Monthly Archives: October 2007

07ASTANA2957, KAZAKHSTAN SUPPORTIVE OF US INTERNATIONAL MARITIME

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2957.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2957 2007-10-31 13:22 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4266
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #2957 3041322
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311322Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1039
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0503
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHDC

UNCLAS ASTANA 002957 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR IO/T (LLUFTIG) 
LONDON FOR EST (J. WHITTLESEY) 
USCG FOR CG-52 AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC IMO EWWT PHSA KZ
 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN SUPPORTIVE OF US INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
ORGANIZATION CANDIDACY 
 
REF: State 148540 
 
Poloff delivered reftel demarche and talking points to Amanbek 
Demesinov, director of the international organizations section of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on October 30. Demesinov said that 
the Government of Kazakhstan was very likely to support the 
reelection of the United States to the IMO Council, particularly 
considering that there does not appear to be a contested election 
for the Category A council positions. 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

Advertisements

07ASTANA2955, KAZAKHSTAN NONCOMMITTAL ON UNGA THIRD COMMITTEE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2955.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2955 2007-10-31 13:12 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4249
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #2955 3041312
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311312Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1038
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1888
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 002955 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UNSC LE KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN NONCOMMITTAL ON UNGA THIRD COMMITTEE 
RESOLUTIONS, UNLIKELY TO CHANGE POSITION FROM PREVIOUS YEARS 
 
REF: (A) State 136426, (B) State 145641 
 
1. Poloff delivered Ref B demarche to Amanbek Demesinov, director of 
the international organizations section of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, on October 30. Demesinov said that in general it was too 
early for the Government of Kazakhstan to make commitments or even 
reveal its inclinations at this point, though he intimated that 
Kazakhstan would not change its position from last year's voting on 
the country specific resolutions.  (Note: In 2006, Kazakhstan voted 
for the resolutions on Burma and North Korea, and opposed the 
resolutions on Belarus, Iran, and Uzbekistan.  End note.) 
 
2. Demesinov recalled Poloff's previous demarche on the issue of 
rape as an instrument of state policy (ref A), but he said there 
were some complications with the resolution that were making it 
difficult for Kazakhstan to support it.  He said that a group of 
African states was opposed to the resolution, and this was causing 
Kazakhstan to hesitate.  He was unwilling to offer more specific 
information. 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2935, KAZAKHSTAN: OPPOSITION WEBSITES BLOCKED

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2935.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2935 2007-10-28 07:30 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1242
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #2935 3010730
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280730Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1020
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0287
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1839
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 002935 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA) 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: OPPOSITION WEBSITES BLOCKED 
 
1. (U) On October 24, Tamara Kaleyeva of the media watchdog group 
Adil Soz and web publishers Yuriy Mizinov and Sergey Duvanov held a 
press conference in Almaty to criticize the blockage within 
Kazakhstan of four independent/opposition-oriented websites. 
According to the press conference organizers, the websites 
www.zonakz.net (published by Mizinov), www.kub.kz, and www.geo.kz 
have been inaccessible since October 18, and that the website 
www.inkar.info (published by Duvanov) has been inaccessible since 
October 22.  The press conference organizers alleged that blockage 
of www.zonakz.net originated in Russia, through intervention 
purportedly initiated by the official Kazakhstani telecommunications 
provider Kazakhtelecom; the rest were blocked by Kazakhtelecom in 
Kazakhstan.  (Note: Zonakz.net and inkar.info are accessible, but 
not through Kazakhstani internet service providers.  End note.) 
 
2. (SBU) Kaleyeva, Mizinov, and Duvanov alleged that the websites 
were blocked because they recently published MP3 audio recordings 
and transcripts of telephone conversations between high-level 
government officials, and that the government was trying to block 
all information relating to this compromising information.  (Note: 
The websites published transcripts of three telephone conversations 
between Minister of Internal Affairs Baurzhan Mukhamedzhanov and 
Vladimir Ni, the former head of the Presidential Administration. 
The telephone conversations in general concerned President 
Nazarbayev's negative reaction to a purported investigation of 
oligarch Vladimir Kim.  Some journalists speculated that Rakhat 
Aliyev released the audio transcripts, though Aliyev refused to 
comment on his connection to the transcripts in an interview with 
Respublika newspaper. End note.) The press conference organizers 
criticized the absence of any judicial process before the websites 
were blocked. 
 
3. (U) According to press reports, Minister of Culture and 
Information Yermukhamet Yertysbayev denied any knowledge or 
responsibility for the blockage of the websites, and speculated that 
there may be technical reasons for the problem.  He said that his 
ministry has not closed any newspapers or journals or websites. 
 
4. (SBU) Comment: There is strong reason to suspect that Aliyev is 
the source of the audio recordings.  The most likely scenario, we 
believe, is that after their release, senior government officials 
intervened to block the websites and limit distribution of the 
information to the Kazakhstani public.  Ultimately, blocking the 
websites will prove futile, as there are methods to circumvent the 
blockages and journalists will continue to share the recordings and 
transcripts.  Instead, the website blockages will only serve to 
raise further questions about the Government of Kazakhstan's 
commitment to freedom of speech.  End comment. 
 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2934, KAZAKHSTANI BUSINESSMAN AGAIN REQUESTS USG HELP

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2934.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2934 2007-10-24 13:54 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8065
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #2934 2971354
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 241354Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1019
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7258
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0019
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8197
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2291
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2140
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0363
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0480
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8083

S E C R E T ASTANA 002934 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2037 
TAGS: AF CH ECON EINV ELTN EMIN ETRD IR KZ PGOV
PK, PREL, RS, TI, UZ 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI BUSINESSMAN AGAIN REQUESTS USG HELP 
WITH BID FOR AFGHAN MINE 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 2344 
 
     B. ASTANA 2388 
 
Classified By: AMB. ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
 1. (S) Rakhat Kereitbayev (General Director of KazInvest, 
Chairman of the Board of Kanimansur, and Advisor to Kazyna 
Chairman Kelimbetov) updated Econoff on October 14 and 24 on 
the latest status of the Kazakhstani bid for Afghanistan's 
AYNAK mine (Ref A and B).  Zia Massoud, Afghanistan's 1st 
Vice President is, according to Kereitbayev, still the 
leading Afghan Government (GOA) proponent of the Kazakhstani 
bid.  Kereitbayev stated that there is tension between 
Massoud and President Karzai, who remains on the sidelines, 
partly due to his fear of an eruption of a scandal involving 
his brother.  Karzai's brother, Kereitbayev claimed, is a 
drug baron who keeps his money in the Bank of China and is 
thus susceptible to pressure by the Chinese.  On October 24 
Kereitbayev told Econoff that he was somewhat heartened by 
Karzai's recent interview to the BBC in which he spoke 
favorably of the Kazakhstani bid. 
 
2. (S) According to Kereitbayev, the Chinese bid for the 
AYNAK mine was largely driven by corruption (ref A), and 
China has now seen its chances evaporate.  However, 
Kereitbayev stated that the Chinese are still pursuing the 
AYNAK mine using a Canadian company as a front.  Although he 
does not know the exact breakdown of the Canadian/Chinese 
deal, Kereitbayev said that the Canadian bid is "largely 
Chinese." 
 
3. (S) Kereitbayev reiterated that the Kazakhstanis' plan to 
build a North-South railroad in Afghanistan is contingent on 
winning the bid for the AYNAK mine (ref A).  He stated that 
the Kazakhstanis would do a "50/50" deal with the Afghans on 
the railroad and secure funding from the World Bank, the 
European Development Bank and, possibly, the Development Bank 
of Kazakhstan.  He added that Kazakhstan is highly (and 
uniquely) capable of building a north-south railroad.  Such a 
project, Kereitbayev explained, would require a lot of steel, 
which the Kazakhstanis could obtain from Russia and Ukraine. 
He noted that the Chinese would have no interest in a 
north-south railroad, since they would take AYNAK's copper to 
China or a Chinese-owned processing plant in Pakistan. 
 
4. (S) Kereitbayev continued that the situation in 
Afghanistan remains precarious due to the drug trade and 
uncertainty about the longevity of the foreign forces' 
presence.   He was emphatic that Kazakhs are uniquely 
positioned to operate in Afghanistan even under challenging 
circumstances.  To Afghans, he said, "we are Muslims, and we 
know how to play the part," adding that the Afghans are 
suspicious of the Chinese and resent some of the things they 
tend to bring to Afghanistan, such as brothels and gambling 
joints.   Kereitbayev noted that his firm has a 
representative in Kabul, who is a Moscow-educated Kazakhstani 
citizen of Tajik descent.  This person, Kereitbayev added, is 
a Farsi speaker, enjoys Afghans' trust and used to import 
Kazakhstani wheat into Afghanistan even back in the Taliban 
days. 
 
5. (C) The picture painted by Kereitbayev contrasts somewhat 
with the one presented on October 10 by Kazakhstan's State 
Secretary Saudabayev to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
 
SIPDIS 
Debra Cagan and the DCM.  In that conversation Saudabayev 
stated the Afghans have not been particularly favorable to 
the Kazakhstani investors. 
 
6. (S) Kereitbayev told Econoff on October 24 that he expects 
the GOA's decision on the AYNAK mine to materialize soon and 
requested USG assistance with promoting the Kazakhstani bid 
over the Chinese one (masquerading as Canadian). 
Ordway

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2932, KASHAGAN PARTIES ESTABLISH FRAMEWORK FOR CONTINUED

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2932.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2932 2007-10-24 13:12 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8001
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #2932 2971312
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241312Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1016
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0286
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 2108
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0362
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0479
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0370
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 002932 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR M. O'MARA 
DEPT PASS TO OPIC - BALLINGER 
DEPT PASS TO TDA FOR STEIN, EXIM FOR GLAZER 
DEPT PASS TO AID - EE-PHILLIPS/RUSHING 
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/MAC/MLONDON, 4201/BISNIS 
USDOC FOR 6110/ITA/TD/BI/RHALPERN 
ANKARA FOR CFC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2017 
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET EFIN KZ
SUBJECT: KASHAGAN PARTIES ESTABLISH FRAMEWORK FOR CONTINUED 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: ASTANA 2586 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Agip KCO and the Government of Kazakhstan signed a 
memorandum of understanding on October 22 establishing the 
framework for continued negotiations to resolve a dispute 
over the exploration of the Kashagan oil field. The 
memorandum calls for further talks "in a spirit of positive 
and constructive cooperation" but is short on details. 
Chevron Country Manager (Chevron is not part of the Agip 
consortium) Zamira Kanapyanova told Poloff that she expects a 
compromise will now be reached by the end of the year. 
 
2. (C) The Kashagan dispute began in August when the GOK 
expressed its dissatisfaction with the latest delays and cost 
overruns at Kashagan, one of the world's largest oil 
projects.  Commercial production has been delayed from 2008 
to 2010 (Comment: Even this date seems wildly optimistic) and 
projected costs have jumped from $56 billion to $136 billion 
over the life of the contract (reftel).  In September, Prime 
Minister Masimov called for negotiations with Agip, to last 
until October 22. 
 
3. (C) During the negotiations rumors have swirled in the 
local press that the GOK would cancel Eni's concession as a 
lead operator and that KazMunayGas (KMG) would have its stake 
in the consortium increased.  Both rumors can largely be 
discounted.  Kanapyanova told Poloff that she does not expect 
the lead operator will be changed, a sentiment echoed by many 
experts.  ExxonMobil Government Relations and Public Affairs 
Director Patricia Graham told the Ambassador that the stakes 
in the consortium are likely to remain unchanged. (Note: If 
KMG were to increase its stake, its cost burden for the 
extremely expensive project would also increase.) 
 
4. (C) Comment:  The memorandum of understanding signed by 
Agip and the GOK lacks in substance but reflects a shared 
desire to reach a resolution.  Temperatures have lowered 
since August, and the chances of a Kashagan shutdown for 
environmental reasons seem to have significantly diminished. 
Difficult issues remain, particularly the question of the 
amount of compensation due Kazakhstan for the latest delays 
and cost overruns, but both sides have too much to lose not 
to reach a compromise.  End Comment. 
Ordway

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2931, KAZAKHSTAN’S PROPOSED SUBSOIL AMENDMENT RATTLES FOREIGN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2931.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2931 2007-10-24 13:11 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7999
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #2931/01 2971311
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241311Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1014
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0284
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2106
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0360
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0477
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002931 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
DEPT PASS TO OPIC - BALLINGER 
DEPT PASS TO TDA FOR STEIN, EXIM FOR GLAZER 
DEPT PASS TO AID - EE-PHILLIPS/RUSHING 
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/MAC/MLONDON, 4201/BISNIS 
USDOC FOR 6110/ITA/TD/BI/RHALPERN 
ANKARA FOR CFC 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET EFIN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN'S PROPOSED SUBSOIL AMENDMENT RATTLES FOREIGN 
INVESTORS 
 
ASTANA 00002931  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  On 27 September 2007, the Kazakhstani Parliament 
approved an amendment to the "Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use" which, 
if signed into law, may have substantial negative consequences for 
the investment climate in Kazakhstan.  The draft amendments give the 
Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) more power to terminate a subsoil use 
contract if it decides that the contractors' actions violate the 
national economic security interests of Kazakhstan.  Interestingly, 
however, the amended law has awaited President Nazarbayev's 
signature for almost one month, perhaps signaling that he is at 
least giving second thought to an amendment sure to displease some 
of Kazakhstan's biggest foreign investors.  End summary. 
 
What the Draft Law Is 
--------------------- 
 
2. (U) On September 12, the Mazhilis (lower house of the Kazakhstani 
Parliament) initiated the process of amending the "Law on Subsoil 
and Subsoil Use".  According to the accompanying executive summary 
provided by the Parliament, the purpose of the proposed law is to 
protect Kazakhstan's "national economic security interests."  In 
doing so, the summary states, the draft law introduces "a real 
mechanism for ensuring compliance" with the National Security Law 
requirement that any contract relating to the use and/or sale of 
strategic resources be monitored for compliance with national 
security requirements. 
 
3. (U) According to the amendment, in cases in which a subsoil 
user's operations cause substantial change to Kazakhstan's economic 
interest or result in a threat to the national security of 
Kazakhstan, the GOK will have the right to require that the subsoil 
user change and/or amend the terms and conditions of the contract in 
order to restore the economic and security interests of the 
republic.  Additionally, this amendment gives the GOK the right to 
unilaterally refuse, on a month's notice, to perform its contractual 
obligations. 
 
4. (U) The proposed amendment also expands the legal grounds for 
termination of a subsoil contract.  Specifically, the GOK can 
terminate a contract under any of the following conditions: 
 
-- If the contractor does not agree in writing to negotiations 
within two months of receipt of notification of the GOK's intent to 
amend the contract. 
-- If the contractor and the GOK cannot reach an agreement within 4 
months of the subsoil user's agreement to enter the negotiations. 
-- If the contractor and the GOK do not sign amendments to the 
contract's terms within 6 months of reaching an agreement on 
restoration of Kazakhstan's economic interests. 
 
5. (U) According to Energy Minister Sauat Mynbayev,  only contacts 
concerning a "limited list of strategic objects" could be subject to 
termination.  The amendments authorize the GOK to define the 
strategically important areas of subsoil use (fields).  Mynbayev 
stated "this list will be short... The authorized body will not be 
able to consider all oil projects related to national security.  At 
the same time it is obvious that some big fields should be regulated 
as strategic objects."  According to the executive summary, the 
amended law will retroactively apply to all contracts relating to 
either exploration or production.  [It would be better in this 
paragraph to use fewer direct quotes so as to more clearly and 
succinctly explain what he wanted to convey] 
 
Investors Are Concerned 
----------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) During the early October KIOGE (Kazakhstan Oil & Gas 
Exhibition) conference numerous business representatives privately 
expressed serious concerns about the consequences of the Subsoil 
draft law's likely enactment.  On October 1, Kazakhstan's Foreign 
Investors' Council Association (FICA), Kazakhstan Petroleum 
Association (KPA), International Tax & Investment Center (ITIC), 
American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) and European Business 
Association (EUROBAK) sent a joint letter to President Nazarbayev 
requesting that he veto the draft law.  The letter referred, inter 
alia, to Article 26.3 of Kazakhstan's Constitution, which states, 
"no one can be deprived of his property unless there is a court 
 
ASTANA 00002931  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
decision".  The letter also expressed serious concerns that the new 
law would increase the political risks of investing in Kazakhstan 
and worsen the country's investment climate. 
 
This, Too, Shall Pass? 
---------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Uncharacteristi
cally, President Nazarbayev has been slow to 
sign the draft law since it was approved by Parliament on September 
27.  Kazakhstan's Constitution gives the president a month to sign a 
proposed law or send it back to Parliament (suggesting changes or 
essentially vetoing it).  Generally very few draft laws come close 
to testing this deadline.  (Note: some precedents appear to suggest 
that only workdays are counted.  End Note.)  President Nazarbayev's 
slow reaction has led some to speculate that he may still be 
weighing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the law. 
 
8. (SBU) The possible enactment of the Subsoil draft law is but one 
challenge currently facing energy investors in Kazakhstan.  Talks 
continue between the GOK and the Agip consortium on resolving a 
conflict over the development of the Kashagan field, with the GOK 
likely to receive compensation for delays in commercial production 
(see septel for additional details).  Separately, TengizChevrOil 
(TCO) has been levied with an environmental fine of over $300 
million for illegal sulfur storage, a decision that TCO has 
appealed. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9. (SBU) Comment:  The proposed amendment is one of the latest - and 
most significant - salvos in the GOK's apparent tightening of its 
policy toward foreign investors, particularly in the extractive 
sector.  The timing of these amendments was likely not a 
coincidence, but rather a means of pressuring the Kashagan 
consortium's foreign shareholders.  As Kazakhstan's foreign 
investors are voicing their displeasure in the faint hope that the 
draft law will meet a presidential veto, President Nazarbayev 
appears to be keeping his options open.  One option, which 
Nazarbayev has exercised with controversial legislation in the past, 
may be to forward the legislation to the Constitutional Council for 
review, where it can linger and die.  However, the government 
continues to maintain its support for the amendment; Prime Minister 
has stated to the Ambassador that he "hopes" Nazarbayev will sign 
it.  End comment. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2895, Vision of the Future from the Forensics Director

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2895.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2895 2007-10-19 11:06 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4119
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #2895 2921106
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191106Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0981
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ASTANA 002895 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE (BUHLER), SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR SOCI KCRM KZ
SUBJECT: Vision of the Future from the Forensics Director 
 
1. Summary:  Newly appointed Head of the Forensic Center in Astana 
has ambitious plans to improve the work of his institution.  He has 
received approval from the Prime Minister for the construction of a 
new building to house the National Forensic Center in Astana.  He 
plans to establish a Regional Forensic Academy for Central Asian and 
other countries in the region at the Center.  He is also working to 
reform and develop methods to improve capabilities of the Forensic 
Center to provide operational assistance to law enforcement in 
combating drug trafficking throughout the country.  End summary. 
 
2.  On September 11, 2007, INL Officer and Program Manager met with 
the Head of the Forensic Center Kairat Amankulov in Astana. 
Amankulov was appointed in December of 2006 and is a former police 
officer with long experience in criminal investigations.  During the 
meeting he shared information about the GOK's plan to improve the 
forensic system in the country. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
3.  In 1997, as part of democratization process, the forensics 
department of the Ministry of Interior was separated into a 
governmental institution under the Ministry of Justice.  The head of 
the forensics department stated that the split was intended to give 
the forensics department independence from law enforcement. 
 
---------------------- 
FUTURE AMBITIOUS PLANS 
---------------------- 
 
4.  Currently there are 17 poorly equipped regional forensic 
laboratories in the country with about 600 experts.  The Central 
Laboratory is located in Almaty.  Amankulov shared his ambitious 
plans for a forensic development program over the next three years. 
The Center expects to soon receive the first large disbursement from 
the state budget and Amankulov has received preliminary approval 
from the Prime Minister for construction of a new building in 
Astana.  His plan is to equip the center with the latest equipment 
that will meet all international standards.  The National Forensic 
Laboratory will then be moved to Astana from Almaty. 
 
5.  Amankulov aspires to establish a Regional Forensic Science 
Academy in Astana.  His objective is for the Academy to serve as a 
center for training and conferences for forensic scientists and 
experts in Central Asia.  As a first step, the Forensic Center 
hosted an international conference in Almaty on September 18 and 19. 
 Experts from Russia, China, and Kyrgyzstan attended. 
 
6.  Amankulov and his staff are also working to reform the forensic 
system in Kazakhstan.  He expects that, as part of the development 
program, the Forensic Center will become a Committee of the Ministry 
of Justice.  This change will give the center official status within 
the Ministry and all of the Center's employees will become civil 
servants.  The Center is working to gain international accreditation 
and is ready to invest in training for its experts. 
 
7.  Amankulov is also personally invested in the development of a 
database to be used to identify the  origin of seized drugs.  He is 
planning to publish a handbook with a map of types of soil and drugs 
to share with regional forensic offices.  He underscored the fact 
that such guide will facilitate the process of drug identification 
and locating the sources.  He expects that in the future his Center 
will be able to use this information to provide analysis of growing 
and trafficking trends to law enforcement agencies in the region. 
 
8.  During the meeting he noted that because of the stabilization 
and development of the economy, the number of drug users is 
increasing, which also attracts a larger flow of drugs into the 
country.  He thanked the USG for support in combating drugs.  He 
also noted that even though the economic situation of Kazakhstan is 
improving, the Center still relies on foreign technical assistance. 
 
 
8. Comment:  Post welcomes GOK efforts to improve the forensic 
system.  If the Forensic Center accomplishes all that Amankulov 
envisions, it will do much to enhance the work of law enforcement to 
combat drug trafficking into and through the region.  End comment. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2851, SOLANA DISCUSSES OSCE, ENERGY, AND IRAN WITH SOLANA

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2851.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2851 2007-10-19 05:59 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3748
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #2851 2920559
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190559Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0938
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0278
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

UNCLAS ASTANA 002851 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR M. O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: SOLANA DISCUSSES OSCE, ENERGY, AND IRAN WITH SOLANA 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  European Union High Representative for 
External Policy and Security Javier Solana met with President 
Nazarbayev in Astana on October 10.  Solana asked Nazarbayev 
to consider the option of chairing the OSCE after 2009. 
Nazarbayev told Solana that proposed amendments to the law on 
sub-soil are not aimed at Western energy companies and 
offered to speak to Iran about its nuclear program. 
 
2. (SBU) On October 10, European Union High Representative 
for External Policy and Security Javier Solana traveled to 
Astana for meetings with President Nazarbayev, Prime Minister 
Karim Masimov, and Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin.  Spanish 
Ambassador to Kazakhstan Chamarro and British DCM Mike Welch 
provided separate briefings to DCM on the visit. Both 
reported that Solana asked Nazarbayev to consider pushing 
back Kazakhstan's bid to chair the OSCE because no consensus 
exists on 2009. According to Welch, Nazarbayev did not 
respond.  Chamarro told DCM, however, that Nazarbayev 
indicated that he would like to be flexible, but that the CIS 
endorsement of Kazakhstan's bid has limited his ability to 
compromise. Solana told Nazarbayev that the EU expects 
further democratic reform in Kazakhstan, highlighting the 
need for better media and electoral laws, enhanced freedom of 
assembly guarantees, and more effective avenues for the 
opposition to engage with the public. 
 
3.  (SBU) Nazarbayev told Solana that Kazakhstan is ready to 
contribute more to Afghanistan's reconstruction, but cannot 
provide troops.  Nazarbayev expressed his willingness to 
speak to Iran about its nuclear ambitions.  Kazakhstan aims 
to become the world's largest exporter of uranium, said 
Nazarabayev, but will not export to Iran until it fully meets 
its IAEA obligations. The two discussed the EU - Central Asia 
strategy, with Nazarbayev questioning whether the plan will 
lead to concrete action. 
 
4.  (SBU) Nazarbayev assured Solana that proposed amendments 
to Kazakhstan's law on sub-soil use are not aimed at Western 
companies.  He also claimed that the amendments do not apply 
retroactively. (Note:  He is incorrect.) On Kashagan, 
Nazarbayev told Solana that Kazakhstan will not take radical 
action and seeks to reach a deal within the framework of the 
existing production sharing agreement. 
Ordway

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2823, KAZAKHSTAN’S CUSTOMS SHUTDOWN DRAGS ON AMID HOPES FOR

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2823.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2823 2007-10-16 02:07 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0163
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #2823/01 2890207
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160207Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0914
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0276
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002823 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTR, COMMERCE, DHS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EINV EIND ENRG PGOV CASC KTDB KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN'S CUSTOMS SHUTDOWN DRAGS ON AMID HOPES FOR 
RESOLUTION 
 
Ref: Astana 2716 
 
ASTANA 00002823  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  The Kazakhstani customs shutdown, precipitated by 
the late-August enactment of a law with severe unintended 
consequences (reftel), continues.  The Government of Kazakhstan 
(GOK) is pursuing a potential resolution on two different tracks: 
enactment of a law designed to relax the current requirement for 
submission of customs export declarations; and finding a legal basis 
to allow the import of goods currently stuck in customs warehouses. 
Post is continuing to aggressively push for a temporary solution and 
looking to ensure that the new draft law currently considered by 
Parliament is adequate in allowing the import of U.S. goods into 
Kazakhstan.  Please see action request in paragraph 6.  End 
summary. 
 
The Root of the Problem 
----------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The late-August enactment of the law requiring submission 
of customs export declarations for goods entering Kazakhstan, the 
culprit behind the ongoing shutdown, was apparently driven by the 
authorities' desire to introduce a mechanism for more accurate 
valuation of goods imported into Kazakhstan, particularly from 
China.  The only exemption provided in the law is for goods 
originating "from countries that do not produce" export declaration 
forms.  According to Kazakhstani customs officials, the U.S., which 
"produces" (even though it does not allow "sharing" of) customs 
declarations, does not qualify for the exemption.  GOK officials 
have repeatedly stated to us that they have no choice but to enforce 
the law strictly as written or face the possibility of being 
personally prosecuted by the General Procuracy, a special body that 
answers directly -- and only -- to the country's president. 
 
A Short-Term Solution? 
---------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Following extensive communication with Post and apparent 
wrangling between the Customs Committee and the Finance Ministry 
(under the umbrella of which the Customs Committee operates), a 
possible short-term solution began to take shape.  On October 11, 
Deputy Chairman of Customs Committee Dusebayev informed DTRO Chief 
that he was authorizing release of all diplomatic shipments 
(pursuant to the Vienna Convention) and outlined a framework for 
resolving the stoppage of U.S. imports into Kazakhstan.  Given that 
the enactment of the new draft law is expected soon (various Finance 
Ministry and Customs officials currently estimate that the law will 
be enacted within two weeks to a month), Dusebayev told DTRO Chief 
that he is willing to start enforcing the new law now.  He stated 
that he is issuing an order to allow U.S. goods to pass through 
customs upon submission of an invoice with a U.S. notary stamp. 
Considering a large backlog of U.S. goods currently stuck in 
Kazakhstani customs warehouses, Post expects that this solution -- 
assuming it holds -- will lead to a high short-term demand for 
notary services of Post's Consular Section. 
 
The New Law: Will It Work for the U.S.? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The requirement for a notarization stamp raises serious 
questions about the acceptability to the U.S. of the GOK's new 
approach.  While the new draft law is still under consideration by 
Parliament (and is, therefore, subject to change), its original text 
(provided to the Parliament by the Government) raises concerns. 
According to Customs Committee sources, this text requires: "a copy 
of a customs declaration or a substitute document certified by the 
customs agency of the country of origin."  "Certification," Customs 
officials have explained, implies a stamp. 
 
5. (SBU) Finding a short-term solution may be gaining additional 
urgency.  Some companies trying to import U.S. goods into Kazakhstan 
have contacted Post with concerns that their goods, currently stuck 
in Kazakhstani customs warehouses, may soon be declared 'contraband' 
on the basis of a statutory deadline.  However, head of the Customs 
Committee's Legal Department Kasymbekov assured Econoff on October 
12 that this threat is non-existent.  Goods can be declared 
'contraband,' Kasymbekov stated, only if they remain unclaimed for a 
specified period of time.  This, he stressed, is not the case with 
goods currently held in customs warehouses due to the shutdown. 
 
Action Request 
-------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Post requests guidance on two issues.  1. Is it acceptable 
for Post's Consular Section to notarize invoices in order to assist 
passage of commercial U.S. goods through Kazakhstani customs?  2. 
Post requests a joint consultation by DOS, DOC, DHS, and USTR to &
#x000A; 
ASTANA 00002823  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
provide analysis of the new draft law as stated in paragraph 4.  If 
the new requirement is unacceptable, Post requests talking points 
for raising U.S.G. concerns with the GOK. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2819, KAZAKHSTAN: MFA ADVISOR DISCUSSES SHANGHAI

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2819.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2819 2007-10-15 12:15 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9553
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #2819/01 2881215
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151215Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0912
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7248
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0014
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8179
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2275
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0358
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1502
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8070

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002819 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR M. O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  MFA ADVISOR DISCUSSES SHANGHAI 
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary: In a discussion with Poloff, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Advisor for the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) Yerlan Shamishev stated that the SCO has a 
broad mandate and serves an important purpose because it 
solidifies links between Central Asian member states and 
Russia and China.  He admitted, however, that the SCO's 
concrete accomplishments are few.  The SCO is interested in 
Afghanistan, he said, but has yet to turn interest into 
action.  Kazakhstan is not interested in a more developed 
role in the SCO for Iran.   End Summary. 
 
2, (SBU)  On October 8, Poloff met with Yerlan Shamishev, 
Ministry Foreign Affairs Advisor for the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO),to discuss Kazakhstan's view of the SCO. 
When asked to describe the aims of the SCO, Shamishev 
responded that the SCO has a broad mandate.  Security 
cooperation has been the most successful component of the 
SCO, he said, but fostering further economic cooperation is 
now an increasingly important goal for the SCO.  Humanitarian 
cooperation is also an element.  The SCO does not wish to be 
confrontational, he added. 
 
3. (SBU) Poloff asked Shamishev to describe major 
accomplishments of the SCO.  Shamishev answered that the 
greatest accomplishment of the SCO has been to "uphold a 
spirit of political unity" and to build trust between the 
four Central Asian member states and China and Russia.  He 
confessed, however, that on "concrete outputs" it is "hard to 
find good success stories." 
 
4. (SBU)  Shamishev also admitted that trying to strengthen 
economic cooperation through the SCO has proven difficult. 
Uzbekistan is reluctant to open its borders and has not been 
particularly cooperative, he said.  Generally, according to 
Shamishev, Uzbekistan is comfortable discussing security 
issues and is disinclined to address other issues. 
Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikstan, in contrast, are more willing to 
cooperate economically but have less potential for 
investment. 
 
5. (SBU)  Poloff asked if Kazakhstan has any concerns of a 
possible power disbalance in the SCO. Shamishev responded 
that to some extent two groups have developed in the SCO, 
with one group comprised of Kazakhstan, China, and Russia 
because of their size and relative economic might.  He noted 
that these three countries are also the big contributors to 
SCO, with Russia and China each paying 24% and Kazakhstan 
21%.  Nevertheless, he insisted that the bigger countries are 
not in a position to dominate the smaller ones, because each 
country has a veto. 
 
6. (SBU)  Turning to Iran, Shamishev said that Kazakhstan 
will not seek to increase its cooperation with Iran through 
the SCO.  Iran's nuclear ambitions, he stated, make it very 
difficult to implement programs and undermine endeavors to 
develop cooperation on issues like an energy pipeline.  "We 
don't want to escalate the situation between Iran and the 
international community," said Shamishev. 
 
7. (SBU) Shamishev said that achieving peace and stability in 
Afghanistan is a goal for the SCO.  A SCO - Afghanistan 
contact group exists, focused on confidence-building 
measures.  "All is on paper at this point," he said, "nothing 
concrete has yet been achieved."  Kazakhstan has achieved 
more progress with Afghanistan bilaterally than through the 
SCO, he remarked.  He also underlined that Kazakhstan 
understands that any negative spillover from Afghanistan into 
Uzbekistan and Tadjikstan will also effect Kazakhstan. 
 
8. (SBU)  Poloff asked Shamishev whether Kazakhstan has been 
able to use the SCO as a venue to discuss pressing problems 
of water use in the region.  Shamishev answered that 
Kazakhstan has tried to raise the issue, but without success 
because of opposition from China and Uzbekistan. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has 
thus far proven to be more of a talking-shop than an 
action-driven organization. Nevertheless, the role of the SCO 
in the region should not be downplayed.  The SCO provides 
another opportunity for regional leaders with similar 
mindsets on many issues to forge personal links (Presidents 
Putin and Nazarbayev have met more than fifteen times in the 
 
ASTANA 00002819  002 OF 002 
 
 
last two years) and to reinforce their shared thinking.  End 
Summary 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2818, KAZAKHSTAN: PRODI VISIT FOCUSES ON ENERGY

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2818.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2818 2007-10-15 12:08 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9551
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #2818 2881208
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151208Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0911
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0275
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0369

UNCLAS ASTANA 002818 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR M. O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PRODI VISIT FOCUSES ON ENERGY 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  During his October 8-9 visit to 
Kazakhstan, Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi urged 
President Nazarbayev to avoid short-term solutions to 
long-term problems in the energy sector, focusing 
particularly on the Kashagan dispute and proposed amendments 
to Kazakhstan's law on subsoil use.  Nazarbayev promised to 
carefully consider the subsoil amendments before acting and 
announced that Kazakhstan does not wish to rewrite the 
Kashagan Production Sharing Agreement (PSA).  Nevertheless, 
Nazarbayev did not rule out the possibility that Kazakhstan 
will seek a substantial penalty from the consortium for 
delays at the Kashagan field.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi traveled to 
Kazakhstan on October 8-9 for meetings with President 
Nazarbayev and other officials.  Prodi's trip has been 
planned since April and was originally intended to center on 
strengthening trade ties between Italy and Kazakhstan. 
Although trade relations remained a focus of the visit, with 
over 200 Italian business representatives accompanying Prodi, 
Italy's Ambassador to Kazakhstan Bruno Asquino told Charge 
that energy issues also took center stage in the Nazarbayev - 
Prodi talks. 
 
3. (SBU) Prodi's message on energy issues, said Ambassador 
Asquino, was straightforward - Kazakhstan should avoid short 
term solutions to long-term solutions. (Note: Ambassador 
Asquino told Charge that Italy believes that Kazakhstan faces 
economic difficulties because of the credit crunch and is 
overreacting.) Nazarbayev responded said that he will 
carefully consider the amendments to the law on subsoil use 
before approving them. (Note:  Both the Mazhilis and the 
Senate have approved the amendments, which would allow 
Kazakhstan to break contracts to protect national interests.) 
 Nevertheless, Nazarbayev justified the amendments by 
claiming that the U.S. has similar legislation. 
 
4. (SBU) Ambassador Asquino told Charge that no breakthrough 
was reached on Kashagan.  Nazarbayev did announce publicly 
that Kazakhstan will not seek to rewrite the Kashagan 
Production Sharing Agreement (PSA).  He also added, however, 
that the AGIP consortium developing Kashagan could face a 
breach of contract suit.  "If investors violate an agreed 
contract, Kazakhstan reserves the right to take measures 
according to our domestic legislation." For his part, Prodi 
told Nazarbayev that a renegotiation of terms within the PSA 
would be acceptable.  Prodi also urged Kazakhstan to "leave 
it to the experts," and to "get it out of the headlines." 
 
5.  (SBU) Charge also asked Ambassador Asquino whether Prodi 
and Nazarbayev discussed Kazakhstan's bid to chair the OSCE 
in 2009.  According to the Ambassador, Nazarbayev does not 
expect a consensus decision.  Italy, however, decided some 
time ago to support the bid, said the Ambassador. He noted 
that 30% of Italy's daily gas consumption comes through 
Russia.  Germany is an even stronger supporter of 
Kazakhstan's bid, he added. 
 
6.  (SBU) Comment: Romano Prodi's visit was a valuable 
opportunity for a high-profile leader to deliver directly to 
President Nazarbayev a message of concern regarding recent 
developments in Kazakhstan's energy sector. Prodi's 
discussions with Nazarbayev indicate that Nazarbayev 
understands the sensitivity of the amendments to the subsoil 
use law and that he will not seek to abandon the Kashagan 
PSA.   Nevertheless, with the GOK still likely to levy a 
substantial penalty on AGIP, Chevron facing a $600 million 
environmental fine, the recent establishment by the Finance 
Ministry's Tax Committee of a special unit to focus 
specifically on western energy companies, and a domestic 
economic downturn spurring a populist reaction from some 
politicians, the coming months look to be bumpy ones for 
western energy companies in Kazakhstan.  End Comment 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2813, DASD CAGAN URGES KAZAKHSTAN TO INCREASE NUMBER OF

07ASTANA2807, KAZAKHSTAN: GOVERNMENT ADVANCES QUESTIONABLE MEDIA REFORM

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2807.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2807 2007-10-12 12:35 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8062
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #2807/01 2851235
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121235Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0896
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0270
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1832
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002807 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA) 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: GOVERNMENT ADVANCES QUESTIONABLE MEDIA REFORM 
LEGISLATION 
 
ASTANA 00002807  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (U) Summary: On October 1, Adil Soz and several other media 
watchdog groups circulated copies of draft amendments to 
Kazakhstan's law concerning defamation in the media, as well as an 
open letter to Parliament criticizing the draft.  Among other 
things, the proposed legislation removes imprisonment as a possible 
punishment for defamation, but leaves other penalties in place, and 
adds liability for dissemination of true information regarding the 
private life of a citizen that derogates his honor and dignity. 
According to Adil Soz, the amendments were drafted by the Ministry 
of Interior rather than the Ministry of Culture and Information, and 
are currently awaiting approval by the cabinet and prime minister 
before they are forwarded to Parliament. End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
GOVERNMENT ADVANCES AMENDMENTS TO DEFAMATION LAW 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2. (U) On October 1, the media watchdog group Adil Soz, the Union of 
Journalists, the Congress of Journalists, and several other 
media-related NGOs publicly criticized new draft amendments to 
Kazakhstan's media law and circulated copies of the proposed 
legislation. According to the NGOs, the amendments were drafted by 
the Ministry of Interior, as opposed to the Ministry of Culture and 
Information, which normally has responsibility for such legislation 
and has purportedly been working on the issue over the past several 
months. 
 
3. (U) According to the text circulated by the NGOs, the proposed 
legislation: 
 
-- removes imprisonment as a possible punishment for insulting the 
dignity and honor of the president, leaving fines or "social or 
correctional works" as the maximum punishment for a violation; 
 
-- removes separate, harsher penalties for defamation through the 
mass media in most cases, though journalists could still be 
prosecuted under the basic defamation provisions; 
 
-- retains liability for defamation through the mass media for cases 
involving the president; 
 
-- retains liability for libel against judges, jurors, prosecutors, 
and investigators, though possible prison terms for such violations 
are reduced; 
 
-- adds liability for dissemination of true information regarding 
the private life of a citizen that derogates his honor and dignity. 
 
4. (U) The text of the draft legislation was accompanied by an 
unsigned Note of Explanation from Prime Minister Karim Massimov. 
(Note: Notes of Explanation are typically signed by the prime 
minister after the cabinet has approved the legislation and is ready 
to forward it to the parliament.  End note.)  According to the Note, 
the draft amendments were prepared pursuant to OSCE recommendations 
and are intended to advance Kazakhstan's bid to chair the OSCE in 
2009. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
MEDIA WATCHDOGS, OSCE STRONGLY CRITICAL 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5. (U) The media NGOs said the proposed amendments fall far short of 
OSCE standards.  In their view, the only positive is the removal of 
imprisonment as criminal punishment for defamation in some cases. 
However, the law retains various forms of punishment for defamation 
and leaves journalists vulnerable to punishment for defamation, 
including serious fines.  In addition, the amendments would add a 
provision punishing the dissemination of true information that 
concerns the private life of a citizen and derogates his honor and 
dignity.  The media NGOs fear this provision will further chill the 
freedom of journalists to report information critical of government 
officials. 
 
6. (U) The media NGOs also expressed frustration that Minister of 
Culture and Information Yermukhamet Yertysbayev has failed to 
deliver on his frequent promises of new media legislation to 
increase media freedom, decriminalize libel, and demonopolize the 
media in Kazakhstan.  The NGOs noted that Yertysbayev's previous 
statements on the issue concerned relatively superficial changes to 
the law, and that the draft amendments now circulating were even 
more disappointing than what he had floated in the past.  The groups 
also questioned the motives of the Ministry of Interior's new 
interest in drafting media law amendments and noted its lack of 
expertise in this area. 
 
 
ASTANA 00002807  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
7. (U) On October 9, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media 
Miklos Haraszti sent a letter to Minister of Interior Baurzhan 
Mukhamedzhanov asking him to withdraw the amendments.  In a public 
statement announcing the letter, Haraszti said that the proposed 
legislation contravenes Kazakhstan's OSCE commitments on freedom of 
the media, and
noted that his office was still reviewing a draft 
media law for Kazakhstan that the government submitted in April. 
Haraszti stated that the new amendments offer substantially less 
decriminalization than the broader media law draft circulated in 
April.  According to Haraszti, journalists could still be prosecuted 
for defamation under the new amendments, the amendments still 
provide special protection for the president, and criticism of some 
public officials could still be punished with prison sentences. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
GOVERNMENT LARGELY SILENT IN RESPONSE TO CRITICISM 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
8. (U) On October 1, the Ministry of Interior spokesman briefly 
commented on the statement by the media NGOs during his weekly press 
briefing.  He expressed surprise that the NGOs were so critical to 
legislation, because the police were actually seeking more freedom 
for reporters.  He speculated that the NGOs may have been confused 
by difficult terms in the legislation.  The Government of 
Kazakhstan, including the usually outspoken Yertysbayev, has 
otherwise been silent on the proposed legislation. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (U) Comment.  The draft amendments as circulated by the media 
NGOs are inconsistent with past signals from the government 
concerning their plans for amending the media law, though the 
government has not disavowed them and Yertysbayev has been unusually 
silent on the issue.  On their face, the amendments represent very 
superficial changes to the defamation law, and may actually serve to 
restrict free speech by allowing punishment for the dissemination of 
true information about the private life of individuals.  However, 
it's not clear at this point if the amendments will pass in their 
current form and whether they constitute the full scope of planned 
reforms to the media law.  Post will continue to monitor the 
legislation and advocate for changes to the media law that comply 
with international standards. End comment. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2786, KAZAKHSTAN AGREES TO REVIEW DRAFT RESOLUTION ON CONDEMNING

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2786.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2786 2007-10-05 08:17 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7576
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #2786 2780817
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050817Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0880
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1885
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 002786 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR IO/RHS (L. Lum) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UN PHUM KWMN SOCI KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN AGREES TO REVIEW DRAFT RESOLUTION ON CONDEMNING 
RAPE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATE POLICY 
 
REF: State 135255 
 
Poloff delivered reftel demarche to Amanbek Demesinov, director of 
the international organizations section of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs on October 3. Demesinov was not familiar with the issue, and 
was therefore noncommittal in terms of offering Kazakhstani support 
or co-sponsorship. Demesinov said that the Government of Kazakhstan 
would review the issue and respond either to Post or through their 
delegation at the United Nations. 
 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2765, KAZAKHSTAN: RISING BREAD PRICES PRESENT CHALLENGE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2765.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2765 2007-10-03 09:35 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5148
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #2765 2760935
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030935Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0861
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7246
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8173
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2268
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8065

UNCLAS ASTANA 002765 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR M. O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: RISING BREAD PRICES PRESENT CHALLENGE 
FOR GOVERNMENT 
 
1. (U) Summary:  The price of bread has increased by thirty 
percent in Kazakhstan over the last two months.  The bread 
crisis has galvanized opposition parties, who have been vocal 
in their criticism of the government.  The People's Communist 
Party has started a petition campaign in protest against the 
rise in costs, and other parties have expressed their support 
for the campaign.  The government has reacted by placing 
bakeries on the list of enterprises subject to state 
regulation. Prime Minister Masimov has also stated that he 
has not ruled out introducing a state monopoly on bread 
making. End Summary. 
 
2. (U) On September 27. representatives from Almaty bakeries 
announced that the price for a standard loaf of bread would 
rise to 55 tenge from 36 tenge as of September 29 (The 
average pension is 13,800 tenge, or just over $100 a month). 
One FSN based in Almaty told Poloff that the price of a small 
loaf of bread at his local store has increased from 30 tenge 
to 82 tenge in less than two weeks. Similar sharp price hikes 
were recorded in Shymkent, Taraz, Atyrau, and Astana. 
 
3. (U) Rising bread costs have occurred despite projections 
that Kazakhstan, the world's fifth largest grain exporter, 
will harvest a record-setting 20 tons of wheat.  Government 
officials claim that conditions on the world market have led 
to the surging prices.  Kazakhstan has also announced that it 
will soon begin to charge market rates for grain exports to 
the other nations of Central Asia. 
 
4. (U) On October 1, Prime Minister Masimov stated publicly 
that he will consider introducing a state monopoly on 
bread-making if prices do not stabilize.  "If in a week we 
fail to see certain measures and cooperation, I will make a 
decision about introducing a state monopoly," he said.  Prime 
Minister Masimov said publicly "Prices are soaring everywhere 
because of monopolization of markets and there are no other 
explanations.  In these circumstances, all akims have to 
resort to administrative resources to provide for free access 
to markets."  As a result, Oblast and Almaty city akims were 
instructed to speak with large producers of flour and bread 
and to stabilize prices on the domestic market.  All bakeries 
have been placed on the list of enterprises whose products 
will be subject to state regulation 
 
5. (U) Opposition parties have criticized the government for 
the recent price increases.  The People's Communist Party has 
started a petition campaign in protest of the increased bread 
prices.  On September 27, Ak Zhol, Auyl, and Rukhaniyat 
political parties expressed their support for the petition 
campaign.  The National Social Democratic Party released a 
statement blaming the government for not anticipating the 
spike in bread prices.  They called on the government to 
allocate funds from the state budget in order to provide 
assistance to those most affected by the increased cost of 
bread. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: The price of bread was a potent political 
symbol in the Soviet Union and remains so in Post-Soviet 
states.  As a result, the surging price of bread is a matter 
of significant concern for the GOK and a first post-election 
opportunity for the opposition. With the rising bread costs 
tied to conditions on the world market, the question now is 
whether the GOK can maintain its free-market principles and 
resist the populist urge to introduce distortionary 
mechanisms. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2762, KAZAKHSTAN: RISING BREAD PRICES PRESENT CHALLENGE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2762.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2762 2007-10-03 09:35 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5147
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #2762 2760935
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030935Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0859
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7245
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8172
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2267
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8064

UNCLAS ASTANA 002762 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR M. O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: RISING BREAD PRICES PRESENT CHALLENGE 
FOR GOVERNMENT 
 
1. (U) Summary:  The price of bread has increased by thirty 
percent in Kazakhstan over the last two months.  The bread 
crisis has galvanized opposition parties, who have been vocal 
in their criticism of the government.  The People's Communist 
Party has started a petition campaign in protest against the 
rise in costs, and other parties have expressed their support 
for the campaign.  The government has reacted by placing 
bakeries on the list of enterprises subject to state 
regulation. Prime Minister Masimov has also stated that he 
has not ruled out introducing a state monopoly on bread 
making. End Summary. 
 
2. (U) On September 27. representatives from Almaty bakeries 
announced that the price for a standard loaf of bread would 
rise to 55 tenge from 36 tenge as of September 29 (The 
average pension is 13,800 tenge, or just over $100 a month). 
One FSN based in Almaty told Poloff that the price of a small 
loaf of bread at his local store has increased from 30 tenge 
to 82 tenge in less than two weeks. Similar sharp price hikes 
were recorded in Shymkent, Taraz, Atyrau, and Astana. 
 
3. (U) Rising bread costs have occurred despite projections 
that Kazakhstan, the world's fifth largest grain exporter, 
will harvest a record-setting 20 tons of wheat.  Government 
officials claim that conditions on the world market have led 
to the surging prices.  Kazakhstan has also announced that it 
will soon begin to charge market rates for grain exports to 
the other nations of Central Asia. 
 
4. (U) On October 1, Prime Minister Masimov stated publicly 
that he will consider introducing a state monopoly on 
bread-making if prices do not stabilize.  "If in a week we 
fail to see certain measures and cooperation, I will make a 
decision about introducing a state monopoly," he said.  Prime 
Minister Masimov said publicly "Prices are soaring everywhere 
because of monopolization of markets and there are no other 
explanations.  In these circumstances, all akims have to 
resort to administrative resources to provide for free access 
to markets."  As a result, Oblast and Almaty city akims were 
instructed to speak with large producers of flour and bread 
and to stabilize prices on the domestic market.  All bakeries 
have been placed on the list of enterprises whose products 
will be subject to state regulation 
 
5. (U) Opposition parties have criticized the government for 
the recent price increases.  The People's Communist Party has 
started a petition campaign in protest of the increased bread 
prices.  On September 27, Ak Zhol, Auyl, and Rukhaniyat 
political parties expressed their support for the petition 
campaign.  The National Social Democratic Party released a 
statement blaming the government for not anticipating the 
spike in bread prices.  They called on the government to 
allocate funds from the state budget in order to provide 
assistance to those most affected by the increased cost of 
bread. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: The price of bread was a potent political 
symbol in the Soviet Union and remains so in Post-Soviet 
states.  As a result, the surging price of bread is a matter 
of significant concern for the GOK and a first post-election 
opportunity for the opposition. With the rising bread costs 
tied to conditions on the world market, the question now is 
whether the GOK can maintain its free-market principles and 
resist the populist urge to introduce distortionary 
mechanisms. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2761, KAZAKHSTAN: RISING BREAD PRICES PRESENT CHALLENGE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2761.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2761 2007-10-03 09:35 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5146
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #2761 2760935
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030935Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0858
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7244
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8171
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2266
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8063

UNCLAS ASTANA 002761 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR M. O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: RISING BREAD PRICES PRESENT CHALLENGE 
FOR GOVERNMENT 
 
 
1. (U) Summary:  The price of bread has increased by thirty 
percent in Kazakhstan over the last two months.  The bread 
crisis has galvanized opposition parties, who have been vocal 
in their criticism of the government.  The People's Communist 
Party has started a petition campaign in protest against the 
rise in costs, and other parties have expressed their support 
for the campaign.  The government has reacted by placing 
bakeries on the list of enterprises subject to state 
regulation. Prime Minister Masimov has also stated that he 
has not ruled out introducing a state monopoly on bread 
making. End Summary. 
 
2. (U) On September 27. representatives from Almaty bakeries 
announced that the price for a standard loaf of bread would 
rise to 55 tenge from 36 tenge as of September 29 (The 
average pension is 13,800 tenge, or just over $100 a month). 
One FSN based in Almaty told Poloff that the price of a small 
loaf of bread at his local store has increased from 30 tenge 
to 82 tenge in less than two weeks. Similar sharp price hikes 
were recorded in Shymkent, Taraz, Atyrau, and Astana. 
 
3. (U) Rising bread costs have occurred despite projections 
that Kazakhstan, the world's fifth largest grain exporter, 
will harvest a record-setting 20 tons of wheat.  Government 
officials claim that conditions on the world market have led 
to the surging prices.  Kazakhstan has also announced that it 
will soon begin to charge market rates for grain exports to 
the other nations of Central Asia. 
 
4. (U) On October 1, Prime Minister Masimov stated publicly 
that he will consider introducing a state monopoly on 
bread-making if prices do not stabilize.  "If in a week we 
fail to see certain measures and cooperation, I will make a 
decision about introducing a state monopoly," he said.  Prime 
Minister Masimov said publicly "Prices are soaring everywhere 
because of monopolization of markets and there are no other 
explanations.  In these circumstances, all akims have to 
resort to administrative resources to provide for free access 
to markets."  As a result, Oblast and Almaty city akims were 
instructed to speak with large producers of flour and bread 
and to stabilize prices on the domestic market.  All bakeries 
have been placed on the list of enterprises whose products 
will be subject to state regulation 
 
5. (U) Opposition parties have criticized the government for 
the recent price increases.  The People's Communist Party has 
started a petition campaign in protest of the increased bread 
prices.  On September 27, Ak Zhol, Auyl, and Rukhaniyat 
political parties expressed their support for the petition 
campaign.  The National Social Democratic Party released a 
statement blaming the government for not anticipating the 
spike in bread prices.  They called on the government to 
allocate funds from the state budget in order to provide 
assistance to those most affected by the increased cost of 
bread. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: The price of bread was a potent political 
symbol in the Soviet Union and remains so in Post-Soviet 
states.  As a result, the surging price of bread is a matter 
of significant concern for the GOK and a first post-election 
opportunity for the opposition. With the rising bread costs 
tied to conditions on the world market, the question now is 
whether the GOK can maintain its free-market principles and 
resist the populist urge to introduce distortionary 
mechanisms. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2760, KAZAKHSTAN: RISING BREAD PRICES PRESENT CHALLENGE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2760.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2760 2007-10-03 09:35 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5145
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #2760 2760935
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030935Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0857
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7243
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8170
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2265
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8062

UNCLAS ASTANA 002760 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR M. O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: RISING BREAD PRICES PRESENT CHALLENGE 
FOR GOVERNMENT 
 
1. (U) Summary:  The price of bread has increased by thirty 
percent in Kazakhstan over the last two months.  The bread 
crisis has galvanized opposition parties, who have been vocal 
in their criticism of the government.  The People's Communist 
Party has started a petition campaign in protest against the 
rise in costs, and other parties have expressed their support 
for the campaign.  The government has reacted by placing 
bakeries on the list of enterprises subject to state 
regulation. Prime Minister Masimov has also stated that he 
has not ruled out introducing a state monopoly on bread 
making. End Summary. 
 
2. (U) On September 27. representatives from Almaty bakeries 
announced that the price for a standard loaf of bread would 
rise to 55 tenge from 36 tenge as of September 29 (The 
average pension is 13,800 tenge, or just over $100 a month). 
One FSN based in Almaty told Poloff that the price of a small 
loaf of bread at his local store has increased from 30 tenge 
to 82 tenge in less than two weeks. Similar sharp price hikes 
were recorded in Shymkent, Taraz, Atyrau, and Astana. 
 
3. (U) Rising bread costs have occurred despite projections 
that Kazakhstan, the world's fifth largest grain exporter, 
will harvest a record-setting 20 tons of wheat.  Government 
officials claim that conditions on the world market have led 
to the surging prices.  Kazakhstan has also announced that it 
will soon begin to charge market rates for grain exports to 
the other nations of Central Asia. 
 
4. (U) On October 1, Prime Minister Masimov stated publicly 
that he will consider introducing a state monopoly on 
bread-making if prices do not stabilize.  "If in a week we 
fail to see certain measures and cooperation, I will make a 
decision about introducing a state monopoly," he said.  Prime 
Minister Masimov said publicly "Prices are soaring everywhere 
because of monopolization of markets and there are no other 
explanations.  In these circumstances, all akims have to 
resort to administrative resources to provide for free access 
to markets."  As a result, Oblast and Almaty city akims were 
instructed to speak with large producers of flour and bread 
and to stabilize prices on the domestic market.  All bakeries 
have been placed on the list of enterprises whose products 
will be subject to state regulation 
 
5. (U) Opposition parties have criticized the government for 
the recent price increases.  The People's Communist Party has 
started a petition campaign in protest of the increased bread 
prices.  On September 27, Ak Zhol, Auyl, and Rukhaniyat 
political parties expressed their support for the petition 
campaign.  The National Social Democratic Party released a 
statement blaming the government for not anticipating the 
spike in bread prices.  They called on the government to 
allocate funds from the state budget in order to provide 
assistance to those most affected by the increased cost of 
bread. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: The price of bread was a potent political 
symbol in the Soviet Union and remains so in Post-Soviet 
states.  As a result, the surging price of bread is a matter 
of significant concern for the GOK and a first post-election 
opportunity for the opposition. With the rising bread costs 
tied to conditions on the world market, the question now is 
whether the GOK can maintain its free-market principles and 
resist the populist urge to introduce distortionary 
mechanisms. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2728, KAZAKHSTAN’S TEXTILES AND APPAREL SECTION: UPDATED

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2728.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2728 2007-10-01 11:37 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3189
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #2728 2741137
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011137Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0843
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0269
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ASTANA 002728 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD KTEX KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN'S TEXTILES AND APPAREL SECTION: UPDATED 
STATISTICS AND PROJECTION OF FUTURE COMPETITIVENESS 
 
Ref: (a) State 114799 (b) 06 Astana 150 
 
1.  (U) The following data for Kazakhstan in 2007, provided by Lubov 
Khudova, representative of the Kazakhstani Association of Light 
Industry Enterprises, and sources from the National Statistics 
Agency, responds to questions in ref A and updates information 
provided in ref B. 
 
-- Industrial production (including extractive industry):  $52.7 
billion (2006); $38.7 billion (January - August 2006) 
 
-- Total textile and apparel production: Approx $281 million 
 
--  Exports in textiles and apparel to the U.S.: N/A (negligible) 
 
--  Total manufacturing employment: 714,600 (as of July 2006) 
 
--  Total employment in textiles and apparel: 21,000 (including 
2,100 in shoe manufacturing) 
 
2.  (SBU) Khudova told Econoff that the internal textile and apparel 
market remains very much unregulated.  She said that the vast 
majority of the textile and apparel products on the Kazakhstani 
market are imports, of which 95% are undeclared.  While Kazakhstan 
has laws on the books which levies customs duties on textile and 
apparel imports, customs enforcement is woefully inadequate.  This, 
Khudova stated, is due to rampant corruption on the part of customs 
enforcement officers, and loopholes found in the Kazakhstani customs 
code. 
 
3. (SBU) Khudova expressed enthusiasm about regulations recently 
passed by Parliament that attempt to close some of the loopholes in 
the Customs Code.  These new regulations primarily aim at preventing 
illegal or undervalued (and hence, undertaxed) Chinese textile and 
apparel products from entering the Kazakhstani market.  Still, 
Khudova was not optimistic about the prospects of a reduction in 
corruption on the part of customs officials. 
 
4.  (SBU) Khudova stated that as a result of post-Soviet economic 
decline and readjustment, Kazakhstan's textile industry is today 
dominated by foreign imports, particularly counterfeit products. 
She noted, however, that the quality of the counterfeit goods has 
improved in recent years, most likely due to Chinese manufacturers' 
improved production methods.  Khudova added that the Government of 
Kazakhstan has not provided any special support mechanisms for 
recently unemployed Kazakhstani textile laborers. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

07ASTANA2727, KAZAKHSTAN ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT TIFA

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA2727.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA2727 2007-10-01 05:46 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2820
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #2727 2740546
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010546Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0842
INFO RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ASTANA 002727 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD EFIN ECON PREL AF KG KZ TI TX UZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT TIFA 
 
REF: State 117583 
 
1. (U) Econoff delivered reftel points on September 28 to Damigul 
Kabiyeva, Head of the WTO accession Department.  Kabiyeva stated 
that she thought this summer's Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement (TIFA) Council events in Washington were a success and 
reiterated Kazakhstan's commitment to developing the TIFA framework 
as a means of facilitating regional economic development. 
 
2. (U) Kabiyeva was quite supportive of the idea of holding 
expert-level preparatory events before next year's plenary session. 
Such an approach, she stated, would help make the political-level 
discussions more focused and fruitful.  She also suggested the 
possibility of launching concrete investment projects at future TIFA 
meetings. 
 
3. (U) Kabiyeva reacted favorably to the idea of holding next year's 
TIFA events in Central Asia, stating that holding them in the region 
may help attract business participation.  She noted that Dushanbe 
has recently hosted a number of multilateral meetings, adding that 
Kazakhstani officials go there "with pleasure."  Kabiyeva was 
somewhat less enthusiastic about Asghabat as a possible venue, but 
said that holding TIFA events there "may help bring Turkmenistan 
into the fold a little more."  She also suggested the possibility of 
determining meeting locations on a rotating basis (an approach, she 
noted, used by other regional organizations).  This, Kabiyeva said, 
would give each country a greater stake in the TIFA framework. 
 
4. (SBU) Still, Kabiyeva emphasized the importance of a continuing 
strong role of the U.S. in the TIFA process.  Initiatives, she 
noted, are received better if they come from the United States. 
Other Central Asian countries, she continued, are wary of the notion 
of Kazakhstan's "regional leadership." 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks