 
of illegal migration in the zones near the border. 
 
54. (SBU) (29J) In 2006 five cases of trafficking in 
the UAE were investigated through the concerted 
efforts of the National Interpol Bureau and the 
Consular Service of the Kazakhstani MFA.  In order to 
advance the Government?s capability to prevent and 
combat illegal migration, 20 international treaties 
and agreements have been signed, both bilateral and 
multilateral.  In 2006 Kazakhstan signed agreements on 
labor migrants and protection of rights of migrants 
with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
 
55. (SBU) (29J) Kazakhstan will shortly sign similar 
agreements with Qatar, Thailand, Poland, Czech 
Republic, and Hungary.  Kazakhstan is reviewing draft 
treaties on rendering legal assistance and 
extradition, which potentially will be signed with 
Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and 
Latvia.  Agreements are under discussion with France, 
Germany, Belgium, Greece, and Romania.  Kazakhstan 
sent a similar draft agreement to the government of 
China for consideration.  CIS member-countries have 
signed a Cooperation Treaty to control illicit 
migration and hazardous migration processes in the 
CIS, as well as to prevent illegal migration.  A Task 
Force has revised and finalised the draft Agreement on 
Key Guidelines for CIS migrants, and it has been sent 
to the CIS Executive Committee for review. 
 
56. SBU) (29K) The Government is forbidden under the 
constitution from extraditing its own citizens to face 
criminal charges abroad.  However, the Government can 
try a citizen for a crime that occurred abroad based 
upon a criminal investigation undertaken by foreign 
authorities. The Government can extradite foreigners 
facing trafficking charges to another country for 
prosecution. 
 
57. (SBU) (29L&M) There is evidence of complicity of 
local officials in trafficking, usually in the form of 
accepting bribes from traffickers.  Although there is 
no evidence of conspiracy within the Border Guards and 
Migration Police to facilitate trafficking, press 
reports of individual officers accepting bribes are 
common.  Corruption is a problem in Kazakhstan, and 
 
ASTANA 00000613  012.2 OF 016 
 
 
public opinion polls show that the Border Guards and 
Customs officials are perceived as the most corrupt 
law enforcement officials.  Based on incidents of 
extortion and bribery, a number of criminal cases were 
initiated against 12 officers working in regional 
offices of the MOJ and Migration Police.  A total of 
20 officers and leaders of the Migration Police were 
disciplined for issuing illegitimate documents and 
failure to properly supervise subordinates. 
 
58. (SBU) (29N) Kazakhstan does not have an identified 
child sex tourism problem, either as a source or 
destination country.  Although the country's child 
sexual abuse laws currently do not have 
extraterritorial coverage, the Government is exploring 
options to strengthen its legal framework before child 
sex tourism becomes a problem. 
 
59. (SBU) (29N) As a measure to prevent abuse of 
children, the PGO and the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade proposed an amendment to legislation regulating 
procedures for foreigners adopting orphans or children 
left without parental support.  In the amendment, a 
new provision was added to the Matrimonial Act to 
limit the adoption of Kazakhstani children to 
foreigners who are nationals of the countries with 
which Kazakhstan has signed and ratified the 
international treaties providing protection of 
children and cooperation in the area of inter-country 
adoption. 
 
60. (SBU) (29N) The Mazhilis (lower house of 
Parliament) is now discussing a bill drafted by the 
Government to accede to the Hague Convention of 29 May 
1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
respect to Inter-country Adoption.  In addition, the 
Ministries of Education and Science, Foreign Affairs, 
Justice, and Internal Affairs adopted a joint order on 
the Efficient Exchange of Information on Children 
Adopted by Foreigners.  The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs also adopted an order on Approval of 
Instruction on Registering Kazakhstani Children 
Adopted by Foreigners.  In January 2006, MFA amended 
the Registration Rules for Foreigners Willing to Adopt 
Kazakhstani Children.  The amended Rules require that 
potential adoptive parents shall also submit documents 
showing whether they have conviction records and that 
officers of the consular department shall monitor the 
status of adopted Kazakhstani children.  In January 
the Government passed a resolution stipulating that a 
Committee for the Protection of Children's' Rights be 
established under the Ministry of Education and 
Science and that it should include a subdivision to 
deal with adoption issues. 
 
61. (SBU) (29 N) In March, the press published 
allegations of the involvement of the Juno Orphans? 
Relief Fund (Juno) in the trafficking of children. 
Both the PGO and Kazakhstani branches of Juno 
conducted investigations regarding Juno?s compliance 
with legislation related to child adoption.  The 
investigation showed that Juno facilitated the 
adoption of 122 Kazakhstani children by U.S. nationals 
and one child by a Belgian national.  However, no 
evidence was found in either investigation that the 
Juno Fund had been involved in trafficking of 
children.  However, given that the existing 
legislation is vague as to the activities of 
international agencies dealing with adoption of 
children, the PGO forwarded a letter to the Government 
suggesting the legal role of adoption agencies be 
clarified. 
 
62. (SBU) (29O) 
 
a) The Government ratified ILO Convention 182, on the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, on 
February 26, 2003.  To implement this Convention in 
2005 the Government began a three-year Program on 
elimination of the worst forms of child labor. 
 
ASTANA 00000613  013.2 OF 016 
 
 
Implementation continued in 2006.  One of the 
priorities of the program was to study the commercial 
sexual exploitation of children, trafficking of 
minors, and the development of the methods of 
rehabilitation of minors engaged in prostitution and 
other anti-social activities. 
 
b) ILO Convention 29 and 105 on forced or compulsory 
labor was ratified on May 18, 2001. 
 
c) The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) on the sale of children, 
child prostitution, and child pornography was ratified 
on
August 24, 2001. 
 
d) The Government has signed but not ratified the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.  The 
Government has stated it plans to sign and to ratify 
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons simultaneously with 
ratification of the underlying convention.  Even 
though the Convention is not ratified, the amended 
Articles 128 and 133 of the Criminal Code fully meet 
the requirements of the Protocol. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS (PARA 30) 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
63. (SBU) (30A&C) Under the new TIP law, recognized 
trafficking victims are granted temporary residence 
status and relief from deportation to ensure their 
safe repatriation or participation in criminal 
proceeding against their traffickers.  However, 
temporary residence is granted only after the criminal 
case is initiated and a person is recognized as a 
victim within this case.  Local law enforcement has a 
mechanism to refer victims to crisis centers and 
shelters based on formal agreements with NGOs, which 
provide a range of legal and psychological assistance 
and arrange for medical care as needed.  Repatriated 
Kazakhstani TIP victims are referred to TIP NGOs for 
assistance and support upon arrival in the country. 
Currently there are about 30 crisis centers for 
victims of domestic violence which are sometimes used 
for victims of trafficking.  There are only two 
shelters specifically designated for trafficking 
victims.  One is in Almaty and one in Shymkent; both 
are managed by NGOs under grants from USAID and other 
foreign donors.  NGOs report that collocation of 
victims of trafficking with victims of domestic 
violence resulted in negative attitude from the 
latter. 
 
64. (SBU) (30B) The Government is discussing the idea 
of establishing a pilot Government-funded shelter for 
TIP victims in Almaty.  The National Commission on 
Family and Gender Policy under the President of 
Kazakhstan, the National Center for Human Rights, the 
Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning, the Ministry 
of Justice, and the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Protection suggested that the shelter be created on 
the basis of the existing crisis centers, which have 
already been fully staffed, have skilled personnel, 
and have acquired certain experience.  The National 
Center for Human Rights also suggested that the 
shelter for victims of trafficking be co-financed from 
the national budget, international organizations, and 
other off-budget sources. 
 
65. (SBU) (30D) According to IOM, the rights of 
victims are generally respected.  However, there were 
cases when victims were detained from a few days to a 
few weeks or months, or they were fined or deported. 
Victims were sometimes prosecuted for violations of 
immigration law.  IOM has no reports of TIP victims 
being jailed in Kazakhstan.  Law enforcement awareness 
of sexual exploitation trafficking has increased over 
the past several years, and NGOs report a general 
recognition of the victims' status by local law 
 
 
*********************** 
* Missing Section 014 * 
*********************** 
 
 
ASTANA 00000613  015.2 OF 016 
 
 
the GOK and with Post.  The Union of Crisis CQers 
(UCC), a coalition of TIP NGO crisis centers and 
shelters across Kazakhstan, is one of the strongest 
local NGO networks in the country.  In addition to 
providing victim assistance and protection services 
through the referral system mentioned above, UCC- 
member NGOs operate hotlines and conduct public 
information campaigns.  The leaders of two UCC-member 
NGOs participated in interagency working group 
meetings, providing frank feedback and suggestions 
about GOK counter-TIP efforts, many of which were 
included in the new TIP Law. 
 
-------------- 
BEST PRACTICES 
-------------- 
 
71. (SBU) Post would like to highlight the MVD's 
establishment of a regional anti-TIP law enforcement 
training center.  Incorporating in-service training of 
mid-level officers into the MVD's flagship academic 
center is a significant step to improving the 
professional knowledge of police, changing attitudes 
of the police regarding trafficking as a crime, and 
improving the combating of trafficking in persons in 
the MVD.  The Government's intention of taking the 
extra step to look at the Center as a possible 
regional training center shows vision that could 
result in regional cooperation to combat trafficking. 
 
72. (SBU) Post officers and staff spent more than 150 
hours compiling information and drafting this report. 
Pol-Econ, INL, USAID, and PAS offices contributed to 
this report.  All of these offices cooperate in Post's 
efforts to combat TIP and collect information on TIP 
throughout the year.  Post's point of contact on 
trafficking is Astana Political Officer Jeffrey Scott 
Waldo.  He may be reached by phone at +7-3172-70-22- 
96, or by fax at +7-3172-70-22-87. After hours, he may 
be reached by mobile phone at +7-777-232-9941. 
 
---------------------- 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
---------------------- 
 
73. In December 2006, USAID conducted a public opinion 
survey in 19 major cities in Kazakhstan to measure 
public awareness of TIP.  The survey sample represents 
Kazakhstani citizens residing in cities with more than 
one hundred thousand people.  The total survey sample 
represented 1200 respondents.  37.3% of them said they 
are aware of TIP cases in Kazakhstan involving 
Kazakhstanis; 30.2% are aware of TIP cases involving 
Kazakhstanis that happened abroad; 13.2% are aware of 
TIP cases involving foreign citizens in Kazakhstan; 
26.4% were not aware of TIP problem; and 7.7% could 
not answer. 
 
74. 36.3% of respondents thought that law enforcement 
agencies provided assistance to victims of trafficking 
in Kazakhstan; 23.3% thought assistance was provided 
by international organizations; 21% by special 
government institutions; 8.4% by civil society 
organizations; and 34.5% could not answer. 
 
75. Out of 791 respondents, 97.2% knew that some job 
opportunities abroad could result in either forced 
labor or prostitution; 1.9% were not aware of this 
threat and 0.8% could not answer. Out of 769 
respondents who are aware of fake jobs, 90.3% learned 
about this problem from TV channels; 53% from 
newspapers and magazines; 30.8% heard this information 
from acquaintances; 15.2% from the radio; and 4.1% 
from the internet. 
 
76. Post's Public Affairs Section administered 
Democracy Commission provided the following grants: 
 
a) to the Women?s Support Center from Petropavlovsk, 
which conducted an information campaign in North 
 
ASTANA 00000613  016.2 OF 016 
 
 &#
x000A;Kazakhstan on the counter trafficking amendments to 
the Criminal Code and other legislation.  The NGO 
conducted two seminars for 37 local social workers and 
teachers, four training sessions for 48 policemen, 50 
Procurators, and 29 judges to enable them to put the 
new amendments into practice. 
 
b) to the Bolashak NGO from Taraz, which conducted an 
anti-TIP information campaign including distribution 
of booklets with hotline info and meetings with target 
audience such as 500 youth and unemployed.  The NGO 
also conducted 30 seminars in 10 rayons of Zhambyl 
oblast for 300 secondary school teachers, local 
government officials, journalists and 200 law- 
enforcement officials. 
 
c) to the Union of Crisis Centers of Kazakhstan to 
create regular exchange of information on domestic 
violence and trafficking in persons through 
establishment of two electronic periodicals: the 
Electronic Bulletin (36 issues per year, 6 pages) on 
problems of domestic violence and the Electronic 
Bulletin (12 issues per year, six pages) on human 
trafficking.  Bulletins are distributed to local 
government officials and police officers, members of 
Maslikhats (City Councils), officials representing the 
National Committee on Women and Family Affairs, local 
and international non-governmental organizations, and 
international organizations. 
 
d) to the Phoenix Center for Development and 
Adaptation from Ust-Kamenogorsk to provide education 
and services to 200 orphans in East Kazakhstan through 
12 educational seminars on the dangers of trafficking 
in persons, violence, and conflict prevention; the 
creation of a trainer group of orphans, which will 
consist of 20 of the most active students; operation 
of a hotline telephone service as well as legal and 
psychological consultations for orphans; provision of 
basic computer and Internet awareness training; and 
production of brochures and pamphlets for general 
distribution. 
 
e) to a Public Affairs Speaker program entitled 
"Specifics of Media Coverage of the Trafficking in 
Persons."  A U.S. speaker discussed with local 
journalists and NGO members in Aktobe and Ust- 
Kamenogorsk how the media covers trafficking. 
 
ORDWAY 
ORDWAY

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07ASTANA605, KAZAKHSTAN: BOUCHER DISCUSSES POLITICAL REFORM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA605 2007-03-07 05:18 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7840
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0605/01 0660518
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070518Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8686
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0054
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8687

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000605 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/FCO (CHAYDEN), SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA) 
STATE FOR DRL/PHD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: BOUCHER DISCUSSES POLITICAL REFORM 
WITH THE OPPOSITION 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 515 B. 06 ASTANA 121 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) AND (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Kazakhstani opposition leaders told 
Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs 
Richard Boucher that President Nazarbayev,s recent 
statements regarding political reform do not reflect actual 
political will for change.  They see the proposals as an 
effort to create the appearance of reform and bolster 
Kazakhstan,s candidacy to chair the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), without diluting 
the power of the president or addressing the most serious 
deficiencies of the current system.  Former Nazarbayev 
confidante Zharmakhan Tuyakbay believes any change to the 
structure of parliament will trigger early elections, while 
younger opposition leaders believe that such a scenario is 
likely only if Kazakhstan is chosen to head the OSCE.  While 
some believe that it would be pointless to pursue judicial 
reform absent broader political liberalization, Tuyakbay has 
several ideas to improve the system.  Opposition leaders 
unanimously see the monopolization of the electronic media by 
the Kazakhstani elite as the single greatest obstacle to 
political development, and also believe that official Russian 
propaganda is responsible for rising anti-Western and 
anti-U.S. sentiment.  They repeated their call for the U.S. 
government to support independent satellite television in the 
region.  Fall elections for local legislative bodies will be 
an important measure of the Kazakhstani government,s 
willingness to undertake real reform, and therefore its 
readiness to lead the OSCE, according to the opposition. 
Tuyakbay, who now supports the chairmanship bid in the belief 
that it will spur reform, told the Assistant Secretary that 
his National Social Democratic Party will work for change 
from within the system.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) During his February 26-28 visit to Astana, Kazakhstan, 
Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs 
Richard Boucher held a digital video conference with 
representatives of the opposition based in Almaty.  True Ak 
Zhol co-chairmen Bulat Abilov, Oraz Zhandosov, and Tulegen 
Zhukeyev, as well as Civil Society Fund chairman Galymzhan 
Zhakiyanov, participated.  Assistant Secretary Boucher also 
met with Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, chairman of the 
newly-registered National Social Democratic Party, in Astana. 
 Ambassador Ordway, Caitlin Hayden, Pol-Econ chief 
(notetaker), and Aleksey Radovskiy (interpreter) also 
participated in the meetings. 
 
------------------------- 
Prospects for Reform 
------------------------- 
 
 3. (SBU) Although the main opposition parties issued a joint 
statement cautiously welcoming the reform ideas that 
President Nazarbayev put forward at the February 19 
Democratization Commission session (Ref A), Assistant 
Secretary Boucher,s interlocutors were uniformly pessimistic 
 
SIPDIS 
about the level of political will for real change.  Abilov 
asserted that the entire Democratization Commission process 
had been nothing more than an effort to give the appearance 
of dialogue with society, in the absence of a legitimate and 
representative parliament where such debate should take 
place.  &If Nazarbayev really wants reform,8 Abilov said, 
&he knows what to do ) he doesn,t need a commission to 
come up with ideas.8  The proposals Nazarbayev raised on 
February 19 are secondary issues that do not touch on the 
fundamental problems such as Kazakhstan,s flawed electoral 
legislation, control of mass media by the elite, and 
restrictions on freedom of assembly, Abilov said. 
 
4. (SBU)  Tuyakbay expressed much the same sentiment, 
describing Nazarbayev,s February 19 proposals as steps to 
&soften8 the system around the edges rather than in-depth 
reforms.  Tuyakbay told Boucher that it was possible to 
liberalize the Kazakhstani political system without changing 
the constitution; the key, he said, was a new electoral law 
and concrete steps to ensure good elections by preventing the 
use of administrative resources and the falsification of 
results.  He was disappointed in President Nazarbayev,s 
failure to utter &a single word8 about these issues. 
 
------------------- 
Early Elections? 
------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Zhakiyanov predicted that even if the coming 
political reforms changed the structure of the parliament, 
 
ASTANA 00000605  002 OF 004 
 
 
President Nazarbayev would be unlikely to call early 
parliamentary elections. &He does not need them at the 
moment,8 Zhakiyanov said; recent  mergers among 
pro-presidential parties were merely &artificial agitation8 
designed to give the impression of political change. 
Zhakiyanov predicted that if Kazakhstan is chosen to chair 
the OSCE in 2009, however, Nazarbayev would hold early 
Mazhilis elections in order to avoid the increased 
international scrutiny that would accomp
any the chairmanship 
year. 
 
6. (C) Tuyakbay minimized the significance of the 
parliamentary reforms that President Nazarbayev had 
suggested, claiming that expanding the power of party 
fractions would have no influence on the decision-making 
process.  Even giving the parliamentary majority the right to 
form the government was just &empty talk8 in the current 
context of one-party rule, he said.  In contrast to 
Zhakiyanov, however, Tuyakbay believes that there is a &90% 
chance8 that Nazarbayev will call early parliamentary 
elections if the reform process changes the structure of the 
parliament.  Tuyakbay said that people in Nazarbayev,s inner 
circle were already talking about this.  Noting that he had 
known Nazarbayev well for 25 years, the opposition leader 
said &he,s an emotional person ) when he has an idea, he 
wants to implement it quickly.8  Changing the constitution 
and holding early elections would be intended as a &signal 
to the West8 that Kazakhstan is ready to chair the OSCE. 
Tuyakbay pointed to recent mergers of pro-presidential 
parties as evidence of such a plan. 
 
------------------- 
Judicial Reform 
------------------- 
 
7. (SBU)  In response to Assistant Secretary Boucher,s 
question about the independence of the judiciary in 
Kazakhstan, Abilov and Zhakiyanov argued that real change 
would not be possible without broader political reform.  In 
particular, Abilov said that it would be impossible to root 
out corruption in the judiciary without liberalization of the 
system.  Problems stemmed both from the power of the 
executive branch over the judiciary, and the prevalence of 
bribery. 
 
8. (SBU) Tuyakbay, who served as Procurator General from 1990 
to 1995, suggested concrete steps that should be taken to 
decrease the dependence of the judiciary on the executive 
branch.   He would like the parliament to choose the members 
of the Supreme Court from a nationwide pool of candidates; 
any citizen with the necessary education and experience could 
submit an application.  Tuyakbay also called for the lowest 
level of judges to be directly elected by the public, with 
appropriate screening for qualifications. 
 
--------------- 
Mass Media 
--------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Asked about the situation with mass media in 
Kazakhstan, Zhandosov informed Assistant Secretary Boucher 
that Rakhat Aliyev and Dariga Nazarbayeva had finally 
admitted that they own several television stations and other 
media outlets.  They had denied this for eight years, even 
suing people who claimed that they controlled media outlets. 
Zhandosov noted with wry humor that they claimed to have 
purchased the outlets only in December 2006, but no one was 
stepping forward to say they were the sellers.  Abilov chimed 
in that the Khabar television station had previously been 
registered in the name of Aliyev,s driver. 
 
10.  (SBU) Abilov stressed that the existence of a handful of 
active independent newspapers did not mean that information 
flowed freely in Kazakhstan.  Nazarbayev is a completely 
authoritarian ruler who will not permit the electronic media 
to discuss the problems that really concern the public, he 
said, and local leaders keep tight control over almost all 
print media in the regions.  Tuyakbay estimated the total 
circulation of all independent newspapers at 100,000 or less. 
 
11. (SBU) Zhakiyanov claimed that independent newspapers are 
severely hampered by the lack of revenue, as advertisers are 
&persecuted by the authorities.8   There are no independent 
television stations.  In urban areas, Zhakiyanov explained, 
most people receive cable television, which is controlled by 
the Kazakhstani elite and contains both local and Russian 
channels and certain international channels such as CNN and 
Euronews.  The Kazakhstani authorities therefore have control 
 
ASTANA 00000605  003 OF 004 
 
 
of the flow of news in the cities.  In rural areas, most 
people receive satellite television from Russian satellites 
such as Yamal and Yamal 2, which in turn are controlled by 
Gazprom.  &It is not in the Kremlin,s interest to permit 
the broadcast of alternative views in Kazakhstan,8 
Zhakiyanov observed.  Zhukeyev referred to a recent poll 
conducted in Russia which showed that 70% of Russians hold 
anti-Western or anti-U.S. views, which he attributed to 
official Russian propaganda transmitted via television. 
 
12. (C) Both Zhakiyanov and Tuyakbay reiterated their earlier 
calls for the U.S. government to help establish an 
independent satellite network for the region (Ref B). 
Assistant Secretary Boucher noted that such a complex and 
expensive undertaking would have to be done on a commercial 
basis in order to succeed. 
 
------------------------------- 
2007 Maslikhat Elections 
------------------------------- 
 
13. (SBU) Zhandosov called Assistant Secretary Boucher,s 
attention to fall 2007 elections for regional maslikhats 
(legislative bodies), which he described as an important 
window into the Kazakhstani government,s attitude toward the 
OSCE chairmanship.  Although maslikhats are not as powerful 
as local legislatures in &normal8 democracies, Zhandosov 
noted, they do have influence over issues such as local 
budgets.  Because the members are elected directly, fair 
elections would provide a clear picture of what the populace 
actually thinks of the Kazakhstani government,s policies. 
Zhandosov warned that if the electoral law is not fixed in 
time, there will be serious falsifications and other 
violations in the local elections. 
 
14. (SBU) Tuyakbay placed less emphasis on the maslikhats, 
claiming that in their current form they were purely 
&decorative8 bodies.  In his opinion their only significant 
role is the formation of local election commissions.  In a 
separate conversation with poloff, Tuyakbay said that his 
party would nevertheless support maslikhat candidates and 
viewed the conduct of the elections as an important sign of 
the Kazakhstani government,s willingness to undertake 
serious reforms. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Kazakhstan,s Bid to Chair the OSCE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
15. (C)  Abilov cautioned Assistant Secretary Boucher not to 
forget President Nazarbayev,s &Soviet8 background. 
Everything Nazarbayev says about wanting to chair the OSCE 
and democratize is merely a &sophisticated policy aimed at 
the U.S.8 rather than a true reflection of his goals and 
plans. 
 
16. (SBU) Tuyakbay said that his opinion on the OSCE 
chairmanship bid had evolved.  While at first he had 
categorically opposed it on the grounds that Kazakhstan did 
not meet OSCE standards, he now believes that a rejection of 
Kazakhstan,s bid would have negative consequences for
 the 
domestic political situation, including the strengthening of 
authoritarianism.  He added that Nazarbayev might move closer 
to Russia and China as a result, choosing enhanced 
integration with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and 
allocating Kazakhstan,s energy resources accordingly. 
Should Kazakhstan be selected as the chair, Tuyakbay believes 
that it will take certain positive steps toward democracy. 
 
17. (C) In response to Assistant Secretary Boucher,s 
question, Tuyakbay predicted that as chair of the OSCE 
Kazakhstan would not overstep any boundaries or rules.  It 
could however be expected to lobby for Russian interests on 
OSCE reform.  Fundamentally, Kazakhstan,s desire to lead the 
organization is tied to Nazarbayev,s personal ambitions and 
desire for international respect, Tuyakbay said. 
 
---------------------- 
The Way Forward 
---------------------- 
 
18. (C)  Tuyakbay told Assistant Secretary Boucher that he 
has a clear plan for where he wants to take his National 
Social Democratic party between now and the next presidential 
elections in 2012.  &After the last elections, I concluded 
that strict opposition will not bring any useful results,8 
Tuyakbay said.  The opposition,s weak ability to convey 
information to the public cannot compete with the powerful 
 
ASTANA 00000605  004 OF 004 
 
 
state machine.  It is therefore necessary to find ways to 
work constructively with the authorities, to develop levers 
to influence them, and to demonstrate that his party is 
seeking gradual change rather than revolution.  His goal is 
to win as many maslikhat and parliamentary seats as possible, 
and then work for change from within the system.  Tuyakbay 
said that Nazarbayev told him in September 2006 that he 
believed Kazakhstan needed an opposition movement that would 
criticize the government, on condition that it did not &stir 
up the people.8  Tuyakbay took that to mean that Nazarbayev 
would tolerate any opposition movement that did not represent 
a direct threat to his own power. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA604, BOUCHER COVERS DEMOCRATIC REFORM, REGIONAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA604 2007-03-07 05:17 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7837
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0604/01 0660517
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070517Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8683
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0051
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1299
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0301
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2183
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1691

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000604 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/FO (CHAYDEN), SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KZ ENRG KDEM
SUBJECT: BOUCHER COVERS DEMOCRATIC REFORM, REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH KAZAKHSTANI 
LEADERSHIP 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway; Reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings on February 26-27 with 
Prime Minister Masimov, Foreign Minister Tazhin, and Senate 
Speaker Tokayev, Assistant Secretary for South and Central 
Asian Affairs Richard Boucher told the Kazakhstani leadership 
that the U.S. is eager to build upon the momentum created by 
the President Bush - Nazarbayev discussions in 2006. 
Assistant Secretary Boucher emphasized that the U.S. views 
Kazakhstan as a key partner, capable of playing a significant 
role in achieving regional stability.  He also stressed in 
his meetings that the U.S. hopes and expects that Kazakhstan 
will take concrete steps to achieve political reform in 2007. 
 Masimov, Tazhin, and Tokayev responded with similar 
affirmations of the importance of the U.S. - Kazakhstan 
relationship.  Tazhin and Tokayev told Boucher that the 
political reform process is already underway, with Tazhin 
also offering a detailed argument in support of Kazakhstan's 
bid to chair the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). All three leaders indicated that Kazakhstan 
wants to be a regional leader, although they offered no new 
ideas on Afghanistan.   Masimov and Tazhin appealed for U.S. 
involvement as Kazakhstan strives to diversify its economy. 
End Summary. 
 
Democratic Reform 
----------------- 
2. (C) Foreign Minister Tazhin told Assistant Secretary 
Boucher in their February 26 meeting that most of the 
political elite agree that progress on democratic reform is 
needed.  No significant rift in understanding of the 
situation exists, according to Tazhin.  Tazhin remarked that 
he personally hopes for "maximum liberalization." He also 
claimed that Kazakhstan's bid to chair the OSCE has 
strengthened the drive for reform.  Senate Speaker Tokayev 
reported in a separate meeting that the political reform 
process has already started and he hopes that among the first 
reforms will be an expansion of the Senate.  According to 
Tokayev, the Parliament seeks the power to approve 
ministerial appointments and greater budgetary control.  The 
Parliament will also push for increased powers to initiate 
legislation, a constitutional right that is limited in 
practice.   Prime Minister Masimov did not directly address 
possible reforms during his February 26 meeting with 
Assistant Secretary Boucher, but he did promise to become 
directly involved with the political party training issue. 
 
Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
3. (C) Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin offered a broad and 
lengthy defense of Kazakhstan's OSCE Chairmanship bid in his 
meeting with Assistant Secretary Boucher on February 26, 
calling it a test of the U.S. - Kazakhstan partnership. 
Since independence, he argued, Kazakhstan has taken a number 
of politically risky steps in order to draw closer to the 
U.S. - welcoming U.S. capital in the late 1990s, moving 
forward with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, sending 
personnel to Iraq, and granting overflight rights for flights 
to Afghanistan.  Kazakhstan has shown  "it is a reliable 
partner and great friend of the U.S."  In its turn, the U.S. 
has responded by telling Kazakhstan it will not chair the 
OSCE in 2009.  This decision is not understood by 
Kazakhstan's political elite, noted Tazhin, and will be seen 
as "a slap in the face" with negative repercussions for the 
bilateral relationship. 
 
4.(C) Tazhin claimed that a Kazakhstani chairmanship would 
strengthen the OSCE because Kazakhstan does not wish to 
radicalize the organization.  The timing for a Kazakhstan 
chairmanship is also right.  No other international 
organization better integrates the West and former Soviet 
states, said Tazhin, but the relationship is becoming more 
complicated.  As a result, Kazakhstan could bring a new and 
useful perspective to the OSCE as chair.  If Kazakhstan's bid 
is rejected, however, it will lead to renewed debate as to 
the future and purpose of the OSCE, he warned. 
 
5. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher welcomed Tazhin's views 
about the importance of the OSCE and Kazakhstan's desire that 
the organization remain balanced.  Boucher made clear that he 
personally, as well as others, made three or four attempts to 
come to agreement with Kazakhstan on their Chairmanship 
before the Ministerial.  Kazakhstan chose not to pursue these 
opportunities.  Boucher continued by saying that if 
Kazakhstan makes the right kind of announcements on reform 
 
ASTANA 00000604  002 OF 003 
 
 
and follows with clear steps to implement them, the United 
States could consider coming to an agreement on their 
Chairmanship later in 2007. 
 
 
Regional Integration and Afghanistan 
------------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher emphasized the U.S. belief 
that Kazakhstan should play a key role in achieving enhanced 
regional integration.  There is a "political pause" in 
Central Asia, Tazhin commented, with the future of the region 
"difficult to forecast."   Tazhin told Boucher that 
Kazakhstan thus understands that it can be an example for the 
region, even if it achieves political reform at a slow pace. 
Tazhin briefly outlined three issues that he considers key 
for further integration -  the creation of water and energy 
consortium, establishment of a common market, and progress in 
solving social problems endemic to the region.  If efforts at 
integration fail, Tazhin predicted, Central Asia will be 
"open for games not regional in nature and not good for the 
region." At a later dinner, Boucher and Tazhin engaged in a 
broad discussion of the dynamics of the region. 
 
7.(C) Senate Speaker Tokayev and Assistant Secretary Boucher 
discussed recent changes in Turkmenistan.  According to 
Tokayev, Kazakhstan considers Turkmenistan one of the most 
important countries in the region, with its significance only 
to increase.  It is no coincidence, he confided, that 
President Nazarbayev has traveled to Ashgabat twice in recent 
months.  Tokayev believes that the Turkmenistanis will be 
cautious, but that their intent is positive and change 
inevitable. He has already noticed changes, even in protocol. 
Tokayev also called on the U.S. to bring Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan together.  Other countries in the Caspian region, 
he noted ominously, might not wish to see such a linkage. 
Tokayev mentioned that Uzbekistan did not send any 
high-ranking figures to Niyazov's funeral, which he said is 
both an insult under Islamic tradition and a strategic 
mistake.  He also remarked that a number of Uzbek businessman 
based in Russia are pushing for reform in Uzbekistan while 
simultaneously attempting to advance their own interests.  To 
counterbalance Uzbekistan's influence in Tajikstan, Tokayev 
recommended that the U.S. build a hydro-electric station in 
Tajikistan. Assistant Secretary Boucher explained that the 
U.S will not build a hydro-electric station there, but is 
instead helping to establish the necessary conditions to 
ensure Tajikistan's long-term success. 
 
8. (C) In his comments on regional integration, Prime 
Minister Masimov focused on economic cooperation.  Kazakhstan 
is ready to cooperate regionally, Masimov told Boucher, but 
the countries of immediate focus are Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
Conditions are also good for cooperation with Tajikistan, but 
Uzbekistan will require time, according to Masimov.  He 
expressed doubts about Kyrgyzstan, explaining that there are 
few people to work with there and even fewer to trust. 
 
9. (C) The Kazakhstani leadership offered no new ideas or 
promises on Afghanistan.  Tazhin told Assistant Secretary 
Boucher that Kazakhstan is focused on two approaches to 
Afghanistan, the first humanitarian and the second providing 
capital for investment projects, particularly in northern 
Afghanistan (Note:  At a dinner for Assistant Secretary 
Boucher, Advisor to the Prime Minister Yerlan Sagadiyev, who 
has business investments in Afghanistan, expressed enthusiasm 
about investment in northern Afghanistan, in part because of 
the region's cultural, historical, and ethnic links with 
Kazakhstan. Conditions and mentalities in southern 
Afghanistan, by contrast, make investment nearly impossible, 
he remarked.)  Prime Minister Masimov commented that 
Kazakhstan "wants to participate in the resolution of 
Afghanistan," with a primary focus on investment. 
 
 
Economic Development and Energy 
------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Prime Minister Masimov expressed his desire to expand 
and diversify Kazakhstan's economic relationship with the 
U.S.  Masimov told Assistant Secretary Boucher that 
Kazakhstan now has surplus electricity at times, but will 
have a deficit by 2009. As a result, Kazakhstan will need 
more power stations.  The Ambassador told Masimov that the 
U.S. is ready to help Kazakhstan to explore its options. 
 
ASTANA 00000604  003 OF 003 
 
 
Kazakhstan is interested, remarked Masimov, but the project 
is a long term one.   Masimov believes the best immediate 
option is to develop hydropower in Kyrgyzstan, but "we have 
been discussing this option for ten years." 
 
11. (C) On energy, Masimov reaffirmed his interest in 
trans-Caspian cooperation, particularly with Azerbaijan.  He 
called the Trans-Caspian and China pipelines most promising 
options.  Assistant Secretary Boucher asked Masimov who would 
benefit from delays in expanding the capacity of the Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium - the Russians?  You would have to ask 
them, Masimov said with a smile.  Masimov also Boucher that 
Kazakhstan would like to initially use tankers to transport 
oil and gas across the Caspian.  He is not concerned about 
problems of tanker capacity, he added, because Kazakhstan can 
build the tankers domestically.  Tokayev told Boucher that 
Kazakhstan is trying to persuade Turkmenistan to run its gas 
pipeline to China directly through Kazakhstan.  He believes, 
however, that China will want to involve Uzbekistan, as they 
claim that the pipeline will serve as an "instrument of peace 
and solidarity." 
 
12. (C) Foreign Minister Tazhin lamented the lack of progress 
on the Houston Initiative, six years after its launch.  Like 
Masimov, Tazhin called for U.S. assistance as Kazakhstan 
attempts to diversify its economy.  Kazakhstan is 
particularly interested in attracting small and medium sized 
enterprises from the U.S..  Tazhin also expressed his concern 
over Kazakhstan's continued inclusion on the Jackson-Vanik 
list.  For Kazakhstan the issue is one of great symbolic 
importance because Armenia, Kyrgystan, Georgia, and Ukraine 
have already been removed from the list.  Tazhin stated that 
removal of Kazakhstan from the Jackson-Vanik list would be 
greeted very positively and demonstrate the strength of the 
U.S. - Kazakhstan relationship. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA594, KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENT DELIVERS STATE OF THE NATION ADDRESS

WikiLeaks Link

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA594.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA594 2007-03-06 09:57 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6732
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0594/01 0650957
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060957Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8670
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0049
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1689
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA, T. PERRY), DRL/PHD (C. 
KUCHTA-HELBLING) 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL OSCE KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENT DELIVERS STATE OF THE NATION ADDRESS 
 
REF: Astana 515 
 
ASTANA 00000594  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On February 28, President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
delivered his annual state of the nation address before a joint 
session of parliament.  The address, entitled "New Kazakhstan in the 
New World," was intended primarily for domestic consumption, with a 
heavy focus on modernizing social and economic development in the 
country.  Nazarbayev emphasized the need to meet global competitive 
challenges, and to utilize international standards.  The president 
listed political reform as one of the 10 major tasks facing the 
nation in the coming decade, but he did not reveal any significant 
new details concerning the plan for reform.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
THE PRESIDENT CELEBRATES PROGRESS, PROMISES MORE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2. (U) On February 28, President Nazarbayev delivered his annual 
state of the nation address before a joint session of parliament. 
The president's speech, entitled "New Kazakhstan in a New World," 
stressed the themes of modernization and development, with a strong 
focus on social and economic issues.  The president reviewed 
Kazakhstan's progress to date, declaring that Kazakhstan "has chosen 
its own way of development," and has "achieved wide renown and its 
standing in the international community is rising year after year." 
He reiterated Kazakhstan's goal of joining the world's 50 most 
competitive nations, acceding to the WTO, and fulfilling 
Kazakhstan's 2030 development strategy, which was adopted by the 
parliament in 1997.  For the first time in recent years, the speech 
was not broadcast live.  President Nazarbayev departed from his text 
on several occasions to scold ministers - and on one issue the press 
- for not carrying out their tasks properly.  The impromptu remarks, 
in both Kazakh and Russian, showed a greater level of frustration 
and dissatisfaction in specific areas than in his prepared remarks. 
 
------------------------- 
SOCIAL SPENDING WILL RISE 
------------------------- 
 
3. (U) In terms of bread and butter social and economic issues, 
President Nazarbayev pledged, among other things, that pensions 
would grow and would be indexed for inflation; employees in 
educational, social, health, culture, and sports institutions would 
be paid health allowances; employees working in harmful or difficult 
labor conditions would receive additional allowances; and that 100 
high schools and 100 hospitals would be built over the next three 
years in impoverished rural areas.  In addition, Nazarbayev 
encouraged Kazakhstanis to have more children, and promised to 
double the payment that families receive upon the birth of a child, 
to increase monthly childcare allowances, and to introduce mandatory 
maternity social insurance.  (Note:  According to the president, 
290,000 children were born in Kazakhstan in 2006, an improvement 
over the 220,000 that were born in 2000. End note.) In all, the 
president planned to allocate 108 billion tenge ($864 million) for 
social welfare improvement in the country. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
10 MAJOR TASKS FOR THE COMING DECADE 
------------------------------------ 
 
4. (U) In keeping with the theme of further modernizing and 
developing Kazakhstan, the president outlined 10 major tasks for the 
country in the coming decade: 
 
1) Maintain and grow Kazakhstan's economy, including by decreasing 
natural monopolies, strengthening the financial system, creating an 
efficient stock market, and ensuring Kazakhstan's accession the 
WTO. 
 
2) Further Kazakhstan's role as the "regional locomotive" of 
economic development in Central Asia, and make it a successful 
player in the global economy.  Nazarbayev indicated that the primary 
focus should be on markets in Russia, China, Central Asia, and the 
Caspian and Black Sea regions, and he proposed establishing a 
Eurasian Economic Union. 
 
3) Increase the effectiveness of the country's extractive 
industries, in part by implementing a responsible and mutually 
beneficial energy policy and by insisting that foreign partners 
respect the needs of the country and play a role in the 
diversification of its economy. 
 
4) Diversify the economy by promoting the development of 
non-extractive sectors. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000594  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
5) Develop a modern infrastructure to sustain the country's new role 
in the regional and global economy, including by exploring new 
approaches to development and management of electricity and energy 
resources and laying the foundation for nuclear energy use in 
Kazakhstan.  The president called for the completion of a thermal 
electric power station near Lake Balkhash as soon as possible. 
 
6) Provide modern education and professional re-training to help &
#x000A;develop an innovative economy. 
 
7) Target social protection and social welfare development to those 
who really need protection, such as the disabled, large families, 
and low-income families, and end support for those who are reluctant 
to find a new job or update their specialty.  Nazarbayev also 
pledged further progress in developing affordable 
(government-subsidized) housing, particularly in the capital of 
Astana, to ensure that Astana can attract a new "intelligentsia" -- 
highly qualified doctors, teachers, and technical and engineering 
professionals.  The president criticized government corruption in 
this sphere, and called on his Nur Otan Party to oversee the 
distribution of subsidized housing and ensure that it goes to those 
it was intended to help, as opposed to corrupt local government 
officials. 
 
8) Modernize the political system by implementing the conclusions of 
the State Democratization Commission (reftel). 
 
9) Accelerate administrative reforms to meet international 
standards, with the goal of creating a modern, professional civil 
service. 
 
10) Promote Kazakhstan's achievements in Central Asia and the 
world. 
 
----------------------------------- 
NO NEW DETAILS ON POLITICAL REFORMS 
----------------------------------- 
 
5. (U) President Nazarbayev praised the work of the Democratization 
Commission and reviewed the direction that future political reforms 
would take, including a more powerful parliament, more powerful 
political parties, judicial reform, and more powerful local 
representative bodies.  He did not reveal any significant new 
details concerning these previously-announced reform plans (reftel). 
 However, he stressed that the reforms must not be "a copy of 
foreign experience or abstract theory," and that they should "take 
into account the needs of our society and realities in Kazakhstan." 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6. (SBU) Comment:  President Nazarbayev focused on his domestic 
constituency, reviewing the many positive developments under his 
leadership, directing social spending to key constituencies, and 
promising great things to come.  Given the target audience, he did 
not elaborate significantly on foreign policy issues.  Nonetheless, 
his modernization agenda tracks closely with several U.S. policy 
goals, including regional integration, economic diversification, and 
political reform.  As always, Nazarbayev framed the debate 
carefully: saying all the right things about the need for further 
reform, while caveating that the country must develop in its own 
way, in response to the "realities in Kazakhstan."  End comment. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA584, KAZAKHSTAN: GUIDANCE SOUGHT ON ASSISTANCE TO U.S. TOBACCO

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA584.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA584 2007-03-06 01:20 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6245
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #0584/01 0650120
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060120Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8663
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHCR/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000584 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA); EB/TPP/ABT/ATP; OES/IHA 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO USTR/ENV, COMMERCE, AGRICULTURE, AND TREASURY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR ETRD ECON KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: GUIDANCE SOUGHT ON ASSISTANCE TO U.S. TOBACCO 
FIRM 
 
REF: STATE 6604 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Post seeks Department's guidance on a request 
from Phillip Morris's Kazakhstan office for the Ambassador to sign a 
letter of support for Phillip Morris's application to join 
Kazakhstan's "Foreign Investors' Council" (FIC).  The FIC, chaired 
by President Nazarbayev, promotes dialogue between the Government of 
Kazakhstan (GOK) and foreign investors, with the goal of improving 
the investment climate. Representatives from current FIC member 
companies have told Post that one of the key, if informal, benefits 
of FIC membership is direct access of company CEOs to President 
Nazarbayev during FIC plenary sessions held each year.  As Phillip 
Morris might logically use its FIC membership, and resulting access 
to key GOK decision-makers, to lobby business interests that the USG 
cannot legally support, Post would appreciate Department's guidance 
on the advisability of writing a letter of support for membership. 
End summary. 
 
Formal Role of FIC 
------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Ali Takesh, Managing Director, Phillip Morris Kazakhstan 
and Central Asia South, recently asked the Embassy for a letter in 
support of his company's application for membership in the FIC.  The 
FIC is an advisory body, established in 1998 to promote dialogue 
between the GOK and private investors "in order to efficiently 
address key issues related to their investment activities in the 
country, to improve the investment climate of Kazakhstan for the 
benefit of foreign investors..."  Members are formally charged with 
developing recommendations for President Nazarbayev and the GOK on 
"key investment and economic development issues," as well as 
"analyzing and discussing other core investment policy issues upon 
instruction of the President."  The FIC's fundamental work is 
undertaken by five working groups, which address areas of interest 
(oil and gas, legal, taxation, investment image enhancement, and 
operations).  The FIC also holds twice-yearly "interim sessions" 
chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister or Minister of Industry and 
Trade, and one or two annual "plenary sessions," chaired by 
President Nazarbayev and customarily attended by company CEOs. 
Twenty-one companies currently belong to the FIC.  (For more 
information of the FIC, see www.fic.kz.) 
 
Informal Role of FIC 
-------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) A few FIC member company representatives have told Post 
that one of the key benefits of FIC membership is the opportunity it 
confers on company CEOs to meet directly with President Nazarbayev 
on the margins of the plenary sessions. These meetings naturally 
offer an opportunity for CEOs to address issues affecting existing 
operations in Kazakhstan, as well as to advocate for new business 
opportunities.  Thus, it is conceivable that Phillip Morris would 
use its FIC membership to lobby, at the highest levels, for business 
opportunities which the USG cannot legally support under reftel 
guidance. 
 
Phillip Morris's Application 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Phillip Morris appears to meet the formal requirements for 
FIC membership, which include a minimum of $25 million of direct 
investment for non-oil/gas companies, and several qualitative 
criteria addressing issues of corporate responsibility, significance 
for the Kazakhstani economy, and prospects for future growth. 
 
5. (SBU) Furthermore, the company appears well-placed to contribute 
to the FIC's high-level discussion of Kazakhstan's investment 
climate.  Phillip Morris was the first foreign investor recognized 
by newly-independent Kazakhstan, and went on to be a founding member 
of the American Chamber of Commerce. With over $330 million invested 
in a manufacturing facility near Almaty, the company is both one of 
the largest employers in the country and one of the biggest foreign 
investors outside of the energy sector.  These factors suggest that 
the company would make a constructive contribution to the FIC's 
work. 
 
6. (SBU) The FIC considers seven criteria for admission, including 
the "recommendations of industrial and business associations, and 
foreign embassies" accredited in Kazakhstan.  Thus, the absence of a 
letter from the Embassy is likely to be noted, and have a 
detrimental effect (however small) on Phillip Morris's candidacy. 
 
7. (SBU) Post appreciates Department's guidance as soon as possible. 
 
 
 
ASTANA 00000584  002 OF 002 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA578, KAZAKHSTAN: INL CONDUCTS TRAINING COURSE FOR FINANCIAL

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA578 2007-03-03 09:42 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4313
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0578/01 0620942
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030942Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8655
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0047
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC//ICITAP
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC//OTA//
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000578 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL ALTON, AND CARROLL; EUR/ACE; SCA/CEN FOR OMARA; 
JUSTICE FOR GREG DUCOT, TREASURY FOR ANTONOVICH 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCRM KCOR PGOV KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: INL CONDUCTS TRAINING COURSE FOR FINANCIAL 
POLICE INVESTIGATORS 
 
 
ASTANA 00000578  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Summary: Embassy Astana's International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement (INL) office, in cooperation with the Financial Police 
Academy (FPA), conducted a five day training course on money 
laundering and financial investigative techniques for financial 
police investigators in Astana February 13-17.  Treasury Department 
anti-money laundering (AML) instructors introduced participants to 
best practices of investigation and prosecution of money laundering 
and shared real-world experiences.  End summary. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2.  The course was the fifth in a series of Financial Investigative 
Techniques courses under a joint INL-GOK program which are a part of 
the official curriculum of the Financial Police Academy approved by 
the Agency on Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (Financial 
Police).  OTA trainers successfully conducted the first course for 
professors and teachers of the Financial Policy Academy (FPA) in 
January 2006.  OTA trainers and FPA professors jointly conducted the 
subsequent four courses for over 115 Financial Police investigators 
from throughout Kazakhstan in July, October, and December 2006.  The 
purpose of the courses is to improve capacity of the financial 
police to investigate financial crimes, especially money laundering. 
 
 
----------------------- 
LESSONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
----------------------- 
 
3.  For the February course, a team from the Office of Technical 
Assistance together with Kazakhstani experts and practicing 
investigators from Interpol, the Procurator General's Office, the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Supreme Court, the Agency on 
Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (Financial Police), as well 
as professors and teachers of the Financial Police Agency, trained 
investigators from all oblasts of Kazakhstan on combating money 
laundering.  The international experts from the Treasury Department 
taught the best U.S. practices in combating this crime and shared 
their wealth of international experience in the field. 
 
4.  During the course the instructors and participants discussed the 
importance of anti-money laundering policy for economic development 
of Kazakhstan; reviewed the legal basis of and threats to the 
economic security of Kazakhstan; discussed Kazakhstani legislation 
on combating money laundering and conducted legal analysis of 
Article 193 of the Criminal Code of Kazakhstan (on money 
laundering); discussed the draft anti-money laundering law and the 
structure of the future Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU); and 
reviewed types of economic and financial crimes and methods to 
combat these crimes. 
5.  In particular, the participants studied money laundering schemes 
used in different parts of the Kazakhstani economy, reviewed money 
laundering scenarios, studied special investigative techniques used 
in detection and investigation of financial crimes, learned about 
bulk cash smuggling and trade-based money laundering, and learned 
methods of proof and how to conduct financial interviewing.  Special 
emphasis was placed on studying the material on money laundering for 
terrorism financing, and schemes for laundering proceeds received 
from illegal narcotics trafficking.  The participants shared their 
experiences in investigating financial crimes and discussed real 
cases from their practice.  The core of the course was devoted to 
practical exercises on the above mentioned topics. 
 
6.  The participants' feedback revealed the widespread understanding 
that money laundering is a transnational crime and the recognition 
of the importance of international cooperation in combating money 
laundering.  The feedback also noted the importance of strengthening 
cooperation between law enforcement agencies combating money 
laundering in Kazakhstan. 
 
----------------- 
PRACTICAL OUTCOME 
----------------- 
 
7.  OTA experts welcomed the idea of the FPA Director publishing a 
book on anti-money laundering and financial investigative techniques 
in English based on the jointly conducted courses.  In addition, the 
February course participants supported the proposal of the FPA 
professors to publish a series of articles in Russian which will 
represent the ideas of practicing investigators and researchers of 
the FPA. 
 
---------- 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
ASTANA 00000578  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
8.  Per the request of the Financial Police Academy, INL will 
continue providing technical assistance in 2007 and will develop a 
new course designed for operational officers of the financial 
police.  The course will focus on detection of financial and 
economic crimes including specific methods of detection and 
investigation of crimes in banking, the oil and gas
 sector, mining 
industry, telecommunications, agriculture, gambling business, state 
and private construction, and the power industry.  It will also 
address specific methods of detection and preservation of evidence 
of financial corruption, detection and investigation of crimes 
related to legalization of capital and other property obtained by 
illegal means.  The training courses will be conducted in April, 
September and November 2007. 
 
9.  In addition, as a portion of the FY 2003/2004 project plan, INL 
provided the Financial Police Academy a language laboratory to help 
the cadets learn English.  This will make possible their enrollment 
at law enforcement institutions abroad (U.S. or Europe) where they 
can study best international experience fighting transnational 
crimes and also permit cooperation with other law enforcement 
authorities on international money laundering cases. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.  The series of trainings provided in 2006 and early 2007 was 
very well received by the trainees and has already resulted in a 
request for operational cooperation in an AML case.  Post attributes 
the GOK's receptivity to the collaborative training approach, 
drawing on international and local expertise to teach all classes. 
Effecting change in GOK institutions is a goal in all INL programs 
and Post views the joint efforts in AML as a significant milestone 
in achieving our foreign assistance goals.  In the long term, Post 
regards the GOK as a willing participant in countering money 
laundering, in part due to its desire to create a regional financial 
center in Almaty. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA563, KAZAKHSTAN: KMG EXECUTIVE DISCUSSES KCTS PROCESS

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA563 2007-03-02 10:58 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3242
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0563/01 0611058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021058Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8625
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0045
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000563 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ AJ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: KMG EXECUTIVE DISCUSSES KCTS PROCESS 
 
REF: A. 06 ALMATY 1835 
 
     B. 06 ALMATY 1934 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway; reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Arman Darbayev, KazMunaiGaz (KMG) Executive 
Director of Transportation Infrastructure, discussed KMG's 
vision of the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS) 
process with Energy Officer on March 1.  Darbayev (strictly 
protect) acknowledged that the Kazakhstanis intend to use the 
fact the IGA has not yet been ratified in Kazakhstan as 
leverage in early negotiations with the Azeris -- 
negotiations which, given the minimalist nature of the IGA 
and apparent differences of opinion on key issues (Darbayev 
focused on the marine transportation concept), were likely to 
be difficult.  Darbayev explained that KMG hoped to get GOK 
approval on a general set of negotiating principles in the 
coming weeks, then launch preliminary talks with the Azeris; 
should the Azeris support a set of "minimal guarantees" 
(which had been written into the IGA at one time, but removed 
to facilitate agreement), then full HGA negotiations could be 
launched with both governments.  Darbayev indicated that KMG 
viewed the two KCTS segments -- the Eskene-Kuryk pipeline and 
the "Trans-Caspian Project" -- as requiring separate 
negotiating processes.  The pipeline, he said, would not need 
to be covered by an HGA.  The GOK was prodding KMG to move 
quickly on KCTS, he said; at the same time, many in power 
believed that the GOK had erred in rushing to sign a 
stripped-down IGA in Spring 2006, and were determined not to 
give anything away in future negotiations.  End summary. 
 
IGA Ratification as Negotiating Leverage 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Darbayev, who as Kairgeldy Kabyldin's Deputy, is an 
active participant in the KCTS negotiations, acknowledged in 
confidence that KMG, at least, viewed the fact that 
Kazakhstan's Parliament had failed to date to ratify the IGA 
as useful leverage in negotiations with the Azeris.  Darbayev 
told Energy Officer that he had heard, indirectly, that 
during his recent visit to Kazakhstan, the Azeri Prime 
Minister had raised the issue of IGA ratification with Prime 
Minister Masimov.  While Darbayev wasn't sure what Masimov's 
had replied, he was "worried that Masimov had not been 
properly briefed" about the strategic value of leaving the 
IGA unratified for the time being. 
 
KMG's Vision of Next Steps 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Darbayev explained that the Kazakhstanis needed all 
the leverage they could get in what he predicted would be 
difficult negotiations with the Azeris.  Darbayev described 
how KMG envisioned the negotiating process:  his office was 
currently drafting a "high-level" set of negotiation 
principles for approval by the GOK.  Once the GOK approved 
the principles, preliminary discussions with the Azeris would 
be launched.  (Darbayev suggested this could occur as soon as 
late March.)  Once the Azeris accepted in principle the 
"basic guarantees" that had been excluded from the IGA 
following Vice-Minister Kiinov's replacement of Kabyldin as 
lead Kazakhstani negotiator in May 2006 (Ref A), then HGA 
negotiations with both governments could begin. 
 
Major Differences on Shipping? 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) Darbayev identified four points to be addressed in 
negotiations with the Azeris:  (a) the "basic guarantees" had 
to either be included in the HGA, or adopted by means of a 
Government of Azerbaijan (GOAZ) decree;  (b) the GOAZ had to 
create a special tax regime for the project; (c) basic 
investor rights would have to be elaborated; and (d) the two 
sides would have to agree on a marine transportation concept. 
Darbayev noted that the last issue was likely to be 
problematic.  The GOK and investors envisioned joint 
ownership of the terminals on both sides of the Caspian, he 
said, but SOCAR President Abdullayev had recently lauded the 
planned construction of an entirely new, Azeri-owned terminal 
to receive Kazakhstani oil -- suggesting the Azeris had 
different ideas in mind.  Further, Darbayev said, the 
Kazakhstanis planned to use 40,000 - 60,000 DWT vessels to 
transport oil; the Azeris, confident that their existing, 
10-15,000 DWT fleet would dominate if tanker size were 
restricted, were likely to object. 
 
Two KCTS Segments, Two Negotiation Processes 
 
ASTANA 00000563  002 OF 002 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Darbayev told Energy Officer that the two components 
of the KCTS Project -- the Eskene-Kuryk pipeline and the 
"Trans-Caspian Project" (comprising a terminal at Kuryk, the 
tankers, an unloading terminal in Azerbaijan, and onward 
pipeline interconnections) -- called for different 
negotiating processes.  For example, he said, the pipeline 
project  would not have to be covered under an HGA; 
"regulation under national legislation" would suffice. 
 
No Specific Deadline f
or KCTS Completion 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Darbayev explained that, while including 
TengizChevrOil (TCO) in the KCTS process had added a sense of 
urgency, no specific completion date -- Kashagan "first oil" 
or other -- was driving the process.  At best, he estimated, 
the negotiations could be finished and construction completed 
in 2011.  (Note: ConocoPhillips' Country Manager Nick Olds 
recently confirmed to Energy Officer that Kashagan producers 
are counting on the fact that first Kashagan oil, in fact, 
will be shipped to market by some other means, with the 
Eskene-Kuryk pipeline coming on-line afterwards.  End note.) 
The GOK was urging KMG to move the KCTS process forward 
quickly, Darbayev said.  At the same time, he added, 
"Nazarbayev and other officials recognize that we made a 
mistake in rushing to sign the IGA, and we're determined not 
to make the same mistake again." 
 
7. (C) Comment: As Kabyldin's loyal deputy, Darbayev is 
likely still smarting from Kabyldin's dismissal as lead IGA 
negotiator last Spring, and the subsequent signature of a 
revised IGA under Kiinov's leadership.  For that reason, his 
comments about Nazarbayev's -- and the GOK's -- overall 
assessment of the IGA probably cannot be taken as 
authoritative.  End comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA562, KAZAKHSTAN: CONOCOPHILLIPS’ “N BLOCK” BID ON HOLD

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA562.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA562 2007-03-02 10:53 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3231
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0562/01 0611053
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021053Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8623
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0043
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000562 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
COMMERCE FOR ADVOCACY CENTER:BLOPP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: CONOCOPHILLIPS' "N BLOCK" BID ON HOLD 
 
REF: 06 ASTANA 738 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway; Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Don Wallette, ConocoPhillips' (CP) Russia 
and Caspian Region President, told the Ambassador on February 
28 that the GOK had decided to postpone, indefinitely, its 
selection of foreign partners to participate in the 
development of the offshore "N" block, in order to 
re-evaluate the reservoir in light of indications that the 
block's reserves are larger than previously assumed.  This 
unexpected news follows high-level GOK assurances in 
December, given both to CP and the Ambassador, that CP would 
be given an initial 10% stake in the project, with the 
details of CP's partnership with Shell and KazMunaiGaz (KMG) 
to be worked out in early 2007.  According to Wallette, 
CP's main rival for the project, Shell, has received the same 
bad news, leaving both companies in a state of uncertainty. 
 
2. (C) Summary (continued):  Discussing Kashagan, Wallette 
noted that ENI's recent announcement of a late 2010 date for 
"first Kashagan oil" was still "somewhat optimistic"; a 
late-summer 2007 engineering review might bring more 
certainty.  Wallette explained that the North Caspian PSA 
partners were increasingly interested in bringing Kashagan's 
sister field, Kalamkas, online in the short term, even before 
first Kashagan production.  ENI was receptive to the idea of 
another consortium partner operating Kalamkas, Wallette 
explained, and Shell had approached CP with a joint 
operatorship proposal.  However, Wallette concluded, given 
CP's small stake (9%) in the consortium, and Kalamkas's 
relative insignificance in CP's global portfolio, the company 
was unwilling to make the personnel commitments required of 
an operator.  End summary. 
 
N Block: Back to Uncertainty 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Wallette informed the Ambassador on February 28 that 
CP had recently been notified that, due to KMG's desire to 
re-evaluate the "N Block" reservoir, further negotiations on 
CP and Shell's participation in the project would be 
postponed, "perhaps until May or June."  (When CP first 
learned of the postponement, KMG sources told CP Country 
Manager Nick Olds that Kashagan delays had triggered a broad 
GOK review of its offshore Caspian development plans; later, 
however, CP received a more authoritative explanation: that 
the GOK had reason to believe that "N" Block reserves were 
larger than previously thought, and wished to re-evaluate the 
available seismic data.) Olds told the Ambassador that, as 
far as CP knew, KMG had not acquired any new data; rather, it 
would re-interpret existing data.  (Earlier in the week Olds 
speculated to Energy Officer that perhaps KMG had acquired 
new data from Chevron, which has been undertaking seismic 
data collection over a broad portion of the Caspian, 
overlapping "N" -- but by February 28 Olds seemed to have 
dismissed the possibility that Chevron's study had provoked 
the decision.) 
 
4. (C) Wallette termed the GOK stance "an abrupt change," 
recalling that CP had received clear notice in December, both 
from Energy Minister Izmukhambetov and Presidential 
son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, that CP would receive an initial 
10% share of the project, and partner with both Shell and 
KMG; further, CP had been told that detailed negotiations 
among the three partners, leading to signature of a "Heads of 
Agreement" (HOA), would commence in January.  While Mulva had 
not accepted that CP would receive only 10%, arguing instead 
for a 20% (CP), 20% (Shell), 60% (KMG) initial split, the 
company had weathered the delays caused by the January change 
of government fully expecting to reach closure on a deal soon 
after.  (Note: On December 15, both Izmukhambetov and Prime 
Minister Akhmetov told the Ambassador, as well, that CP would 
get an initial 10% of "N." The same day, President Nazarbayev 
also informed the Ambassador that CP would be included. End 
note.) 
 
5. (C) Wallette noted that "N" block rival -- and potential 
partner -- Shell had also been caught off-guard by the 
announcement; Shell's Country Manager, Martin Ferstl, had 
called Olds in an attempt to understand the GOK's decision. 
(Olds reported that a KMG source had told him that, upon 
hearing the news, Prime Minister Blair had called Nazarbayev, 
only to be told the same thing -- that KMG was re-evaluating 
the field.) 
 
 
ASTANA 00000562  002 OF 002 
 
 
6. (C) Olds told the Ambassador that KMG sources had informed 
him that the GOK's "N" block strategy was dependent on the 
outcome of the reevaluation.  If the reserve estimates grew 
substantially, the GOK would either launch an entirely new 
tender process, split the block in two and run separate 
tenders -- or, conceivably, "stay the course" with Shell and 
CP.  Ambassador Ordway raised the possibility that this 
latest news was (another) GOK tactic designed to squeeze the 
maximum amount of money out of Shell and CP before going &#x
000A;forward.  Did it not make sense, he asked, for Shell and CP 
to join forces, both to consolidate their position and to 
eliminate the possibility of being played off against one 
another?  Wallette and Olds agreed that it was time to 
re-evaluate CP's strategy, and that approaching Shell with 
such an offer was certainly worth another look. 
 
Kashagan:  Kalamkas Oil First? 
------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) Turning to Kashagan, Wallette suggested that operator 
ENI's recent announcement that first oil would be delayed 
until 2010 "meant December 31, 2010," and, even at that, was 
still "somewhat optimistic."  The consortium would likely 
know more by the end of the summer, he said, after further 
engineering work was done.  Wallette added that the 
consortium would have to provide the GOK with a revised 
development plan and budget during the summer -- which would 
likely provoke a "tough" GOK reaction. 
 
8. (C) Wallette told the Ambassador that a recent appraisal 
well at Kashagan's sister field, Kalamkas, had been "very 
successful."  Furthermore, he said, unlike Kashagan, Kalamkas 
gas was "sweet," making overall field development "no harder 
than routine North Sea work."  As a consequence, the 
consortium partners were seriously considering bringing 
Kalamkas oil to market early, ahead of Kashagan first oil. 
ENI, Wallette added, was open to the idea of appointing a 
sub-contractor as Kalamkas operator, so long as the field 
remained under the Kashagan Production Sharing Agreement, and 
so long as the operator adhered to the current development 
concept -- i.e., so long as Kalamkas oil was produced early, 
in order to help compensate for Kashagan delays.  (Wallette 
pointed out that accelerating the date of Kalamkas production 
was not necessarily the best economic decision.) 
 
9. (C) Shell had approached CP with a proposal to jointly 
operate Kalamkas, Wallette said.  Given their respective 
shares in the AGIP KCO consortium, and Kalamkas's relatively 
small size, neither company wanted to operate alone.  In 
fact, Wallette added, CP had turned down Shell's offer, 
unwilling to commit large numbers of its skilled personnel to 
operate what was, in global terms, a relatively insignificant 
project.  The CP executives reported that ExxonMobil was also 
rumored to be a candidate for the Kalamkas operatorship. 
 
10. (C) Comment.  The GOK's decision to delay a "N" Block 
deal is, of course, disappointing.  It is also mysterious -- 
is there, in fact, new seismic data?  Is this move a GOK ploy 
to squeeze more money out of CP and Shell, or perhaps to 
introduce new partner companies into the deal?   However, it 
is too early to assume that the GOK's promise of 10% CP 
participation has been broken.  While CP may find itself 
forced to raise its offer in the face of new reserve 
estimates, or even match another company's better offer in 
order to secure its promised 10%, we continue to take some 
comfort, at least, in the high-level promises made in 
mid-December.  End comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA546, JCIC-DIP-07-001: U.S. RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA546.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA546 2007-03-01 07:34 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0546 0600734
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 010734Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8612
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0009
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1381
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0657
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0948
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0011

S E C R E T ASTANA 000546 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR JCIC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 
TAGS: JCIC START PARM PREL KACT RS UP BO KZ US
SUBJECT: JCIC-DIP-07-001: U.S. RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN 
NON-PAPER REQUESTING ADDITIONAL PHOTOGRAPH FOR THE TRIDENT 
 
REFERENCE AID 
 
REF: STATE 23656 
 
Classified By: POL-ECON CHIEF DEBORAH MENNUTI, REASONS 1.4 (B/D). 
 
 1. (S) On February 28 DTRO-A delivered reftel U.S. response 
to the Russian non-paper requesting an additional photograph 
for the Trident Reference Aid to Major Makhit Nyshanily 
Tulegenov in MOD,s Arms Reduction Control and Inspection 
Activities Center.  Major Tulegenov had no comment. 
 
2. (U) POC for this issue is DTRO-A Chief Laura Smiley. 
Phone 011-7-3172-702-120; e-mail: AlmatyDTRO@state.gov. 
ORDWAY

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