08ASTANA2118, KAZAKHSTAN: BRITISH FCO,S CASPIAN ENERGY ADVISOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA2118 2008-10-24 11:34 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3365
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #2118 2981134
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241134Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3655
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0727
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2206
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0127
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0837
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0058
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 0283
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0205
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2011
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1960
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2296
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 002118 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/CARC, EEB 
STATE PLEASE PASS USTDA FOR DAN STEIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018 
TAGS: PGOV EPET EWWT AJ KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  BRITISH FCO,S CASPIAN ENERGY ADVISOR 
EXPRESSES CONCERNS ON CROSS-CASPIAN MARITIME CAPACITY 
 
REF: ASTANA 2101 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard Hoagland, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) During an October 15 meeting with the Ambassador, 
Angus Miller, Caspian Region Energy Advisor to Britain's 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, expressed his concerns that 
Kazakhstan will not be able to expand its maritime capacity 
quickly enough to handle the expected volumes of Kazakhstani 
crude requiring transport across the Caspian to Baku. 
 
2. (C) Miller noted that Deputy Energy Minister Lyazzat 
Kiinov had said publicly at the KIOGE conference that crude 
transported via the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System 
(KCTS) will be shipped only by Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani 
tankers, with international shippers excluded from the action 
(see reftel).  The Kazakhstanis also expect that their 
vessels will be manned solely by Kazakhstani crews.  Miller 
told the Ambassador it will be challenging enough for 
Kazakhstan to build in time the necessary tankers (six to 
eight, if they are large tankers of 60,000 dwt), while 
training such a sizable contingent of new Kazakhstani seamen 
presents even greater hurdles.  He believes that this will 
put pressure on the Kazakhstanis to lower standards for both 
vessels and crews.  Miller also maintained that if Kazakhstan 
is unable to increase its maritime capacity to handle all the 
crude, there will be an opening for the Iranians to get 
involved in shipping it, as the Iranians already have the 
largest fleet on the Caspian. 
 
3. (C)  Miller said that he had just come from a meeting with 
Kiinov, who rebuked Miller for Miller's address at KIOGE in 
which he had argued that Kazakhstan's lack of preparedness 
for cross-Caspian crude shipment is creating economic and 
political vulnerabilities for the country.  Miller said that 
in the end, Kiinov admitted to him that there are serious 
problems in building up Kazakhstan's maritime capacity for 
KCTS.  Miller told the Ambassador that he had also met with 
the international oil companies operating in Kazakhstan 
together with Kazakhstani port authorities.  The companies 
expressed concerns in line with Miller's on Kazakhstan's 
maritime capacity and maritime standards.  An Aktau port 
official explained that Kazakhstan had installed a maritime 
radar system for the Aktau area, but does not have the 
personnel to run it properly.  As a result, the radar can not 
be used for active maritime management and collision 
avoidance; rather, it is just a passive system for now. 
 
4. (C) Miller stressed to the Ambassador that in his view, 
the international companies need to provide assistance to 
KazMorTransFlot (KMTF) -- Kazakhstan's national maritime 
shipping company, which is owned 50 percent by KazMunaiGas 
(KMG) and 50 percent by Samruk-Kazyna -- to build up its crew 
capacity and to ensure that crews are trained to 
international standards. 
HOAGLAND

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