Monthly Archives: April 2008

08ASTANA858, KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE ON NPT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA858 2008-04-30 08:36 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0858 1210836
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300836Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2330

UNCLAS ASTANA 000858 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN M. O'MARA, ISN/MSA SCOTT DAVIS / TERRILL 
RAY / STEVE ADAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PREL NPT IAEA KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE ON NPT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE 
DELIVERED 
 
REF: STATE 45218 
 
Poloff delivered reftel demarche to MFA International 
Security Section Advisor Faizrakhmam Kassanov on April 30. 
Kassanov had no immediate comment but promised to consider 
the information. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA849, KAZAKHSTAN DENIES OVERFLIGHT TO FLIGHT OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA849 2008-04-29 12:20 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0849 1201220
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 291220Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2328
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7318
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8271
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2353
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0398
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8152

S E C R E T ASTANA 000849 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, T, SCA, NEA, EUR. EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2018 
TAGS: KNNP PREL KZ KN SY IR
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN DENIES OVERFLIGHT TO FLIGHT OF 
PROLIFERATION CONCERN 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 797 B. ASTANA 673 C. STATE 43804 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Steve Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (S) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Advisor for International 
Security Faizrakhmam Kassanov told Poloff on April 29 that 
Kazakhstan denied overflight to the North Korean airliner 
subject of reftel C.  According to Kassanov, North Korea 
presented the Government of Kazakhstan a diplomatic note 
requesting overflight clearance and stated that the flight 
would be carrying a government delegation. 
 
2. (S) Kassanov asked if the U.S. knows, and is able to 
share, the names of the delegation aboard the flight. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA848, KAZAKHSTAN – UPDATE ON AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE PLANS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA848 2008-04-29 11:57 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0848 1201157
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291157Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2327
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0496
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2142
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0397
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0504
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0236

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000848 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/A LAUREN FRESE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2018 
TAGS: EAID PREL PGOV KZ AF
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN - UPDATE ON AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE PLANS 
 
REF: A. STATE 32155 
     B. ASTANA 341 
     C. ASTANA/ALMATY JANUARY 31 OFFICIAL-INFORMAL EMAIL 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Steven Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (SBU) Pol-Econ Chief met on April 29 with MFA Asian 
Cooperation Department Advisor Yerzhan Kalekenov to discuss 
Kazakhstan's assistance plans for Afghanistan and its 
participation in the upcoming Afghanistan support conference 
in Paris. 
 
2. (SBU) As previously reported, Kazakhstan allocated $2.88 
million in Afghanistan assistance in 2008 for humanitarian 
aid and to build a school, hospital, and road (ref C). 
Kalekenov confirmed that all of these activities are moving 
forward.  He accompanied MFA Special Envoy Askhat Orazbai on 
the latter's trip April 11-18 trip to Kabul.  Kalekenov 
explained that during the trip, the Kazakhstanis, in 
consultation with the Afghans, agreed that rather than 
constructing a new road, Kazakhstan will finance the 
reconstruction of an existing one that runs between Kunduz 
and Taloqan in northern Afghanistan.  (Note:  Kazakhstan 
already agreed several months ago that the school will be 
constructed in Samangan province and the hospital in Bamayan 
province.  End Note.) 
 
3. (SBU) During Orazbai's Kabul visit, the Kazakhstanis and 
Afghans finalized MOU's for the three construction projects, 
under which Kazakhstan will transfer the necessary funds -- 
in one tranche -- to the Afghan government, which will be 
responsible for project implementation, including for hiring 
contractors through tenders.  Kalekenov said that he expected 
that the money would be transferred in the near future, 
perhaps even within a month.  He also confirmed that 
Kazakhstan was in the process of preparing to deliver the 
humanitarian aid portion of its assistance -- $500,000 in 
grain and grain products.  Kalekenov said that shipment 
should begin before the end of May. 
 
4. (C) Per ref A demarche, Pol-Econ Chief inquired about 
Kazakhstan's plans for the Afghanistan support conference in 
Paris.  Kalekenov responded that he had very few details 
about the conference.  Kazakhstan had not yet received an 
invitation and was not certain it was being invited.  As a 
result, Kalekenov explained, no decision had been made as to 
who would represent Kazakhstan at the event.  In response to 
Pol-Econ Chief's question, Kalekenov said that Kazakhstan 
hoped, within its economic limitations, to continue 
assistance to Afghanistan in future years, though this would 
depend on the successful implementation of its 2008 
assistance program. 
 
5. (C) Pol-Econ Chief asked Kalekenov about the status of 
Prime Minister Masimov's plans to visit Afghanistan in 2008 
(see ref B).  Kalekenov said that the details still had to be 
firmed up, but the trip "remains on the agenda."  It would 
more likely occur during the latter part of the year, rather 
than earlier. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA842, INTERPRETER PAYMENT AND AIRLINE TICKETS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA842 2008-04-29 08:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0842 1200826
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADX088E6B8 MSI3258 611)
P 290826Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2322
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8153

UNCLAS ASTANA 000842 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  COPY: ADDRRESS 
 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT FOR ADM, RSO, POLECON 
ATTENTION SUZANNE CLARKE, CHRIS PHILLIPS, TIMOTHY BUCKLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR AMGT AFIN KZ
SUBJECT: INTERPRETER PAYMENT AND AIRLINE TICKETS 
 
1.  AmEmbassy Astana requests AmEmbassy Tashkent process cash 
payment in the amount of USD 3,500 to Mr. Sergey Belov for 
interpretation services provided during a Counter Narcotics Dog 
Training program in Bad Kreuzen, Austria.  The program is being 
conducted from February 25 through April 30, 2008. 
 
amount (USD) - 3,500 (to be paid in cash to Sergey Belov) 
 
agency code - 1911 
appropriation code - 1911-451022.0000 
bureau code - 00 
allotment code - 0259 
obligation number - 0259504314 
function code - 2721 
object class - 2589 
project code - 9904 
 
2.  AmEmbassy Astana also requests AmEmbassy Tashkent to support the 
visit of Sergey Belov to Kazakhstan on May 5-9, 2008.  Mr. Belov 
will interpret during a Counter Narcotics press conference on May 6 
and official meetings on May 7-8.  AmEmbassy Astana requests the 
purchase of airline tickets (Tashkent-Astana-Almaty-Tashkent) not to 
exceed $ 1,000, using the below fund cite: 
 
amount (USD) - 1,000 (to be paid for airline tickets) 
 
agency code - 1911 
appropriation code - 1911-341022.0000 
bureau code - 00 
allotment code - 0259 
obligation number - 0259403324 
function code - 2721 
object class - 4121 
project code - 9903 
 
2. Post appreciates AmEmbassy Tashkent's support and cooperation. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA829, KAZAKHSTAN – DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON SPECIAL 301

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA829 2008-04-25 12:13 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0829 1161213
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251213Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2313

UNCLAS ASTANA 000829 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD KIPR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN - DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON SPECIAL 301 
 
REF: STATE 43163 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Per reftel, Poloff met on April 25 with 
officials from the Ministry of Trade and Industry to inform 
them that Kazakhstan will not be listed on the 2008 Special 
301 Watchlist.  Ministry officials were very pleased to hear 
this news.  They sought clarification of several of the 
demarche points, specifically concerning the authority for 
customs officials to initiate criminal cases, and the 
destruction of equipment used in the production of pirated 
materials.  The Ministry requested that the content of the 
demarche be given to them in writing, so that they can 
respond in detail.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Poloff met on April 25 with Damegul Kabieva and 
Saadat Assanseitova, respectively Director and Deputy 
Director of the Department of Trade Policy Development and 
WTO Accession of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, as well 
as with Ministry IPR expert Marina Sirotina.  They thanked 
Poloff for conveying the good news that Kazakhstan will not 
be listed on the 2008 Special 301 Watchlist, and said that 
Minister Aitzhanova will be very glad to hear it as well. 
They noted that this is evidence of the hard work of their 
Ministry and the many positive steps that they have made in 
terms of adapting Kazakhstani IPR legislation to WTO norms. 
 
3. (SBU) Kabieva had specific questions with respect to two 
of the points in the demarche.  Regarding the request for 
adoption in the Customs Code of ex officio authority for 
customs officials to seize illegal material and to commence 
their own investigations and criminal cases, she stated 
currently only the IPR holder can initiate court proceedings. 
 They expect that in the revised Customs Code, which is still 
in draft, customs officials will be able to initiate 
administrative proceedings against IPR infringers, but not 
criminal proceedings.  Regarding adoption of provisions in 
the Criminal Code clarifying the government's authority to 
confiscate and destroy manufacturing equipment used to 
produce confiscated materials, she stated that the issue of 
destruction of equipment is still being negotiated with the 
IPR committee of the Ministry of Justice.  In addition, the 
officials explained that the Customs Committee (which is 
under the Ministry of Finance) will open a new department for 
IPR protection, which will train customs officials on IPR 
protection. 
 
4. (SBU) Kabieva requested that the demarche points be sent 
in written form to their Ministry so that they can review 
them and provide written answers.  (Note: Per the demarche 
instructions, Poloff only delivered the points orally.  End 
Note.)  She also stated that the Kazakhstani side looks 
forward to meeting with U.S. officials during the fourth TIFA 
meeting in Tajikistan in June. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA827, KAZAKHSTAN – ARREST OF UZBEK CITIZEN CONNECTED TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA827 2008-04-25 11:44 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0827 1161144
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251144Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2311
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0495
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1906

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000827 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2018 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL KZ UZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN - ARREST OF UZBEK CITIZEN CONNECTED TO 
ANDIJAN EVENTS 
 
REF: O'MARA-FAGIN APRIL 24 EMAIL 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Steven Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) On April 25, Pol-Econ chief raised with MFA Americas 
Department head Talgat Kaliyev media reports that on April 
20, Kazakhstani law enforcement authorities in Almaty had 
arrested Uzbek citizen Rafik Rakhmonov on various counts of 
participating in the 2005 Andijan events.  A UNHCR 
spokesperson in Almaty was quoted in the press explaining 
that Rakhmonov had been registered recently by UNHCR as an 
asylum seeker.  Pol-Econ chief explained to Kaliyev that 
Washington was concerned about the case, and while the timing 
of the arrest may have been a pure coincidence, there was the 
unfortunate appearance that it was a "deliverable" for Uzbek 
President Karimov's April 22-23 visit to Kazakhstan.  He 
reminded Kaliyev that Kazakhstan had a strong record of 
non-refoulement of refugees, and asked Kaliyev to look into 
the Rakhmonov case and bring USG concerns to the attention of 
the Kazakhstani officials dealing with it.  Kaliyev promised 
to follow up on this request. 
 
2. (C) In a subsequent April 25 meeting in Almaty, Poloff 
discussed the Rakhmonov case with UNHCR Protection Officer 
Narasimha Rao.  According to Rao, Rakhmonov approached UNHCR 
with a request for refugee status on or about April 10. 
Rakhmonov told UNHCR that he had been living in Kazakhstan 
for almost three years, and had not previously approached 
UNHCR because he had felt safe until very recently, when he 
saw himself mentioned on Uzbek television.  Rao told Poloff 
that UNHCR had not yet conducted a refugee interview with 
Rakhmonov, so he did not know whether Rakhmonov would merit 
refugee status.  Following Rakhmonov's arrest, UNHCR sent a 
diplomatic note requesting that arrangements be made so UNHCR 
could conduct a refugee interview, in accordance with 
Kazakhstan's international obligations.  While UNHCR has not 
yet received a formal response, the MFA has informally 
assured UNHCR that the proper process will be adhered to in 
this case. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA824, KAZAKHSTAN – FORWARD MOVEMENT ON AMENDING MEDIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA824 2008-04-25 10:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9257
OO RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHBW RUEHCI RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHMRE RUEHPOD
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #0824 1161045
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251045Z APR 08 ZEL
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2309
INFO RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ASTANA 000824 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (SECSTATE PASS INSTRUCTIONS) 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SECSTATE PLEASE PASS TO SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM KDEM OSCE KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN - FORWARD MOVEMENT ON AMENDING MEDIA 
LEGISLATION 
 
REF: ASTANA 0613 (NOTAL) 
 
1. (SBU) Pol-Econ Chief met on April 24 with Anastasiya 
Shchegortsova, head of the Information and Culture Ministry's 
Strategic Planning Department, and Bogatoz Kaipova, from the 
Presidential Administration's Domestic Policy Department, to 
discuss Kazakhstan's Madrid commitment to amend the country's 
media legislation by the end of 2008. 
 
2. (SBU) Shchegortsova and Kaipova confirmed to Pol-Econ 
Chief that the Information and Culture Ministry was moving 
forward in establishing a working group on media legislation 
amendments, as Minister Yertysbayev had agreed to do during a 
February 25 meeting with the OSCE (see reftel).  They 
explained that the first working group meeting would be held 
in Astana on May 12.  In addition to the Information and 
Culture Ministry, government participants would include the 
Justice Ministry, Procurator General's Office, and the 
Economy and Budget Planning Ministry.  Shchegortsova and 
Kaipova said that key NGO's in the media field had agreed to 
participate, including Adil Soz, Internews, the Club of 
Editors-in-Chief, the National Association of Broadcasters, 
and the Congress of Journalists -- which had proposed its own 
package of media legislation amendments in 2007.  (Note:  We 
subsequently confirmed with Adil Soz that they had been 
contacted by the Information and Culture Ministry requesting 
the name of their working group participant, though Adil Soz 
had not yet received a formal invitation to the May 12 
meeting.  End Note.) 
 
3. (SBU) Pol-Econ Chief noted that addressing the fundamental 
issues -- including media registration requirements as well 
as decriminalization of libel -- would require not only 
amendments to the law on mass media, but also amendments to 
the criminal and civil codes.  Shchegortsova and Kaipova 
explained that the aim of the working group would be to 
develop a package of amendments to all media-related 
legislation.  They also stressed that while the OSCE would 
not be participating directly in the working group, 
implementing the OSCE's recommendations would be the crux of 
its work.   The Information and Culture Ministry had already 
received a number of amendment proposals from various 
sources, which would be discussed by the working group, they 
added. 
 
4. (SBU) Shchegortsova and Kaipova could not provide details 
on a timeframe for completing a package of amendments.  The 
working group, they contended, would develop a schedule once 
it met.  Kaipova emphasized that while the Information and 
Culture Ministry has the lead on the media legislation 
amendments, the overall effort of implementing the Madrid 
commitments is being coordinated by the Presidential 
Administration's Domestic Policy Department. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA823, KAZAKHSTAN: ADDITIONS TO 2007 INL END USE MONITORING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA823 2008-04-25 09:31 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8373
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #0823 1160931
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 250931Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2308
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0391

UNCLAS ASTANA 000823 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE (BALABANIAN), INL/C, SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCOR KCRM PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: ADDITIONS TO 2007 INL END USE MONITORING 
REPORT 
 
REF: A) STATE 19195 
 
 B) ASTANA 362 
 
1.  In response to Reftel A, Post is providing additional 
information on equipment provided to the GOK. 
 
2.  Computers at the Financial Police Academy.  INL provided 25 
computers to the Financial Police Academy in Astana.  End-use 
monitoring was conducted during training at the Academy in November 
2007.  All computers are being used in a classroom and were in good 
condition.  The computers were also seen by INL representatives 
during a visit to the Academy on April 16, 2008. 
 
3.  Computers at the National Laboratory of Forensics Control.  INL 
provided 16 computers to the National Lab in Almaty.  End-use 
monitoring was conducted in October 2007.  All computers were being 
used and in good condition.  On a recent visit to the Lab, INL 
representatives learned that 3 of the computers are no longer 
operational because of a power surge in the Lab. 
 
4.  Equipment at the Military Institute.  The fiber optic boroscope 
and metric tools were provided to the Military Institute in Almaty 
to provide hands-on training to border guards.  The equipment is in 
working order and is being used.  IOM is building lockable display 
cabinets that will hold such training equipment. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA798, KAZAKHSTAN – DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON DISCOURAGING

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ASTANA798.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA798 2008-04-25 06:32 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0798 1160632
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 250632Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2283
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1529
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0013

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000798 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2018 
TAGS: PREL GG RS KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN - DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON DISCOURAGING 
UPGRADED RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA 
 
REF: (A) STATE 40673 (B) ASTANA 755 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Steven Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Pol-Econ Chief delivered reftel demarche on 
discouraging Russia from upgrading relations with Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia to MFA Americas Department head Talgat 
Kaliyev on April 25.  Kaliyev promised to relay the substance 
to his MFA superiors.  He reminded Pol-Econ Chief that 
Kazakhstan had made its position on Abkhazia clear in MFA 
spokesman Yerzhan Ashikbayev's April 7 statement to the press 
that it was "premature" for Kazakhstan to consider lifting 
CIS sanctions on Abkhazia and that Kazakhstan respects 
Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity (see ref B). 
Kaliyev said that Dmitri Medvedev was expected to visit 
Kazakhstan during May 22-23, which would likely be his first 
trip abroad to a CIS country as Russian president.  In 
preparation, Foreign Minister Tazhin would be visiting Moscow 
during the week of April 28.  Kaliyev opened up and reviewed 
a folder labelled "Consulations with Russian MFA," which 
included information on Kazakhstan's position on Abkhazia -- 
an indication that Tazhin was being prepped to discuss 
Abkhazia when in Moscow. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA797, S) KAZAKHSTAN – DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON UPDATED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA797 2008-04-25 06:07 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

O 250607Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2282
INFO AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY

S E C R E T ASTANA 000797 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, T, SCA, NEA, EUR, EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2033 
TAGS: KNNP PREL PARM KZ KN SY IR
 
SUBJECT: (S) KAZAKHSTAN - DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON UPDATED 
SCHEDULE OF DPRK FLIGHT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN 
 
REF: (A) STATE 43804 (B) ASTANA 673 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Steven Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (S) Pol-Econ Chief delivered reftel demarche regarding the 
latest schedule of a North Korean flight of proliferation 
concern to MFA Americas Department head Talgat Kaliyev on 
April 25.  Kaliyev said he would immediately relay the 
information to the appropriate Kazakhstani government 
agencies.  As previously (see ref B), he indicated he 
expected Kazakhstan would take appropriate action.  Pol-Econ 
Chief asked Kaliyev to provide any information Kazakhstan 
ultimately receives about the flight. 
ORDWAY 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text

Wikileaks

08ASTANA795, KAZAKHSTAN – DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON TURKEY’S CHANGE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA795 2008-04-24 11:08 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0795 1151108
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241108Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2280
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000795 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EEB/IFD/ODF, TREASURY FOR DO/IA/IDP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN - DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON TURKEY'S CHANGE 
OF STATUS AT THE EBRD 
 
REF: STATE 41999 
 
 1. (SBU) On April 24, Poloff delivered reftel demarche 
points on Turkey's EBRD status to MFA Multilateral Economic 
and Humanitarian Cooperation Department head Mursulnaby 
Tuyakbayev.  He was not aware of Turkey's request, and 
thanked poloff for bringing this proposal to their attention 
in advance of the May 18-19 EBRD Board of Governor's meeting. 
 Tuyakbayev appeared willing to support the U.S. position, as 
long as Turkey did not object to this approach.  He told 
poloff that the MFA will discuss this in detail with the 
Ministry of Finance, which has the lead on EBRD issues. 
Tuyakbayev was interested in the reasoning for Turkey's 
request for a change of status and if this change of status 
would be permanent.  Poloff explained that according to the 
EBRD office in Astana, Turkey had asked the organization to 
provide project financing for various economic reform 
activities and that if its status was changed to a country of 
operation, this change could be permanent.  Tuyakbayev said 
that the MFA will inform the Embassy of the Kazakhstani 
government's official position as soon as the issue is 
reviewed interagency. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA782, KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, APRIL 5 – APRIL 18,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA782 2008-04-22 06:21 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4156
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0782/01 1130621
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220621Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2270
INFO RUCPCIM/CIMS NTDB WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0493
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2162
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0394
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0502
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0389

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000782 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
DEPT PASS TO OPIC - BALLINGER 
DEPT PASS TO TDA FOR STEIN, EXIM FOR GLAZER 
DEPT PASS TO AID - EE-PHILLIPS/RUSHING 
TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTRI 
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/MAC/MLONDON, 4201/BISNIS 
USDOC FOR 6110/ITA/TD/BI/RHALPERN 
ANKARA FOR CFC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET EFIN KTDB KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, APRIL 5 - APRIL 18, 
2008 
 
 
ASTANA 00000782  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Summary:  This information is drawn primarily from the 
Kazakhstani local press, and has not been verified for accuracy. 
 
-- Temporary Ban on Wheat Exports 
-- First Hearings on New Competition Law 
-- Social Security of Bazaar Workers to Be Ensured 
-- Economic Statistics for January-March 2008 
-- Crude Export Duty Introduced 
-- Metals Export Duty Proposed 
-- National Sulphur Storage to Be Built 
-- Caspian Energy Hub to Be Built 
-- Energy Statistics for January-March 2008 
 
Temporary Ban on Wheat Exports 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  To better ensure the country's food security, the Government of 
Kazakhstan has banned wheat exports until September 1, 2008.  Flour 
exports are not affected.  In 2007, Kazakhstan harvested over 20.1 
million tons of wheat.  Of the 10 million tons of wheat intended for 
export this year, 7 million tons have already been exported. 
(Interfax-Kazakhstan, April 15) 
 
First Hearings on New Competition Law 
------------------------------------- 
 
3.  The recently formed Competition Agency presented the government 
with the first draft of a new competition law, which will be 
submitted to parliament in November 2008.  According to Competition 
Agency chairman Mazhit Yessenbayev, the new law stipulates the 
agency's statutory independence, a general reduction of state 
interference in market competition, and the substitution of regular 
inspections with market analysis to determine whether company 
practices can be considered fair.  (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda 
newspaper, April 14) 
 
Social Security of Bazaar Workers to Be Ensured 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4.  Minister of Industry and Trade, Vladimir Shkolnik suggested 
amending the Law on Trade Regulation to add provisions imposing 
social taxes and pension payments on bazaar vendors.  According to 
official statistics, as of January 1, 2008, more than 1 million 
people, or approximately 15 percent of the Kazakhstani labor pool, 
are employed in bazaars.  Shkolnik, however, also made reference to 
TASIS survey results indicating that as many as 27 percent of the 
Kazakhstani labor force works in bazaars.  (TV Channel 31, April 8) 
 
Economic Statistics for January-March 2008 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5.  According to Economy and Budget Planning Minister Bakhyt 
Sultanov, Kazakhstan's GDP grew at an annual rate of 5.3% during 
January-March 2008.  The unemployment rate dropped to 6.9%. 
(Interfax-Kazakhstan, April 15) 
 
6.  According to the Financial Supervision Agency, Kazakhstan's 35 
commercial banks earned a net profit of 27.6 billion tenge ($229.1 
million) during January-March, a decrease of 46.8% year-on-year. 
Meanwhile, deposits grew 2.3% and loans dropped 0.1%. (Press Release 
of the Financial Supervision Agency, April 15) 
 
Crude Export Duty Introduced 
---------------------------- 
 
7.  Kazakhstan will introduce a $109.91 per ton crude export duty on 
May 17.  However, companies that pay rent tax will be charged just 
$27.43 per ton.  The new duty does not apply at all to projects 
enjoying a fixed tax regime under their subsoil use contracts (this 
includes TengizChevrOil, Kashagan, and Karachaganak).  Minister of 
Industry and Trade Vladimir Shkolnik said that he does not rule out 
the possibility of repealing the crude export duty in the new tax 
code that is expected to go into effect January 1, 2009.  In view of 
the new crude export duty, KazMunayGas Exploration & Production, a 
KMG subsidiary, will revise its production, finance, and investment 
 
ASTANA 00000782  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
plans.  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, April 17; Liter newspaper, April 9; 
Press Release of EP KMG, April 8) 
 
Metals Export Duty Proposed 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  Vice Minister of Finance Daulet Yergozhin announced that the 
Government of Kazakhstan will establish a new metals export duty by 
the end of April.  It will be lower than that of the new crude 
export duty.  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, April 18) 
 
National Sulphur Storage to Be Built 
------------------------------------ 
 
9.  In 2008, the Caspi Social Entrepreneurial Corporation, the 
Kazakhstan Oil and Gas Institute (KOGI), and TengizChevrOil (T
CO) 
plan to launch a national sulphur storage project in Atyrau province 
(West Kazakhstan).  TCO and Caspi will provide technical support, 
and KOGI will design an economic model.  TCO, the largest producer 
of sulphur in the country, is currently maintaining approximately 9 
million tons of sulphur in open storage.  (Panorama newspaper, April 
11) 
 
Caspian Energy Hub to Be Built 
------------------------------ 
 
10.  The Gulf Finance House (a Bahrain-based Islamic investment 
bank), PFC Energy International, Dunie Stock Energy, the Samruk 
State Asset Management Company, the Kazyna Sustainable Development 
Fund, and the Mangistau Investment Company signed a memorandum to 
build in Aktau a center for training technical personnel for oil 
companies.  The center will include a science and technology park, a 
geophysical laboratory, a renewable energy center, and facilities 
for information technology development and environmental research. 
(Interfax-Kazakhstan, April 10) 
 
 
Energy Statistics for January-March 2008 
---------------------------------------- 
 
11.  According to the National Statistics Agency, Kazakhstan 
produced 29.45 million tons of coal during January-March 2008, an 
increase of 19% year-on-year.  Electricity generation grew 7.6% to 
22.85 billion kilowatt-hours.  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, April 17) 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA779, GOK INCREASES PRESSURE ON TENGHIZCHEVROIL OVER

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA779 2008-04-21 11:52 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0779/01 1121152
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211152Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2267
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0490
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000779 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB 
COMMERCE FOR HUEPER 
ENERGY FOR EKIMOFF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EPET KZ
SUBJECT: GOK INCREASES PRESSURE ON TENGHIZCHEVROIL OVER 
SULFUR 
 
REF: ASTANA 206 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Kazakhstani authorities continue to closely 
scrutinize TenghizChevroil (TCO), which has already paid 
hundreds of millions of dollars in fines in recent years. 
Consortium representatives describe a working environment 
made difficult by government harassment and constant requests 
for information. TCO's most serious problem concerns sulfur 
production and storage.  It has already paid a $300 million 
environmental fine for storing sulfur without official 
permission, and now faces an additional $300 million 
administrative penalty connected to the original fine. 
Chevron CEO David O'Reilly met with President Nazarbayev on 
April 15, with the sulfur issue a primary topic of 
conversation.  End Summary 
 
TCO Under Scrutiny 
------------------ 
 
2. (C) TCO, which is owned by Chevron (50%), KMG (20%), 
ExxonMobil (25%), and LukArco (5%), has been fined by both 
national and regional authorities on numerous occasions in 
the last year. Most significantly, TCO  was fined over $600 
million dollars for storing 2.5 million tons of sulfur 
without official permission.  The fine was later reduced to 
$300 million by an Atyrau regional court.  TCO now faces an 
additional $300 million administrative penalty connected with 
the alleged environmental violations.  On April 15, Chevron 
CEO David O'Reilly met with President Nazarbayev in Astana 
and urged the Kazakhstanis to work towards an equitable 
solution on the sulfur issue.  TCO has also paid a series of 
smaller fines.  For example, the environmental prosecution 
department of the Atyrau Oblast brought environmental charges 
against TCO for excessive gas flaring in 2007, for which TCO 
paid a $12 million fine.  Kazakhstan's Ministry of 
Environment charged TCO with 22 environmental violations 
subject to civil penalties of $1.1 million dollars. 
 
3. (C) In a meeting with Poloff on April 12, Linsi Crain, TCO 
Deputy Manager for Government and Public Affairs, and Mark 
Maurer, TCO Finance Manager, said that interference and 
harassment from Kazakhstani authorities is unrelenting. 
The Kazakhstanis, they said, are looking for every 
opportunity to "find a hole." Maurer stated that TCO receives 
fifteen threatening letters a week. Crain described TCO as 
constantly in reactive mode because of the intense scrutiny. 
Pete Clark, Chevron Eurasian Business Unit Manager for 
Strategic Planning, told Poloff in a separate meeting on 
April 5 that Chevron is in a defensive position at Tenghiz, 
trying to preserve contract sanctity.  Realistically, said 
Clark, Chevron will suffer reduced earnings at Tenghiz, but 
"we are trying to hold off as much as possible." "Every time 
we fix one problem, another arises," he added. 
 
4. (C) Crain, Maurer, and Clark were extremely critical of 
the latest sulfur fines. Clark noted that when O'Reilly met 
with President Nazarbayev last year, Nazarbayev promised to 
instruct Prime Minister Masimov to solve the sulfur conflict. 
 Despite Nazarbayev's promises, the Kazakhstanis have not 
relented on sulfur.  TCO cannot go to the Ministry of Energy 
and Natural Resources for permits on storage, because such 
permits do not even exist. Maurer said that TCO believes that 
it can take a royalty offset for the $300 million 
environmental fine.  The Ministry of Finance, however, 
disagrees.  According to Maurer, TCO may at some point decide 
to challenge the government by taking the offset, or file a 
notice of arbitration. 
 
5. (C) Crain said that TCO sold 2.05 million tons of sulfur 
in 2007, with sales equaling 126% of production and an 
increase of 24% from 2006.  Total sulfur on pads was reduced 
by nearly half a million tons in 2007, and new projects are 
underway to increase sales capacity to three million tons per 
year.  TCO prepares a biweekly report for the Kazakhstanis on 
sulfur, but still has faced accusations that it is not doing 
everything possible to sell its sulfur.  Crain said that TCO 
has enough clients for its sulfur, but faces issues of 
transportation capacity. 
 
6. (C) When asked why TCO is facing such intense oversight, 
Maurer replied that "it is strictly about the money."  Patty 
Graham, ExxonMobil Kazakhstan Government and Public Affairs 
Representative, told Poloff that she has heard the fines are 
linked to the budget concerns of regional governments. Clark 
 
echoed Graham, saying that Tenghiz fines have become an 
essential part of the Atyrau Oblast budget.  Courtney Fowler, 
a partner at PriceWaterhouseCooper (PWC) in Almaty, told 
Poloff on April 6 that once after a large fine against TCO 
was upheld by the Kazakhstani courts she overheard the Atyrau 
Akim saying "Why so much? I only needed $7 million." (Note: 
In the end, all of the $300 million sulfur penalty went to 
the central authorities). 
 
7. (C) Although acknowledging that Chevron's partnership with &#x000
A;Kazakhstan at Tenghiz has been extremely profitable for all 
parties, Clark admitted that the relationship is not without 
cause for occasional concern.  Chevron would like to think 
that it is irreplaceable, he said, because of the value and 
reliability it provides to the project.  Nevertheless, "there 
are ways we could replaced," he said, particularly with the 
project personnel increasingly Kazakhstani.  Chevron will be 
most vulnerable, believes Clark, after completion of second 
stage expansion.  (Comment: We think this is exaggerated. 
KMG does not have the ability to manage this project for the 
foreseeable future.) 
 
8. (C) The story is slightly different from the GOK 
perspective.  Energy Minister Mynbayev has told visiting USG 
delegations and the Ambassador that his ministry will "have 
to get more involved" to resolve the sulfur problem.  Senior 
management at KMG is also reasonably aligned with KMG on this 
issue.  Prime Minister Masimov confirmed to the Ambassador on 
April 17 that President Nazarbayev had promised Dave O'Reilly 
(again) that the sulfur issue will be solved.  Masimov said 
that the President has turned this problem over to him and 
that he has not yet figured out how to resolve it. 
 
The Bigger Picture 
------------------ 
 
9. (C) Westerners with links to Kazakhstan's energy sector 
told Poloff that problems at Tenghiz are part of a broader 
pattern of behavior by the GOK.  PWC's Fowler believes that 
the GOK is "layering one tax after another" on the IOCs and 
using tax and environmental laws as "extortionary tools." She 
assessed the energy investment climate as worsening.  Marla 
Valdez, a partner at the law firm of DentonWildeSapte in 
Almaty, believes that there is "no doubt that the government 
is tightening up."  Patty Graham of ExxonMobil believes that 
the recently announced oil export duties will also place 
additional pressures on western companies, even though it 
will not directly affect companies operating under 
tax-stabilizing contracts.  Attention is sure to shift to the 
IOCs, believes Graham, when local companies begin to bear the 
brunt of the export tax. 
 
10. (C) Nevertheless, no one is yet proclaiming that the sky 
is falling.  Graham sees clear distinctions between 
Kazakhstan and countries such as Venezuela and Russia and 
does not believe Kazakhstan will follow their path.  Valdez 
reported that companies are still coming in to Kazakhstan to 
make acquisitions, describing DentonWildeSapte's acquisitions 
services as "booming."  Fowler noted that Kazakhstan has some 
promising leaders who have the right vision for Kazakhstan's 
energy sector, praising Presidential Administration Head 
Kairat Kelimbetov in particular. 
 
11. (C) The biggest issue is contract sanctity. Despite the 
large numbers involved in the long-running sulfur dispute, 
most of the GOK's actions against the IOCs are based on 
contract provisions that the government construes in their 
favor and the IOCS argue strenuously are clearly in their 
favor.  While the companies are quick to say they will go to 
arbitration, it is in the interest of neither side to let the 
situation get so far out of hand - and an acceptable 
compromise is inevitably found.  More broadly, Masimov has 
told the Ambassador on several occasions that existing 
contracts will be honored as long as Nazarbayev has anything 
to say about it - a view that the companies largely echo. 
However, the contracts are vulnerable to attack in the longer 
run if they are in conflict with subsequent tax and other 
legislation.  Masimov told the Ambassador that his idea is 
that the contracts be "ratified" by the Parliament, thus 
giving them a status superior to contravening legislation and 
a much better chance of surviving post-Nazarbayev scrutiny. 
It is not clear that the companies will eagerly agree to have 
their confidential contracts exposed to parliamentary (and 
public) scrutiny, but the threat of imposing the new tax code 
due to be adopted by the end of the year regardless of 
stabilization clauses could be a very significant bit of 
 
leverage.  Masimov broached this idea with O'Reilly during 
his recent visit. O'Reilly apparently was not expecting this 
approach, and said that he would consult with the company's 
lawyers and provide a response later.  TCO has resisted 
joining EITI because of concerns about publicly revealing 
certain portions of their contract. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
Sulfur at Tenghiz is hardly Kazakhstan's most pressing 
environmental problem, particularly when TCO is making a 
good-faith effort to accelerate pad removal.  With a series 
of extravagant fines and unrelenting pressure, however, the 
GOK risks creating a serious rift with TCO.  While there are 
many factors at play - the populist appeal of taking on the 
IOCs, the budget pressures created by an economic downturn, 
simple greed - a primary cause for conflict the appears to be 
that bureaucratic elements, including the Environmental 
Ministry and Tax Committee, are pursuing their own agendas 
aided by tough interpretations of ambiguous legislation.  The 
GOK leadership must sort out this situation by reducing the 
pain to the oil companies to a manageable level. 
Simultaneously, they have to avoid providing the opposing 
bureaucrats (and the procuracy and financial police lurking 
in the background) with ammunition to accuse them of selling 
out the country or violating the law. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA778, KAZAKHSTAN – POST ENDORSES FY2008 SECTION 1206

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA778 2008-04-21 09:02 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0018
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0778 1120902
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210902Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2266

UNCLAS ASTANA 000778 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN - POST ENDORSES FY2008 SECTION 1206 
PROPOSAL 
 
 1. (SBU) Post fully endorses the FY2008 proposal for Section 
1206 funding for Kazakhstan that was submitted by CENTCOM. 
The funding is aimed at providing Kazakhstan with the 
capability to conduct counterterrorist operations,  deploy 
forces, and react to threats in the northern Caspian Sea, 
which is the site of significant and expanding oil and gas 
infrastructure.  The 1206 proposal addresses priority needs 
and reinforces other ongoing assistance and security efforts. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA769, AMBASSADOR OPENS AMERICAN CORNER, MEETS WITH KEY

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA769 2008-04-18 12:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0020
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0769/01 1091235
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181235Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2263
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0488

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000769 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2018 
TAGS: PGOV ECON SOCI KZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR OPENS AMERICAN CORNER, MEETS WITH KEY 
LEADERS IN AKTOBE 
 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Steven Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) The Ambassador attended the official opening of the 
eighth American Corner in Kazakhstan on April 8 at the Aktobe 
branch of the Republican Science Technical Library.  While in 
Aktobe, he also held meetings with oblast (regional) and city 
officials, NGO's representatives, and local businessmen. 
Aktobe appears to be pinning its economic development hopes 
on natural resources.  Business leaders complained about 
poorly-trained personnel, low educational standards, and 
problems with government regulation.  The Aktobe Women's 
Support Center, an NGO, is cooperating well with local 
authorities on issues of domestic violence, human 
trafficking, and protecting children's rights.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Lacking Infrastructure, Aktobe Banks on Natural Resources 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
2. (C) Having broken with Soviet-era revenue streams from 
agriculture and livestock, Aktobe oblast (i.e., region) 
officials now believe that their economic prosperity is 
ultimately linked to the efficient exploitation of their 
natural resources, which include significant deposits of oil 
and gas.  According to Oblast Deputy Akim Zhetkergen 
Oralmagambekov, wheat is still cultivated on over 6.5 million 
acres of land in the oblast's northeast, but most of the 
agricultural land surrounding the city of Aktobe has long 
been fallow.  Although plans have been discussed for the 
resuscitation of part of the agricultural sector, more 
emphasis is being placed on the extraction of minerals, 
including copper, nickel, gold, chromium and silicon.  Like 
all of Kazakhstan, the rapidly rising cost of living and 
commodities and looming threat of increased inflation rates 
weigh heavily on Aktobe officials.  According to Aktobe City 
Akim Serik Nokin, the sub-prime crisis has had an impact on 
local economic growth.  He noted specifically the relative 
unavailability of credit, which has impacted several 
unfinished construction sites.  Despite these challenges, 
Oralmagambekov insisted that in Aktobe oblast "we are 
developing quickly." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Businesses Face Obstacles, Seek Partner in Advocacy 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador met with a group of Aktobe business 
leaders, including a representative of the Aktobe branch of 
the Atameken business association.  The business leaders 
agreed that despite significant resource wealth, the economic 
development of Aktobe is hindered by several factors, 
including a lack of skilled laborers, irregular governmental 
regulation, poorly developed infrastructure (including poor 
roads and deficient power generation), and inefficient 
customs practices.  Acknowledging the need to bring issues to 
the attention of the government, the group was divided in 
their vision as to how best this could be achieved.  They 
also were apprehensive about rising inflation rates, which 
have for some increased production costs by 20 percent over 
the past year.  Rising oil prices, proposed export tariffs 
and export restrictions, and growing food costs have curbed 
their optimism. 
 
4. (C) According to the businessmen, a lack of qualified 
specialists and technicians, as well as an ineffective system 
of educational accreditation, is impacting economic 
development.  Absent rigorous accreditation standards like 
those maintained during the Soviet period, Kazakhstan has 
witnessed an increase in the number of questionable 
degree-offering institutions, they maintained.  Relaxed 
standards and easily purchased degrees have shaken industry 
confidence in the ability of the system to prepare qualified 
personnel.  According to Anatoly Kunevich, President of Caspi 
Neft TME, verifying credentials is nearly impossible, making 
it easy for many job-seekers to simply lie about their 
qualifications from the start.  Tleumurat Darkhanuly of 
KazTechnoGas said he was reluctant to use local employment 
agencies and increasingly turned to the internet to outsource 
work such as financial and legal services. 
 
5. (C) Inconsistent government regulations continue to 
challenge business development. According to Kunevich, he has 
still not recovered his initial investment made nine years 
ago, yet his enterprise has been increasingly subjected to 
inspections from government agencies who believe it is 
profitable.  "The government's appetite is growing, and 
everyone checks us, especially before January 1" said 
Kunevich, indirectly implying official corruption.  The 
 
businessmen collectively acknowledged the need for effective 
business advocacy, arguing that those who regulate it from 
above do not properly understand the market. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Small But Real Victories For Civil Society 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) At a press conference hosted by the Aktobe Akimat, 
reporters
and officials made clear their curiosity about the 
opening of the American Corner, the availability of English 
language instruction, other possible U.S. regional 
priorities, and their general perception of decreased levels 
of U.S. funding and interest in Kazakhstan.  Several locals 
inquired about the fate of relations between the U.S. and 
Kazakhstan following 2008 U.S. presidential elections. 
(Note: The audience laughed heartily when the Ambassador 
assured them that the only certainty was that there would be 
a new president.  End Note.)  Journalist Bayan Sarsembina 
from Zhas Alash made an indirect plea for continued support 
of independent media, inquiring about future programs that 
the U.S. government would provide similar to the previous 
independent journalism seminars.  Noting "the situation we 
are currently in here," Sarsembina criticized the Kazakhstani 
political process and one-party parliament asking if in light 
of its "murderous" treatment of the opposition Kazakhstan had 
the "moral right" to serve as Chair of the OSCE.  (Note: 
Later that day, Aktobe City Akim Nokin and Deputy Oblast Akim 
Oralmagambekov remarked to the Ambassador on Sarsembina's 
bravado, saying with a wink that the authorities have 
ultimately "found it easier to let journalists talk" rather 
than to trying to impede them.  End Note.) 
 
7. (U) Participating in a round table discussion with the 
Ambassador at the Aktobe Women's Support Center, both local 
officials and center staff discussed their work to prevent 
domestic violence and human trafficking and protect the 
rights of children and migrant laborers.  The Center 
currently receives funding from the Soros and Counterpart 
Foundations, as well the U.S. government.  Operating 
primarily as a community-based resource and training center, 
it has also demonstrated unusual success by initiating an 
ongoing partnership and collaboration with regional 
authorities, including the Transport Police and the Aktobe 
Oblast Department of Internal Affairs.  Working closely with 
the authorities, the Women's Support Center maintains a 
hotline and offers psychological counseling and 
rehabilitation services for victims of trafficking and 
violence. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Street-Level Observations Indicate A Society In Transition 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
8. (SBU) The ethnically diverse city of Aktobe is home to 
Russian, Kazakh, and -- increasingly -- Chinese speakers. 
Russian remains omnipresent, but Kazakh is increasingly 
spoken on the streets and -- according to  Deputy Oblast Akim 
Oralmagambekov -- in the halls of government.  Religion, 
Oralmagambetov assured the Ambassador, does not play a major 
role in Aktobe.  More specifically, he said that there were 
no problems with religious extremism, but the city was 
constructing a new mosque in the city center in response to 
increased demand for places of worship.  According to 
Oralmagambetov, a new Orthodox church is also being built 
across the street from the mosque, but we did not see signs 
of its construction.  The bulk of the infrastructure of 
Aktobe clearly dated from Soviet times, much of it in 
significant disrepair.  There were a few new construction 
sites, and government facilities visited, including the 
Pedagogical Institute and City Administration, were in good 
condition. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA768, KAZAKHSTAN AND INDIA SEEK TO REVIVE BILATERAL TIES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA768 2008-04-18 12:11 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1779
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0768/01 1091211
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181211Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2260
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0485
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0042

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000768 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2018 
TAGS: PREL ECON ETRD KZ IN
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN AND INDIA SEEK TO REVIVE BILATERAL TIES 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Steven Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and India 
started off strongly following Kazakhstani independence, but 
the momentum has slowed since then.   Both sides appear to be 
interested in reviving ties, and President Nazarbayev is 
expected to visit to India in November -- his first trip 
there in six years.   During the April 7-10 visit to 
Kazakhstan of Indian Vice President Ansari, the two sides had 
cordial discussions, but no agreements were signed. 
Kazakhstan-India trade has increased significantly in recent 
years, but from a very low level.   Trade barriers include 
the high cost of goods transportation due to a lack of viable 
overland trade routes.  Thus far, Kazakhstan and India have 
not made headway in developing bilateral mil-mil cooperation. 
 On a more positive note, cultural and people-to-people 
contacts are increasing.  We believe that, especially in 
comparison with Russia, the U.S., China, and the European 
Union, India will remain of only limited importance in 
Kazakhstan's strategic vision.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Kazakhstan-India Relations: Quick Start, Lost Momentum 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
2. (C) Kazakhstan-India bilateral relations got off to a 
quick start following Kazakhstan's December 1991 declaration 
of independence, but the momentum appears to have slowed 
since then -- with Kazakhstan emphasizing ties to the North 
(Russia), West (Europe and the U.S.), and East (China), over 
those to the South.  India was, in fact, among the first 
nations to recognize Kazakhstani independence, and President 
Nazarbayev made a state visit to New Delhi in February 1992 
to formally establish bilateral diplomatic relations. 
Nazarbayev made two subsequent state visits to India, first 
in December 1996 and again in February 2002, when he endorsed 
India's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council.  However, Nazarbayev has not been back to Delhi in 
over six years. 
 
3. (C) During a February 11 meeting in Astana, Foreign 
Minister Tazhin told visiting Assistant Secretary Boucher 
that India, with its vast population and burgeoning economic 
growth, held real potential for Kazakhstan.  The Kazakhstani 
government, he explained, hoped to revitalize ties with New 
Delhi in the coming year, including through a "state visit." 
It was subsequently announced in April that Nazarbayev will 
visit India in November. 
 
4. (C) As a prelude, Indian Vice President Mohammad Ansari -- 
who also serves as Chairman of the upper house of India's 
parliament -- visited Kazakhstan during April 7-10 together 
with an Indian parliamentary delegation, at the invitation of 
Kazakhstani Senate Chairman Tokayev.  Ansari met with 
President Nazarbayev, Prime Minister Masimov, and Foreign 
Minister Tazhin, and addressed the Kazakhstani parliament. 
According to the presidential press service, Nazarbayev and 
Ansari discussed expanding cooperation in economics, trade, 
and information technology, and strengthening 
inter-parliamentary ties.  They also touched on oil and gas 
cooperation, including regarding the Satpayev oil block on 
the Caspian shelf.  Ansari thanked Nazarbayev for 
Kazakhstan's role in assisting India in getting observer 
status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).   In 
addition to his government meetings in Astana, Ansari also 
visited Almaty, where he was awarded an honorary doctorate by 
Al-Farabi University.  In a speech at Al-Farabi, Ansari 
stressed the inter-connections between Central and South 
Asia.  Indian Embassy diplomat George Raju told us that while 
Ansari was received warmly by the Kazakhstani government, 
there were no agreements signed, and no major projects were 
discussed in any detail. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Commercial Ties Growing -- But From A Low Level 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5. (SBU) During the Ansari visit, the sides agreed to set up 
an experts working group to explore ways to increase trade 
and commerce.   Indian Embassy officials told us they see the 
potential for significant trade expansion.  In fact, 
Kazakhstan-India trade turnover increased by 76 percent from 
2005 to 2006, from $120 million to $210 million.  However, to 
put this into context, the $210 million figure represented 
just 0.3 percent of Kazakhstan's overall 2006 trade turnover 
of $62 billion.  (Note: Looking at this from the Indian 
perspective, Kazakhstan was not even among India's top 50 
 
ASTANA 00000768  002 OF 003 
 
 
trade partners.  End Note.)  By contrast, Russia, China, and 
the EU accounted for approximately 80 percent of Kazakhstan's 
trade.  In addition, in 2006, Indian investment in Kazakhstan 
was a miniscule $16 million. 
 
6.  (C) The Indian Embassy admitted to us that there are a 
n
umber of barriers to increased bilateral trade, including 
insufficient information about each country's markets, 
language barriers, and the high cost of goods transportation 
due to a lack of viable overland trade routes. Commercial 
relations are also hampered by lack of an Indian chamber of 
commerce or similar organization in Kazakhstan that could 
relay information about Indian companies and lobby for Indian 
business interests.  Indian companies, not surprisingly, 
complain about unpredictable and "arbitrary" treatment by 
Kazakhstani tax and customs authorities.  For instance, in 
2006, Larsen and Toubro, India's largest engineering and 
construction conglomerate, ended their operations in 
Kazakhstan, allegedly because of persistent problems 
encountered with red tape and corruption. 
 
7. (SBU) India is not a meaningful player in Kazakhstan's oil 
and gas sector, though India's ONGC Videsh Ltd. has attempted 
to secure investment deals on Caspian offshore blocks and has 
held talks with KazMunayGaz (KMG) and Kazakhstani officials 
on oil transportation issues.  Indian Oil Corp., Turkey's 
Calik Energy, and KMG are also negotiating to jointly build 
an oil refinery in Ceyhan, Turkey.   The Indian Ambassador to 
Kazakhstan has repeatedly stated that India is interested in 
expanding its ties with Kazakhstan in the civilian nuclear 
power sector.  Kazakhstan holds the world's second largest 
reserves of uranium -- a resource of great interest to India. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Mil-Mil Ties:  Lost Opportunities 
--------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Though Nazarbayev and Ansari reportedly also discussed 
"military-technical cooperation," Kazakhstan and India have 
not managed to succeed in establishing meaningful mil-mil 
ties.  The Indian Embassy told us that Kazakhstani Defense 
Minister Akhmetov, Defense Chief General Altynbayev, and Navy 
Chief Rear Admiral Komratov had been invited to visit India 
from February 15-18.  (Note:  This information has been 
reported separately via DOD channels.  End Note.)   The visit 
was to take place during a military equipment exposition, 
which was attended by more than 50 national delegations.  The 
Indian Defense Ministry had made a special effort to get a 
meeting between Akhmetov and Indian Defense Minister Antony. 
However, two days before the scheduled visit, Kazakhstani 
Defense Ministry officials informed the Indian side that 
Akhmetov had decided to travel to Russia instead. 
Altynbayev's staff separately informed the Indians that he 
could also not attend.  (Note:  Once Akhmetov declined, 
Altynbayev may have had to back out as well for Kazakhstani 
protocol reasons.  End Note.) 
 
9. (C) The Indians feel snubbed since this is the second time 
that a senior Kazakhstani defense delegation has cancelled a 
visit recently.  In August 2007, Deputy Defense Minister 
Sembinov cancelled his trip to India with no explanation.  At 
this time, we believe there is little enthusiasm on either 
side for pushing forward with a Kazakhstan-India bilateral 
security program. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Cultural, Educational, and People-to-People Ties 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
10. (SBU) There is brighter news on other fronts.  Cultural, 
educational, and people-to-people ties between Kazakhstan and 
India are modest, but appear to be increasing.  Indian 
Embassy officials estimate that there are currently 2500 
Indian nationals in Almaty (including up to 1000 Indian 
medical students), about 100 in Astana, and about 40-50 in 
the Temirtau-Karaganda region working for the steel producer 
ArcelorMittal.  Astana's Eurasian National University and 
Almaty's Al-Farabi University have started offering Hindi 
classes in their oriental languages departments and have 
established exchange programs with India.  In March, the 
first center for Kazakh language and studies opened at 
Delhi's Jamia Milia Islamia University. 
 
11. (SBU) In Kazakhstan's larger cities, we have noticed a 
growing interest in Indian traditions, including vegetarian 
cuisine, yoga, and dance. The Indian government established 
an Indian Cultural Center (ICC) in 1992, which was moved from 
Almaty to Astana in January 2008.  The ICC offers regular 
yoga classes, cooking demonstrations, Indian cinema, and 
Hindi language classes. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000768  003 OF 003 
 
 
12. (SBU) Kazakhstan's principal airline, Air Astana, offers 
twice a week service between Almaty to Delhi, though at 
inconvenient hours.  Talks are underway to increase service 
to three times per week.  We have observed that passengers on 
this route are mainly Kazakhstani tourists, including 
religious pilgrims (Hare Krishna and Sai Baba followers), and 
yoga enthusiasts.  There are also Kazakhstani vendors who buy 
Indian goods to sell in Kazakhstan.  Indians coming to 
Kazakhstan on the flight appear to be either business people 
or students. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
13. (C) While there appears to be interest on both sides in 
expanding bilateral relations across a number of fronts, 
India will likely continue to play a limited role in 
Kazakhstan's strategic vision.   Lack of overland trade 
routes puts India at a huge commercial disadvantage, 
especially relatively to China.  Geographic realties also 
make it unlikely that meaningful quantities of Kazakhstani 
oil and gas can be moved to the Indian market.  The simple 
fact of the matter is that geo-politics, history, mutual 
commercial benefit, and the aspirations of the Kazakhstani 
leadership portend a continued focus on Kazakhstani ties to 
the North, West, and East, rather than South.  End Comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA767, KAZAKHSTAN: NEW LEGISLATION THREATENS RELIGIOUS

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA767 2008-04-18 11:52 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1752
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHMRE RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #0767/01 1091152
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181152Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2256
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0481
RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1902

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2018 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KIRF KDEM PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NEW LEGISLATION THREATENS RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 113 (NOTAL) (B) ASTANA 411 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Steven Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) On April 2, a group of parliamentarians introduced 
draft amendments to Kazakhstan's laws governing religious 
organizations.  Among other things, the amendments would 
require all religious groups in the country to re-register 
under more restrictive procedures; limit the activities of 
smaller groups; establish a quota system and require local 
government consent for missionaries; and prohibit all 
financial contributions from foreign or anonymous donors. 
Though the Ministry of Justice claimed that the amendments 
are purely a parliamentary initiative, their introduction 
follows a coordinated campaign by the Ministry of Justice to 
increase political and public support for changes to the law, 
through increased public pressure and criticism of 
non-traditional religious groups and "sects."  The Mazhilis 
conducted a public hearing on the legislation on April 17. 
According to participants, the legislation appears to be on 
the fast track for approval, and deputies showed little 
interest in inviting outside inp 
ut or review.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION TIGHTENS GOVERNMENT CONTROL 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2. (SBU) On April 2, six Mazhilis deputies and two senators 
introduced draft amendments to Kazakhstan's laws governing 
religious organizations. Among other things, the amendments 
would: 
 
-- establish new procedures for registering a religious 
organization, and divide such organizations into local 
religious organizations (formed within one administrative 
unit upon the initiative of at least 10 adult citizens) and 
central religious organizations (formed upon the initiative 
of local religious organizations registered on the territory 
of more than half of the oblasts for at least 10 years); 
 
-- create a new category of entity called a "religious 
group", subject to a simplified registration procedure but 
sharply restricted in its activities.  Such groups would be 
permitted to engage in religious activities only among 
members of the group, and would be forbidden from producing 
religious literature or products, maintaining facilities open 
to the public for religious worship or meetings, or preaching 
and teaching outside of the group; 
 
-- require all existing religious organizations (or 
organizations involved in religious activities, but not 
currently registered as a religious organization) to 
re-register under the new law within two years from the date 
it becomes effective; 
 
-- prohibit all financial and other contributions from 
foreigners and anonymous donors, and require religious 
organizations to receive contributions with the assistance of 
cash registers and with the participation of local government 
officials; (Note: This provision would prohibit the common 
practice of collecting tithes by passing a collection plate 
during a church service.  End note.) 
 
-- require religious organizations to provide the government 
with information about the fundamentals of the religion and 
its associated practices, including information about the 
history of the religion, forms and methods of its operation, 
its perspective on marriage, family relations, education, and 
the health of its followers, and restrictions for its members 
and priests concerning human rights and liabilities; 
 
-- establish that registration of a religious group 
previously unknown in Kazakhstan may be suspended for up to 
six months; 
 
-- in the event the government denies registration, require 
that the government provide written justification for the 
denial and establish a right of appeal to court; 
 
-- prohibit entities not registered as a religious 
organization from conducting religious activities, unless the 
entity is formed by a registered religious organization 
(Note: According to a comment in the text of the draft 
legislation, this provision is aimed at various public funds 
 
ASTANA 00000767  002 OF 004 
 
 
and charities that are actually involved in religious 
education and preaching.  End note.) 
 
-- establish that the relationship between the government and 
religious organizations will take into account the influence 
of the religious organization on the development of spiritual 
and cultural traditions of the people of Kazakhstan; 
 
-- establish that religious organizations may be subject to 
theological analysis by representatives of religious 
organizations, public organizations, government agencies, 
theologians, lawyers, and other experts upon request by a 
citizen or a government agency; 
 
-- define missionary activity as religious-educational 
activity on behalf of a religious organization beyond the 
territory of its activity (the region where t
he organization 
is registered), and establish a yearly quota system for 
missionaries, taking into account the views of local 
government agencies on the number and affiliation of 
missionaries that should be permitted in their territory; 
 
-- prohibit religious organizations that force a split in 
families, hinder high school education, damage the morale or 
health of citizens, or force citizens to give their property 
to the organization or its leaders 
 
-- prohibit religious organizations that force citizens to 
get involved in their operations or hinder them from 
quitting, including through the use of force or threat of 
force, dependence, hypnosis, or deceit; 
 
-- require written consent from the parents or guardians of 
underage children for their participation in any religious 
gatherings or groups; 
 
-- establish procedures for registering a religious 
educational organization; 
 
-- require that the full and short name of a religious 
organization must contain an indication of its religion, and 
a religious organization must use its full name during its 
operations; 
 
-- prohibit religious organizations from conducting worship 
services or religious rites and ceremonies in private 
dwellings, except in cases of ritual need where the rights 
and interests of neighbors are observed; 
 
-- require local government authorization for the 
construction of a religious facility; 
 
-- require expert theological review of all religious books 
and materials, and restrict their public distribution to 
public places, public transport, public streets, and during 
visits to citizens' dwellings at the initiative and approval 
of the citizens; 
 
-- significantly increase fines and penalties for violating 
the law. 
 
3. (SBU) According to Ninel Fokina, chairperson of the Almaty 
Helsinki Committee, the legislation represents a significant 
and aggressive restriction of religious freedom.  She said 
the legislation is part of a trend throughout the CIS and 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization to tighten control over 
religious groups.  In her analysis, the legislation is aimed 
at evangelical Protestants, Jehovah's Witnesses, 
Scientologists, and Hare Krishnas, all of whom have been 
singled out for criticism by various government officials and 
the media over the past few years.  She predicted that most 
of these groups will be pushed into the new "religious group" 
category, which essentially prohibits proselytizing, and only 
traditional groups such as state-approved Islamic groups, the 
Russian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, and the Jewish 
community will be able to gain religious organizations 
status. Fokina speculated that a few of the more onerous 
provisions may be dropped before final passage to pacify 
critics. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
GOVERNMENT DENIES IT IS BEHIND THE AMENDMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) On April 11, Ardak Doszhan, the new chairman of the 
Religious Issues Committee in the Ministry of Justice, told 
us that these amendments were drafted and introduced by 
members of parliament, not the government.  He claimed that 
the Ministry of Justice was not involved in drafting or 
 
ASTANA 00000767  003 OF 004 
 
 
proposing the legislation. (Comment: Doszhan's claim 
contradicts earlier statements from deputy chairman of the 
Religious Issues Committee Amanbek Mukhasov, who told us that 
the Religious Issues Committee was drafting legislation and 
arguing for its inclusion on the legislative agenda this 
year.  Ministry of Justice officials in Shymkent also told us 
last month that the Ministry of Justice was working on new 
legislation.  End Comment.) 
 
5. (SBU) Doszhan explained that members of parliament rarely 
introduce legislation themselves, but there are special 
procedures allowing them to do so.  In accordance with these 
procedures, he explained that the Cabinet reviewed the 
legislation and offered general approval, with some 
reservations.  (Note: The draft amendments were accompanied 
by a comment signed by Prime Minister Masimov that included a 
few technical reservations, but offered "general support" for 
the draft law.  End note.)  He said that the Religious Issues 
Committee will function as an expert during the legislative 
process, and will present the government's viewpoint and 
reservations. He said the government was still in the process 
of forming its viewpoint. Doszhan referred questions 
concerning timing and process to the Mazhilis, and told us 
that parliament is responsible for deciding whether to submit 
the legislation to the OSCE for expert review. 
 
------------------------------------- 
MOMENTUM BUILDING OVER SEVERAL MONTHS 
------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Despite Doszhan's position that the amendments are 
the result of a parliamentary initiative, the Ministry of 
Justice and other supporters have been building public and 
political support for new restrictions over the past several 
months.  The legislation follows the December 2007 adoption 
of a Ministry of Justice program that specifically called for 
new legislation to restrict missionaries and nontraditional 
religious groups, a January 2008 speech by President 
Nazarbayev criticizing foreign missionaries and calling for 
new legislation to stop "religious radicalism" and extremism, 
and a February and March 2008 surge in negative media 
coverage of non-traditional religious groups, which was 
consistent with the educational aims of the Ministry of 
Justice program. (Refs A, B) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
LEGISLATION ON TRACK FOR QUICK PASSAGE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Fokina attended an April 17 public hearing organized 
by the Mazhilis to discuss the legislation.  She described 
the public hearing as carefully orchestrated, and attended by 
several NGOs, previously unknown to her, who claimed to 
represent victims of religious extremism and sects. She 
described most deputies as very aggressive in their support 
of the legislation and very uninterested in considering 
international norms. She asked deputies for the opportunity 
to provide outside expertise and analysis of the legislation, 
and asked how long she would have to provide such an 
analysis.  According to Fokina, the deputies told her that it 
was too late. In her analysis, the legislation is on track 
for passage within one month. 
 
8. (C) OSCE Human Dimension Officer Eugenia Benigni and 
Political Adviser to the EU Special Representative for 
Central Asia Jens Beikuefner also attended the hearing and 
shared Fokina's characterization of the event. Benigni spoke 
at the hearing and encouraged the deputies to submit the 
legislation to ODIHR for its review, though the deputies made 
no commitment to do so.  According to Fokina and Beikuefner, 
the deputies agreed to create a working group for further 
discussi
on of the legislation, though both believe that only 
a few deputies were genuinely interested in further 
discussion and input. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (C) Kazakhstan often prides itself on its religious 
freedom record and tradition of inter-faith tolerance.  This 
legislation, if adopted in its current form, would severely 
restrict the freedom of evangelical Christians, Jehovah's 
Witnesses, Hare Krishnas, and other "non-traditional" groups, 
and would formalize what critics such as Fokina already 
allege:  that inter-faith tolerance in Kazakhstan applies 
only to certain favored traditional religious groups. 
Supporters of this legislation knew it would be 
controversial, and have developed significant momentum 
 
ASTANA 00000767  004 OF 004 
 
 
through a careful political and public relations campaign. 
The government may be willing to drop a few provisions in 
order to show moderation and pacify critics. Indeed, 
supporters likely orchestrated the legislation's introduction 
by individual parliamentarians in order to take pressure off 
the government and give it room to maneuver.  We believe it 
will take sustained engagement by us and our like-minded 
partners to ensure that the most objectionable provisions are 
dropped.  End Comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA760, LIFESTYLES OF THE KAZAZHSTANI LEADERSHIP

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ASTANA760.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA760 2008-04-17 10:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1604
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #0760/01 1081035
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171035Z APR 08 ZEL
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2248
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0478
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0110
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2159
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0130
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1899

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000760 

SIPDIS 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADD "CLASSIFIED BY" LINE 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KZ
SUBJECT: LIFESTYLES OF THE KAZAZHSTANI LEADERSHIP 

ASTANA 00000760 001.4 OF 003 


CLASSIFIED BY POL/ECON CHIEF STEVEN FAGIN, REASONS 1.4 
(B) AND (D) 

------- 
Summary 
------- 

1. (C) Kazakhstan's political elites appear to enjoy typical 
hobbies -- such as travel, horseback riding, and skiing. Not 
surprisingly, however, they are able to indulge in their 
hobbies on a grand scale, whether flying Elton John to 
Kazakhstan for a concert or trading domestic property for a 
palace in the United Arab Emirates. This cable recounts 
several instances in which Embassy officers have learned of, 
or witnessed, the recreational habits of Kazakhstan's 
leaders. End Summary. 

-------------- 
Sun and Horses 
-------------- 

2. (C) President Nazarbayev, like many of his countrymen, has 
a strong affinity for horses. In 2007, emboff visited the 
presidential horse farm with the daughter of the farm's 
manager. The farm is located on the outskirts of Astana in a 
residential area, but is surrounded by a high-fence and 
security guards. Inside the gates are a large stable, indoor 
and outdoor riding arenas, and a clubhouse with a pool table, 
sauna, and exercise room. Emboff toured the stable and saw 
approximately forty horses from various parts of the world. 
Emboff's companion told him that Nazarbayev visits the horse 
farm on occasion, though not too frequently. She said that 
Nazarbayev's wife -- Sara Nazarbayeva -- never accompanies 
him, but claimed that sometimes his "second wife" comes to 
the horse farm. (Comment: Most Kazakhstanis are familiar 
with the rumor that Nazarbayev has a "second wife," a former 
airline stewardess, who is said by some to reside in London. 
More recently, there have been whispers that Nazarbayev has 
yet a "third wife," a former beauty queen. We have no 
concrete information about either relationship, although 
Taszhargan, an opposition newspaper, printed a sympathetic 
article about Sara Nazarbayeva which expounded on her status 
as Nazarbayev's "co-wife." End Comment.) 

3. (C) Nazarbayev is also fond of traveling to warmer climes 
in the region. The UAE Ambassador told emboff that Nazarbayev 
had traded property in Borovoe -- a mountainous resort area 
of Kazakhstan north of Astana and sometimes likened to 
Switzerland -- for a "palace" in the Emirates. He did not 
make clear whether the transaction was a permanent 
arrangement or only a temporary one. The head of Turkey's 
liaison office in Astana, Orhan Isik, told emboff that 
Nazarbayev has a mansion in Antaliya, which he visits 4-5 
times a year. Isik claimed that Nazarbayev received the 
property as a gift in the early 1990's and now plans to use 
part of the land for the construction of a luxury hotel. 

------------------------ 
Dancing at the Nightclub 
------------------------ 

4. (C) On March 7, two days after his trip to the U.S. was 
cancelled, Prime Minister Masimov was spotted by emboff at 
Chocolat, one of Astana's trendiest nightclubs. Masimov 
entered at approximately 11:30 pm, accompanied by 
Presidential Administration head Kairat Kelimbetov, Astana 
mayor Askar Mamin, three middle-aged Kazakh women (presumably 
their wives), and a security detail. Although the club 
offers a VIP area, Masimov chose to sit at a table in full 
view of all of the club's patrons. Emboff lingered close to 
Masimov's group and saw several bottles of alcohol on the 
table. (Note: Another emboff had seen the group drinking 
earlier in the evening at a cigar bar at the Radisson Hotel, 
which is located in the same complex as Chocolat. End Note.) 
Masimov led his companions on to Chocolat's dance floor soon 
after their arrival. The dance floor holds approximately 100 
people, and at the time perhaps 50 patrons were dancing. 
However, Masimov himself chose to dance on an empty stage 
above the dance floor. His companions quickly tired but 
Masimov remained, dancing alone and animatedly on the stage 
for another 15-20 minutes. At approximately 1:00 am, Masimov 
and his retinue left the club. 

------------------------- 
Skiing with the Oligarchs 
------------------------- 

5. (C) In September 2007, Kazakhstani oligarch Aleksandr 
Mashkevich -- the co-founder of metals and mining giant 
Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation and, according to 

ASTANA 00000760 002.4 OF 003 


CLASSIFIED BY POL/ECON CHIEF STEVEN FAGIN, REASONS 1.4 
(B) AND (D) 

Forbes magazine, the 334th wealthiest man in the world -- 
hosted a dinner at his house in Almaty for two visiting U.S. 
congressmen. Only two Kazakhstanis attended the event, State 
Secretary Kanat Saudabayev and his assistant. Judging from 

SIPDIS 
the friendly banter between Saudabayev and Mashkevich, the 
two have a quite cordial personal relationship. Mashkevich 
told a lengthy anecdote about a ski vacation that he and 
Saudabayev had taken together in Europe. 

6. (C) Saudabayev had hosted a codel
at that same Almaty 
residence in 2005, without Mashkevich in attendance. At that 
time, when the Ambassador asked Saudabayev whose house it 
was, he would only say that it belonged to "a friend." 
Saudabayev has twice hosted visiting USG officials for a meal 
at Mashkevich's Astana residence -- both times without 
Mashkevich. It is not clear what Mashkevich is spending his 
billions on, but it is certainly not culinary talent. On all 
four occasions the Ambassador has eaten at one of his houses, 
the menu has been similar and focused on beshparmak (boiled 
meat and noodles) and plov. The wait staff appeared to be 
graduates of a Soviet cafeteria training academy. The wine, 
at least, was somewhat upscale with reasonably good French 
vintage bottles uncorked for the guests. The Astana 
residence has wooden plaques on the doors that would fit in 
nicely in a Wyoming hunting lodge but are somewhat out of 
touch with the upscale "Euro-remont" that is so popular among 
the Kazakhstani elite. 

------------------------------- 
Private Concerts with the Stars 
------------------------------- 

7. (C) In 2007, President Nazarbayev's son-in-law, Timur 
Kulibayev, celebrated his 41st birthday in grand style. At a 
small venue in Almaty, he hosted a private concert with some 
of Russia's biggest pop-stars. The headliner, however, was 
Elton John, to whom he reportedly paid one million pounds for 
this one-time appearance. (Note: The British Ambassador 
relayed a slightly different story, with an unknown but 
obviously well-heeled friend arranging and paying for Sir 
Elton's gig. End Comment.) There have been separate 
reports that Nelly Furtado performed at the August 2007 
birthday bash for Kulibayev's wife, Dinara Nazarbayeva. 
Kulibayev also appears willing to spend his fortune on 
others. According to Turkish diplomat Isik, when the 
Kempinski group recently built luxury villas in Bodrum, 
Turkey, Kulibayev bought up a number of them -- at a cost of 
4-5 million dollars each -- and doled them out as gifts to 
friends and family. 

----------------------- 
Sports and Politics Mix 
----------------------- 

8. (C) Sports and politics mixed seamlessly in Almaty on 
April 2, when some of Kazakhstan's most prominent political 
figures participated in the Beijing Olympics torch relay. 
Torchbearers included President Nazarbayev, Presidential 
Administration business affairs head Bolat Utemuratov, Nur 
Otan party first deputy chairman Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, and 
Agency for the Regulation of Natural Monopolies head Mazhit 
Yesenbayev. All of these bigwigs, except Nazarbayev himself, 
could justify their participation in the relay based not on 
their high-ranking political offices, but rather on their 
prominent official positions in the Kazakhstani sports world. 
Utemeratov just happens to head Kazakhstan's Tennis 
Federation, while Dzhakysbekov chairs the Football Federation 
-- a position previously held by ex-Nazarbayev son-in-law 
Rakhat Aliyev. Yesenbayev heads the Judo Federation. 
KazMunayGaz chairman Uzakbay Karabalin, who heads the Boxing 
Federation, and Nazarbayev son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, who 
heads the Golf Federation, also shared in the glory of 
carrying the Olympic torch. One prominent sport federation 
president who missed the torch call was Defense Minister 
Daniyal Akhmetov. He is head of the scandal-ridden Cycling 
Federation that sponsored a team in last year's Tour de 
France which flunked the drug test. 

----------------------------------- 
Relaxation the Good, Old Soviet Way 
----------------------------------- 

9. (C) Kazakhstan's political elites also have recreational 
tastes that are not so exotic. Some, in fact, prefer to 
relax the old-fashioned way. Defense Minister Akhmetov, a 
self-proclaimed workaholic, appears to enjoy loosening up in 
the tried and true "homo sovieticus" style -- i.e., drinking 

ASTANA 00000760 003.4 OF 003 


CLASSIFIED BY POL/ECON CHIEF STEVEN FAGIN, REASONS 1.4 
(B) AND (D) 

oneself into a stupor. While most of our accounts of 
Akhmetov's indulgences with the bottle are hearsay, we do 
have "eyes on" for one episode which supports the rumors. In 
June 2007, Akhmetov showed up in grand form for a meeting 
with a visiting senior U.S. Defense Department official. 
Making no attempt to conceal his condition -- slouching back 
in his chair and slurring all kinds of Russian participles -- 
Akhmetov explained to this very senior guest that he had just 
been at a cadet graduation reception "toasting Kazakhstan's 
newly-commissioned officers." Who was toasted more -- the 
Defense Minister or the cadets -- is a matter of pure 
speculation. Akhmetov's excesses do not solely extend to the 
bottle. An insider at Astana's Radisson Hotel recently told 
us about preparations for the unbelievably lavish and 
expensive wedding of Akhmetov's son. In the Kazakh 
tradition, the parents of the groom are responsible for the 
wedding -- so it would seem that Akhmetov must have footed 
the bill. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA754, TURMOIL AT KMG – FIRST VP IDENOV MAY BE OUT THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA754 2008-04-15 11:50 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0754 1061150
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151150Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2242
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0475
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000754 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN. EEB 
DOE FOR EKIMOFF 
COMMERCE FOR HUEPER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EPET KZ
SUBJECT: TURMOIL AT KMG - FIRST VP IDENOV MAY BE OUT THE 
DOOR 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) KazMunaiGas (KMG) First Vice President Maksat Idenov 
called the Ambassador from Dubai on April 14 and told him 
that he is on the verge of leaving KMG.  According to Idenov, 
KMG President Uzakbay Karabalin met earlier that day with 
President Nazarbayev to complain about Idenov's activities at 
KMG.  Karabalin criticized Idenov's efforts to restructure 
KMG, saying that they were unacceptable, demoralizing, and 
not in accordance with "Kazakh traditions and culture". 
Karabalin also blamed Idenov for problems with the Kashagan 
Memorandum of Understanding.  Idenov said that Karabalin had 
ordered him to write a letter admitting his mistakes. 
 
2. (C) Idenov noted that in reforming KMG he was acting at 
the instructions of Prime Minister Masimov. (Note: 
Karabalin's attack on Idenov came as Masimov was returning 
from China).  He told the Ambassador that Karabalin and Askar 
Balzhanov, Director General of KMG Exploration and 
Production, had planted a story in the media accusing Idenov 
of corruption.  After indicating earlier in their 
conversation that he was considering resigning, Idenov 
concluded by saying "I am going to resign anyway." (Note: 
Idenov later called Coordinator for Eurasian Energy Policy 
Steve Mann  and told him that he would return to Astana on 
Wednesday to submit his resignation.  He said that Samruk 
Chairman Sir Richard Evans asked him not to resign.  Idenov 
also discussed at further length Karabalin's motivations, 
saying that he is trying to get his own people in to the new 
Kashagan operational structure in order to gain access to the 
procurement and supply chain.  Karabalin is also seeking to 
chair the Kashagan management committee, which Idenov 
currently chairs.) 
 
3. (U) On April 15, one media source, RusEnergy, reported 
that Idenov had already resigned, citing a source close to 
Agip KCO. According to the source, Idenov wrote in his 
resignation letter that he is leaving KMG because of 
disagreements with the GOK over Kashagan, in particular the 
heavy demands placed on the project's operator. 
 
4. (C) Comment: The cocksure Idenov may rub some the wrong 
way but he is also a bright light in Kazakhstan's energy 
sector.   His resignation would be a significant loss for KMG 
and a sign that entrenched interests are hesitant to accept 
his serious efforts to reform the company.  Only last week, a 
representative from ExxonMobil told Poloff that she had 
recently attended a presentation by Idenov on restructuring 
and that she was extremely impressed with Idenov's vision for 
KMG. End Comment 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA729, WITH IGA ON TRANS-CASPIAN OIL TRANSPORT RATIFIED,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA729 2008-04-15 08:31 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7681
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #0729/01 1060831
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 150831Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2215
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0473
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2157
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000729 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
DOE FOR EKIMOFF 
COMMERCE FOR HUEPER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EPET KZ
SUBJECT: WITH IGA ON TRANS-CASPIAN OIL TRANSPORT RATIFIED, 
KAZAKHSTAN IMPATIENT WITH AZERBAIJAN, ALOOF OF IOCS 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 480 B. ASTANA 354 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: On March 26, Kazakhstan's Parliament ratified 
an intergovernmental agreement with Azerbaijan on 
trans-Caspian oil transportation.  According to the 
Kazakhstanis, Azerbaijan appears "not in a hurry" in 
trans-Caspian talks and, sensing Kazakhstan's 
vulnerabilities, is driving a hard bargain.  Kazakhstan may 
try to strengthen its position by shipping some oil from the 
Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS) to Russia and 
Iran, although shipments to Iran would be small. The 
Kazakhstanis continue to insist that they will build and 
finance the Eskene - Kurik pipeline on their own, to the 
concern of their international partners.  End Summary 
 
2. (C) On March 26, Kazakhstan's Parliament ratified an 
intergovernmental agreement (IGA) with Azerbaijan on 
trans-Caspian oil transportation.  Arman Darbayev, 
KazMunayGas Executive Director for Oil Transportation and 
Service Projects, told Poloff on March 27 that when he 
notified his Azeri counterparts of ratification, they seemed 
"disinterested."  Their reaction is not a surprise, said 
Darbayev, because the Azeris appear "not in a hurry" to 
develop trans-Caspian options.  "We are doing all the 
pushing."  Darbayev noted that Kazakhstan cannot even get the 
Azeris to travel to Astana; the last three meetings on 
transportation have all been held in Baku. 
 
3. (C) The Azeris are also taking a tough negotiating stance, 
according to Darbayev.  They are well-aware that Kazakhstan's 
need for additional export routes provides them a strong 
bargaining position.  Darbayev identified two immediate 
problems for the trans-Caspian project.  First, Kazakhstan 
and Azerbaijan are in a dispute over sole risk expansion. 
Kazakhstan wishes to establish provisions for sole risk 
expansion, but the Azerbaijanis will do so only with strict 
conditions.  The Azeris have also said that only project 
financing is acceptable, which the Kazakhstanis believe could 
cause delays of two to four years. 
 
4. (C) Darbayev confirmed that Kazakhstan will build the 
KCTS' Eskene - Kurik pipeline by itself.  He described the 
project as technically simple and relatively inexpensive 
($1.2 - 1.3 billion) (Note: The Kazakhstanis have indicated 
that they may dip into their oil fund to pay for the project. 
Minister of Energy Sauat Mynbayev told the Ambassador in 
February that the Kazakhstanis realize that they will need to 
offer stable tariffs and other guarantees with the pipeline. 
Reftel A). Darbayev also noted that KMG will soon register a 
new daughter company focused solely on assessing and 
developing trans-Caspian transportation options.  The outfit 
will have ten employees.  Kazakhstan had initially considered 
creating a joint venture with Azerbaijan, but has abandoned 
the idea because of concerns that Azerbaijan would not 
provide sufficient manpower. 
 
5. (C) Poloff asked Darbayev about his previous statement 
that the Eskene - Kurik pipeline might be a means to ship oil 
to points other than Azerbaijan.  Darbayev responded that 
Kazakhstan needs to show the Azerbaijanis that it has other 
options and will consider additional shipments to Iran and 
Russia.  He noted, however, that shipments to Iran would be 
small and that Kazakhstan has no interest in pipeline 
projects in Iran. 
 
6. (C) Darbayev also briefly discussed Kazakhstan's plans 
beyond Baku. The extent to which BTC's capacity will be 
expanded is uncertain, said Darbayev.  As a result, more 
shippers (Darbayev specifically identified Shell, Exxon, and 
Chevron) are clamoring for another route to Georgia, a "Baku 
- Supsa II."  While Darbayev believes that this plan has 
advantages, it also could create more conflict between 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan because of their competing 
terminals in Georgia (Kazakhstan's at Batumi, Azerbaijan's at 
Kulevi). Referring to President Yushchenko's recent trip to 
Kazakhstan, Darbayev said that Kazakhstan considers the 
Odessa - Brody pipeline unprofitable and is waiting to be 
shown a feasibility study proving otherwise. Many of 
Kazakhstan's problems could be solved, he admitted, with a 
trans-Caspian pipeline.  Political issues still exist, but 
"as soon as we have a chance we will build it," said 
Darbayev. 
 
ASTANA 00000729  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
7. (C) KMG Vice President for Oil and Gas Transportation 
Kabildin reaffirmed that Azerbaijan is "not rushing" on KCTS 
in a conversation with the Ambassador on April 3. Kabildin 
added that it is unfortunate that Baku-Supsa has been idle 
for a year and he hopes that it will be revived to accomodate 
Kazakhstani volumes in excess of BTC capacity. Kabildin also 
discussed a number of other transportation issues with
 the 
Ambassador. Kabildin expressed some optimism on CPC 
expansion, claiming that the Russians have moved beyond any 
political considerations and are prepared to look at 
expansion in commercial terms.  He noted that Transneft will 
have substantial excess capacity in the westward direction 
because of falling Russian oil production and the expansion 
of pipelines.  This, he believes, will strengthen the 
position of Kazakhstani shippers and could even support the 
reversal of Odessa-Brody.  Kabildin does not think Russia has 
the oil for Bourgas - Alexandropoulos and doubts the pipeline 
will be built.  He stated that Atyrau - Samara could be 
expanded in one year, and would be once Transneft needs 
Kazakhstani oil. 
 
8. (C) After the ratification, Poloff discussed the status of 
KCTS with several representatives from western oil companies 
.  Patty Graham, ExxonMobil's Kazakhstan Government and 
Public Affairs Representative, said that ExxonMobil has of 
late been consistently told that Kazakhstan will build and 
finance the Eskene - Kurik pipeline, and that "the door is 
totally shut" on negotiations. The decision on financing is 
particularly crucial, she said, because it eliminates 
possible leverage for the IOCs.  "All we can do", she said, 
"is engage on tariff and capacity agreements."  Pete Clark, 
Manager of Chevron's Strategic Planning Eurasia Business 
Unit, told Poloff that Azerbaijan is "playing hard to get" on 
KCTS.  Chevron, he said, would still like to participate as 
an equity partner in Eskene - Kurik. If the Kazakhstanis came 
looking for a loan from TenghizChevroil for the pipeline, "it 
would be hard to turn down." The real tricky part for Chevron 
will come when Kazakhstan asks it to commit volumes for KCTS. 
 Chevron then might have to make a choice at the expense of 
the CPC, said Clark. 
 
9. (C) Comment: Kazakhstani criticism of Azerbaijan's inertia 
is a bit rich, given that it took more than one year for 
Kazakhstan to ratify the IGA.  Nevertheless, the Kazakhstanis 
are now acting with an increased sense of urgency as they try 
to diversify their oil export options to meet increased 
production.  With CPC expansion still uncertain and other 
options less appealing, they are ready to show some 
flexibility in the face of tough demands from Azerbaijan. 
Given their apparent unshakable determination to build and 
finance the Eskene - Kurik pipeline by themselves, the 
Kazakhstanis also must reassure their Kashagan and Tenghiz 
partners that they will establish fair access conditions. End 
Comment 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA726, KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, MARCH 22 – APRIL 4,

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ASTANA726.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA726 2008-04-15 06:15 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7599
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0726 1060615
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 150615Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2213
INFO RUCPCIM/CIMS NTDB WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0472
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2156
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0393
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0501
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0384

UNCLAS ASTANA 000726 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
DEPT PASS TO OPIC - BALLINGER 
DEPT PASS TO TDA FOR STEIN, EXIM FOR GLAZER 
DEPT PASS TO AID - EE-PHILLIPS/RUSHING 
TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTRI 
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/MAC/MLONDON, 4201/BISNIS 
USDOC FOR 6110/ITA/TD/BI/RHALPERN 
ANKARA FOR CFC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET EFIN KTDB KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, MARCH 22 - APRIL 4, 
2008 
 
 
1.  Summary:  This information is drawn primarily from the 
Kazakhstani local press, and has not been verified for accuracy. 
 
-- KazAgro to Transfer Secondary Assets 
-- ArcelorMittal Temirtau Wins Court Ruling in Tax Dispute 
-- KMG to Upgrade Oil Refineries 
-- State Considers a 15% Stake in Kazakhmys 
-- Economic and Energy Statistics for January-March 2008 
 
KazAgro to Transfer Secondary Assets 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  The state agricultural holding company KazAgro plans to spin off 
some of its secondary assets not directly associated with its 
operations.  According to KazAgro management board chairman Alikhan 
Smailov, such assets include grain storage facilities and a cotton 
refining plant.  (Kazakhstan Today, April 4) 
 
ArcelorMittal Temirtau Wins Court Ruling Tax Dispute 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3.  The Karaganda regional court ruled in favor of metals company 
ArcelorMittal Temirtau (AMT) in its claim against the Temirtau Tax 
Committee, which levied corporate income taxes from 2002-2005 on an 
AMT offshore subsidiary in the UAE.  The Tax Committee will appeal 
the decision.  The Karaganda regional court's decision reversed an 
earlier ruling by a lower court in the Tax Committee's favor. 
(Kazinform, April 4) 
 
KMG To Upgrade Oil Refineries 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  According to the KMG Crude Processing Department Deputy Director 
Arman Kairdenov, reconstruction of the Pavlodar oil refinery (in 
North Kazakhstan) will cost approximately $500 million.  KMG plans 
to obtain a 70% stake in the Indonesian-led company 
MangistauMunayGas, which co-owns the refinery.  KMG is also in talks 
with its partner, Chinese National Petroleum Corporation, to fund 
the upgrade of the Shymkent oil refinery (in South Kazakhstan) and 
is in search of external financing to increase the capacity of its 
Atyrau oil refinery (in West Kazakhstan).  (Astana TV Channel, March 
27) 
 
State Considers a 15% Stake in Kazakhmys 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5.  Kazakhstan's government intends to buy a 15% stake in the 
privately-owned copper producing company Kazakhmys.  The company 
confirmed that it has held preliminary negotiations with the 
government.  In December of 2002, the state sold its 24.65% stake in 
Kazakhmys.  (Delovaya nedelya newspaper, March 28) 
 
Economic and Energy Statistics for January-March 2008 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6.  According to the National Statistics Agency, the inflation rate 
was 2.5% during January-March 2008, compared to 2.6% during the same 
period in 2007.  The exchange rate averaged 120.45 tenge per dollar. 
 (Delovaya Nedelya newspaper, April 4) 
 
7.  Total production of gas condensate and crude oil during 
January-March was up 6.4% year-on-year to 17.675 million tons, 
though gas condensate production itself fell 5.3% to 1.648 million 
tons.  Production of gas (dry natural gas, LNG, and natural gas 
liquids) during the three-month period grew 10.4% year-on-year to 
8.294 billion cubic meters, which included an 18.8% increase in dry 
natural gas production to 5.041 bcm. (Interfax-Kazakhstan, April 2) 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA722, KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, MARCH 8 – MARCH 21,

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ASTANA722.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA722 2008-04-14 12:02 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7465
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0722/01 1051202
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141202Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2209
INFO RUCPCIM/CIMS NTDB WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0470
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2154
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0391
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0499
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0382

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000722 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
DEPT PASS TO OPIC - BALLINGER 
DEPT PASS TO TDA FOR STEIN, EXIM FOR GLAZER 
DEPT PASS TO AID - EE-PHILLIPS/RUSHING 
TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTRI 
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/MAC/MLONDON, 4201/BISNIS 
USDOC FOR 6110/ITA/TD/BI/RHALPERN 
ANKARA FOR CFC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET EFIN KTDB KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, MARCH 8 - MARCH 21, 
2008 
 
 
ASTANA 00000722  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Summary:  This information is drawn primarily from the 
Kazakhstani local press, and has not been verified for accuracy. 
 
-- $1 Billion Loan for Kazakhstan Development Bank 
-- New Appointments at FSA 
-- MangistauMunayGas Appeals Energy Ministry Decision 
-- Karachaganak Consortium Faces Environmental Fine 
-- Petrolinvest to Merge Two Kazakhstani Companies 
-- Energy Statistics for January-February 2008 
 
$1 Billion Loan for Kazakhstan Development Bank 
---------------------- ------------------------ 
 
2.  The state-owned Kazakhstan Development Bank (KDB) has received a 
$1 billion syndicated loan on the international markets, according 
to a KDB press release.  The loan was extended by a group of banks 
including Credit Suisse, ING, HSBC, SMBC, Bayern LB, and the China 
Development Bank.  The Kazakhstan Development Bank is one of several 
institutions operating under the umbrella of the state-owned Kazyna 
Sustainable Development Fund.  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, March 11) 
 
New Appointments at FSA 
----------------------- 
 
3.  Alina Aldambergen and Kuat Kozahkkhmetov have been appointed 
co-deputy chairpersons of Kazakhstan's Financial Supervision Agency 
(FSA).  Prior to this appointment, Aldambergen worked as the Deputy 
Chairperson of the Almaty Financial Center Agency, and Kozhakhmetov 
served as Chairman of the Managing Board of Tsesna Bank.  Former FSA 
Deputy Chairman Gani Uzbekov was simultaneously dismissed and 
transferred to another, unnamed position. (Interfax-Kazakhstan, 
March 14) 
 
MangistauMunayGas Appeals Energy Ministry Decision 
-------------------- ----------------------------- 
 
4.  MangistauMunayGas(MMG), which is owned by Central Asia Petroleum 
Ltd. of Indonesia, filed an appeal with the Almaty economic court 
against the results of a January 2008 inspection conducted by the 
Energy Ministry.  The Energy Ministry accused MMG of failing to meet 
its investment obligations, and thus causing a $72.2 million loss to 
the state budget.  (Liter newspaper, March 14) 
 
Karachaganak Consortium Faces Environmental Fine 
------------------ ----------------------------- 
 
5.  A Kazakhstani court fined a group of Western energy majors 
developing the Karachaganak gas field $15 million for environmental 
damages.  Kazakhstani authorities accused the Karachaganak Petroleum 
Operating (KPO) consortium of unauthorized gas flaring.  KPO denied 
any wrongdoing and is challenging the fine.  (Reuters, March 19) 
 
6.  KPO reached an important milestone on March 10.  It loaded its 
200 millionth barrel of oil into the Caspian Pipeline Consortium 
(CPC) pipeline.  (KPO press release, March 11) 
 
Petrolinvest to Merge Two Kazakhstani Companies 
------------------------ ---------------------- 
 
7.  Polish oil company Petrolinvest plans to merge two Kazakhstan's 
engineering and servicing companies, Caspian Services (CS) and 
KazakhstanCaspiShelf (KCS) after completing its acquisition of them 
over the coming months.  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, March 12) 
 
Energy Statistics for January-February 2008 
-------------------------- ---------------- 
 
8.  Kazakhstan produced 5.567 billion cubic meters of gas (including 
dry natural gas, liquefied natural gas, and natural gas liquids) 
during the January-February 2008 period -- which represents a 15.8% 
increase year-on-year.  Dry natural gas production rose 20.2% 
year-on-year to 3.224 bcm.  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, March 20) 
 
9.  According to the National Statistics Agency, coal production for 
January-February grew 18.4% year-on-year to 18,903.9 tons. 
 
ASTANA 00000722  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Electricity production rose 11.5% to 15,756.3 million 
kilowatt-hours.  (Interfax - Kazakhstan, March 21) 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA703, KAZAKHSTAN ENVIRONMENT UPDATE, FEBRUARY-MARCH 2008

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA703 2008-04-10 10:57 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8491
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0703/01 1011057
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101057Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2201
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0468
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0376

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000703 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV ECON ENRG EPET KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN ENVIRONMENT UPDATE, FEBRUARY-MARCH 2008 
 
ASTANA 00000703  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Summary:  This information is drawn primarily from the 
Kazakhstani press and has not been verified. 
 
-- Koksaray Water Reservoir To Be Built in South Kazakhstan 
-- Ecological Tax To Replace Pollution Fees 
-- Kazakhstan Expects Russia To Cut Toxic Rocket Fuel Use 
-- Science Funding To Soar By 2015 
-- Environment Minister Discusses Cooperation with EU 
-- Kazakhstani Government To Introduce Sturgeon Monopoly 
-- Health, Environment Issues at ArcelorMittal 
 
---------------------- --------------------------------- 
Koksaray Water Reservoir To Be Built in South Kazakhstan 
---------------------- --------------------------------- 
 
2.  Prime Minister Masimov announced plans on March 18 to move 
forward in building the Koksaray water reservoir in South 
Kazakhstan.  This reservoir will be aimed at controlling water flow 
from the Syrdarya River.  Every spring, South Kazakhstan suffers 
from flooding because excessive water comes from the Syrdarya River, 
which the Shardaryinskoye water reservoir cannot store.  In summer, 
the situation is the opposite, with South Kazakhstan suffering from 
drought.  The new water reservoir will address both of these 
problems. Alongside construction of the Koksaray reservoir, 
Kazakhstan plans to press ahead with the Central Asian Water and 
Energy Consortium initiative to regulate water distribution in the 
Central Asia region.  On April 4, Express-K newspaper reported that 
Kazakhstani environmental protection experts were expressing 
discontent with constructing the Koksaray reservoir.  They fear that 
this project might hamper their efforts to restore the Aral Sea.  On 
April 8, President Nazarbayev effectively ended the debate by 
announcing that the Koksaray reservoir will, in fact, be built.  He 
noted that by protecting Southern Kazakhstan and Kyzylorda Oblasts 
from spring floods, the reservoir will save the government $100 
million annually in rescue and reconstruction costs. 
 
------------------ --------------------- 
Ecological Tax To Replace Pollution Fees 
------------------ --------------------- 
 
3.  Environmental Protection Minister Iskakov on February 5 
reaffirmed Kazakhstani government plans to introduce an ecological 
tax to replace pollution fees in accordance with the German 
experience.  This tax would aim to promote renewable sources of 
energy (wind, hydropower, solar energy, biofuels) and stimulate 
production of environmentally-friendly products.   On February 22, 
Iskakov said that the new ecological tax would be included in 
Kazakhstan's new tax code, which is being developed this year in 
accordance with President Nazarbayev's February state of the nation 
address.  Iskakov also announced that the government is developing a 
draft law on supporting alternative sources of energy, which he 
expects parliament will adopt this Fall.   In an April 1 interview 
given to Business and Vlast business weekly, Iskakov focused on the 
advantages of an ecological tax over existing pollution fees.  He 
noted that pollution fees currently bring in annual revenues of 30 
billion tenge (approximately $250 million), but only a small part of 
these revenues are used to fund environmental protection programs. 
 
---------------------- ------------------------------- 
Kazakhstan Expects Russia To Cut Toxic Rocket Fuel Use 
---------------------- ------------------------------- 
 
4. Interfax reported on February 18 that the Kazakhstani government 
will approve a plan for Russian Proton rocket launches from the 
Baikonur space center for the second half of 2008 only after the 
Russian Space Agency (Roskosmos) offers proposals on gradually 
reducing rocket launches that use unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine 
(UDMH) as a propellant.  Kazakhstani National Space Agency chief 
Talgat Musabayev said that Kazakhstan had not yet received the 
proposals promised by Roskosmos.  Russia and Kazakhstan signed an 
intergovernmental agreement in 2004, one of the provisions of which 
implies a gradual reduction in the number of rocket launches from 
Baikonur using the highly-toxic UDMH propellant. 
 
------------------------------- 
Science Funding To Soar By 2015 
------------------------------- 
 
5.  On March 17, Interfax reported that the Ministry of Education 
and Science plans a 10-fold increase in science funding by 2015, 
from 0.26 percent of GDP at present to 2.5 percent of GDP. 
Education and Science Minister Tuimebayev told the Majilis (i.e., 
the lower house of parliament) that current science funding was 
inadequate and well below the levels of developed countries. 
Quoting data from independent experts, Tuymebaev argued that if a 
country's research and development expenditures do not exceed 1 
percent of GDP for 5-7 years, an irreversible decline in scientific 
potential may occur. 
 
---------------------- --------------------------- 
Environment Minister Discusses Cooperation with EU 
---------------------- --------------------------- 
 
ASTANA 00000703  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
6.  On February 26, Environmental Protection Minister Iskakov met EC 
Head of Delegation to Kazakhstan Adriaan van der Meer and a European 
Commission delegation to discuss cooperation in environmental 
protection.  Iskakov asked for EU assistance in developing renewable 
energy sources in accordance with EU standards, establishing a solar 
center, and introducing ecological taxes based on German experience. 
 Van der Meer informed Iskakov about the intention of the German, 
Norwegian, and Dutch governments to act as co-founders of a regional 
ecological center in Central Asia, and expressed hope for 
Kazakhstan's support for the initiative. 
 
----------------------- ----------------------------- 
Kazakhstani Government To Introduce Sturgeon Monopoly 
----------------------- ----------------------------- 
 
7.  Interfax reported on March 13 that the Kazakhstani government 
had presented parliament a draft law on the fishing industry, which 
includes provisions for establishing a state monopoly on purchase of 
sturgeon, as well as processing and sale of caviar.  Implementation 
of the law will require 6.3 billion tenge (approximately $52.5 
million) in budget funding.  According to Deputy Agriculture 
Minister Kurishbaev, a state monopoly will enhance control over 
sturgeon reproduction, sturgeon farm operations, and sturgeon 
resources.  It will also ensure supply of the domestic market with 
fish products in line with world standards. 
 
8.  It was reported on March 7 that a new sturgeon plant will be 
built in west Kazakhstan to preserve sturgeon in the Ural-Caspian 
basin and organize commercial sturgeon breeding. According to Kanat 
Suleimenov, the chairman of the Agricultural Ministry's Fisheries 
Committee, the plant will also breed and preserve young sturgeon. 
Its capacity will be 15-20 million young sturgeon a year.  Today 
there is only one sturgeon plant in west Kazakhstan. 
 
---------------------- -------------------- 
Health, Environment Issues at ArcelorMittal 
---------------------- -------------------- 
 
9.  Interfax reported on February 22 that the Karaganda sanitary 
control department had revealed violations of labor health standards 
at eight coal mines operated by ArcelorMittal Temirtau. 
Arcelor-Mittal was fined 78,624 tenge (approx $650) for failure to 
meet workplace health standards.  Environmental Protection Minister 
Iskakov met on February 26 with ArcelorMittal senior management to 
discuss the company's pollution permit for 2008.  The company was 
notified about the time period within which it must improve its 
environmental protection efforts. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA701, KAZAKHSTAN – IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ASTANA701.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA701 2008-04-10 07:49 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8324
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0701 1010749
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100749Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2199
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0467

UNCLAS ASTANA 000701 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR OES/IHB JKOWALSKI AND IO/T ABLACKWOOD 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO AORC PREL WHO KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN - IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH 
REGULATIONS 
 
REF:  State 33263 
 
1. Summary: In response to reftel, CDC representatives met with the 
Republican Sanitary and Epidemiological Station (RSES) to discuss 
implementation of International Health Regulations (IHR) in 
Kazakhstan.  RSES is the point of contact on IHR implementation in 
Kazakhstan.  RSES will coordinate with relevant ministries and the 
WHO in drafting an action plan on IHR implementation.  RSES is 
interested in receiving the U.S. implementation plan in Russian and 
believes it is necessary to have a seminar by a WHO expert to 
explain the IHR concept to local authorities.  End summary. 
 
2. On April 8, CDC health specialists met with Dr. Stanislav 
Kazakov, Medical Epidemiologist and IHR coordinator, Republican 
Sanitary and Epidemiological Station (RSES). According to Dr. 
Kazakov, Kazakhstan has supported International Health Regulations 
(IHR) since they were revised in 2005. Kazakhstan understood that 
IHR regulates not only outbreaks of infectious diseases, but also 
any events that could present significant harm to humans.  That is 
why the GOK wants to have a joint effort of several ministries, 
including the Ministry of Health, Ministry for Emergency Situations, 
Ministry of Economy, and others. 
 
3.  National Focal Point:  The Ministry of Health has appointed the 
RSES as the National IHR Focal Point.  They have sent the 
organization's coordinates to the World Health Organization (WHO), 
and they are accessible 24 hours a day. In 2007, Dr. Kenes Ospanov, 
RSES head, traveled to Lyon to one of the IHR meetings. 
 
4.  Assessment of Surveillance System:  To assess the 
epidemiological surveillance system in the country, WHO recently 
sent a questionnaire to the Ministry of Health.  The questionnaire 
was answered and sent back to WHO.  Currently, the questionnaire is 
being analyzed by the WHO. 
 
5.  Action Plan:  According to Dr. Kazakov, the Ministry of Health 
should work together with the Ministry for Emergency Situations and 
Ministry of Economy on the National IHR Regulations.  However, they 
have not started yet.  Dr. Kazakov thinks that as a starting point, 
they could use the Strategic Plan for Avian Influenza that they 
developed three years ago.  This Strategic Plan contains a component 
on rapid reaction to an emerging event that poses a threat to public 
health and notification of WHO about the event.  Currently, they are 
gathering all relevant regulations of the Ministry of Health and 
Ministry for Emergency Situations.  They plan to analyze these 
regulations, and then plan next steps. 
 
6.  U.S. Implementation Plan:  RSES thinks that it is necessary to 
have a seminar where a WHO expeQ will explain the IHR concept to 
local authorities and CDC could present the American plan of action. 
 RSES is interested in receiving the U.S. implementation plan.  The 
CDC office in Almaty can translate it into Russian and share it with 
RSES. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA691, EXBS KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR’S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE (MARCH

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ASTANA691.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA691 2008-04-09 11:25 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7379
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #0691/01 1001125
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091125Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2184
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0101
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC//NNSA//
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC 0026
RUCQAAA/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0469
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8263
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8146
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0042
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2346
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7314
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0369

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000691 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC YWONG, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN, SROBINSON 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC-AMT LSPRINGER 
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE DFISCHER 
DEPT FOR SCA/RA JSPILSBURY 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN MO'MARA 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO EXPORT CONTROL AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
CBP/INA FOR KCHAISSON AND RWATT 
USDOE/NNSA CWALKER, TPERRY AND EDESCHLER 
DOC FOR DCREED 
USCG FOR SHABETIMICHAEL 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT, BISHKEK, BAKU, DUSHANBE AND ASHGABAT FOR EXBS 
ADVISORS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: EXBS KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR'S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE (MARCH 
2008) 
 
I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS: 
 
1.  President Bush nominated Richard E. Hoagland to be U.S. 
Ambassador to Kazakhstan.  Mr. Hoagland, a career member of the 
Senior Foreign Service, currently serves as Charge d' Affaires at 
the U.S. Embassy in Turkmenistan. Prior to this, he served as U.S. 
Ambassador to Tajikistan. Earlier in his career, he served as 
Director of the State Department's Office of Caucasus and Central 
Asian Affairs. 
 
2. On March 27, the Customs Service of Kazakhstan seized 537 kilos 
(1,181.4 pounds) of heroin at the Kairak customs checkpoint, located 
180 kilometers from Kostanai city in the Kostanaiskaya oblast 
(Northern Kazakhstan) on the border with Russia.  The heroin was 
hidden under a false bottom of a Volvo refrigerated truck with 
Russian license plates.  The truck, which entered Kazakhstan from 
Uzbekistan, was about to depart Kazakhstan for Russia when an export 
control examination, using a stationary TC-Scan x-ray machine, 
detected the false bottom.  A subsequent search of the vehicle 
revealed the heroin.  The two Russian drivers were arrested. 
 
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS CONDUCTED 
 
1.  On March 7, 2008, the EXBS program manager met with Rear Admiral 
Abileyev, Maritime Border Guard Service, and was informed of a major 
engine problem with the Sea Ark vessel.  The Sea Ark, which was a 
1996 donation, has a fuel leak.  The status of the Sea Ark is 
certain to be a major topic of discussion during the visit of Lt. 
Michael Fisher, EXBS Caspian Regional Advisor, to Bautino, 
Kazakhstan, during April 23-24, 2008. 
 
2.  On March 11, 2008, the EXBS advisor met with three British 
counterterrorism desk officers from their London office at the 
request of British Embassy Deputy Head of Mission Mike Welch.  U.S. 
Embassy personnel also attending this meeting included Steven Fagin, 
Chief of Pol/Econ, Richard Damstra, Pol/Econ officer, and Howard 
Leabetter, legal attache.  The EXBS advisor limited his 
participation in this meeting to an overview of EXBS and Second Line 
of Defense activities in Kazakhstan. 
 
3.  On March 20, 2008, the EXBS advisor attended a Security 
Assistance Working Group (SAWG) meeting held in Astana, Kazakhstan. 
Among the topics discussed were the proposed U.S. Department of 
Energy's AirConOps program and possible meetings with a variety of 
concerned agencies within the Government of Kazakhstan. 
 
4.  On March 26, 2008, the EXBS advisor participated in a Kazakhstan 
Action Officer Working Group at the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense. 
Also representing the U.S. were officers from the Naval Forces 
Central Command (NAVCENT), the Arizona National Guard (AZNG), the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement office (INL), and the Office of Military 
Cooperation (OMC).  The Border Guard Service of the Kazakhstan 
National Security Committee was represented by Captain Nurakhmetov, 
Captain Khasanov, LTC Akhmedov, and CPT Tusupbekova.  Discussions 
during this meeting focused on the Border Guards' training and 
equipment needs. 
 
5.  On March 27, 2008, the EXBS team attended meetings between Major 
Alexandra Vozhakova, Head of the Radioactive Materials and Technical 
 
ASTANA 00000691  002 OF 003 
 
 
Means Department of the Kazakhstan Customs Control Committee, Robert 
E. Upchurch, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Wayne M. Lechelt, 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.  The purpose was to discuss 
the development of a Second Line of Defense training curriculum and 
to assess the Customs Control Committee's current training materials 
and other products.  Discussions included how SLD materials may be 
modified to meet the Kazakhstani government's requirements for 
operation of the radiation detection equipment. 
 
6.  On Saturday, March 29, 2008, a follow-up meeting on Second Line 
of Defense training was attended by the EXBS team at the Astana 
Intercontinental Hotel.  During this meeting Major Alexandra 
Vozhakova, Head of Radioactive Materials and Technical Means 
Department of the Kazakhstan Customs Control Committee, informed 
Robert E. Upchurch, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Wayne M. 
Lechelt, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, of the Kazakhstan 
Customs Control Committee's desire to create a regional training 
center near Astana that would be modeled after the Interdict/RADACAD 
course conducted at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 
Volpentest Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response 
(HAMMER) training center, in Richland, Washington.  This facility 
would be a regional training center designed for frontline officers 
and teach techniques in the detection, identification, and 
interdiction of illicit transfers of radioactive materials, 
commodities, and components used in the development, production, or 
deployment of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass 
effect (WME), and their associated delivery systems. 
 
B.  TRAINING DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
1.  None 
 
C. EQUIPMENT DELIVERED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
1.  None 
 
D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT STATUS UPDATE 
 
1. The Department of Energy Second Line of Defense 
Program is continuing its project to install radiation portal 
monitors at border crossing sites.  The SLD equipment is being 
installed at nine locations but can not be officially transferred to 
the Customs Control Committee until the CTR Umbrella agreement has 
been ratified by Kazakhstan. 
 
2.  A Diplomatic Note was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
informing the Government of Kazakhstan of the proposed Safe Boat 
Operations Course for Kazakhstani Maritime Border Guards that will 
be conducted in Aktau, Kazakhstan, by the U.S. Coast Guard from July 
5 to August 1, 2008. 
 
E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT CONTROLS, NONPROLIFERATION, OR 
RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
 
1. None 
 
F. CASPIAN SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
1. On March 5, 2008, the EXBS program manager assisted the assisted 
the Maritime Border Guard Service in Aktau with the procurement of 
supplies needed to paint the three Safe boats donated by EXBS in 
2006.  Two of these vessels should be returned to active duty during 
 
ASTANA 00000691  003 OF 003 
 
 
April 2008 after being painted.  The third vessel has a mechanical 
defect which needs to be repaired before it can be placed back in 
the water. 
 
III. RED FLAG ISSUES. 
 
1. None 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks