07ASTANA2178, KAZAKHSTAN: STRUCTURE OF THE BORDER GUARD SERVICE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2178 2007-08-09 07:40 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5646
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #2178/01 2210740
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090740Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0330
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5/
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP/APSA-CA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP/GSA-CN
RHMFIUU/DTRA CT WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002178 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (OMARA), INL/AAE (BUHLER), ISN/ECC (HARTSHORNE), 
SCA/RA (CUMMINGS), CENTCOM FOR MALCOM AND ROESNER, DHS FOR CBP - 
GLYNCO GEORGIA, DTRA FOR SULLIVAN 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV KCRM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: STRUCTURE OF THE BORDER GUARD SERVICE 
 
ASTANA 00002178  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
--------- 
OVERVIEW 
--------- 
 
1. (SBU)  Post continues to work with the Border Guard Service 
through programs to combat narcotics, terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction, and trafficking in persons.  Programs are implemented 
by Department of State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Office (INL) and Export Control and Border Security Office (EXBS), 
the Department of Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and 
CENTCOM's Office of Military Cooperation (OMC).  The Defense 
Attach's office is an active participant in program development and 
implementation.  Close coordination among embassy offices is 
maintained through monthly embassy Security Assistance Working Group 
meetings chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission.  The programs have 
enhanced mission capacity on the land, sea, and river borders 
through the provision of equipment and training to maritime border 
guards, improvement of checkpoint infrastructure and personnel 
training, establishment of new training centers and improvement of 
existing centers, and curriculum reform.  In the U.S., Kazakhstani 
border guards have been trained in the DHS Customs and Border 
Protection Academy in Glynco, Georgia, which has created a 
professional relationship between the U.S. Border Patrol and the 
Border Guard Service of Kazakhstan.  Post provides the following 
information as a reference for addressees interested in working with 
the Border Guard Service. 
 
----------------------------------- 
BORDER GUARD MISSION AND STAFFING 
----------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU)  The 4,700 male and female officers of the Border Guard 
Service are charged with protecting the land, sea, and river borders 
of Kazakhstan, interdicting illegal goods and people attempting to 
cross the border, facilitating legitimate transit of people and 
commerce through authorized checkpoints, and repelling invading 
troops.  The Border Guards also protect Kazakhstan's economic and 
environmental interests as they relate to the borders of the 
country.  The Border Guard Service cooperates with the regional 
departments of the Committee for National Security, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, and other security and law enforcement agencies. 
Border Guard Officers are assisted by contractors hired locally at 
each post, the majority working in passport control. 
 
------------------------- 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU)  The Border Guard Service is within the Committee for 
National Security.  Bolat Seitkazynovich Zakiyev, Deputy Chairman of 
the Committee for National Security, is the Director of the service. 
 He was appointed to the position in July 1999.  Deputy Director of 
the Border Guard Service is Khussain Imangaliyevich Berkaliyev. 
 
4. (SBU) The Border Guard Service is headquartered in Astana and has 
four regional border control departments: 
 
a)  Ontustik in Southern Kazakhstan Oblast oversees the Kazakhstani- 
Uzbekistani border.  Headquarters are in Shymkent. 
 
b)  Soltustik in Northern Kazkahstan Oblast oversees the Kazakhstani 
Russian border.  Headquarters are in Ust-Kamenogorsk. 
 
c)  Batys in Mangystau Oblast oversees the Caspian Sea and the 
Russian border in Uralsk oblast.  Headquarters are in Aktau. 
 
d)  Shygys in Eastern Kazkahstan Oblast oversees the 
Kazakhstani-Chinese and Kazakhstani-Kyrgyzstani borders. 
Headquarters are in Almaty. 
 
Each of the regional border control departments is comprised of 
border guard detachments (pogranichnyi otryad or the short form - 
pogranotryad) which are responsible for a specified portion of the 
border, usually 40-100 kilometers.  Within the area of 
responsibility each detachment is responsible for patrolling the 
green border and manning the crossing points (punkt propuska). 
Green border areas are patrolled from frontier stations 
(pogranichanya zastava).  Officers at frontier stations patrol by 
 
ASTANA 00002178  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
vehicle, horse, and on foot.  They communicate via radio and use 
night vision goggles (where available) to locate people illegally 
crossing the border.  Note: INL and EXBS have provided the Border 
Guards with modular buildings to use as offices, communications and 
inspection equipment, and vehicles for patrol and personnel 
transport.  End note. 
 
5. (SBU)  There are more than 160 border crossing points.  One 
hundred twelve have been officially designated by the government and 
approximately 50 additional posts are pending 
delimitation/demarcation of the border.  Of the 112 official 
crossing poi
nts, only 95 are operational.  The remainder have been 
closed primarily because of Uzbekistan's closure of its border with 
Kazakhstan at some locations. 
 
--------------- 
SPECIAL UNITS 
--------------- 
 
6. (SBU)   The Border Guards have fixed and rotary wing aviation 
assets in each of the four regional border control departments. 
They have a total of about twenty MI-8 helicopters and have plans to 
refurbish old helicopters in order to increase this number.  Three 
helicopters are undergoing capital repair at Aircraft Plant #405 in 
Almaty at any given time.  Eight MI-8 helicopters and two airplanes 
have been seen in Atyrau and Aktau.  Note:  Using CENTCOM 
counter-narcotics funding, OMC is upgrading three MI-8 helicopters 
which will be located in Aktau to provide night vision and forward 
looking infrared capability (FLIR) for use in patrolling the 
southwest desert border and Caspian coast line.  End note. 
 
7. (SBU)  The Maritime Division of the Border Guards is 
headquartered in Astana.  The division also has offices in Aktau and 
Atyrau and a large maritime base in Bautino on the Caspian Sea. 
According to press reports in June 2005, a Berkut-6 boat, produced 
at the Zenit factory in Uralsk, was launched on the Caspian Sea.  A 
200-ton ship is also under development.  The Berkut provides greater 
speed and navigation capability to interdict traffickers and 
poachers.  There are approximately 10 boats in Bautino, including 
three SAFE boats donated in May 2006 by EXBS.  In addition, a Sea 
Ark was donated in 1996 and is located in Bautino.  There are also 
believed to be two boats in Atyrau.  Finally, the Maritime Border 
Guards patrol the Ural River with a small boat. 
 
8. (SBU)  The Border Guard Structure includes an intelligence 
office, an internal security office to combat corruption, and a 
quartermaster corps. 
 
 
 
--------- 
TRAINING 
--------- 
 
9. (SBU)   The primary training facility for Border Guard Officers 
is the Military Institute located in Almaty.  It is a four-year 
training academy for agents of the Committee for National Security 
and officers of the Border Guard Service.  Post had learned that the 
Military Institute will relocate to Astana in 2008, although the 
Head of the Institute told INL Officer that Border Guard training 
would remain in Almaty.  The cadets are trained in a full range of 
subjects and at the conclusion are commissioned as border guard 
officers and receive the equivalent of a bachelor's degree. 
Although assignments vary upon graduation, reportedly depending on 
any particular graduate's political connections or financial 
capabilities, new officers are assigned to posts on the border and 
slowly work up through the ranks.  Officers rotate from region to 
region approximately every three years and rarely will serve in the 
border district where they were born. 
 
10. (SBU)  The primary training facility for maritime officers is 
the Ministry of Defense's Naval Institute located in Aktau.  The 
institute in Aktau is a military training academy for naval 
officers.  After commissioning, officers serve either in the Navy or 
in the Maritime Border Guard. 
 
11. (SBU)  In high-visibility posts such as Almaty or Astana border 
guard officers will staff the passport control booths while in other 
 
ASTANA 00002178  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
posts, particularly non-international posts in the heavily-populated 
south, local residents will be hired as contractors to check 
identity cards and passports.  Contractors receive on-the-job 
training from border guard officers or other contractors. 
Contractors who show skill and interest may be sent to a passport 
control training facility in Almaty for more advanced, formal 
instruction.  (Note: INL established a regional training center in 
Saryagash, on the Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani border, and expects to 
establish another in the northeast near the Russian and Chinese 
borders in the coming year.  End note.)  The level of knowledge and 
professionalism of the contractors is uneven at best.  For example, 
training sessions sponsored by INL using professional educators from 
the Military Institute were attended by contractors who could not 
properly identify an expired Uzbekistani identity card. 
 
 
ORDWAY

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