Monthly Archives: February 2008

08ASTANA405, KAZAKHSTAN SEARCHES FOR NEW ENERGY SECTOR MODEL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA405 2008-02-29 11:48 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1212
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0405/01 0601148
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291148Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1866
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0411
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2144
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0037
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000405 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FOR EKIMOFF/THOMPSON 
COMMERCE FOR HEUPER 
USTDA FOR DAN STEIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018 
TAGS: EPET PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN SEARCHES FOR NEW ENERGY SECTOR MODEL 
 
REF: ASTANA 3379 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Kazakhstani officials have made a series of 
announcements since the beginning of 2008 indicating that 
Kazakhstan intends to take a tougher stance with foreign 
energy investors.  Prime Minister Masimov has banned new 
production-sharing agreements, called for a new tax code for 
natural resource users, and vowed to expropriate mineral 
fields from "unscrupulous operators." Minister of Energy and 
Natural Resources Sauat Mynbayev announced that Kazakhstan 
will seek to introduce customs duties on exports of crude oil 
and other products from 2009.  While Kazakhstan is clearly 
trying to increase its share of energy sector profits, 
foreign investors are not panicking.  Both ExxonMobil and 
ConocoPhillips are actively pursuing new opportunities in 
Kazakhstan.  Several country representatives for 
international oil companies have described Kazakhstan's 
actions as a move to a new model for deals, not a 
radicalization of the energy sector. In addition, Prime 
Minister Masimov told the Ambassador that as long as 
President Nazarbayev is in power existing contracts will be 
respected. End Summary 
 
Tough Statements From the GOK 
----------------------------- 
 
2, (SBU) GOK officials have signaled their intent to 
establish a new modus operandi in the energy sector.  In 
February, Prime Minister Masimov banned new production 
sharing agreements and announced publicly that a new tax code 
will be formulated defining "precise rules of the game for 
natural resource users and increasing the government's take 
from the raw materials sector."  Masimov also announced that 
Kazakhstan would expropriate mineral fields from 
"unscrupulous" developers by the end of 2008.  In January, 
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resouces Sauat Mynbayev said 
that the GOK would introduce customs duties on exports of 
crude oil and products from 2009. 
 
3. (SBU)  While seeking a bigger share of the energy sector 
pie, the GOK has also sought to reassure foreign investors. 
Masimov promised that Kazakhstan will "continue to honor its 
obligations stipulated by the contracts that have already 
been concluded."  Deputy Energy Minister Lyazzat Kiinov, 
responding to Prime Minister Masimov's threat to revoke 
mineral licenses, said that "there is not a single Western 
investor" in a group of 60 to 70 contracts under review. 
Even Mynbayev's call for export duties on oil exports may 
have a limited affect, as the new taxes will not apply to 
production sharing agreements or most other stabilized 
contracts. 
 
Kazakhstan Seeks a New System 
----------------------------- 
 
4.(C) Several country representatives for international oil 
companies acknowledged to Poloff that Kazakhstan is looking 
to increase its share of energy sector earnings.  Per Einer 
Rettedal, Country Manager for StatoilHydro, described the 
Kazakhstanis as mistrustful of PSAs and searching for a new 
framework for deals.  According to Rettedal, the Kazakhstanis 
still do not clearly understand PSAs. They believe that PSAs 
only benefit the oil companies while offering no advantages 
to Kazakhstan.   Rettedal, who has worked with Kazakhstan 
since its independence, said that twice Kazakhstani Energy 
ministers in Norway have asked how Kazakhstan should punish 
oil companies that have delays and cost overruns. The 
Norwegians, he said, had difficulty on each occasion even 
understanding the question, because they see it as a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship between 
goverments and oil companies.  (Comment: This was not the 
only instance in which Kazakhstanis energy officials 
exhibited a different world view than the Norwegians.  One 
KazMunaiGas official on a tour of oil-rich Norway asked " 
where are all the Mercedes'?") 
 
5. (C) Nevertheless, said Rettedal, Kazakhstan "is not 
Moscow."  He believes that the Kazakhstanis have no intention 
of "squeezing out the IOCs."  Moreover, the Kazakhstanis 
understand that they do not have the resources or the 
 
ASTANA 00000405  002 OF 002 
 
 
expertise to act alone , he added. 
 
6. (C) Patty Graham, ExxonMobil General Relations and Public 
Affairs Director, told Poloff that she believes Kazakhstan is 
moving to a new model in its relationships with international 
oil companies,, but is "not looking to take things over." 
Graham said that Kazakhstan's energy policymakers are 
adopting a strategy mirroring Kazakhstan's multi-vector 
foreign policy. Kazakhstan in the future will try to achieve 
a balance between the major foreign oil companies, seeking 
different partners for different projects, but with KMG 
always in the lead. 
 
7. (C) ConocoPhillips Country Manager said that Kazakhstan is 
"tightening the screws" but that its ac
tions must be compared 
with "situations elsewhere."  As an indication that 
ConocoPhillips has not been put off by changes in Kazakhstan, 
Olds told Poloff that ConocoPhillips is making another push 
for a deal on N Block.  Conoco CEO Jim Mulva traveled to 
Kazakhstan on February 28.  (Comment: Both Prime Minister 
Masimov and Energy Minister Mynbayev have told the Ambassador 
that Kazakhstan will move forward with ConocoPhillips on N 
Block.  Conoco is not the only American major pursuing new 
deals in Kazakhstan.  ExxonMobil is attempting to secure 
rights to an on-shore field.) 
 
Prime Minister Masimov's Message to the Ambassador 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
8. (C) Prime Minister Masimov told the Ambassador on February 
19 that ensuring long-term stability and respect for existing 
contracts will not be a problem as long as President 
Nazarbayev is in office.  After his departure, however, the 
contracts may be vulnerable because they have never been 
ratified and thus do not have status superior to Kazakhstani 
law as amended.  Masimov said that the only way to solve the 
problem is to get the contracts ratified, which he described 
as a personal priority. 
 
9. (C) Comment: Kazakhstan's vision of terms for future 
energy deals should become clearer in coming months after 
talks with several of the major investors seeking new 
projects in Kazakhstan. With President Nazarbayev, Prime 
Minister Masimov, and KMG's Makhsat Idenov (in that order) 
shaping the strategy, we expect the new framework established 
to be more advantageous and profitable for Kazakhstan but not 
damaging to the investment climate. End Comment 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA392, SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA392 2008-02-28 06:34 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0028
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0392 0590634
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 280634Z FEB 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1856
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0026
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0093
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0138

S E C R E T ASTANA 000392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, NEA, AND PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2028 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IZ KZ
SUBJECT: SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS 
 
REF: STATE 4865 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
1. (S) Summary:  Kazakhstani officials have stated 
consistently that Kazakhstani troops will stay in Iraq the 
duration of coalition engagement. The absence of Chapter VII 
UNSCR authority will not affect Kazakhstan's Iraq strategy. 
Kazakhstan's committment in Iraq is based on political 
considerations made by top leadership and, with their 
support, a decision to remain in Iraq will not meet serious 
domestic opposition or legislative delay.  End Summary 
 
2. (S) Kazakhstani officials continue to indicate that 
Kazakhstan troops will remain in Iraq beyond 2008.  On 
February 25. MFA Americas Director Talgat Kaliyev told DCM 
that Kazakhstani troops will stay in Iraq as long as a U.S. - 
led international coalition remains there and offered no 
other necessary conditions.  At a February 22 Ministry of 
Defense briefing for chiefs of mission and military attaches 
from over 20 countries, Kazakhstani military officials 
prominently mentioned their Iraqi participation and gave no 
suggestion of plans for withdrawal. 
 
3. (S) Kazakhstan's Iraq involvement has not led to serious 
domestic protest.  Iraq was not a significant theme in last 
year's parliamentary elections, nor has it been a leading 
theme of recent political debate.  As a result, if 
Kazakhstan's top leadership decides to extend Kazakhstan's 
Iraq deployment beyond the expiration of Chapter VII UNSCR 
authority, they will not experience serious public outcry or 
political obstacle. 
 
4. (S) Comment: Kazakhstani officials give every indication 
that they intend to maintain a Kazakhstani presence in Iraq. 
Nevertheless, the chances for a continued commitment in Iraq 
will be further strengthened if the U.S. helps to ensure that 
the Kazakhstani contingent remains subordinate to U.S. 
commanders, increases funding for equipment and training for 
Kazakhstani soldiers in Iraq, and maintains U.S. support for 
other bilateral military cooperation programs.  End Comment. 
MINMIZE CONSIDERED. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA371, KAZAKHSTAN: ADVANCING THE U.S. POSITION FOR CHANGE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA371 2008-02-25 09:22 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0371 0560922
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250922Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1839

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000371 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN M. O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CU KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: ADVANCING THE U.S. POSITION FOR CHANGE 
IN CUBA 
 
REF: STATE 18317 
 
Classified By: DCM KEVIN MILAS FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
(C) DCM delivered reftel demarche to Talgat Kaliyev, MFA 
Americas Section Director, on February 25.  Kaliyev promised 
to share the information and said that he believes that the 
U.S. "will find the right approach" with Cuba. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA367, KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, JANUARY 19 –

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA367 2008-02-22 13:29 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4807
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0367/01 0531329
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221329Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1833
INFO RUCPCIM/CIMS NTDB WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0408
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2141
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0378
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0491
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0251

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000367 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
DEPT PASS TO OPIC - BALLINGER 
DEPT PASS TO TDA FOR STEIN, EXIM FOR GLAZER 
DEPT PASS TO AID - EE-PHILLIPS/RUSHING 
TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTRI 
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/MAC/MLONDON, 4201/BISNIS 
USDOC FOR 6110/ITA/TD/BI/RHALPERN 
ANKARA FOR CFC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET EFIN KTDB KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, JANUARY 19 - 
FEBRUARY 1, 2008 
 
 
ASTANA 00000367  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  Summary:  This information is drawn primarily from the 
Kazakhstani local press, and has not been verified for accuracy. 
 
-- WTO accession: updates and comments 
-- Socially Responsible Business in Kazakhstan 
-- New Special Economic Zone 
-- Inflation in January 
-- Energy Minister Proposes Oil Export Duty 
-- Prime Minister Urges Construction of Aluminum Plant 
-- National Operator To Develop Kazakhstan's Rare Metals Industry 
-- First Petrochemical Plant to Be Built in Atyrau Province 
-- KazTransOil Transits Russian Crude to China 
-- Tax Claims Against Oil Companies 
-- TengizChevrOil Increases Crude Output 
 
WTO Accession: Updates and Comments 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  "In 2008 we shall conclude all bilateral talks on Kazakhstan's 
accession to the WTO, and after one or two rounds of multilateral 
talks we shall be on the way to the completion of this process," 
said Kazakh Minister of Industry and Trade Galym Orazbakov on 
January 22nd in Astana. (Note. Galym Orazbekov has since been 
replaced by Vladimir Shkolnik. End note.)  The tenth session of the 
WTO Working Party will be held in April.  In 2008, Kazakhstani 
officials also intend to achieve the ranking of "market economy" as 
determined by the European Union. In 2007, Kazakhstan signed 
protocols to join the WTO with Israel, Brazil and Malaysia. 
Bilateral talks with the U.S., the EU and Australia are ongoing. 
(Central Asia General Newswire, January 23) 
 
3.  Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister Kobyakov said that Belarus, 
Russia and Kazakhstan should synchronize their accession into the 
WTO.  "In our view, this is possible, but our partners want to join 
it earlier," he said.  According to Kobyakov, multiple accession 
dates into the WTO will not impact the longer-term goal of creating 
a customs union.  (Interfax, January 29) 
 
Socially Responsible Business in Kazakhstan 
---------------------------- 
 
4.  The National Forum on Social Responsibility of Businesses was 
held in Zhezkazgan (Karaganda region) at the end of January during 
which representatives from the forum, the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Protection, and large corporations signed an agreement to 
promote the principles of the United Nations Treaty on Social and 
Labor Relations.  Signatory businesses include Kazakhmys (copper), 
the Eurasian Natural Resource Corporation (metallurgy), 
Tengizchevroil, KazZinc, and KazAtomProm (uranium). 
(Interfax-Kazakhstan, January 25) 
 
New Special Economic Zone 
------------------------- 
 
5.  A new 370-hectare special economic zone (SEZ) has been 
established in Burabai, Kazakhstan.  According to the GOK, the 
creation of an efficient and competitive resort infrastructure in 
the Shchuchinsk-Borovoe area (Akmola region) would attract 
significant numbers of Kazakhstani and foreign tourists. 
(Interfax-Kazakhstan, January 25) 
 
 
Inflation in January 
-------------------- 
 
6.  According to the Statistic Agency, inflation in January 2008 was 
1.1%.  Prices for food grew by 1.6%, non-food goods increased by 
0.8% and service by 0.6%.  January-on-January inflation totaled 
18.7%.  the average annual inflation rate in 2007 stands at 10.8%. 
The National Bank forecasts year-on-year inflation in the range of 
7.9%-9.9% in 2008, 7.5%-9.5% in 2009; and an average annual 
inflation rate of 16%-18% and 8.5%-10.5% respectively. 
(Interfax-Kazakhstan, February 1) 
 
Energy Minister Proposes Oil Export Duty 
 
ASTANA 00000367  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
7.  On 29 January 2008, at a government meeting Minister of Energy 
and Mineral Resources Sauat Mynbayev proposed to introduce customs 
duty on the export of crude and oil products effective January 1, 
2009.  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, January 30) 
 
Prime Minister Urges Construction of Aluminum Plant 
------------------------------------ 
 
8.  Kazakhstan's Prime Minister Karim Masimov urged the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade to transfer the bauxite fields in Kostanay 
province (North Kazakhstan) to the social entrepreneurial 
corporation Tobol for the construction of a new aluminum smelter. 
(Kazakhstan today, January 23) 
National Operator To Develop Kazakhstan's Rare Metals Indust
ry 
---------------------------------------- 
 
9.  Kazakhstan's Ministry of Industry and Trade proposed to create a 
national operator for developing the country's rare metals industry. 
 Kazakhstan has unique reserves of rhenium, niobium and other rare 
metals that can be used in petrochemical, aviation, and space 
industries.  (Kazakhstan Today, January 23) 
 
First Petrochemical Plant to Be Built in Atyrau Province 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
10.  The first integrated petrochemical plant in Kazakhstan, with a 
designed capacity of 1.2 million tons of polyethylene and 
polypropylene per year, will be built in Karabatan (West Kazakhstan) 
near the gas refinery of Agip KCO, which will receive Kashagan oil. 
The project must be implemented and 50% owned by JSC Kazakhstan 
Petrochemical Industries (owned by JSC SAT & Company and a 
subsidiary of the national oil and gas company KazMunayGas (KMG), 
JSC Exploration & Production KazMunayGas).  (Kazinform, January 22) 
 
11.  KMG and the International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) 
of UAE signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate in building 
the Karabatan petrochemical plant.  (Panorama newspaper, January 25) 
 
 
12.  LyondellBasell Industries, the world's third-largest 
independent chemical company, announced its intention to acquire a 
25% stake in the Karabatan petrochemical plant.  (Interfax - 
Kazakhstan, January 25). 
 
KazTransOil Transits Russian Crude to China 
--------------------------------------- 
 
13.  KMG subsidiary, KazTransOil, started transiting Russian crude 
to China via the Omsk-Pavlodar-Atasu-Alashankou pipeline.  The 
estimated transit volume in January consists of 51.1 thousand tons 
from the Russian oil company TNK-BP Ltd, and 50 thousand tons from 
the Russian oil and gas company JSC Gazprom Neft.  KazTransOil is 
scheduled to transit 300 thousand tons of Russian crude in the first 
quarter of 2008.  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, January 22) 
 
Tax Claims Against Oil Companies 
-------------------------------- 
 
14.  In 2007, the State Agency for Fighting Economic Crimes and 
Corruption (Financial Police) initiated 23 criminal charges against 
subsoil users in Mangistau, Atyrau, and Zhambyl provinces for 14.3 
billion-tenge ($119.1 million) of contract violations.  It also 
accuses the shareholders of JSC KarazhanbasMunay of failure to pay 
41 billion-tenge of taxes on the increased share value that resulted 
from the purchase of a 50% stake by KMG subsidiary, Exploration & 
Production KMG (EP KMG), from CITIC Canada Group (the owner of JSC 
KarazhanbasMunay).  (Kazakhstan today, January 25) 
 
15.  The Financial Police accused of fraud two KMG subsidiaries - 
KazTransGas for 533 million tenge when building 17 gas wells in 
Amangeldy field (Zhambyl province), and EP KMG in the amount of 366 
million tenge when estimating the cost of seismic and geodynamic 
assessment of the oil reserves in Uzen field (Mangistau province). 
 
ASTANA 00000367  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
(Interfax - Kazakhstan, January 25) 
 
TengizChevrOil Increases Crude Output 
------------------------------------- 
 
16.  TengizChevrOil (TCO) raised its daily crude output by 11,000 
tons to 40,000 tons by putting into operation the Sour Gas Injection 
and the Second-Generation Plant projects.  The Sour Gas Injection 
project allows TCO to increase the productivity of its oil 
reservoirs, reduce sulphur volumes, and minimize gas flaring 
amounts.  At its full capacity, the Second-Generation Plant will 
process sour gas. It is currently using 1/3 of its designed 
capacity.  The projects are expected to run at their full capacity 
by raising the daily crude output to 70,000 tons in the second half 
of 2008.  (Kazinform, January 30)

Wikileaks

08ASTANA366, KAZAKHSTAN: USE OF MOBILE GROUPS ON THE BORDER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA366 2008-02-22 13:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4804
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0366 0531328
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221328Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1832
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RHFJUSC/USCUSTOMS WASHDC

UNCLAS ASTANA 000366 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL (BALABANIAN); SCA/CEN (OMARA), SCA/RA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM KCOR PREL KZ
 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: USE OF MOBILE GROUPS ON THE BORDER 
 
REF: A. 07 ASTANA 3287 
 B. 07 ASTANA 3355 
 
1.  Summary:  The Kazakhstani Border Guard Service (BGS) is 
interested in establishing mobile border guard groups to combat both 
trafficking and corruption.  End Summary. 
 
2.  On November 29, Lieutenant-General Nikolai Rybalkin, Deputy Head 
of the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service 
(FSB), announced that the Russian Border Guard Service has 
established special units (similar to SWAT Teams) that will work at 
the most vulnerable and dangerous parts of the border in order to 
more effectively fight crime.  Currently, such units are operating 
in Northern Caucasus, at the Kazakhstani-Russian border, and in the 
Far East.  Equipment and arms provided to the Russian mobile special 
groups allow them to operate both in the mountains and on the sea. 
The mobility of the groups is an important deterrent to those who 
may attempt to illegally cross the border.  Rybalkin also stated 
that the FSB will continue creating such units and sending them to 
other parts of the border. 
 
3. During an April 2007 visit to the Kazakhstani-Uzbek border, an 
INL program manager observed the work of a Kazakhstani mobile group 
at the Saryagash border checkpoint.  The group was made up of 
several mid-level officers from the Border Guard Division in 
Saryagash.  The mobile group made an unannounced visit to the border 
checkpoint and participated in passport processing of passengers. 
 
4.  During last year's annual message to the people, President 
Nazarbayev stated that the fight against corruption was one of 30 
priority tasks of the government.  The creation of border guard 
mobile groups directly addresses this task and will be a powerful 
weapon in the fight against corruption in the BGS.  Because of 
personnel shortages, the BGS hires former military personnel from 
the villages near the border as contractors.  Though this has solved 
the basic personnel issue, it has caused concerns.  Some 
entrepreneurs have found that friendships with the border guards 
help their business.  For the contractors, living among the people 
who cross the border on a daily basis presents opportunities for 
corruption.  The BGS hopes that the use of roving patrols with no 
ties to the community may help keep its contractors honest. 
 
5.  Because of several incidents on the border of Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan in April 2006, members of Parliament visited several 
villages and spoke with the citizens in order to better understand 
the causes of the incidents.  To their surprise, the deputies heard 
much more about corruption among the border guards.  They were told, 
for example, that it cost a driver of a commercial freight truck 
approximately 1,000 tenge ($8) to pass through temporary "entry 
points" unofficially opened by border guards. 
 
6.  The BGS is now planning a pilot project to fully equip and train 
one mobile group to prevent corruption, stop traffickers and those 
that illegally cross the border, and perform rescue operations on 
both land and sea.  Post expects to receive a request to fund the 
pilot phase.  It is not yet clear whether the GOK plans to request 
assistance from other international donors.  If the first mobile 
group proves its effectiveness, the Border Guard Service will 
introduce more at the most vulnerable parts of the border.  The GOK 
may be willing to provide the funding to create and support future 
mobile groups. 
 
7.  During his trip to the U.S., Deputy Head of the BGS 
General-Major Berkaliyev was impressed by the operation of the U.S. 
Border Patrol's BORTAC (tactical) and BORSTAR (search and rescue) 
teams and requested training from these units (ref A).  Such 
training, especially search and rescue, would be an integral part of 
the training program for mobile groups. 
 
8.  The BGS continues to struggle with the openness of the southern 
border, especially the border with Uzbekistan.  One of the most 
serious problems along the southern border is the narrow and 
under-protected green zone between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  The 
checkpoints along this border are equipped, staffed, and operating 
effectively; however, traffickers and illegal migrants have been 
able to avoid these checkpoints.  In other cases, traffickers have 
been willing to use violent methods to boldly cross through 
checkpoints, as was the case in December 2007 on the 
Kazakhstani-Kyrgyz border (ref B).  The development of mobile groups 
will allow the BGS to both patrol the green zone and quickly provide 
back-up to checkpoints in case of an attack. 
 
9.  Comment. As the BGS looks forward to strengthening not only 
border checkpoints but border posts along the green zone, U.S. 
assistance, training, and experience is needed more than ever. End 
Comment. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA363, CORRUPTION CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST MINISTRY OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA363 2008-02-22 10:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4634
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0363 0531028
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221028Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1830
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0407
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC

UNCLAS ASTANA 000363 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EPET KZ
SUBJECT: CORRUPTION CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST MINISTRY OF 
ENERGY OFFICIALS 
 
 
1. (SBU) On February 18 Kazakhstan's financial police brought 
criminal charges against a group of officials at the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR).  The officials, who 
have not yet been publicly identified, were charged with 
misfeasance and corruption.  According to a press release, 
the officials failed to act and deliberately omitted facts to 
the benefit and advantage of one foreign company, also 
unnnamed.  The officials allegedly caused 40.9 billion tenge 
($340.3 million) worth of damages in the form of unpaid 
budget taxes. 
 
2. (SBU) In a brief television interview, Minister of Energy 
and Mineral Resources Saut Mynbayev said that he is unable to 
comment on the case and does not know which officials have 
been charged. 
 
3. (SBU) According to television channel KTK, the foreign 
company involved is likely JSC Karazhanbasmunay, currently 
developing oil fields in the Mangistau province.  CITIC Group 
of China partially owns the company, after acquiring a 94.62% 
stake in Karazhanbasmunay from Canada's Nations Energy in 
2006.  In 2007, KazMuniaGas Exploration and Production (EP 
KMG) purchased a 50% stake from CITIC. 
 
4. (SBU) In January 2008, the financial police accused the 
former shareholders of JSC KarazhansbayMunay of failure to 
pay 41 billion tenge of taxes on the increased share value 
that resulted from the purchase of a 50% stake by EP KMG. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment: Although Kazakhstani authorities have not 
yet named the foreign company linked to corruption at MEMR, 
CITIC is almost certainly the company involved.  Minister 
Mynbayev's public admission that he does not know which 
officials were charged also raises questions about the 
strength of his position.   End Comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA362, KAZAKHSTAN: 2007 INL END USE MONITORING REPORT

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA362 2008-02-22 09:17 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4563
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0362/01 0530917
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220917Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1827
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0246
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000362 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE (BALABANIAN), INL/C, SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCOR KCRM PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: 2007 INL END USE MONITORING REPORT 
 
ASTANA 00000362  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  In 2007, Post provided equipment to GOK institutions throughout 
Kazakhstan.  These include the Statistics Committee of the 
Procurator General's Office, the Ministry of the Interior's 
Committee on Combating Narcotics, the Legal Institute of the 
Ministry of the Interior, Border Guard Service of the Committee for 
National Security, and the Military Institute of the Committee for 
National Security.  Over the course of the year, Post conducted End 
Use Monitoring of the equipment in conjunction with separate 
programs such as training events, site visits, and follow up trips. 
 
------ 
STATUS 
------ 
 
------------------- 
COMPUTER EQUIPMENT 
------------------- 
 
2.  As part of the program to improve collection and analysis of 
crime statistics, post purchased 62 computers with printers, two 
color printers, and four notebook computers for the Criminal 
Statistics Division of the Procurator General's Office (PGO) on 
October 1, 2004.  On March 17, 2007, an INL program manager 
conducted end-use monitoring at the PGO's Kokshetau (Northern 
Kazakhstan) Oblast Department and confirmed that the computer 
transferred in 2004 was in place and being used by an employee of 
the Statistics Department for collection of criminal statistics. 
The monitor, processor and printer were in good condition.  During 
an elections monitoring trip on August 20, an INL program manager 
conducted end-use monitoring of computers in the Taraz and Zhambyl 
oblasts.  All equipment was in good condition and being used. 
 
3.  Upon completion of renovation of the Saryagash Border Guard 
Training Classroom in October 2006, office equipment and furniture 
was delivered to the training classroom.  An INL team conducted 
end-use monitoring during the Advanced Training on Improved Border 
Inspection conducted in April 2007.  Fourteen computers provided for 
the classroom were checked and they were operating.  The trainers 
extensively used the 15th computer for showing presentations and 
video.  The furniture was in good condition and other equipment, 
including a digital video camera and TV, were also used during the 
training. 
 
4.  Within the Anti Trafficking in Persons project, Post is 
strengthening the Study Center on Combating Illegal Migration and 
Trafficking in Persons of the Karaganda Law Institute of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (Anti-TIP Center).  Along with training 
for law-enforcement officers, Post provided furniture and equipment 
to the Anti-TIP Center.  Office equipment delivered to the training 
center includes two computers, two notebooks, one printer, one 
scanner, one projector and one projector screen.  Post conducted 
end-use monitoring on February 8, 2008.  All equipment is being used 
and in good working condition. 
 
--------- 
VEHICLES 
--------- 
 
5.  On February 8-9, 2007, Post, jointly with IOM as implementing 
organization, conducted the follow-up trip to the checkpoints on the 
Kazakhstani-Uzbek border.  During the follow-up trip, the INL 
representative also conducted end-use monitoring of the 4WD UAZ 
minivans transferred to four border guard checkpoints during the IOM 
project in 2006.  The checkpoints are Zhibek Zholy, Kazygurt, Tole 
bi and Gani Muratbayeva.  The heads of the checkpoints confirmed 
that the vehicles are used to transport both border guards and 
equipment.  The vehicles are also used to respond to border 
incidents. 
 
--------------------- 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECT 
--------------------- 
 
6.  During the "Enhancing Immigration Inspection and Border Control 
on the Land Border of Kazakhstan with Uzbekistan" project 
implemented by IOM, INL funded renovations and purchased equipment 
for a training classroom at Saryagash Border Control Division 
(Kazakhstani-Uzbek Border) in 2006.  IOM hired a local construction 
company to do all necessary renovations, which included replacement 
of windows, installation of doorways, and replacement of linoleum 
flooring.  An INL team visited the classroom during the INL Desk 
Officer's visit in March 2007.  The classroom was fully equipped for 
training. 
 
7.  In July 2005, Post provided an inspection hangar to the MVD's 
Committee on Combating Narcotics for use at the Ulken 
counter-narcotics checkpoint that was completed in 2005.  On January 
18, 2006, an INL team traveled to Ulken and discovered that the 
inspection pit was not properly constructed and the soil used was 
not satisfactory.  On December 5, 2007, an INL program manager 
 
ASTANA 00000362  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
visited the Ulken checkpoint during the assessment of six internal 
"Rubezh-Narkotiki" checkpoints and saw that a new inspection pit had 
been built and the inspection hangar moved.  The new inspection pit 
was properly built and being used for inspection of vehicles and 
trucks. 
 
8.  As part of the INL project to i
mprove border security, INL 
funded the renovation of a classroom at the Military Institute of 
the Committee for National Security.  During the visit of the Head 
of the U.S. Border Patrol Academy, INL was able to inspect the 
classroom, which had been well renovated.  The Military Institute 
has asked to provide showcases for equipment which has been 
transferred by international organizations, including INL, for 
training purposes. 
 
--------------------- 
LABORATORY EQUIPMENT 
--------------------- 
 
9.  To enable the GOK to analyze suspected narcotics in a 
scientific, legally defensible process that will produce admissible 
evidence, Post upgraded the equipment at the Almaty Forensic 
Laboratory of the Ministry of Justice.  INL purchased infrared 
spectrometer and gas chromatograph, scales, and a digital camera. 
An INL program manager met with the Head of the National Lab on 
April 28 to conduct end-use monitoring of the equipment and 
furniture.  The gas chromatograph was in place and was effectively 
used by the employees of the lab.  The Director of the lab said that 
law enforcement officers bring in an average of 15 to 20 materials, 
of which 5 to 7 are found to be drugs.  According to the Director, 
the detector of the first gas chromatograph transferred by INL in 
2003 was broken and had not properly functioned for more than a 
year.  The cost to replace the detector is approximately $6,000. 
 
---------------- 
OTHER EQUIPMENT 
---------------- 
 
10.  In support of the Anti-TIP Center, INL provided office 
furniture and furnished a dormitory in 2007.  INL purchased standard 
sets of furniture for bedrooms and kitchens so that officers in 
training from different cities of Kazakhstan can stay at the Center. 
 Participants can only begin using the dormitory after the official 
opening of the center.  INL program manager conducted end-use 
monitoring of the furniture, household goods, and visual aids 
transferred to the dormitory on February 5, 2008. 
 
11.  During the delivery of additional equipment to "Aul" and 
"Zhezkent" border checkpoints located on the Kazakhstani-Russian 
Border, an INL team received information from the border guards 
working at those checkpoints that equipment delivered in 2005 was 
very useful in the detection of drugs.  The endoscopes were used to 
examine the gas tanks and border guards were able to find drugs 
hidden in inaccessible places. 
 
12.  In 2007, INL transferred a digital language laboratory to the 
Financial Police Academy.  The lab includes an instructor's 
terminal, 15 terminals for students, an instructor's computer, one 
multimedia centralized control system, 15 tables with divisions, 15 
monitors, 16 pairs of headphones, and accessories.  The manager of 
the language lab at the Academy received training on the use of the 
lab; however, due to the fact that the manager left the Academy, the 
staff needs additional training.  Post will make ensure that the 
staff of the Academy receives proper training. 
 
13.  In September 2005, INL and the Canine Enforcement Program of 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) co-sponsored an exchange of 
puppies between the U.S. Canine Training Center and the Kazakhstani 
Customs Canine Center with the goal of more effectively interdicting 
the flow of narcotics.  In June 2007, Post conducted end-use 
monitoring of the dogs.  One of the dogs was at the Canine Training 
Center going through a regular medical examination and another was 
serving on the Kazakhstani-Russian border.  The Head of the Customs 
Canine Center said that dogs have been working well. 
 
-------- 
PROBLEMS 
-------- 
 
14.  The GOK cooperated with INL in end-use monitoring monitoring. 
However, due to the immense size of Kazakshtan, Post was unable to 
check each piece of equipment provided to agencies in different 
regions. 
 
------ 
IMPACT 
------ 
 
15.  The Statistics Division of the Procurator General's Office: 
The computers transferred to different regions in 2004 were the 
 
ASTANA 00000362  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
initial part of the project.  Another 146 computers were transferred 
to other remote villages and towns.  The employees of statistics 
divisions no longer need to submit paper copies of crime statistics. 
 The GOK plans to provide an internet network for all statistics to 
be transferred directly to the oblast and central levels. 
 
16.  The National Laboratory of Narcotics Control, Forensics Science 
Center of the Ministry of Justice:  As many as twenty samples a day 
can be processed by the lab with the available equipment.  Post 
hopes that with the new liquid chromatograph being delivered in 
2008, the forensics experts will increase their capacity to resolve 
criminal investigations through forensic analysis of evidence. 
 
17. The Committee on Combating Drugs of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (MVD):  The hangar at the Ulken "Rubezh-Narkotiki" 
checkpoint allows detailed inspection of vehicles in severe weather 
conditions.  MVD told Post that the highest seizures of drugs are 
registered at the Ulken and Syrdarya posts. In 2006, police working 
at Ulken seized five kilos of heroin and, during the first ten 
months of 2007, seized more than two kilos of heroin.  The next step 
for strengthening the "Rubezh-Narkotiki" checkpoints is to provide 
training and communications equipment. 
 
18.  Financial Police Academy in Astana:  As soon as the language 
lab is working at full capacity, the Financial Police Academy will 
be able to improve the English language skills of its cadets, who 
will be able to participate in training at law enforcement 
institutions abroad to improve their financial crime detection and 
investigation skills. 
 
19.  Karaganda Legal Institute, Anti Trafficking in Persons Study 
Center:  The Anti-TIP Study Center is used to provide training for 
migration police and MVD officers.  During each cycle of training, 
approximately 30 students are enrolled.  In 2007, Post conducted 
four training events and trained 77 law-enforcement officers, 
including migration and criminal police.  Post will continue 
conducting training at the Anti-TIP Study Center. 
 
20.  Border Guard Service of the Committee for National Security: 
The relationship with the Border Guard Service has continued to 
improve.  INL provided equipment to the Kazakhstani-Uzbek, 
Kazakhstani-Kyrgyz, Kazakhstani-Turkmen and Kazakhstani-Russian 
borders.  Equipment provided helps border guards to detect drugs and 
other contraband.  The visit of the Deputy Director of the Border 
Guard Service to the in November 2007 resulted in plans for 
cooperation in the areas of border protection and combating drugs. 
 
21.  The Military Institute of the Committee for Nat
ional Security: 
The relationship with the Military Institute was initiated on March 
10, 2006.  In June 2006, Post provided samples of equipment 
purchased for use on the border.  In November 2006, Post conducted 
Identification of Fraudulent Documents and Detection of Drugs 
training for 34 cadets of the Institute.  From May 17 to 26, the 
Head of the Military Institute visited various U.S. Government 
Agencies and the U.S. Border Patrol Academy, which resulted in an 
invitation to the Head of the U.S. Border Patrol Academy to visit 
Kazakhstan, which took place in September 2007.  The professional 
relationship has been firmly established between the two institutes. 
 As a result, two graduate of the Military Institute were invited to 
take part in a four-month training course in Artesia, New Mexico. 
Post will continue working with the Institute.  In March 2008, the 
Military Institute will receive a language lab which will help to 
improve the language skills of cadets and trainers. 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA358, KAZAKHSTAN: DRUG AND CRIME REPORT FOR 2007

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ASTANA358.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA358 2008-02-21 09:51 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3532
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0358/01 0520951
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210951Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1822
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0244
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000358 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE (BALABANIAN), INL/C, SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR ASEC PREL KCOR KCRM PREL KZ
 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DRUG AND CRIME REPORT FOR 2007 
 
ASTANA 00000358  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. According to the Statistics Committee of the Procurator General's 
Office, 10,502 drug-related crimes were committed during 2007.  The 
number of individuals that committed these crimes decreased 1.2% to 
8,147.  Drug seizures in 2007 decreased 6.2% from the previous year. 
Total seizures in 2007 were 23.479 metric tons, including 522 
kilograms of heroin and 335 kilograms of opium.  The number of 
registered drug addicts increased 1.6% to 55,286. 
 
-------------------- 
DOMESTIC INITIATIVES 
-------------------- 
 
2.  On December 12, Saparbek Nurpeisov, Official representative of 
the Procurator General's Office (PGO), announced that the PGO 
submitted a proposal to the government to institute mandatory drug 
tests for all minors (under 16 years old) and students.  He stated 
that such a measure will protect the rights of children.  The 
proposal anticipates the participation of doctors specialized in 
drug addiction to conduct examinations of students from schools, 
colleges and higher education institutes.  According to the PGO's 
statistical data, there has been a 10-fold increase in the number of 
registered drug addicts in the last 15 years; the increase among 
teenagers over the same time has been 18-fold.  Currently, 55,286 
people are registered by treatment facilities, 4,104 of which are 
minors.  The population of Kazakhstan is over 15.5 million people. 
 
3.  In a newspaper interview, Chairman of the Committee on Combating 
Drugs Maratkali Nukenov said that, within the "Astana - Drug Free 
City" program, voluntary testing took place among students during 
medical exams.  He explained that early detection of a drug problem 
lessens the chance of becoming an addict.  In five schools in 
Kokshetau (Akmolinskaya oblast), 2,627 students were drug-tested and 
the number of children testing positive increased from three the 
previous year to nine in 2007. 
 
4.  The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) stated that 2,258 crimes 
were detected with the help of the civilian population.  In 2007, 
local governments allotted 29 million tenge (approximately $240,000) 
for programs to encourage citizens to participate in crime 
prevention programs.  Local executive bodies gave rewards to 3,932 
people for providing information about criminal activity, including 
homicides, robberies, and the sale of narcotics and psychotropic 
substances. 
 
------------------- 
CHILD DRUG COURIERS 
------------------- 
 
5.  During the Shekara-2007 (Kazakh for Border) operation, the 
Border Guard Service (BGS) of the Committee for National Security 
(KNB) seized ten packages containing 10 kilos of heroin from 
children's backpacks.  The Tajik children, ages 10 and 12, were 
accompanied by their mother as they illegally crossed the border 
from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan.  The family crossed through the green 
zone, avoiding the Saryagash checkpoint.  The Tajik mother was 
charged with illegal trafficking of drugs in large amounts. 
 
 
 
----------------- 
POLICE CORRUPTION 
----------------- 
 
6.  The Almaty Department of National Security arrested three police 
officers for selling drugs.  The policemen were selling heroin, 
previously seized as evidence.  The drugs were sold to local users, 
who were then arrested.  The police then requested a bribe to drop 
the case.  Master Sergeant Talgat Bekzhanov was sentenced to ten 
years in prison for illegal purchase, transportation, and storage of 
drugs with the intent to sell.  Due to the frequency of such cases, 
the MVD has proposed draft amendments to the Criminal and 
Administrative Codes to allow for the destruction of seized drugs 
with only a small sample kept as evidence.  The MVD hopes that these 
amendments will put a stop to evidence being resold by police.  They 
believe that one of the main reasons for drug-related crimes 
committed by police is low salaries. However, police also want 
bonuses or other recognition for seizures. 
 
---------------- 
MAJOR OPERATIONS 
---------------- 
 
7.  In 2007, the KNB closed 21 distribution networks used by 
traffickers and arrested 252 people for involvement in trafficking. 
More than a metric ton of narcotics, including 688 kilograms of 
heroin and opium, were seized.  The KNB and its counterparts from 
Russia, Uzbekistan, and Germany jointly carried out three 
operations, crushing five trans-national drug rings and cutting off 
some transit routes from Afghanistan.  Ninety-five kilos of drugs 
 
ASTANA 00000358  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
were seized, 54 criminal cases were initiated, and 23 people were 
convicted in 2007in Astana as part of President Nazarbayev's "Astana 
- Drug Free City" campaign.  Furthermore, two large drug rings that 
operated in some cities were wiped out during Operation Eastern 
Safari
 and Operation Typhoon.  Twenty-one people were arrested and 
more than 160 kilos of opium and heroin were seized.  In 2007, the 
KNB closed warehouses used by traffickers in Almaty (0.5 kilos of 
cocaine and 14.6 kilos of opium seized), Pavlodar (21.5 kilos of 
heroin seized) and Kostanai (127 kilos of opium and 3 kilos of 
heroin seized). 
 
8.  The Barrier-2007 interagency operation resulted in the seizure 
of 378 kilos of drugs and over 210 weapons and pieces of ammunition, 
537 criminal cases, and the arrests of 665 people.  The operation, 
conducted throughout Kazakhstan from November 20 to December 15, 
focused on drug trafficking through the borders and on the 
transportation arteries roads.  The KNB, MVD, the Customs Control 
Committee of the Ministry of Finance (Customs Committee), and the 
Agency on Combating Economic and Corruption Crime (Financial Police) 
assigned officers to 319 mixed mobile groups to participate in the 
operation.  The mobile groups patrolled the entire border and all 
major international and national highways. 
 
------------ 
LEGISLATION 
------------ 
 
9.  The Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency reported that the Mazhilis 
(lower house of Parliament) has approved a bill to increase criminal 
penalties for drug-related crimes, including life imprisonment. 
Vice Minister of Internal Affairs Kalmukhanbet Kassymov stated that 
life imprisonment will be appropriate in cases of the sale of drugs 
in educational institutions, sales to minors, sales of large amounts 
by organized criminal groups, or involvement in a death caused by 
overdose.   The bill also allows for the temporary suspension or 
closure of bars and clubs in which narcotics are used. 
 
------------------------- 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
------------------------- 
 
10.  The pilot phase of the Central Asian Regional Information 
Coordination Center (CARICC) was launched on November 1, 2007 in 
Almaty.  During the pilot phase, UNODC is assisting CARICC to 
recruit staff, design databases, construct communications 
infrastructure, and renovate its facilities. CARICC will be fully 
operational after the Russian Federation signs the CARICC 
Agreement. 
 
11.  The Federal Service on Drugs Control (FSKN) of the Russian 
Federation assigned a representative to Kazakhstan.  On November 15, 
Colonel Sergei Varnin was officially assigned to the Russian Embassy 
and has been empowered to officially represent the FSKN in its 
relationship with Kazakhstan in the area of countering drugs. 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA357, KAZAKHSTAN: KNB INTENSIFIES INVESTIGATION OF GRACE

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ASTANA357.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA357 2008-02-21 09:14 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3476
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0357/01 0520914
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210914Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1819
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0404
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000357 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN M. O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KIRF KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: KNB INTENSIFIES INVESTIGATION OF GRACE 
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH 
 
REF: 07 ASTANA 2718 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: On January 25, Committee for National 
Security (KNB) agents raided yet another Grace Presbyterian 
Church, this time in Almaty.  The raid is the latest step in 
an ongoing KNB investigation of the denomination, which began 
with August 2007 raids on two churches and several 
church-related homes and continued with intensive questioning 
of church officials.  Although the KNB has not formally 
detained or charged any church officials, and the churches 
continue to operate, church leaders are increasingly 
concerned about the broadening scope of the investigation and 
what it means for the future of the church.  The KNB has 
remained publicly silent on the case, though some press 
reports have linked the case to the ongoing investigation and 
prosecution of former presidential son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev. 
End summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
KNB RAIDS GRACE CHURCH IN ALMATY 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) On January 25, Committee for National Security (KNB) 
agents raided yet another Grace Presbyterian Church, this 
time searching the large, 4500 member Grace Church in Almaty. 
 KNB agents seized documents, financial records, and 
computers and questioned church officials.  The raid is the 
latest step in an ongoing KNB investigation of the church, 
which began with August 24, 2007 raids on the Grace Church 
headquarters in Karaganda, the Grace Church in Ust 
Kamenogorsk, and several church-related private homes in 
Karaganda (reftel).  Other law enforcement bodies, including 
the financial police, have also been involved in the ongoing 
investigation, intensively questioning church officials and 
examining church records for the denomination since the 
initial August 24, 2007 raids.  Although Grace Church 
Archbishop Igor Kim, his wife, and other pastors and 
administrators have been subjected to extensive questioning, 
they have not been formally detained, and the churches 
continue to hold worship services. 
 
3. (SBU) According to Association of Religious Organizations 
of Kazakhstan chairman Aleksandr Klyushev and various media 
reports, this investigation is connected to a treason 
investigation involving church officials and Almaty 
businessman Sergey Tsoy (reftel), but has expanded to include 
virtually every aspect of the church's operation. Klyushev, 
who met with Archbishop Kim on January 31 in Karaganda, told 
us on February 1 that he now believes the investigation is 
about much more than Tsoy,s ties to the church; he alleged 
that it is a case of religious persecution by the 
authorities, as the Grace Church is one of the more active 
and visible nontraditional religious groups in the country. 
 
4. (C) Klyushev maintains that the Grace Church leaders are 
innocent of any espionage, and still does not know the basis 
for possible treason charges. In his view, the authorities 
are nonetheless determined to find wrongdoing by the church. 
As an example, he said that authorities have zeroed in on 
charitable donations by a foreign donor that were deposited 
into the bank account of Archbishop Kim's wife Arina, which 
she then used for charitable purposes. He said that 
authorities are preparing criminal charges against Arina Kim 
for tax evasion. 
 
5. (C) Klyushev provided additional information about the 
August 2007 KNB raids on the church offices in Karaganda, 
which he learned during his January 31 meeting with 
Archbishop Kim.  According to Kim, the church dismissed a 
high-level staffer a few years ago after suspecting that he 
was a KNB informant and had conducted a number of illicit 
activities and actions to undermine the church.  (Note: Kim 
briefly mentioned this case during an April 5, 2007 meeting 
with Poloff.  End note.) This unnamed staffer,s office 
contained a wall safe, though nobody from the church had 
access to it. The church essentially ignored it after his 
departure.  During the August 2007 KNB raid, the KNB forcibly 
opened the safe and confiscated a number of sensitive 
documents, including instructions from the KNB about how to 
monitor religious groups.  Several church administrators 
witnessed the opening of the safe, and were sworn to secrecy 
about the content of the documents.  The KNB then accused the 
church of illegally possessing classified documents. 
Klyushev also thought it a strange coincidence that the fired 
church employee/KNB informant died only 15 days after the 
inspection of the church. According to press reports, the man 
died of cancer and his family blamed the Grace Church for 
 
ASTANA 00000357  002 OF 003 
 
 
hastening his death. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
KNB STEPS UP INTEREST IN OTHER CHRISTIAN GROUPS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
6. (C) Klyushev told us that the
KNB also appears to have 
taken action against other churches.  He reported that Pastor 
Pavel Kuptsov of the Word of Life Church in Karaganda was 
summoned by the KNB for questioning on January 3, and was 
interrogated daily until January 25, from 10 a.m. until 4 or 
5 p.m. each day, without breaks.  (Note: The Word of Life 
church is a registered Protestant Christian church.  End 
note.)  The interrogations were prompted by a complaint filed 
by the parents of a 19-year-old girl who had attended the 
church for some time and then ran away from home.  The 
parents accused the church of kidnapping her.  According to 
Klyushev, the girl had only attended the church a few times, 
and church members were able to find her shortly after 
Kuptsov,s interrogations began; she and her parents both 
filed statements with the KNB absolving the church of any 
responsibility. Nonetheless, the KNB persisted in 
interrogating Kuptsov, and questioned him intensely about the 
church's teachings, its relationship with foreign 
organizations, its funding from foreign sources, the source 
of the money the church used for construction of its 
building, and other religious groups in Karaganda. Kuptsov 
was not arrested or charged with a crime, and the church 
continues to operate. 
 
7. (C) In addition, Klyushev said that the KNB recently 
stepped up its interest in him.  Klyushev, who also pastors a 
New Life Church in Astana, said that in recent weeks two of 
his close associates were separately approached by officers 
from the KNB Department for Combat Against Extremism and 
Terrorism and pressured to work as informants and provide 
information about Klyushev and his activities.  He said that 
both of his associates refused, and told Klyushev about the 
meetings despite being warned not to. Klyushev speculated 
that the KNB does not really need informants, given their 
technical abilities to intercept conversations and perform 
surveillance; instead, he believes the KNB is recruiting 
people to eventually serve as witnesses in some future court 
action. 
 
-------------------- 
MEDIA JOINS THE FRAY 
-------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Several newspapers have reported on the Grace Church 
investigation since its inception, generally portraying the 
church very negatively and playing up the espionage/treason 
angle as much as possible.  On January 29, for example, 
pro-government newspaper Liter published an article entitled 
"Deceptive Grace," with the subheading "Foreign Spies 
Operated under the Cover of a Church." The article reported 
that the KNB has found substantial evidence that the church 
is engaged in intelligence activities, and repeated the 
allegation that illegal drugs and materials inciting 
inter-faith discord were found during the Karaganda raid. 
The article also repeated the link to Tsoy, the Almaty 
businessman. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
INVESTIGATION LINKED TO RAKHAT ALIYEV? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) A few news reports in recent months have linked the 
Grace Church case to the Rakhat Aliyev investigation.  On 
December 3, 2007, Ferghana.ru published an article by Rinat 
Saydullin reporting that, in addition to the raids on the 
Grace Churches on August 24, 2007, the KNB also raided the 
local offices of the Christian Association for Prison 
Aftercare in Ust-Kamenogorsk.  The Association is a religious 
prison ministry with ties to many churches, including the 
Grace Church.  KNB officers reportedly seized a computer and 
other documents from the head of the local Association and 
told him that he was a witness in a treason case.  They then 
questioned him extensively about the national head of the 
Association, businessman Sergey Manevich, and Manevich,s 
ties to Rakhat Aliyev. (Note: Manevich is frequently 
identified in the press as a close associate of Aliyev. On 
December 25, 2007, the Vremya newspaper reported that 
Manevich was being investigated along with Aliyev and Alnur 
Musayev for organizing and running a criminal gang, though 
Manevich has not been put on trial with Aliyev.  End note.) 
 
10. (SBU) On January 25, Delovaya Nedelya published a broad 
report on the Aliyev investigation, and speculated that the 
 
ASTANA 00000357  003 OF 003 
 
 
Grace Church pastors may become witnesses in the closed trial 
of Aliyev and Musayev.  The same article also described the 
KNB's October 23, 2007 detention of Anatoliy Rebrov, who was 
arrested as part of the same overall investigation into 
Aliyev and all of his associates.  According to the article, 
his Almaty apartment "looked like a wireless interception 
center." 
 
11. (SBU) These news reports followed a statement purportedly 
from Tsoy,s wife, Natalya Filippova, which appeared on the 
Free Asia website (www.freeas.org) on October 30, 2007, 
claiming that Tsoi has been accused of importing 
eavesdropping devices into Kazakhstan.  Filippova appealed 
for help, explaining that her husband is an honest 
businessman, is sick, and has been detained since July 9, 
2007 in a KNB pre-trial investigation facility without any 
formal charges.  She said that he is accused of working for 
the CIA and Western intelligence and of importing 
eavesdropping devices into Kazakhstan.  She denied all the 
charges, and claimed that someone in the government or close 
to the president wants to seize her husband's business. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
INVESTIGATION COORDINATED BY KNB IN ASTANA 
------------------------------------------ 
 
12. (SBU) Local officials, such as the religious affairs 
official in the Karaganda Oblast administration, routinely 
tell the press that they do not know the reasons for the 
Grace Church investigation, and that it is being handled by 
the KNB in Astana.  Amanbek Mukhashov, the deputy chairman of 
the Religious Issues Committee in the Ministry of Justice and 
a frequent Embassy contact on religious freedom issues, 
consistently has been unable to offer information beyond what 
is reported in the press.  Responding to concerns about the 
investigation raised by the US delegation at the OSCE 
permanent council meeting on February 7, 2008, Kazakhstan's 
OSCE representative Kairat Abdrakhmanov stated that "(a)s far 
as the Grace Presbyterian Church is concerned, I would like 
to inform that some of its activists in some cases go beyond 
their usual church activity."  He offered to provide further 
information at a later date. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
13. (C) The timing of the investigation, the central KNB's 
control, the consistent indications of treason charges, and 
the connections between some of the people involved all 
suggest that that there is more to this case than the 
religious persecution of a non-traditional religious group. 
Nevertheless, the KNB has long perceived the Grace Church as 
a threat to Kazakhstan, as evidenced by previous public 
comments by the deputy
 chief commander of the KNB Counter 
Terrorism Center (reftel). As a result, it appears that the 
authorities are using this opportunity for a very deep and 
wide-ranging investigation of one of the most active 
non-traditional religious groups in the country. The 
investigation and the accompanying negative media attention 
threaten the future of the Grace Church in Kazakhstan, and 
raise the prospect of wider pressure on other non-traditional 
groups by using charges that are ostensibly not related to 
purely religious beliefs or activities. 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA355, KAZAKHSTAN: TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS CASES IN JANUARY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA355 2008-02-21 04:31 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3234
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0355 0520431
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210431Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1817
INFO RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0243

UNCLAS ASTANA 000355 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE (BUHLER), G/TIP, SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SOCI KCRM PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS CASES IN JANUARY 
 
1.  Summary:  The following is a summary of media reports on human 
trafficking cases from local newspapers in January 2008.  End 
summary. 
 
-------------------- 
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
-------------------- 
 
2. The January 12 edition of Express-K and January 17 edition of 
Yuridicheskaya Gazeta published articles about a sixteen year-old 
girl and a seventeen year-old girl trafficked to Uzbekistan for 
further transportation to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for 
purposes of sexual exploitation.  The parents of the girls reported 
their disappearance to police in August 2007.  Three days later one 
of the girls sent a text message to her parents asking for help and 
explaining that they were being held in Tashkent for further 
transportation abroad. 
 
3. During the investigation, the police determined that the one of 
the traffickers was the mother of a friend of the girls, who 
promised them a lucrative job in Almaty.  As proof, the woman showed 
the girls photos of her successful daughter. The woman confessed to 
the police that she and a friend recruited the girls.  She explained 
that she and her friend's daughters had been trafficked to the UAE 
and that they were sending the girls in exchange for the release of 
their daughters. Police later found a Western Union receipt for $250 
from the UAE.  A criminal case was initiated under the trafficking 
in minors article of the criminal code.  The case is under 
investigation and further details will be reported septel. 
 
4. Kazinform reported on January 18 that police officers of the 
organized crime department in Astana freed three young women who had 
been kidnapped from Torgai village and transported to Astana, where 
they were held hostage for sexual exploitation.  A criminal case was 
initiated against two suspects accused of illegal deprivation of 
freedom for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The case is under 
investigation. 
 
------------ 
CHILD LABOR 
------------ 
 
5. In the January 19 edition of Liter, it was reported that a 
twelve-year old girl and a thirteen-year old girl were rescued by 
Almaty police and returned home.  In 2006, their mother brought them 
from Kyrgyzstan to Malybai to work in the tobacco fields. In 
Malybai, their mother physically abused them and she sold them to 
someone else six months later. In March 2007, their mother returned 
to Kyrgyzstan and promised to bring more laborers back to the 
tobacco fields. The girls were repatriated by the Kyrgyz 
authorities. 
 
6. Karavan published an article about a seventeen year-old boy from 
an orphanage who died while cleaning fuel tanks. According to the 
investigation, a former assistant tutor at the Valihanov orphanage 
was paid $120 by a local entrepreneur to clean and paint a 50 cubic 
meter fuel tank.  The tutor assigned the job to two of his students, 
one of whom fainted soon after getting into the container. He never 
regained consciousness. 
 
7. Other children from the orphanage reported that it was normal 
practice to be assigned such jobs. Police found a roster listing the 
children's names and jobs they had performed, such as collecting 
hay, chopping firewood, planting, gardening, or cleaning. The case 
is under investigation. 
 
ORDWAY

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08ASTANA354, DESPITE OBSTACLES, KAZAKHSTAN MAINTAINS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA354 2008-02-20 10:56 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0354/01 0511056
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201056Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1815
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0402
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2139
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000354 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EPET PINR KZ
SUBJECT: DESPITE OBSTACLES, KAZAKHSTAN MAINTAINS 
TRANS-CASPIAN OIL MOMENTUM 
 
REF: ASTANA 338 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D) 
 
1. (C)  Summary:   KazMunayGas, (KMG) Executive Director for 
Oil Transportation Arman Darbayev expects the Parliament to 
soon ratify the Azerbaijan ) Kazakhstan Inter-governmental 
Agreement on Trans-Caspian transport. KMG is establishing a 
sister company focused on Trans-Caspian transport issues. 
While many questions still surround the Kazakhstan Caspian 
Transportation System (KCTS), Darbayev expects  the pipeline 
to Kuryk and a system of ferrying oil across the Caspian via 
tankers to be up and running by 2011-2012.  End Summary 
 
Kazakhstan Moves Forward on Trans-Caspian Transport Plans 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) Arman Darbayev, KazMunaiGas (KMG) Executive Director 
for Oil Transportation and Service Projects, told Poloff on 
February 11 that he expects Kazakhstan,s Parliament to soon 
ratify the Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan Inter-governmental Agreement 
(IGA) on Trans-Caspian transport.  Darbayev admitted that KMG 
is not entirely satisfied with the IGA, for two primary 
reasons.  First, the document,s vague taxation language 
potentially allows Azerbaijan to levy other charges not 
covered by the IGA, such as transit and ecological fees. 
Second, the IGA only covers transportation to the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, ignoring other possibilities, 
including the use of railroad facilities or other new or 
existing pipelines.  Nevertheless, said Darbayev, Kazakhstan 
cannot turn back on an agreement between presidents. 
 
3. (C) KMG is now establishing a sister company to 
investigate its Trans-Caspian options, according to Darbayev. 
 A fully dedicated staff will focus on the Kazakhstan Caspian 
Transportation System (KCTS), Trans-Caspian transportation, 
and &issues beyond Baku.8 Darbayev called the Azeris 
&lazy,8 and implied that the Kazakhstanis will have to do 
much of the work to develop Trans-Caspian options.   The 
Azeris had BP to push through BTC, said Darbayev, but &now 
there is no one.8 
 
4. (C) Darbayev believes that KCTS will be up and running by 
2011-2012,  with  a pipeline to Kuryk and a system of 
ferrying oil across the Caspian via tankers.  Kazakhstan is 
ready to use smaller ships in the beginning (12,000 TW). He 
suggested, however, that Azerbaijan has generally agreed to 
then move to higher tonnage vessels (63,000 TW), perhaps by 
2012.  Darbayev briefly mentioned another possible 
disagreement between the two countries: Kazakhstan believes 
that the terminal in Kuryk should be used to ship oil in 
multiple directions, creating &flexibility and competition.8 
 
5. (C) Kazakhstan, unlike Azerbaijan, is still willing to 
bring other partners in to KCTS. Chevron is ready for a 
stake, said Darbayev (Reftel).  Other shippers are not 
seeking a share, as long as they receive access and tariff 
guarantees. 
 
Kashagan Consortium Struggles With Its KCTS Strategy 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
6. (C) Patty Graham, ExxonMobil Kazakhstan,s General 
Relations and Public Affairs Director, told Poloff on 
February 13 that the Kashagan consortium is still in 
disagreement on KCTS, with Total the biggest obstacle to a 
unified approach.  Total and Eni still want to retain the 
option to use the KCTS to ship some oil south.  As an example 
of the lack of harmony, Graham said that both Total and Shell 
approached Kazakhstan alone to discuss KCTS after all 
Kashagan partners had agreed to only make a joint approach. 
Nick Olds, ConocoPhillips Country Manager, confirmed the 
ExxonMobil ) Total rift and said that Conoco would like 
ExxonMobil to take the lead on KCTS discussions. 
ConocoPhillips is not necessarily seeking an ownership share 
of KCTS but would require some type of protected interest. 
 
Comment 
----------- 
 
7.  (C) With the likely ratification of the IGA with 
Azerbaijan, the creation of a Trans-Caspian unit at KMG, and 
savvy downstream transactions Kazakhstan continues to 
steadily and quietly strengthen its Trans-Caspian options. 
Many questions still remain for Kazakhstan to resolve in its 
relations with both Azerbaijan and the IOCs.  But with 
Tenghiz production increasing, Kashagan output on the 
 
horizon, and Caspian Pipeline Consortium Pipeline expansion 
far from a certainty, the Kazakhstanis have ample motivation 
to find solutions. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA352, KAZAKHSTAN: TYPHOON COUNTER-NARCOTICS OPERATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA352 2008-02-20 03:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2011
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0352/01 0510326
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200326Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1811
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000352 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL (BALABANIAN); SCA/CEN (OMARA) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM KCOR PREL KZ
 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TYPHOON COUNTER-NARCOTICS OPERATION 
 
1.  Summary:  Law enforcement agencies of Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with the assistance of Afghanistan, broke 
up one of the largest Central Asian trafficking organizations.  As a 
result of the multi-stage operation "Typhoon" conducted over the 
past three years, law enforcement initiated 24 criminal cases and 
arrested 42 active members of an international drug ring, including 
14 citizens of Kazakhstan.  A total of 800 kilos of heroin and 100 
kilos of opium were seized in the four countries during the 
operation.  End Summary. 
 
2.  On January 17, a multi-year operation conducted by the 
Committees for National Security (in Kazakhstan, KNB)and Border 
Guard Services of Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
culminated in the arrest of B. Makhmudkhodzhayev (AKA "Boar"), the 
head of one of the largest narco-trafficking organizations in the 
region, and five of his accomplices in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.  At the 
time of their arrest, Makhmudkhodzhayev and his accomplices were in 
possession of ten kilos of heroin.  As a result of the operation, 
all branches of his operations were disrupted in the participating 
countries. 
 
3.  Makhmudkhodzhayev, a citizen of Tajikistan residing in Tashkent, 
organized and managed the secretive and well-organized group 
transporting heroin and opium through Central Asia to Russia.  The 
drug couriers transported drugs via two routes: from Shymkent (on 
the Kazakhstani-Uzbek border) through Taraz, Karaganda, Astana, and 
Petropavlovsk and from Shymkent through Taraz, Almaty, Taldy Korgan, 
and Ust-Kamenogorsk. 
 
------------------------ 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
------------------------ 
 
4.  Law enforcement began targeting Makhmudkhodzhayev in February 
2004, when he was identified as the main source of heroin and opium 
to the largest Kazakhstani drug ring operated by Ilkham 
Mirzakhmedov.  In an earlier operation against Mirzakhmedov's 
organization, 14 people, including Mirzakhmedov, were convicted and 
sentenced to prison.  The KNB seized 200 kilos of heroin and 30 
kilos of opium. Following the arrest of Mirzakhmedov, the 
Kazakhstani KNB followed the trail to Makhmudkhodzhayev and 
continued its investigation. 
 
5.  The KNB struck a second blow at Makhmudkhodzhayev by halting the 
delivery of a large quantity of narcotics bound for Russia.  The 
drug couriers were stopped in Kostanaiskaya oblast (Northern 
Kazakhstan) on the Kazakhstani-Russian border in October 2005.  The 
operation resulted in the seizure of 70 kilos of opium and 20 kilos 
of heroin. 
 
------------- 
BOAR RETREATS 
------------- 
 
6.  After the arrest of his associates in Kazakhstan, 
Makhmudkhodzhayev stopped traveling to Kazakhstan and moved his 
residence from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan.  Living in Tashkent, he 
substantially extended the scale of his criminal activity and became 
one of the main traffickers of narcotics from Afghanistan to Central 
Asia and Russia.  By this time, Boar was purchasing directly from 
farmers in Afghanistan.  During a press conference on February 14, 
German Didenko, Head of the Kazakhstani KNB Division on Combating 
International Drug Trafficking explained that a portion of the 
heroin trafficked through Kazakhstan remained in the local market. 
For the most part, shipments of less than 10 kilos remained in 
Kazakhstan for local sale.  He also said that the heroin transported 
through Kazakhstan was extremely pure and was transported by drug 
couriers in nut shells, persimmons, and cheese.  Couriers also used 
natural gas tanks on vehicles. 
 
7.  During the investigation into Boar's activities, agents and 
operations officers worked undercover in his cartel.  As a result of 
the undercover work, law enforcement was able to closely monitor 
Makhmudkhodzhayev and his operations throughout the region.  Eight 
special operations conducted from May 2007 through February 2008 in 
Almaty, Shymkent, Karaganda and Petropavlovsk led to the seizure of 
100 kilos of heroin.  German Didenko also announced that the 
operation was successful due to the close cooperation of 
Afghanistan.  In 2007, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding to fight narcotics. 
 
8.  Comment.  This large-scale, multinational operation proves that 
the countries of Central Asia and Russia are capable of cooperating 
in the long-term fight against narco-traffickers.  The operation 
began prior to the opening of the Central Asian Regional Information 
and Coordination Center (CARICC), but future operations are expected 
to be coordinated through CARICC.  This operation is also proof of 
Kazakhstan's new focus on quality operations against entire cartels 
and not just arrests of drug couriers to increase its seizure 
 
ASTANA 00000352  002 OF 002 
 
 
statistics. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA342, KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV DISCUSSES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA342 2008-02-19 03:53 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0901
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0342/01 0500353
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 190353Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1796
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0400
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1871

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000342 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018 
TAGS: PREL OSCE ECON EPET KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV DISCUSSES 
BILATERAL RELATIONS, ENERGY, REGIONAL ISSUES WITH A/S 
BOUCHER 
 
REF: 07 ASTANA 2933 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (S) President Nazarbayev thanked Assistant Secretary 
Boucher for U.S. support for Kazakhstan's OSCE chairmanship 
bid during a February 11 meeting.  (Septel provides details 
of their discussion of the commitments on democratic reform 
that Kazakhstan made at the OSCE Madrid ministerial.) 
Nazarbayev said Prime Minister Masimov's March visit to the 
U.S. would advance the bilateral strategic partnership, and 
promised that Masimov would reaffirm Kazakhstan's support in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Nazarbayev praised U.S. support for 
the Kazakhstani military, in particular the Huey-II program. 
He expressed doubts about expansion of the CPC pipeline, 
explaining that Kazakhstan would continue to seek alternative 
transportation options.  Nazarbayev stressed that Kazakhstan 
strongly supported the UN Security Council resolutions on 
Iran, and recounted his own efforts to press Iran to comply 
with them.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------- 
OSCE and Path to Europe 
----------------------- 
 
2. (C) During a February 11 meeting in Astana, President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev expressed appreciation to visiting 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher for U.S. support 
for Kazakhstan's successful bid for the 2010 chairmanship of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE).  In preparing for the chairmanship, Kazakhstan would 
implement a "Path to Europe" program -- which Nazarbayev had 
announced in his February 6 state of the nation speech -- 
aimed at enhancing cooperation with Europe.  Nazarbayev 
affirmed that Kazakhstan had begun the process of fulfilling 
the commitments on democratic reform it had made at the 
Madrid OSCE ministerial.  Boucher pressed for full 
implementation and said "we will walk the Path to Europe with 
you." (See septel for further details.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Prime Minister's U.S. Visit, Bilateral Relations 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
3. (C) Nazarbayev told Boucher that Prime Minister Masimov's 
March visit to Washington would advance the bilateral 
strategic partnership.  Masimov, he noted, will launch 
Public-Private Partnership Initiative (PPPI) to elevate our 
economic dialogue.  The visit will also be an opportunity to 
discuss the development of trans-Caspian transportation 
routes for oil and gas.  Nazarbayev promised that Masimov 
would reaffirm Kazakhstan's continued support in Iraq and its 
commitment to participate in Afghan reconstruction. 
 
4. (C) Boucher noted that bilateral relations have become 
more dynamic since Nazarbayev's September 2006 visit to 
Washington.  President Bush and Secretary Rice are committed 
to further strengthening our strategic partnership over the 
coming months.  We want to build on the momentum of recent 
achievements, Boucher explained.  We concluded a good 
five-year military cooperation program at the recent 
Bilateral Defense Consultations.  Extension of the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) agreement is an important 
achievement.  Kazakhstan's successful restructuring of the 
Kashagan consortium may create additional opportunities for 
energy cooperation. 
 
5. (C) Nazarbayev hailed U.S. support for Kazakhstan's 
military, in particular, U.S. provision of Huey-II 
helicopters.  He also thanked Boucher for the continuation of 
robust bilateral nonproliferation cooperation.  Nazarbayev 
said that Kazakhstan would welcome a visit by President Bush 
in 2008. 
 
------ 
Energy 
------ 
 
6. (C) Nazarbayev told Boucher that he did not expect an 
expansion of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline. 
For that reason, Kazakhstan is looking at alternative 
transportation options.  Nazarbayev explained that Kazakhstan 
is working with the other Caspian littoral states on a 
Caspian delimitation agreement which he hoped would be signed 
at their 2008 summit meeting in Baku.  Nazarbayev welcomed 
 
ASTANA 00000342  002 OF 002 
 
 
U.S. support for Kazakhstan's efforts to work more closely 
with Turkmenistan on Caspian energy development. 
 
-------------------- 
Regional Integration 
-------------------- 
 
7. (C) Boucher affirmed that U.S. will continue to support 
Central Asia regional integration through the development of 
stronger energy, trade, and transportation links.  Nazarbayev 
said that economic integration among the Central Asian 
countries is difficult because of Soviet-era legacies as well 
as the post-Soviet experiences.  Russia blocked his earlier 
initiative to form a Central Asia union.  Kazakhstan could 
sign a three-party agreement with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
but does not want to leave Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
behind.  Kazakhstan welco
mes U.S. support as it continues to 
press forward on its regional integration efforts, Nazarbayev 
explained. 
 
---------- 
Uzbekistan 
---------- 
 
8. (C) Boucher noted that the U.S. has been receiving signals 
from Tashkent that Uzbekistan wants to improve relations with 
the U.S.  He asked whether President Nazarbayev detected any 
signs that Uzbek President Karimov is reassessing relations 
with Washington.  Nazarbayev could not confirm whether there 
were any indications of a shift in Karimov's views, but in 
any case, he said, Karimov can not go against his promises to 
Russia, which no one had forced him to make.  Nazarbayev 
noted that it is in Karimov's nature to constantly change his 
ideas.  Nazarbayev recalled that during his September 2006 
White House meeting with President Bush he had stressed the 
importance of the U.S. improving relations with Uzbekistan. 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
 
9. (S) Nazarbayev recounted his October 2007 meetings in 
Tehran with Iranian President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader 
Khomenei in which he pressed Iran to reverse its reckless 
nuclear policy.  He had urged Iran to step back and comply 
with the UN Security Council resolutions.  If sanctions on 
Iran are lifted, Kazakhstan and Iran could then engage in 
trade and energy cooperation, Nazarbayev told his Iranian 
interlocutors.  Ahmadinejad responded to Nazarbayev that Iran 
would not back down.  If Iran complied with U.S. demands, 
Washington would only come up with new reasons to confront 
Tehran.  Iran would agree to open talks with the U.S., but 
without any preconditions, Ahmedinejad claimed. (See reftel 
for further details.) 
 
10. (C) Nazarbayev said he had asked the Chinese whether they 
would work to persuade Iran to step back from its policy. 
Boucher noted that China prefers not to take the lead in 
resolving international disputes.   The U.S., however, is 
trying to keep China engaged on Iran through the UN Security 
Council process.  Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstan strongly 
supports the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran.  He 
stressed that Kazakhstan will continue to support U.S. policy 
towards Iran, though this is a delicate issue for Kazakhstan 
because of its relations with Russia and China. 
 
------- 
Russia 
------- 
 
11. (C) Nazarbayev told Boucher that in his numerous 
conversations with Russian President Putin, he has stressed 
that a nation is a great power not because of its energy 
resources, but because of its positive contributions to 
global developments.  Nazarbayev has encouraged Putin to 
shift his policy towards the West now that he has established 
prosperity and stability in Russia. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA341, KAZAKHSTANI LEADERSHIP DISCUSSES ECONOMIC ISSUES,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA341 2008-02-19 03:52 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0899
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0341/01 0500352
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190352Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1794
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0398
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1869

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000341 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2018 
TAGS: ECON EPET PREL WTO KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI LEADERSHIP DISCUSSES ECONOMIC ISSUES, 
REGIONAL INTERGRATION, WTO ACCESSION WITH A/S BOUCHER 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Prime Minister Masimov told Assistant Secretary 
Boucher during a February 11 meeting that he was seeking to 
implement further structural economic reforms in Kazakhstan, 
including tax reform.  The government would also be focusing 
greater attention on developing human capital.  Masimov 
stressed that Kazakhstan would not reopen the terms of 
existing subsoil use contracts, though would seek more 
favorable terms for new deals.  In a separate meeting, 
Foreign Minister Tazhin told Boucher that in addition to 
Kazakhstan's assistance program for Afghanistan, the 
Kazakhstanis would continue to seek private investment 
opportunities there.  Deputy Trade and Industry Minister 
Aitzhanova argued to Boucher that the U.S. was pressing 
Kazakhstan to agree to terms in its bilateral WTO accession 
agreement that it had not demanded of Russia.  (See septel 
for details of Tazhin's discussion of the democratic reform 
commitments Kazakhstan made at the Madrid OSCE ministerial.) 
End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
FURTHER ECONOMIC REFORMS 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C) During separate February 11 meetings in Astana, Prime 
Minister Karim Masimov, Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin, and 
Deputy Trade and Industry Minister Zhannar Aitzhanova 
discussed with visiting Assistant Secretary of State Richard 
Boucher a range of economic issues, regional integration, and 
Kazakhstan's WTO accession.  Masimov told Boucher that he 
would take advantage of the domestic reverberations of the 
global financial crisis to implement further structural 
economic reforms.  Kazakhstan's financial sector, he 
contended, was the best in the region, but nevertheless still 
required structural changes.  Kazakhstan is getting advice 
from former World Bank President James Wolfenson and his team 
on the issue.   Masimov added that 2008 presented a unique 
opportunity for Kazakhstan to implement tax reform, which in 
part would be aimed at reducing corruption.  The government 
is considering lowering tax rates for the non-extractive 
sectors of the economy, and might increase rates on the 
extractive sectors. 
 
3. (C) Masimov explained that in the coming years, Kazakhstan 
would place even greater attention on developing its human 
capital.  Kazakhstan had a good agreement with the World Bank 
to cooperate on health, education, and other social programs. 
 The government would focus its efforts in particular on the 
critical ages for human development -- i.e., children six and 
under.  Masimov said that the government was also considering 
moving to a 12-year school program from the current 11-year 
one, but adding the year at the beginning rather than the 
end. 
 
------------ 
NEW PIPELINE 
------------ 
 
4. (C) Masimov stressed to Boucher that Kazakhstan would not 
reopen the terms of existing subsoil use contracts.  He 
contended, however, that circumstances had changed and 
Kazakhstan would seek more favorable terms for new contracts. 
  Masimov had already made this clear to ExxonMobil and 
Chevron.   Regarding energy transport, Masimov said 
Kazakhstan is pessimistic about expansion of the Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline.  As a result, Kazakhstan 
had begun discussing with Chevron the construction of a 
Baku-Batumi pipeline.  Masimov said he had also spoken with 
Azerbaijani President Aliyev and Georgian President 
Saakashvili about the issue when he was in Tbilisi for 
Saakashvili's recent inauguration.  Masimov reminded Boucher 
that as part of Kazakhstan's efforts to diversify transport 
routes, the Kazakhstanis had recently purchased an oil 
terminal in Batumi and a controlling stake in Rompetrol.  The 
Kazakhstanis are considering buying or building a terminal in 
Constanza, he added. 
 
-------------------- 
REGIONAL COOPERATION 
-------------------- 
 
5. (C) Masimov told Boucher that President Nazarbayev had 
made a decision to provide assistance, in the form of free 
and discounted fuel oil (mazut), to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
to help them get through the difficult winter.  He stressed 
 
ASTANA 00000341  002 OF 002 
 
 
that energy and water cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, as well as 
with Tajikistan, is extremely important for Kazakhstan. 
Masimov explained that because of the manner in which 
Kyrgyzstan is operating its hydroelectric dams, too much 
water flows from Kyzgyzstan into Kazakhstan in the winter and 
not enough in the summer.  This can cause tensions. 
Kazakhstan is discussing the issue with Kyrgyzstan 
bilaterally, and is building a reservoir to try to mitigate 
the problem. 
 
----------- 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
 
6. (C) Foreign Minister Tazhin told Boucher that U.S. and 
Coalition efforts in Afghanistan have been critical to the 
Central Asia
n states, particularly in mitigating the 
cross-border terrorism threat.  Boucher encouraged the 
Kazakhstanis to implement expeditiously their planned 
assistance for Afghanistan.  Tazhin admitted that the 
approximately $3 million Kazakhstan allocated for its 2008 
assistance program was modest, but stressed that this 
nevertheless sent an important signal.  Kazakhstan had 
additionally offered to provide police training, but was 
waiting for the Afghans to give a concrete response.   Tazhin 
said the Kazakhstanis would continue to explore private 
investment opportunities in Afghanistan.  Masimov told 
Boucher that he hoped to make his first visit to Afghanistan 
this year, and would bring a business delegation with him. 
 
------------- 
WTO ACCESSION 
------------- 
 
7. (C) Deputy Trade and Industry Minister -- and Kazakhstan's 
lead WTO negotiator -- Zhannar Aitzhanova told Boucher that 
Kazakhstani had finally concluded a bilateral WTO accession 
agreement with Canada.  (Note:  The agreement was 
subsequently signed on February 13.  End Note.)  Kazakhstan's 
next priorities for accession agreements would be the EU and 
Australia.  She claimed Kazakhstan and the EU had reached 
agreement on all but a handful of issues. 
 
8. (C) Aitzhanova was less optimistic about negotiations with 
the U.S.  She contended that the U.S. was asking Kazakhstan 
to agree to conditions that it was not demanding of Russia. 
This presented a major political problem, because the 
Kazakhstani parliament would find it difficult to approve an 
accession agreement with the U.S. that had worse terms than 
the agreement reached between Russia and the U.S.  She 
claimed, for example, that the U.S. side had agreed to 
Russian GMO labeling so long as it was codified in the 
country's consumer protection law, but U.S. negotiators want 
Kazakhstan to completely repeal its GMO labeling provisions. 
Similarly, she claimed that the U.S. had agreed to a 
nine-year transition period with Russia on branching rights 
for foreign financial institutions.  Kazakhstan was willing 
to agree to a six-year transition period, but the U.S. 
insists it can only offer two or three years. 
 
9. (C) Aitzhanova explained that Kazakhstan needed 
significant expert assistance to determine the full 
implications of the proposals of the U.S. and other countries 
with which it is negotiating accession agreements.  This is 
one reason why it is difficult for Kazakhstan to accelerate 
negotiations.  She praised USAID for the expert advice it has 
provided to Kazakhstan. 
 
------------- 
EXPORT DUTIES 
------------- 
 
10. (C) Boucher asked Aitzhanova about Kazakhstan's reported 
plans to levy export duties on crude oil and oil products. 
Aitzhanova explained that Kazakhstan expected to introduce 
the duties on January 1, 2009.  The aim was to increase 
budget revenues so that the government could follow through 
on planned assistance to the banking and construction sectors 
to mitigate the effects of the global financial crisis. 
Aitzhanova admitted that the export duties might raise issues 
in Kazakhstan's WTO accession negotiations, but she noted 
that other countries, including Russia, have similar duties. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA338, CHEVRON INCIDENT REFLECTS CHANGING DYNAMICS IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA338 2008-02-15 11:18 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0338/01 0461118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151118Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1789
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0396
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000338 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB 

EO 12958 DECL: 02/14/2018 
TAGS PGOV, PREL, EPET, PINR, KZ 
SUBJECT: CHEVRON INCIDENT REFLECTS CHANGING DYNAMICS IN 
KAZAKHSTAN’S ENERGY HIERARCHY

REF: A. ASTANA 65 B. ASTANA 225

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

1.(C) On January 15, KazMunaiGas First Vice President Maskat Idenov expelled from a meeting Chevron executives Guy Hollingsworth, President for Chevron Eurasia, Europe, and Middle East Exploration and Production, and James Johnson, Chevron Eurasia Strategic Business Unit Managing Director. In press reports, an unnamed source stated that the two were thrown out of the meeting because of “improper comments on Kashagan negotiations and disrespectful conduct towards KazMunaiGas management.” Johnson told us later that the incident occurred at the end of a meeting that had gone generally well, and resulted from an innocent issue over the newly-arrived Johnson not having his cell phone number handy to exchange with Idenov. Idenov,s version of the conversation was heavy with descriptions of Hollingsworth &pounding on the table8 and Johnson slowly tapping a business card on the table while telling Idenov all he needed was his secretary,s phone number. Idenov almost immediately sent a letter of protest to Chevron CEO Dave O,Reilly, and faxed (twice) a cc to the Ambassador. Knowledge of the incident, and the letter, have been the talk of the diplomatic and business community ever since, with sources ranging from the Indian Ambassador to the local ABN Amro chief raising it with the Ambassador.

2. (C) In subsequent conversations with the Ambassador and Eurasian Energy Diplomacy Coordinator Steve Mann, Idenov emphasized that his actions were not an indication of poor relations with Chevron. In both conversations, Idenov amplified his anger with Hollingsworth by explaining that Hollingsworth does not understand &how we are doing business now8 ) followed immediately by a detailed recitation of Hollingsworth,s extensive contacts with Timur Kulibayev in locations ranging from the Astana golf course to the beach in Spain.
Comment
------- 

3. What really appears to be at issue here is Idenov demonstrating that he, not Timur Kulibayev, is now the &go to8 guy in Kazakhstani oil and gas. Idenov, the chief negotiator for Kazakhstan on Kashagan, is now &number 1A8 at KMG, according to one international oil company representative. Under restructuring at KMG, all employees report to Idenov, and only Idenov to KMG President Uzakbay Karabalin. The ascendant Idenov appears determined to show the international majors that they need to deal with him. In an early stage of the Kashagan negotiations, he tossed some less senior ConocoPhillips representatives out of a meeting to deliver the message that he should be dealing with the upper levels of KMG,s corporate partners. In the case of Chevron, he felt secure enough to throw out of a meeting executives from one of Kazakhstan’s biggest money-makers. It is difficult to imagine that any KMG official would have so criticized Kulibayev, even in private to American diplomats, if he were not very confident of his position.

4. (C) One very substantive aspect of determining who,s on top is related to the oil pipeline that must be built to connect Kashagan (and Tengiz) to the planned trans-Caspian oil terminal in Kurik. Both Hollingsworth and Prime Minister Masimov have told the Ambassador that discussions are underway to make this pipeline project a joint project between the GOK/KMG and Chevron. Masimov has noted that the Kashagan companies, the natural partners for such a pipeline, have been unable to agree on how to do this despite several years of trying. Chevron, which is not involved with Kashagan, has a major interest in additional transportation routes for Tengiz crude ) which it is 100 percent responsible for marketing. The proposed pipeline would run right past the Tengiz field on its way to the terminal; even a 25 percent Chevron share would give them an inside track at getting their crude into that pipeline if there were capacity problems with both Kashagan and Tengiz volumes. Idenov, by contrast, told the Ambassador and Mann that KMG would build the pipeline &100 percent by ourselves8 and conclude commercial contracts with the Kashagan shippers to transport their oil. He specifically said that it would be a violation of business principles to cut the Kashagan partners out of the process of determining how to build the pipeline ) a direct swipe at the Chevron proposal. To make this mix even more complicated, ExxonMobil country rep told Mann that his company was working with KMG on a new legal basis to build
the pipeline that would allow the Kashagan partners to share ownership.

5. (C) Idenov’s actions are designed not only to demonstrate that he,s up, but that Timur Kulibayev is down, if not actually out. We had already concluded that Kulibayev,s influence in the oil and gas sector had been significantly reduced with his removal late last year from a senior executive position at Samruk, the state holding company that owns KMG. Shortly after Kulibayev was fired, Hollingsworth told us that Kulibayev had explained (during a golf game) that it was the desire of the President to &protect8 him from responsibility for the Kashagan negotiations if they went wrong. This appears to be somewhat self-serving: A former USG official told the Ambassador that she had been at a dinner in Astana with the CEO of Samruk, Kanat Bozumbayev, immediately after Kulibayev lost his position. According to Bozumbayev, he had been instructed to personally deliver the news of the firing to Kulibayev, who appeared to have no inkling that it was going to happen.

6.(C) Kulibayev is still the head of Kazenergy, the semi-official trade group, and has obvious links to key government officials, including his father-in-law, the President. Kulibayev is by all accounts a very savvy
and effective businessman. Samruk Board Chairman Richard Evans (retired CEO of BAE), told the Ambassador that Kulibayev was the one real businessman he had met in the entire Samruk structure. Our guess is that Nazarbayev, in the aftermath of the Rakhat Aliyev affair, decided to minimize risks to him and his reputation by removing all of his close relatives from major government positions. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA330, CORRUPT POLICE OFFICIAL CONVICTED FOR PROTECTING A

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA330 2008-02-15 09:35 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9236
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0330 0460935
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 150935Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1782
INFO RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0230

UNCLAS ASTANA 000330 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE (BUHLER), G/TIP, SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR SOCI KCRM KZ
SUBJECT: CORRUPT POLICE OFFICIAL CONVICTED FOR PROTECTING A 
PROSTITUTION RING. 
 
REF: 07 ASTANA 3182 
 
1. On February 12, the Almaty regional court sentenced Captain Igor 
Morozov, the former head of the anti-trafficking in persons unit of 
the Ministry of Interior (MVD), and Olga Kodonidi, the infamous 
madam he protected. 
 
2. Captain Igor Morozov was convicted of abuse of professional 
functions and falsification of evidence and was sentenced to 6.5 
years in prison. Olga Kodonidi was found guilty of charges related 
to the operation of brothels and was sentenced to 6 years in prison. 
 
 
3. In March 2007, a local newspaper began an investigation and 
published a series of articles about Captain Morozov, who was on the 
payroll of Kodonidi, one of the most successful madams in Almaty. 
Kodonidi, also known as Mama Roza, had an estimated net worth of 
five million dollars and a monthly income of $60,000.  She employed 
approximately 100 prostitutes between the ages of 18 and 25 from 
Central Asia, Russia, and Azerbaijan.  Captain Morozov was paid 
thousands of dollars a month to protect Mama Roza and her 
enterprises (Reftel). 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA315, KAZAKHSTAN: ALMATY NOTES, JANUARY 28 – FEBRUARY 8, 2008

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA315 2008-02-13 05:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0315/01 0440548
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130548Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1768
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1867
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8238
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8121
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7293
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2327
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1518

UNCLAS ASTANA 000315 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: ALMATY NOTES, JANUARY 28 - FEBRUARY 8, 2008 
 
 
1. The "Almaty Notes" series is intended to maintain focus on 
developments in civil society, the media, and the opposition in 
Kazakhstan's "southern capital" following the move of the Embassy to 
Astana. 
 
Comments on President's State of the Nation Address 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2. Political party leaders expressed various opinions about 
President Nazarbayev's state of the nation address.  National Social 
Democratic Party chairman Zharmakhan Tuyakbay said "I have not been 
inspired.  The address included many good words, but it is doubtful 
whether they will come true.  Practically nothing has been said 
about political reforms." Auyl leader Gani Kaliyev agreed with 
Tuyakbay, saying that he had heard nothing new.  Patriot Party 
leader (and Senator) Gani Kasymov said he very much appreciated 
Nazarbayev's announcement that additional funds would be allocated 
to build hospitals, schools, and sports facilities.  (Interfax, 
February 6) 
 
Maslikhat Candidate Loses his Case 
---------------------------------- 
 
3. On February 5, the Supreme Court rejected an appeal from Sergey 
Utkin, who had run as an independent candidate for the Almaty city 
maslikhat (i.e., the local legislative body).  Utkin had challenged 
the results of the August 18, 2007 election, claiming that electoral 
protocols he had obtained from 10 out of the 11 election precincts 
proved that he had won his race.  District and city courts 
previously denied Utkin's appeals and confirmed the official 
results, according to which Utkin lost to a candidate from Presdent 
Nazarbayev's Nur Otan party.  Utkin has the right to file a second 
appeal with the Supreme Court.  (Interfax, February 5) 
 
Communist Leader Proposes One-Chamber Parliament 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4. "Because the current two-chamber parliament is not efficient, we 
have proposed setting up a one-chamber parliament," Communist Party 
leader Serikbolsyn Abdildin told a press conference in Almaty on 
February 5.  This proposal was one of several that the Communists 
submitted to the Central Election Commission pertaining to 
amendments to Kazakhstan's election law. (Note: The Central Election 
Commission recently solicited input on amendments to the election 
law from all political parties.  End Note.)  The Communists also 
proposed that only half of parliamentary deputies be elected though 
a nationwide proportional party list system, with the other half 
elected in majoritarian territorial districts.  They further 
proposed that city and oblast akims be elected through direct 
elections.  Abdildin added that in order to "allow Kazakhstan to 
chair the OSCE in 2010 with dignity," the constitutional amendment 
which allows Nazarbayev to be continually re-elected without term 
limits should be annulled. (TAN TV channel and Interfax, February 
5) 
 
Political Parties Support Strikers 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. The unregistered Alga political party issued a statement in 
support of miners from Mittal Steel Corporation and Kazakhmys who 
recently went out on spontaneous strikes following an explosion at a 
mine in Karaganda. The striking miners were successful in obtaining 
wage increases.  Alga congratulated the miners on their victory and 
blamed the government for its failure to arbitrate labor disputes. 
Ak Zhol, Auyl, the People's Communist Party, and Rukhaniyat issued 
their own statement expressing solidarity with the miners, as well 
as with trade unions representing employees of healthcare and 
education institutions and members of the armed forces.  (Alga press 
release, February 5; www.zonakz.net, February 6) 
 
Turkish Workers Attacked in Almaty 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. On January 24 in Almaty, approximately three dozen individuals 
wearing masks attacked workers from the Turkish construction company 
B.N.N. Pegasus, the executive director of the company, Sechim Kose, 
told the media.  According to Kose, the attackers were armed with 
knives and firearms.  Four workers suffered injuries and were 
hospitalized.  The Turkish Embassy in Kazakhstan addressed a protest 
note regarding the incident to the Government of Kazakhstan. 
According to the Embassy, more than 20,000 Turkish nationals work in 
Kazakhstan.  (Novoye Pokoleniye, February 1, 2008) 
 
Tightened Security in Almaty Schools 
------------------------------------ 
 
7. According to Deputy City Akim Serik Seydumanov, authorities are 
planning to install video cameras in Almaty schools.  This security 
campaign was launched after a January 26 incident in Almaty school 
number 9, in which a grenade exploded and killed two people.  Recent 
inspections have turned up grenades and mines in other schools. 
(Interfax, February 5) 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA305, KAZAKHSTAN: TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS SOLICITATION FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA305 2008-02-12 01:24 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5424
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0305/01 0430124
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120124Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1762
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0222
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000305 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, INL/AAE (BALABADIAN), SCA/CEN (OMARA), G/TIP 
(SHEREEN FARAJ) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCRM PHUM PREL SMIG
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS SOLICITATION FOR 
G/TIP-MANAGED FY 2008 ESF AND INCLE FUNDS 
 
REF: STATE 161503 
 
ASTANA 00000305  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Summary: In response to the Solicitation for Proposals by the 
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking (G/TIP), Post has reviewed, 
vetted, and selected five proposals addressing human trafficking in 
Kazakhstan.  Post would welcome the opportunity to discuss and 
supply additional information concerning these proposals.  The 
remaining information requested in reftel is being via email to 
G/TIP Program Coordinator for NEA and SCA Shereen Faraj separately. 
 
 
2.  Proposal Summary Information: 
 
(1) Name of Applicant: United Nations Children's Fund in Kazakhstan 
 
Requested Funding Amount: $498,540 
Project Title: Anti-Trafficking in Children 
Project Duration: 36 months 
Proposal Abstract: The applicant's proposal includes a revision of 
policies, legal instruments and standards to identify, refer and 
register cases of child trafficking.  The applicant also intends to: 
establish a system of assistance for children who are at risk of 
being trafficked and child victims of trafficking; strengthen the 
referral system through the national toll free telephone line "150" 
in five regions of Kazakhstan; implement an advocacy and 
communication campaign for communities and children to prevent the 
risk of being trafficked and develop safe behavior practices.  The 
proposal also includes analysis and, where necessary, revision of 
roles and responsibilities, and capacity building of personnel 
working with children at national and local levels, and governmental 
and non-governmental organizations.  Under the proposal, 
internationally developed methodological guides would be adopted 
with modifications for local conditions in the subjects of 
identification, rescue and investigation; child protection minimum 
standards and services for children at risk of exploitation, abuse 
and trafficking; child helpline operation. 
 
(2) Name of Applicant: The Women Support Center NGO 
Requested Funding Amount: $484,290 
Project Title: Anti-Trafficking Centers in Kazakhstan 
Project Duration: 36 months 
Proposal Abstract: The applicant's proposal includes establishment 
of anti-trafficking in persons training centers in three oblasts of 
Kazakhstan (Almaty, East-Kazakhstan, and North-Kazakhstan) for 
training migration police, city police, and police in rural areas; 
development and publication of anti-trafficking and victim 
assistance training programs; development of anti-trafficking and 
victim assistance strategies for law enforcement agencies; 
development of and conduct of trafficking prevention activities for 
groups at potential risk; and development and publication of 
information materials for further distribution through established 
anti-trafficking training centers. 
 
(3) Name of Applicant: The Union of Crisis Centers NGO 
Requested Funding Amount: $273,970 
Project Title: Ant-Trafficking Centers in Kazakhstan 
Project Duration: 30 months 
Proposal Abstract: The applicant's proposal includes professional 
conduct of training seminars to develop joint anti-trafficking 
action plans and to build capacity of NGOs and mass media to run 
information campaigns; development of Children Support Centers in 
Taldykorgan, Karaganda, Aktobe, and Aktau; development of data 
collection systems; publication of anti-trafficking information 
materials in Russian and Kazakh; and production and broadcast of 
video materials on  national television. 
 
(4) Name of Applicant: Public Foundation (NGO) Center of Social and 
Psychological Adaptation for Women and Children "Rodnik" 
Requested Funding Amount: $297,900 
Project Title: TIP Victims assistance and awareness raising 
Project Duration: 24 months 
Proposal Abstract: The applicant's proposal includes provision of 
shelter assistance, trafficking victims protection and assistance 
including return of victims, reintegration, medical, and legal 
assistance; raising awareness among risk groups, victims of 
trafficking and the general population on trafficking issues through 
development and distribution of information materials; operating 
toll-free hotlines and conducting trainings; and capacity 
development of local institutions involved in the protection of and 
assistance to victims and prosecution of trafficking. 
 
(5) Name of Applicant: Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, 
Assistance and Training (DOJ/OPDAT) 
Requested Funding Amount: $300,000 
Project Title: Strengthening Kazakhstan's Capacity to Prosecute and 
Adjudicate TIP Crimes 
Project Duration: 90 days, with follow-up every 6 months for 24 
months. 
 
ASTANA 00000305  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Proposal Abstract: The project includes implementation of anti-TIP 
legislation and design of a practical manual and case-based 
interactive TIP curriculum for use by the Prosecutor General's 
Office. The series of DOJ/OPDAT-supported multi-regional workshops 
for those investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating the TIP law 
will be conducted.  The selected cadre of Kazakhstani trainers will 
be trained as a resource for future su
pplemental training on TIP 
related issues.  Training will improve the skill level of 
Kazakhstani prosecutors and investigators to successfully pursue TIP 
cases through continued mentoring on investigative techniques and 
best practices in handling victim witnesses in other countries.  The 
program will also encourage Kazakhstani prosecutors and relevant law 
enforcement agencies to work together to combat TIP on a 
multi-disciplinary task force basis by providing examples of the 
efficiency of this model from the US and other countries. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA301, KAZAKHSTAN: SLAVERY CONVENTIONS RATIFIED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA301 2008-02-11 06:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4433
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0301 0420648
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110648Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1758
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0218
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ASTANA 000301 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, G, G/TIP, SCA/CAN, SCA/RA, DRL, PRM 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM SOCI KCRM PGOV KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SLAVERY CONVENTIONS RATIFIED 
 
REF: 07 ASTANA 3313 
 
1. According to a government press service, President Nazarbayev 
signed the bill on February 5 to ratify the League of Nations' 
Slavery Convention of 1926, the 1953 UN Protocol on Amendments to 
the Slavery Convention, and the 1956 UN Supplementary Convention on 
the Abolition of Slavery. 
2. The lower house of Parliament approved ratification of the draft 
law in December (reftel); the upper house approved it in January. 
Initially, the law was drafted to implement one of the provisions of 
the OSCE Chairmanship Action Plan aimed at improving the capacity of 
law enforcement to combat slavery, assist victims of trafficking, 
and bring Kazsakhstani legislation in line with international 
standards. 
3. Comment: It is now likely that this ratification will result in 
the development of amendments to the criminal code to strengthen the 
laws against slavery. Specifically, the amendments may make it 
easier to prosecute a case by ending the requirement to prove that 
the victim was recruited for purposes of exploitation. End Comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA284, EXBS KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR’S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE (JANUARY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA284 2008-02-08 02:31 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2589
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #0284/01 0390231
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080231Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1741
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0086
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC 0013
RUCQAAA/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0464
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8234
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8116
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0037
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2324
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7290
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0215

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000284 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC YWONG, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN, SROBINSON 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC-AMT LSPRINGER 
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE DFISCHER 
DEPT FOR SCA/RA JSPILSBURY 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN MO'MARA 
CBP/INA FOR KCHAISSON AND RWATT 
USDOE/NNSA CWALKER, TPERRY AND EDESCHLER 
DOC FOR DCREED 
USCG FOR SHABETIMICHAEL 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT, BISHKEK, BAKU, DUSHANBE AND ASHGABAT FOR EXBS 
ADVISORS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: EXBS KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR'S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE (JANUARY 
2008) 
 
 
I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS: 
 
1. Indiana Senator Richard Lugar, Republican leader of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, visited Kazakhstan on January 10-11, 2008, to 
discuss energy cooperation, as well as Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program implementation.  Subsequent to this trip, Senator 
Lugar introduced legislation to repeal Jackson-Vanik restrictions on 
trade with Kazakhstan and establish permanent normal trade 
relations. 
 
2. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mitchell Shivers signed a 
five-year cooperation plan with Kazakhstan envisaging fresh U.S. 
assistance in matters ranging from military reform and equipment 
acquisition to education and training. 
 
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS CONDUCTED 
 
1. On January 15, 2008, the EXBS team had a very successful meeting 
with high ranking representatives of Border Guard Services of the 
National Security Committee and the Customs Control Committee of the 
Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  The meeting 
focused on discussions on EXBS donated equipment and future 
implementation, training, and delivery issues. Also discussed was 
the assessment of excessive storage fees on EXBS donated equipment 
caused by delays in customs clearance and two controversial 
newspaper articles. One article was on a rail car alleged to have 
highly radioactive material that was turn back from Uzbekistan, 
through Kazakhstan, to Kyrgyzstan. Another article concerned an 
alleged Kazakhstani policy change in relation to border controls and 
the closing or consolidation of border stations on the Russian 
Border.  Both of these news articles were refuted by the 
representatives present at the meeting. The Customs Control 
Committee was represented by Ermek Kozhabergenov, Acting Head of the 
Department of International Relations; Ermek Smagulov, Deputy Head 
of the Customs Control Organization Department; Alexandra Vozhakova, 
Head of Radioactive Materials and Technical Means Department, Ajdyn 
Turashev, Chief Specialist of the Customs Control Organization 
Department; Botagoz Abilova, Chief Specialist of International 
Relations Department.  The Border Guard Service was represented by 
Abilay Nurakhmetov, Head of Border Cooperation Division; Lt. Colonel 
Talgat Kerikbayev, Deputy Head of Engineering Department. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was presented by Kanat Shekaliyev from 
the International Security Department. 
 
2.  On January 23, 2008, the EXBS team attended a Border Security 
Donor Coordination meeting at the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP)in Astana, Kazakhstan.  Represented at the meeting 
were the Kazakhstan Border Guard Services of the National Security 
Committee, the Kazakhstan Customs Coordination Committee of the 
Ministry of Finance, the Border Management and Drug Action 
Programmes in Central Asia (BOMCA/CADAP), the British Embassy, the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations High 
Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Office on Drug 
Controls (UNODC), the International Criminal Police Organization 
(OIPC-Interpol),and the U.S. Embassy (EXBS, DTRO, OMC, INL).  Each 
agency made a presentation on their accomplishments in Kazakhstan 
during the last six months and on their future plans for the coming 
year. 
 
3. On January 29, 2008, a special country team meeting was held for 
 
ASTANA 00000284  002 OF 003 
 
 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mitchell Shivers and Rear 
Admiral Miller (CENTCOM).  During this meeting the EXBS Advisor 
presented an overview of EXBS activities in Kazakhstan and a summary 
of the Second Line of Defense efforts in the installation of 
Radiation Portal Monitors. 
 
4. On January 29, 2008, a meeting was held with Glen Spindel, Deputy 
ICE Attache-Frankfurt.  The Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
office in Frankfurt has area responsibilities which include &#x0
00A;Kazakhstan.  The Deputy ICE Attache was in country as part of the 
WMD International Investigations course team.  Discussions during 
this meeting covered EXBS activities to date in Kazakhstan and 
Second Line of Defense efforts in installing Radiation Portal 
Monitors. 
 
 
 
 
B.  TRAINING DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
1.  An International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) course, "WMD 
International Investigations", was taught in Astana, Kazakhstan, 
from January 28 - February 1, 2008.  This course was attended by 
twenty-eight persons from four 
agencies.  There were eight representatives from the Ministry of 
Emergency Situations (MCHS), fifteen representatives from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), four representatives from the 
Customs Services, and one representative from the Financial Police. 
This course is designed for criminal investigators to enhance 
specialized investigative skills in transnational investigations of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents. 
 
C. EQUIPMENT DELIVERED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
1. On December 15, 2008, three CT-30 Contraband Inspection Kits were 
delivered to the Border Guard Services of the National Security 
Committee and accepted by Major General Berkaliyev, Deputy Director 
of the Border Guard Service. 
 
D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT STATUS UPDATE 
 
1. The Department of Energy Second Line of Defense 
Program is continuing its project to install portal monitors at 
border sites.  The EXBS team accompanied Ms. Laurel Cotton, the 
Project Coordinator for the U.S. Department of Energy's Second Line 
of Defense (SLD) Program, to a meeting in Astana with Kazakhstani 
Customs Control Committee officials on February 4, 2008, to discuss 
a broad range of matters concerning the SLD program, including 
training and equipment delivery issues. The SLD equipment for Phase 
One installation is scheduled to arrive in Kazakhstan from Russia in 
four rail shipments between February 4th and 20th, 2008. EXBS will 
assist in obtaining customs release for SLD equipment in Almaty. 
EXBS will also send a Diplomatic Note to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs requesting access to the requested sites for U.S. technical 
specialists so that they can begin the installation of the portal 
monitors and related equipment during March 2008. 
 
E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT CONTROLS, NONPROLIFERATION, OR 
RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
 
 1. None. 
 
F. CASPIAN SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
ASTANA 00000284  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
1. A Diplomatic Note is being drafted concerning a proposal 
by Michael Fisher, EXBS Caspian Region Maritime Advisor, to have the 
U.S. Coast Guard conduct a Basic Small Boat Operation Course for 
Kazakhstani Marine Border Guards (MBG) in Bautino, Kazakhstan from 
June 2 to June 27, 2008.  The purpose of the training is to provide 
hands-on instruction to further enhance the MBG's capabilities in 
the operation of the three EXBS donated SAFE boats.  The course will 
include classroom training and at sea exercises. 
 
III. RED FLAG ISSUES. 
 
1. None 
 
 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA282, Kazakhstani Koreans Wield Disproportionate Influence

WikiLeaks Link

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ASTANA282.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA282 2008-02-08 02:29 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0282/01 0390229
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080229Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1738
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0229
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0392
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ASTANA 000282 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - MARTY O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  Kazakhstani Koreans Wield Disproportionate Influence 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Kazakhstan's ethnic Korean minority has made great 
strides in the country's business and political spheres since 
independence, with a number of them holding influential positions. 
The success Kazakhstani Koreans have achieved in the post-Soviet era 
is a product of their higher rates of urbanization and education as 
well as their role as facilitators for South Korean investment. 
While members of other minority groups emigrated from Kazakhstan in 
large numbers during the 1990's, few ethnic Koreans chose to do so, 
and Kazakhstan became a destination for ethnic Koreans emigrating 
from elsewhere in Central Asia.   End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Koreans in Kazakhstan 
--------------------- 
 
2. (U) An estimated 100,000 ethnic Koreans -- about 0.7 percent of 
the country's population -- reside today in Kazakhstan.  Like many 
of Kazakhstan's minority communities, ethnic Koreans came to inhabit 
Kazakhstan as the result of Stalinist-era deportations.  In 1937, 
the mass resettlement of Koreans living in the Russian Far East was 
ordered on the pretense that they posed a security risk to the 
Soviet Union during a period of tensions Korea's colonial master, 
Imperial Japan. 
 
3. (U) Kazakhstani Koreans were assimilated into ethnic Russian -- 
rather than ethnic Kazakh -- culture during the Soviet era.  Today, 
most speak only Russian and only the elderly still have knowledge of 
Korean.  According to Alexander Kim, the Chairman of the Astana 
branch of the Association of Koreans in Kazakhstan, marriages 
between Koreans and non-Koreans are common and carry no social 
stigma.  Today, no evidence of tensions between Koreans and Kazakhs 
or any other group in this multi-ethnic society is readily 
apparent. 
 
------------------------------ 
Influence Greater Than Numbers 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) Ethnic Koreans hold a disproportionately large presence in 
Kazakhstan's business sphere.  Ethnic Kazakhs sometimes refer to 
Kazakhstani Koreans as the "tortinshi zhuz," i.e., "the fourth 
horde," because of their influence and propensity for supporting 
each other. (Comment: Ethnic Kazakhs are divided into three hordes 
or "zhuzes," the Great Horde or Uli Zhuz, the Middle Horde or Orta 
Zhuz, and the Small Horde or Kishi Zhuz.  End Comment.)  According 
to Professor German Kim, a leading expert on the Korean diaspora in 
the former Soviet Union, Kazakhstani Koreans are often stereotyped 
by other Kazakhstanis as being generally affluent. 
 
5. (U) Several Kazakhstani Koreans are particularly noteworthy 
figures in the country's business and political spheres.  For 
instance, Vladimir Kim and Vladimir Ni are close associates of 
President Nazarbayev and serve on the board of Kazakhmys, 
Kazakhstan's largest copper mining company.  Victor Tsoi heads the 
Ak Ayul construction company, one of Kazakhstan's largest, and was 
elected as a deputy to the Majilis -- the lower chamber of 
Kazakhstan's parliament --- in September 2007.  Oleg Nam is 
currently the Chairman of the Board of Kuat, a large construction 
company hit hard by the reverberations of the global financial 
crisis.  The previous Kuat chairman, Yuriy Tckhay, is also a 
Kazakhstani Korean.  Tckhay is currently the President of Caspian 
Bank and since 1999 as been the Chairman of the Political Council of 
the ruling Nur Otan (previously Otan) party. Finally, Georgiy Kim 
served as Kazakhstan's Minister of Justice during 2002-03 and since 
2004 has been the Deputy Procurator General. 
 
---------------- 
Roots of Success 
---------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Higher rates of education and urbanization among 
Kazakhstani Koreans during the Soviet period left members of this 
group well-position to prosper in a market economy.  According to 
Professor German Kim, Soviet Koreans were twice as likely to obtain 
a higher education as the population in general.  Moreover, 
Kazakhstani Koreans were -- and continue to be -- concentrated in 
cities.  This has allowed them to take advantage of Kazakhstan's 
hydrocarbon-driven economic boom which has spurred dramatic economic 
growth in urban areas over the last decade, but left behind much of 
rural Kazakhstan. 
 
7. (SBU) Investments in Kazakhstan by South Korean companies have 
also benefited Kazakhstani Koreans.  When South Korean companies 
first entered Kazakhstan in the early 1990's, local Koreans often 
served as the foundation for their investment projects, according to 
Chungho Tae, a Second Secretary from the South Korean Embassy in 
Kazakhstan.  Many Kazakhstani Koreans went to work for South Korean 
firms, gaining valuable business experience and an understanding of 
modern business practices.  Furthermore, many South Korean 
multinationals developed business relationships with local 
Kazakhstani Korean-owned companies, assisting the survival and 
development of those firms in the pivotal years of economic shocks 
in t
he 1990's.  However, as Kazakhstani Korean companies become more 
confident, they are no longer satisfied with the subordinate 
position they once held and are increasingly insisting on dealing 
with South Korean companies on even terms, according to Jong-mun 
Won, a First Secretary from the South Korean Embassy. 
 
------------ 
Here to Stay 
------------ 
 
8. (SBU) While many of Kazakhstan's ethnic Russians and Germans been 
able to take advantage of laws in Russia and Germany which have 
facilitated their emigration from Kazakhstan, no such option is 
available to Kazakhstani Koreans.  According to Yang Goo Lee, the 
head of the South Korean Embassy's Astana office, his government's 
policy is not to encourage their immigration to South Korea, but 
rather to promote their retention of their language and culture in 
Kazakhstan.  Alexander Kim of the Association of Koreans in 
Kazakhstan added that Kazakhstani Koreans have not been able to 
immigrate to South Korea because of that country's rather onerous 
requirements to obtain residency. In any case, he contended, 
Kazakhstani Koreans are not interested in emigrating. 
 
9. (SBU) Kazakhstan has also become a destination for ethnic Koreans 
emigrating from elsewhere in Central Asia.  The first wave of ethnic 
Korean immigrants arrived in the 1990's as refugees from the Civil 
War in Tajikistan and in recent years they have been joined by 
Uzbekistani Koreans attracted by the prospect of economic 
opportunities in Kazakhstan.  Members of these groups, like other 
impoverished immigrants to Kazakhstan, are more likely to face 
levels of discrimination which their ethnic kin native to Kazakhstan 
have so far not encountered, according to Professor German Kim. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (SBU) Kazakhstani Koreans perceive that ethnic Kazakh 
nationalism is on the rise and could some day threaten the great 
strides their community has made to succeed in the post-Soviet 
world.  They are heavily supportive of President Nazarbayev in part 
because they see him as a reliable bulwark against Kazakh 
nationalism.    In a country where economic success is frequently 
dependent on government connections -- or at least the absence of 
state interference -- Kazakhstani Koreans remain concerned about a 
post-Nazarbayev era, and the prospects that a successor 
administration could be inclined to more aggressively promote the 
interests of Kazakhs over Koreans and other minority groups.  End 
Comment.

Wikileaks

08ASTANA281, SCENESETTER FOR SCA ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER’S VISIT TO

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA281 2008-02-08 02:29 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2577
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0281/01 0390229
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080229Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1735
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0389
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000281 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - MARTY O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET KZ
 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SCA ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER'S VISIT TO 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Your trip to Kazakhstan follows January visits 
from Senator Lugar, Eurasian Energy Diplomacy Coordinator Mann, and 
Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Central 
Asia Shivers.  The steady traffic of high-level visitors to and from 
Kazakhstan (Prime Minister Masimov is expected to travel to 
Washington in March) reflects the healthy state of U.S.-Kazakhstan 
relations.  Kazakhstan is a reliable security partner and a steady 
influence in a turbulent region.  The country is proud of its 
achievements -- a thriving economy, a rapidly expanding capital 
city, a largely harmonious multi-ethnic society -- and is 
increasingly confident on the international stage.  The pace of 
democratic development has been slower, with political institutions, 
civic society, and the independent media still underdeveloped.  End 
Summary. 
 
Political Context 
------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) In Parliamentary elections held last August 19, the ruling 
Nur Otan Party received 88% of the vote.  No other party broke the 
7% threshold necessary to win seats in Parliament.  The OSCE/ODIHR 
International Election Observation Mission concluded that the 
elections fell short of the OSCE standards, noting "welcome progress 
in the pre-election process and during the conduct of the vote" but 
that "a number of OSCE commitments and Council of Europe standards 
were not met, in particular with regard to elements of the new legal 
framework and to the vote count."  The pre-election period was 
relatively good, with all parties having adequate access to the 
electorate. Voting proceeded smoothly.  The major problems developed 
during counting and aggregation.  That said, the single party 
parliament is as much a result of the opposition parties' failure to 
gain political traction as it was a result of vote manipulation. 
The opposition has continued to struggle to enunciate a clear 
message post-election. 
 
3. (SBU) When Kazakhstan was selected as OSCE Chairman-in-Office for 
2010 at the Madrid OSCE ministerial in November, Foreign Minister 
Tazhin publicly committed that Kazakhstan would amend its election 
and media laws to better meet international standards and liberalize 
registration procedures for political parties and media outlets by 
the end of 2008.  He also publicly stated that Kazakhstan would 
support the OSCE's human dimension and preserve the mandate of the 
OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). 
In January, the Central Election Committee (CEC) requested that 
political parties, including opposition parties, provide 
recommendations for election law amendments.  The main opposition 
parties, including True Ak Khol, the National Social Democracy Party 
(OSDP), and the Communist Party, recently responded to the CEC with 
their own proposals.  The CEC is now beginning a series of working 
group meetings, with invitations to the political parties, to 
discuss possible amendments. 
 
Consistent Economic Growth 
-------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Kazakhstan is the region's economic powerhouse, with an 
economy larger than those of all the other Central Asian states 
combined (2006 GDP: $68 billion).  The economy has averaged 9.2% 
real growth over the past three years, and the percentage of 
Kazakhstan's population living below the level of subsistence 
dropped from 28.4% in 2001 to 9.8% 
in 2005.  The energy sector is the dominant earner, with oil exports 
accounting for roughly a third of GDP. 
 
5. (SBU) Short-term challenges remain.  In November, 
year-on-year inflation hit 17.5 percent, propelled by 
soaring food prices (up nearly 25 percent year-on-year). This 
remains a politically sensitive issue. During the Fall of 2007, the 
price of bread rose 30% in two months.  According to one private 
sector analyst, on average 40 percent of household expenditures are 
spent on food.  The government announced at the end of 2007 a $4 
billion package to mitigate the domestic effects of the global 
financial crisis.  The money is to be disbursed via Kazyna's 
Development Bank of Kazakhstan and injected into the banking system 
as deposits in the accounts of participating commercial banks. 
 
An Emerging Energy Power 
--------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Kazakhstan produced 55.5 million tons of crude oil in 2007 
and is expected to become a top ten oil producer soon after 2015. 
The Tengiz field is expected to produce 540,000 barrels per day by 
the second half of this year after its latest stage of expansion 
comes on line.  The huge Kashagan field has estimated reserves of 13 
 
ASTANA 00000281  002 OF 003 
 
 
billion barrels, although full production is unlikely to begin until 
2015 at the very earliest.  Kazakhstan also possesses substantial 
proven gas reserves (3 billion cubic meters), though there is 
currently very limited gas available for e
xport.  At Tengiz, for 
example, most gas is reinjected into the reservoir to maximize 
long-term crude production. 
 
7. (SBU) The U.S is encouraging the Kazakhstan to diversify its oil 
and gas export routes.  Currently, the bulk of Kazakhstan's crude is 
exported via Russia, both through the Transneft system and the 
independent Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC).  In the absence of a 
CPC expansion, most of Kazakhstan's near term oil production 
increases are likely to flow to market by rail through Russia, or by 
tanker across the Caspian to Baku (and from there through 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or to Batumi or Supsa on the Black Sea.).  All 
of Kazakhstan's gas exports currently flow through Russia.  In 
December, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia signed an agreement 
to build the "Prikaspiysky" gas pipeline, intended to carry gas from 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan north through Russia.  The GOK insists 
trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines will be difficult to build 
without a five-country agreement on delimitation of the Caspian 
Sea. 
 
8. (SBU) Kazakhstan has grown increasingly assertive in its energy 
sector, reexamining the terms of existing agreements, driving a 
harder bargain with prospective investors, and aggressively pursuing 
environmental and tax claims against international oil companies. 
In October, President Nazarbayev signed into law an amendment to the 
"Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use" which gives the Government of 
Kazakhstan the power to terminate a subsoil use contract if it 
determines that the contractor's actions violate the national 
economic security interests of the country.  Only a "limited list of 
strategic objects" will be subject to the amendment, but the GOK has 
not yet made any such list public. President Nazarbayev has publicly 
stated that the amendments will not be used to change existing 
contracts.  In January, Kazakhstan and the foreign consortium 
partners reached agreement on renegotiating the terms of the 
Kashagan contract, as a result of which Kazakhstan's state oil and 
gas company, KazMunaiGaz (KMG), will get an increased equity stake 
in the project, financial compensation for delays in project 
development, and an enhanced role in project operations.  (Note: 
The subsoil amendments were not/not applied in the Kashagan case. 
End Note.) 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
9. (SBU) Kazakhstan has cooperated extensively with the United 
States in the Global War on Terrorism.  Kazakhstan has directly 
supported efforts in Iraq by deploying a military engineer unit 
which has disposed of over 4.5 million pieces of ordnance. 
Kazakhstan has provided over 6000 cost-free overflight and emergency 
landing rights for U.S. aircraft supporting Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  The GOK has indicated that it would like to deploy its 
KAZBRIG unit for a peacekeeping operation, although no commitments 
have yet been made. The GOK has also issued strong statements in 
support of U.N. resolutions sanctioning Iran and North Korea. 
 
10. (SBU) In December, the U.S. and Kazakhstan extended the 
bilateral Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement for 
seven additional years. The GOK must still ratify it.  The CTR 
agreement has facilitated successful bilateral efforts to eliminate 
the Stepnogorsk anthrax weapons production facility, dismantle 
Kazakhstan's intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, and close 
194 nuclear weapons test tunnels and boreholes at the former Soviet 
nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk.  Several important programs are 
ongoing, most notably the effort to secure and store spent nuclear 
fuel from the closed BN-350 plutonium production reactor in Aktau. 
 
Regional Relations 
------------------ 
 
11. (SBU) The GOK has stated its willingness to play an enhanced 
role in achieving regional integration.  Kazakhstan adopted an 
action plan for Afghanistan under which it will provide $2.880 
million in assistance in 2008.  The funds are to be spent on food 
and agricultural seed aid and for construction of a school, 
hospital, and possibly a road.  The Kazakhstanis, however, are 
discouraged about prospects for private sector investment following 
a failed attempt to win a tender for an Afghan copper mine, as well 
as other unsuccessful commercial approaches to the Afghans. 
12. (SBU) Kazakhstan continues to deftly balance relations with 
Russia, China, and the U.S.  Social, cultural and personal links 
help provide Russia an unmatched influence in Kazakhstan. 
Presidents Putin and Nazarbayev have met more than 15 times over the 
last two years. Kazakhstan's population is approximately one-third 
ethnic Russian.  Russian remains the dominant language of the 
 
ASTANA 00000281  003 OF 003 
 
 
country, the most popular TV stations provide a heavy diet of 
programming from Russia, and the most widely-read newspapers cover 
events in Russia closely (and rarely unfavorably). 
13. (SBU) Relations with China have strengthened as fears of Chinese 
encroachment have largely disappeared.  Kazakhstan-China trade grew 
by 66% in 2007.  China is also a major player in Kazakhstan's energy 
sector.  A Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, Atasu-Alashankou, has an 
annual capacity of ten million tons of crude, with capacity to 
double when the second segment of the pipeline is launched. During 
2008-09, a gas pipeline with an annual capacity of 40 billion cubic 
meters will be laid from the Kazakh-Uzbek border to the 
Kazakh-Chinese border. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA280, NAZARBAYEV’S STATE OF THE NATION SPEECH FOCUSES ON

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ASTANA280.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA280 2008-02-08 02:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2572
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0280/01 0390228
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080228Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1733
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0387
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - MARTY O'MARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET KZ
SUBJECT:  NAZARBAYEV'S STATE OF THE NATION SPEECH FOCUSES ON 
ECONOMICS, SOCIAL PROGRAMS 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (U) President Nazarbayev's 2009 state of the nation address 
focused largely on the economy, as well as on government social 
programs.  He only touched briefly on foreign policy, highlighting 
Kazakhstan's selection as OSCE chairman for 2010.  He said little 
about democratic reforms.  End Summary. 
 
---------------- 
FOCUS ON ECONOMY 
---------------- 
 
2. (U) President Nazarbayev delivered his annual state of the nation 
address to parliament and other assembled guests, including foreign 
ambassadors, on February 6.   His remarks focused largely on 
economic matters, as well as on government social programs.  He 
showed great enthusiasm in discussing the economy, deviating several 
times from his prepared text.  Nazarbayev noted that the state is 
strengthening its position in strategically important parts of the 
extractive sector, and pointed out that Kazakhstan had increased its 
share in Kashagan and several other projects.  He said the 
government had to undertake measures to better develop the country's 
infrastructure, especially transport links and electricity. 
 
3. (U) Discussing the banking sector and the domestic impact of the 
global financial crisis, Nazarbayev called for strengthening the 
Financial Supervision Agency (FSA), and said the government, FSA, 
and National Bank have to create a strong system of risk management. 
 He said that the government needs to develop a new tax code that 
would faciliate economic modernization and diversification, and 
reduce the shadow economy.  He argued that taxes should be lowered 
on the non-extractive sectors of the economy, especially on small 
and medium-sized enterprises, with increased output in the 
extractive sector compensating for the lost government revenues. 
 
--------------------------- 
COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (U) Nazarbayev touched on foreign affairs only briefly, but made 
one comment of note.  He first explained that Kazakhstan has to 
strengthen its economic and political cooperation with Russia, 
China, and the Central Asian states.  He added, however, that with 
the "aim of strengthening security in the Central Asian region," 
Kazakhstan is also "widening constructive cooperation with the U.S., 
EU, and NATO." 
 
---- 
OSCE 
---- 
 
5. (U) Nazarbayev contended that Kazakhstan had achieved a 
"qualitatively new level of international recognition," of which the 
most persuasive testament was Kazakhstan's selection as 2010 OSCE 
chairman.  He said Kazakhstan has to develop a special program in 
connection with the chairmanship, which he named the "Road to 
Europe."  Nazarbayev said that this program must "facilitate the 
development of economic cooperation, the attraction of technology 
and managerial experience, the perfection of our laws, and the 
development of our agenda, the strategic vision of our chairmanship 
of the OSCE."  (Note:  While Nazarbayev did not elsewhere directly 
touch on Kazakhstan's Madrid commitments on democractic reform, his 
mention of "perfection of our laws" may have been an oblique 
reference to the issue.  End Note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND DOMESTIC PRIORITIES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
6. (U) Nazarbayev contended that in the 16 years of the country's 
independence, Kazakhstan had realized its own model of "guaranteeing 
social stability, inter-ethic accord, and the formation of a 
Kazakhstani identity and common Kazakhstani patriotism. "  He 
stressed that "long-term stability, peace, and accord" were critical 
to the further strengthening of the country and its economic 
prosperity. 
 
7. (U) Nazarbayev said that political parties, as well as NGO's and 
other public organizations, would play the main role in the further 
development of Kazakhstan's political system.  He said that "the 
model with Nur Otan as dominant party could be considered the 
optimal form of Kazakhstan's political system," claiming that this 
model would open a path for all other parties to participate in 
elections, to enter parliament, and to participate in all political 
processes.  He argued that there are no obstacles to the emergence 
of new parties and the expression of their own points of view. 
 
ASTANA 00000280  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) While Nazarbayev did not clearly address the Madrid 
commitments, it is important to note that the government has in any 
event begun taking at least some steps toward implementing them.  In 
January, the Central Election Committee (CEC) requested that 
political parties, including opposition parties, provide 
recommendations for election law amendments.  The main opposition 
parties
recently responded to the CEC with their own proposals.  The 
CEC is currently inaugurating a series of working group meetings to 
discuss the issue further, and has invited political parties to 
participate in them.  End Comment.

Wikileaks

08ASTANA242, KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE ON REQUEST FOR MORE NSG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA242 2008-02-07 13:04 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0242 0381304
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071304Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1695
INFO RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000242 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/RA R. NEPHEW AND R. MONGIELLO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE ON REQUEST FOR MORE NSG 
EXPORT DENIAL DATA 
 
REF: STATE 0099 
 
(SBU) On February 6, Poloff delivered reftel points and IAEA 
Director General for Safeguards Olli Heinonen's letter to 
Sergey Savelyev, MFA Department for International Security 
Director.  Savelyev said that Kazakhstan is always open with 
its non-proliferation information and will try to cooperate. 
In closing, however, he noted with some evident bitterness 
that he found it "interesting" that the United States often 
asks Kazakhstan for its help in the non-proliferation sphere 
but has not assisted Kazakhstan in its effort to attain 
Missile Technology Control Regime membership. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA241, KAZAKHSTAN: NSG DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT ON INDIA

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ASTANA241.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA241 2008-02-07 13:03 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0241 0381303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071303Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1694
INFO RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0490

UNCLAS ASTANA 000241 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR DOS/ISN R. STRATFORD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP PARM TRGY KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NSG DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT ON INDIA 
 
REF: STATE 7192 
 
1. (SBU) On February 6, Poloff notified MFA Department of 
International Security Director Sergey Savelyev that the U.S. 
is waiting for the IAEA and India to complete their 
discussions before circulating the draft Nuclear Suppliers 
Group policy statement regarding India.  Savelyev responded 
that he does not see any consensus in the NSG on India. He 
said that Kazakhstan is unclear as to India's intention and 
believes it a mistake that Indian officials have not made a 
presentation to the NSG.  Kazakhstan, he concluded, is ready 
to speak with India and would like to learn more of "India's 
obligations." 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks