Monthly Archives: April 2009

09ASTANA756, KAZAKHSTAN: TV CO-OP SUBMISSIONS 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA756 2009-04-30 12:06 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0756/01 1201206
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301206Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5307

UNCLAS ASTANA 000756 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/PPD 
PA/OBS/P FOR GEORGE SANTULLI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPAO OPRC OIIP
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  TV CO-OP SUBMISSIONS 2009 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY:  Embassy Kazakhstan is proud to submit two 
proposals for the 2009 TV Co-Op Program.  The first is a proposal to 
produce a series of news stories and a 15-minute documentary on 
trafficking in persons (TIP) in the United States.  They will air 
both locally and on the popular national channels "Astana" and 
"Channel 31."  These stories will also be used as educational tools 
by local NGOs and the Embassy office of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement (INL).  The second proposal is for a series of 
stories highlighting the life of disabled people in the United 
States.  The stories will appear on "Era TV," a growing Astana-based 
television company.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Trafficking In Persons:  The Proposal 
 
2.  (U) Journalist Yuliya Yefremova plans to investigate the chain 
of trafficking in illegal immigrants from Mexico to the United 
States.  She would describe the role U.S. border security plays in 
fighting trafficking and how U.S NGOs support victims of TIP. 
 
3.  (U) On returning to Kazakhstan, Ms. Yefremova plans to produce 
five 3-minute news stories and a 15-minute documentary on anti-TIP 
activities in the United States.  In addition to her main subject, 
Ms. Yefremova will create five news stories on cultural and social 
life in America.  Every news story and the documentary will air at 
prime time on "Channel 31 Ust-Kamenogorsk," local independent 
station "Kalken TV," and government-owned channel "Oskemen 
Kazakhstan."  Additionally, the news stories and the documentary 
will be run on the national channels "Channel 31" and "Astana." 
 
Trafficking in Persons:  The Justification 
 
4.  (U) Kazakhstan faces a growing problem of illegal migration and 
human trafficking from other Central Asian countries.  The danger of 
falling victim to sexual and labor slavery is very real for illegal 
migrants.  Also, the limited number of shelters for TIP victims is 
another major Kazakhstani problem.  NGOs willing operate shelters, 
but with little government or private funding.  To help counteract 
these societal problems, Ms. Yefremova hopes to: 
 
-- Study U.S. border security in terms of prevention of illegal 
migration and TIP, and obtain statistics on TIP and illegal 
migration; 
 
-- Participate in law enforcement operations aimed at stopping 
illegal migration and/or TIP; 
 
-- Visit shelters operated by NGOs for TIP victims and/or illegal 
migrants and learn about their operations and management; 
 
-- Interview TIP victims and illegal migrants to get a sense of 
their motivation; 
 
-- Interview independent analysts to get a balanced view of the 
problem; 
 
5.  (U) Securing Kazakhstan's borders against illegal immigration 
and human smuggling dovetails with numerous Embassy programs to 
prevent trafficking in narcotics, to prevent non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and to prevent the rapid spread of 
disease across borders, among others.  These reports would create 
popular support for several of our Mission Strategic Goals, such as 
Partnership in Regional and Strategic Security, Ensuring 
Non-proliferation to Bolster Global Security, and Improving Health 
in Kazakhstan to Promote Security and Prosperity.  Highlighting U.S. 
NGO work helps to build civil society in Kazakhstan, and the life 
and culture pieces will create mutual understanding.  It's hard to 
imagine another single program that touches on as many of Embassy 
Astana's goals as does this proposal. 
 
Trafficking In Persons:  The Journalist 
 
6.  (U) Yuliya Yefremova is a freelance journalist who has covered 
TIP cases in East Kazakhstan.  She created and anchors the View 
Point program at "Channel 31 Ust-Kamenogorsk."  In 2006, she was 
named Journalist of the Year for social, economic, and political 
issues by the mayor of Ust-Kamenogorsk.  In 2008, she won first 
prize in a Eurasia Foundation competition for her coverage of 
illegal immigration and TIP.  This will be her first TV Co-Op 
opportunity. 
 
Trafficking In Persons:  The Details 
 
7.  (U) PA/OBS/BS will be asked to assist the crew in identifying 
appropriate site visits and contacts for interviews.  Travel 
expenses to the United States for the two journalists will be paid 
by the INL office of U.S. Embassy Astana.  Post will cover travel 
expenses for the interpreter. 
 
Disabilities in America:  The Proposal 
 
8.  (U) Dana Saudegerova of "Era TV" plans to film a series of TV 
stories (approximately ten 20-minute TV reports) about disabled 
people in the United States.  Her stories will focus on how American 
with disabilities live and work day-to-day.  The stories will be 
broadcast in prime time and will be heavily advertised. 
 
Disabilities in America:  The Justification 
 
9.  (U) Disability is a very sensitive topic for Kazakhstani 
society.  Kazakhstani disabled people live in appalling conditions 
leftover from the Soviet era.  Many stay locked in their apartments 
for months since staircases and elevators are not designed for 
wheelchairs or crutches.  People with disabilities are often unable 
to work or attend
 schools or universities.  They tend to live in 
poverty, since it is always impossible to find a job and family 
members often have to quit their jobs to provide care.  Also, public 
places are not wheelchair accessible, so disabled people are cut off 
from the life of Kazakhstani society.  The American experience in 
the field of disabilities, and especially the effects of the 
American with Disabilities Act, can help change the attitudes of 
both authorities and the general public in Kazakhstan toward the 
disabled.  Some of the issues Ms. Saudegerova would like to explore 
include: 
 
--Social Safety Net - Is it enough to allow for food, housing, 
medicine, and a decent life; 
 
--Employment - Can disabled people find work, are they paid fairly, 
do they work together with people who are not disabled; 
 
--Daily life - How do disabled people move around the city and visit 
public places?  How are they integrated into society; 
 
--Education - What is the effect of disabilities on children in 
school? 
 
10.  (U) By showing the constructive way America has integrated 
people with disabilities into daily life, something our exchange 
program returnees invariably comment on, these reports will do more 
than simply create a positive view of the United States and build 
mutual understanding, though these goals are certainly worthy enough 
in their own right.  They can also support a sense of civic virtue 
that is absent in many post-Soviet societies.  The American approach 
to people with disabilities focuses attention on the need for civil 
society in Kazakhstan, and the importance of tolerance for and 
understanding of minorities.  This strongly supports one of our high 
priority Mission Strategic Goals, Supporting the Development of 
Democratic Systems and Practices. 
 
Disabilities in America:  The Journalist 
 
11.  (U) Dana Saudegerova is a correspondent for "Era TV," an 
Astana-based television company that has been growing in influence 
and viewership over the last year.  "Era" has worked closely with 
the Embassy on many projects, and we hope to develop that 
relationship as the channel becomes more and more influential.  This 
will be Ms. Saudegerova's first TV Co-Op opportunity. 
 
Disabilities in America:  The Details 
 
12.  (U) PA/OBS/BS will be asked to assist the crew in identifying 
appropriate site visits and contacts for interviews.  Travel 
expenses to the United States for journalists will be paid for by 
"ERA TV." 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

09ASTANA748, KAZAKHSTAN: A KCTS SCORECARD OF RISKS AND REWARDS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA748 2009-04-30 05:21 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2833
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHROV
RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0748/01 1200521
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 300521Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5298
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1550
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0927
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1630
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0614
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1112
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1026
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1467

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000748 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, EEB/ESC 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA FOR DAN STEIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET EINV RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  A KCTS SCORECARD OF RISKS AND REWARDS 
 
REF:  ASTANA 0675 
 
ASTANA 00000748  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  From April 7-17, Energy Officer accompanied a 
definitional mission from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency to 
identify potential technical assistance projects in support of the 
Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS).  During the course 
of that mission, Energy Officer traveled to Atyrau, Aktau, Kuryk, 
and Bautino on the Kazakhstani shores of the Caspian, discussing the 
cross-Caspian transportation of oil with international oil company 
(IOC) executives, port authorities, shipping companies, local 
government officials, and Western diplomats.  Reftel reports on 
current and future infrastructure investments associated with the 
development of KCTS.  This cable draws upon those conversations and 
observations to provide an updated scorecard of the players, and 
their positions, in KCTS.  Negotiations among KMG, SOCAR, and the 
IOCs have intensified in recent weeks and major decisions must be 
made soon if the system is to be ready in time for first oil from 
Kashagan in 2013.  The most critical issues to be resolved are the 
construction of tankers to transport Tengiz and Kashagan crude 
volumes across the Caspian and the nature of IOC participation in 
the project.  It also remains to be seen whether Russia will 
influence the development of KCTS, perhaps by building the large 
tankers called for by the IOCs, or shipping vessel modules through 
the Volga-Don canal.  END SUMMARY. 
 
KCTS IS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER 
 
3.  (SBU) KCTS is a simple concept, but an incredibly complex 
project.  Its success requires billions of dollars of investment, 
concerted diplomatic effort, new institutions and infrastructure, 
and a level of trust and cooperation among national oil companies, 
government ministries, local officials, and international oil 
companies not seen since the early days of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline.  In its fullest form, KCTS will transport more than 
one million barrels of crude each day by pipeline from Eskene near 
the oilfields to Kuryk on Kazakhstan's Caspian coast, load it onto 
large tankers, ship it to Baku, and pump it into the BTC pipeline, 
where the crude will be sold on the world market.  But KCTS means 
different things to different people.  Some argue, for example, that 
existing infrastructure -- such as oil loading terminals at Aktau 
and Baku -- should be excluded.  Others say that smaller tankers 
should continue to be used, at least in the beginning.  There are 
many permutations of the project, and the definition of KCTS depends 
on who is talking, and what they have at stake. 
 
INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES 
 
4.  (SBU) The IOCs know that they need an outlet for future oil 
production from Tengiz and Kashagan, even if pipelines via Russia 
and China are expanded as planned.  But the companies say they will 
not commit crude volumes to KCTS unless they have equity in the 
Eskene-Kuryk pipeline and the trans-Caspian project (the marine 
portion from terminal to ship to terminal).  Although the IOCs are 
not in the shipping business, they insist that partial ownership of 
vessels, buoys, and docks will help control risk, cost, and safety. 
They are clearly wary of Azerbaijani assurances that fees and 
tariffs will be transparent, fixed, and reasonable.  Furthermore, if 
there is an oil spill in the Caspian, they know that the media 
spotlight will be on the Western majors, not the parastatal 
bystanders.  IOCs insist on using large, 63,000 deadweight ton 
tankers with trained crews operating according to international 
standards in order to increase safety and reduce risk.  They will 
likely end up financing the majority of the project, which could 
cost as much as $9 billion, including the Eskene-Kuryk pipeline. 
 
KAZMUNAIGAS 
 
5.  (SBU) KMG needs KCTS as much as the international companies do, 
if not more so.  As an equal partner in the Kashagan consortium, KMG 
must export its production volumes as safely and efficiently as 
possible.  In addition, as a national oil company, KMG has a larger 
 
ASTANA 00000748  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
strategic interest in ensuring the development of an alternative 
export route that is not controlled by any one country.  KCTS, from 
KM
G's perspective, will provide that flexibility by theoretically 
enabling Kashagan crude to be shipped in three directions:  Baku, 
Makhachkala (Russia), and Neka (Iran).  The risk to KMG is that 
SOCAR, its joint venture partner in the project, will squeeze 
tariffs and extract rent from KCTS at every turn, severely reducing 
the netback price for crude shipments from Kazakhstan.  KMG is also 
concerned about ceding control or majority ownership of KCTS 
infrastructure assets that will be built in Kazakhstan, such as 
ports and terminals. 
 
THE STATE OIL COMPANY OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN 
 
6.  (SBU) Azerbaijan is absolutely essential to the success of KCTS 
and SOCAR knows it.  SOCAR will hold out as long as it can, enjoying 
the advantage of geography, comforted by the thought that 
Kazakhstan's producers will become more willing to negotiate tariff 
terms and service fees as the date of early oil from Kashagan 
approaches.  The risk for SOCAR is that if they wait too long, they 
will own and operate a large -- and largely empty -- pipeline from 
Baku to Ceyhan, as oil production from Shah Deniz and 
Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli declines.  In addition, KMG and Kashagan's 
European partners Eni and Total have spoken openly about shipping 
crude to Neka instead of Baku, although the MOU between Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan requires "mutual agreement" on shipping destinations 
other than Baku.  Finally, it is worth noting that a number of 
influential Azerbaijani shipping companies have a vested interest in 
maintaining the status quo of a smaller, older tanker fleet.  These 
stakeholders will not be eager to go out of business and will want a 
piece of the action even if new, large tankers are used. 
 
MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES 
 
7.  (SBU) Recent comments from Minister of Energy Mynbayev and Vice 
Minister Kiinov indicate that Kazakhstan's Ministry of Energy (MEMR) 
takes a more conservative, if not skeptical, view of KCTS.  As a 
government agency, it is keenly aware of the political implications 
of developing an oil export route that circumvents Russia.  The 
Ministry is no doubt wary of needlessly annoying their neighbors to 
the north with public statements extolling the virtues of 
trans-Caspian shipping.  MEMR is likely also concerned about the 
fiscal and political wisdom of embarking on a multi-billion dollar 
project during a severe economic crisis.  Mynbayev struck a populist 
pose when he insisted that the government will retain a majority (51 
percent) stake in the pipeline portion of the project (i.e., the 
Eskene-Kuryk pipeline).  Nevertheless, if MEMR were to be convinced 
of both the urgency and benefits of the project -- and if the IOCs 
said they would pay for it -- MEMR could become an ardent champion. 
Certainly, the Ministry understands the importance of finding an 
outlet for oil from Kashagan, upon which so much of Kazakhstan's 
future development depends.  Unlike the 30-somethings who run KMG 
and KazMorTransFlot, MEMR is managed by a trusted old guard of 
veteran oilmen who will undoubtedly weigh in with President 
Nazarbayev when he makes the final decision about when, where, and 
whether to move forward with KCTS. 
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
8.  (SBU) For the regional government of Mangistau oblast and local 
officials there, KCTS is a gold mine waiting to be discovered -- and 
divided.  In their eyes, the project has the power to modernize 
infrastructure, triple the population, create thousands of jobs, and 
transform sleepy towns into bustling port cities.  It will quite 
literally put Kuryk on the map.  The risk for local governments is 
that the project will not go forward for political, financial, 
technical, or other reasons -- a risk only increased by recent 
reports of infighting among authorities.  On April 24, Kazakhstan's 
Procurator General annulled a decision by the mayor of Kuryk to 
lease 16.77 hectares of coastal land to Ersai Caspian Contractors, a 
50-50 joint venture of Italy's Saipem and Kazakhstan's ERC Holdings, 
for 48.2 million tenge ($321,333).  The head of the local 
administration of neighboring Karakiyanski raion protested the 
 
ASTANA 00000748  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
decision and appealed to the Procurator General, who ruled that the 
land is legally considered part of Kazakhstan's territorial waters 
and therefore the rights to its use and disposition may be decided 
only by the central government. 
 
THE RUSSIAN TRUMP CARD 
 
9.  (SBU) Would Russia support a project that is designed to 
circumvent its territory and reduce its control over energy exports 
from the region?  Russian sensitivities about alternative energy 
export routes from Central Asia are indeed high.  In a meeting with 
the Ambassador on April 29, Russian Ambassador Mikhail Bocharnikov 
alleged that the United States has urged that no oil should flow 
from Kazakhstan through Russia and should instead be sent to China. 
Yet Russian opposition to KCTS has been surprisingly muted, perhaps 
because the project is largely undefined and unfunded.  It is still 
not clear, for example, what size tankers will be used, where they 
will be built and assembled, and who will pay for them.  The Russian 
government would clearly prefer Kazakhstani crude to transit Russian 
territory, which explains its support for the expansion of Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline, expansion of the Atyrau-Samara 
pipeline, and establishment of a quality bank system for exports 
from the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.  These measures will ensure 
that, even once KCTS becomes a reality, the majority of Kazakhstan's 
oil will continue to go through Russia.  Nevertheless, there are 
several ways in which Russia could participate in (and have leverage 
over) KCTS.  For example, Russian shipyards in Astrakhan, Nizhny 
Novgorod, or St. Petersburg could be contracted to build the 63,000 
dwt tankers.  Alternatively, if the ships are built outside the 
Caspian, for example in South Korea, the modules would have to be 
delivered to the Caspian through the Volga-Don canal.  No shipyard 
on the Caspian currently has the capability to build the large 
tankers that the IOCs insist are necessary to make the project safe 
and commercially viable.  Russia therefore holds a tanker trump card 
that could determine the ultimate success of the project.  It 
remains to be seen how and when they will play that card, but it is 
clear that the stakes will rise as Kashagan's production deadlines 
near. 
 
MILAS

Wikileaks

09ASTANA744, KAZAKHSTAN: “TASZHARGAN” EDITOR ARRESTED AND RELEASED,

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA744.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA744 2009-04-29 10:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7219
OO RUEHNEH
DE RUEHTA #0744/01 1191026
ZNR UUUUU ZZHZDF
O 291026Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5294
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1548
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0925
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1628
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0612
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2306
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2636
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2050
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1110
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1024
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000744 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  "TASZHARGAN" EDITOR ARRESTED AND RELEASED, 
PAPER CEASES PUBLICATION 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 0715 
      (B) ASTANA 0545 
 (C) ASTANA 0479 
 (D) ASTANA 0431 
 (E) ASTANA 0006 
 
ASTANA 00000744  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Yermurat Bapi, editor of the opposition 
newspaper "Taszhargan," was arrested on April 23 for failing to pay 
a 30 million tenge ($200,000) court-ordered damage award to a 
parliamentarian, but was released the same day after the Almaty 
procurator's office protested his detention.  Bapi's quick release 
was reportedly the result of an unexpected intervention from 
President Nazarbayev's daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva.  We were told 
she intervened to prevent the case from marring her Eurasian Media 
Forum -- an international media conference which was taking place in 
Almaty at the time of the arrest (ref A).  Civil society activists 
sharply criticized the arrest as an act of political pressure 
against independent media.  Following his release, Bapi sent a 
letter to various government agencies and diplomatic missions, 
including this Embassy, announcing his intention to cease 
publication of "Taszhargan," lest it create a risk for his 
colleagues, and claiming that the excessive fine levied against him 
was part of a campaign to suppress freedom of speech in Kazakhstan. 
He later confirmed to us that "Taszhargan" has ceased publication, 
and said he will begin publishing a new paper, under a different 
name, at the beginning of May.  END SUMMARY. 
 
EDITOR ARRESTED AND RELEASED 
 
3.  (SBU) (SBU) Yermurat Bapi, editor of the opposition newspaper 
"Taszhargan," was arrested and sentenced to five days in jail on 
April 23 for disobeying a court order to apologize and pay damages 
to Romin Madinov, a member of the Mazhilis, the lower house of 
Kazakhstan's parliament.  Bapi was released the same day after the 
Almaty procurator's office protested his detention.  On February 26, 
the Almaty City Court -- an appellate body -- had ordered Bapi to 
pay 30 million tenge ($200,000) in compensation for emotional 
damages to Madinov, increasing ten-fold a district court's January 
decision to grant Madinov 3 million tenge ($20,000) in damages (refs 
D and E).  As reported previously, the judgment against "Taszhargan" 
stems from an article that referred to Madinov as a "land baron" and 
implied that he was involved in shady business activities (ref E). 
Bapi planned to take the case to Kazakhstan's Supreme Court, but 
that appeal has been delayed for technical reasons. 
 
INTERVENTION FROM POWERS THAT BE? 
 
4.  (SBU) Bapi's quick release from custody was reportedly aided by 
an intervention from a higher power, President Nazarbayev's 
daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva.  His arrest coincided with the opening 
in Almaty of the Eurasian Media Forum, a large international media 
conference organized by Nazarbayeva and co-sponsored by CNN and the 
"International Herald Tribune" (ref A).  We understand from contacts 
who attended the conference that Rozlana Taukina, head of the NGO 
Journalists in Danger, approached Nazarbayeva regarding Bapi's 
arrest and asked her to intervene, arguing that it was poor optics 
for the Forum.  Nazarbayeva reportedly then "made a phone call" -- 
and Bapi was released shortly afterwards. 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY SURPRISED BY THE ARREST 
 
5.  (SBU) Tamara Kaleyeva, the director of media watch-dog NGO Adil 
Soz, ascribed Bapi's arrest to the wish of some "mid-level 
bureaucrats to make a name for themselves on a high-profile case." 
She joked that the Kazakhstani government could have picked a 
"better time" to arrest Bapi, i.e., sometime other than during the 
Media Forum.  Kaleyeva reiterated her view that the "Taszhargan" 
ruling contradicts the law since the courts must take into account 
the finances of a media outlet in assessing damages in libel cases. 
She argued that the case is "a warning to other journalists." 
Almaty Helsinki Committee head Ninel Fokina said she was "shocked" 
 
ASTANA 00000744  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
to hear about Bapi's arrest.  Court judgments against construction 
companies that embezzled the funds of their investors have 
languished for years, she argued, and yet Bapi is asked to come up 
with the full sum "a mere two months after the court's decision." 
 
"TASZHARGAN" CEASES PUBLICATION 
 
6.  (SBU) On April 23, Bapi sent a letter to various government 
agencies and diplomatic missions, including the U.S. Embassy, 
announcing his intention to cease publicati
on of "Taszhargan."  "I 
do not want to create any risks for my friends, journalists, and 
their families," wrote Bapi.  He claimed that the government, and 
possibly even President Nazarbayev, is behind the court decision to 
impose the heavy fine on the newspaper, which he insisted was the 
result of legitimate article reporting on corruption and the need 
for democratic reform.  (COMMENT:  The article did not actually 
directly touch on the issue of democratic reform.  END COMMENT.) 
Bapi maintained that the damage award was beyond the financial means 
of any independent publication, and called on the international 
community to protest the "campaign to suppress freedom of speech in 
Kazakhstan." 
 
7.  (SBU) Bapi confirmed to us on April 28 that "Taszhargan" has 
ceased publication.  He said that he will begin publishing a new 
newspaper, under a different name, at the beginning of May.  He is 
fairly certain that this strategy will help him avoid paying the 
fine since the court judgment was technically against "Taszhargan" 
and not Bapi personally.  This is the fifth time that Bapi closed a 
newspaper and established a new one to avoid paying compensation in 
libel cases or what he calls "excessive taxes." 
 
8.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Bapi has not yet exhausted all the legal 
remedies available, and it is possible that the judgment against 
"Taszhargan" will be overturned by the Supreme Court.  Even if it 
isn't, it looks like Bapi will succeed, as he has done in the past, 
in continuing his work by opening up a new paper under a different 
name -- an indication of what a strange cat and mouse game this is. 
In a March 5 letter to Foreign Minister Tazhin on the "Taszhargan" 
case, OSCE Freedom of the Media Representative Miklos Haraszti 
explained that in accordance with OSCE commitments and Council of 
Europe standards, damage awards in defamation cases "should not 
bankrupt or endanger" media outlets.  The Ambassador stressed this 
very point in a March 10 meeting with Presidential Human Rights 
Commission Chairman Saginbek Tursunov.  We should consider raising 
the issue of excessive fines for libel again during Foreign Minister 
Tazhin's May 4-5 visit to Washington.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA734, KAZAKHSTAN: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PED EXTENSION,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA734 2009-04-28 11:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7209
RR RUEHNEH
DE RUEHTA #0734 1181135
ZNY CCCCC ZZHZDF
R 281135Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5281
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1544
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0921
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0608
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1624
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2302
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2632
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1106
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1020
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000734 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE, F, ISN 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EAID KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PED EXTENSION, 
PPEPI, AND BN-350 FUNDING WITH ECONOMY MINISTER SULTANOV 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 07756 
     B. (B) O,MARA-FAGIN APRIL 22 E-MAIL 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  During an April 28 meeting, the Ambassador 
informed Minister of Economy and Budget Planning Bakhyt 
Sultanov about the U.S government's approval of a three-year 
extension for the Program for Economic Development (PED) and 
updated him on the progress of the U.S.-Kazakhstan 
Public-Private Economic Partnership Initiative (PPEPI). 
Sultanov welcomed the news on the PED's extension and PPEPI's 
progress.  The Ambassador also stressed the need for the 
Kazakhstani government to follow through on its funding 
commitments for our joint program to store spent fuel from 
Kazakhstan's BN-350 plutonium breeder reactor.  Sultanov 
responded that the necessary funding may be available from 
Kazakhstan's budget reserve.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) During an April 28 meeting, the Ambassador informed 
Minister of Economy and Budget Planning Bakhyt Sultanov that 
the U.S. government has agreed to extend the 
USAID-implemented Program for Economic Development (PED) for 
an additional three years, 2010-12.  The PED extension will 
allow for extended implementation of existing activities, as 
well as the development of new initiatives.  The Ambassador 
said that we look for continued cost-sharing for PED, with 
the Kazakhstani government bearing a greater percentage of 
PED expenses during the extension period. 
 
3. (SBU) The Ambassador also updated Sultanov on the 
Public-Private Economic Partnership Initiative (PPEPI), 
explaining that the five PPEPI working groups had convened 
for the first time during the past week.  The working groups 
will produce policy recommendations for the Kazakhstani 
government.  The Ambassador emphasized that if these policy 
recommendations are implemented, they should significantly 
improve Kazakhstan's investment climate. 
 
4. (SBU) Sultanov thanked the Ambassador for the good news on 
the PED extension and on PPEPI's progress, explaining that he 
was pleased about our continued bilateral cooperation on 
these economic issues.  He acknowledged that the ongoing 
economic crisis had raised many questions about the 
Kazakhstani business environment and said that "these 
programs will do a lot to help us." 
 
5. (C) Per refs A and B, the Ambassador also stressed the 
need for the Kazakhstani government to follow through on its 
funding commitments for our joint program to store spent fuel 
from Kazakhstan's BN-350 plutonium breeder reactor at the 
Baikal-1 site.  He passed Sultanov a non-paper on the issue 
and reminded him that the U.S. Department of Energy has 
already spent more than $100 million on the BN-350 spent fuel 
program.  The Ambassador requested that the Ministry of 
Economy and Budget Planning allocate $5 million for 2009 so 
that the project can stay on schedule.  Sultanov appeared 
somewhat surprised that the $5 million was needed for this 
year, but indicated that the money could be made available 
from budget reserve funds.  He said that his Ministry would 
need to receive a request and the necessary documentation 
from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR). 
The Ambassador thanked Sultanov and said the Embassy would 
follow up directly with MEMR. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA728, KAZAKHSTAN: ASD BENKERT PRESSES FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA728 2009-04-28 02:55 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7229
PP RUEHNEH
DE RUEHTA #0728/01 1180255
ZNY SSSSS ZZHZDF
P 280255Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5273
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 1541
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0918
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0605
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1621
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1103
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1017
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0073
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2629
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2299

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000728 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  ASD BENKERT PRESSES FOR 
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRESS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 31628 
 
ASTAN...

Wikileaks

09ASTANA725, KAZAKHSTAN: RECOMMENDATION THAT WE NOT DEMARCHE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA725 2009-04-27 11:40 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0725 1171140
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271140Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5269

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE, SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019 
TAGS: PREL KV KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  RECOMMENDATION THAT WE NOT DEMARCHE 
GOVERNMENT TO RECOGNIZE KOSOVO 
 
REF: A. STATE 41665 
     B. ASTANA 0261 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
(C)  Post recommends that we not deliver ref A demarche 
requesting that the Kazakhstani government recognize Kosovo. 
As outlined previously in ref B, we believe this would be 
counterproductive. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA724, KAZAKHSTAN: LIFE ON THE STEPPE, APRIL 18-24

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA724 2009-04-27 11:25 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9749
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHROV
RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0724/01 1171125
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271125Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5267
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1539
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0916
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1619
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0603
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1101
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1015
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1457

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000724 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON SOCI SENV KCRM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  LIFE ON THE STEPPE, APRIL 18-24 
 
ASTANA 00000724  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  This is another in a series of weekly cables drawn mostly from 
public media, as well as think-tank, NGO, and opposition web-sites, 
selected to show the diversity of life in Kazakhstan, and 
information about it available to citizens of Kazakhstan.  Our goal 
is to choose what might interest and be of use to various end-users 
in Washington and -- especially -- to provide a more complex view 
from the other side of the world, illustrating the vitality (and 
sometimes the quirkiness) of discourse available to citizens of 
Kazakhstan. 
 
OIL WORKERS' STRIKE ENDS IN SUCCESS 
 
2.  Oil workers in Mangistau oblast who had not been paid for 
several months had to resort first to a labor strike and then to a 
hunger strike to finally receive what was rightfully theirs.  The 
protests by 70 employees of the Second Drilling Unit of 
UzenMunaiGas, a subsidiary of the Kazakhstani national oil company 
KazMunaiGas, lasted ten days.  Initially, the drillers stopped all 
work and demanded their salaries and the resignation of the unit's 
general director, who unilaterally decided to withhold their 
salaries, ostensibly due to the ongoing financial crisis.  "Seven 
days later, when nothing happened, we announced a hunger strike," 
Zhak Aminov, one of the participants of the protests said.  The 
workers fasted in teams of three in one of the oil company's trucks, 
and at the same time turned to local representatives of the Azat 
opposition party for legal assistance.  With the help of Azat, the 
workers petitioned the management of UzenMunaiGas and local 
authorities to quickly and peacefully negotiate a settlement 
agreeable to both sides. 
 
3.  However, during the night of April 19, three days into the 
hunger strike, local police officers stormed the truck with the 
fasting workers and forcibly removed them.  Yet, as local and 
national media began to pick up the story, the pressure began to 
grow on local authorities to deal with the "pesky" problem.  Local 
authorities denied any excessive use of police force and claimed the 
officers had to arrest the ring leaders of an unsanctioned 
demonstration.  Soon after, however, the authorities relented and 
gave in to the workers' demands.  A decree has been signed promising 
to pay their back wages, and the director and head engineer of the 
Second Drilling Unit have been dismissed. 
 
DEATH OF POLICE CADET REVEALS WEB OF CORRUPTION AND FRAUD 
 
4.  The recent suicide of a young cadet attending the Pavlodar Legal 
College, a school for aspiring law enforcement officers, appears to 
have been the tip of an iceberg of corruption and fraud.  According 
to the school administration, the young man took his life because of 
love woes.  His parents and journalists from the newspaper "Vremya," 
however, tell a different story.  As the newspaper reported in 
several articles, the school, which is formally under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Justice, was run like a personal fiefdom by its 
former director, Colonel Amangazy Syzdykov.  According to an 
internal investigation by the Ministry, which was prompted by the 
first article published in "Vremya," the cadets almost literally 
could not take a step without having to bribe the school 
administration.  Permission for leave cost 1,500-2,000 tenge 
($10-13), passing an exam cost 10,000-15,000 tenge ($66-100), and 
permission to depart on vacation was 7,500-15,000 tenge ($50-$100). 
As it turned out, the young cadet committed suicide in December last 
year not for love but for money, or rather lack thereof.  The 
student reportedly had to pay 15,000 tenge for an examination in 
July 2008, and then another 11,000 tenge ($73).  However, having no 
money, he borrowed the sum from his fellow students promising to pay 
them back when he returned from vacation.  When his parents were 
unable to give him the money, the cadet decided that his situation 
was hopeless and killed himself. 
 
5.  This was not all that the investigation found -- or rather did 
not find.  According to "Vremya," the investigators found no test or 
exam records for the period of 2004-08, meaning that in the time 
period the students of the Pavlodar Legal College did not take a 
single examination.  Moreover, during Syzdykov's tenure, the 
school's payroll listed a number of "dead souls" -- people who were 
receiving salary without actually working.  One instructor who 
travelled overseas when he was supposed to be teaching in Pavlodar 
was actually promoted to major.
 Colonel Syzdykov himself continues 
to have a successful career.  Following his tenure at the Pavlodar 
 
ASTANA 00000724  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Legal College, he was appointed head of the Penitentiary System 
Committee of Pavlodar oblast.  It remains to be seen whether the 
"Vremya" expose and an internal investigation into Syzdykov's "rule" 
at the Pavlodar Legal College will finally catch up with Syzdykov. 
 
RICH BANNED FROM SPECIAL MARKET FOR LOW-INCOME RESIDENTS 
 
6.  Last month, the city of Pavlodar opened up a special market to 
serve low-income residents.  Weeks after opening, however, the 
authorities had to restrict access to it since the cheap prices 
attracted not only the destitute, but also wealthy bargain-hunters. 
According to the local media, Pavlodar's rich quickly became 
regulars at the "Shapagat" market and, arriving in SUVs and 
government-owned cars, were frequently seen leaving with bulging 
shopping bags.  Clearly, everyone loves a bargain, even in 
Kazakhstan.  However, soon goods meant for Pavlodar's invalids, 
pensioners, and other needy people began disappearing from shelves 
before those people actually had a chance to buy them.  Local 
authorities ultimately had to step in and restrict the 
bargain-shopping to those who truly need it.  The "Shapagat" market 
is partially subsidized by the city administration in that its 
vendors do not have to pay rent.  This allows store owners to keep 
prices on average 10 percent lower than anywhere else in the city. 
 
KAZAKHSTANIS ASPIRE TO "CONQUER THE WORLD" WITH KUMYS 
 
7.  Kazakhstan has big plans for kumys, the national drink made from 
fermented mare's milk.  According to Minister of Industry and Trade 
Vladimir Shkolnik, the country plans to increase production of the 
drink and export it beyond Kazakhstan's borders.  "Considering the 
fact that kumys is a Kazakhstani national product that could become 
the country's trademark, we cannot remain in the role of a spectator 
as other countries like Russia, Germany and France slowly fill this 
export niche," said Shkolnik.  Kazakhstan's kumys producers will 
reportedly need government support to acquire new technologies for 
production and preservation and expanded horse ranching. 
Traditional kumys, which is mildly alcoholic (with about 2% of 
average alcohol content), can be stored for only up to three days, 
and its production is limited to the milking period of mares. 
Recently, however, a method of producing pasteurized kumys was 
developed allowing year-round export.  Kumys is often described as 
an "acquired taste" among non-Central Asians, but has been praised 
in Russia for its purported medicinal qualities. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA718, KAZAKHSTAN: CHANGES TO PROTECTION LAW WILL BENEFIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA718 2009-04-27 10:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9697
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHROV
RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0718 1171048
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271048Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5264
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1538
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0915
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1618
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0602
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1100
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1014
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1451

UNCLAS ASTANA 000718 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, G/TIP, SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI SNAR KCRM KTIP KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  CHANGES TO PROTECTION LAW WILL BENEFIT 
VICTIMS OF TIP AND OTHER CRIMES 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  Changes to Kazakhstan's witness protection law will 
enable the government to more quickly provide a full range of 
services to crime victims during lengthy, complex investigations. 
These changes will benefit victims of trafficking-in-persons and 
other serious transnational crimes.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  On April 7, President Nazarbayev signed amendments to the Law on 
State Protection of Participants in Criminal Proceedings.  This law 
provides the legal basis for the government to provide a full range 
of assistance to crime victims and witnesses, including pre-trial 
housing, security, relocation, assistance finding new employment, 
and, in extraordinary cases, assistance in changing one's physical 
appearance. 
 
3.  The new amendments extend the time frame during which government 
assistance and protection can be provided.  Previously, assistance 
could only be provided after the initiation of a criminal case. The 
amendments allow the government to provide assistance at all stages 
of the criminal process from the moment a crime is reported through 
the investigation and trial phases.  In complex crimes, such as 
human trafficking, the success of a prosecution depends greatly on 
the testimony of victims and the lack of protection and assistance 
during the initial stages created unnecessary obstacles to 
successful investigations.  Previously almost all victims had to be 
transferred to NGOs for assistance until a criminal case was 
initiated and government funding could kick in. 
 
4. Amendments were also made to the Criminal Code, the Criminal 
Procedural Code, and the Law on Operational Investigative Activities 
in order to provide protection to convicts, prisoners, and those 
acquitted or whose sentences were dismissed. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA717, KAZAKHSTAN: AMBASSADOR DELIVERS DEMARCHE ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA717 2009-04-27 08:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9563
OO RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHSK RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0717 1170845
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 270845Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5263
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1537

UNCLAS ASTANA 000717 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/RA, SCA/CEN, S/SRAP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ECON AF PK KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  AMBASSADOR DELIVERS DEMARCHE ON 
ISLAMABAD ECONOMIC COOPERATION CONFERENCE TO FM TAZHIN 
 
REF: STATE 39779 
 
(SBU) The Ambassador delivered reftel demarche urging 
high-level Kazakhstani representation at the May 13-14 
Islamabad Regional Economic Cooperation Conference to Foreign 
Minister Marat Tazhin on April 25.  Tazhin responded that the 
Kazakhstani government recognized the importance of the 
conference.  He said they had not yet decided who will attend 
for Kazakhstan, but promised the country will be 
appropriately represented. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA715, KAZAKHSTAN’S EIGHTH EURASIAN MEDIA FORUM:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA715 2009-04-27 06:50 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9624
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHROV
RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0715/01 1170650
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270650Z APR 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5260
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 1534
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0912
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0599
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1615
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1097
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1011
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2626
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2296

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000715 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PROP SOCI KPAO RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN'S EIGHTH EURASIAN MEDIA FORUM: 
OUT-TAKES 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) Dr. (sic) Dariga Nazarbayeva organized (or at least 
it was organized in her name), the Eighth Eurasian Media 
Forum, April 23-24, in Almaty, co-sponsored by CNN and "The 
International Herald Tribune," with support from EuroNews and 
a large number of other international media, media-related, 
and other businesses.  U.S. participants included Republican 
National Committee Chairman Michael Steele, former U.S. 
Congressman and NBC news analyst Harold Ford, former USUN 
Ambassador (and former Ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq) 
Zalmay Khalilzad, and several other lesser but probably 
worthy lights. 
 
3.  (SBU) Those who had attended previous years' events noted 
this eighth iteration was significantly scaled back because 
of the global financial crisis.  Still, the usual MC presided 
-- Riz Khan, former CNN correspondent currently with 
Al-Jazeera (English).  His opening monologue each day 
employed many U.S.-specific political-commentary jokes, but 
left most of the audience scratching their heads, especially 
once his shtick went through translation into Russian, 
because English-Russian word-play jokes notoriously fall flat 
in translation. 
 
4.  (SBU) President Nazarbayev was originally scheduled to 
give the welcome speech, but the final schedule distributed 
at the last minute noted the welcome speech would be 
delivered "on behalf of President Nazarbayev."  The deliverer 
was State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev, reputedly one of 
Nazarbayev's closest confidants.  Saudabayev's speech had 
very little, if anything, to do with international media. 
Instead, it was a well-reasoned message in support of 
international non-proliferation, clearly a nod to the United 
States and other Western partners, both to support the Obama 
Administration's non-proliferation priorities and to burnish 
President Nazarbayev's global non-proliferation credentials 
in his alleged effort to be considered for the Nobel Peace 
Prize.  We talked to Saudabayev's speech writer later who, 
somewhat sheepishly, confirmed both these goals. 
 
5.  (SBU) When Dariga Nazrabayeva subsequently took the stage 
for her welcome comments, she grimly "thanked the President 
of Kazakhstan for his words."  The back-story here is that 
Q, once the golden girl for the future leadership, has been 
sidelined politically because of her (former) marriage to 
Rakhat Aliyev, who is now Nazarbayev's mortal enemy-supremo. 
(Besides that, she tumbled this year out of the Forbes' list 
of international billionaires.)  In the medieval-khan, 
blood-feud-to-the-death battle between Nazarbayev and Aliyev, 
Nazarbayev decreed that Dariga had to divorce Rakhat Aliyev, 
even though she is said to have more than a soft spot for her 
former husband, and, some say, might even bolt to the other 
side -- except that Nazarbayev has taken up her first son, 
his namesake, as a new favorite.  Even more intriguing, word 
on the street is that Nazarbayev is now not averse to letting 
it be known that Dariga is "only" his step-daughter, being 
the off-spring of his official wife from a previous liaison. 
The real facts are hard to determine because both sides -- 
Nazarbayev and Aliyev, with Dariga caught in the middle -- 
have engaged international public relations firms to do 
battle against each other.  And yet Dariga is not without her 
friends.  At the Media Forum, two female members of 
parliament hovered around her like mother hens, including 
former Minister of Justice Baliyeva, who was recently demoted 
to be a member of parliament. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Back to the Media Forum.  As usual at such events, 
the initial presentations in each session were generally 
reasonable and innocuous -- but not all.  Both for the 
record, and for a degree of amusement, certain statements 
 
ASTANA 00000715  002 OF 003 
 
 
follow.  Without doubt, the most outrageous panel participant 
was Igor Panarin, described as a "doctor of geopolitical 
analysis and member of the faculty of the Diplomatic Academy 
of the Russian Foreign Ministry."  He alleged the following: 
 
-- Since the U.S. Administration of President B
ill Clinton, 
there has been no difference between the U.S. political 
parties.  The secret plan is in place and is being 
implemented by the permanent foreign policy cabal of 
Washington to dominate the world. 
 
-- The collapse of the "five totalitarian bankers of Wall 
Street" (sic) marks the beginning of the destruction of 
Imperial America and the equal destruction of global U.S.-led 
capitalism. 
 
-- September 8, 2008 (the Russian invasion of Georgia), was a 
glorious date in world history, because it marked the 
beginning of the spiritual reintegration of the former Soviet 
peoples. 
 
-- The U.S. dollar will collapse and disappear by August 
2009, opening the way for a global currency the following 
year that will be based on the currencies of Russia, China, 
Japan, and maybe the European Union.  Further, within a few 
years the United States will likely disintegrate into a loose 
 commonwealth of mutually antagonistic regional powers. 
Proof for this is the recent call by the Governor of Texas to 
secede his state from the Union, as well as percentages in 
Vermont and North Caroline who favor secession. 
 
NOTE:  Chairman of Kazakhstan's National Bank, Grigoriy 
Marchenko, well known for not suffering fools gladly, raked 
his fingers through his hair, ostentatiously rubbed his neck, 
and stared at the ceiling during Ponarin's wild-eyed 
presentation.  END NOTE. 
 
7.  (SBU) Relatively less loony, and rational more often than 
not, was Gaidar Djemal, Chairman of the Islamic Committee of 
Russia.  Still, he had his colorful moments: 
 
-- The defeat of the Soviet Union didn't fully satisfy the 
people of the world, including in Europe.  They want the 
"Final Solution" against the Homeland (rodina).  There is now 
a great vacuum because American Imperialism has failed. 
Russia is re-emerging as the great world power that will 
organize and lead "the lesser nations." 
 
-- When we speak of the nuclear problem in Iran, we should 
not forget the attitude of the United States.  Obama, like 
Bush, still supports regime change in Tehran.  The U.S. 
nuclear concern is nothing more than a pretense to 
restructure Iranian politics against Russia's interests. 
Obama is not concerned about nuclear weapons in Iran -- he 
wants to achieve the final destruction of Russia. 
 
-- Obama has turned the initial Russian liberal-democratic 
joy about his election into bitter ashes in their mouths. 
He's signaled they don't matter to him.  They now understand 
his cynical rejection of the forces of Russian democracy in 
favor of the final humiliation -- the thorough disarmament of 
Great Russia. 
 
8.  (SBU) Lest it appear we are dumping only on Russian 
participants in the Eurasian Media Forum, Alexander Rahr, 
Program Director for Russia/Eurasia of the German Council on 
Foreign Relations, said, "I have no doubt that Obama has a 
secret agreement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) for the SCO to step into Afghanistan as soon as NATO 
fails.  The goal will appear to be to empower Russia and 
China to be the power arbiters of Eurasia, but the real goal 
 
ASTANA 00000715  003 OF 003 
 
 
will be to bog them down in the 'graveyard of empires.'" 
 
9.  (SBU) Finally, we want to take note of an older 
Kazakhstani intellectual who rose to thunder an impassioned, 
grandly self-important, extraordinarily repetitive 
intervention (until he was cut off by the Chinese moderator), 
demanding to know:  "Why are we wasting time with all these 
different points of view when we should be developing 
instructions for the journalists here so that they know what 
to publish tomorrow!" 
 
10.  (SBU) COMMENT:  We want to acknowledge that the public 
goals of the Eurasian Media Forum -- to bring together 
leaders and thinkers to promote international understanding 
-- are laudable.  At the same time, we acknowledge that we, 
like Grigoriy Marchenko, don't suffer fools gladly.  Maybe 
all international fora are subject to a degree of 
public-intellectual ideological posturing.  This one, 
however, seems to have had more than its fair share of fools. 
 On the other hand, it was an interesting exposure to public 
opinion.  END COMMENT. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA714, KAZAKHSTANI FM TAZHIN’S PRIORITIES FOR HIS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA714 2009-04-27 05:39 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9617
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNP RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #0714/01 1170539
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270539Z APR 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5257
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 1531
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0909
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0596
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1612
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1094
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1008
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2623
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2293

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000714 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D, P, SCA, S/P, S/SRAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2024 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE CH RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTANI FM TAZHIN'S PRIORITIES FOR HIS 
WASHINGTON TRIP, MAY 4-5 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 0674 (SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER 
        TAZHIN'S MAY 4-5 VISIT TO WASHINGTON) 
     B. ASTANA 0731 (KAZAKHSTAN...SEEKS AN ENHANCED 
        RELATIONSHIP) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Previewing for the Ambassador his May 4-5 
visit to Washington, Foreign Minister Tazhin said: 
 
-- he hopes to be prepared to make new "strategic 
non-military proposals" for enhanced Kazakhstani asssistance 
in Afghanistan; 
 
-- he will be fully prepared to discuss with Secretary 
Clinton Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE chairmanship, and wants to 
take back to President Nazarbayev Washington's realistic 
suggestions for countering Russian pressure; 
 
-- "frozen conflicts" will likely be one of Kazakhstan's 
signature issues during its OSCE chairmanship; 
 
-- he will be prepared for a fully frank geostrategic 
discussion with National Security Adviser Jones on Central 
Asia, Russia, and China; and 
 
-- he would appreciate a meeting (although he did not press 
for it), even if brief, with Vice President Biden for its 
symbolic value to demonstrate to Russia Kazakhstan's enhanced 
relationship with the United States.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador met one-on-one with Foreign Minister 
Tazhin on April 25 to discuss Tazhin's visit to Washington, 
May 4-5.  Tazhin said his key issues in Washington will be 
Afghanistan, the OSCE, and the geopolitics of the region.  He 
said he needs to return to Astana with a clear message about 
Washington's priorities for Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE 
chairmanship in order to counter heavy pressure from Russia. 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
3.  (C) Tazhin prefaced his remarks by saying, "Afghanistan 
is increasingly important to us."  He said he is putting 
together "strategic non-military proposals for enhanced 
assistance" so that Kazakhstan can be more helpful to the 
United States and to the International Security Assistance 
Force in Afghanistan.  He declined to offer any details 
because his proposals are not yet fully cleared.  He admitted 
he might arrive in Washington without final approval by the 
government and President Nazarbayev because he has been 
travelling so much and, in his absence, his ideas have not 
moved forward through the interagency process as quickly as 
he would have liked.  However, he promised to make a full 
press in the final week before he departs for Washington. 
 
OSCE 
 
4.  (C) Tazhin said he has already consulted with Russia (and 
Russia has consulted with him more than once), the European 
Commission, and individual European capitals on Kazakhstan's 
2010 OSCE chairmanship.  He commented that Russia's views are 
crystal clear.  Although he declined to elaborate, he said 
that Moscow is pressing him on ODIHR, the Parliamentary 
Assembly, and OSCE membership contributions, "among other 
issues."  European views, however, are less clear to him. 
With a certain degree of frustration, Tazhin described the 
European views as "strongly ideological but not very 
coordinated, and sometimes even contradictory." 
 
5.  (C) Tazhin said it will be very important for him to 
return to Astana with a precise view of what Washington hopes 
to see during Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE chairmanship.  He said 
that clear evidence of a realistic -- and he emphasized 
realistic -- U.S.-Kazakhstan partnership will allow him to 
sell progressive views to President Nazarbayev, whereas if he 
 
ASTANA 00000714  002 OF 003 
 
 
presents them to the President simply as his own 
recommendations, he will have less chance of success.  As an 
example, he cited Kazakhstan's current draft Internet 
legislation, which he described as "idiotic."  He said that a 
strong message from the United States that he can pass to 
Nazarbayev would be helpful, because the President "is 
inclined to listen to you these days." 
 
6.  (C) Tazhin indicated Kazakhstan will include "frozen 
conflicts" in its 2010 priorities, and will likely propose a 
very high-level meeting during 2010, if not necessarily a 
summit, on this issue.  In an aside, he praised the United 
States's role in the current Turkey-Armenia rapprochement. 
He confided that Armenian Foreign Minister Nalbandian had 
told him it couldn't have been achieved without President 
Obama's pe
rsonal attention. 
 
GEOPOLITICS 
 
7.  (C) Tazhin expressed his gratitude that he will have a 
meeting with National Security Adviser Jones.  He noted this, 
in fact, will be his 10th year of meeting with U.S. National 
Security Advisers.  He said, "It will be really important for 
me to understand the Obama Administration's view of Central 
Asia, and especially the situation in Kyrgyzstan.  He said 
bluntly that Kazakhstan sees Kyrgyzstan's President Bakiyev 
as weak, venal, and potentially dangerous for regional 
stability.  He added that he finds "growing tension" between 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan very worrying.  Tazhin said he will 
be prepared to discuss the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
and Kazakhstan's vision for it. 
 
8.  (C) Tazhin emphasized he also will be keenly interested 
in gaining a clear understanding of the "strategic relations" 
between the United States and Russia, as well as between the 
United States and China, and said he will be prepared for a 
very frank exchange.  He said he knows that Russia is not so 
important economically, but Moscow's military power is a 
point of concern.  In an aside, Tazhin commented that 
Kazakhstan promotes its relationship with Russia more than 
its relationship with China "frankly because Russia is the 
weaker of the two.  We would be uncomfortable with China as 
the dominant regional power."  (COMMENT:  Tazhin left it 
unsaid, but we know from other conversations that Russia's 
August 2008 invasion of Georgia was a wake-up call for 
Kazakhstan because it was the first time in the post-Soviet 
period that Russia took direct military action against a 
former Soviet republic.  END COMMENT.) 
 
"SYMBOLISM IS IMPORTANT" 
 
9.  (C) Tazhin said he is very much looking foward to his 
meeting with Secretary Clinton because of his real respect 
for her, where he expects most of the OSCE conversations will 
take place.  He said that he will officially invite her to 
visit Kazakhstan at any time, but hopes she will agree to 
participate in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
ministerial in Astana June 24-25.  He conceded, however, that 
a "stand-alone visit" would have more symbolic importance. 
 
10.  (C) Without pressing for it, he mentioned that he would 
appreciate a short meeting with Vice President Biden for its 
symbolic value.  Tazhin also said he has not yet coordinated 
with Nazarbayev, but he wants to push forward the idea of a 
U.S.-Kazakhstan Commission, perhaps similar to the 
Gore-Nazarbayev Commission during the Clinton Administration 
of the 1990s.  While such commissions can be a bureaucratic 
annoyance, "they do make things happen," he said.  Even more 
important is the symbolic value.  He said bluntly, "Because 
of Russia, we need sustained, high-level contact with 
Washington." 
 
11.  (C) COMMENT:  Foreign Minister Tazhin has long been a 
heavy-weight in President Nazarbayev's inner circle.  Among 
his several previous senior positions, he was briefly the 
 
ASTANA 00000714  003 OF 003 
 
 
chairman of the Committee for National Security (KNB, 
ex-KGB).  Although we believe Tazhin is a key member of the 
progressive camp, he is also a consummate practitioner of the 
"art of the possible."  That is why he is asking for clear -- 
but realistic -- messages from Washington that he can carry 
back to President Nazarbayev to reinforce his own positions. 
 
12.  (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  President-elect Obama's 
telephone call to President Nazarbayev in November was a 
watershed for U.S.-Kazakhstan relations, because it appeared 
to Kazakhstan to signal that the new U.S. Administration was 
ready to pay attention to this strategically located country 
(ref B) and to Central Asia as a whole.  The April 23 Vice 
President Biden-President Nazarbayev telephone call 
reinforced that perception.  We know from various sources and 
multiple conversations that Nazarbayev is uncomfortable with 
the relentless pressure from Moscow, both overt and covert, 
to limit U.S. influence in Kazakhstan and, more broadly, in 
Central Asia.  The more we can forge realistic relations with 
Kazakhstan, the better it is likely to be for U.S. long-term 
interests in this volatile part of the world that stretches 
from Islamabad to Moscow.  END COMMENT. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA713, KAZAKHSTAN — MORE EURASIA THAN CENTRAL ASIA —

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA713 2009-04-27 04:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9364
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNP RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #0713/01 1170408
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270408Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5254
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 1528
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0906
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0593
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1609
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1091
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1005
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2620
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2290
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000713 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR P, SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, S/P, EEB, DRL 
NSC FOR MCFAUL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM ECON RS AF KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN -- MORE EURASIA THAN CENTRAL ASIA -- 
SEEKS AN ENHANCED RELATIONSHIP 
 
REF: ASTANA 0674 (SCENESETTER FOR FM TAZHIN'S MAY 4-5 
     VISIT TO WASHINGTON) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  From many conversations with top-level 
officials and other signals, it is clear Kazakhstan is 
seeking an enhanced relationship with the United States, in 
part to better balance its relations with especially Russia 
but also with China.  Kazakhstan is different from the other 
four countries of Central Asia; it is richer, less 
provincial, and more progressive.  Kazakhstan is a force for 
stability in the region -- it does not employ territorial, 
ethnic, economic, or energy threats or claims against its 
neighbors.  Kazakhstan's early decisions to make serious 
macroeconomic reforms away from a command economy and its 
commitment to prepare a new generation of leaders through 
international education are now paying off.  Civil society is 
alive and well in Kazakhstan, although top-down 
authoritarianism still sets limits.  President Nazarbayev has 
both old-guard and progressive senior advisers and usually 
balances their views with a nod, even if sometimes slight, 
toward the progressive side, although he is cautious as he 
balances his equities.  Constraints toward greater progress 
include the Committee for National Security (ex-KGB) and 
elements of the Ministry of Defense, which lean toward the 
siloviki faction in Moscow.  With smart, reality-based 
diplomacy that puts our long-term national interests first, 
we can build a mutually beneficial, strategic partnership 
with Kazakhstan.  It's our choice, because at the beginning 
of the Obama administration, the door is open.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) The Obama Administration is focusing major 
foreign-policy attention and resources on 
Afghanistan/Pakistan and on the U.S.-Russia bilateral 
relationship.  Kazakhstan -- oil-rich, stable, and relatively 
progressive -- is our most reliable partner between Russia 
and Afghanistan and is seeking to enhance its relationship 
with us, including with more frequent, high-level contacts 
(cabinet-level and above).  We have had a good start with 
President-elect Obama's telephone conversation with President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev in November, which was greatly 
appreciated and widely reported in Kazakhstan; Vice President 
Biden's phone call to Nazarbayev on April 23; and now Foreign 
Minister Marat Tazhin's May 4-5 visit to Washington.  It will 
be important to maintain regular senior-level contacts both 
ways. 
 
WHAT SETS KAZAKHSTAN APART 
 
3.  (C) Since the fall of the Soviet Union nearly two decades 
ago, we have talked about a region we call Central Asia: 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan.  It would be more accurate now to refer to 
Kazakhstan and Central Asia.  Except for a few of its 
southern provinces bordering Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan really is 
not like its more southern neighbors.  It is richer, less 
provincial, and more progressive. 
 
4.  (C) Part of this marked difference is a function of 
history.  While all five countries in the region were 
Sovietized, only Kazakhstan was heavily Russified, with the 
process beginning nearly 300 years ago.  About 30% of 
Kazakhstan's current population is still ethnic Russian, 
compared to single-figure percentages in the other four 
countries.  The northern third of Kazakhstan's vast territory 
is still heavily ethnic-Russian, which is one key reason why 
President Nazarbayev planted his new capital, Astana, firmly 
on the steppes of southern Siberia in 1998 -- to declare to 
any possible irridentists, "All of Kazakhstan is ours." 
 
ASTANA 00000713  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
5.  (C) Another part of Kazakhstan's marked difference is a 
function of national policy.  Two early decisions were 
seminal.  Immediately after independence, Kazakhstan made the 
fundamental decision to become a market economy and undertook 
serious economic and financial reforms, at the same time it 
opened its door to major investment by Western international 
oil companies.  Although Kazakhstan is no stranger to &#
x000A;post-Soviet corruption that allows senior officials and their 
favorites to gain vast wealth, Kazakhstan was wise enough to 
spread the wealth (and had enough available) so that a real 
economic middle class has begun to develop.  Today, 
Kazakhstan's economy is larger than the combined economies of 
the other four states in the region. 
 
6.  (C) A second early decision set Kazakhstan apart from the 
other four.  President Nazarbayev established the Bolashak 
Program to give a new generation of Kazakhstanis full 
university education, mostly in the West.  The nearly 5,000 
alumni of this on-going program are now salted throughout the 
upper mid-levels of the public and private sectors.  Their 
openness to new ideas, sophistication, and self-confidence 
are clearly in evidence in our daily interactions.  While the 
other four countries have serious "capacity problems," 
Kazakhstan is confidently moving ahead, with a new generation 
increasingly prepared to move into power. 
 
BASE OUR FOREIGN POLICY ON OBJECTIVE REALITY 
 
7.  (C) Kazakhstan is a force for stability in the region. 
Relatively prosperous and at peace internally, it does not 
employ territorial, ethnic, economic, or energy threats or 
claims against its neighbors.  Its "multi-vector" foreign 
policy adroitly balances its major partners -- Russia, China, 
the United States, and the European Union -- as well as 
important regional players like India and Iran.  Nazarbayev 
states clearly that Russia is Kazakhstan's number-one 
strategic partner for any number of reasons -- geography, 
history, economics, infrastructure, language, and culture. 
But he makes likewise clear, usually in private, that 
Kazakhstan greatly values its independence and has no 
intention of being anyone's "privileged sphere of influence." 
 Despite the close relations between Moscow and Astana, 
Russia's post-colonial psychology often causes it to 
over-play its hand dealing with Kazakhstan.  The brief 
Russia-Georgia war in 2008 seems to have been, to a degree, a 
wake-up call for Nazarbayev, and we believe he is 
recalibrating his foreign policy somewhat to the advantage of 
the United States.  But it's fine-turning; he doesn't make 
wild swings like Uzbekistan's Karimov between Moscow and 
Washington. 
 
8.  (C) For a time earlier this decade, our bilateral 
relations were constrained to a degree by the primacy of our 
focus on democracy and human rights.  The annual Freedom 
House report that rates Kazakhstan as "not free" and lumps it 
together with Uzbekistan and Belarus -- an absurdity that, to 
use Soviet-speak, "does not correspond to objective reality" 
-- seemed to some to play an inordinate role in determining 
to what degree we would engage with the Government of 
Kazakhstan. 
 
9.  (C) We acknowledge that Kazakhstan is authoritarian, but 
its authoritarianism is generally benign, in some ways even 
relatively progressive.  Although there might not be as many 
independent NGOs as some might like to see, civil society 
exists and is active.  Citizens band together to challenge 
the government on specific issues without fear of being 
rounded up and tossed into prison.  Across the political 
spectrum they provide testimony to Parliamentary committees. 
 
ASTANA 00000713  003 OF 003 
 
 
Government-approved and -financed "public associations" exist 
in which a broad range of opinion is expressed.  Does the 
government always listen and implement the most liberal 
views?  No.  But public discussion without fear of 
retribution is the beginning of democratic institutions. 
Public discussion also occurs in the print media, which 
freely criticize the government (and occasionally even the 
President) and regularly uncover the malfeasance of 
government officials and other scandals. 
 
EYES WIDE OPEN 
 
10.  (C) While we strongly advocate enhanced relations with 
Kazakhstan, including increased senior-level visits both 
ways, two constraints exist we should not ignore.  This is a 
post-Soviet state that has both progressive factions pushing 
for greater liberalization and old-guard factions seeking to 
retain tight control.  The old guard are strong in the 
security bodies, especially in the Committee for National 
Security (KNB, the Soviet KGB successor) and, to a degree, in 
the Ministry of Defense.  The KNB and the Minister of Defense 
himself, but not all his deputies, are generally believed to 
be closely allied to the Russian siloviki faction.  The KNB 
seems addicted to playing games to uncover (or to 
manufacture) "Western threats."  To a degree, they have 
Nazarbayev's ear, but he doesn't automatically succumb to 
their worst instincts. 
 
11.  (C) The second constraint, also KNB-related, is 
Nazarbayev's implacably estranged son-in-law, Rakhat Aliyev 
who is exiled in Europe.  To please Nazarbayev, who feels 
Aliyev has compromised his honor, the KNB has demanded we 
cooperate "to capture Aliyev and render him to Kazakhstan to 
face justice."  We cannot have a dog in that fight.  This 
disappoints Nazarbayev, but it does not prevent him from 
productive cooperation when he judges that our national 
interests coincide. 
 
12.  (C) COMMENT:  With smart, reality-based diplomacy that 
puts our long-term national interests first, we can build a 
mutually beneficial, strategic partnership with Kazakhstan. 
It's our choice, because at the beginning of the Obama 
administration the door is open.  END COMMENT. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA711, KAZAKHSTAN: U.S. AMBASSADOR’S FUND FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA711 2009-04-24 10:18 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8123
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHROV
RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0711/01 1141018
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241018Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5252
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1526
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0904
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1607
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0591
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2288
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2618
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1089
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1003
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000711 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD 
 
E.O.  12958:  N/A 
TAGS: ASEC EFIN PTER KCRM KPAO PTER KHLS AEMR
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  U.S. AMBASSADOR'S FUND FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 
PROPOSAL 
 
1.      (SBU)  Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public 
Internet. 
 PROPOSED PROJECT:  COUNTERING YOUTH EXTREMISM 
 2.     (SBU)  SUMMARY:   Embassy Astana requests $100,000 to 
counter youth extremism in Kazakhstan through English-language 
training and sustained exposure to the best of American culture. 
Modeled on the successful English Access Microscholarship Program, 
this project will counter extremist ideology and recruitment in 
southern and western Kazakhstan.  One hundred disadvantaged youth 
(50 in each of two regions) will be selected to participate in an 
intensive, two-year English language program that will help them 
improve their language ability, expand their job prospects, increase 
their possibility of being selected for exchange programs or study 
abroad opportunities, and offer them a positive vision of the future 
with an emphasis on common values.  END SUMMARY. 
 
EXPLANATION OF HOW THE PROPOSAL WILL ENHANCE THE ABILITY OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS TO DETER TERRORISTS AND TERRORIST GROUPS 
3.     (SBU)  Kazakhstan, with a population of 16.7 million, is a 
Muslim-majority country.  Ethnic Kazakhs, who constitute just over 
half the population, and ethnic Uzbeks, Uighurs, and Tatars, who 
collectively comprise less than 10 percent, are historically Sunni 
Muslims.  Other Islamic groups that account for less than one 
percent include Shafi'i Sunni, Shi'a, Sufi, and Ahmadi.  There are 
approximately 2,200 registered mosques in Kazakhstan. 
 
4.     (SBU)  As noted in the 2008 International Religious Freedom 
Report for Kazakhstan, government officials have increasingly 
expressed concern about the potential spread of political and 
religious extremism. The Committee for National Security (KNB) has 
characterized the fight against "religious extremism" as a top 
priority of the internal intelligence service. 
 
5.     (SBU)  Embassy Astana proposes to prevent the spread of 
violent extremism among Kazakhstan's youth by offering 100 
disadvantaged teenagers an opportunity to participate in an 
intensive, two-year English-language and American cultural program. 
As southern Kazakhstan is one of the poorest regions in the country 
and also has the highest concentration of practicing Muslims, 50 
percent of the students will be selected from Shymkent, the 
principal city in that part of the country.  The other 50 percent 
will be selected from western Kazakhstan, near the city of Aktau, 
due to that region's poor economic conditions and history of 
religious problems, such as unregistered mosques, some of which are 
purportedly linked to Salafi groups. 
 
6.    (SBU)  Students from these two areas frequently come from 
disadvantaged backgrounds and do not hold out hope for a brighter 
future.   Learning English for two solid years will open their eyes 
to a wide range of alternative views and foster their critical 
thinking skills.  They will expand their employment options.  They 
will increase their prospects of being selected for a U.S. 
government-sponsored exchange program or one of the Kazakhstani 
government's presidential fellowships for study abroad (for which 
English is required).  They will aspire to new goals and succeed in 
reaching them, thus becoming less susceptible to extremist ideology 
or recruitment. 
 
PLANNED START DATE 
 
7.     (SBU)  September 15, 2009 through August 15, 2011 
 
ESTIMATED TOTAL COST 
 
8.     (SBU)  $100 K 
 
POTENTIAL SUPPLEMENTARY FUNDING 
 
9.     (SBU)  0 
 
TARGET AUDIENCE 
 
10.     (SBU)  The audience is one hundred underprivileged, 
underrepresented Muslim youth, ages 12-14; 50 will come from 
Shymkent in the south and 50 from Mongistau Oblast in the west. 
Each area is extremely poor and youth have few options, leaving them 
 
ASTANA 00000711  002 OF 002 
 
 
vulnerable to religious extremism.  The focus will be on ethnic 
Uzbeks and other ethnic minorities who have been the most fertile 
ground for extremist recruiting in Kazakhstan. 
 
AUDIENCE PERCEPTIONS 
 
11.     (SBU)  Two years of English-language training and exposure 
to American culture will allow th
em access to other world views and 
sources of information, and improve their chances for participating 
in other USG exchange programs, such as FLEX.  Students' level of 
English will drastically improve, allowing them access to higher 
education and career options they otherwise would not have. 
Students will also develop positive feelings about the United States 
and become less vulnerable to religious extremism. 
 
TASKS AND ACTIVITIES 
 
12.     (SBU)  One hundred Kazakhstani Muslim youth will study 
English and American culture 
six hours a week for two years.  There will be English classes with 
modern materials and 
methods, American holiday parties, field trips, summer camps, and 
service-learning projects 
during the two-year program. The program will be delivered by two in 
country providers, one in 
Shymkent and one in the region of Aktau.  Each in-country provider 
will work closely with 
Embassy Astana to ensure high quality programming.  Embassy Astana 
will make regular site 
visits, bringing American officers to interact with the students and 
teachers in the program. 
Participation certificates and completion certificates will also be 
awarded to all the students. 
 
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
 
13.     (SBU)  Students will be given a language and cultural 
knowledge pre-test and post-test. 
Students' attitudes towards English and the United States will be 
qualitatively checked during the program.  Students' grades in their 
regular English classes will also be monitored, demonstrating their 
quantitative improvement over the two-year period. 
 
BEST PRACTICES 
 
14.     (SBU)  Teachers will take the new materials, methods, and 
modern teaching techniques 
utilized in this program into their regular, government classrooms, 
ultimately 
improving the quality of language instruction in these two cities. 
In addition to having solid 
English language skills, these students will also have a more 
positive view of the United States, 
creating powerful pockets of goodwill. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA678, KAZAKHSTAN: CHINA NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION ACQUIRES

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA678 2009-04-23 07:39 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7055
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0678/01 1130739
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230739Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5219
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1524
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0902
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1605
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0589
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1087
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1001
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1440

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000678 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, EEB/ESC 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA FOR DAN STEIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET EINV RS IR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  CHINA NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION ACQUIRES 
50 PERCENT STAKE IN MANGISTAUMUNAIGAS 
 
ASTANA 00000678  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (U) SUMMARY:  On April 16, during President Nazarbayev's state 
visit to Beijing, KazMunaiGas (KMG) and China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) announced that they will jointly acquire the 
production assets of MangistauMunaiGas (MMG), Kazakhstan's 
fourth-largest oil producer at 100,000 barrels per day.  The two 
companies will manage the assets via Mangistau Investments BV, an 
investment vehicle in which both companies have a 50 percent stake. 
CNPC will reportedly pay $1.4 billion for its share in MMG, which 
has proven reserves of 812 million tons of crude, including 194 
million tons of extractable reserves.  KMG will use a $5 billion 
loan from the Chinese to pay for its stake.  The transaction is 
scheduled be finalized by the end of July 2009, after relevant 
regulatory approvals are obtained.  The assets of MMG acquired by 
KMG and CNPC include the Kalamkas deposit and Zhetybai group.  MMG's 
shares in the Pavlodar oil refinery were excluded from the deal. 
The Chinese sweetened the deal through an additional $5 billion loan 
to the Development Bank of Kazakhstan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (U) On April 16, during President Nazarbayev's state visit to 
Beijing, KMG and CNPC Exploration and Development Company (CNPC E&D) 
signed an agreement to acquire 100% of the common shares in 
MangistauMunaiGas from Central Asia Petroleum Ltd.  The shares in 
MMG will be acquired through Mangistau Investments B.V., a joint 
venture co-owned by KMG and CNPC E&D.  The transaction is scheduled 
to close at the end of July, after relevant regulatory approvals 
have been obtained, and will be funded by the Export-Import Bank of 
China.  The assets acquired by KMG and CNPC E&D include the Kalamkas 
deposit, Zhetybai group, and other exploration blocks owned by MMG. 
Notably, the shares and assets of the Pavlodar oil refinery, 58 
percent of which was owned by MMG, were excluded from the 
transaction and are expected to be acquired and managed solely by 
KMG. 
 
4.  (SBU) On April 17, KMG First Vice President Maksat Idenov told 
the Ambassador at a private dinner that he had two comments about 
the deal with China.  "First," he said, "this is the decision of the 
government, and of course we respect it and will implement it. 
Second, I will tell you what I would tell my wife in the kitchen. 
It's a shame.  When we deal with the Chinese, there is always 
concern about quality and performance, safety and security, health 
and the environment.  But how can you walk away from $10 billion?" 
(COMMENT:  Idenov did not accompany the official delegation to 
Beijing, so it appears that this deal was made without his direct 
involvement, which is unusual for a transaction of this magnitude. 
We take Idenov's reference to "the government" to mean President 
Nazarbayev and/or Prime Minister Masimov.  END COMMENT). 
 
5.  (U) According to the terms of the deal, KMG will receive $5 
billion in financial support to finance acquisition of its share of 
MMG, and construction of the Beineu-Bozoi-Akbulak gas pipeline, 
which will traverse southern Kazakhstan and lessen the country's 
dependence on imported natural gas from Uzbekistan.  In addition, 
the Development Bank of Kazakhstan will receive a $5 billion loan 
from the Export-Import Bank of China. 
 
6.  (SBU) MMG was established in 1995 and was reportedly controlled 
by President Nazarbayev's then-son-in-law, Rakhat Aliyev, through 
the Central Asia Petroleum Company, incorporated in the British 
Virgin Islands, until his 2007 falling out with Nazarbayev.  MMG is 
one of the largest enterprises in Mangistau oblast and the fourth 
largest oil producer in Kazakhstan at 100,000 bpd.  The company has 
36 oil and gas deposits, 15 of which are under development.  The 
largest deposits in terms of reserves are Kalamkas and Zhetybai.  In 
1996, the company received 25-year licenses from the government to 
develop the oil and gas fields of Asar, Burmasha, Kalamkas, East 
Zhetybai, and Oimasha; the oil fields of Alatobe and North Asar; and 
the oil-and-gas-condensate fields Zhetybai and South Zhetybai. 
 
7.  (SBU) Accord
ing to Tanya Costello, Director of the Eurasia 
Group, the acquisition of MMG is particularly important for CNPC 
 
ASTANA 00000678  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
because MMG is already producing oil and does not require 
significant development investment.  It also produces heavy oil, 
which is needed to mix with the lighter oil currently produced in 
the Turgai Basin that travels via the Kazakhstani-China oil 
pipeline.  Costello said that the lighter oil from the Turgai Basin 
risks freezing during winter months without being blended with 
heavier crude. 
 
8.  (SBU) Costello also commented on the $5 billion loan from 
China's Export-Import Bank which will go to the Development Bank of 
Kazakhstan, which is owned by the Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare 
Fund, where President Nazarbayev's son-in-law Timur Kulibayev serves 
as Deputy Chairman.  She said it is unclear exactly which sectors of 
the economy will receive support from this loan and worried that 
funds will be directed to companies associated with Kulibayev 
himself rather than the most vulnerable parts of the economy. 
 
9.  (U) In addition to purchasing 50 percent of MMG, China plans to 
build a refinery in Kazakhstan, near the Chinese border.  In a 
newspaper interview on April 14, Chinese Ambassador to Kazakhstan 
Cheng Guoping said the original plan was to build the refinery in 
China, "but the Kazakhstani side changed their minds and wants the 
refinery to be on its territory.  Kazakhstan badly needs oil 
products and we do not mind."  Cheng added that more than 300 
Chinese companies have invested $10 billion in Kazakhstan and will 
continue to invest in the country.  Kairat Kelimbetov, CEO of the 
Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund, said at a press conference on 
April 17 that he expects Chinese firms to invest more than $5 
billion in Kazakhstan in 2009.  "In addition to oil exploration and 
production," he said, "we expect to sign contracts with the Chinese 
in the uranium and power generation sectors.  We also see 
opportunities for Chinese investment in the mining, chemical, 
petrochemical, and non-energy sectors."  He said Kazakhstani energy 
officials will meet China's National Energy Administration head 
Zhang Guobao on April 27 to discuss uranium cooperation.  Kelimbetov 
said that Chinese uranium firms will develop the uranium mine 
Semisbay, although no specific terms have been negotiated. 
 
10.  (U) CNPC also owns shares in five oil producers in Kazakhstan: 
AktobeMunaiGas, North Buzachi, PetroKazakhstan-Kumkol, KazGerMunai, 
and ADM.  CNPC acquired two-thirds of PetroKazakhstan in 2005 for $4 
billion, including the Shymkent oil refinery, which it operates 
jointly with KMG.  PetroKazakhstan's annual crude oil production now 
exceeds 200,000 bpd, accounting for 14 percent of Kazakhstan's total 
oil output. 
 
11.  (SBU) COMMENT:  MangistauMunaiGas was an attractive target for 
China, which beat out India's ONGC and Russia's Gazpromneft for an 
ownership stake in the company -- presumably by offering the best 
financial package to the Kazakhstanis.  Production from MMG's fields 
could eventually supply the Atyrau-Kenkiyak-Kumkol-Atasu-Alashankou 
oil pipeline to China, which has a design capacity of 200,000 bpd 
and is expected to be completed this year.  The MMG purchase may 
very well have been accelerated by the global economic crisis.  As 
senior MFA official Talgat Kaliyev (please protect) put it to us on 
April 22, "We needed the money."  That said, we do not view the deal 
as representing a shift away from the West in the development of 
Kazakhstan's oil and gas resources.  Western companies continue to 
play the leading roles in Kazakhstan's three major hydrocarbon 
projects -- Kashagan, Tengiz, and Karachaganak -- and continue to 
look for new investment opportunities.  The China deal is, in fact, 
consistent with the U.S. objective of ensuring Kazakhstan has 
multiple routes for its energy exports and is less reliant on 
transport through Russia.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA677, KAZAKHSTAN: GOVERNMENT’S ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA677 2009-04-22 11:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0677/01 1121143
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221143Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5216
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1521
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0899
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0586
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1602
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1084
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0998
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2615
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2285

Wednesday, 22 April 2009, 11:43
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000677 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
EO 12958 DECL: 04/22/2019 
TAGS PGOV, PREL, SOCI, KCRM, KZ 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  GOVERNMENT’S ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN 
-- SWEEPING EFFORT OR SELECTIVE TARGETING?
REF: A. 08 ASTANA 0680  B. 08 ASTANA 1309
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Kazakhstani authorities recently launched a well-publicized anti-corruption campaign that has resulted in the arrest of several high-ranking individuals, including the Minister of Environment and a Deputy Minister of Defense, and in convictions of a number of others. The campaign appears to have the full support of President Nazarbayev, who has repeatedly called on the government and the ruling Nur Otan party to battle this “most serious evil.”  Political analysts and civil society leaders remain skeptical, however, that the government’s clean-up efforts will bring permanent results. Most see the campaign simply as evidence of a power struggle among elite groups within the Kazakhstani government and doubt that any of the “biggest fish” will be affected. END SUMMARY.
GOVERNMENT LAUNCHES ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN
2. (SBU) The Kazakhstani authorities recently launched a well-publicized anti-corruption campaign that seems to be aimed at the higher echelons of the government and has already brought down several senior individuals. Over the past two months, the Agency for Fighting Economic Crimes and Corruption (also known as the Financial Police) launched investigations against several government officials on suspicion of corruption and abuse of power. The list includes Minister of Environment Nurlan Iskakov and two of his deputy ministers, the director of the Astana City Construction Company and one of his deputies, the Chairman of the Water Resources Committee, and the Director of the Astana Health Department. All of the officials have been removed from their positions and are currently in detention or under house arrest pending the outcome of investigations against them. Investigations have also been launched against numerous mid-level officials and officials in local government, and two regional governors -- for South Kazakhstan and East Kazakhstan oblasts -- have been replaced and are under investigation. In addition, on April 13, the Committee for National Security (KNB) detained Deputy Defense Minister Kazhimurat Mayermanov on suspicion of abuse of office (i.e., corruption) in connection with government contracts with two Israeli defense firms to design and manufacture new artillery systems.
3. (SBU) Several high-ranking government officials were charged or prosecuted for corruption-related crimes in an earlier “wave” last year. In August 2008, Yuriy Tleumuratov, the Chairman of the Financial Control Committee at the Ministry of Finance, and Ruslan Yusupov, an office director in the same committee, were arrested and charged with bribery and abuse of power. (NOTE: Then-Tax Committee Chairman Nurlan Rahkmetov resigned shortly thereafter, stating that ethics rules demand he share responsibility for the wrong-doings of his subordinates. Some commentators suggested, however, that he had been directly involved in the crimes. END NOTE.) In November 2008, Zhaksybek Kulekeyev, the former chairman of the national railroad company Temir Zholy, was convicted of accepting bribes and abusing his authority (see ref A).
4. (SBU) Perhaps the most high-profile official convicted of corruption-related crimes is Serik Burkitbayev, the former head of KazMunaiGaz and a one-time advisor to President Nazarbayev (see ref B). Burkitbayev was tried in a closed trial and convicted on March 24 for abuse of power, misappropriation of property, and embezzlement. His case, however, is surrounded by political intrigue -- Burkitbayev was at one point a close associate of Rakhat Aliyev, Nazarbayev’s exiled former son-in-law, and some press reports have suggested that his conviction was the result of his links to Aliyev rather than his corrupt dealings. Some media accounts claimed that Burkitbayev provided Aliyev with the eavesdropping equipment he apparently used to record embarrassing conversations among senior government officials which were later uploaded to the Internet. Aliyev himself publicly criticized the conviction and vowed to bring the attention of the international community to the case.
ORDER COMES FROM THE TOP
5. (SBU) The anti-corruption drive certainly has the highest backing. On April 1, President Nazarbayev commended Financial Police head Kairat Kozhamzharov for his anti-corruption efforts and told him to continue the fight “irrespective of people’s status and connections.” Nazarbayev has repeatedly called on the government and the ruling Nur Otan party to battle this “most serious evil,” and there is evidence that his words have been taken to heart. Following the President’s criticism of the “corrupt state” of the Shymkent Medical Academy, the Health Ministry reorganized it, shutting down all but three faculties and transferring close to three thousand students to other institutions. The Ministry of Interior (MVD) recently announced that in response to “goals set forth by the President,” the Ministry will reorganize its hiring and promotion processes to increase transparency. And the Ministry of Education publicly committed to cleaning up corruption at schools and universities.
BIG FISH OR SMALL FRY?&#x000A
;6. (C) Despite the high publicity surrounding the round-up of corrupt officials, independent analysts remain skeptical that the government’s clean-up efforts will bring permanent results. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us on April 7 that arrests of individual “wayward” officials will have little effect unless systemic corruption -- “the gray economy in government services” -- is addressed. Evidence of corrupt dealings could be dug up against numerous high-level government officials, argued XXXXXXXXXXX, so the decision about which officials to bring to justice becomes a purely political one.  He predicted that the campaign will bring down the level of corruption in the short-term -- “some will think twice” -- but will have little effect on the system as a whole.
7. (C) Political analyst XXXXXXXXXXXX sees the recent convictions more as a sign of intra-elite warfare than evidence of a concerted anti-corruption effort. As evidence, he pointed to the cases of Kulikeyev and Burkitbayev, both of whom XXXXXXXXXXXX believes were convicted on marginal evidence. XXXXXXXXXXXX sees the anti-corruption effort as little more than a fight for property in uncertain economic times -- “the accused are the unlucky losers.”
8. (C) Civil society activist XXXXXXXXXXXX also describes the discredited officials as “the weak links in the chain” and believes that the “real sharks” are continuing to operate with impunity. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the criminal investigations themselves are hardly transparent and some, like the investigation against former Vice Minister of Environment Alzhan Braliyev, are border-line illegal. (NOTE: A contact of our Public Affairs Section who knows Braliyev personally questioned the veracity of the evidence against him and maintained to us that he is “taking the fall” for his boss, former Minister of Environment Nurlan Iskakov. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that several of Bralieyev’s associates and friends are coming together to fund his defense. END NOTE.)
XXXXXXXXXXXX ascribed the recent “fury of activity” to new management at the Financial Police. Kozhamzharov was appointed in December 2008 and was given what XXXXXXXXXXXX believes were express orders from President Nazarbayev to clean up the government, “within reason, of course.”
OPPOSITION LEADERS SEE EFFORTS AS “FUTILE”
9. (C) Key opposition leaders also voiced skepticism about the efficacy of the anti-corruption efforts. XXXXXXXXXXXX sees the campaign as “selective punishment” that will not touch the highest echelons of the government. XXXXXXXXXXXXdescribed it as a power struggle between leading elite groups “with corruption used as an excuse.” XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that the campaign was aimed at eliminating the competition of Nazarbayev son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, who XXXXXXXXXXXX believes has been selected as his successor. (COMMENT: XXXXXXXXXXXX’s view appears to be a bit off base, since Kulibayev’s strongest competitors as potential Nazarbayev successors -- such as Astana Mayor Imangali Tasmagambetov -- have not been affected by the anti-corruption campaign. END COMMENT.) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Kazakhstan’s endemic corruption problems can only be addressed through appropriate changes to legislation -- “all else is futile.”
10. (C) COMMENT: Corruption is endemic among Kazakhstani officialdom, as it is across the CIS. Blessed with strong tax revenues, government salaries are high in Kazakhstan compared to its neighbors -- for example, Prime Minister Masimov’s salary is over $50,000 a year -- but most senior officials live lifestyles that require much higher incomes. In many instances, they receive profits from businesses registered in the names of their spouses or other relatives. In other cases, they’re stealing directly from the public trough. The officials taken down by the anti-corruption campaign are thus just a tiny fraction of those with dirt on their hands. The ongoing anti-corruption campaign does appear to be targeting some officials who have gone too far -- and don’t have adequate protection from above to ward off the law enforcement authorities. In other cases, however, it seems likely that officials no more corrupt than any one else have been targeted by rivals taking advantage of the anti-corruption campaign to bring them down. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA675, KAZAKHSTAN CASPIAN TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA675 2009-04-22 07:55 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5799
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDF
RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0675/01 1120755
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220755Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5211
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1517
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0895
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1598
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0582
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1080
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0994
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1436

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000675 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/CARC, EUR/RUS, NEA/IR, EEB/ESC 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA FOR DAN STEIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET EINV RS IR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN CASPIAN TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE 
INVESTMENTS 
 
REF:  (A) ASTANA 0578 (B) ASTANA 0530 (C) ASTANA 0283 
      (D) BAKU 0314 
 
ASTANA 00000675  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The government of Kazakhstan is committed to 
developing alternative oil export routes, whether by pipeline, rail, 
or tanker, that reduce its dependence on Russia.  From April 9-17, 
Energy Officer joined a definitional mission from the U.S. Trade and 
Development Agency to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to identify 
technical assistance projects to develop the Kazakhstan Caspian 
Transportation System (KCTS), which is expected to move as much as 1 
million barrels of oil per day from Atyrau to market through Baku, 
Makhachkala (Russia), and possibly Neka (Iran) by 2015.  With one 
notable exception, company executives and government officials 
agreed that KCTS will be necessary to accommodate oil production 
from Tengiz and Kashagan starting in 2013.  Although many key 
aspects of this multi-billion dollar oil export project remain to be 
determined -- such as whether international oil companies (IOCs) 
will take an equity stake, who will build the pipeline from Eskene 
to Kuryk, and what size oil tankers will be used -- the basic 
concept is already being tested and millions of dollars have been 
invested in infrastructure on Kazakhstan's side of the Caspian. 
This cable summarizes those infrastructure projects; septel will 
look at the stakeholders in Kazakhstan and their equities in the 
project.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 
 
3.  (SBU) The basic concept behind KCTS is already being 
successfully tested.  Tengizchevroil (TCO) now sends approximately 
75,000 barrels per day (bpd) by rail from Atyrau to Aktau, where it 
is loaded onto 12,000 deadweight ton (dwt) tankers and shipped to 
Baku, for onward distribution to global markets via the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.  KCTS will replace the rail link 
with a 281-mile pipeline from Eskene to Kuryk; deploy massive, 
63,000 dwt tankers; and enhance port infrastructure in Kuryk and 
Baku to accommodate the larger tankers.  (NOTE:  At the moment, no 
port on the Caspian can dock -- and no shipyard can build -- a 
tanker as large as those called for by KCTS.  END NOTE.)  An 
engineering study commissioned by national oil company KazMunaiGas 
(KMG) projects KCTS capacity at 56 million tons of crude per year 
(approximately 1.1 million barrels per day) and estimates that the 
Kuryk portion of the project will cost $700 million for new rail 
terminals, platforms, berths, and vessel servicing infrastructure. 
 
CRUDE SHIPMENTS TO IRAN EXPECTED TO CONTINUE 
 
4.  (SBU) A constant refrain during the definitional mission was 
that KCTS will provide Kazakhstani shippers with the flexibility to 
ship crude to three ports on the Caspian:  Baku, Makhachkala 
(Russia), and Neka (Iran).  On April 13, Murat Kurbanbayev, Deputy 
General Director of MangistauMunaiGas (MMG), said that oil swaps 
with Iran are a significant source of revenue to the company. 
(NOTE:  On April 16, the China National Petroleum Corporation 
purchased 50 percent of MMG for $1.4 billion.  END NOTE). 
Kurbanbayev said Iran will continue to be a viable export option for 
Kazakhstan, particularly as the volume of production and the number 
of tankers in the Caspian increase.  He explained that MMG does not 
sell to Iran directly.  Instead, private oil traders buy oil from 
MMG, pick it up at the port in Aktau, load it onto tankers, mix it 
with lighter crude from other fields, and ship it directly to Neka. 
According to Kurbanbayev, the Ministry of Energy determines what 
volumes go where:  "All of these questions are decided at the top 
and handed down." 
 
5.  (SBU) Vladimir Konstantinov, Deputy Director of the Aktau Sea 
Port, told Energy Officer on April 13 that Kazakhstan swaps 
approximately five million tons of oil per year, or 100,000 bpd, 
with Iran.  He confirmed that private oil traders ship Kazakhstani 
crude to Baku, Makhachkala, and Neka and considers it beneficial for 
 
ASTANA 00000675  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Kazakhstan to have multiple export options.  "It's very good that we 
now ship ou
r crude in all three directions," he said.  "It gives us 
flexibility to maneuver."  The Deputy Governor (Akim) of Mangistau 
Oblast, Amangeldy Aitkulov, echoed these remarks, telling Energy 
Officer on April 13, "It is important for Kazakhstan to have 
alternative export routes, including Iran." 
 
KCTS CRITICAL TO FUTURE OIL EXPORTS 
 
6.  (SBU) The government of Kazakhstan, particularly state-owned oil 
company KazMunaiGas (KMG), is committed to moving forward with KCTS. 
 Political support is strong, feasibility studies are underway, and 
KMG is willing to sell IOCs equity in the project.  KMG and IOC 
executives agree that KCTS will be essential if Kazakhstan is to 
develop alternative export routes for its future oil production.  On 
April 15, Richard Eldridge, Director of TCO's Future Growth project, 
told Energy Officer that output at Tengiz will grow from current 
levels of 540,000 bpd to 780,000 bpd by 2013, and 1.1 million bpd by 
2016.  Agip KCO's Public Relations Manager Richard Fritz told Energy 
Officer that production at Kashagan will begin with approximately 
75,000 bpd in 2012, and grow to 150,000 bpd in 2013, 300,000 bpd in 
2014, and 450,000 bpd by 2015.  TCO's Transportation Manager Doug 
Schoen said that even if the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) 
pipeline's capacity is expanded to 1.3 million bpd, there will still 
not be enough westward export capacity to accommodate increased 
volumes from Tengiz and Kashagan, unless KCTS is fully developed. 
 
A DISCORDANT NOTE FROM A KEY STAKEHOLDER 
 
7.  (SBU) Vice Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Lyazzat 
Kiinov, however, sounded a discordant note, telling Energy Officer 
on April 17, "There is no oil transportation crisis.  We are 
expanding the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, we are expanding the CPC 
pipeline, we are expanding the pipeline to China, and we will 
continue to use 12,000 dwt tankers to ship crude across the Caspian. 
 We have all the transportation capacity we will need for the next 
ten years."  (COMMENT:  When listing Kazakhstan's oil transportation 
capacity, Kiinov assumed that the IOCs would be just as willing to 
ship to China or Russia as they would via KCTS.  In fact, that 
decision will depend on a number of factors, including the netback 
price they receive, the volumes they have available, and the quality 
guarantees they are given.  END COMMENT.) 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE EXPANSION UNDERWAY AT KURYK 
 
8.  (SBU) The two-lane road from Aktau to Kuryk is absolutely 
atrocious.  Nominally paved with asphalt, the road is riddled with 
potholes and makes for a back-breaking ride, even at speeds below 60 
kmh.  The final five kilometers to town is simply open steppe. 
However, Energy Officer observed more than a dozen dump trucks, 
bulldozers, and steamrollers building a new, four-lane asphalt road, 
which is expected to be completed by the end of the year.  In 
addition, development of other transportation infrastructure in 
Kuryk is also underway.  On April 12, Minister of Transportation 
Abelgazy Kussainov visited Kuryk to inaugurate a new railway 
terminal and a 14-kilometer rail line, expected to be completed this 
year, linking Yeraliyevo to Kuryk. 
 
ITALIAN JOINT VENTURE TO BUILD LARGE TANKERS 
 
9.  (SBU) In September 2004, an Italian-Kazakhstani joint venture, 
Ersai, 60 percent owned by Italy's Saipem and 40 percent owned by a 
group controlled by Kazakhstani businessman Nurlan Kapparov, 
invested $100 million to develop a steel fabrication yard to support 
the offshore development of Kashagan and other fields.  According to 
Salvatore Ripepi, Operations Manager for Ersai, the company will 
invest an additional $300 million in Kuryk by the end of 2009, 
including $100 million for a new dry dock.  Ripepi said the dry dock 
investment will enable Ersai to build or assemble large, 60,000 dwt 
tankers.  He added that a number of harbor improvements have been 
made, including installation of a 100-meter opening door, which he 
 
ASTANA 00000675  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
said is larger than any in Europe.  Ripepi said Ersai is already 
equipped to build tankers up to 10,000 dwt and noted that the 
current draught at Kuryk is 4.5 to 5.0 meters, which is deep enough 
for Ersai to service the largest vessels currently plying the 
Caspian Sea.  The company has plans to increase the draught to 20 
meters, which would enable them to service ships as large as 63,000 
dwt.  "The soil investment is done and permits have been awarded," 
Ripepi said.  "We will excavate in July and are now soliciting bids 
for dredging."  When asked to confirm Ersai's plans to build or 
assemble tankers as large as 60,000 dwt, Ripepi said that was indeed 
the company's plan.  "In fact," he said, "it would be very difficult 
for us to work on smaller ships, because we would have to adjust the 
assembly apparatus to do so." 
 
ADVOCATES FOR AKTAU 
 
10.  (SBU) Expansion of the port of Aktau is also underway.  While 
KCTS would ultimately operate from Kuryk, not Aktau, oil shipments 
from Aktau via 12,000 dwt tankers are expected to continue for 
several years.  Aktau port's Deputy Director Konstantinov said that 
four new berths are under development, in addition to new oil 
terminals and a new harbor.  He said these enhancements will allow 
the port to load and ship an additional 240,000-280,000 bpd, 
bringing its total capacity to 500,000 bpd.  Konstantinov confirmed 
that the largest tankers any port in the Caspian can currently 
accommodate are 13,000 dwt and he said that only Aktau, Baku, and 
Makhachkala can handle ships of that size.  He added that the 
largest tanker Neka can currently handle is 5,000 dwt.  Advocating 
for a continued role for Aktau in future oil shipments across the 
Caspian, Konstantinov said that 12,000 dwt tankers are safe, provide 
a steady return on investment, and fit with current terminals.  He 
said that using larger ships would require "huge investments in 
supporting infrastructure." 
 
11.  (SBU) Murat Ormanov is General Director of KazMorTransFlot 
(KMTF), which is 50 percent owned by KMG and 50 percent owned by the 
Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund.  His company owns and operates 
16 ships, including three 12,000 dwt tankers built in St. 
Petersburg, eight barges, and five tug boats.  On March 27, KMTF 
awarded a contract to Krasnoye Sormovo Shipyard (Nizhniy Novgorod, 
Russia) to construct three 13,000 dwt tankers for $66.45 million. 
Ormanov said that the first tanker will be delivered in August, the 
second in May 2010, and the third in July 2010.  He added that 
Russian and Ukrainian crews are trained and available to man the 
ships.  According to Ormanov, KMTF also leases up to 30 additional 
tankers from Azerbaijan and Russia and operates "a few" 
80,000-120,000 dwt tankers in the Mediterranean Sea.  Ormanov said 
KMTF shipped six million tons of crude in 2008 in all three 
directions:  Baku, Makhachkala, and Neka. 
 
EXPANSION OF SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE AT BAUTINO 
 
12.  (SBU)
While the port of Bautino is not expected to play a 
direct role in transporting oil from Kazakhstan across the Caspian, 
Bautino's oil response base, fleet coordination facilities, and 
marine fuel station could provide important support to the shipping 
operations of KCTS.  The largest operation at Bautino is the base 
owned and operated by Agip KCO, which is focused on providing 
logistical support to Kashagan.  Alessandro Masiero, Bautino Base 
Manager for Agip KCO, said the port offers a natural harbor free of 
ice which is navigable year-round. 
 
13.  (SBU) The Bautino base currently provides Kashagan with a wide 
range of services, including fleet coordination, crew changes, waste 
management, oil spill response, materials supply, and storage. 
Masiero said Agip KCO will expand the Bautino base and build a new 
jetty, an airplane runway, and a helipad for medevac emergencies. 
He added that the water depth around the base is five to six meters, 
but dredging is ongoing.  In addition to Agip's Bautino base, 
TenizService, a wholly-owned subsidiary of KMG, owns and operates a 
facility at Tupkaragan Bay in Bautino.  TenizService provides rock 
 
ASTANA 00000675  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
loading, waste management, fire response, and marine fueling 
services to the operators of Kashagan, Pearls, and the N Block. 
 
COMMENT 
 
14.  (SBU) Although the IOCs and the government of Kazakhstan are 
clearly committed to the project, several fundamental questions 
about KCTS remain unanswered.  It is unclear, for example, if IOCs 
will be allowed to take an equity position in the project, who will 
construct and own the pipeline from Eskene to Kuryk, what size 
tankers will be used, where they will be built and assembled, who 
will crew and pilot the ships, which ports and terminals will be 
used, and which export routes from Baku onward will be utilized. 
These are fundamental, even existential, questions that must be 
answered before KCTS becomes a reality, and before Kashagan volumes 
come online in 2013.  What is clear, however, is that marine 
transportation of Kazakhstani crude from its largest fields to its 
closest markets is not only doable -- it is being done.  TCO ships 
Tengiz crude by rail to Aktau, by tanker to Baku, and by pipeline to 
Ceyhan.  With continued U.S. diplomatic support, future USTDA 
technical assistance, IOC financial and technical contributions, and 
the patience to bake the pie before slicing it up, KCTS can develop 
into a viable, alternative export route for Kazakhstani crude. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA674, KAZAKHSTAN: SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA674 2009-04-21 11:45 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0674/01 1111145
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211145Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5207
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1513
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0891
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0578
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1594
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1076
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0990
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2611
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2281

S E C R E T ASTANA 000674 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2034 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ECON EPET KNNP AF RS KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER 
TAZHIN'S MAY 4-5 VISIT TO WASHINGTON 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Kazakhstani Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin's 
May 4-5 visit to Washington is the Obama Administration's 
first opportunity for face-to-face engagement with the 
leadership of our most important partner in Central Asia.  We 
have a robust bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan, with 
close cooperation on such critical issues as Afghan 
reconstruction, nuclear non-proliferation, and developing 
Kazakhstan's vast energy resources to support global energy 
security.  With its upcoming 2010 OSCE chairmanship, 
Kazakhstan is poised for its most important international 
leadership role to date -- and Tazhin's visit will be a 
chance to discuss Kazakhstan's priorities for its 
chairmanship year.  We should also ask Tazhin about 
additional ways Kazakhstan can assist Afghanistan; stress the 
need for further democratic reforms; and reiterate our 
commitment to Kazakhstan's WTO accession.  END SUMMARY. 
 
RAISING BILATERAL RELATIONS TO A NEW LEVEL 
 
2. (C) Foreign Minister Tazhin's May 4-5 visit to Washington 
comes at a time when the Kazakhstani leadership sees the new 
Obama administration as an opportunity to enhance our already 
good bilateral relations.  President Nazarbayev welcomed then 
President-elect Obama's early phone call last November, and 
recently invited him to visit Astana -- an invitation passed 
directly to President Obama by Senate Chairman Kasym-Zhomart 
Tokayev at an Alliance of Civilizations reception in Istanbul 
on April 7.  Nazarbayev has told us he would also welcome 
visits from the Secretary and other senior Administration 
officials, including Secretary of Defense Gates.  Tazhin is 
likely to emphasize Kazakhstan's strong desire for regular 
high-level visits both ways.  He will almost certainly be 
prepared to consult on Kazakhstan's agenda for its 2010 OSCE 
chairmanship, and is also likely to raise Kazakhstan's 
perennial desire to be graduated from the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment and to be exempt from annual human-rights 
certification, both of which the government views as 
"incompatible" with a mature relationship between strategic 
partners. 
 
3. (C) President Nazarbayev carefully balances Kazakhstan's 
relations with Russia, China, the United States, and the EU 
-- what he terms a "multi-vector" foreign policy.  The 
Kazakhstanis consider Russia their most important 
international partner, and Russian's influence is 
unparalleled in Kazakhstan due to long historical ties, 
Kazakhstan's large ethnic Russian population, and the 
predominance here of the Russian language -- which means most 
Kazakhstanis obtain their news from Russia's broadcast and 
print media.  Kazakhstan's close relationship with the United 
States serves as an essential counterweight -- reinforcing 
the country's sovereignty and independence and helping it 
stave off pressure from both its giant neighbors, i.e., China 
as well as Russia.  For the Kazakhstanis, high-level 
interactions with the United States, such as Tazhin's visit, 
are thus not only important for their substance, but also for 
their symbolism -- sending a signal to Moscow that we remain 
closely engaged with them, despite Moscow's assertion of a 
"privileged sphere of influence." 
 
AFGHANISTAN:  POISED TO DO EVEN MORE 
 
4. (C) Kazakhstan has provided critical support for Coalition 
efforts in Afghanistan -- and is looking for ways to do even 
more.  Bilateral agreements from 2001 and 2002 allow U.S. 
military aircraft supporting Operation Enduring Freedom to 
transit Kazakhstani air space cost-free and to make emergency 
landings in Kazakhstan when conditions do not permit landing 
at Kyrgyzstan's Manas Air Base.  In January, Kazakhstan 
agreed to participate in the Northern Distribution Network -- 
 
which entails commercial shipment through Kazakhstani 
territory of non-lethal supplies for U.S. troops in 
Afghanistan.  Kazakhstan is considering sending several 
officers to ISAF headquarters and deploying a military 
medical unit to Afghanistan.  As a later step, the 
Kazakhstanis may also consider deploying a military 
engineering unit to teach at the military engineering school 
at Mazar-i-Sharif or to assist in unexploded ordnance 
disposal, a mission they carried out in Iraq for over five 
years.  The Kazakhstani government provided Afghanistan $3 
million in humanita
rian assistance in 2008 and is developing 
a program to provide Afghan students with free university 
education in Kazakhstan.  The Kazakhstanis also hope to make 
Afghanistan a focus of their 2010 OSCE chairmanship. 
 
DEMOCRACY:  SLOW GOING 
 
5. (C) While the Kazakhstani government articulates a 
strategic vision of democracy, it has lagged on the 
implementation front.  The leadership remains resistant to 
competitive political processes -- and the situation is 
complicated by the fact that Nazarbayev is extraordinarily 
popular (with a 90 percent approval rating in our own 
polling), while the opposition is weak, fractured, and 
comprised mostly of ex-Nazarbayev loyalists who fell out of 
favor.  Nazarbayev's Nur Otan party officially received 88% 
of the vote and won all the parliamentary seats in the August 
2007 elections, which OSCE observers concluded did not meet 
OSCE standards.   The next elections, both parliamentary and 
presidential, are scheduled for 2012.  Should Nazarbayev run 
again -- and at this juncture it appears likely he will -- he 
would almost certainly win, even with fully free and fair 
balloting.  (NOTE:  Nazarbayev is not yet grooming a 
successor.  END NOTE.) 
 
6.  (C) On a positive note, Nazarbayev has taken steps that 
could facilitate a transition to a more democratic system 
over the long run.  His Bolashak program provides 
scholarships for several thousand Kazakhstanis to receive 
higher education abroad, mostly in the West, where they 
absorb Western ideas and values.  He has also brought into 
government a new generation of young, ambitious bureaucrats 
-- many of whom studied in the West through Bolashak or our 
own programs. 
 
7. (C) When Kazakhstan was selected to be 2010 OSCE chairman 
at the November 2007 Madrid OSCE Ministerial meeting, Foreign 
Minister Tazhin promised his government would amend 
Kazakhstan's election, political party, and media laws in 
accordance with OSCE and ODIHR recommendations.  (NOTE: 
Tazhin also promised that as OSCE chairman, Kazakhstan would 
support the OSCE's Human Dimension and preserve ODIHR's 
mandate.  END NOTE.)  The amendments were finally signed into 
law in February.   While key civil society leaders were 
disappointed that the new legislation did not go further, we 
consider them to be steps in the right direction, and will 
continue pressing for further reforms, including complete 
decriminalization of libel and the establishment of fully 
independent electoral commissions with representatives from 
all political parties.  While Kazakhstan prides itself on its 
religious tolerance, parliament passed legislation in late 
2008 which would have restricted the religious freedom of 
minority religious groups.  Rather than signing the 
legislation, President Nazarbayev sent it for review to the 
Constitutional Council (Court) -- which ultimately declared 
it to be unconstitutional. 
 
ENERGY:  DIVERSIFYING TRANSPORT ROUTES 
 
8. (C) U.S. and Kazakhstani strategic interests are largely 
aligned on the development of Kazakhstan's vast energy 
resources.  Both sides agree that U.S. and other Western 
 
companies must continue playing a lead role in Kazakhstan's 
energy exploration and production projects and that 
diversifying transport routes will bolster Kazakhstan's 
sovereignty and enable it to capture the maximum benefits of 
its energy wealth.  Kazakhstan produced 70.7 million tons of 
oil in 2008 (approximately 1.41 million barrels per day), and 
is expected to become one of the world's top ten crude 
exporters soon after 2015.  While the country also has 
significant gas reserves (1.5 trillion cubic meters is a 
low-end estimate), current gas exports are very limited for 
now, in part because gas is being reinjected to maximize 
crude output.  U.S. companies -- ExxonMobil, Chevron, and 
ConocoPhilips -- have significant ownership stakes in 
Kazakhstan's three major hydrocarbon projects, including 
Kashagan, the world's largest oil field discovery since 
Alaska's North Slope. 
 
9. (C) With major crude production increases on the horizon, 
Kazakhstan must develop additional transport routes to bring 
its crude to market.  Currently, most of Kazakhstan's crude 
is exported via Russia, though some exports flow east to 
China, west across the Caspian through Azerbaijan, and south 
across the Caspian to Iran.  We are focused on helping the 
Kazakhstanis implement the Kazakhstan-Caspian Transportation 
System (KCTS), which envisions a "virtual pipeline" of 
tankers transporting large volumes of crude from Kazakhstan's 
Caspian coast to Baku, from where it will flow onward to 
market through Georgia, including through the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.  While a trans-Caspian 
crude pipeline would be a cheaper long-term transport option, 
the Kazakhstanis maintain that an agreement on Caspian 
delimitation among the five Caspian littoral states is a 
prerequisite -- politically, if not legally -- for moving 
forward on such a pipeline's construction. 
 
ECONOMY:  AGGRESSIVE STEPS TO TACKLE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
10. (C) Kazakhstan is Central Asia's economic powerhouse, 
with a GDP larger than that of the region's other four 
countries combined.  Economic growth averaged over 9% per 
year during 2005-07, before dropping to 3% in 2008 with the 
onset of the global financial crisis.  While the country's 
economic success is partly due to its fortuitous natural 
resource deposits, astute macroeconomic policies and 
extensive economic reforms have also played an important 
role.  Kazakhstan has a modern banking and financial system, 
a well-endowed pension fund, and a transparent sovereign 
wealth fund with $22 billion in assets.  The government has 
taken aggressive steps to tackle the domestic reverberations 
of the world economic crisis, allocating $21 billion to take 
equity stakes in private banks, prop up the construction and 
real-estate sectors, and support small- and medium-sized 
enterprises and agriculture. 
 
11. (C) Kazakhstan's long-run economic challenge is to 
diversify its economy away from reliance on the energy 
sector.   In 2008, we launched a bilateral Public-Private 
Economic Partnership Initiative (PPEPI), which is bringing 
together the U.S. and Kazakhstani public and private sectors 
to make policy recommendations on improving the country's 
business climate and reducing other barriers to non-energy 
investments.  Kazakhstan is currently negotiating WTO 
accession agreements with the United States, several other 
countries, and the EU.  The Kazakhstanis maintain that we are 
demanding greater concessions from them than we have 
requested from other WTO candidates, including Russia.  Some 
in the Kazakhstani government would prefer to first finalize 
a Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union and deal with the 
WTO later -- though this might give Russia significant 
leverage over Kazakhstan's WTO accession.  A high-level 
message from us that we remain committed to Kazakh
stan's WTO 
membership (and actions to back up our rhetoric) would help 
 
the Kazakhstanis keep their focus on WTO accession. 
 
NON-PROLIFERATION:  A HALLMARK OF BILATERAL COOPERATION 
 
12. (S) Non-proliferation cooperation has been a hallmark of 
our bilateral relationship since Kazakhstan became 
independent and agreed to give up the nuclear arsenal it 
inherited from the USSR.  The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) program remains the dominant component of our 
assistance to Kazakhstan.  Key ongoing CTR activities include 
our efforts to secure the radiological material at the former 
Soviet nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk and to 
decommission and store the spent fuel from Kazakhstan's 
plutonium breeder reactor.  We are pressing the Kazakhstanis 
to allow us to speed up work at Semipalatinsk -- consistent 
with President Obama's effort, announced in Prague, to secure 
all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide by the end of his 
first term.  The Kazakhstanis are seeking additional ways to 
burnish their non-proliferation credentials.  On April 6, 
President Nazarbayev announced publicly that Kazakhstan is 
interested in hosting the Nuclear Threat Initiative's 
IAEA-administered international nuclear fuel bank -- an offer 
we welcomed.  The Kazakhstanis are also considering running 
this year for a seat on the IAEA Board of Governors (a 
position we initially pressed them to take in 2008), and 
continue to press us to support their joining the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA673, KAZAKHSTAN: ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, MARCH 29-APRIL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA673 2009-04-20 11:58 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4066
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
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DE RUEHTA #0673/01 1101158
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5205
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1511
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0889
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1592
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RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0988
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1434

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000673 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/CARC, EEB/ESC 
PLEASE PASS TO USTDA DAN STEIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON EPET EINV KZ
 
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, MARCH 29-APRIL 
11, 2009 
 
ASTANA 00000673  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  This information is drawn primarily from the 
Kazakhstani local press and has not been verified for accuracy. 
 
-- Banking Sector News 
-- Etihad Airways to Fly to Astana 
-- New Commodity Exchange Launched 
-- Kazakhstan Raises Loan For Europe-China Transit Corridor 
-- Economic Statistics 
-- KazMunayGas Bid on Iraq Deposits 
-- Kazakhstan President Receives Gazprom President 
-- Austrian-Romanian JV Launches Production 
 
BANKING SECTOR NEWS 
 
2.  The total foreign obligations of the Kazakhstani banking were 
$35 billion as of April 1, the National Bank reported.  According to 
National Bank Chairman Grigoriy Marchenko, banks repaid $3.6 billion 
to foreign creditors during the first quarter of 2009, and are 
scheduled to repay $2.5 billion in each of the remaining quarters of 
the year. 
 
3.  On April 10, BTA Bank Ukraine officially announced that its 
parent, Almaty-based BTA Bank, reduced its share in the Ukrainian 
subsidiary from 49.98% to 9.99%.  BTA Bank promptly refuted the 
announcement and said any such transactions would have been 
conducted without its consent and would not be legally valid.  Arman 
Dunaev, BTA Bank's Chairman, said "the attempt to deprive us from 
the right of ownership is illegal.  We will defend our rights and 
will appeal to the Ukrainian authorities with a request to stop 
illegal actions towards Kazakhstani investors." 
 
4.  According to press releases issued by BTA Bank, UBS and Goldman 
Sachs will act as advisors to the bank.  BTA Bank did not provide 
any other details regarding this decision. 
 
5.  Abu Dhabi-based Al Hilal Bank said it will open the first 
Islamic bank in Kazakhstan.  This will also be the bank's first 
foray outside of the United Arab Emirates.  Al Hilal, which plans to 
open in Almaty during the second half of 2009, will offer 
traditional Islamic financial instruments. 
 
ETIHAD AIRWAYS TO FLY TO ASTANA 
 
6.  Etihad Airways, the national airline of the United Arab 
Emirates, will launch non-stop flights from Abu Dhabi to Astana 
beginning May 7.  The airline already operates non-stop flights from 
Almaty. 
 
NEW COMMODITY EXCHANGE LAUNCHED 
 
7.  The Eurasian Trading System (ETS), a new commodity exchange 
operated jointly by the Regional Financial Center Almaty (RFCA) and 
Russia's RTS Stock Exchange, opened in Almaty in March.  The 
exchange currently facilitates spot trading in grain, but plans to 
add trading in metals, fuel, and lubricants in the near future.  It 
also expects to conduct futures trading.  RFCA chairman Arken 
Arystanov expects the turnover of the commodity exchange to exceed 
$200 million in 2009. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN SECURES LOANS FOR EUROPE-CHINA TRANSIT CORRIDOR 
 
8.  Kazakhstan signed loan agreements with the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) for the construction of the Western Europe - Western China 
international transit corridor.  ADB will lend $340 million for 25 
years at an annual rate of LIBOR plus 0.2%, with a five-year grace 
period.  The EBRD loan is for $180 million and will be extended for 
19 years at LIBOR plus 1% annually, including a four-year grace 
period.  In addition, Kazakhstan plans to obtain loans for this 
project from IBRD, the Islamic Development Bank, and the Japan 
 
ASTANA 00000673  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
International Cooperation Agency. 
 
ECONOMIC STATISTICS 
 
9.  National Bank Chairman Grigoriy Marchenko said that 2008 was 
marked by the largest inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the history of Kazakhstan -- almost $20 billion in gross inflow and 
$14.5 billion in net inflow.  Net FDI for 2008 was 12% of GDP. 
 
10.  Bilateral trade between Japan and Kazakhstan grew from $116 
million to $1.7 billion between 2000 and 2007, according to the 
Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies.  Trade with Japan is 2.5 
times greater than trade with South Korea. 
 
KAZMUNAIGAS BID ON IRAQ DEPOSITS 
 
11.  KMG Exploration and Production (KMG E&P), the production 
subsidiary of national oil and ga
s company KazMunaiGas, has been 
shortlisted, along with nine other companies, to take part in the 
second round of negotiations for the development of Iraq's oil 
deposits, the Khabar television channel reported on April 1.  KMG 
E&P would more likely act as a service provider, rather than a field 
operator. 
 
PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV RECEIVES GAZPROM HEAD 
 
12.  President Nazarbayev received Gazprom head Alexei Miller at his 
Almaty residence on April 9.  Miller informed Nazarbayev that the 
Kazakhstani-Russian joint venture KazRosGas plans to develop the 
Imashevskoye gas field.  He also said that Russia would soon provide 
Kazakhstan with the results of a geological survey for the 
Tsentralnaya offshore oil deposit in the Russian sector of the 
Caspian Sea.  Miller told reporters that the designed throughput 
capacity of the Prikaspiiski gas pipeline would be boosted from 20 
billion cubic meters (bcm) to 40 bcm. 
 
AUSTRIAN-ROMANIAN JV LAUNCHES PRODUCTION 
 
13.  On April 9, the Austrian-Romanian joint venture KomMunai 
launched commercial production at the Komsomolskoye oil and gas 
field in Mangistau oblast.  The field is expected to produce 480,000 
tons of crude oil a year until 2038.   The Akim (Governor) of 
Mangistau oblast, Krymbek Kusherbayev, hailed the company as an 
"effective investor that managed to start industrial development in 
two years."  The estimated reserves of the Komsomolskoye field total 
13.5 million tons of oil and 2.5 bcm of natural gas. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA672, KAZAKHSTAN: LIFE ON THE STEPPE, APRIL 11-17

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA672 2009-04-20 11:53 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4061
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1509
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RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1432

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000672 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON SOCI SENV KCRM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  LIFE ON THE STEPPE, APRIL 11-17 
 
ASTANA 00000672  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  This is another in a series of weekly cables drawn mostly from 
public media, as well as think-tank, NGO, and opposition web-sites, 
selected to show the diversity of life in Kazakhstan, and 
information about it available to citizens of Kazakhstan.  Our goal 
is to choose what might interest and be of use to various end-users 
in Washington and -- especially -- to provide a more complex view 
from the other side of the world, illustrating the vitality (and 
sometimes the quirkiness) of discourse available to citizens of 
Kazakhstan. 
 
POLICE FORCE IN LISAKOVSK PURGED FOLLOWING INCIDENTS 
 
2. The town of Lisakovsk in Kostanai oblast witnessed a major 
shakeup of its police force.  Five policemen were dishonorably 
discharged, five others resigned, and another nine received 
warnings.  Local residents, used to the antics of local policemen 
which they engaged in with apparent impunity, reacted with both 
relief and surprise.  The two drops which have caused the vase to 
finally overflow were recent incidents at a local cafe called 
Maksim.  On two separate occasions, drunken off-duty policemen beat 
up other patrons to the point where they had to seek medical care. 
Moreover, on both occasions, police patrols called by other 
residents not only did not intervene, but also failed to report any 
incidents.  Following these events and a flood of complaints by 
victims and witnesses, regional law enforcement brass decided that 
the situation finally deserved their attention.  "Those who should 
protect the law are the ones breaking it," the deputy chief of the 
Department of Internal Affairs of Kostanai oblast told the disgraced 
officials during their disciplinary hearings.  "You all acted as if 
you were your own bosses, your own prosecutors, and your own judges. 
 Hand over your badges." 
 
DAM BREAKS, LOCAL "ENTREPRENEURS" LAUNCH MINI-FERRY SERVICE 
 
3.  As the spring slowly makes itself felt in Kostanai oblast, local 
residents are bracing themselves for the annual flood season. 
Experts claim there is no real danger of a major flood, but 
overflowing rivers are making lives difficult for many residents, 
especially those living in sparsely inhabited rural areas.  Kozyrevk 
and Krasnooktyabrskiy, two neighboring villages in the center of the 
oblast, are normally connected by a road running on a narrow dike, 
but they became separated when a usually small river broke through 
the feeble dam.  According to local residents, the dike break occurs 
annually, almost as if on schedule.  Dodging of responsibility of 
who will be in charge of repairing the dike is also an annual 
occurrence.  Happy are only those 20 Kozyrevk elementary school 
students who attend school in Krasnooktyabrskiy.  It took local 
officials several days to arrange for a school bus to bring the 
children to school via a different route.  Also quite content with 
the situation are some entrepreneurs who launched a mini-ferry 
service between the two small villages for a fare of 50 tenge 
($0.33) a person. 
 
UNSUCCESSFUL SALESMAN PAID IN ICE CREAM CAKE 
 
4.  A frozen goods producer from Pavlodar is reportedly using rather 
drastic means to motivate its sales staff.  According to several 
employees, salespeople who do not meet their monthly sales quotas 
receive unsold ice cream in lieu of their salaries.  To make matters 
even worse, the frozen goods that they receive are past their 
expiration date.  Yuriy Zhakiyanov, who was previously warned about 
the practices of Smak, the Pavlodar firm, did not think twice when 
he received a call from the warehouse to come pick up his salary. 
Yet, as he quickly discovered, he found himself among the 
"unproductive" salesmen and brought home eight ice cream cakes in 
lieu of part of his salary.  Anatoliy Fesikov, Smak's director, 
claims that such practices do not exist.  In the meantime, 
Zhakiyanov's parents turned to local authorities to investigate the 
firm's strange motivational practices.  Zhakiynov himself summarized 
the ordeal as follows:  "I, of course, love sweets -- but not in 
such quantity and in such (bad) quality.  But they told us: 'You 
couldn't sell, so go ahead and eat.'" 
 
DRIVER'S LICENSE DEALER ADVERTISES HIS SERVICES, GETS CAUGHT 
 
5.  Last week, Almaty police detained a sophomore at KIMEP 
university under suspicion of fraud.  According to the police, the 
student posted a classified ad on a public Internet website 
 
ASTANA 00000672  002.2 OF 00
2 
 
 
advertising his driver's license "business."  For 50,000 tenge 
(approximately $333), he offered to provide anyone with a driver's 
license without having to pass a driving test and an oral exam. 
When contacted by a police officer posing as a potential customer, 
the student doubled his fee and promised that he would take the 
driving test and smooth out any possible complications with the road 
police.  Not surprisingly, when finally apprehended, the young 
"entrepreneur" admitted that he had a good friend at the road police 
in East Kazakhstan oblast, with whose help he ran his driver's 
license "business." 
 
GIANT MUSHROOMS CAN FEED A VILLAGE 
 
6.  Mushroom pickers in Moiynkumskiye Peski in the Zhambyl oblast in 
southern Kazakhstan were ecstatic about their recent find.  Local 
mushroom enthusiasts found several Boletus edulis, more commonly 
known as porcini mushrooms, weighing more than two pounds each. 
"One such mushroom is enough to make soup for an entire small 
village," one lucky finder bragged.  Reportedly, the unique size is 
due to unusually high rainfall this spring -- and not to anything 
more ominous, such as radioactivity or chemical waste. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA666, KAZAKHSTAN: INTER-AGENCY DELEGATION TO VISIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA666 2009-04-20 11:31 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0666/01 1101131
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201131Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5201
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1507
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0885
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0572
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1588
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1070
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0984
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2279
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2609

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000666 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN/MTR, T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2029 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC KNNP MTCR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: INTER-AGENCY DELEGATION TO VISIT 
WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS KAZAKHSTAN'S REQUEST TO JOIN THE MTCR 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (SBU) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent us a diplomatic 
note on April 14 requesting bilateral consultations in 
Washington during May 4-5 to discuss Kazakhstan's interest in 
joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).  The 
text of the note follows: 
 
BEGIN TEXT 
 
No. 10-3/1270 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
expresses its compliments to the Embassy of the United States 
of America and further to its Note 10-3/434 of February 6, 
2009, has the honor to inform the Embassy that the following 
Kazakhstani delegation will visit (the United States) May 
2-5, 2009, to discuss issues connected to Kazakhstan's 
accession to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): 
 
1) B.K. Sadykov, Director, Multilateral Cooperation 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2) E.M. Shaimagambetov, Deputy Chairman, National Space Agency 
3) A. Gabdullin, Division Chief, National Space Agency 
4) D. Akpanbayeva, Division Chief, Ministry of Industry and 
Trade 
5) A. Makhmudov, Attache, Multilateral Cooperation 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
During its visit, the Kazakhstani delegation would like to 
make a presentation on Kazakhstan's system of export controls 
and the development of the country's space activities, and 
provide to the U.S. side exhaustive information on 
Kazakhstan's readiness to accede to the MTCR. 
 
Delegation members B. Sadykov and A. Makhmudov will also be 
prepared to discuss specific issues regarding international 
security, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Strategic 
Offensive Reductions Treaty. 
 
In this regard, the Ministry kindly requests assistance in 
arranging meetings for the delegation with the appropriate 
agencies of the U.S. Government to discuss the aforementioned 
issues, and in obtaining U.S. visas in a timely fashion. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the 
assurances of its highest consideration. 
 
Astana, April 14 
 
END TEXT 
 
2. (C) COMMENT:  The Kazakhstanis regularly press us here to 
support their candidacy to join the MTCR.  They see MTCR 
membership as consistent with their membership in the 
expiring START I Treaty, their status as host of the Baikonur 
cosmodrome, and their ambitions to further develop their own 
space program.  They also believe MTCR membership will be yet 
another opportunity to demonstrate their reliability as an 
international partner on non-proliferation, and point out 
that Kazakhstan joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 
2002 and became a subscribing state to the Hague Code of 
Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) in 
2005. 
 
3. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  We recognize that there has 
essentially been a moratorium on new MTCR members since 
Bulgaria joined in 2004, with Russia holding membership for 
several new EU member states hostage to its demand that 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and China be admitted.  At the same 
 
time, we understand that independent of this dispute, 
Washington does not support Kazakhstan's membership bid for 
several reasons, including because of concerns Kazakhstan has 
not harmonized its export control list with the MTCR's and 
does not have a track record of effective implementation of 
missile-related export controls.  Instead, Washington 
believes that Kazakhstan can make a contribution to 
preventing missile proliferation through unilateral adherence 
to MTCR guidelines.  At this juncture, however, we urge 
consideration of a new approach -- one that reflects the 
maturity of the U.S.-Kazakhstan strategic partnership and 
takes into account Kazakhstan's expressed interest in raising 
bilateral cooperation to a new level under the Obama 
Administration.  We recommend that U.S. government 
interlocutors use the Kazakhstani delegation's May visit to 
detail the specific steps Kazakhstan must take to address our 
MTCR concerns -- with a promise that should Kazakhstan 
satisfactorily implement all the steps, the United States 
would actively support Kazakhstan's MTCR candidacy once 
agreement is reached within the organization on admitting new 
members.  END COMMENT. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA664, KAZAKHSTAN: KAZKOSMOS LAYS OUT SPACE AMBITIONS, REQUESTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA664 2009-04-17 12:08 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2591
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0664/01 1071208
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171208Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5197
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1504
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0882
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1577
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1585
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0569
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEANAT/NASA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1067
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0981
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000664 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, OES/PCI, ISN 
MOSCOW PLEASE PASS TO NASA OFFICE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TSPA SENV KNNP KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  KAZKOSMOS LAYS OUT SPACE AMBITIONS, REQUESTS 
SUPPORT FOR KAZAKHSTAN TO JOIN MTCR 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for Public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Kazakhstan's National Space Agency, KazKosmos, 
expects that Russia and Kazakhstan will sign an agreement this year 
to allow visits to the Baikonur cosmodrome for tourists.  Russia's 
current Baikonur lease runs until 2050, but its terms do not 
adequately address the growing costs of maintaining the site.  There 
is a joint venture to build a new rocket launch site at Baikonur, 
called Baiterek, designed to launch Russia's newest Angara 
heavy-launch boosters.  Planned to be completed by 2012, it 
currently is only at the design stage.  KazKosmos told us that it 
fully understands Russia's interest in developing its own 
independent space launch site in the Russian Far East but believes 
that Russia has no intention to withdraw from Baikonur.  KazKosmos 
would like to enter into a cooperative partnership with NASA.  This 
year it hoped to send a Kazakhstani cosmonaut to the International 
Space Station, but this has been postponed because of the global 
financial crisis.  Kazakhstan would like to develop tourism in the 
Baikonur area and plans to develop tourism infrastructure. 
KazKosmos also hopes to preserve and restore Baikonur's basic launch 
site infrastructure, implement Russia's GLONASS global positioning 
system, and build a factory in Astana that will assemble satellites. 
 Kazakhstan is working to improve social and economic conditions in 
the city of Baikonur.  KazKosmos also asked for U.S. support for 
Kazakhstan to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
END SUMMARY. 
 
RENEGOTIATION OF RUSSIA-KAZAKHSTAN AGREEMENT ON BAIKONUR 
 
3. (SBU) On April 15, Kazakhstan National Space Agency (KazKosmos) 
Deputy Chairman Yerkin Shaimagambetov and International Cooperation 
Department Director Lyailya Tlepgergenova did not directly confirm 
to Regional Environmental Officer (REO)rumors about a renegotiation 
of the Russia-Kazakhstan lease for Baikonur, but they did say that 
during an upcoming May visit to Kazakhstan of Russian Prime Minister 
Putin, Kazakhstan hopes the two countries will sign an agreement to 
allow tourists to visit the space launch site.  Shaimagambetov noted 
that Russia and Kazakhstan signed the first Baikonur lease in 1994, 
and it included a provision that the agreement could be extended. 
In 2004, Kazakhstani President Nazarbayev and then-Russian President 
Putin signed a memorandum of understanding to extend the lease until 
2050.  Shaimagambetov maintained, however, that the terms of the 
lease do not adequately address the growing costs of maintaining the 
site. 
 
4. (SBU) Shaimagambetov said both Russia and Kazakhstan have to 
maintain administrative facilities at Baikonur, support military 
units and law-enforcement agencies that provide security there, and 
fund the presence of other state agencies.   In addition, there are 
costs associated with improving infrastructure at the site and 
funding pension obligations for those who work there.  Ensuring 
ecological safety at Baikonur, with spent rocket fuel contaminating 
parts of the site, also entails costs. 
 
5. (SBU) Shaimagambetov noted that there is a Russia-Kazakhstan 
joint venture to build a new rocket launch site at Baikonur, called 
Baiterek, which is designed to launch Russia's newest Angara 
heavy-launch boosters.  The Angara booster will use a less toxic 
fuel than Russia's existing Proton booster.  Nonetheless, this new 
fuel will involve additional costs for storage and handling.  In the 
past, there were several fuel-related accidents and fires involving 
Proton booster rockets, Shaimagambetov said, and Russia has agreed 
in principle to pay for the ecological damage to the surrounding 
area.  The Baiterek project is supposed to be completed by 2012, 
though it is only at the design stage now.  In short, he said, there 
are a lot of reasons why Kazakhstan wants more favorable terms for 
the Baikonur lease, but for now that process is on hold until the 
financial situation improves. 
 
6. (SBU) Regarding Russia's plans to build a new launch site in the 
 
ASTANA 00000664  002 OF 003 
 
 
Russian Far East, Shaimagambetov said KazKosmos fully understands 
Russia's interest in develop
ing its own independent access to space. 
 These plans, however, will not affect joint projects.  He stressed 
that Russia has affirmed it has no intention to withdraw from 
Baikonur, and the Russian government directly reassured President 
Nazarbayev about this. 
 
KAZKOSMOS WOULD LIKE TO HAVE COOPERATION WITH NASA 
 
7. (SBU) Shaimagambetov said that KazKosmos would like to enter into 
a cooperative partnership with NASA.  He said Kazakhstan has no 
direct experience in space flight or exploration and, thus, could 
benefit immensely from NASA's experience.  Shaimagambetov said he 
has traveled to the United States to observe U.S. experience in 
operating a launch site and a control center.  Kazakhstan has sent 
two cosmonauts into space, and had hoped to send one of its two 
current candidate cosmonauts to the International Space Station in 
late 2009 to carry out experiments as part of Kazakhstan's science 
program.  Unfortunately, such contracts with Russia to send 
cosmonauts into space are very costly for Kazakhstan, and the 
financial crisis has forced Kazakhstan to postpone these plans for 
now. 
 
DEVELOPING TOURISM AT BAIKONUR 
 
8. (SBU) According to Shaimagambetov, Kazakhstan would like to 
increase its presence at Baikonur, not only for operational reasons, 
but also because Kazakhstan is interested in developing tourism 
there.  The city was closed for security reasons, but Kazakhstan 
hopes to reopen the zone again, possibly this year, if Putin and 
Nazarbayev sign an agreement on international tourism for Baikonur 
during Putin's May visit to Kazakhstan.  Kazakhstan intends to 
refurbish a tourist hotel in Baikonur that can handle large official 
delegations as well as ordinary tourists.  Currently, there is very 
little lodging in Baikonur, and this serves as a limiting factor. 
There are discussions with Kazakhstani tourist agencies to help 
build the necessary tourist infrastructure -- including roads, 
hotels, and souvenir shops -- as well as to develop and improve a 
number of historical sites at Baikonur.  In addition, new air routes 
will be needed, since currently there are no direct flights to 
Baikonur from within Kazakhstan.  At present, only a very small 
number of people are able to go to Baikonur, but Shaimagambetov 
hopes this will change. 
 
PROJECTS STRUGGLING BECAUSE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
9. (SBU) Shaimagambetov enumerated a number of projects that 
KazKosmos was undertaking, many of which have been affected by the 
ongoing financial crisis.  KazKosmos hopes to be able to preserve 
and, to some extent, restore some of the basic launch site 
infrastructure.  This is a project of the Russian-Ukrainian company 
Kosmotras, which also does commercial launches, and Kazakhstan is 
currently negotiating its entry into participating in this project. 
He said KazKosmos also plans to implement Russian's GLONASS global 
positioning system (similar to GPS) to help it find natural 
resources and preserve the environment in Kazakhstan.  The bidding 
is under way, involving contenders from France, Russia, Ukraine, 
India, South Korea, and China.  According to Shaimagambetov, France 
and Kazakhstan intend to sign a space cooperation agreement later 
this year when French President Sarkozy visits Kazakhstan. 
Shaimagambetov said Kazakhstan plans to build a factory jointly with 
France in Astana that will assemble satellites.  The original 
intention was for Kazakhstan and France to share the financing for 
this project equally, but Kazakhstan is now looking for additional 
international partners. 
 
BAIKONUR CITY NEEDS DEVELOPMENT 
 
10. (SBU) Kazakhstan is working to improve life in the city of 
Baikonur, Shaimagambetov said.  It is doing this on its own, without 
 
ASTANA 00000664  003 OF 003 
 
 
Russian participation, since Russia is only interested in exploiting 
the launch site.  He described Baikonur city as out of the Soviet 
1970s, lacking modern infrastructure.  The government now is 
building a new school, kindergarten, hospital, and government 
administrative buildings.  Shaimagambetov noted that, in the past, 
Kazakhstan had to rent buildings from Russia -- now it is building 
its own.  He said the government is beginning to worry about the 
social and economic development of the city, including cleaning up 
the environment and securing pensions for the elderly.  In addition, 
Kazakhstan sends a number of students to the aeronautics institute 
in Baikonur for training. 
 
REQUEST FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR KAZAKHSTAN TO JOIN THE MTCR 
 
11. (SBU) Shaimagambetov argued that Kazakhstan has worked actively 
in the realm of missile technology control and has consistently 
supported the U.S. position on this issue.  He said Kazakhstan is 
seeking U.S. support to join the Missile Technology Control Regime, 
and he hopes that the United States will agree to this.  He said 
this will help Kazakhstan's efforts to enter the commercial space 
market as it plans for the future of Baikonur.  (COMMENT: 
Kazakhstani MFA officials have also reiterated to us on several 
occasions in recent months Kazakhstan's continued interest in 
joining the MTCR.  They see this as consistent with Kazakhstan's 
strong record on non-proliferation.  END COMMENT.) 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA663, KAZAKHSTAN: MEDIA REACTION, APRIL 9 – 15

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA663 2009-04-17 11:50 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2564
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0663/01 1071150
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171150Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5195
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1502
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1583
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0880
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0567
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1065
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0979
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2277
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2607

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000663 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON SOCI KDEM KPAO KMDR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  MEDIA REACTION, APRIL 9 - 15 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  Kazakhstani political commentators focused on the 
domestic political scene this week, weighing the relative merits of 
the ruling Nur Otan party and its adversaries in the opposition. 
"Delovaya Nedelya," an independent weekly, published a wrap-up of 
the G-20 summit in which it mocked the IMF as solely an 
Anglo-American institution and another critical article about the 
situation for immigrants in the United States.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NUR OTAN:  SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 
 
2.  Independent, Russian-language "Vremya" published a commentary by 
opposition National Social Democratic Party deputy head Amirzhan 
Kosanov blasting the government's handling of the financial crisis, 
which Kosanov describes as "an ever worsening economic disease" 
causing "social cramps" and which could eventually lead to "a fatal 
political crisis."  Kosanov believes that the reason that the 
"staggering financial inflows from the National Fund" have failed to 
stimulate the economy is the lack of oversight.  The government 
can't control itself.  "How can the Nur Otan parliament control the 
Nur Otan government?"  Kosanov concludes that government oversight 
can only come from independent institutions which are lacking in 
Kazakhstan. 
 
3.  On the other hand, pro-government, Russian-language "Liter" 
trumpeted recent survey results showing a high approval rating for 
President Nazarbayev and his party.  The director of Moscow State 
University's Information and Analytical Center, Alexei Vlasov, 
credited the high public trust in Nur Otan to its First Deputy 
Chairman, Darkhan Kaletayev.  Under Kaletayev's leadership, Nur Otan 
is controlling state procurements, conducting an anti-corruption 
campaign, helping children, and collecting money for medical 
treatments.  Vlasov believes that Kaletayev is a rising party figure 
giving a good account of himself in the eyes of President. 
 
ZOMBIE POLITICS 
 
4.  Pro-government, Russian-language "Central Asia Monitor" reports 
that the Kazakhstani political scene reminds one of a cemetery -- 
"some politicians are already dead, others have one foot in the 
grave."  The majority of oppositionists are "the living dead" who 
emerge from the grave only on the eve of elections.  While 
Kazakhstani opposition parties present articulate ideologies, their 
forgettable front benches give the impression that the parties are 
being directed by "headless horsemen." 
 
G-20 SUMMIT:  U.S. AND BRITISH DOMINATION 
 
5.  Independent, Russian-language "Delovaya Nedelya" blasted the 
G-20 leaders for allegedly taking no serious steps against the 
growing financial crisis.  However, "at least the G-20 leaders 
didn't fight among themselves" and did manage to pledge $1 trillion 
dollars for the IMF.  The author said that "even G-20 members such 
as Russia, Brazil, Thailand, and Saudi Arabia have practically no 
influence on the IMF's decision-making" which is under "American and 
British control."  The author concluded, "The results of the G-20 
London summit show that the United States and the United Kingdom 
will continue to be the main financial players and will continue 
dictating to the rest of the world what to do." 
 
IMMIGRANT BRAIN DRAIN 
 
6.  "Delovaya Nedelya" reported that the U.S. State Department and 
Congress are concerned about a "brain drain" of immigrants leaving 
the United States.  According to the author, 150,000 immigrants left 
the United States over the last six months, most of whom decided to 
resettle in Canada, Australia, Europe, New Zealand, and Chile.  The 
author cited the arduous visa process as the main culprit, but also 
said that immigrants are leaving America because they are made to 
feel uncomfortable in the wake of the "war on terrorism" and the 
absence of a "human foundation" in the United States.  This term is 
defined by "Americans' unwillingness to help each other, the lack of 
work, friends, and family values, and Americans' disrespect for the 
elderly."  The author finished by stating that the "brain drain will 
 
ASTANA 00000663  002 OF 002 
 
 
continue until the United States profoundly changes its immigration 
policies and stops perceiving the rest of the world as a hostile 
encirclemen
t." 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA662, KAZAKHSTAN: FUTURE OF LARGEST BANKS REMAINS UNCLEAR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA662 2009-04-17 11:40 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2543
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0662/01 1071140
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171140Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5193
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1500
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0878
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1581
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0565
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1063
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0977
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000662 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO OPIC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON EINV EFIN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  FUTURE OF LARGEST BANKS REMAINS UNCLEAR 
 
REF:  ASTANA 0386 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Recent developments within the Kazakhstani 
banking sector -- specifically pertaining to BTA and Alliance banks 
-- indicate continued instability and increased risk of default on 
the repayment of foreign obligations.  In an April 13 press release, 
Alliance Bank announced approximately $1.1 billion in newly 
discovered obligations.  BTA Chairman Arman Dunayev restated the 
Government of Kazakhstan's commitment to support BTA, but warned 
that any request for accelerated repayment of debt could force the 
government to abandon this cause, leaving creditors in the lurch. 
The government's Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Funds bought a 22 
percent in Halyk Bank on April 2.  END SUMMARY. 
 
ALLIANCE BANK ON THE BRINK 
 
3. (SBU) The future of Alliance Bank, Kazakhstan's fourth largest 
private financial institution, remains uncertain.  Alliance has yet 
to receive the capital injection pledged by the government's 
Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund when it took over a 76 percent 
ownership stake in the bank in February for the symbolic sum or 100 
tenge (less than $1).  On April 1, the United Kingdom's Financial 
Services Authority announced a temporary suspension of trading in 
Alliance Bank securities listed on the London Stock Exchange 
"pending clarification of the company's financial position."  This 
announcement was made following a press release from Alliance Bank 
the same day describing a "discovery by Alliance Bank's new 
management team" that the Alliance's securities portfolio "may be 
seriously impaired." 
 
IT GETS WORSE 
 
4.  (SBU) More recently, on April 13, Alliance Bank announced that 
it is seeking a three-month standstill agreement from its creditors 
because of a previous overstatement of assets.  According to this 
statement, "the bank wishes to advise that the overstatement relates 
to transactions entered into by the Bank between 2005 and 2008 that 
were not properly recorded on the Bank's balance sheet.  The 
transactions included guarantees that were issued by the bank that 
were secured by a pledge of U.S. Treasury securities in the amount 
of approximately $1.1 billion."  As a result, Alliance said it was 
"not in a position to repay the outstanding balance due under a 
facility agreement which matured on March 19."  The request for stay 
of payment by Alliance Bank was confirmed by representatives of 
Wachovia Bank in a meeting with the Ambassador in Astana on April 
15.  This announcement led Fitch Ratings to downgrade Alliance's 
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to RD (Restricted Default). 
(COMMENT:  OPIC informed Embassy that the standstill request might 
directly impact its $27 million exposure to Alliance.  END COMMENT.) 
 
 
BTA STILL TOP PRIORITY 
 
5.  (SBU) The fate of BTA bank also remains uncertain.  However, 
despite sharply divided opinions regarding whether the government, 
through Samruk-Kazyna, should have taken over BTA in the first 
place, the consensus remains that the government will not let it 
fail.  Commitments to the survival of BTA come amidst a growing 
tally of criminal allegations against its former top executives, 
Muktar Ablyazov and Roman Solodchenko, both of whom fled Kazakhstan 
and are believed to be in the United Kingdom.  In a rather sharply 
worded official press release from BTA on March 17, a clear message 
was sent to creditors not to force accelerated debt repayment, 
because they would risk losing their entire investments.  The BTA 
press release states "Samruk-Kazyna intends to ensure that the 
members of the BTA Group continue to pay their financial 
indebtedness at maturity and interest payments as and when they fall 
due whilst BTA Bank and its advisers consider any potential 
modifications to the BTA Group's debt structure to ensure the long 
term stability of the BTA Group, although in the event any financial 
 
ASTANA 00000662  002 OF 002 
 
 
indebtedness of the BTA Group is accelerated prior to its stated 
maturity, Samruk-Kazyna may no longer be prepared to provide such 
support."  Meruert Makhmutova, Director of Public Policy Research 
Center in Almaty, told EconOff on April 6 that the government will 
maintain the bank until the very last moment regardless of how much 
it costs, and the price will be high for doing this.  Yerlan

Sagadiyev, a respected embassy contact and entrepreneur, told the 
DCM "it will be a nightmare for everyone in government if BTA fails. 
 However, he added "it was stupid for the government to go into the 
private sector."  Sagadiyev claimed that the number of bad loans 
increased 46 percent in February and alleged that the new management 
of BTA had lost control of their credit portfolio. 
 
FOREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING KEY TO SURVIVABILITY 
 
6.  (SBU) According to the press, during a April 13 meeting with 
President Nazarbayev, the Financial Supervision Agency head Yelena 
Bakhmutova said that the situation in the banking sector remains 
problematic.  Nazarbayev assigned both Bakhmutova and National Bank 
Chairman Grigoriy Marchenko the task of reviewing the possibility of 
debt restructuring in order to lighten pressure on the banking 
system.  On April 15, Marchenko announced that both Alliance and BTA 
had until the end of April to prepare their programs for 
restructuring external debts.  "After that, it will be clear which 
portion of the banks' obligations will be bought at a discount, and 
which portion will be restructured.  Then the numbers for external 
debts of these banks will be understood, and then we can move 
forward also with our strategic investors, which we have for both 
banks."  Marchenko concluded saying that "if this is done correctly, 
and all foreign creditors agree to it, it will be beneficial for 
these two banks we are discussing, for the banking system as a 
whole, and also for the country." 
 
SBERBANK INTERESTED IN BTA 
 
7. (SBU) Marchenko claimed that the possible strategic investor for 
BTA remains Russia's Sberbank, and for Alliance Bank is an unnamed 
local investor.  However, Makhmutova maintained to Econoff that it 
is likely that Sberbank will be even less enthusiastic about the 
possible purchase once it learns the results of BTA's audit at the 
end of April. 
 
GOVERNMENT MOVES AHEAD WITH PURCHASE INTO HALYK BANK 
 
8.  (SBU) On April 2, Samruk-Kazyna officially announced the 
purchase of 21 per cent of the common shares in Kazakhstan's third 
largest private financial institution, Halyk Bank, for 27 billion 
tenge (about $179 million).  The news came with an announcement from 
Halyk Bank that it expected the government to inject an additional 
$219 million into the bank through the purchase of preferred shares 
over the following two months.   The majority owner of Halyk remains 
the Almex holding company, which holds approximately 54 percent of 
its common shares.  (NOTE: Almex is owned by Timur Kulibayev and his 
wife Dinara, President Nazarbayev's second eldest daughter. 
Kulibayev is currently the deputy head of Samruk-Kazyna.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
9.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The government remains publicly committed to 
rescuing Kazakhstan's largest banks.  However, its failure thus far 
to inject the promised funds into Alliance may be an indication it 
is reconsidering saving that institution because of the high cost of 
doing so, or it may be waiting to first reach agreement with a 
private investor to share these costs.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA661, KAZAKHSTAN: WORLD TUBERCULOSIS DAY — INSPIRING STUDENTS

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA661 2009-04-17 11:02 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

O 171102Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5191
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE 1498
ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USMISSION USNATO 
DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
NSC WASHDC 1061
SECDEF WASHDC 0975
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDC ATLANTA GA
USOFFICE ALMATY

UNCLAS ASTANA 000661 
 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE, F, OES/IHB 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID EINV TBIO SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  WORLD TUBERCULOSIS DAY -- INSPIRING STUDENTS 
TO MEET A CRITICAL NEED 
 
REF:  STATE 17303 
 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  The DCM addressed a World Tuberculosis Day conference 
for medical students at the Kazakhstan National Medical University 
on April 7.  The conference, entitled "We Can Stop TB," aimed to 
motivate students to get involved in the country's fight against 
tuberculosis (TB) -- a disease that claims the lives of over 2,000 
Kazakhstanis every year -- and to generate awareness among the 
general public.  The event also emphasized the role of primary 
health-care practitioners as a first line of defense in controlling 
the disease.  Approximately 80 students and faculty from the 
Kazakhstan National Medical University attended the event, which 
several national media outlets covered.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  The conference was co-organized by USAID and the Kazakhstan 
National Medical University, whose rector, Dr. Aikan Akanov, has 
twice served as Kazakhstan's Vice Minister of Health.  Dr. Akanov, a 
respected and proven champion in Kazakhstan's fight to control TB, 
reiterated his appreciation for U.S. Government support and 
recognized the friendship between the two countries.  He expressed 
his interest in U.S. health sector commercial sales and investment 
in Kazakhstan.  Dr. Akanov is a former cardiologist who speaks 
fluent English. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN'S TUBERCULOSIS EPIDEMIC 
 
3.  Kazakhstan's TB epidemic compounded by HIV/AIDS could 
potentially impact Kazakhstan's development.  The TB epidemic 
presents a major challenge to the country's health-care system and 
to its economy via decreased workforce productivity.  Kazakhstan 
suffers from one of the world's highest recorded rates of TB.  In 
Kazakhstan, according to the World Health Organization's (WHO) 
latest figures, 139 people per 100,000 have TB, as opposed to six 
per 100,000 in the United States.  Further exacerbating the epidemic 
is the emergence of "multi-drug-resistant" (MDR) TB, a form of TB 
which cannot be treated with a standard course of antibiotics.  WHO 
identifies Kazakhstan as one of the world's 22 highest-burden 
countries faced with the prevalence of this deadlier version of TB. 
Factors that contribute to the spread of MDR TB include deviation 
from international treatment standards, interruptions in drug 
supply, poor patient compliance with treatment, and poor infection 
control in TB and penitentiary facilities. 
 
CHALLENGES IN TREATMENT: TB VERSUS MDR TB 
 
4.  It is far easier to treat "normal" TB than drug-resistant forms. 
 Patients infected with "normal" TB face treatment regimens lasting 
between six and 12 months with a standard course of antibiotics that 
are affordable ($40) and readily available.  However, to cure MDR 
TB, the patient must undergo at least two years of treatment with a 
more complex regimen of drugs that are up to 1,000 times more 
expensive than the standard course of antibiotics.  Drug-resistant 
TB is a concern because treatment can be debilitating -- not just 
due to duration of treatment, but also due to the side effects 
caused by the more sophisticated antibiotics.  Further, all who are 
infected by a drug-resistant TB carrier also acquire a resistant 
form of the infection. 
 
WHO IS AT RISK? 
 
5.  Populations most at risk of becoming infected with TB are 
prisoners and people living with HIV, which is predominantly spread 
via injected drug use in Kazakhstan.  TB is the leading cause of 
death among HIV patients worldwide and in Kazakhstan.  The 
Kazakhstan National AIDS Center reported that 40 percent of HIV 
patients died from TB in 2008.  The challenge for prisoners is not 
only contracting TB and/or HIV in prison, but also defaulting from 
treatment upon release. 
 
HISTORY IS PARTLY TO BLAME 
 
6.  A legacy of Soviet times, Kazakhstan's health-care system relies 
on many "vertical" structures -- that is, highly independent, 
stand-alone facilities charged with diagnosing and treating specific 
diseases or conditions.  The TB and HIV/AIDS systems of care are 
typical vertical structures, operating separate databases and using 
different protocols that allow for little interaction or 
collaboration outside the disease-specific facilities.  These 
vertical structures present an obstacle for HIV-positive patients in 
need of TB diagnosis, counselling, and treatment, and vice-versa for 
TB patients.  Prisoners participate in yet another vertical system 
of care that is not connected to civil health-care systems, 
presenting problems for newly-released prisoners who are suffering 
from TB and/or HIV. 
 
THE RESPONSE IN KAZAKHSTAN 
 
7.  In 1998, Kazakhstan adopted the "DOTS" strategy,
the 
internationally-recognized approach to controlling TB.  One year 
later, Kazakhstan reported 100% DOTS coverage in the civilian 
system, and models have since been developed for TB management in 
prisons.  This "success" is deceptive:  the quality of DOTS 
implementation has been questionable, with good detection rates, but 
low treatment-success rates.  Although the Government has drafted a 
number of TB-control decrees (e.g., a 2008-2012 national TB plan, 
and TB and MDR TB management guidelines), there remains a dearth of 
specialists who can interpret and analyze data, conduct operational 
research, test interventions, design evidence-based action plans, 
and monitor impact. 
 
8.  Despite shortages of trained TB specialists and inadequate 
technical capacity to treat MDR TB, the Government of Kazakhstan 
would like to rapidly scale up MDR TB case management nationwide. 
To guard against resistance to MDR TB drugs, TB medical staff must 
be well-trained to monitor treatment and resistance, and  MDR TB 
drugs are made available consistently and affordably throughout 
Kazakhstan. 
 
9.  In concert with the World Bank; the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
TB, and Malaria; and other donors, the U.S. Government -- through 
USAID -- has responded by providing support to Kazakhstan's national 
TB program.  Activities include expanding social support services to 
increase patients' adherence to treatment; providing better 
information to high-risk groups to increase care-seeking and early 
diagnosis; providing training to improve diagnosis, treatment, and 
support for those infected with TB; and improving the collection and 
use of data to make sound policy decisions. 
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
 
10.  Some efforts have demonstrated progress in the fight to control 
TB, such as enhancing laboratories' capacity to correctly diagnose 
the infection, and a pilot MDR TB treatment project in Almaty that 
had a treatment success rate of 84 percent compared to the national 
average of 76 percent.  However, given the high rates of TB, MDR TB, 
and TB/HIV co-infection, it is clear that much more needs to be done 
to prevent the further spread of this disease in Kazakhstan.  For 
example, although TB mortality rates were reduced by half in 2008, 
18,000 new TB cases were registered -- of which 14 percent had a 
drug-resistant strain -- and 2,500 people died of TB. 
 
11.  COMMENT:  The "We Can Stop TB" conference is just one of many 
activities to encourage Kazakhstan's medical students -- the 
prospective leaders of the country's uphill battle against TB -- to 
focus on this important disease.  TB is not only a threat to 
Kazakhstan, but to the greater region and the world.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

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09ASTANA660, KAZAKHSTAN: INTERNATIONAL CANINE CONFERENCE

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09ASTANA660 2009-04-17 10:21 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2456
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1495
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0873
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1576
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0560
RUEHDI/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0143
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1423

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000660 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR SOCI KCRM ZK KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  INTERNATIONAL CANINE CONFERENCE 
 
REF:  TASHKENT 479 
 
ASTANA 00000660  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. Sensitive but Unclassified. Not for Public Internet 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY. INL funded a March 26-27 International Conference 
on the Role of Canines in the Fight against Drug Trafficking, 
Extremism and Terrorism in Almaty.  Representatives from the canine 
services of the five Central Asian countries, Austria, and Germany 
discussed coordination and the possibility of unified canine 
standards in the region.  In general, most national representatives 
complained that insufficient budgets resulted in poor quality dogs 
and undertrained handlers.  Only Uzbekistan touted its 
accomplishments but deferred from volunteering to be a regional 
breeding center.  INL Astana believes that the Kazakhstani canine 
program is adequate and sustainable.  Kazakhstan has volunteered to 
host regional training including for Afghanistan.  Uzbekistan also 
offered to initiate an independent assessment of Central Asian 
training centers and host regional training.  Embassy Astana 
supports Tashkent's request in reftel that INL fund Uzbek 
participation in the June Kazakhstan trip to the Austrian Canine 
Center.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3. (SBU) The Military Institute of Kazakhstan's Committee for 
National Security (KNB) and the Embassies of Austria and the United 
States sponsored an International Conference on the Role of Canines 
in the Fight against Drug Trafficking, Extremism and Terrorism, 
which provided an assessment of the current situation, discussion of 
future developments, and an agreement on joint cooperation. 
Conference participants included representatives of the canine 
services of the Central Asian countries, Germany, and Austria, the 
Director of the Military Institute, the head of the Shygys Regional 
Directorate of the Kazakhstan Border Guard Service, Austrian 
Ambassador to Kazakhstan Ursula Fahringer, the IOM Chief of Mission, 
the technical advisor of the Border Management Program in Central 
Asia and Central Asia Drug Action Program (BOMCA/CADAP), and 
representatives of the Central Asian Regional Information 
Coordination Center (CARICC).   The DCM and INL Officer represented 
the Embassy. 
 
4. (SBU) Alexander Bodnar, head of the Canine Department of 
Kazakhstan's Military Institute, presented his views on the reasons 
that canine programs in Central Asia have not succeeded.  He stated 
that there are no regionally accepted methods of training canine 
specialists and dogs.  Moreover, there are an insufficient number of 
dogs meeting the selection requirements for special training.  These 
countries do not sufficiently fund their canine programs and the 
budgets provided are not sufficient to purchase quality dogs.  Law 
enforcement agency headquarters generally do not understand the 
needs of the canine services and the importance and abilities of 
their canine services.  Bodnar also complained of an insufficient 
number of instructors and managers in Central Asia capable of 
conducting training for canine specialists.  He proposed retraining 
current canine specialists as opposed to training new ones.  He also 
stated that there is very little communication among canine 
instructors in the region. 
 
5. (SBU) Bodnar presented his analysis of the canine situation in 
Central Asia based on his visits to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.  He 
claimed that some dogs in the Canine Center of the Tajik Border 
Guard Service died because of insufficient care.   This incident led 
international organizations and embassies to halt assistance to the 
border guard canine service.  Donors later provided funding to care 
for ill dogs.  According to Bodnar, one of the most successful 
centers in Tajikistan is the Canine Center of the Drug Control 
Agency.  The Center provides proper conditions for dogs and canine 
teams participate in operations on a regular basis.  Bodnar stated 
that this training center only needs assistance in training 
instructors to conduct training at an appropriate level. 
 
6. (SBU) Bodnar also discussed the situation in Kyrgyzstan, which he 
described as similar to that in Tajikistan.  The State Customs 
Committee and the BOMCA/CADAP programs constructed an Interagency 
Canine Center there.  However, according to Bodnar, the canine 
service of the Ministry of Interior is in poor condition.  There is 
a professional relationship between the Kazakhstani canine services 
 
ASTANA 00000660  00
2.2 OF 003 
 
 
and the Kyrgyz Interagency Canine Center.  (COMMENT: Despite 
Bodnar's pessimistic evaluation of the situation in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, according to statistics presented at the conference, the 
majority of seized drugs from Afghanistan along the northern 
corridor are detected by canine units. (reftel)END COMMENT) 
 
7. (SBU) Pavel Sukhodolskih, Head of the Canine and Cavalry Services 
of the Border Guard Service of Kyrgyzstan, discussed the activity of 
criminal groups within large flows of migrants.  Currently, the 
Border Guard Service, the State Customs Committee, and the Drug 
Control Agency have 54 dogs trained in searching for drugs and 
explosives; however, they are only able to cover 20% of the Kyrgyz 
border with Kazakhstan.  Sukhodolskih complained that of a lack of 
pure-bred dogs, lack of professional instructors, insufficient 
equipment, and absence of methodological literature hamper efforts 
to train specialists.  In 2008, canine specialists of the Kyrgyz 
Border Service and the Drug Control Agency experimented with joint 
border patrols.  The cooperation proved to be effective and, this 
year, they will continue to work together. 
 
8. (SBU) Davron Mirbabayev, Deputy Director of the National Canine 
Center of the State Customs Committee of Uzbekistan, maintained that 
the National Canine Center, established in 1996, has become the 
center for training, retraining, and advanced training of canine 
specialists.  The Center conducts dog selection and raises pure-bred 
dogs.  In 2008, the Center received regional status as a result of 
its work on development of the canine service.  The center has had 
extensive experience working with international experts from 
Austria, Kazakhstan, France, Russia, and Germany.  Mirbabyev said 
that the National Canine Center is always ready to cooperate with 
other countries.  He proposed monitoring graduates of regional 
courses to improve and amend canine curricula.  (COMMENT: There is 
some question if all Central Asian countries, particularly 
Tajikistan, would be willing to attend training in Uzbekistan.  END 
COMMENT) 
 
9. (SBU) The representative of the State Border Service of 
Turkmenistan stated that construction has been started on a Canine 
Center in Mary. 
 
10. (SBU) Josef Schuetzenhofer, the Head of the Austrian Ministry of 
Interior's Canine Center, discussed existing problems and prospects 
for future cooperation.  Since May 2005, he has had an opportunity 
to learn about the canine systems in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Kazakhstan.  He maintained that there is a lack of quality work 
dogs, a lack of breeding dogs, and improper dogs are purchased.  All 
services should pay attention to the selection of dogs, proper 
training of puppies, training dogs in a less stressful manner, 
training with proper equipment, and humane treatment of dogs.  In 
the future, Schuetzenhofer would like to see an increase in the use 
of canines, interagency cooperation, and the use of real drugs for 
training, as well as bigger budgets better used, and an improvement 
in breeding programs. 
 
11. (SBU) Conference participants agreed to hold meetings once every 
two years for managers of canine services and once a year for 
instructors to discuss training methods and tactics to stop the 
traffic of narcotics, explosives, and weapons and to combat 
extremism and terrorism in Central Asia.  They also recommended 
training canine instructors at institutes in Central Asia to improve 
teaching methods and make methods uniform.  The Kazakhstani Military 
Institute announced its willingness to host such training.  The 
Military Institute also invited the Canine Center of the Uzbek Drug 
Control Agency to conduct exchange programs. 
 
12. (SBU) The Kazakhstanis proposed a regional breeding program; the 
Uzbeks recommended revisiting the issue later.  The representatives 
of Uzbekistan's National Canine Center of the State Customs 
Committee believe that their center can breed good dogs, but it is 
not ready to provide dogs for the whole region.  Moreover, by law, 
puppies bred in Uzbekistan are the property of the Uzbek government. 
 
 
13. (SBU) Participants also recommended regional canine competitions 
in searching for drugs, weapons, and ammunition starting in 2010. 
 
ASTANA 00000660  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Representatives of the Austrian Ministry of Interior invited canine 
specialists to attend the annual competition in Austria in June 2009 
to observe Austria's organization and standards.  Representatives 
from Kazakhstan will be there from April 6 to June 19 as part of a 
counternarcotics training course. 
 
14. (SBU) Kazakhstan offered to provide the results of its testing 
of SOKKS (a special material saturated with micro particles of 
narcotics).  The testing will determine how SOKKS can be introduced 
into the training process.  (COMMENT:  Post purchased SOKKS for the 
Military Institute and the Border Guard Service in November 2008 and 
funded a training seminar on the use of SOKKS in January 2009. 
According to Austria's Schuetzenhofer, the use of SOKKS should be 
followed within the first three days with the use of real drugs in 
the training process.  ENDCOMMENT.) 
 
15. (SBU) Currently, all canine services in Kazakhstan use drug 
substitutes for training.  Although the Ministry of Interior allows 
the use of real drugs in training, trainers refuse to use them 
because of strict controls.  When drugs were previously used for 
training, the Procurator General's Office conducted regular checks. 
There is no clear system for storing drugs for training purposes. 
Administrative and criminal cases were initiated against canine 
officers in the past for misuse of training samples.  The 
Kazakhstani participants in the conference now believe that it will 
be possible to better organize the control of samples used in 
training and will recommend using real drugs. 
 
16. (SBU) Conference participants also recommended regional 
development of canine programs with the assistance of international 
organizations, bilateral donors, and other interested parties.  An 
independent expert would assess the Central Asian canine services. 
 
 
17. (SBU) After the conference, INL discussed future programs with 
the Kazakhstani representatives.  They continue to learn about new 
methods of training from the Austrian Ministry of Interior.  Post 
plans to send two more interagency groups of instructors to the 
Counternarcotics Canine Training Course in Bad Kreuzen, Austria. 
The instructors who attended last year's courses have made changes 
in their services to conform with lessons learned in Austria.  The 
Military Institute tested the Austrian methods of teaching and, 
based on the effectiveness of a pilot project, made changes to the 
training curriculum.  The Border Guard Service conducted a pilot 
training course o
n the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border.  The Ministry 
of Interior is also testing a training program and some participants 
of the conference attested to the positive results of that training. 
 Kazakhstani law enforcement bodies are striving to prove the 
efficiency of the new methods of training. 
 
18. (SBU) COMMENT.  Post believes that the canine programs in 
Kazakhstan are sustainable or on the verge of long-term 
sustainability.  Post plans to support more training events, 
co-training courses, and the production of a set of canine 
textbooks.  The basic contents of the textbooks were presented at 
the conference and contain both best practices and new methods.  The 
final four-volume set is expected to be issued by the end of 2010. 
Austria's Schuetzenhofer is writing several chapters with the 
support of Post.  We believe that all services in Kazakhstan will 
unanimously move to the Austrian methodology of training dogs. 
However, even if one method is accepted universally, we do not 
foresee Kazakhstan creating a unified training center.  Despite 
their common goals, each agency has different tasks and there is a 
great deal of competition among them.  All the canine centers are 
well-equipped and have motivated staffs.  The Military Institute is 
working to ready itself to train cadets from Mongolia and Tajikistan 
this year.  The Military Institute has informed us that it is ready 
to receive canine handlers and trainers from other Central Asian 
countries and Afghanistan for counternarcotics canine training. 
Addressees may pass this information to appropriate authorities in 
their host governments.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

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