Monthly Archives: July 2007

07ASTANA2067, KAZAKHSTAN: UNGA DELEGATION NOT FINALIZED

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2067.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2067 2007-07-30 07:11 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5654
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #2067 2110711
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300711Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0227
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1880
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 002067 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR IO/PPC(Batlle), USUN (McBride), NSC (McDonald), 
SCA/RA (Pfleiderer, Micaller) 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ITRA OVIP KSEP UNGA KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: UNGA DELEGATION NOT FINALIZED 
 
REF: State 101170 
 
1. (U) Poloff contacted Erlik Ali, head of the international 
organizations section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerning 
reftel. Ali reported that the Government of Kazakhstan has not 
finalized its delegation to UNGA, and would not do so until 
mid-August at the earliest. 
 
2. (SBU) Several government sources, including Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Yerzhan Kazykhanov, have informally indicated over 
the past month that President Nursultan Nazarbayev plans to attend 
UNGA, and will request a pull-aside with President Bush while in New 
York. Post will provide confirmation and additional information as 
it becomes available. 
 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

Advertisements

07ASTANA2061, KAZAKHSTANI OFFICIALS LUKEWARM TO DEMARCHE ON WTO ACCESSION

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2061.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2061 2007-07-27 08:39 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4149
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #2061 2080839
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 270839Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0218
INFO RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1452
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0009

UNCLAS ASTANA 002061 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA; USTR - HAFNER, ERRION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EINV EFIN WTRO WTO KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI OFFICIALS LUKEWARM TO DEMARCHE ON WTO ACCESSION 
BILATERAL SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: State 94657 
 
1. Summary:(SBU) Charge delivered reftel demarche to Minister of 
Labor and Social Protection Gulzhana Karagusova, Minister of Energy 
and Mineral Resources Baktykozha Izmukhambetov, and Deputy Chairman 
of the Financial Supervision Agency Gani Uzbekov.  While the 
responses ranged from friendly but technical (Karagusova) to 
respectful but aggressive (Izmukhambetov) to plainly unreceptive 
(Uzbekov), it is difficult to judge reliably the likelihood of these 
officials relaxing their stances as a result of the discussions. 
Uzbekov, perhaps, summed it up best: "in the end, it's a political 
decision, either by the President or the Prime Minister."  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) In a very diplomatic tone and in highly technical terms, 
Karagusova explained why she was "surprised" by the notion that 
progress has stopped in the bilateral services negotiations. She 
spoke of Kazakhstan's offer on labor being quite fair and, in 
various aspects, being superior to Russia's.  She mentioned her 
Ministry's flexibility on some areas highlighted by the USTR.  But, 
she stated, "we need to foster development of young specialists" in 
Kazakhstan.  "Unfortunately," Karagusova remarked, "our borders are 
not with the U.S.," alluding repeatedly to Russia and China, 
Kazakhstan's two "big neighbors."  Still, she expressed willingness 
to adopt some USTR recommendations and said, somewhat cryptically, 
at the end of the conversation, "This fall, when Ms. Aitzhanova 
[Zhanar Aitzhanova, Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade and WTO 
accession chief negotiator] resumes services negotiations, there 
will be no Mode 4 problems."  (Note: Karagusova recently joined the 
pro-presidential Nur Otan party and now appears on the party's 
roster of candidates for the August 18th parliamentary election. 
This is a strong indication that her days as Labor Minister may be 
numbered.  In response the Charge's question on her future plans, 
Karagusova (with some apparent bitterness in her voice) remarked 
that everything now is up to "God and the President."  End note.) 
 
3. (SBU) Energy Minister Izmukhambetov began his response to 
Charge's points by graciously acknowledging the role the U.S. 
investors have played in the history of independent Kazakhstan. 
"U.S. and Russia," he stated, "are our main partners," adding later 
that "with Russia, as well as China, we are neighbors; thus, our 
interests [with them] do not always coincide."  Izmukhambetov, 
however, appeared to concede nothing when he turned to the terms of 
Kazakhstan's WTO accession.  "As far as services," he said, "we are 
no worse than Russia on any issue."  Turning to energy specifically, 
he added, "Our terms are much more favorable than Russia's, with 
whom you have already signed.  So, what's the problem?"  He went on 
to state that U.S. energy companies have no problems operating in 
Kazakhstan, adding, however, "today we want investors here not just 
to take our oil but to help us: train our staff, develop technology 
in Kazakhstan."  "I have a request," Izmukhambetov continued, "if 
there are specific issues, please provide them in writing.  I will 
talk to Aitzhanova as well...  We would like to accede with Russia. 
If we fall behind, it will cause major problems.  It's in your 
interests, too, since no one is as involved in our economy as you 
are."  Izmukhambetov echoed Karagusova in expressing the 
Kazakhstanis' main concern with the accession: "We know we won't get 
twenty million U.S. workers and become 'dissolved.'  We can't be 
sure of that with some other countries." 
 
4. (SBU) Commenting on financial services, Financial Supervision 
Agency (FSA) Deputy Chairman Uzbekov displayed little willingness to 
compromise.  The FSA, he said, met with Aitzhanova two weeks ago and 
is now discussing what kind of new offer it can come up with.  "In 
our opinion," Uzbekov stated, "the financial sector is already 
liberalized...  You may not feel we are doing enough; in my - and 
our - opinion, we are doing too much."  Remarking on "very tough" 
negotiations with the E.U., Uzbekov bemoaned lack of appreciation 
"by the other side" of Kazakhstan's "significant" concessions. 
"There is talk as to whether we need to join the WTO.  There is no 
real analysis as to what we will gain [from joining]."  He stressed 
that the FSA is presently involved in "very tense discussions" with 
the Kazakhstani private sector, which has grown concerned, having 
realized that the WTO accession is imminent.  Turning to specifics, 
Uzbekov described the U.S. offer of a two-year transition period as 
"unacceptable."  "At the end, of course," he added, "it's a 
political decision." 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1994, KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, JULY 8-21, 2007

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1994.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1994 2007-07-24 05:01 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0532
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1994/01 2050501
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240501Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0160
INFO RUCPCIM/CIMS NTDB WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0224
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2073
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0340
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0468
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001994 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
DEPT PASS TO OPIC - BALLINGER 
DEPT PASS TO TDA FOR STEIN, EXIM FOR GLAZER 
DEPT PASS TO AID - EE-PHILLIPS/RUSHING 
TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTRI 
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/MAC/MLONDON, 4201/BISNIS 
USDOC FOR 6110/ITA/TD/BI/RHALPERN 
ANKARA FOR CFC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET EFIN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, JULY 8-21, 2007 
 
ASTANA 00001994  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  Summary: This information is drawn primarily from the 
Kazakhstani local press, and has not been checked for accuracy.  The 
opinions and policies expressed in this report are those of the 
authors, not the U.S. Government. 
 
-- Amendments to Budget 2007 Signed 
-- Amendments to Budget Code Approved 
-- Government Seeks to Curb Inflation 
-- The Railroad Gathers Steam... 
-- ...And KamAZ Trucks Along 
-- KazAtomProm to Purchase 10% of Westinghouse 
-- KazAtomProm to Set up Three New Facilities 
-- KZ/RU Consortium Wins Tender for 51% of Turkish Petrochem Co. 
-- Kazakhstan Welcomes Oil Cooperation with Croatia 
-- Bogatyr Access Komir Names New Director General 
 
Amendments to Budget 2007 Signed 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  Amendments to the national budget 2007 were approved by 
President Nazarbayev.  The document raised the projected 2007 budget 
deficit from 1.2% to 2.2% of the GDP.  The amendments also increased 
the annual inflation forecast from the range of 5-7% to 7-9% and 
adjusted the projected annual GDP growth from 8.6% to 9.7%.  The 
projection for 2007 GDP now stands at 12,464 billion KZT (approx. 
$102.4 billion).  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, July 5) 
 
Amendments to Budget Code Approved 
---------------------------------- 
 
3.  President Nazarbayev has signed amendments to the Budget Code. 
According to the president's press service, this law aims to 
introduce a more comprehensive definition of "budgetary oil 
revenues" and ensure their timely transfer to the National (Oil) 
Fund (NF).  The term "oil revenues" currently covers the 
government's revenues from exploration, production and sales of oil 
and gas condensate.  The new law creates additional income sources 
for the NF by classifying as "oil revenues" such government revenues 
as penalties charged for delays in fulfillment of contractual 
liabilities or non-compliance with rules governing oil production 
technology.  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, July 2) 
 
Government Seeks to Curb Inflation 
---------------------------------- 
 
4.  Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose by 0.8% during the month of 
June.  This is the highest monthly inflation rate for any June since 
1997.  Growth of food prices was responsible for 54.5% of inflation, 
services - 26.6% and non-food products - 18%.  According to Anvar 
Saidenov, Chairman of the National Bank, growth of money supply and 
a doubling of credit volume were the main causes of accelerating 
inflation.  In response, the Government asked the National Bank to 
tighten controls over money supply and called on various state 
agencies to continue its policy of stock exchange development and 
encouragement of industrial growth through higher labor 
productivity.  As of June 2007, the year-on-year rate of inflation 
was 8.1%.  (Izvestiya-Kazakhstan newspaper, July 17, Press-Release 
of the National Bank, July 3) 
 
The Railroad Gathers Steam... 
----------------------------- 
 
5.  The national railway company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ) has 
declared a $177.6 million profit in 2006 after a $129.5 million loss 
in 2005. The company stated that its assets soared from $5.1 billion 
in 2005 to $6.35 billion in 2006, while equity capital increased 
from $3.9 billion to $4.35 billion.  KTZ is wholly owned by the 
Samruk State Holding Company. (Interfax-Kazakhstan, July 11) 
 
...And KamAZ Trucks Along 
------------------------- 
 
6.  KamaAZ-Engineering, a Russian-Kazakhstani joint venture auto 
assembly plant (located in Akhmolinskaya Oblast in northern 
Kazakhstan), reported a sharp year-on-year increase in output.  In 
January-June 2007, the company assembled $52.7 million worth of 
 
ASTANA 00001994  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
trucks, compared to $21.1 million the year before. 
 
KazAtomProm to Purchase 10% of Westinghouse 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  Kazakhstani national atomic company KazAtomProm (KAP) is in 
talks to purchase 10% of the stock of U.S.-based nuclear reactor 
manufacturer Westinghouse Electric Co. from Toshiba Corp., which 
holds a 77% stake in Westinghouse.  According to KAP President 
Dzhakishev, the $486-million deal is to be finalized by autumn 2007 
and will be financed by the company's own assets.  The deal is to be 
coordinated with the U.S. authorities, said KAP President. 
Observers speculate that the deal may stem from
Toshiba's interest 
in obtaining access to Kazakhstan's uranium.  In turn, Kazakhstan 
may gain access to Japan's uranium enrichment technologies and a 
distribution channel for its uranium production.  (Interfax - 
Kazakhstan, July 18) 
 
8.  Four U.S.-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have 
called on the Bush administration to reject Kazakhstan's bid to 
acquire a share in Westinghouse.  According to the NGOs, the deal 
would undermine non-proliferation efforts and hand over sensitive 
nuclear technologies to the Kazakhstani regime, which they described 
as cruel, repressive and undemocratic.  (RIA Novosti - Russia, July 
19) 
 
KazAtomProm to Set up Three New Facilities 
------------------------------------------ 
 
9.  Ulba Mill (a division of KazAtomProm) has launched three 
projects, with a total value of $848 million, under the aegis of the 
Kazakhstani Government's (GOK's) "30 corporate leaders" program. 
The projects aim to create the complete cycle of nuclear fuel 
production in Kazakhstan.  The project on production of uranium 
hexafluoride and fuel assemblies will ensure fuel supply for 
third-generation reactors.  Ulba is also implementing a beryllium 
project to provide feedstock for nuclear fusion reactors and space 
engineering.  The third project is production of tantalum, which 
would be employed in manufacturing of super-light condensers with 
the use of nanotechnologies.  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, July 3) 
 
KZ/RU Consortium Wins Tender for 51% of Turkish Petrochem Co. 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
10.  On July 8, "TransCentralAsia Petrochemical Holding" consortium 
won the tender for 51% of Turkish petrochemical company "Petkim 
Petrokimya Holding" with a $2.05 billion bid.  The shareholders of 
the consortium are the Russian bank "Troika Dialog," the Kazakhstani 
investment group "Eurasia" (controlled by TuranAlemBank Head Mukhtar 
Ablyazov) and the "Caspi Neft" company, a Kazakhstani subsidiary of 
the U.S.-based "Transmeridian Exploration Incorporated."  However, 
Turkey's Privatization Ministry has requested a national security 
review of the consortium shareholders due to "negative comments 
among the Turkish community."  Furthermore, the trade union of 
Turkish petrochem specialists declared its opposition to the deal. 
(webside nomad.su/Kazakhstan - July 18) 
 
Kazakhstan Welcomes Oil Cooperation with Croatia 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
11.  Kazakhstan is interested in exporting its hydrocarbon resources 
to Croatia and, via Croatia, to western Europe, Kazakhstani 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev said at a joint press conference with 
Croatian President Stjepan Mesic on July 3.  According to President 
Nazarbayev, Kazakhstani companies are interested in developing 
Croatian oil and gas pipelines, and they also seek to become 
shareholders of European-based (or -linked) oil refineries and 
seaports. 
 
12.  National oil and gas company KazMunayGas plans to take part in 
the privatization of Croatian oil company INA, 44% of which is owned 
by the Croatian government, Kazakhstani Energy Minister 
Izmukhambetov said after his meeting with INA Executive Director 
Petrovic.  "The sides agreed that after the Croatian side provides 
concrete proposals for the privatization of INA, a Kazakhstani 
delegation will travel to Zagreb for further talks," the statement 
 
ASTANA 00001994  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
said.  INA owns about 450 filling stations and two oil refineries in 
Croatia.  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, July 9) 
 
Bogatyr Access Komir Names New Director General 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
13.  Sergey Opanasenko has been named a new director general of 
Bogatyr Access Komir (BAK), a Pavlodar Oblast affiliate of the 
U.S.-based Access Industries Inc.  Opanasenko, formerly employed by 
Russia's electricity transmission company RAO UES, has been with 
Access Industries since 2006.  Opanasenko replaces Dennis Price, who 
became Director General of "Sayran ON", a subsidiary of "Kuat," a 
leading Kazakhstani construction company.  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, 
July 11) 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1991, KAZAKHSTAN: A LITTLE PRE-ELECTION SPIN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1991.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1991 2007-07-23 08:11 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1991/01 2040811
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230811Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0158
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1792

UNCLAS ASTANA 001991 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV OSCE KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: A LITTLE PRE-ELECTION SPIN 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  During the July 13-14 nodel visit of 
Congresswoman Shelley Berkley, the GOK highlighted its 
preparations for the August parliamentary elections, 
arranging two separate trips for her to local polling 
stations.  Domestic media coverage was extensive, and 
pro-government media outlets emphasized Congresswoman 
Berkley's most flattering comments on Kazakhstan's democratic 
development and election preparations. Kazakhstan's 
arrangements for the visit appear to be part of a larger 
pre-election public relations push. End Summary. 
 
Congressman Berkley Shown to the Polls (Twice) 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2. (U) Congressman Shelley Berkley of Nevada visited Almaty 
on January 13-14.  The Congresswoman traveled to Kazakhstan 
at the invitation of the United Jewish Congress of Kazakhstan 
and on the recommendation of State Secretary Kanat 
Saudabayev, the former Kazakhstan Ambassador to the United 
States. Her main purpose for the trip was to support Mark 
Seidenfeld, a jailed constituent. Seidenfeld was found not 
guilty of embezzlement after spending eighteen months in jail 
prior to the verdict. 
 
3. (U) During her two days in Almaty, Berkley (accompanied by 
Charge) met with State Secretary Saudabayev, the Almaty 
Oblast Akim, the Almaty Vice-Akim, and representatives of the 
Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan.  She also visited a local 
synagogue and the Kazakhstani Jewish Community Center. 
Because she missed a connecting flight to Kazakhstan, 
Congressman Berkley's schedule was truncated and a meeting 
with Senate Speaker Kasymzhomart Tokayev canceled. 
 
4. (SBU) In addition, her Kazakhstani hosts organized two 
separate trips to polling stations, one a modern poll in 
Almaty with electronic voting equipment, the other a 
traditional ballot box poll on the outskirts of the city. On 
her July 14th visit to a suburban polling station, she was 
greeted by the Akim of the Almaty Oblast, at least 75 invited 
guests, and a host of media.  The polling facility was 
decorated with banners and various instructions on how to 
submit paper ballots.  Following several rounds of picture 
taking and welcoming speeches, Representative Berkley held an 
impromptu news conference.  Although most of the questions 
pertained to her impressions of Kazakhstan, when she stated 
"according to the U.S. Embassy, relations between the U.S. 
and Kazakhstan are strong and point to a fruitful future," 
sustained spontaneous applause broke out. 
 
5. (U)  Berkley's visit received extensive domestic press 
coverage.  The four national television stations, the Almaty 
and Astana municipal stations, and two cable channels devoted 
4-5 minutes of their evening primetime news broadcasts to her 
visit.  Three of the country's four daily newspapers managed 
to file stories for their Saturday editions.  All stations 
reported that the purpose of her visit was to observe the 
preparations for the Mazhilis elections. The official 
television stations highlighted Berkley's comments made at a 
polling station, where she said (translated from Russian 
transcript) "I am convinced that the system of electronic 
voting is simple, transparent, and elicits confidence that 
the vote will be counted correctly."  The newspapers, 
official and pro-government, reported her positive assessment 
of Kazakhstan's political and economic reforms.  She was not 
asked one question about the Seidenfeld trial during any of 
her press events. 
 
Kazakhstan's Embassies Active 
----------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Kjetil Hestad, Security Advisor for the OSCE/ODIHR 
election monitoring mission, told Poloff that when he applied 
for a visa to Kazakhstan in Oslo, Kazakhstan's Ambassador met 
with him for ninety minutes to discuss Kazakhstan's progress, 
how Kazakhstan is trying to do the "right thing" in the 
elections, and how CIS countries suffer from a double 
standard in the OSCE.  During the meeting, the Ambassador 
presented Hestad with several small gifts, including a 
leather-bound book on Kazakhstan filled with pictures of 
President Nazarbayev meeting foreign dignitaries.  According 
to Hestad, some of his OSCE colleagues from other European 
countries had similar experiences.  In Washington, Ambassador 
Idrissov sent a letter to "friends of Kazakhstan" in the 
United States soliciting volunteers for the OSCE observer 
mission through the U.S. quota. He wrote that "a personal 
knowledge of Kazakhstan and the understanding of building new 
institutions and political culture in a young society are 
important to be an objective observer." 
 
7. (SBU) Comment: With the international community keenly 
interested in the conduct of the Mazhilis' elections, 
Kazakhstan's public relations efforts are not a surprise. 
Despite its public relations efforts, however, the GOK 
remains aware that there will be a serious, substantive 
evaluation of its election related conduct, and thus far has 
been cooperative with the ODIHR election observation mission. 
 In a July 20 meeting with Charge, Lubomir Kopaj, the head of 
the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, sai
d that he has 
been pleased with his team's reception from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Central Election Committee, and he 
believes that the mission is on track thus far for an 
effective evaluation of the election.  These early reports of 
cooperation and transparency signal that the ODIHR election 
observation mission will be allowed to do its job, and will 
be able to distinguish "spin" from reality.  End Comment 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1988, KAZAKHSTAN: COUNTER NARCOTICS DONOR MEETING

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1988.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1988 2007-07-23 05:10 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9485
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #1988/01 2040510
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230510Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0153
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5/
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP/APSA-CA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP/GSA-CN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001988 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (OMARA), INL/AAE (BUHLER) 
CENTCOM FOR MALCOM AND ROESNER 
DHS FOR CBP - GLYNCO 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV KCRM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: COUNTER NARCOTICS DONOR MEETING 
 
ASTANA 00001988  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  On July 16, the International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Section of the US Embassy in Kazakhstan hosted another 
in a series of Counter Narcotics Donor Coordination meetings.  Major 
General Nukenov, Chairman of the Committee on Combating Drug 
Trafficking (KBN) briefed participants on the drug situation in 
Kazakhstan and spoke frankly about the material shortcomings of the 
KBN.  He described the concept for strengthening internal 
"Rubezh-Narkotiki" (Narcotics Frontier Posts).  Securing funding for 
the interdiction checkpoints was a focal point of the meeting. 
Donors noted that while resources are limited and preclude 
commitment to fund expensive equipment, e.g. UAVs, much can still be 
achieved through joint effort.   Participants appeared ready to fund 
additional projects,including development of a counter-narcotics K-9 
breeding/training program and equipment for public affairs work to 
enable KBN to establish public outreach and demand reduction 
programs In addition, INL has $1.1 million to assist in the 
development of the checkpoints.  End summary. 
 
---------------------- 
NUKENOV SETS THE SCENE 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) For the first time since assuming  leadership of the 
Committee on Combating Narcotics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MVD) in March, Major General Maratkali Nukenov participated in a 
counter-narcotics donor community meeting.  At the July 16 meeting 
hosted by INL officer at Embassy Astana, Nukenov said that between 
January 1 and June 30 the MVD initiated approximately 5,600 drug 
cases and seized 6,660 kilos of drugs including 75 kilos of heroin 
and 200 kilos of opium.  He reported that 55,000 drug addicts are 
registered in the country.  He noted the KBN works closely with 
Kazakhstan's drug addiction treatment centers and has a demand 
reduction program that he would like to expand.  The MVD is planning 
to add staff and purchase additional equipment to counter the 
projected increase in narcotics transit and sale in Kazakhstan. 
 
3.  (SBU) Regarding interdiction, Nukenov outlined his committee's 
plan for improving results.  Using the limited number of highways 
and the immense open spaces of Kazakhstan to the best advantage, the 
MVD established seven "Rubezh-Narcotiki" checkpoints (Narcotics 
Frontier Posts) to stem the flow of narcotics transiting Kazakhstan. 
 The posts are Kargaly in Aktobe oblast; Post Arasan in Akmola 
oblast; Post Ayagoz in Eastern Kazakhstan oblast; Post Syrdarya in 
Kyzylorda oblast; Post Ulken in Almatinskya oblast; Post Kyzyltu in 
South Kazakhstan oblast; and Post Leninskiy in Pavlodar oblast. 
(Note: To more effectively combat drug flow the Committee plans to 
move the post from the Akmolinskaya oblast to Karagandinskaya oblast 
which is now considered to be as more vulnerable area. End note.) 
 
4.  The checkpoints are located at intersections of major 
north-south traffic arteries in the interior of the country where 
readily available alternate vehicle routes are not possible.  The 
desert surrounding the posts prevents smugglers from detouring 
around the posts.  The bottlenecks serve as excellent locations to 
monitor the passage of vehicles and passengers.  Currently, 19 MVD 
counter-drug officers work at each post. 
 
5.  (SBU) Nukenov presented his vision of the overall functioning of 
the posts.  He described a future with established posts, fully 
staffed and operational 24/7.  The staff will be a team of 
professional counter-narcotics officers.  They will have received 
advanced professional training from foreign experts (including 
Customs and Border Protection and the Drug Enforcement Agency) to 
develop their skills.  Training will include courses for 
counter-narcotics operations officers, profiling, vehicles, and 
personnel search techniques.  The officers will use modern drug 
detection devices for which they will have also received training. 
The officers' detection and investigation skills will be 
supplemented by a high pedigree K-9 corps trained to locate 
narcotics. 
 
6.  (SBU) The posts will launch from 3-6 mobile teams each who will 
deploy randomly on paths and desert tracks to detect and deter those 
who try to skirt the main highways to avoid the fixed checkpoints. 
The checkpoints and mobile teams will be equipped with unmanned 
aircraft capable of working twenty-four hours a day and will be able 
to communicate with data and voice channels throughout the country 
via satellite connectivity. 
 
7. (SBU) Nukenov outlined the government of Kazakhstan's 
contribution to establishing, staffing, and equipping the 
 
ASTANA 00001988  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
"Rubezh-Narcotiki."  He said the government had allotted
funding for 
construction of staff offices, erecting inspection hangars, and 
establishment of dog kennels.  He pointed out that given the 
checkpoints' remote locations establishing them was neither easy nor 
inexpensive.  The locations are usually far from existing electrical 
lines and cell phone towers, communication by land-line is limited, 
if available at all, and the travel time from population centers is 
lengthy.  Nukenov said that the Committee will perform the necessary 
engineering work, construct inspection hangars, provide staff, and 
construct office space.  He requested donor assistance to complete 
the "picture" with equipment such as fixed and mobile X-ray 
machines, unmanned aircraft, communications for data and voice. 
(Note: a scanned copy of the complete list of the requested 
equipment has been forwarded to INL/AAE.  End note.) 
 
 
-------------------------- 
HALF A LOAF IS NOT TOO BAD 
-------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Budget limitations preclude the assembled donors from 
sponsoring the expensive items the MVD requested such as UAVs or 
x-ray machines.  However, some of the less expensive items were of 
interest to the attendees.  Hardy Roehling, Team-Leader of the 
European Union-sponsored Border Management for Central Asia (BOMCA) 
and representative of Central Asia Development Assistance Program 
(CADAP)noted that the equipment and other assistance requested by 
the Nukenov to create an Public Information Section seemed like a 
good fit with three CADAP projects scheduled for the next year.  He 
said EU programs on raising awareness of drug consumption, drug 
abuse prevention, and drug abuse monitoring systems could fit with 
Nukenov's desire to produce press clips, training films, and 
information pamphlets for public outreach campaigns on demand 
reduction. 
 
9. (SBU) Jean-Francois Puel, Attach of Internal Security of the 
French Embassy reported that the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
France is ready to provide training for K-9 experts and to train 
agents on shadowing techniques.  Mike Welch, newly arrived Deputy 
Chief of Mission of the British Embassy stated that most UK funds 
are allotted for regional programs involving Afghanistan.   He said 
that cooperation with the Kazakhstani MVD may therefore be 
considered only within a regional framework. 
 
 
10.  (SU) INL Officer noted State's substantial $1.1 million 
dedicated funding for the Rubezh-Narcotiki checkpoints and 
encouraged other donors to contribute.  U.S. funding is split 
between an $860,000 grant to UNODC to purchase equipment and 
training and $300,000 managed at post to purchase specialized 
training from U.S. sources.  The funds will be used to purchase a 
portion of the communications system to connect checkpoints and HQ, 
professional training, and expand K-9 capacities.  In addition, 
UNODC is considering training MVD officers under one or more of its 
regional programs. (Note: technical specifications of the 
communication equipment to be purchased have been provided to 
INL/AAE and OMC/CENTCOM via email.  End note.) 
 
11.  The head of the Office of Military Cooperation briefly 
described CENTCOM's Counter Narcotics Program.  He noted ongoing 
cooperation with the Border Guards and expressed interest in the GOK 
Counter-Narcotics Strategy 2006-2010. Nukenov promised to provide 
the strategy to all attendees including representatives of the 
British Embassy, French Embassy, UNODC, BOMCA/CADAP, OSCE. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
12. (SBU) Persuading Nukenov to come to the embassy for a 
counter-narcotics coordination meeting was not difficult - he is an 
engaging, open fellow - but it is a big milestone in INL's 
relationship with the MVD.  Generally, there is a strong reluctance 
by security service officials to visit, much less conduct business, 
in the chancery.  The donor and quasi-donor turnout at the meeting 
(most, but not all, now reside in Astana) and the active 
participation of the MVD is a strong indication that a quorum can be 
achieved in the new capital city to create multilateral cooperation 
to assist the GOK to counter the drug trade. 
 
13. (SBU) The MVD request was ambitious but the equipment and 
 
ASTANA 00001988  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
training fit into an overall development plan which is a marked 
improvement from requests received as recently as last year. 
Nukenov's can-do approach is a welcomed change.  To present the 
request to the donors, the MVD had to admit gaps in its current 
approach; this was a sign of openness and a new serious approach of 
the Committee to improving interdiction capability.  It is obvious 
that Nukenov is going to actively participate and closely oversee 
the work of his Committee.  Proof of this was his invitation to 
donor meeting participants to visit the MVD posts and see how the 
KBN works behind the scenes. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1973, KAZAKHSTAN: BORDER SECURITY DONOR MEETING

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1973.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1973 2007-07-23 02:06 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9357
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #1973 2040206
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230206Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0139
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5/
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP/APSA-CA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP/GSA-CN

UNCLAS ASTANA 001973 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (OMARA), INL/AAE (BUHLER), ISN/ECC (HARTSHORNE), 
SCA/RA (CUMMINGS), CENTCOM FOR MALCOM AND ROESNER, DHS FOR CBP - 
GLYNCO 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV KCRM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: BORDER SECURITY DONOR MEETING 
 
 
1.  On July 16, Embassy Astana's International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Section  hosted a Border Security Donor Coordination 
Meeting.  Participants included the Deputy Head of the United 
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) from Tashkent, the 
European Union Border Management Program in Central Asia (BOMCA), 
the Office of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Post's offices of 
Military Cooperation (OMC), Defense Threat Reduction (DTRO), Export 
Control and Border Security (EXBS).  The participants agreed to 
create a common database of equipment and training provided to the 
Border Guards (INL will create and maintain the database), share a 
list of events planned for the year, and conduct future Donor 
Coordination Meetings with the participation of the Border Guard 
Service of the Committee for National Security. 
 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2.  At a June 27 meeting with INL Officer and visiting ISN/ECC 
officer (EXBS), General Berkaliyev, First Deputy Head of the Border 
Guard Service of the Committee for National Security, agreed to 
regular border assistance coordination meetings with interested 
donors.  To lay the groundwork for future meetings, INL hosted a 
preparatory meeting of donors to work out a common approach for 
cooperation with the Border Guard Service. 
 
 
----------- 
WAY FORWARD 
----------- 
 
3.  The donors jointly decided that it would be convenient for all 
donors to participate in a common database of equipment and training 
provided to the Border Guard Service.  Zhuldyz Akisheva, UNODC 
Deputy Regional Representative for Central Asia proposed modeling 
the database on the existing web-based Paris Pact database.  INL 
Officer pointed out that that the donors would likely want a simple, 
nimble system.  Furthermore, donors agreed to  share annual plans, 
conduct joint assessment trips, and distribute trip reports and 
assessments in order to avoid duplication and overlapping projects. 
The next meeting was scheduled for September, after the August 
holiday recess. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
4.  As with the counter-narcotics donor coordination meeting 
reported septel, having enough participants resident in Astana to 
conduct coordination meetings is a necessary and welcome first step 
in the effort to maximize impact of scarce program funding.  If 
enthusiasm and energy are any indication, the future looks bright. 
Conducting the next meeting with the participation of the 
traditionally insular Border Guards will be the true test of future 
cooperation. 
 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1925, KAZAKHSTAN: SIX TRAFFICKERS DO THE CRIME… AND GET TIME

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1925.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1925 2007-07-17 06:41 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5497
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #1925 1980641
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 170641Z JUL 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0100
INFO RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 001925 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE (ALTON), G/TIP (FARAJ), SCA/CEN (O'MARA), SCA/RA 
(PFLEIDERER), TASHKENT FOR ALLEN 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM KCOR PREL PGOV KZ UZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SIX TRAFFICKERS DO THE CRIME... AND GET TIME 
 
REF: A) 06 ASTANA 32 
     B) ASTANA 62 
 
1. (U) Summary: On July 12, the town court in the western 
Kazakhstani city of Aktobe convicted and sentenced six people for 
torturing and using force to secure the labor and sexual services of 
13 citizens of Uzbekistan.  The Uzbek men and women had been held as 
slaves in a sauna complex.  The police discovered the situation on 
July 17, 2006 and moved the victims to a shelter for the duration of 
the trial.  The successful conviction of the traffickers was result 
of cooperation between Uzbekistani and Kazakhstani police and 
representatives of local and international NGOs funded by INL and 
USAID grants.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) Interfax Kazkhstan reported on July 12, 2007 that six 
traffickers were convicted of trafficking or abetting trafficking. 
The main defendant was a 37-year old woman who was the owner of the 
Atager sauna complex in Aktobe.  She was sentenced to seven years in 
prison for trafficking in persons and using force against people. 
Her two brothers were convicted of rape and torture.  One brother 
received six years in prison and the other three years probation.  A 
brother-in-law, an employee of the sauna complex, was convicted of 
sexual assault and torture and sentenced to six years imprisonment. 
 
 
3. (U) Two intermediaries from Beineu (a town near the 
Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani border) were also convicted. One woman was 
sentenced to three years in prison and the other was put on 
probation for two and a half years.  (Note:  The woman received 
probation because she had a minor child.  End note.)  The press 
reported that three Uzbek recruiters were convicted in Uzbekistan 
and will be imprisoned in Uzbekistan. 
 
4. (SBU) Post contact Timur Karimov, Head of the Trafficking in 
Persons Unit of the Criminal Police Department in the Ministry of 
Interior, confirmed the substance of the story as reported by 
Interfax.  He also provided further details on the convictions and 
terms of sentences - the court ordered the traffickers to pay each 
victim $400 as compensation for moral damage and a total of $2,000 
in salary compensation split between the 13. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment: Joint efforts of Kazakhstani and Uzbekistani 
police to investigate this case, their cooperation with local NGOs 
and with the International Organization for Migration in both 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan resulted in the successful conviction and 
sentencing of the traffickers.  In this one case, the government of 
Kazakhstan quintupled its conviction rate over the previous year. 
 
6.  (SBU) Comment continued: Programs of the International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Office (INL) and USAID both contributed to this 
successful prosecution, conviction, and sentencing.  INL has been 
trainng law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges to 
properly detect, investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers. 
One notable participant in INL courses has been Serik Aldashev from 
the Aktobe police department who led the case against the sauna 
traffickers.  USAID has been working with local and international 
NGOs to provide assistance and protection to Uzbekistani victims. 
End comment. 
 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1910, EXBS: KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR’S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1910.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1910 2007-07-16 00:18 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3129
RR RUEHAST RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #1910/01 1970018
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160018Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0077
RHFJUSC/USCUSTOMS WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0051
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC//NNSA/
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUCQAAA/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0432
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8063
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7966
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0009
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2186
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7195
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001910 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC PVANSON, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC-AMT LSPRINGER 
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE RBUCK 
DEPT FOR SCA/RA JSCHLOSSER 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN M. O'MARA 
CBP/INA FOR CDONOFRIO AND RWATT 
USDOE/NNSA CWALKER, TPERRY AND EDESCHLER 
DOC FOR DCREED AND GPETERSEN-BEARD 
USCG FOR BGOLDEN 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT, BISHKEK, BAKU, DUSHANBE AND ASHGABAT FOR EXBS 
ADVISORS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP KZ
SUBJECT:  EXBS: KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR'S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE 
(MAY-JUNE 2007) 
 
I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS: 
 
      1. TDY EXBS Jim Kelly departed post on June 21. 
 
     2. Small Boat Operations Course in Aktau, July 9-20. The EXBS 
office has received a cable requesting our cooperation and 
assistance in preparing for an advance Safe Boat Operations Course 
for Kazakhstan Maritime Border Guards in Aktau, Kazakhstan. EXBS 
sent a CC Cable for the U.S. Coast Guard team and a Diplomatic Note 
requesting Kazakhstan Maritime Border Guards' participation. 
 
 3. Administrative Enforcement Training (AE). The Department of 
Commerce will send one U.S. export control technical specialist to 
Kazakhstan to assist the Customs Control Committee to conduct an 
Administrative Enforcement Workshop for customs officials in Almaty 
on July 11-12. EXBS sent the CC Cable for a U.S. technical 
specialist and a Diplomatic Note requesting Kazakhstan Customs' 
participation. 
 
     4. ISN/ECC Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 
Program Manager for Central Asia Jeff Hartshorn visited Kazakhstan 
for a program review and consultations with Embassy and GOK 
officials from June 25 to June 29. 
 
 
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS CONDUCTED 
 
 1. May 14-18 - TDY Advisor Kevin Cummings and Kazakhstan EXBS 
Program Manager Gulnara Abildaeva traveled to the Dostyk Customs 
Port and the Bakhty Border Crossing on the Kazakhstan-China border. 
The EXBS team accompanied the representative from the Nuclear 
Technology Safety Center (NTSC) to Dostyk and Bakhty to conduct 
Border Site Assessments.  As part of the assessment process, the 
EXBS team inspected all equipment donated by EXBS and reviewed port 
facilities, operations and procedures. The Border Guards do the 
majority of searches on the passenger trains and on the external 
area of all cargo trains- a function normally performed by customs 
in the United States and in most other countries. Both the Border 
Guards and Customs at Dostyk would like a site visit to a US rail 
entry port to understand the US inspection process at international 
rail facilities. Those assessment reports have been submitted to 
INS/ECC Country Lead Jeffrey Hartshorn. 
 
      2. Department of Energy Software Upgrades. May 14-25 - A 
representative of NTSC upgraded the software for the portable X-ray 
Florescence (XRF) metal analyzers provided to the Dostyk, Bakhty and 
Maikapchagai customs posts. 
 
 
      3. June 14-15 - TDY Advisor Jim Kelly and EXBS Program 
Assistant Oxana Limareva performed an assessment of the status and 
capabilities of the Kazakhstan Border Guards and Customs at the 
border posts of Zhana-Zhol and Kyzyl-Zhar along the Kazakh-Russian 
border.  During the assessment the EXBS team also surveyed equipment 
donated to the Government of Kazakhstan under the Export Control and 
Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program, observed how 
Kazakhstan Customs and Border Guards officers conduct inspections of 
commercial trucks, and examined the commodities and vehicles 
crossing the border in both directions. 
 
      4. On June 19, the Ambassador, TDY EXBS Advisor, EXBS Program 
 
ASTANA 00001910  002 OF 003 
 
 
Manager and Chief of USAID Astana office attended a meeting with the 
Chairman of the Customs Control Committee, General Karbuzov. Customs 
procedures and Volunteer Visitor Programs were discussed. 
 
      5. During his June 25-29 trip to Kazakhstan, EXBS Program 
Manager for Central Asia Jeff Hartshorn attended country team and 
met with the Ambassador, DCM, Pol/Econ, INL, DTRO and USAID 
Officers. He also met in Astana with the Kazakhstan Border Guards, 
Customs and Ministry of Industry and Trade officials to discuss what 
Kazakhstan border security agencies need to improve their 
capabilities to prevent WMD. General Berkaliyev, first deputy 
director of the Border Guards Service stated t
hat he looks forward 
to increased cooperation with the United States in the fight illegal 
activity. On June 29 Jeff Hartshorn with INL Staff and the Second 
Line of Defense (SLD team) visited the Customs K-9 Training Center 
in Almaty. 
 
B.  TRAINING DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
 1. Industry-Government Relations Forum. TDY EXBS Advisor Jim Kelly 
and Kazakhstan EXBS Program Manager Gulnara Abildaeva attended the 
Industry-Government Relations Forum (IGR) on June 7-8 in Almaty. 
During the discussions, representatives from the Prime Minister's 
office and the Ministry of Industry and Trade expressed a desire to 
obtain (in some cases further) assistance in the following areas: 
 
      a) Internal Control Programs; 
      b) Product Identification Training; 
      c) Administrative Enforcement Training; 
      d) Industry Partnerships; 
      e) enhancing/creating websites; and 
      f) acquiring information on export control systems in other 
countries. 
 
During general discussions, government officials indicated that they 
could also use assistance in modernizing customs laws and procedures 
and automating their export license information 
 
 
C. EQUIPMENT DELIVERED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
      1. No equipment delivered during this reporting period. 
 
D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT STATUS UPDATE 
 
 1. Task Order 79 Donation. Task Order 79 for the EXBS donation of 
Ural Trucks and Border Guard Shelters is nearing completion. EXBS 
was notified by Kazakhstan Border Guards that eleven URAL trucks had 
arrived at their final destination. Definite delivery dates for the 
shelters have not yet been determined. 
 
 2. Preliminary Department of Energy Second Line of Defense 
(DOE/SLD) site survey. The Second Line of Defense (SLD) program team 
will develop an installation and integration plan for the placement 
of radiation detection equipment and portal monitors at vehicle 
crossing sites throughout Kazakhstan. The date for the start of this 
project has been moved from July 1 to October 1. 
 
     3. Product Identification Tool Training (PIT). Commonwealth 
Trading Partners (CTP) Export Control Specialist Elizabeth Antonia 
Smiroldo conducted a two day Product Identification Tool (PIT) 
Technical Workshop for Kazakhstan Customs in Aktobe  on June 21-22. 
CTP Export Control Specialist Adrian Boanca conducted PIT for 
 
ASTANA 00001910  003 OF 003 
 
 
Kazakhstan Customs in Ust-Kamenogorsk on June 26-27. Assisting in 
the training was CTP's in country representative Business Inform, 
who translated the PIT into Russian and modified the software to 
make the program more useful and user friendly. PIT participants 
gave praised the training and the usefulness of the PIT software. 
 
 
 4. The Kazakhstan Border Guards Service postponed the U.S. Cost 
Guard Mobile training scheduled for July 9 to July 20 because the 
hull of the Safe boats provided to 
Kazakhstan Border Guards in May of 2006 are not painted with the 
anti-fouling paint.  Two Safe boats are also not operational. The 
training was moved from July to October. 
 
E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT CONTROLS, NONPROLIFERATION, OR 
RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
 
 1. None. 
 
F. CASPIAN SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
      1. None. 
 
III. RED FLAG ISSUES. 
 
 1. None. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1902, KAZAKHSTAN: INFORMATION ON POULTRY TARIFF LINES

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1902.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1902 2007-07-12 10:14 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0555
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #1902 1931014
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121014Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0067
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2072
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0958
RUEHCR/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC

UNCLAS ASTANA 001902 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA), EB (M SINGER, A WINTON, R SCHNELLER) 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTR (B HAFNER, L O'CONNOR) 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USDA/FAS (K RAMOS, J FLEMINGS) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR ECON ETRD WTRO USTR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: INFORMATION ON POULTRY TARIFF LINES 
 
REF: A. STATE 88685, B. ASTANA 01448, C. STATE 67132 
 
1. (SBU) Post has reviewed evidence on Kazakhstan's 2006 tariff 
rates on poultry in response to Ref A request.  Government of 
Kazakhstan (GOK) decrees establishing poultry tariff rates, as well 
as import documents for frozen chicken halves or quarters, support 
the assertion that the poultry tariff rate for 2006 was 10%, rather 
than 20% and higher, as indicated in the GOK's July 2006 bilateral 
market access offer (Ref A). 
 
2. (SBU) A May 2005 GOK decree (number 430), which came into force 
the following month, changed the tariffs on frozen poultry meat 
(including on the line listed as 0207 14 20 0) from "20%, but no 
less than 0.15 euro per 1 kg" to "10%."  (Note: This lowering of 
tariffs appears to be part of populist economic measures passed in 
2005 in the run-up to the December 2005 presidential election.  End 
note.)  The next relevant decree was passed in August of 2006 
(number 765) and was to take effect in October of that year.  That 
decree, however, appears to have been primarily technical in nature, 
with the goal of making a transition to the 10-digit HS (Harmonized 
System) code.  Thus, it appears that the 10% tariff on poultry meat 
remained in force throughout 2006 and until May 2007, when another 
decree (number 287), passed in April 2007, resulted in broad tariff 
rate increases on poultry meat (Ref B and C).  In particular, the 
April 2007 decree raised the tariff rate for frozen chicken halves 
or quarters (02071420000) to "20%, but no less than 0.4 euros per 1 
kg." 
 
3. (SBU) Almaty FAS FSN was provided by a Kazakhstani company, on 
condition of anonymity, copies of two import documents for frozen 
chicken halves or quarters (HS Code 0207142000), dated July 14, 2006 
and November 29, 2006.  Both documents list 10% as the tariff rate 
applied to the imports. 
 
4. (SBU) As Ref A notes, one of the possible implications of 
Kazakhstan's July 2006 poultry meat tariff rates is whether or not 
the rate increase passed in April 2007 violates the standstill 
agreement (Note: The standstill agreement  dictates that, while 
negotiating WTO accession, applicant countries will not adopt laws 
or practices that are more restrictive End note).  It is notable 
that in recent discussions with Post, Kazakhstani officials appeared 
to accept the notion that the measure violated the standstill 
agreement.  Their retort, however, was that the standstill agreement 
represents an expectation rather than a formal obligation (Ref B). 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1877, KAZAKHSTAN FACES ANOTHER POTENTIAL WATER CRISIS

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1877.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1877 2007-07-10 05:53 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7731
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #1877/01 1910553
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100553Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0038
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7189
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0006
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8051
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2174
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1433
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7956

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001877 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR OES/SCI M. O'MARA, OES/PCI P. HUDAK 
EPA FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, B. FREEMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN FACES ANOTHER POTENTIAL WATER CRISIS 
 
REF: 06 ASTANA 934 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: As a country short on water, Kazakhstan 
relies heavily on the resources of the Ili-Balkash Basin, 
particularly the Ili River and Lake Balkhash.  Mismanagement, 
abuse, and increased water use by neighboring China all now 
threaten the Basin,s long-term sustainability.  The problem 
is particularly acute at Lake Balkhash, an already fragile 
ecosystem at risk if water use practices remain unchanged. 
The GOK is increasingly focused on protecting its water 
resources but is hampered by a shortage of technical experts 
and a strained relationship with China on water issues. End 
summary 
 
The Ili-Balkhash Basin: Kazakhstan,s Fertile Center 
 
2. (U) The Ili-Balkhash Basin, which encompasses parts of the 
Zhambyl, East Kazakhstan, and Almaty Oblasts as well as 
China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, occupies 13% of 
Kazakhstan's total territory (353,000 square kilometers) and 
has a population of 3.2 million people.  Lake Balkhash and 
the Ili River form the heart of the basin.  Lake Balkhash, 
the second largest lake in Central Asia and the third largest 
in Eurasia, has a length of 600 kilometers, a width varying 
from 5 to 70 kilometers, and a total surface area of 16,000 
km2.  The lake is freshwater in its western section, salt 
water in its eastern section.  The Ili River originates in 
China before stretching through Kazakhstan for 815 
kilometers. The river provides Lake Balkhash with 80% of its 
water. 
 
3. (U) The basin's wealth of water resources and favorable 
climatic conditions make it one of the most fertile areas in 
Kazakhstan.  The basin contains 45,000 rivers, temporary 
currents, and gullies with a total length of 118,000 
kilometers and another 24,000 lakes and man made reservoirs. 
 The total area of agriculture lands is 8.18 million 
hectares, including 6.53 million hectares of natural grazing 
pastures.  The basin is home to over 50 species of mammals 
and 120 species of birds. 
 
The Domestic Threat 
 
4.(U) Misuse, overuse, and abuse of Lake Balkhash and the Ili 
River threaten the long-term sustainability of the 
Ili-Balkhash basin.  The lake,s ecosystem is fragile because 
it is extremely shallow, with an average depth of only 5.8 
meters.  Intensive economic activity in southeastern 
Kazakhstan has led to increased water consumption. 
Watersystems that drain into nearby farms consume twice the 
water that similar sized European and American operations 
require.  As a result water levels have decreased, and 
coastal areas have degraded.  The surface area of the lake 
was reduced from 21,400 square kilometers in 1961 to 17,000 
square kilometers in 1999.  From 1972 to 2001, according to 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Division of 
Early Warning and Assessment, the southern part of the lake's 
surface decreased by approximately 150 sq kilometers. 
 
5. (U) Pollution has also done serious harm to the 
Ili-Balkhash ecosystem.  The Balkhash mining and smelting 
plant (Balkhashtvetmet), which sits on the shores of Lake 
Balkhash, pollutes the lake with heavy metal and sulfites, 
according to UNEP.  Bagban Taimbetov, the Karaganda region's 
deputy state prosecutor, told the Kazakhstani media in 2006 
that 1800 tons of dust discarded by Balkhashtsvetmet settles 
on the surface of the lake annually, including 140 tons of 
copper, 120 tons of lead, and 135 tons of zinc.  As many as 
600 tons of heavy metals and harmful microelements dissolve 
in the water and settle to the bottom. He also reported that 
in the tissues of fish caught in Balkhash, chrome content has 
increased 13 times, zinc 11 times, and nickel doubled over 
the last ten years. Bulat Bekniyazov, Ministry of Environment 
Department of Environmental Problems, Sciences and 
Monitoring, told ESToff that fish production in Balkhash has 
decreased by 40 million tons since the 1960s. 
 
The External Threat 
 
6. (SBU) Western China,s growing thirst for water also 
threatens the Ili-Balkhash Basin.  With a booming economy and 
a growing population, western China,s water needs are almost 
certain to keep growing. According to public reports, China 
 
ASTANA 00001877  002 OF 003 
 
 
intends to divert more water from the Ili to develop its oil 
industry.  Anatoliy Ryabtsev, Chairman of Kazakhstan's 
Committee on Water Resources, told ESToff that Kazakhstan has 
information that China has started to build a new water use 
facility for the Ili.  Ryabtsev also informed ESToff that 
China has admitted that the country,s industrial growth is 
surpassing its ability to prevent the Ili,s pollution 
(reftel). 
 
7.  (SBU) Kazakhstan lacks data, however, on China,s use of 
the Ili.  Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Water Resources 
Mukhtar Zhakenov told ESToff in May that the information 
Kazakh
stan possesses is dated, making it impossible to 
predict China,s future use.  In a March meeting, the 
Ministry of Environment,s Bulat Bekniyazov reported to 
ESToff that they have no official information from China as 
to whether they are using more water.  He did note, however, 
that Kazakhstani officials visiting China have noticed an 
increased number of water facilities on the Ili. 
 
8.  (U) In March, Kazakhstan hosted a meeting on Ili-Balkhash 
Basin integrated management attended by representatives from 
Kyrgyzstan and China.  The parties agreed to support 
development and introduction of an integrated management plan 
for the Ili-Balkhash Basin.  They also recommended finalizing 
a draft agreement by the end of the year on integrated basin 
management. 
 
9. (SBU) Talks broke down, however, when China rejected 
Kazakhstan,s offer to send China large stocks of free or 
heavily subsidized food for 10 years in exchange for a 
commitment from China to allow an unimpeded flow of river 
water into Lake Balkhash.  According to Bekniyazov, who 
attended the meeting, the Chinese refused to provide details 
on their use of the Ili River.  The Chinese also argued that 
Kazakhstan already has ample water resources, said 
Bekniyazov. 
 
A Visit to Balkhash 
 
10. (U) In early June, ESToff, Acting EST Hub Officer and 
Embassy Tashkent Scientific Affairs Specialist traveled to 
Balkhash, a city of 74,000 on the shores of Lake Balkhash. 
Upon approaching Balkhash, the first noticeable sight was the 
tremendous cloud of smoke emanating from Balkhashtsvetmet, 
giving Balkhash the look of a U.S. steel city in years past. 
 
11. (U) City Akim Kazhmurat Tokushev told ESToff that Lake 
Balkhash is healthy, and that no industry in Balkhash creates 
serious pollution.  A representative from Balkhashsvetmet 
present at the meeting with the Akim stated that the firm has 
never been fined for environmental pollution.  He added that 
Balkhashsvetmet plans to introduce cleaner technologies at 
its plant, although he could not give a fixed date for the 
introduction of the technology.  The Akim also emphasized the 
importance of Balkhashsvetmet for the city; the plant 
employees 12,000 people. 
 
12. (U) While in Balkhash, ESToff also met with NGO 
representatives Iskander Mirkhashimov of the Regional 
Environmental Center for Central Asia and Sayatbek 
Beysembekov of the Balkhash Environmental Center.  Both 
agreed that the greatest threat facing Lake Balkhash is water 
loss.  If the lake decreases 1 to 1.5 meters from current 
water levels, they said, the results will be catastrophic for 
Lake Balkhash and the region.  According to Mirkhashmidov, as 
the lake bed increases, the salinity of the entire lake will 
increase, and more salt and dust will be blown by wind across 
the Ili-Balkhash region, leading to the melting of glaciers, 
drought, and desertification.  The Ministry of Environment's 
Bekniyazov delivered a similar message to ESToff in an 
earlier meeting, saying that a small decrease in Balkhash 
water levels could lead to many of the same problems 
witnessed at the Aral Sea. 
 
13. (U) Focusing on China, Mirkhashimov reiterated that 
Kazakhstan lacks sufficient data on China,s water use. One 
solution, he suggested, would be to place measuring posts on 
the Chinese border, but he questioned whether Kazakhstan 
would have the personnel to man the posts.  He added that 
Kazakhstan should not make China the scapegoat for all of 
Balkhash,s problems.  Kazakhstan has created many 
environmental programs, he said, but has struggled to 
 
ASTANA 00001877  003 OF 003 
 
 
implement them because of a lack of human resources.  He 
noted that the Ministry of Agriculture's Committee on Water 
Resources only has several working level-experts who are 
overstretched because of Kazakhstan's many water problems. 
 
14. (SBU)  Comment:  Kazakhstan must improve its water 
management practices and reach an understanding with China on 
water-sharing if it is to ensure the sustainability of Lake 
Balkhash and the Ili-Basin.  The U.S. can play a role as 
Kazakhstan searches for solutions.  Post intends to send 
three Kazakhstani water experts to the U.S. as part of the 
International Visitors Program.  Further interaction with 
U.S. water experts will be appreciated by Kazakhstan as it 
attempts to deepen its own pool of experts and may help 
Kazakhstan to avoid an environmental crisis. End comment. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1851, KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, JUNE 10 – 23, 2007

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1851.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1851 2007-07-09 07:10 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6407
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1851/01 1900710
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 090710Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0012
INFO RUCPCIM/CIMS NTDB WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0222
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2070
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0338
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0466
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001851 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
DEPT PASS TO OPIC - BALLINGER 
DEPT PASS TO TDA FOR STEIN, EXIM FOR GLAZER 
DEPT PASS TO AID - EE-PHILLIPS/RUSHING 
TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTRI 
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/MAC/MLONDON, 4201/BISNIS 
USDOC FOR 6110/ITA/TD/BI/RHALPERN 
ANKARA FOR CFC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET EFIN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, JUNE 10 - 23, 2007 
 
ASTANA 00001851  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Summary: This information is drawn primarily from the 
Kazakhstani local press, and has not been checked for accuracy.  The 
opinions and policies expressed in this report are those of the 
authors, not the U.S. Government. 
 
-- Samgau's Board of Directors is Formed 
-- Kazakhstani Banking Sector Attracts Foreign Capital 
-- New First Vice President of KazMunayGas Appointed 
-- AES Fined For Antimonopoly Law Violation 
-- Chevron Interested in Burgas-Alexandroupolis Project 
-- Eurasian Bank to Finance Nuclear Plant Construction 
-- Oil & Gas Statistics for January-May 2007 
 
Samgau's Board of Directors is Formed 
------------------------------------- 
 
2.  Serik Burkitbaev, assistant to President Nazarbayev, was elected 
chairman of the board of the Samgau holding.  The National Holding 
"Samgau," a joint stock company, was created in April with the 
stated goal of fostering a favorable environment for achieving 
scientific and technological progress in Kazakhstan.  Vice Minister 
of Culture and Information Erzhan Babakumarov, Vice Minister of 
Economy and Budget Planning Viktor Suprun, Vice Minister of Finance 
Bakhyt Sultanov, and Vice Minister of Education and Science Farkhat 
Kuanganov were named members of the board.  Azamat Abdymomunov, 
former Vice Minister of Education, was earlier appointed chairman of 
Samgau's managing board.  (Press Service of the Government of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, June 17) 
 
Kazakhstani Banking Sector Attracts Foreign Capital 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
3.  Alliance Bank, Kazakhstan's leader in retail lending, has 
announced its plans to hold a global offering of its common shares 
in the form of Global Depository Receipts (GDRs).  The bank's press 
release states, "this offer is a secondary placement of existing 
common shares and represents about 20% of the bank's capital. 
Seimar Alliance Financial Corporation (SAFC) is the holder of these 
shares."  Alliance Bank's GDRs are expected to start trading on the 
London Stock Exchange in July.  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, June 21) 
 
4.  The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
purchased 25% of shares of KazInvestBank for 2.5 billion tenge 
($20.5 million).  Citigroup-affiliated CITI Venture Capital 
International (CVCI), a leading private equity investor in growth 
markets, also acquired a stake in the amount of $20 million. 
According to Nurlan Kapparov, Chairman of the Board of 
KazInvestBank, this deal will lead to the highest level of foreign 
participation in a Kazakhstani bank.  (Press Service of 
KazInvestBank, June 16) 
 
5.  Bank Austria Creditanstalt, part of the European banking group 
UniCredit, signed an agreement to purchase a controlling stake in 
Kazakhstan's Almaty Merchant Financial Bank (ATF Bank).  (Note: Head 
of the General Services Department of the Presidential 
Administration Bulat Utemuratov and his sons were known to be major 
shareholders of the ATF Bank, collectively owning about 33% of the 
common stock.  End note.)  According to ATF Bank's top managers, 
UniCredit paid $2.3 billion in this deal.  A UniCredit statement 
said that, following the transaction, Bank Austria Creditanstalt 
expects its stake in the registered capital of the ATF Bank to total 
at least 85%.  The UniCredit group will use its own internal 
resources to finance the purchase, which will be completed in the 
second half of 2007.  (Vienna, Interfax, June 22, Television Channel 
31, June 25) 
 
New First Vice President of KazMunayGas Appointed 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
6.  Maksat Idenov, 39, has been appointed First Vice President of 
the national oil and gas company KazMunayGas (KMG).  Prior to this 
appointment, Mr. Idenov served as Shell Vice-President for Strategic 
and Commercial Development, Middle East, South Asia and Caspian. 
Previously, Mr. Idenov worked as Assistant to Kazakhstan's Minister 
of Oil and Gas Industry; Deputy Head of the World Bank's Energy 
Department, Europe and Central Asia Region; and Presidential Advisor 
 
ASTANA 00001851  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
on Caspian energy and oil and gas export pipelines.  Idenov replaced 
Zhaksybek Kulekeyev, who was appointed the Chief Executive Officer 
of the state-owned railroad company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy. 
(Interfax - Kazakhstan, June 18) 
 
AES Fined For Antimonopoly Law Violation 
---------------------------------------- 
 
7.  On June 15, East Kazakhstan court fined AES, a U.S.-based power 
generating company, for violations of the antimonopoly law.  AES's 
Shulbinskaya and Ust-Kamenogorskaya hydroelectric power stations 
have been ordered to pay KZT 2.7 billion (approx. $22 million) to 
the Kazakhstani budget.  According to Industry and Trade Minister 
Orazbakov, an Antimonopoly Committee investigation revealed that AES 
had exploited its vertical monopoly in East Kazakhstan, selling 
electricity through an affiliated company, to derive monopoly 
profits.  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, June 18) 
 
Chevron Interested in Burgas-Alexandroupolis Project 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
8.  Chevron is interested in participating in the 
Burgas-Alexandroupolis project, together with KazMunayGas (KMG), 
Chevron's Executive Vice President George Kirkland said at the 17th 
session of the Foreign Investors' Council in Ust-Kamenogorsk on June 
15.  According to Mr. Kirkland, "We [Chevron] welcome the progress 
of Burgas-Alexandroupolis project, which will help ease congestion 
through the Bosporus Strait.  In step with CPC expansion, Chevron is 
interested in participating in this project together with KMG." 
(Interfax - Kazakhstan, June 18) 
 
Eurasian Bank to Finance Nuclear Plant Construction 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
9.  The Eurasian Bank of Development [jointly established by 
Kazakhstan and Russia in 2006] is ready to participate in nuclear 
power plant construction in Kazakhstan, the Bank's President 
Finogenov said.  According to Finogenov, the Bank has signed a 
corresponding memorandum with national atomic company KazAtomProm 
and Russian "Techsnabexport".  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, June 19) 
 
Oil & Gas Statistics for January-May 2007 
----------------------------------------- 
 
10.  According to the National Statistics Agency, in January-May 
Kazakhstan produced 22.9 million tons of crude oil, and 12.4 billion 
cubic meters of natural gas, up 5.4% and 19.6%, respectively, from 
the same period in 2006.  (Interfax - Kazakhstan June 12) 
 
11.  In January-April Kazakhstan exported 19.9 million tons of oil 
and gas condensate (valued at $7.7 billion), up 15.6% versus 2006. 
During the same period the republic exported 1.2 million tons of oil 
products (79% higher compared to the same period last year).  Oil 
products imports came to 0.7 million (up 20.3%).  Imports of natural 
gas reached 2.6 billion cubic meters (up 68.8%).  Kazakhstan 
exported 4.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas in the reporting 
period (up 90.1%).  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, June 12) 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1848, KAZAKHSTAN: GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION VIEWS ON

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1848.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1848 2007-07-09 00:09 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6149
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #1848/01 1900009
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 090009Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//SCA COLLECTIVE/ PRIORITY 0007
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0219
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2224
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1777

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001848 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION VIEWS ON 
UPCOMING PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
Classified By: CDA Kevin Milas, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  While some in the government seek to dampen 
expectations about the opposition's performance in upcoming 
parliamentary elections, the opposition itself is uniting and 
preparing to run an active campaign highlighting social 
justice issues and the presidential Nur Otan party's Achilles 
heel of corruption.  Presidential Administration head Adilbek 
Dzhaksybekov assured the Ambassador that the authorities will 
ensure fair Mazhilis elections on August 18, but predicted 
that the opposition's decision to unite under the Social 
Democratic name will cost it votes.  Opposition leaders 
Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and Bulat Abilov claim that the united 
opposition faces an uphill battle against "fake" opposition 
parties and a presidential party benefiting from massive 
private sector subsidies, administrative resources, and 
biased electoral commissions.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Government: Opposition Will Fail in Fair Elections 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
2. (C) The Kazakhstani government is doing everything it can 
to ensure that the August 18 elections for the Mazhilis 
(lower house of parliament) will be open to equal competition 
by all parties, Presidential Administration head Adilbek 
Dzhaksybekov told the Ambassador on June 28.  Dzhaksybekov, 
whose awkward body language revealed his discomfort 
discussing the election issue, claimed that "everyone" was 
seeking administrative resources from the government but "not 
even (presidential party) Nur Otan" will receive assistance. 
 
3. (C) Dzhaksybekov stated that the government recognized the 
long-term benefit of having the opposition represented in 
parliament.  He said that he is nonetheless skeptical that 
the newly enlarged Social Democratic party, which has 
absorbed True Ak Zhol, will be able to cross the 7% threshold 
for inclusion.  Dzhaksybekov characterized it as a mistake 
for the opposition to abandon the well-known True Ak Zhol 
"brand."  All parties, even Nur Otan, will face difficulty 
getting out the vote during the hot vacation season in 
August, he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Opposition: Results Will Be Determined by Astana 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4. (SBU) During a June 29 meeting with the Ambassador, 
opposition leaders Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and Bulat Abilov 
confirmed the decision to merge the Social Democratic and 
True Ak Zhol parties at a July 7 party congress.  The new 
party's campaign platform will focus on themes that will 
resonate with the general public such as education, health 
care, natural resources, corruption, criminality, and drugs, 
said Tuyakbay.  (In a separate conversation with the DCM, 
opposition activist Petr Svoik said that two main campaign 
slogans would be "Hands Off Our Right-Drive Cars" and "the 
National Fund Should be the People's Fund," a reference to 
spending more of the country's oil wealth on pressing social 
needs.)  Tuyakbay told the Ambassador that negotiations were 
underway to include Alga and the Communist Party.  (Note: 
Subsequent press reports indicate that both groups decided 
not to join, and the Communists have called on their voters 
to boycott the Mazhilis elections.  End note.) 
 
5. (C) Abilov alleged that rival Alikhan Baymenov's Ak Zhol 
party was already receiving administrative resources from the 
government and being allowed to advertise widely.  The 
government will try to portray Ak Zhol as a true opposition 
party and will manipulate the voting so that it comes in 
second after Nur Otan, he claimed.  In contrast, Abilov said, 
the Social Democrats had thus far not been able to air a 
single television ad.  While he expected the television 
channels to agree to air their ads during the formal campaign 
period, Abilov predicted problems distributing printed 
material around the country, which they would seek to avoid 
by printing as much as possible locally. 
 
6. (SBU) Abilov also complained that the opposition had been 
included in only 1,000 of the 10,000 local electoral 
commissions around the country.  The bulk of their 
representatives were in rural areas where they expected few 
votes. At the same time, several very small pro-presidential 
parties such as Rukhaniyat and the Patriots' Party were 
represented on almost all electoral commissions.  (Details of 
the commission formation process to be reported septel.) 
 
7. (C) Abilov predicted that the Social Democrats would 
 
ASTANA 00001848  002 OF 003 
 
 
receive 30% of the vote.  If the campaign, voting, or 
tabulation were rigged, the party might pull out of the 
voting or refuse to take any seats it won, he added.  Voters 
distinguish between President Nazarbayev the person, still 
respected as the creator of an independent, stable &#x
000A;Kazakhstan, and Nur Otan, which is seen as the party of 
corrupt bureaucrats, Abilov said.  Tuyakbay commented that 
Almaty mayor Imangali Tasmagambetov had become one of the 
richest people in the country thanks to billions of dollars 
worth of land sales during his tenure.  Abilov named 
Nazarbayev confidante Bulat Utemuratov as another example of 
high-level corruption, "a billionaire who has never had a 
business."  The opposition will use the scandal surrounding 
presidential son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev to show that Nazarbayev 
has failed to rein in his family, Tuyakbay said. 
 
8. (C) Tuyakbay alleged that Nur Otan has received massive 
donations from the country's main businesses, including $50 
million each from KazMunayGas and Kaz Temir Zholiy (the 
national railroad); $50 million from metals magnate Aleksandr 
Mashkevich; $50 million from KazakhMys; and $50 million total 
from the five main banks.  "The Social Democrats have 
resources," he said, "but nothing like Nur Otan's $300 
million warchest."  Tuyakbay also claimed that oblast akims 
(regional leaders) have been ordered to deliver 80% of the 
vote to Nur Otan; the akims have in turn set an 85% target 
for the local leaders underneath them in order to "outdo the 
next guy."  He predicted that the final totals would be 
determined in Astana, and that Ak Zhol and the Social 
Democrats would each likely receive the minimum 7%. 
 
9. (SBU) Alga leader Asylbek Kozhakhmetov told the DCM on 
July 2 that he believed the end result would depend on 
President Nazarbayev's will, but it was realistic to expect 
the united opposition forces to cross the 7% threshold and 
receive 10-15 seats in the Mazhilis. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Zhakiyanov Sees Shortcomings on Both Sides 
------------------------------------------ 
 
10, (C) In a separate meeting with the Ambassador on June 29, 
former opposition leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov said that the 
recent constitutional reforms and new elections were 
Nazarbayev's way of protecting himself.  Nazarbayev is "not 
eager to leave office," Zhakiyanov said, but is making 
preparations to retain control by appointing more members of 
parliament, becoming party leader, and securing the loyalty 
of the Assembly of Peoples.  Zhakiyanov predicted that when 
Nazarbayev left office he would become a senator for life and 
take a seat on the Constitutional Council. The recent changes 
were not an effort to win the chairmanship of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
Zhakiyanov asserted.  Nazarbayev is "sick of the issue," 
which is "now much more important for Vladimir Putin than for 
Nazarbayev himself," he explained. 
 
11. (C) Zhakiyanov said that at one point Tuyakbay had the 
chance to be the "constructive opposition" included in the 
Mazhilis, but the decision to merge with True Ak Zhol would 
irritate Nazarbayev because of the group's tendency to make 
radical statements.  The Social Democrats will therefore 
probably receive 6.5% of the vote, Zhakiyanov predicted; Ak 
Zhol and perhaps the splinter People's Communist Party would 
be included in the lower house.  The authorities will say 
that the Social Democrats failed to cross the threshold due 
to the perceived "closure" of True Ak Zhol and the 
Communists' refusal to participate.  He saw the decision not 
to preserve the True Ak Zhol name as a mistake. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
12. (C) Given the Kazakhstani government's continued drive to 
chair the OSCE in 2009 (which, despite Zhakiyanov's 
assertions, has not flagged), we expect the authorities to do 
everything possible to give the appearance of a clean and 
fair election.  Nevertheless, the opposition's predictions of 
abuse of administrative resources and vote manipulation are 
not baseless; whatever the exhortations from Astana, the 
fundamental conditions which contributed to flawed elections 
in the past -- primarily the fact that regional leaders are 
appointed by and loyal only to President Nazarbayev -- have 
not changed.  The fact that the opposition maintains a 
relatively optimistic outlook in the face of such odds lends 
support to the rumor that negotiations with Astana have 
resulted in a mutual understanding regarding the election 
 
ASTANA 00001848  003 OF 003 
 
 
results. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1842, KAZAKHSTAN: CIVIL AVIATION COMMITTEE SUGGESTS NEGOTIATIONS

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1842.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1842 2007-07-06 10:23 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4992
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #1842 1871023
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061023Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9997
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0050

UNCLAS ASTANA 001842 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA), PM/SNA (LOFTIS) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR MARR MOPS PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: CIVIL AVIATION COMMITTEE SUGGESTS NEGOTIATIONS 
ON STATE AIRCRAFT FEES AGREEMENT 
 
REF: Astana 1220 and previous 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The two Kazakhstani entities with the greatest 
interest in concluding a State Aircraft Fees Agreement with the 
U.S., the Civil Aviation Committee and KazAeroNavigatsiya, believe 
that the time is ripe for a U.S. negotiating team to come to Astana 
to conclude negotiations and initial the text.  Post agrees that 
bringing a U.S. delegation would help speed up the sclerotic 
Kazakhstani interagency review process.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Pol-Econ Chief, Econoff, and Economic Specialist met on 
July 2 with Radilbek Adimolda, Deputy Chairman of the Civil Aviation 
Committee of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, to 
discuss the current status of negotiations on the State Aircraft 
Fees Agreement (SAFA).  Marat Dautaliyev, KazAeroNavigatsiya's 
Astana-based Deputy General Director, also participated in the 
meeting. 
 
3. (SBU) Adimolda confirmed that the MFA had circulated the draft 
SAFA text for interagency review, and that many of the relevant 
ministries had already submitted their comments.  The Ministry of 
Defense has no objections to the current language of the agreement. 
The Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning objected to the 
reference to commercial aircraft in Article I (which Adimolda 
acknowledged was added specifically to address Kazakhstani 
concerns).  The Agency for Regulation of Natural Monopolies (ARNM), 
which regulates KazAeroNavigatsiya, opposed waiving the fees 
retroactively and wanted some part of the GOK to make up for the 
financial "gap" created by exemptions for U.S. state aircraft. 
Adimolda indicated that once all the comments were in, the relevant 
ministries would meet to decide which objections had merit and 
should be conveyed formally to the U.S. 
 
4. (SBU) Adimolda said that he sees a need for engagement between a 
U.S. delegation and a GOK interagency working group headed by a Vice 
Minister of Transport and Communications.  The delegations, he 
added, should be of high enough level to be able to make decisions 
and initial the agreement.  It would then need to be sent for final 
interagency review, signed, and ratified.  Adimolda remarked that 
additional information regarding how the U.S. has resolved this 
issue with other CIS countries would be helpful in garnering support 
for the agreement. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment:  Post believes that sending a USG delegation to 
Astana with the authority to initial an agreement would give 
additional impetus to the Kazakhstani review process and bring us 
closer to resolving the long-standing aircraft fees issue.  End 
comment. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1840, KAZAKHSTAN: BRIEFING ON NUCLEAR ENERGY AND

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1840.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1840 2007-07-06 08:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1840 1870845
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060845Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9995
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1429

UNCLAS ASTANA 001840 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR M. O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: BRIEFING ON NUCLEAR ENERGY AND 
NONPROLIFERATION DECLARATION 
 
REF: STATE 93192 
 
On July 6, Poloff and his Russian Embassy counterpart 
delivered reftel information to Kayrat Sarzhanov, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Section for International Security Advisor. 
Sarzhanov welcomed the information and said that Kazakhstan 
is focused on further developing its nuclear industry.  He 
noted that Kazakhstan and Russia are already cooperating to 
create an international uranium enrichment center in Angarsk. 
 Sarzhanov also emphasized that Kazakhstan will be fully open 
and transparent about its nuclear program.  In August, he 
said, Kazakhstan will host a seminar for CIS countries that 
have not yet ratified the IAEA additional protocol. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1837, KAZAKHSTAN: NATO PFP DESTRUCTION PROJECT MEMORANDUM PASSED

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1837.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1837 2007-07-06 08:20 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1837 1870820
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060820Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9990

UNCLAS ASTANA 001837 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/WRA (BAKER); SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA) 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NATO PFP DESTRUCTION PROJECT MEMORANDUM PASSED 
BY MAZHILIS AND SENATE 
 
REF:  06 STATE 194986 
 
1. (SBU) On June 20, the Mazhilis ratified the memorandum for the 
NATO Partnership for Peace-sponsored destruction of Kazakhstani 
small arms and light weapons.  On June 28, the Senate followed suit 
and passed the memo, forwarding it to the desk of the president. 
According to the press, Deputy Defense Minister Bolat Sembinov said 
that the project would support the Ministry's "high priority project 
to destroy over 27,000 units of surplus out-of-date small arms and 
over 300 substandard missiles" (i.e. MANPADS, reftel). 
 
2. (U) According to Kazakhstani law, the president now has one month 
to sign the memo, finalizing the process by the end of July. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1824, KAZAKHSTAN: BORDER GUARDS VISIT U.S. AND WANT TO STAY IN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1824.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1824 2007-07-06 00:49 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4457
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #1824/01 1870049
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060049Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//SCA COLLECTIVE/ PRIORITY 9975
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5/
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP/APSA-CA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP/GSA-CN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001824 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (OMARA), INL/AAE (ALTON AND BUHLER) 
CENTCOM FOR MALCOM AND ROESNER 
DHS FOR CBP - GLYNCO AND ARTESIA 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: BORDER GUARDS VISIT U.S. AND WANT TO STAY IN 
TOUCH 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  On May 17-26, the Director and Deputy Director 
of the Kazakhstani Border Guard training academy visited Washington, 
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers in Glynco, GA and 
Artesia, NM, and the Rio Grande Valley Sector of the Border Patrol 
in order to familiarize themselves with U.S. methods of securing 
borders and training officers.  The visit resulted in agreement for 
future professional cooperation between U.S. and Kazakhstani 
training academies; possible establishment of a regional training 
program for border guards of Central Asia in Almaty on the grounds 
of the Border Guard Academy; an invitation to the Chief Patrol Agent 
of the U.S. Border Patrol Academy in Artesia to visit Kazakhstan; 
and a request to send two Kazakhstani border guards to receive basic 
training at the CBP Academy in Glynco, Georgia.  End summary. 
 
----------- 
BACKGROUND 
----------- 
 
2.  (U) As part of the INL project to combat transnational crime at 
Kazakhstan's borders, INL proposed creating a professional 
relationship between the border guard training institutes of the 
U.S. and Kazakhstan.  As the first step, in the spring of 2006 INL 
Assistant Secretary Anne Patterson and Ambassador Ordway invited of 
the Head of the Military Institute, Major General Bauyrzhan 
Yelubayev, to visit the U.S. 
 
3.  (U) Over the last year Yelubayev expressed interest in reforming 
the border guard training system for cadets and in-service officers. 
 He said that Kazakhstan should abandon the use of border troops as 
a military vanguard protecting the country and reorient the service 
to perform a multi-mission law enforcement role.  He asserted that 
the main threat at the border for Kazakhstan is transnational crime, 
especially narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan.  Additionally, 
stability in the country and economic opportunity attract illegal 
migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and even Russia. 
Therefore, INL organized a visit to the Customs and Border 
Protection Academy on the campus of the Department of Homeland 
Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, GA, 
the U.S. Border Patrol Academy on the grounds of the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center in Artesia, NM, and the Rio Grande 
Valley Sector of the Border Patrol. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
STATE-DOD INTEREST IN REGIONAL BORDER GUARD TRAINING IN ALMATY 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
4.  (U) INL launched the visit of Major General Bauyrzhan Yelubayev 
and Colonel Nazym Muzdybayev, Director and Deputy Director 
respectively of the Military Institute of the Committee for National 
Security (which trains Kazakhstani Border Guards), with meetings at 
State and the Pentagon.  In conjunction with the visit, Astana INL 
Officer and INL/AAE Desk Officer met with DASD for Central Asia, 
Mitch Shivers, to discuss joint State-DOD efforts to combat 
narcotics through improved border security in Central Asia. 
 
5.  (SBU) INL meetings with DASD for Central Asia as well as 
Yelubayev's meetings at the Pentagon with Principal Director for 
Transnational Threats, Ed Frothingham, in the office of the ASD for 
Global Security Affairs, and with State's Acting Director of INL/AAE 
revealed interest in the idea of establishing a regional border 
guard training center on the grounds of the Military Institute in 
Almaty.  Department of Defense representatives also expressed 
interest in joining with members of the Astana country team to 
consider contributing to the development of the Military Institute 
or a regional border guard training center. 
 
------------------------- 
A LOOK AT U.S. EXPERIENCE 
------------------------- 
 
6.  (U) Beyond Washington, in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
Field Operations Academy in Glynco, GA Dorothy Shiefer, Acting 
Director briefed on the training curricula for basic and advanced 
training for CBP officers.  The graduates of the Academy work at 
international airports, seaports and land border crossings. 
Yelubayev said that using tools and technology as well as real life 
role plays during training is the best way to prepare the officers 
for real life situations when they are on duty.  He expressed the 
willingness to send some of his graduates to receive basic training 
at CBP Academy.  Shiefer agreed that this was an avenue of 
cooperation that should be explored.  (Comment: Notwithstanding that 
 
ASTANA 00001824  002 OF 002 
 
 
the government of Kazakhstan deploys border forces differently than 
the U.S. the tasks of border protection, passport control, and 
customs enforcement are sufficiently similar to permit joint 
training.  End comment.) 
 
7.  (U) The discipline, intensive training courses, and facilities &#x
000A;at the Border Patrol Academy in Artesia, NM impressed the 
Kazakhstani delegation.  Yelubayev told EmbOffs that he wanted to 
amend the Kazakhstani specialized training program on border 
management in order to have more practical exercises as is done in 
the U.S. system.  He added that his Institute has a good location 
and highly professional staff; however, the institute needs modern 
equipment and new language learning methods. 
 
8.  (U) The method for learning English and other languages at the 
institute needs to be changed, Yelubayev asserted, and the course 
vocabulary must be specialized to relate specifically to those tasks 
accomplished by a border officer as he saw at Artesia.  He requested 
that the Border Patrol Academy provide a copy of the Spanish 
language curriculum and textbooks so the Military Institute can 
modify its curriculum.  (Note: On June 12, INL provided the 
requested material which it had received from Artesia.  End note.) 
 
9.  (U) The representatives of the Public Affairs Office of the Rio 
Grande Valley Sector showed the Central Asian visitors the daily 
operations of U.S. Border Patrol agents.  Yelubayev noted that high 
quality modern equipment is very useful in the work of border patrol 
agents and having such equipment in Kazakhstan would be an asset, 
especially the video surveillance system.  Yelubayev noted that 
patrolling on the river prevents some illegal migration, but it not 
possible to control the river along the border 24 hours a day.  The 
delegation immediately grasped the concept that patrolling in 
cooperation with the intelligence analysis increases rates of drug 
seizures and arrests of illegal migrants. 
 
----------------------- 
FAST, POSITIVE FEEDBACK 
----------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) Arriving back in Kazakhstan on May 29 General Yelubayev 
reported to Armangeldy Shabdarbayev, Chairman of the Committee for 
National Security about the visit on May 31, and met with EmbOffs on 
June 1.  Yelubayev reported that Shabdarbayev supported the idea of 
opening the Military Institute to regional training courses; the 
invitation of Charles Whitmire, Head of CBP Border Patrol Academy 
Artesia to visit the Military Institute; and concurred with sending 
two graduates of the Military Institute with excellent English 
language skills to attend the basic course at CBP Academy in 
Glynco. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11.  (SBU) The system of training Border Patrol and CBP officers in 
the U.S. definitely caught the attention of the Kazakhstani 
delegation.  Yelubayev seemed very interested in reducing the 
four-year training program of border guard officers in Kazakhstan 
and saw much to admire in the U.S. 17-week program.  While the U.S. 
and Kazakhstani border management systems are quite different, 
teaching the specific tasks necessary for officers to accomplish 
their missions looks to be a basis to bridge the gap. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1808, KAZAKHSTAN: TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS IN DARFUR

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1808.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1808 2007-07-03 06:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1808 1840628
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 030628Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9962

UNCLAS ASTANA 001808 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN M. O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO UNSC MASS SU KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS IN DARFUR 
 
REF: STATE 90022 
 
(SBU) In a meeting with Poloff on July 3, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs International Security Advisor Kayrat Sarzhanov 
promised to pass reftel information on to his superiors at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Security Council.  He 
gave no indication of the likelihood of Kazakhstan's 
participation but told Poloff that he hopes to have an answer 
soon. DATT also delivered the message informally to Israel 
Telegen, Ministry of Defense Directorate of International 
Cooperation Chief, who offered no immediate reaction. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1801, KAZAKHSTAN: MAZHILIS ELECTION ROUNDDUP, JULY 2

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1801.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1801 2007-07-02 10:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1004
RR RUEHAST RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #1801/01 1831045
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021045Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9957
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1770
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8042
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7944
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7179
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2164
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1423

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 001801 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV OSCE KZ
 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: MAZHILIS ELECTION ROUNDDUP, JULY 2 
 
1. (U) This is the first in a series of weekly election roundups in 
advance of Kazakhstan's August 18 Mazhilis and Maslikhat elections. 
Items were drawn primarily from the local press and media. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Social Democratic Party and True Ak Zhol Merge 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2. (U) On June 23 in Almaty two opposition parties, the Social 
Democratic Party and the True Ak Zhol, held congresses where the 
delegates supported the merger of the two parties.  They then 
conducted a joint meeting to discuss their forthcoming merger.  In 
their speeches the leaders of the parties, Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and 
Bolat Abilov, stressed they were merging not simply because of the 
upcoming elections to Mazhilis, but because their party platforms 
were very close and their intention was a long-term partnership. 
Both leaders expressed hope that the Communist Party of Kazakhstan 
and the unregistered Alga party would join their cause. 
 
3. (U) According to Marzhan Aspandiyarova, an activist of the True 
Ak Zhol party, this meeting was a preliminary joint meeting on the 
merger.   The next step will include similar meetings of the two 
parties' branches in every region of the country.  On July 7 the two 
parties will conduct a joint congress in Almaty.  This congress will 
elect the new party leadership and will nominate candidates for the 
party list.  Because the early elections to Mazhilis do not leave 
time for a formal merger, the new grouping will retain the name 
Social Democratic Party; members of True Ak Zhol will leave their 
party and formally join the Social Democrats. 
 
4. (U) The leader of the Communist Party, Serikbolsyn Abdildin, 
showed up at the meeting, but quickly left.   Some opposition 
activists suggested Abdildin was offended because he had not been 
given the floor.  According to Tolen Tokhtasynov, Abdildin's deputy, 
the Communists do not plan to join the new party. 
 
5. (U) The election law forbids two of the True Ak Zhol leaders, 
Bulat Abilov and Tulegen Zhukeyev, from running for Parliament. 
Abilov has a conviction record: on July 24, 2006 the city court of 
Temirtau gave Abilov a 3-year suspended sentence with two years of 
probation for insulting a police officer.  Tulegen Zhukeyev lived 
abroad from 1995 to 2003 as Kazakhstan's ambassador to Korea and 
Iran.  According to the recent constitutional amendments, a 
candidate for Mazhilis must have lived in Kazakhstan for the last 10 
years. Out of three co-chairmen of True Ak Zhol, only one, Oraz 
Zhandosov, has a chance to win a seat in the Mazhilis. 
 
---------- 
Alga Party 
---------- 
 
6. (U) According to a report in the June 21 "Taszhargan" weekly, 
Bulat Abilov and Tulegen Zhukeyev attended a recent meeting of the 
Alga leadership.  Abilov and Zhukeyev tried to persuade their 
comrades in arms "to consolidate their efforts," but failed. Alga's 
press service confirmed on June 22 that the party would not join the 
Social Democratic Party.  Fourteen out of seventeen regional 
branches of the party rejected the idea.  On June 20 the majority of 
the party political council also voted against convening a congress 
on the merger. Party leader Asylbek Kozhakhmetov spoke at the June 
23 Social Democratic Party / True Ak Zhol congresses.  Kozhakhmetov 
welcomed the new party, but gave no promise to join it.  According 
to opposition journalist Yermurat Bapi, there is a split in the 
Alga: Kozhakhmetov and a number of the party activists would like to 
join the new block, but influential banker Mukhtar Ablyazov, who 
finances Alga, is opposed. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Comments by analysts and reporters 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) In a private conversation with a Pol FSN, journalist Ayan 
Sharipbayev of "Svoboda Slova" weekly said that according to his 
anonymous sources, President Nazarbayev assured Tuyakbay during 
their last meeting that a united opposition party would receive a 
certain number of seats in the Mazhilis.   The True Ak Zhol leaders 
then agreed to merge with the Social Democratic Party, as it is 
their only chance to survive and to have some representatives in 
Parliament.  According to Sharipbayev it was President Nazarbayev's 
idea to merge all opposition parties into one. 
 
8. (SBU) Recently, Zharmakhan Tuyakbay spoke about the Social 
Democratic Party's chances in the upcoming elections: "Even if 
 
ASTANA 00001801  002 OF 004 
 
 
administrative resources are used, we will get no less than 30% of 
the seats."   (Interfax, June 23).  However, political analyst Petr 
Svoik told Pol FSN on June 23 that the united opposition party may 
win only the minimum 7% required to obtain seats, which translates 
to six or seven seats in the Mazhilis. 
 
9. (U) Well-known opposition journalist Sergey Duvano
v discussed the 
merger of the opposition parties in an article on an opposition web 
site (www.kub.kz, June 22).   According to Duvanov, the authorities 
have an interest in the merger of opposition parties.  A year ago 
Nazarbayev mentioned that it was time to finish with the "flood" of 
opposition parties and that a matured political regime needs a 
two-party system. According to Duvanov, the Social Democratic Party 
is the most appropriate base for merging all opposition parties. 
The main opposition parties have agreed to recognize the current 
status of President Nazarbayev and agreed to a compromise which 
includes principles of constructive opposition and readiness to 
fight for power in Parliament.  This scenario suits President 
Nazarbayev, who in Duvanov's view can more easily control a few 
opposition members in the Mazhilis. 
 
10. (U) Political analyst Dosym Satpayev expects no political 
intrigue in the upcoming elections to Mazhilis.   (Nachnyen s 
Ponedelnika weekly, June 22-28)  The united opposition will compete 
not only with the presidential Nur Otan, but with the Ak Zhol and 
Adilet who also agreed to unite their efforts.  The opposition may 
get several seats in the Mazhilis, which will not allow them to 
influence Parliament.  Standing alone, neither the Social Democratic 
Party nor True Ak Zhol would overcome the 7% threshold.  They had to 
merge, because the law bans creating election blocs. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Central Election Commission Preparations 
---------------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) After the elections were announced, the Central Election 
Commission (CEC) proceeded quickly with its preparations.  CEC 
member Marat Sarsembayev told Pol FSN that the CEC was well aware of 
the upcoming announcement and was prepared.  On June 21, the CEC 
issued a calendar for the elections.  June 22 was the first day when 
nomination of candidates to run in Mazhilis and Maslikhat elections 
could begin.  The CEC issued a press release explaining that 
candidates to be included on political party lists should be 
approved by the majority votes of the party's highest ruling 
council, and must be party members, citizens of Kazakhstan above 25 
years old, and have lived in Kazakhstan at least the last 10 years. 
Candidates judged by a court to be incapable, or candidates who 
served sentences in jail, are ineligible to run. Upon approval by 
the party's ruling council, the lists and records of its meeting 
must be filed with the CEC along with each candidate's application 
showing that he/she is willing to run in the elections. Candidates 
to maslikhats can be nominated by public organizations or individual 
citizens can self-nominate. 
 
12. (U) On June 25, the CEC issued rules on the format of 
information on political parties and candidates to maslikhats to be 
posted on bulletin boards in precincts, approved the forms of 
ballots including protection measures against forgery, and approved 
the form of voter lists. It also passed guidelines for issuance of 
absentee ballots; on accreditation of international observers, which 
is done through the MFA and must be completed by August 12; and on 
e-voting, which will be used in more than 1500 precincts (5% more 
than in 2005 elections). As in the past, the voters will be offered 
an option of selecting between the traditional voting by paper 
ballots and electronic voting. 
 
13. (U) The CEC cancelled a number of its old regulations and 
replaced them with new ones to make legislation comply with the 
recent amendments of the Constitution and the election law. For 
example, under the new system there are no circuit election 
commissions for the Mazhilis elections and no election blocs of 
political parties.  The CEC also increased the number of printed 
ballots, raising the reserve to 1% (compared to 0.1% in the past). 
 
--------------- 
Rules for Media 
--------------- 
 
14. (U) On June 22 and 27, the CEC held workshops for media 
representatives in Aktau and Almaty on election coverage.  The CEC 
stressed the need for equal and unbiased access to media sources for 
all political parties and candidates and objective coverage of the 
election campaign. According to the CEC, the media should not 
 
ASTANA 00001801  003 OF 004 
 
 
publish information which damages any candidate's honor, dignity and 
business reputation, calls for the overthrow of the constitutional 
order, or instigates racial or inter-ethnic hatred. If media 
reporters or editors run in the elections they must step down from 
performance of their official duties for the time of the campaign. 
 
15. (U) The CEC experts reminded media representatives that all 
media outlets interested in covering candidates' or political 
parties' election campaigns should post their prices for publication 
(broadcast) of campaign materials by July 2, and also send their 
pricelists to local election commissions and the CEC. Those media 
outlets that fail to meet this requirement will not be allowed to 
publish campaign materials. 
 
16. (U) The CEC said that information coming from election 
commissions should be treated as a priority and it should be 
delivered to readers and the audience quickly, without any delays. 
An example is the upcoming publication of the names of candidates on 
party lists: they must be published in the media by the legal 
deadline.  If necessary, newspapers must add supplementary pages to 
their regular format. 
 
-------------- 
Campaign Funds 
-------------- 
 
17. (U) During these workshops for the media, CEC expert Alma 
Omarova explained the rules for funding of political parties' 
election campaigns.  Political parties must pay for their 
candidates' campaigns, publications and media advertising out of 
their own election funds. These funds may be formed from two 
sources: the parties' own resources, and contributions by individual 
citizens and organizations. A candidate, however, cannot use his/her 
own resources. Expenditures from a political party's own fund cannot 
exceed 48,760,000 tenge ($400,000) and voluntary contributions 
cannot more exceed 97,520,000 tenge ($800,000). Thus the total 
amount of a political party's election fund shall not exceed 
146,280,000 tenge ($1,200,000) regardless of the number of 
candidates. Foreign support is banned.  Political parties may not 
fund their campaigns with any government resources.  The government, 
however, will give each political party an opportunity to 
participate in TV debates on one of the national TV channels.  The 
channel will be selected by the CEC. 
 
18. (U) Candidates for maslikhats may use the following resources: 
the government will provide a guaranteed minimum media coverage 
(15-minute presentation on TV, 10-minute presentation on radio, and 
2 articles in press); the candidate's own election fund which cannot 
exceed 975,200 tenge ($8,000) and voluntary contribu
tions not 
exceeding 2,925,600 tenge ($24,000). Candidates nominated by public 
organizations or political parties may get additional support from 
them in the amount of 1,950,400 tenge (about $16,000). 
 
--------------------------- 
Nur Otan Begins Its Campaign 
---------------------------- 
 
19. (U) National TV channels recently began broadcasting Nur Otan's 
public service announcements, programs and news items on the party's 
social support projects. The broadcasts were supplemented by 
numerous newspaper publications. One of its mostly widely covered 
projects was a train traveling around the country, stopping at small 
settlements where Nur Otan activists talked to people about 
political reforms and elections and offered various types of 
support: health check-ups, legal advice, musical performances, 
shows, and sports competitions. Another strong public relations 
project was State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev's tour of the regions 
with a group of former Mazhilis members. The purpose of the trip was 
to assess the social and political situation in regions on the eve 
of the upcoming elections and to explain the early dissolution of 
the Mazhilis and the importance of further democratic reform. 
Saudabayev visited Ust-Kamenogorsk, Atyrau, Aktau, and Southern 
Kazakhstan.  In his media interviews, Saudabayev said that people 
welcome President Nazarbayev's initiatives on further 
democratization and the upcoming Mazhilis elections which will 
demonstrate Kazakhstan's economic and political leadership. 
 
20. (U) Several well-known politicians recently joined Nur Otan. On 
June 25, Senate speaker Kasymzhomart Tokayev, Kazyna holding 
President Kairat Kelimbetov, and mayor of Almaty Imangali 
Tasmagambetov announced that they had joined Nur Otan. The next day, 
Chairman of the Airspace Agency Talgat Musabayev became a member of 
Nur Otan. In his interview with Kazakhstan TV channel, Musabayev 
 
ASTANA 00001801  004 OF 004 
 
 
said that he had always accomplished assignments given to him by the 
president, and would always do so in future. He said that he 
considered his Nur Otan membership as another assignment and he 
would try to accomplish it very successfully. 
 
21. (U) Khabar TV broadcast interviews and statements by government 
leaders, politicians, political observers, and rank and file people 
who were unanimous in their support of "President Nazarbayev's wise 
decisions on further democratization."  Kazpravda (6-23-07) 
published a collective letter of all employees of 
Sokolovsko-Sarbaiski mining factory stating that they all 
unanimously support amendments into the Constitution, the 
President's choice of the way of Kazakhstan's further development, 
and the new mechanism of Mazhilis elections.  The letter stated that 
all employees of the factory will support Nur-Otan's candidates in 
the Mazhilis and Maslikhat elections. 
 
22. (U) In addition, Kazakhstan's ethnic and cultural centers 
reported on their unanimous support of the early dissolution of the 
Mazhilis and the initiative to elect representatives of the 
Kazakhstan Peoples Assembly to the Mazhilis.  Nur Otan held 
conferences in the regions to pull their forces together and 
nominate candidates to Maslikhats and delegates to the upcoming 
party conference scheduled for July 4. 
 
23. (U) This flurry of activity led to criticism of Nur Otan for 
violation of the law which establishes the date when the parties may 
begin their election campaigns. Opposition parties accused the 
president's party of abusing the administrative resources and 
starting its campaign several months before announcement of the 
elections. Ualikhan Kaisarov, Director of the Astana office of True 
Ak Zhol, gave an interview to Channel 31 TV in which he criticized 
Nur Otan's powerful administrative influence, alleging that Nur Otan 
used this influence to begin broadcasting its PSAs and other 
information several months before the announcement of elections. He 
claimed that no media outlet would dare to run opposition parties' 
early advertisements. 
 
24. (U) However, the CEC does not see any violations of the law by 
Nur Otan: Deputy Chairman Vladimir Foos stated in a media interview 
that at this stage political parties can be considered as 
participants of the pre-electoral marathon. Political campaigning 
begins only after a party forwards its list of candidates and after 
the list is registered. According to Foos, under the law on 
advertisement and on political parties, the parties are free to 
advertise their activities now. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA1796, KAZAKHSTAN: VERDICT IN HIV OUTBREAK TRIAL

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA1796.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA1796 2007-07-02 04:33 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0634
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #1796 1830433
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020433Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9949
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7178
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8040
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2163
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 7943

UNCLAS ASTANA 001796 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR OES/PCI HUDAK AND SCA/CEN O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KHIV SOCI KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: VERDICT IN HIV OUTBREAK TRIAL 
 
REF: 06 ASTANA 205 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: A court in South Kazakhstan sentenced 
seventeen medical workers to prison terms of up to five years 
for their roles in infecting over 100 children with HIV. Four 
senior health officials, including the former head of the 
South Kazakhstan's Region health department Nursulu 
Tasmagambetova, received suspended sentences.  The families 
of the infected children expressed outrage at the verdict, 
calling the sentences too lenient.  Largely in response to 
the HIV outbreak in Shymkent, Kazakhstan has taken steps to 
improve its blood transfusion practices.  While the reform is 
sorely needed, the trial in Shymkent demonstrated that simple 
corruption is often the cause of Kazakhstani medical 
malpractice.  End summary. 
 
An Unpopular Verdict 
-------------------- 
 
2. (U) On June 27, a South Kazakhstan court convicted 21 
health care workers of negligence for their roles in an HIV 
outbreak in Shymkent. At least 118 children in the region 
have been infected as a result of transfusions of 
contaminated blood or through the use of unsterilized medical 
equipment (Reftel). Ten of the infected children have died. 
Seventeen medical workers were sentenced to jail terms 
ranging from nine months to five years.  Four senior health 
officials, including former regional health department head 
Nursulu Tasmagambetova, received suspended sentences. 
 
3. (SBU) Families of the infected children attacked the 
verdict, which marked the end of a trial that started in 
January.  The families were particularly critical of the 
suspended sentences for senior officials.  One parent told 
the local media that "those who got suspended sentences are 
the most senior ones and thus most responsible for all this." 
Forty medical workers in Shymkent also gathered in protest 
after the verdict. According to one speaker, "if 
Tasmagambetova has been given a suspended sentence, then 
others should have been released. She was the manager and the 
rest subordinates." (Comment: Former regional health 
department chief Nursulu Tasmagambetova is the sister of 
influential Almaty mayor Imangali Tasmagambetov. Before the 
trial, several sources predicted to Poloff that 
Tasmagambetova would receive a light sentence because of her 
connections. While her sentence may be a fair result in a 
case centered on low level corruption, many Kazakhstanis will 
view the verdict as further evidence of a two tiered system 
of justice.) 
 
Outbreak Spurs Reform, but Problems Deep-Rooted 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4. (U) The HIV outbreak in Shymkent spurred Kazakhstan to 
reassess and improve its blood safety and transfusion 
procedures.  Investigations conducted across the country 
revealed that all 28 of the country's blood centers violated 
legal standards.  According to the director of the Republican 
Blood Center, 60 to 85% of the equipment at the centers is 
defunct.  Kazakhstan has since announced plans to launch a 
new safe blood transfusion program at a cost of 32 billion 
tenge (approximately $2.5 million).  The program calls for 
the resupply and reequipping of existing blood centers and 
the construction of several new centers, and a blood 
processing plant in Almaty. 
 
5. (U) While systematic reform is necessary, an underlying 
cause of the Shymkent outbreak was corruption.  According to 
prosecutors, local doctors, who earn an average of $175 a 
month, charged $30 for blood transfusions, sharing the 
profits between doctors and local blood banks.  Unnecessary 
blood transfusions have thus become a source of income for 
corrupt doctors.  One eight month old child in Shymkent 
received 24 blood transfusions, prescribed only to boost the 
child's immunity. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: The HIV outbreak in Shymkent serves as a 
reminder that beyond the booming oil profits and glitz and 
glamour of Astana and Almaty, many Kazakhstanis still lack 
access to basic necessities like decent health care.  The GOK 
appears to understand the problem, and has announced plans to 
spend at least 4% of its GDP on public health in 2008-2010. 
End comment 
MILAS

Wikileaks