Monthly Archives: December 2007

07ASTANA3368, SCHOOL OF HARD KNOCKS: BECOMING A LIBERAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3368 2007-12-27 03:10 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9816
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #3368/01 3610310
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 270310Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1426
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0342
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 003368 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017 
TAGS: ECON KDEM KZ OSCE PGOV PHUM
SUBJECT: SCHOOL OF HARD KNOCKS:  BECOMING A LIBERAL 
POLITICIAN IN NORTHERN KAZAKHSTAN 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 2222 
     B. ASTANA 3025 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 1. (C) Summary.  Young, U.S.-educated and fed up with local 
corruption, Viktor Frolov wants to enter politics and change 
the way things are done in his native Petropavlovsk (capital 
of Northern Kazakhstan oblast).  Frolov told Econoff that, 
despite being defeated in his first campaign for the 
Petropavlovsk City Maslikhat (city council), he aspires to 
run again.  Although he most closely identifies himself with 
the opposition Ak Zhol, Frolov has chosen to direct his 
pursuits through the ruling Nur Otan.  He sees his region as 
one with an increasingly disaffected population and no 
functioning political opposition.  Frolov's travails present 
an interesting microcosm of the political realities in 
Northern Kazakhstan oblast.  End summary. 
 
Pick Your Party 
--------------- 
 
2. (C) In a December 15 conversation with Econoff, Viktor 
Frolov, an ethnic Russian native of Petropavlovsk, made it 
clear that his political perspective was largely defined by 
the year he spent studying in the United States as an 
undergraduate on a U.S.-funded program.  By the time of the 
August elections, Frolov had been preparing for a run for the 
Petropavlovsk City Maslikhat for some time.  Ideologically, 
he most closely identifies himself with Ak Zhol (Econoff 
first met Frolov when visiting the Petropavlovsk Ak Zhol 
campaign headquarters in early August in the run-up to the 
Parliamentary elections, ref A).  However, Frolov never 
officially joined Ak Zhol due to his conviction that an 
affiliation with the opposition would prevent him from 
getting elected.  Instead, in early 2008, with the 
encouragement from the city akim, Frolov joined Nur Otan, 
hoping to build his political career from within the ruling 
party. 
 
3. (C) Upon joining Nur Otan, the twenty-something Frolov was 
immediately made a member of the 12-member "politburo" of Nur 
Otan's Petropavlovsk branch.  Nevertheless, Frolov's 
ambitions to run in the August election on the Nur Otan 
ticket for the city maslikhat were dashed.  Frolov told 
Econoff that, although his candidacy was supported by the 
city akim, the oblast akim struck it down.  The reason, 
Frolov explained, was that he "had nothing to lose" and was 
therefore difficult to control.  Without a substantial stake 
in the "system" (such as owning his own business), Frolov was 
deemed by the oblast akim as not subject to leverage and 
potentially too independent. 
 
Run on Your Own 
--------------- 
 
4. (C) Undeterred (and without leaving Nur Otan), Frolov 
proceeded to run for the city maslikhat as an independent. 
He and his supporters canvassed the neighborhoods of his city 
district, talking to residents and handing out campaign 
materials.  The issues were local: repairing buildings, 
constructing a playground, etc.  Frolov told Econoff that he 
came under some pressure from the local authorities to pull 
out.  His supervisor at the bank was asked to coerce Frolov 
to abandon his pursuit.  To this, Frolov said, his boss had a 
"clever" response: he (falsely) claimed that he was powerless 
to act against Frolov, because the latter had strong links to 
the bank's leadership in Almaty. 
 
5. (C) Frolov echoed the claim made to Econoff by the 
Petropavlovsk Ak Zhol leader in August that all the local 
election results were drawn up in the oblast maslikhat a 
month or two before the election (ref A).  Other local 
opposition-minded candidates (all running as independents) 
were, Frolov said, pressured to withdraw or even stricken 
from the ballot.  The oblast akim, Frolov claimed, violated 
the law by openly campaigning for Nur Otan.  Many businesses, 
including Frolov's own bank, called their employees and 
pressured them to show up at the polls.   Frolov was told by 
the authorities not to bother fielding observers at two of 
his district's four polling stations.  At the end of the day, 
he garnered 29% of the vote, with the Nur Otan candidate 
winning over 60%, and the rest going to a "stand-in, 
sacrificial lamb" candidate.  Of the 19 seats in the city 
Maslikhat, Frolov said, 18 went to Nur Otan, with the 
remaining seat going to a "token" independent with no ties to 
the opposition. 
 
Savor the Frustration 
 
ASTANA 00003368  002 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------- 
 
6. (C) Frolov stated to Econoff that he is happy with his 
career in banking but remains determined to enter politics. 
Many people in the largely ethnic-Russian Northern Kazakhstan 
oblast are, according to Frolov, increasingly unhappy with 
the current state of affairs.  Endemic corruption and 
preferences for ethnic Kazakhs in hiring are, he said, 
fueling public unease.  Emigration to Russia from the oblast 
is continuing.  Frolov stated that t
he removal of Tair 
Mansurov, the oblast akim, in October drew a sign of relief 
from the local business community, which resented Mansurov's 
penchant for extracting money from businesses.  (Note: 
Mansurov has since been appointed the General Secretary of 
the Eurasian Economic Community, "EurAsEc," which includes 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan.  End note.)  On the other hand, Frolov added, 
Mansurov's replacement, his former deputy Serik Bilyalov, is 
a "nobody" and does not inspire confidence.  At the same 
time, the political situation in the oblast is becoming 
"harsher": every single local newspaper issue is read and 
pre-approved by oblast authorities prior to publication; Nur 
Otan is increasingly acting as the sole party in power and 
calling the shots by itself.  The oblast authorities, 
according to Frolov, routinely compel local businesses, 
particularly banks, to provide money for various public 
projects, though the recent financial turmoil (ref B) has 
abated these pressures.  Government jobs, he added, are 
routinely "purchased."  Frolov stated that young people who 
come back to Petropavlovsk after studying in the U.S. are 
"incensed" by the corruption they see. 
 
...And Run, Run Again 
--------------------- 
 
7. (C) With the next Petropavlovsk city maslikhat election 
nearly five years away, Frolov's main hope is that one of the 
maslikhat's seats becomes vacated early.  (Note: Candidates 
for the Petropavlovsk city maslikhat must be residents of the 
city but not necessarily of the district they are vying to 
represent.  End note.)  In the meantime, Frolov said, he 
remains in the Nur Otan politburo, which "hypocritically" 
approves any proposal that comes before it.  Frolov stated 
that he is presently laying the groundwork for a political 
career by building connections.  For now, he believes that 
Nur Otan is his best bet for getting elected as a member of 
the city maslikhat.  He noted that the law allows a maslikhat 
deputy (though not a Mazhilis deputy) to leave his party 
after being elected and still retain his seat. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (C) Frolov's travails present a good cross-section of the 
political realities in the Northern Kazakhstan oblast, which 
-- under the thumb of the recently departed akim Tair 
Mansurov -- earned the reputation of being a tightly 
controlled one (ref A).  The increasingly close marriage of 
the ruling Nur Otan with the government, the virtually 
unbridled powers enjoyed by the oblast akim, the rampant 
corruption, and the nearly complete impotence of the local 
opposition are the common threads running through Frolov's 
story and that of his oblast. 
ORDWAY

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07ASTANA3355, KAZAKHSTAN: BORDER INCIDENT UNDERSCORES LIMITATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3355 2007-12-21 10:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7638
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #3355 3551026
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211026Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1407
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS ASTANA 003355 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL (BUHLER, BALABANIAN); SCA/CEN (OMARA), ISN/ECC 
(HARTSHORNE), SCA/RA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PBTS PREL KG KZ
 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: BORDER INCIDENT UNDERSCORES LIMITATIONS 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 3287 
 
1. Summary:  On the evening of December 10, four people attacked 
border guards at the Karasu checkpoint on the Kazakhstani-Kyrgyz 
border.  As a result of the conflict, the border guards killed one 
person, police detained two suspects, and the others escaped.  The 
conflict with the border guards was apparently initiated to distract 
them from an illegal border crossing.  End Summary. 
 
----------- 
BACKGROUND 
----------- 
 
2. The international checkpoint Karasu is located in the Korday 
rayon of the Zhambylskaya oblast on the Kazakhstani-Kyrgyz border. 
It is located near the Chu River Bridge and is on the most direct 
route from Issyk-Kul in the Kyrgyz Republic to Almaty.  Issyk-Kul is 
a major tourist destination for Kazakhstanis and many tourists cross 
at the Karasu checkpoint during summer months.  The length of the 
Kazakhstani-Kyrgyz border is 1,205 km. 
 
3. The Border Guard Service (BGS) has complained that the 
Kazakhstani-Kyrgyz border is not well equipped and is planning to 
begin providing additional equipment on the border in 2008. 
General-Major Talgat Yessetov, Commander of the Ontustik Regional 
Department, stated in a November interview that traffickers and 
organized criminal groups are actively smuggling drugs and other 
contraband over the border with Kyrgyzstan for transit through 
Kazakhstan.  He also said that traffickers were willing to use 
increasingly aggressive means to cross the border.  Yessetov said 
that last summer there were several attempts to cross the border 
using a column of a hundred cars forcing their way through 
checkpoints.  He added that, whereas traffickers had been willing to 
attempt to intimidate border guards in the past, they were now 
willing to physically fight with the guards. 
 
4. During his recent visit (reftel A), Deputy Head of the BGS 
General-Major Berkaliyev also discussed the problems on the southern 
borders and said that the borders with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 
were in the most dire need of additional equipment and assistance. 
 
--------------- 
LATEST INCIDENT 
--------------- 
 
5. On December 10, one person was killed and two detained when a 
group attacked the border post at Karasu.  According to official 
statements from the Ontustik Regional Department reported in the 
local press, two people arrived in a vehicle from the village of 
Karasu in Kazakhstan, stopped at the checkpoint, and were joined by 
two others, who had been hiding near the checkpoint.  The two border 
guards on duty were attacked and wounded one of assailants.  The 
attackers were unarmed and attempted to disarm the border guards. 
During the attack, a jeep passed through a shallow part of the Chu 
River into Kazakhstan.  As soon as the jeep crossed the border, the 
three assailants grabbed their wounded colleague and escaped towards 
the village of Korday.  The authorities later received a report that 
a wounded Kazakhstani died in the central hospital in Korday. 
 
6. Because the BGS has limited jurisdiction, the case was 
transferred to the Korday Regional Office of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD).  As a result of MVD's investigation, 
officers detained two Kazakhstanis suspected of being involved in 
the incident.  No other suspects have been detained and the 
nationalities of the others involved in the incident have not been 
determined.  Though the investigation is ongoing, the authorities 
suspect that the driver of the jeep was transporting drugs, but they 
have not excluded the possibility that other types of contraband or 
even persons were transported in the jeep. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7. This incident clearly highlights the continued weaknesses at the 
southern borders.  In light of Kazakhstan's geographic position and 
the record opium harvest in Afghanistan, the BGS will face an 
increasingly serious threat of drug traffic.  As the BGS responds to 
this threat and increases security on the border, the traffickers 
may be pushed to use bolder methods and take greater risks, as seen 
in this incident.  The BGS will need to be aware of these risks and 
appropriately train their officers.  The Embassy will continue to 
assist the GOK in securing its border and examine its assistance 
programs for opportunities to provide the necessary training and 
equipment.  This issue will also be raised at the next international 
coordination meeting in January.  End Comment. 
 
ORDWAY

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07ASTANA3351, EXBS KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR’S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE (NOVEMBER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3351 2007-12-21 02:25 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7271
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #3351/01 3550225
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210225Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1402
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0075
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC 0006
RUCQAAA/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0455
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8218
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8104
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0028
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2314
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7276
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0073

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 003351 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC YWONG, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC-AMT LSPRINGER 
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE RBUCK 
DEPT FOR SCA/RA JSCHLOSSER 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN MO'MARA 
CBP/INA FOR CDONOFRIO AND RWATT 
USDOE/NNSA CWALKER, TPERRY AND EDESCHLER 
DOC FOR DCREED AND GPETERSEN-BEARD 
USCG FOR BGOLDEN 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT, BISHKEK, BAKU, DUSHANBE AND ASHGABAT FOR EXBS 
ADVISORS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: EXBS KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR'S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE (NOVEMBER 
2007) 
 
I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS: 
 
An amendment to the U.S.-Kazakhstan Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) Umbrella Agreement (UA) of December 13, 1993, has been signed. 
 This amendment extends the agreement, which was to expire on 
December 13, 2007. 
 
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS CONDUCTED 
 
1. A site assessment of the Kurmangazy vehicle and pedestrian border 
crossing with Russia was conducted on November 1, 2007.  This border 
site, which is located on the right bank of the Kigash River in the 
Kurmangazinsk District of Atyrau Providence, consists of a newly 
constructed vehicle and pedestrian bridge, which replaces a ferry 
barge system, and a newly constructed single check-point 
inspectional facility, which operates continuously. 
 
2. A site assessment of the Atyrau Airport was conducted on November 
2, 2007.  Atyrau, which is the capital of Atyrau Province, is 
located 2,700 kilometers west of Almaty and 350 kilometers east of 
the Russian city of Astrakhan. This airport operates around the 
clock with international flights operating primarily to and from 
Europe and Turkey.  Much of the cargo handled by this port is bound 
for the oil rigs in the Caspian Sea. 
 
3. A site assessment of the Aktau Airport was conducted on November 
5, 2007.  Aktau, which is the capital of Mangystau Province, is 
located on the Mangyshlak Peninsula and is the only Kazakhstan city 
with a seaport on the Caspian Sea.  Because of this there is a great 
deal of concern over the airport's capacity to sustain the growing 
demand for services. This airport terminal, which operates 
continuously, is scheduled to undergo major reconstruction starting 
in 2008.  Most of the international cargo and passenger flights 
operate between a range of countries, including Russia, Turkey, 
Azerbaijan, Great Britain, and Georgia. 
 
4. A site assessment of the Aktau Seaport was conducted on November 
6, 2007. This facility, which is Kazakhstan's only seaport on the 
Caspian Sea, consists of piers and warehouse serving both commercial 
cargo and a ferry vessel for passengers and vehicles.  The passenger 
ferry services Baku while vehicles are transported to and from Iran. 
 The port has seven access points and is serviced by rail and 
vehicle traffic. 
 
5. A site assessment of the Temirbaba vehicle border crossing with 
Turkmenistan was conducted on November 7, 2007.  This vehicle border 
crossing is scheduled to be replaced in 2008 with a new $6 million 
dollar single check-point inspectional facility.  The Second Line of 
Defense project will not be implemented at this port until after the 
completion of the new construction. 
 
6. A meeting was held on November 1, 2007, at the Kurmangazy vehicle 
and pedestrian border crossing, with Mr. Altay Hasenov, Head of the 
Department of Nuclear Materials Control and Technical Devices for 
the Atyrau Customs office, and Mr. Doskariev Gibratjan, Deputy Head 
of Customs.  Discussion centered on the newly constructed vehicle 
bridge and single check-point port facilities as well as equipment 
and manpower requirements of the port in order to meet the projected 
increase in commercial and passenger traffic that will be generated 
by the completion of the vehicle bridge.  Because of the strategic 
location of this port and the rapidly improving road system in the 
 
ASTANA 00003351  002 OF 004 
 
 
area, this port is an excellent candidate for EXBS assistance to 
supplement the Second Line of Defense Radiation Portal Monitors. 
 
7. A meeting was held on November 2, 2007, at the Atyrau airport 
with Mr. Altay Hasenov, Head of the Department of Nuclear Materials 
Control and Technical Devices for the Atyrau Customs office, Mr. 
Baltuev Muhfuz, Head of the Atyrau Airport Customs Post, Mr. 
Drazakov Totlon, Shift Supervisor for the Atyrau Customs Post, and 
Mr. Kemol bei Afkov, Deputy Director of the airport company. 
Discussions centered on
customs control of the airport, and manpower 
and infrastructure requirements to secure the airport facility from 
any possible smuggling of nuclear, chemical, and biological related 
material.  In addition to the terminal arrival and departure gates 
there is a VIP entrance/exit, and four gates that are used by 
vehicle and pedestrian traffic in support of airport operations. 
 
8. A meeting was held on November 5, 2007, at the Aktau airport, 
with Mr. Temirbek Ibrasher, Acting Head of the Customs post at the 
Aktau Airport, Mr. Alexander Desnikov, Aviation Security Officer, 
Mr. Alibek Mazhikenov, Deputy General Director for the Aktau 
Airport, Evgeny Rayavkin, Chief of Communication Services, and Mr. 
Kameshov Amaugeldy, Head of Aviation Security.  Discussions centered 
on the projected reconstruction of the airport facilities and 
projected increase of international air traffic created by the 
increase in oil production activity in the Caspian Sea area serviced 
by Aktau. 
 
9. A meeting was held on November 6, 2007, at the Mangystau Province 
Customs Department Headquarters in Aktau, with Mr.Albek Kantov, Head 
of the Customs Control Department, Mr. Erlan Butkeouv, Deputy Head 
of the Customs Control Department, and Mr. Muratbek Spabekov, Head 
of the Aktau Division of Customs Control Office.  Discussion 
centered on the increased attention the region is receiving from the 
central government because of its strategic location and the growing 
oil production capability of the area.  The Government of Kazakhstan 
recent commitment of additional expenditures on infrastructure 
improvements in the region were discussed as were the manpower and 
equipment requirements to secure the region from the smuggling of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological related materials. 
 
10. A meeting was held on November 6, 2007, at the Aktau Seaport, 
with Mr. Amir Atambaev, Head of the Customs Post Aktau Seaport, Mr. 
Erlik Samagulov, Deputy Commander of the Marine Border Guards, and 
Mr. Vasily Novikov, Deputy Head of the Aktau Seaport. Discussions 
centered on manpower and equipment requirements to secure the 
countries only seaport on the Caspian Sea from the smuggling of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological related material. Also discussed 
was the proposed addition of new deep water piers and facilities 
which will provide the capability of handling larger commercial 
vessels from all countries bordering the Caspian Sea. 
 
11. A meeting was held on November 6, 2007, at the Aktau Seaport 
Border Guard base, with Admiral Berkliyev, Commander of the Maritime 
Brigade in Aktau.  Discussions centered on the winterization of the 
EXBS donated FAST boats and continued support of the EXBS mission. 
 
12. A meeting was held on November 7, 2007, at the Temirbaba vehicle 
crossing with Mr. Erlan Kilibaev, Head of the Customs Post, and 
Arhat Uohbaev, Senior Controller.  Discussion centered on the 
construction of the new border inspection facility and the impact 
this will have on port operations.  The new infrastructure at this 
facility, when completed, should greatly enhance the posts capacity 
of preventing the smuggling of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
 
ASTANA 00003351  003 OF 004 
 
 
related material by integrating the border regulatory agencies into 
a single check point facility, with adequate inspectional areas, and 
integrated Radiation Portal Monitors. 
13. On November 12-13, 2007, the EXBS Advisor participated in the 
U.S. Mission to Kazakhstan's Country Team Offsite meeting at the 
Okzhepes Sanatorium in Brovorvoe, Kazakhstan.  Topics involving EXBS 
included discussions of progress made in achieving the FY 2009 
Mission Strategic Plan goals of Partners in Regional and Strategic 
Security and Ensuring Non-Proliferation to Bolster Global Security. 
Also discussed were matters related to EXBS participation in 
International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) 
and how to improve services providers adherence with the mission's 
service goals. 
 
 
B.  TRAINING DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
1.  On November 26-27, Kevin Cummings, U.S. export control 
specialist, assisted a Kazakhstan nongovernmental organization, 
Business Inform, in conducting a "Product Identification Tool (PIT) 
Technical Workshop" in Shymkent for Kazakh Customs officials in that 
region.  This training focuses on the identification of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical materials, and the use of Kazakhstan's 
software and licensing systems. The PIT project is part of the U.S. 
- Kazakhstan bilateral cooperation on export controls under EXBS. 
 
 
 
 
 
C. EQUIPMENT DELIVERED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
 
      1. No equipment delivered during this reporting period. 
 
 
D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT STATUS UPDATE 
 
1. Task Order 79 Donations.  Delivery of the original water tanks 
for the four modular shelters donated to the Border Guards was 
delayed due to difficulties encountered in the Customs clearance 
process created by a change in the Kazakhstani law which required 
the submission of the Shipper's Exportation Declaration (SED) for 
all shipments arriving in Kazakhstan. 
 The EXBS office applied to the Ministry of Economy and Budget 
Planning to approve the release of the water tanks from the Almaty 
airport warehouse without charging the warehouse storage fees. The 
official letter from the  Vice Minister, Ministry of Economic and 
Budget Planning, approving the release of the water tanks from the 
Almaty airport warehouse without charging the warehouse storage fees 
was passed on to the Customs Control Committee on November 19. 
However, the letter has not made it to the local customs authority 
in Almaty and the water tanks are still being held. 
 
1. Department of Energy Second Line of Defense (DOE/SLD) continues 
with its project to install portal monitors at border sites.  A 
diplomatic note was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
requesting its assistance in gaining duty free entry of the DOE/SLD 
radiation portal monitoring equipment scheduled to arrive in 
Kazakhstan during January 2007.  This equipment to be installed at 
the following Phase One sites:  Kordai, Karasu, Sapytai Batyr, 
Kazgurt, Zhibek Zholy, Kaplanbek, and Sary-Agash. 
 
 
ASTANA 00003351  004 OF 004 
 
 
2. A Commodity Identification Training (CIT) course for Customs 
Control Committee personnel was conducted the week of December 3, 
2007, in Brovorvoe, Kazakhstan.  This was the fifth CIT seminar in 
Kazakhstan and the second one that will not require U.S. instructors 
to present any training materials.  The training was monitored by 
Richard Talley, Program Manager for the Causasus Region and Central 
Asia for the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security &
#x000A;Administration's (DOE/NNSA) International Nonproliferation Export 
Control Program (INECP), and Chuck Willingham, Staff Engineer, 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. 
 
4.  On December 8, 2007, the EXBS Advisor met with Mr. Richard 
Talley, Program Manager for the Caucasus Region and Central Asia 
for the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security 
Administration's (DOE/NNSA) International Nonproliferation Export 
Control Program (INECP), and Mr. Chuck Willingham, Staff Engineer, 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, on the International 
Nonproliferation Export Control Program's country plan for 
Kazakhstan and to discuss proposed training for Customs and Border 
Guards during 2008. 
 
5. From December 3 - 7, 2007, EXBS Program Manager Gulnara Abildaeva 
and EXBS Program Assistant Oxana Limareva travelled to Frankfurt, 
Germany, to participate in the Foreign Service Institute's training 
class on Managing Foreign Assistance Awards Overseas. This course 
prepares employees to link assistance programs with post-specific 
strategic planning goals and objectives and to develop a 
post-specific assistance awards program from concept and design, 
through implementation and management, to evaluation of the 
results. 
 
6.  There will be an International Counterprofliferation (ICP) 
program "WMD International Investigations" course, taught in Astana, 
Kazakhstan, from January 28 - February 1, 2008.  This course is 
designed for approximately 30-35 criminal investigators to enhance 
specialized investigative skills transnational investigations of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents. 
 
E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT CONTROLS, NONPROLIFERATION, OR 
RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
 
 1. None. 
 
F. CASPIAN SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
      1. None. 
 
III. RED FLAG ISSUES. 
 
1. None 
 
POC for this report is Robert Colbert, EXBS Advisor, Email: 
Colbertrj@state.gov, Phone +7 (3172) 70 2420; EXBS Program Manager 
Gulnara Abildaeva, Email: AbildaevaG@state.gov, Phone +7 (3172) 70 
2320; EXBS Program Assistant Oxana Limareva, Email: 
LimarevaO@state.gov, Phone +7 (3172) 70 2237. 
 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA3350, NAZARBAYEV’S INDEPENDENCE DAY ADDRESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3350 2007-12-21 02:24 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7268
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #3350/01 3550224
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210224Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1400
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0071
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1849
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0340
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 003350 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON PHUM OSCE SOCI OEXC KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: NAZARBAYEV'S INDEPENDENCE DAY ADDRESS 
 
 
ASTANA 00003350  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. President Nazarbayev delivered his annual Independence Day 
address on December 14.   His remarks largely focused on 
Kazakhstan's economic achievements and the government's successes in 
the socio-economic sphere, especially regarding health care, 
education, and pensions and other forms of socio-economic 
assistance.   Nazarbayev also discussed political reform and 
Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE chairmanship.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
2.  Nazarbayev focused most of his December 14 Independence Day 
speech on Kazakhstan's economic achievements and the government's 
successes in the socio-economic sphere.  He pointed to several 
indicators of Kazakhstan's efforts at achieving economic 
diversification, noting the recent openings of a large aluminum 
producing complex and steel tubing factory, and the fact that 
Kazakhstan is currently, manufacturing cars and light trucks for the 
first time.  He claimed that agricultural production had tripled 
over the past ten years, and that Kazakhstan is now the world's 
leading country in per capita grain production.  Nazarbayev 
explained that Kazakhstan is currently experiencing the effects of 
the U.S. sub-prime mortage crisis, but claimed that in conditions 
where there have been cases of default and bankruptcy among large 
Western financial institions, "Kazakhstan's financial system has 
shown itself to be stable and functioning effectively." 
 
3. Nazarbayev ran through a litany of statistics pointing to the 
government's efforts at improving the population's living standards. 
 He said, for example, that the minimum wage had increased 350% 
since 1997, and the average pension 230% since 1998. (Note: It 
appears he was expressing these figures in nominal terms.  End 
Note.)  He promised that by 2012, the average pension would be 
increased an additional 150%.  Nazarbayev contended that government 
spending on health care had increased 13-fold over the past decade - 
as a result of which, over the same time period, life expectancy had 
increased by two years, and infant and maternal mortality had 
decreased by 40%.  He pointed to the government's Bolashak 
scholarship program to send students to study abroad and the 
independent efforts of parents to do the same as keys to developing 
the country's human capital, while noting that construction had 
begun on a new university in Astana so that students could receive 
the same high level of training domestically. 
 
---------------- 
POLITICAL REFORM 
---------------- 
 
4. Nazarbayev described Kazakhstan's 16-year period of independence 
as a time of radical political change and wide-scale constitutional 
reform.  He argued that Kazakhstan is greeting each anniversary of 
its indepedence with "qualitatively new democratic standards." 
Nazarbayev pointed to the strengthening of parliament, political 
parties, and the independence of the courts; the development of 
local self-government; the new role of the Assembly of Peoples; and 
the strengthening of citizens' rights in the judicial system as 
indicators that the country had moved forward along the path to 
democracy.  He said that the May 2007 constitutional changes had 
transformed Kazakhstan from a presidential to a 
presidential-parliamentary republic, with competencies of the 
president moving to parliament.  Nazarbayev contended that 
Kazakhstan's political system, "in its fundamental parameters," 
accords with all the universally-accepted democratic norms and 
criteria.  This, he said, was one of the main achievements of the 
years of independence.  He argued that Kazakhstan had never 
previously had any liberal traditions.  In a short time, however, 
"we established a new Kazakhstani, and a new country which has 
turned to the side of the civilized world." 
 
----------------- 
OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP 
----------------- 
 
5.  Nazarbayev concluded the substantive portion of his speech with 
a discussion of Kazakhstan's selection as 2010 OSCE 
Chairman-in-Office (CIO).  He said that in supporting Kazakhstan's 
CIO candidacy, OSCE member states confirmed the correctness of the 
"strategic vector" of Kazakhstan's development, and recognized the 
effectiveness of the country's economic and political model.   With 
this decision, he continued, world society had given a positive mark 
to Kazakhstan's efforts to build a democratic state and develop 
civil society, and to the political reforms carried out in the 
country this year. 
 
ASTANA 00003350  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
6.  Nazarbayev argued that a number of countries disagree in their 
interpretation of the OSCE's tasks and the prio
ritorization of the 
organization's activities.  In this situation, he explained, the 
principled position of Kazakhstan is the necessity of achieving 
compromises regarding all issues, even the most pointed ones.  He 
said that Kazakhstan's considers one of the fundamental tasks for 
its chairmanship to be finding common platforms and 
mutually-acceptable resolutions for problems, "taking into account 
historical and cultural specifics and the equality of all member 
states."  Nazarbayev promised that Kazakhstan would work to develop 
and strengthen the OSCE's institutions, to maintain the OSCE's high 
principals and standards, and to develop all three dimensions of the 
organization's activities.  He also underlined the importance of 
using the OSCE's capabilities for Afghan reconstruction. 
 
7. Nazarbayev contended that Kazakhstan's course of development 
regarding democratization, free market economics, and security fully 
accord with the OSCE's traditions and criteria.  He added that 
democratization of Kazakhstan's political system and the development 
of its civil society are, first of all, in the interests of 
Kazakhstan itself. 
 
8. Nazarbayev explained that Kazakhstan has significant work ahead 
of itself to prepare for the OSCE chairmanship.   This will require 
the efforts of all government bodies; of the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches of power; and of political parties and civil 
society.  Nazarbayev argued that the chairmanship must become yet 
one more symbol of the unity of Kazakhstan's people, and demonstrate 
to the entire world an advanced, democratic, economically 
competitive Kazakhstan. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
YOUTHFUL NAZARBAYEV - WITH POST'S ASSISTANCE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9. Shown at the venue (Astana's Pyramid) prior to the speech, and 
broadcast, at least in part, on national television was a 
documentary featuring Nazarbayev in his twenties and thirties.  The 
film, in which the youthful Nazarbayev appears as a Komsomol leader 
at the Karaganda mines, received a roaring response from the 
audience.  The footage came from films restored with a grant from 
the Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation.  An attribution to 
the Embassy was not made during the presentation. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA3318, CONOCOPHILIPS CEO SEES PROSPECTS FOR JOINT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3318 2007-12-14 09:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #3318/01 3480927
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140927Z DEC 07 ZDK CITING RUEHCB #6313 3481213
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1367
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0337
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0373

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 003318 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2017 
TAGS: EINV ENRG EPET PREL KZ
SUBJECT: CONOCOPHILIPS CEO SEES PROSPECTS FOR JOINT 
OPERATORSHIP AT KASHAGAN 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 3281 (B) ASTANA 3226 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) ConocoPhillips CEO James Mulva told the Ambassador on 
December 13 that he sees prospects for a deal under which Eni 
will be replaced as Kashagan operator, with three of the 
larger consortium members developing the field as joint 
operators.  All companies in the Kashagan consortium except 
ExxonMobil have agreed to increase the stake of KazMunayGaz 
(KMG) in the project.  A negotiating group is working in 
London to establish the compensation due Kazakhstan for 
Kashagan delays and cost overruns.  While in Kazakhstan, 
Mulva will also discuss with the GOK the results of a 
ConocoPhillips study of the country's gas transportation 
options and make a renewed pitch for a ConocoPhillips role at 
N-Block and the Northern Caspian Jurassic Block.  End Summary. 
 
-------- 
Kashagan 
-------- 
 
2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on December 13, 
ConocoPhillips CEO James Mulva discussed two key outstanding 
issues in the Kashagan dispute:  operatorship and 
compensation for Kazakhstan.  Mulva told the Ambassador that 
he sees the emergence of a deal under which three of the 
larger companies in the Agip Kashagan Consortium (which 
consists of Eni, Total, ExxonMobil, Shell, ConocoPhillips, 
and KazMunayGaz) will develop the field under a joint 
operator model, with perhaps one company taking the lead on 
each of the three main aspects of the project:  on-shore, 
off-shore, and pipeline.  A joint operatorship might require 
the creation of a new entity, which could be lightly staffed 
with just a dozen or so key people, he explained.  According 
to Mulva, Eni may remain responsible for developing 
Kashagan's initial phase - and may even be left in place for 
the longer run as the formal operator, in order for the 
company to "save face."  Full-field development, however, is 
beyond Eni's capabilities and must be performed by larger 
companies, contended Mulva.  Since ConocoPhilips owns a 
smaller share than the others, it has decided not to take a 
leading role in the negotiations, and will accept what 
ExxonMobil, Shell, and Total work out. 
 
3. (C) Mulva explained that the Kazakhstanis continue to ask 
for $7 billion dollars in compensation for the Kashagan 
development delays.  At a $55 per barrel price for oil, the 
project is not even worth $7 billion dollars, he argued. 
Thus, the consortium members have said no to this demand. 
Mulva said that all the companies except ExxonMobil have 
agreed to a dilution of their ownership share and thus an 
increase in KMG's equity stake of 8.33 percent.  The sides 
are negotiating in London to establish the value of the 
additional ownership stake.  The companies expect that KMG 
would pay something for the stake, and the difference between 
the valuation of the stake and KMG's payment would be part of 
Kazakhstan's compensation.  Mulva reminded the Ambassador 
that valuation is a very complicated process, requiring the 
sides to agree on a number of factors, including future oil 
prices and an appropriate discount rate. 
 
4. (C) Mulva contended that the main issue for ExxonMobil is, 
in fact, what the fair market price is for KMG's increased 
share - hinting that in the end, ExxonMobil would agree to go 
along with dilution once this is worked out.  (Note:  During 
a December 3 meeting in Washington, ExxonMobil International 
Governmental Affairs Manager David Bailey told the Ambassador 
that ExxonMobil is prepared to agree to dilution if 
compensated.  End Note.)  Mulva explained that if ExxonMobil 
is offered a piece of the operatorship and the valuation 
issue is resolved, then the other companies will have more 
leverage to pressure ExxonMobil to finalize a deal.  Mulva 
argued that all of the consortium members agree that "we need 
to get this done," particularly because further delays may 
force the consortium to shut down portions of the project. 
Even brief delays now may delay the project by several years, 
as equipment, supplies, and personnel are reallocated to 
other projects around the world. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
ConocoPhilips Pushes for Additional Projects in Kazakhstan 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
5. (C) Mulva told the Ambassador that the main reason for his 
trip to Kazakhstan is, in fact, to lobby for a role for 
ConocoPhillips in two major off-shore projects and to discuss 
 
the results of a ConocoPhillips study on gas.  ConocoPhillips 
remains very interested in developing N-Block, said Mulva. 
Nevertheless, Kazakhstan still insists that it will undertake 
at least the initial project development on its own. 
ConocoPhillips has also conveyed its interest on the Northern 
Caspian Jurassic field and will continue to push for 
involvement, although Kazakhstan has received 15-20 other 
proposals, according to Mulva.  In general, he said,
 
Kazakhstan is delivering the message that it wants to solve 
Kashagan before discussing new projects. 
 
6. (C) Mulva will also discuss with the Kazakhstanis the 
results of a study on Kazakhstan's gas performed by 
ConocoPhillips upon the suggestion of Prime Minister Masimov 
in June.  Masimov expressed Kazakhstan's interest for further 
information on options beyond traditional exploration and 
development projects, including LNG, CNG, and pipelines. 
Nick Olds, Conoco Phillips Country Manager for Kazakhstan, 
reported that the study revealed that Kazakhstan's three best 
gas options are continued northern transport through Russia, 
a trans-Caspian option, and a pipeline to China. All other 
options, including LNG and CNG, make little economic sense. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
7. (C) Mulva's comments, and President Nazarbayev's recent 
assurances to the Ambassador that Kazakhstan will not 
invoke its sub-soil law, strengthen our belief that the 
Kashagan dispute will be resolved through negotiations, 
although not likely before the latest December 20 deadline. 
Thus far, Kazakhstan has handled the negotiations skillfully, 
driving a hard bargain without scaring off investors, as 
witnessed by Mulva's visit to push for further investment in 
the country. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA3317, DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO KAZAKHSTAN – MISSING AMCIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3317 2007-12-14 07:55 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #3317 3480755
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 140755Z DEC 07 ZDK CITING RUEHCB #6313 3481213
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1366

S E C R E T ASTANA 003317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR CA JENNY FOO AND NEA/IR TIM STANDAERT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2017 
TAGS: PREL CASC KJUS IR KZ
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO KAZAKHSTAN - MISSING AMCIT 
ROBERT LEVINSON 
 
REF: STATE 166405 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Steven Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (S) Pol/Econ Chief delivered reftel demarche on missing 
Amcit Robert Levinson to MFA America's Desk Director Talgat 
Kaliyev on December 14.  Per demarche instructions, he 
requested that Kazakhstan make inquiries to Iran about 
Levinson and press Iran to cooperate with Levinson's family, 
share results of its investigation with the Swiss, and pass 
available information on the Levinson case to the USG. 
Kaliyev made no specific promises, but said that Kazakhstan 
would "try to work the issue through its channels." 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA3313, KAZAKHSTAN TAKES STEPS TOWARDS RATIFICATION OF SLAVERY AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3313 2007-12-13 09:56 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0729
OO RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #3313 3470956
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 130956Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1364
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0062
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0336

UNCLAS ASTANA 003313 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR G (ACBLANK), G/TIP, SCA/CEN (O'MARA), SCA/RA, INL/AAE 
(BUHLER), DRL, PRM, USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCRM PHUM SOCI KCOR PGOV KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN TAKES STEPS TOWARDS RATIFICATION OF SLAVERY AND 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES CONVENTIONS 
 
 
1. Kazakhstan has taken another step towards ratification of the 
Slavery Convention, Protocol of Changes and Amendments to the 
Slavery Convention, and the Additional Protocol on Slavery 
Abolishment (Slavery Convention). 
 
2. The Slavery Convention was approved by the Mazhilis (the lower 
chamber of Parliament) on December 12 and sent to the Senate (the 
upper chamber) for action. Following Senate approval, the draft law 
will be sent to President Nazarbaev for signature, which will 
complete the process of Kazakhstan's accession to this convention 
and the aforementioned protocols. 
 
3. A Mazhilis working group was formed on December 4 to consider a 
draft law on ratification of the UN Convention on Transnational 
Crimes and three additional convention protocols.  It is expected 
that Kazakhstan will accede to the UN Convention on Transnational 
Crimes shortly after ratification of the Slavery Convention. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA3308, KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: CONTINUED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3308 2007-12-12 12:04 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #3308 3461204
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121204Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1356
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0370

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 003308 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO S/WCI C WILLIAMSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017 
TAGS: AF KZ PHUM PINR PTER
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: CONTINUED 
DETENTION OF DETAINEE 
 
REF: STATE 162192 
 
Classified By: DCM Kevin Milas; reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
1. (SBU)  Poloff delivered reftel demarche on December 11 to 
Zhan Kystaubayev, head of the international affairs 
department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consular 
section. 
 
2. (C) Kystaubayev reported that the Government of Kazakhstan 
has not changed its position on the issue of Kazakhstani 
citizens held as detainees at Guantanamo Bay. He said that if 
the remaining Kazakhstani detainee, Dolkun Kerimbakiev, is 
guilty, he should be punished, and if not, he should be 
released when the USG is ready to release him.  He said that 
if Kerimbakiev is released, the Government of Kazakhstan will 
accept him and will monitor and control him as appropriate. 
 
3. (C) Kystaubayev said that the Government of Kazakhstan 
does not intend to inform Kerimbakiev's family about the 
Administrator Review Board's recent decision to continue 
holding him, because his family has been in contact with 
journalists who have written articles criticizing the 
Government of Kazakhstan for failing to secure his release 
(and also criticizing the USG for the prolonged detention). 
He said that if asked, he will tell the family that 
Kerimbakiev's case remains under review. 
 
4. (C) Kystaubayev said as part of Kazakhstan's earlier 
agreement to accept the return of three detainees, the USG 
promised to provide Kazakhstan with full case materials 
concerning on the matter, including facts learned during the 
investigation of their cases.  However, he said that the USG 
has not provided this information to date.  He again 
requested the information, both for the three detainees 
already returned to Kazakhstan and for Kerimbakiev. He added 
that among other things, this information was necessary to 
justify any requested monitoring or restrictions on the 
detainees once they return to Kazakhstan. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA3303, KAZAKHSTAN: ALMATY NOTES, NOVEMBER 26 – DECEMBER 7, 2007

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3303 2007-12-12 11:49 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9821
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #3303/01 3461149
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121149Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1350
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1847
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0334
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0047

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 003303 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: ALMATY NOTES, NOVEMBER 26 - DECEMBER 7, 2007 
 
 
ASTANA 00003303  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. The "Almaty Notes" series is intended to maintain focus on 
developments in civil society, the media, and the opposition in 
Kazakhstan's "southern capital" following the move of the Embassy to 
Astana. 
 
----------------------------- --------------------------------- 
Kazakh Nationalists Are Against Formation of Kazakhstani Nation 
----------------------------- --------------------------------- 
 
2. At a round table in Almaty on December 4, a group of Kazakh 
nationalists spoke out against a recent proposal by President 
Nazarbayev to support tri-lingualism (Kazakh, Russian, and English) 
and promote the idea of a broader "Kazakhstani" nation.  According 
to these representatives of the Kazakh intelligentsia, this is a 
hastily-conceived and wrong idea and putting it into practice could 
lead to irreversible consequences.  Burikhan Nurmukhamedov of the Ak 
Zhol party contended that national self-identification is important 
for ethnic Kazakhs and a failure to take this factor into account 
may worsen inter-ethnic relations.  (TV Channel 31, December 4) 
 
--------------------------- ------------------------- 
Utkin Loses His Case against City Election Commission 
--------------------------- ------------------------- 
 
3. On November 23 the Almaty city court ruled for the city election 
commission in a case filed by independent Maslikhat candidate Sergey 
Utkin.  Utkin challenged his loss to Nur Otan candidate Serik 
Kusainov in the August 18 election to the Almaty Maslikhat.  Utkin 
provided the court with protocols from polling stations which he 
said confirmed his victory.  At an earlier hearing in the Bostandyk 
district court, all members of precinct election commission number 
184 testified that Utkin's protocols were accurate, casting doubt on 
the accuracy of the protocols produced by the city election 
commission.  However, an examination conducted by city court experts 
reportedly confirmed that signatures on the city election 
commission's protocols were authentic.  (Respublica weekly, November 
30) 
 
------------------------- --------------------- 
NGO's Urge Transparency in Mazhilis' Activities 
------------------------- --------------------- 
 
4. At a round table in Almaty on November 27, a number of NGO's, 
including the Human Rights Bureau, Adil Soz, the Charter for Human 
Rights, and Almaty Helsinki Committee, announced their intention to 
set up an NGO coalition to promote transparency of the Mazhilis' 
activities and to provide public oversight over the work of 
parliamentarians.  Mazhilis deputy Nikolay Turetskiy admitted that 
there was no mechanism for the publication of roll-call voting in 
parliament and no mechanism for keeping parliamentarians properly 
accountable before the electorate.  Tamara Kaleyeva of AdilSoz 
complained that parliament does not put texts of draft laws on its 
web site and provides no information on the reasons a draft law is 
rejected.  "There is no feedback and there are no e-mail addresses. 
It is impossible to reach any deputy through the web site," Kaleyeva 
said.  Evgeniy Zhovtis contended that Parliament needs to pass a law 
on access to information which would further cooperation between 
state agencies and citizens and would make officials accountable for 
not providing information. (Interfax, November 27) 
 
-------------- ------------- 
Reasons for Political Apathy 
-------------- ------------- 
 
5. "The main reason for apathy is that people do not believe they 
can change anything in the country through their actions," True Ak 
Zhol party co-chairman Oraz Zhandosov opined in an interview with 
Dozhiveym do Ponedelinka.  "It is an interesting question why people 
do not go to rallies and do not protest against inflation and 
against the government's inaction in curbing soaring prices.  These 
people are used to the practice we had in the Soviet Union when 
nothing depended on public opinion".  (Dozhiveym do Ponedelinka 
weekly, November 30) 
 
-------------------------- ---------------------------- 
NGO's and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
-------------------------- ---------------------------- 
 
6. At a conference in Almaty on November 27 entitled "Oil Revenues - 
Under Control of Society," a coalition of NGO's proposed revisions 
in Kazakhstan's Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI).  The coalition would like to enlarge its delegation in the 
National Council, which is composed representatives of extractive 
industry companies, the government, parliament, and NGO's.  In 
addition, the coalition proposes to make National Council meetings 
more transparent by placing announcements in the press and reporting 
about its activities in the mass media.  (Interfax, November 27) 
 
------------------------ ------------------- 
Allegation of Violation of Detainees' Rights 
------------------------ ------------------- 
 
ASTANA 00003303  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
7. On November 26, the Human Rights Bureau issued a
 statement 
calling on the Almaty office of the Committee for National Security 
(KNB) to stop violating the rights of detained individuals, 
especially the right to an attorney.  According to the Bureau, 
Rishat Musayev and Sergey Tsoy have been kept in Almaty KNB 
pre-trial detention centers since July 9 with no access to their 
chosen attorneys.  Despite agreements the attorneys signed with the 
two detainees and the fact that they have state secret clearances, 
the attorneys have been denied meetings with their clients. 
Instead, the KNB invited other attorneys recommended by 
investigators to meet with the detainees. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA3302, KAZAKHSTAN: ASSESSMENT OF ANTI-DRUG CHECKPOINTS

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3302 2007-12-12 10:37 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9771
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #3302/01 3461037
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121037Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1347
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 003302 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL (SNYDER, BUHLER); SCA/CEN (OMARA), ISN/ECC 
(HARTSHORNE), SCA/RA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM KZ
 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: ASSESSMENT OF ANTI-DRUG CHECKPOINTS 
 
 
1.  Summary:  From November 24 through December 4, a joint UNODC/INL 
team and an independent expert assessed six internal ("Rubezh") 
checkpoints.  The international expert will provide a report with 
recommendations to the donor community and the GoK in January, 
including proposals for training and equipment.  End Summary. 
 
----------- 
BACKGROUND 
----------- 
 
2.  INL provided a grant to UNODC in July 2007 to support the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs' (MVD) efforts to strengthen controls 
on primary narco-trafficking routes and to help improve national and 
regional law enforcement capacities along these routes through the 
provision of communications and other equipment.  As part of its 
Counter Narcotics Strategy, the GOK provided 1.5 billion tenge 
(approximately $12.5 million) for first-stage implementation of the 
strategy from 2006 to 2008.  With a portion of the funding, the 
MVD's Committee on Combating Drugs established seven internal 
checkpoints ("Rubezh-Narkotiki") including the Ulken post in the 
Almaty oblast, Syrdarya post in the Kyzylorda oblast, Kyzyltu post 
in the South-Kazakhstan oblast, Kargaly post in the Aktobe oblast, 
Ayagoz post in the Eastern Kazakhstan oblast, and Leninskiy post in 
Pavlodar in 2005.   The Sary-Arka post was established in the 
Karaganda oblast in November 2007.  MVD provided infrastructure and 
drug identification equipment.  INL will provide training of 
officers working at the Rubezh checkpoints. 
 
3.  In 2006, MVD seized a total of 126 kilos of narcotics at all 
seven posts, and approximately 125 kilos in the first 10 months of 
this year.  The Ulken post has had the best results with 115 kilos 
seized during the first 10 months of this year.  MVD seized 21.119 
kilos of heroin in 2006, including 15.504 kilos at the Kyzyltu post, 
five kilos at Ulken in the Almaty oblast and 1.804 kilos at Syrdarya 
in the Kyzylorda oblast.  In the first ten months of this year, 
7.678 kilos of heroin were seized at all posts. 
 
4.  Hardy Roehlung, an international expert from the EU Border 
Management in Central Asia Program, was contracted by UNODC to 
assess the internal checkpoints to determine checkpoint capacity, 
assess needs for specialized technical equipment, and recommend 
needed training programs.  Representatives of the Embassy's INL 
Office, the UN Office of Drug Control (UNODC), and the MVD joined 
the assessment mission. 
 
5.  Generally, the posts are independent subdivisions of the 
Committee on Combating Drug Trafficking and are directly subordinate 
to the oblasts' Divisions on Combating Drug Trafficking.  They have 
the same organizational structure as the divisions, which include 
counter-narcotics operations officers, migration police, canine 
specialists, and road police.  There are usually two officers who 
patrol the area adjacent to the post to counter the threat of drug 
couriers bypassing posts.  Though posts are theoretically located in 
areas without detour roads, the assessment showed that there are 
possibilities to avoid the posts by driving on secondary roads or 
off-road.  On average there are 18 officers working in two or three 
shifts.  Some posts have satellite phones, some have trunk telephone 
lines, and the rest use their own cellular phones.  There is not 
appropriate infrastructure and equipment to communicate with the 
regional MVD offices or between checkpoints at longer distances. 
While some posts have access to the MVD databases, some are limited 
in their functions and others do not even have electricity.  The 
assessment team also found that there are not sufficient personnel 
assigned to the checkpoints.  Some officers are working for 24 hours 
straight. 
 
----- 
ULKEN 
----- 
 
6.  The first post visited is located in Almaty oblast, 371 
kilometers from Almaty on the main road to Astana.  The post 
received INL-provided inspection equipment and a hangar for 
searching vehicles in 2005-2006.  The GOK provided infrastructure. 
The local rural district administration provides assistance to the 
post because the work of the post and the presences of police ensure 
security in the area.  The post is well equipped, but living 
conditions for the officers should be improved. 
 
-------- 
SYRDARYA 
-------- 
 
7.  The post is located 8 kilometers from Kyzylorda on the main road 
between Shymkent and Samara.  The post focuses on trucks and buses 
coming from Uzbekistan.  Post personnel have a very good 
 
ASTANA 00003302  002 OF 003 
 
 
relationship with other agencies, including Customs, Border Guard 
Service and the local police.  During its visit, the assessment team 
saw several border guards at the post who were sent from the closest 
border guard posts to strengthen the post's work during Operation 
Barrier.  The Committee for National Security (KNB) first launched 
the operation in 2003 with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Customs 
Control Committee, Financial Police and Border Guard Service.  The
 
operation proved to be effective and has since been conducted 
several times each year.  The officers working at the post use drug 
profiling techniques and canines.  Twenty minutes before the 
assessment team arrived, a canine detected eight kilos of hashish on 
a bus and officers arrested the courier. 
 
-------- 
KYZYLTU 
-------- 
 
8.  The checkpoint is located 58 km from Shymkent on the main road 
from Almaty to Tashkent and Termez, Uzbekistan.  During the 
assessment team's visit to the post, the head of the post presented 
a plan for a model Rubezh post that will include an administrative 
building, a hangar, a dormitory, and dog kennels.  The model post 
also would have an access road to the hangar, sufficient lighting, 
barriers, and other necessary equipment.  Unfortunately, the present 
situation at the post is quite the opposite.  The inspection hangar, 
which was built with GOK funds, was shoddily constructed and appears 
ready to collapse.  MVD has complained that none of the six hangars 
constructed with their funds in 2006 meet minimal safety 
requirements and the MVD is currently taking legal action against 
the contractor. 
 
9.  MVD officers stated that the biggest problem is with trucks 
operating under the TIR convention (The Convention on International 
Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets), which MVD officers 
cannot inspect.  If MVD receives intelligence information that a 
truck is carrying contraband, officers must ask the driver of the 
truck to drive 150 kilometers to a customs checkpoint on the 
Kazakhstani-Uzbek border to inspect the truck with a fixed x-ray 
machine. Drivers can refuse and claim not to have sufficient fuel or 
time.  Approximately 150 vehicles pass through the post daily, 
including 30 trucks - 25 of which operate under the TIR convention. 
The post is the first on the route from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
and must be strengthened.  MVD plans to construct an administrative 
building and reconstruct the hangar for inspection of vehicles, but 
does not have sufficient funds to purchase fixed X-ray equipment. 
 
------- 
AYAGOZ 
------- 
 
10.  The post is located 360 km from Semey city on the main road 
from Almaty to Semey.  The location of the post is not effective 
because it is located 90 kilometers from a main route from China to 
Almaty.  The majority of traffic passing through this checkpoint are 
fully loaded cargo trucks, which are difficult to examine.  Though 
the post has modern equipment, officers are fearful of misusing or 
breaking the equipment and continue to use traditional drug 
profiling techniques and dogs in searching vehicles. 
 
------- 
KARGALY 
------- 
 
11.  The post is located 4 kilometers from the customs checkpoint on 
the main road from Aktobe to Orsk, Russia.  One of the officers 
believed that a better location for the post is in Karabutak.  The 
post is ill equipped; there is no infrastructure or buildings; and 
the living and working conditions are very poor.  The traffic volume 
at this post is low. 
 
---------- 
SARY-ARKA 
---------- 
 
12.  The checkpoint is located outside of the city of Karaganda on 
the main road from Almaty to Astana.  The post was relocated from 
the Arasan checkpoint in Atbasar.  Due to the implementation of the 
"Astana - Drug-Free City" program to reduce demand, treat addiction, 
and fight drug trafficking and with the aim of creating a barrier 
around Astana, the MVD relocated the post to a city much closer to 
Astana.  The head of the post pointed out the number of trucks with 
a TIR carnet passing through the checkpoint. 
 
---------- 
LENINSKIY 
---------- 
 
 
ASTANA 00003302  003 OF 003 
 
 
13.  The MVD established the Leninskiy post outside of the small 
town of Shiderty in the Pavlodarskaya oblast.  The assessment team 
did not visit the post because UNODC and INL did not receive an 
official request to provide assistance to the post.  However, the 
MVD colonel accompanying the assessment team stated that this was an 
oversight and that the post should be assessed.  INL will work with 
UNODC and the international expert to arrange an assessment trip in 
the future. 
 
---------- 
TIR ISSUES 
---------- 
 
14.  Post personnel are unable to legally unseal and inspect the 
contents of vehicles with a TIR carnet because customs officers are 
not present.  However, upon receipt of intelligence information, 
they do inspect vehicles with an X-ray machine when possible.  There 
appear to be two possible solutions: the purchase and installation 
of X-ray machines or the assignment of customs officials to the 
checkpoints. 
 
15.  Article 5 of the TIR Convention stipulates that goods carried 
under the TIR procedure under seal shall not, as a general rule, be 
subject to examination at customs offices en route.  However, 
customs authorities may, in exceptional cases and when irregularity 
is suspected, carry out an examination of the goods.  There are 
clear advantages for the countries which entered this Convention. 
TIR trucks avoid long delays at borders and physical inspection of 
goods in transit.  However, police officers in Kazakhstan suspect 
that some of these trucks are carrying contraband goods or 
narcotics. 
 
16.  In addition to the TIR trucks, officers at the checkpoints also 
face the difficulty of searching fully loaded trucks.  There is not 
enough manpower to unload the cargo, search the truck, and reload 
the cargo in a timely manner.  Such procedures could unduly delay 
shipments traveling to, from, and through Kazakhstan. 
 
---------- 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
17.  The issue of strengthening the internal checkpoints will be 
raised at the next Counter Narcotics Donor Coordination Meeting in 
January, where we hope to find additional funds from other donors. 
Currently, INL does not have sufficient funds to cover the needs of 
the posts.  In addition, the MVD will also receive the assessment 
and have an opportunity to address the deficiencies at the 
checkpoints. Only by joining forces will it be possible to 
sufficiently strengthen these checkpoints. 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA3287, KAZAKHSTAN BORDER GUARDS VISIT U.S.

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3287 2007-12-11 09:30 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8577
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #3287/01 3450930
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 110930Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1336
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC 0001
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 003287 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL (SNYDER, BUHLER); SCA/CEN (OMARA), ISN/ECC 
(HARTSHORNE), SCA/RA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM KCOR PREL KZ
 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN BORDER GUARDS VISIT U.S. 
 
 
1.  Summary:  From October 29 to November 7, General-Major (one star 
equivalent) Berkaliyev, the First Deputy Director of the Kazakhstani 
Border Guard Service (BGS), visited Washington, Miami, and Texas to 
familiarize USG officials with his strategy for the development of 
the BGS and to learn about USG methods of border security and for 
providing in-service training to officers.  During the visit, 
discussions moved forward on future cooperation between the USG and 
GOK; possible establishment of a regional training center for 
Central Asia in Almaty on the grounds of the Border Guard Academy; 
and a request to send two or three Kazakhstani border guards for 
basic training at specialized CBP Academies in El Paso, Arizona and 
Glynco, Georgia.  General-Major Berkaliyev extended an invitation to 
David Aguilar, Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol, to visit Kazakhstan. 
 End Summary. 
 
----------- 
BACKGROUND 
----------- 
2. Over the past several years, the Kazakhstani Border Guard Service 
(BGS) has aimed to strengthen its border to better fight 
transnational crime, illegal migration, and the trafficking of drugs 
and other contraband.  Kazakhstan shares its approximately 15,000 km 
border with Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and China. 
In total there are 142 border guard checkpoints out of which only 92 
are fully functioning.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
new national borders were created.  While the historical borders of 
the former USSR were equipped and able to function, the internal 
borders between the former Soviet republics were merely 
administrative and many citizens were not aware of the locations of 
what would become national borders.  As was the case in many of the 
newly-independent nations, Kazakhstan was not ready to protect all 
of its borders after independence.  Poor infrastructure, 
insufficient numbers of border guards, new legislation, and poor 
living conditions for personnel in the field all contributed to this 
problem. 
 
3. Currently, delimitation issues with neighboring countries have 
been solved and the BGS is in the process of placing markers on the 
border and creating border posts.  In the framework of the 2006-2010 
program of border and BGS development, the BGS is constructing posts 
on the border and purchasing equipment and vehicles. 
 
4.  With the aim of developing its infrastructure and improving the 
professional potential of its service, the BGS is pursuing bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation.  USG programs are managed by offices 
of Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) program, the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Military Cooperation (OMC) and 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). 
 
5. As part the Mission Strategic Plan, INL proposed creating a 
professional relationship between the Border Guard Services of the 
U.S. and Kazakhstan.  In 2006, INL Assistant Secretary Anne 
Patterson and Ambassador Ordway invited the management of the BGS to 
visit the U.S.  The BGS expressed interest in meeting to discuss 
overall strategy, main threats on the border, and present problems 
and needs.   INL thus organized Berkayliyev's October 2007 trip to 
the U.S., including an interagency roundtable in Washington to meet 
with the delegation,  and visits to the U.S. Coast Guard in Miami, 
Florida and the Rio Grande Valley Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol 
in McAllen, Texas. 
 
---------- 
WASHINGTON 
---------- 
 
6.  The visit of General-Major Khussain Berkaliyev, Lieutenant 
Colonel Yevgeniy Trofimenko, and Major Yesbulat Kussainov began in 
Washington with meetings at the Department of State, the Pentagon, 
and Customs and Border Protection.  During the roundtable held on 
October 30, representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, 
and Homeland Security discussed the results of their programs and 
future plans with General-Major Berkaliyev. 
 
7.  Monette Melanson from the Department of Defense raised problems 
on behalf of DTRA including insufficient access to the border.  In 
response to this issue and problems working with some parts of the 
BGS, Berkaliyev stated that the roundtable had prompted him to 
appoint one individual in the International Relations Department of 
the BGS to work on each program to increase transparency and 
increase the effectiveness of cooperation with the international 
community. 
 
8.  Berkaliyev said that the BGS is now focused on new methods for 
controlling the border - to use less physical force and substitute 
it with new technologies.  Thirty percent of the border is in 
desolate areas with severe climate conditions.  He stated that it is 
 
ASTANA 00003287  002 OF 003 
 
 
necessary to use night-vision aviation and unmanned aerial vehicles 
to monitor the area.  The possibility of usi
ng satellite-based 
intelligence is at the top of the BGS' list of priorities.  The BGS 
is also switching to mobile patrols to control portions of the 
border.  He is interested in other countries' experience in training 
personnel for mobile patrols. 
 
8.  In following up on the May visit of General-Major Yelubayev, 
head of the Committee for National Security's Military Institute 
(the main training academy for the BGS),  Berkaliyev asked about the 
progress of proposals to create a student exchange program and 
establishing the Regional Border Guard Training Center at the 
Military Institute.  During Yelubayev's visit, professional 
cooperation between USG and GOK training academies, possible 
establishment of a regional training center for border guards of 
Central Asia, and the possibility of sending two Kazakhstani border 
guards for basic training at the CBP Academy in Glynco, Georgia were 
discussed.  Yelubayev also invited the head of the U.S. Border 
Patrol Academy in Artesia to visit Kazakhstan (septel). 
 
9.  At CBP, Berkaliyev met with David Aguilar, Chief of the U.S. 
Border Patrol, and Tom Walters, Assistant Commissioner for Training 
and Development.  Both assured Berkaliyev of continued cooperation 
with the Military Institute and the BGS.  Aguilar presented an 
overview of training, operations, and the successes and failures of 
the U.S. Border Patrol. He thanked Berkaliyev for the warm reception 
received by Charles Whitmire, head of the U.S. Border Patrol 
Academy, in Kazakhstan and Berkaliyev extended an invitation to 
Aguilar to come to Kazakhstan.  (Note:  Whitmire's visit did much to 
strengthen the relationship between the training academies and a 
visit by Aguilar would be a welcome step in further strengthening 
the relationship between the BGS and CBP. End Note.)  Whitmire and 
Yelubayev agreed to send two graduates of the Military Institute to 
U.S. Border Patrol Academy for basic training.  Walters and Aguilar 
confirmed CBP's commitment to support this proposal. 
 
10.  Berkaliyev discussed the establishment of the Regional Training 
Center for Border Guards at the Military Institute with Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Global Security Joe Benkert and INL Deputy 
 
SIPDIS 
Assistant Secretary Charles Snyder, who both supported the idea. 
The Military Institute will need to grow to meet the requirements of 
the BGS.  Currently there are approximately 30,000 border guards in 
Kazakhstan and the BGS is planning to increase that amount to 
100,000.  The Military Institute has trained cadets from Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan.  Mongolia has also expressed interest in training 
its cadets at the Military Institute. 
 
11.  The BGS already has experience in hosting international 
students at its Canine Center in Almaty.  At the end of the 1980s, 
the Central USSR Canine Center was established in Almaty and border 
guards from throughout the USSR received training in Almaty.  In 
2007, the EU-funded Border Management and Drug Action Program 
(BOMCA) conducted three-month K-9 training for border guards from 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan in Almaty. 
 
12.  INL Astana will continue to support training classes for border 
guards in Regional Training Centers in various regions of 
Kazakhstan.  In 2006, INL funded the renovation and equipping of a 
classroom in Saryagash. The classroom will be used as a training 
center for personnel working on the Uzbek border.  The equipment 
provided, such as computers, presentation devices, and furniture, 
allows for different types of training, including training on the 
Berkut centralized electronic registration system.  Berkaliyev 
mentioned that the opening of training centers in the oblasts 
enhances sustainability of the BGS and allows for on-the-job 
training of more border guards.  INL DAS Snyder assured Berkaliyev 
that INL will continue to support the opening of classrooms 
throughout Kazakhstan.  The next classroom will be opened in Eastern 
Kazakhstan, which will allow for training of personnel working both 
on the border with China and Russia. 
 
13.  When ASD Joe Benkert asked about the most serious problems 
faced by the BGS, Berkaliyev answered that the most vulnerable areas 
are the borders with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and the Caspian Sea. 
He added that the GOK has a good relationship both with Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan and that they face the threats of terrorism and 
narco-traffic. 
 
14.  During his meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary for South 
and Central Asian Affairs Evan Feigenbaum, Berkaliyev shared the 
problems that Kazakhstani law-enforcement encounters in the fight 
against drugs.  While all law enforcement agencies are tasked with 
combating drugs, there is not sufficient coordination among the 
agencies.  Fights over seizure statistics are a common occurrence 
within the GOK.  Another problem mentioned by Berkaliyev was 
corruption, though he also stated that corruption in law enforcement 
 
ASTANA 00003287  003 OF 003 
 
 
agencies has recently been uncovered through the GOK's 
anti-corruption program. 
 
----- 
MIAMI 
----- 
 
15.  During the visit to the U.S. Coast Guard in Miami, the 
delegation had an opportunity to tour a cutter and discuss the 
differences and similarities of the work of the Coast Guard and the 
BGS.   Coast Guard officials described daily operations to the 
delegation and its duties in the areas of national defense, counter 
narcotics, marine security and safety, protection of natural 
resources, and waterways management.  Berkaliyev explained that the 
BGS implements laws and regulations relative to defense and control 
of the state border, provides assistance to law enforcement, and 
protects natural resources in the border area. Kazakhstan's main 
priority is fighting poaching in the Caspian Sea.  The delegation 
was particularly interested in the pay system and possibilities for 
career advancement in the Coast Guard. 
 
----- 
TEXAS 
----- 
 
16.  Representatives of the Public Affairs Office of Rio Grande 
Valley Sector showed the delegation the daily operations of U.S. 
Border Patrol agents.  Berkaliyev and the delegation were interested 
to see the high-quality, modern equipment used by the Border Patrol, 
especially the video surveillance system.  The delegation 
immediately understood the importance of intelligence analysis in 
addition to patrolling to increases the rates of drug seizures and 
arrests of illegal migrants. 
 
17.  Following presentations by the heads of the U.S. Border Patrol 
Search, Trauma and Rescue Team (BORSTAR) and Special Response Team 
(SRT), Berkaliyev asked about the possibility of sending his border 
guards to the BORSTAR Academy in El Paso, Arizona and BORTAC Academy 
in Glynco, Georgia to learn more about the training system.  While 
it may take some time to receive funds for such training, t
he Border 
Guard Service has requested INL to provide training for BGS SWAT 
teams in Kazakhstan. 
 
18.  The system of border control in the U.S. definitely caught the 
attention of the Kazakhstani delegation.  Berkaliyev is very 
interested in increasing international programs.  He was also 
interested in the BORSTAR and BORTAC programs and would like to 
establish a unit similar to BORSTAR in the BGS.  According to 
Berkaliyev, the BGS will focus on the development of its personnel 
and increasing the knowledge and skills of border guards through 
exchange programs. 
 
19.  Comment.  This visit was another important step in developing 
the relationship between the BGS and its counterparts in the USG. 
General-Major Berkaliyev's returned home with many ideas for 
reforming and modernizing the BGS and its training methods.  The USG 
has an opportunity now to work with both Berkaliyev and Yelubayev to 
strengthen the BGS and provide it the necessary tools to be a leader 
in fighting transnational crime in Central Asia.  End Comment. 
 
 
20.  Chief Aguilar, Assistant Commissioner Walters, DAS Snyder, and 
DAS Feigenbaum have not cleared this cable. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA3276, GENERAL MOTORS RIDES INTO KAZAKHSTAN

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3276 2007-12-07 12:02 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6308
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #3276 3411202
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071202Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1322
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0040
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0324
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ASTANA 003276 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EINV EIND ELTN KTDB KZ
SUBJECT: GENERAL MOTORS RIDES INTO KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Ref: Astana 2201 
 
1. General Motors is rapidly expanding its still modest presence in 
Kazakhstan, GM European affairs executive director Trayce Wakefield 
told the Ambassador on October 31.  Through collaboration with Azia 
Avto, a Kazakhstani company, GM is now assembling Chevrolet cars in 
Ust Kamenogorsk (East Kazakhstan Oblast) at a plant that also 
assembles Avtovaz (Lada), Skoda, and Suzuki cars.  The Azia Avto 
operation employs about 3,000 people, of which approximately 500 
work on the Chevrolet operation. 
 
2. Having launched Chevrolet in Kazakhstan, GM also has plans to 
introduce the more expensive Opel brand.  GM Marketing Manager for 
Kazakhstan Assel Kozhakova told Econoff on November 8 that for now, 
GM assembles in Kazakhstan several Chevrolet models, with prices 
ranging from around $12,000 (for a bare-bones Aveo) to $39,000 (for 
a fully equipped Captiva SUV).  GM is also importing into Kazakhstan 
bigger, more upscale SUV's, including Chevrolets, Cadillacs, and 
Hummers, all assembled in the U.S. and United Arab Emirates. 
 
3.  According to Wakefield, GM has a good relationship with the 
Kazakhstani Government and has ambitious expansion plans in the 
country.  It already has 13 dealerships in 13 different cities and 
intends to open more, including a soon-to-be-completed "very large" 
dealership in Almaty.  That dealership will offer Chevrolets, Opels, 
Hummers, and probably Saabs. 
 
4. Sales of new GM cars are currently growing at nearly 30 percent 
per year.  Kozhakova said that the recent ban on importation of 
right-hand drive vehicles is helping increase demand for GM cars. 
GM's management in Kazakhstan is pinning additional hopes on the 
possible introduction of stricter environmental standards, which 
could benefit the automaker at the expense of its competition, 
including the burgeoning industry of importing used vehicles from 
western Europe.  (Note: Stricter emission and fuel quality standards 
may, indeed, be coming to Kazakhstan soon. See Reftel. End note.) 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

07ASTANA3256, KAZAKHSTAN: UPDATE OF INFORMATION ON THE WORST FORMS OF

WikiLeaks Link

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ASTANA3256.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA3256 2007-12-03 11:54 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2019
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #3256 3371154
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031154Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1307
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0037
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0965
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0323
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ASTANA 003256 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - O'MARA; DOL/ILAB - T. McCARTER; DRL/IL - T. 
DANG. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB EIND ETRD PHUM SOCI USAID KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: UPDATE OF INFORMATION ON THE WORST FORMS OF 
CHILD LABOR 
 
REF: (A) STATE 158223 (B) 06 ASTANA 891 (C) 05 ALMATY 3112 
 
 (D) 04 ALMATY 3206 
 
1. Summary:  In accordance with reftel A, this telegram provides 
updated information on Kazakhstan's compliance with international 
norms on the prevention of the worst forms of child labor.  The 
cable updates reftels B, C, and D.  This information is provided to 
assist in the determination of Kazakhstan's continued eligibility 
for benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 
Post concludes that the GOK is meeting its obligations under the 
relevant ILO Conventions to prevent and punish illegal child labor 
practices.  There is currently no justification for altering 
Kazakhstan's eligibility for the GSP on the basis of child labor 
issues.  End summary. 
 
2. Kazakhstan, with a booming economy and a strong government, does 
not have an acute problem with the worst forms of child labor.  To 
the extent child labor in Kazakhstan exists, it is largely a 
function of migration from much poorer, neighboring Central Asian 
countries.  The bulk of child labor in Kazakhstan can be found in 
the country's South, where Uzbek migrants work on cotton fields and 
Kyrgyz migrants work on tobacco fields.  Due, in part, to the lack 
of transparency inherent in cross-border migration, no formal 
statistical survey of child labor in Kazakhstan is known to have 
been done. 
 
3. Children are generally not found in Kazakhstan doing the 
country's traditional hazardous jobs: heavy manufacturing, 
construction, and mining.  Farming, the occupation drawing the bulk 
of child workers in the country, is not officially designated as 
hazardous. 
 
4. Kazakhstan ratified International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Convention 182 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor 
in 2003.  In 2005 the Government began, in collaboration with the 
ILO, a three-year program on elimination of the worst forms of child 
labor.  The program aims to raise awareness of the child labor 
problem.  One of its priorities is to study the commercial sexual 
exploitation of children, trafficking of minors, and the development 
of the methods of rehabilitation of minors engaged in prostitution. 
 
5. The ILO sees two countervailing forces acting in Kazakhstan: on 
one hand, rising incidence of child labor, and on the other, the 
government's increasing recognition - and the institutionalization - 
of its approach to the problem.  Kazakhstan's labor code has a 
specific section on child labor.  The authorities have a wide range 
of legislative tools at their disposal to effect criminal and 
administrative prosecution for child enslavement, abuse or coercion. 
 The Ministry of the Interior works to identify at-risk children 
(such as runaways, abused children, and children involved in gangs) 
and, in some cases, places them in temporary detention and 
rehabilitation centers.  These centers, which provide classes and 
counseling, can serve as a stepping stone to a return home 
(including, in case of migrant children, to the country of origin) 
or to a transfer to an orphanage. 
 
6. In Kazakhstan's southern regions, the Ministry of Education works 
together with the Interior Ministry and the local authorities to 
seek out school dropouts in markets, private farms, and other 
places.  Schools closely monitor attendance and contact students 
absent for extended periods of time.  Local authorities do make 
schooling available to migrant children. 
 
7.  Comment:  Post is satisfied that the Government of Kazakhstan 
takes the issue of child labor seriously.  While Kazakhstan is 
facing some challenges in this respect due to a growing challenge of 
illegal migrants, the government is making credible efforts to deal 
with the child labor problem.  Post recommends against any change in 
Kazakhstan's GSP eligibility on the basis of child labor issues. 
End comment. 
 
MILAS

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