To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA604.
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA604.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ASTANA604 | 2009-04-08 10:14 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | SECRET | Embassy Astana |
VZCZCXRO2389 OO RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV DE RUEHTA #0604/01 0981014 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 081014Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5115 INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1465 RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0843 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0530 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1546 RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1028 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0941 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0068 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2259 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2589
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000604 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/A, NEA/IR, ISN, CA/OCS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2034 TAGS: PREL PGOV CASC MARR KNNP IAEA AF IR KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SARYBAY SAYS AHMADINEJAD WELCOMED OBAMA,S PRAGUE SPEECH REF: A. ASTANA 0601 ¶B. ASTANA 0557 ¶C. STATE 31102 ¶D. ASTANA 0547 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: On April 8, Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Kairat Sarybay gave the Ambassador a readout of President Nazarbayev's April 6 meeting with Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Sarybay said that Ahmadinejad appeared to welcome President Obama's April 5 Prague speech. Ahmadinejad maintained that he had taken the first step, by writing a letter to Obama. The Kazakhstanis believe that U.S. cooperation with Iran in Afghanistan could lead to cooperation in other areas. Sarybay explained that Nazarbayev's March 30 comment to the Ambassador that Kazakhstan could provide a "logistical base" for Afghanistan meant that Kazakhstan could be a storage location and source for supplies to the Coalition, in addition to being a transit country. The Ambassador raised ref C demarche requesting specific Kazakhstani contributions to Afghanistan; Sarybay promised to review the request. Sarybay recommended remaining in close touch with the MFA about the case of Peace Corps volunteer Anthony Sharp. END SUMMARY. AHMADINEJAD APPEARED TO WELCOME PRAGUE SPEECH ¶2. (S) On April 8, Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Kairat Sarybay gave the Ambassador a readout of President Nazarbayev's April 6 meeting in Astana with Iranian President Ahmadinejad. (NOTE: See ref A for State Secretary Saudabayev's readout of the meeting. END NOTE.) Sarybay explained, "It was interesting to speak with Ahmadinejad. He'll most probably be re-elected, but he was modest about it, saying 'Let's see what the Iranian people will do.'" According to Sarybay, the Kazakhstanis were worried that Ahmadinejad would misuse his Astana visit as a platform "for other claims" (NFI, but likely this means inappropriate public statements or outbursts), but this didn't come to pass. ¶3. (S) Sarybay said that Ahmadinejad welcomed efforts to increase Kazakhstan-Iran trade -- including Kazakhstani wheat exports to Iran -- and to develop the necessary transport infrastructure for this. It was the Iranian side, he explained, that had proposed building a railway from western Kazakhstan through Turkmenistan to Iran. There are also plans to build a roadway parallel to the rail line, Sarybay added, looking a little skeptical. ¶4. (S) Sarybay said that while he would not describe Ahmadinejad as "very optimistic," he nevertheless appeared to welcome President Obama's April 5 Prague speech. According to Sarybay, Ahmadinejad said, "I took the first step, despite domestic pressure. I wrote to Obama. We are ready (NFI)." Explaining that while Ahmadinejad was cautious, Sarybay nevertheless read the situation as "promising," though perhaps not leading to immediate negotiations. The Kazakhstanis asked Ahmadinejad whether both sides -- the United States and Iran -- are ready for a meeting between the Secretary and Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki. "Ahmadinejad turned to Mottaki and asked, 'Are you ready?'; Mottaki silently shook his head yes." Nazarbayev and Ahmadinejad agreed that Kazakhstan and Iran need to be more involved in Afghanistan. "If the United States and the West can cooperate more with Iran in Afghanistan, this should lead to more cooperation in other areas, including non-proliferation, and all the countries in the region will benefit," Sarybay argued to the Ambassador. NUCLEAR FUEL BANK ASTANA 00000604 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Sarybay noted that during the Ahmadinejad visit, Nazarbayev had announced Kazakhstan's offer to host the Nuclear Threat Initiative's IAEA-supervised international nuclear fuel bank. The Ambassador explained that he had discussed the issue with State Secretary Saudabayev on April 7 (ref A). He said the United States welcomes the proposal in principle, and that we are in the process of providing Saudabayev with our formal response. CLARIFICATION OF "LOGISTICAL BASE" REMARKS ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked Sarybay to clarify a remark from his March 30 meeting with Nazarbayev, when Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstan could provide a "logistical base" for Afghanistan (see refs A and B). Sarybay said that as far as he understood, this meant that Kazakhstan could be a storage location and source for supplies for the Coalition in Afghanistan, in addition to being a transit country. He admitted that Nazarbayev had been thinking out loud when he suggested this concept. SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHANISTAN ¶7. (C) Per ref C, the Ambassador raised with Sarybay the U.S. government's Afghanistan-Pakistan strategic review, and provided him with non-papers on the review and our request to Kazakhstan for specific contributions to Afghanistan. The Ambassador explained that we would also be raising this issue with the MFA. Sarybay promised to review the request. ANTHONY SHARP CASE ¶8. (C) The Ambassador thanked Sarybay for his advice regarding the criminal case against Peace Corps volunteer Anthony Sharp, explaining he had had a good conversation with Nazarbayev about it on March 30 (ref D). Sarybay asked whether the matter is now closed. The Ambassador responded that we are just waiting for the courts to finish the paperwork, and then we hope Sharp will be able to depart the country. Sarybay recommended remaining in close touch with the MFA about the case. HOAGLAND
Wikileaks