Monthly Archives: July 2009

09ASTANA1292, KAZAKHSTAN: UNHCR, UIGHUR ACTIVIST HAVE RECEIVED NO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1292 2009-07-30 07:07 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

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DE RUEHTA #1292/01 2110707
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 300707Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5914
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1801
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
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RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1266
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1354
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001292 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, PRM, DRL, EUR/CM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2009 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PHUM PREL SOCI KDEM CH KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  UNHCR, UIGHUR ACTIVIST HAVE RECEIVED NO 
REPORTS OF CHINESE UIGHUR DEPORTATIONS 
 
REF: ASTANA 1210 
 
Classified: by Charge d'Affaires Steven H. Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b)/(d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  A UNHCR official told us on July 28 that UNHCR has 
received no reports that Kazakhstani authorities have deported 
Chinese Uighurs back to China.  However, he was aware of several 
cases of Uighur refugee activists being detained by the Almaty police 
for several hours, which he believes was meant as a warning to them 
"not to start trouble."  He also briefed us on his recent visit to 
two border posts on the Kazakhstan-China border.  According to him, 
the Migration Police and Ministry of Emergency Situations recently 
held a refresher seminar for their employees at the border posts on 
proper procedures for handling refugees.  An activist within the 
local Uighur community separately told us on July 28 that she also 
has not heard of any deportations of Chinese Uighurs.  END SUMMARY. 
 
UNHCR:  NO REPORTS OF UIGHUR DEPORTATIONS... 
 
2.  (C) On July 28, we met in Almaty with UNHCR Protection Officer 
N.L. Narasimha Rao to ask him whether the Kazakhstani authorities 
have taken any action against Chinese Uighurs living in Kazakhstan in 
the wake of the recent Uighur-related unrest in China's Xinjiang 
Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).  We specifically inquired as to 
whether there is any evidence that Chinese Uighurs have been deported 
from Kazakhstan back to China.  Rao confirmed for us that UNHCR has 
received no such reports.  He said that UNHCR has held several 
meetings with the Uighur refugee community since the beginning of the 
unrest in Xinjiang, and he was fairly certain that had such actions 
taken place, UNHCR would have heard about them immediately. 
 
... BUT SEVERAL INCIDENTS AGAINST CHINESE UIGHURS 
 
3. (C) Rao did tell us, however, that there have been five separate 
instances of Chinese Uighur refugees being detained by the Almaty 
police and held for several hours without any formal explanation for 
the detention.  All of them were released after UNHCR's intervention. 
 Rao described the detained refugees as "community activists" and 
speculated that the detentions may have been meant as a warning from 
the authorities "not to start trouble."  He also told us that over 
the past six months, there have also been three instances of physical 
attacks against Chinese Uighur refugees.  In all three cases, the 
victims said they did not know their attackers and did not know the 
reason behind the attack.  Rao said that attacks against refugees are 
quite rare in Kazakhstan, which made UNHCR "somewhat worried" that 
all three attacks specifically involved Chinese Uighurs.  Despite 
these incidents, Rao's overall take is that "all is quiet" for the 
Uighur refugee population in Kazakhstan. 
 
SITUATION AT THE CHINESE BORDER 
 
4.  (C) Rao also told us that he recently traveled to two border 
posts, Dostyk and Korghas, on the China-Kazakhstan border, where he 
met with representatives of the Migration Police and the Border 
Guards.  He said that both border posts were well outfitted with 
detection equipment and electronic fencing, which in his view 
significantly limits the possibilities of illegal border crossings. 
Rao was quite impressed by the work of Migration Police and the 
Ministry of Emergency Situations.  He said that the two agencies 
recently held a refresher seminar for their employees at the border 
posts on proper procedures for handling refugees, and that the 
Ministry of Emergency Situations redirected some of its financing 
from other projects to accommodate potential increased flow of 
migrants from China.  Rao doubted that the flow would increase 
significantly because of the Xinjiang unrest, but expressed 
confidence that individuals who reach the Migration Police and ask 
for asylum "will be given appropriate care." 
 
5. (C) Rao maintained, however, that the Border Guards -- who fall 
under Kazakhstan's Committee for National Security Committee (KNB) 
and make admission decisions at border crossings -- have an agreement 
with their Chinese counterparts to turn back individuals without 
proper passports and visas.  Rao's ventured that because of this 
agreement, the Border Guards might turn back individuals who request 
asylum at admission if their documents are not in order.  (COMMENT: 
As a practical matter, it seems quite unlikely that individuals would 
make it past the Chinese border authorities to the Kazakhstani side 
if they do not possess the appropriate valid travel documents
.  END 
 
ASTANA 00001292  002 OF 002 
 
 
COMMENT.) 
 
UIGHUR ACTIVIST ALSO HAS NO REPORTS OF DEPORTATIONS 
 
6.  (C) We also met on July 28 with Tamara Mamedova, the head of the 
National Uighur Association.  Mamedova, a Kazakhstani Uighur, is a 
prominent activist within the local Uighur community who works 
extensively with the Chinese Uighur refugee population.  Mamedova 
told us that, like Rao, she has not heard of any deportations of 
Chinese Uighur refugees in the wake of the Xinjiang unrest.  She said 
that the Almaty authorities seem keen on working with the local 
Uighur community and have granted it several permits for 
demonstrations in response to the events in Xinjiang (reftel). 
 
FAGIN

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09ASTANA1266, KAZAKHSTAN TAKES FURTHER STEPS TO PROTECT INVESTORS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1266 2009-07-27 04:19 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6777
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RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1266 2080419
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FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1800
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
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RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1353
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1265
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1735

UNCLAS ASTANA 001266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE, F 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID EINV SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:   KAZAKHSTAN TAKES FURTHER STEPS TO PROTECT INVESTORS 
THROUGH NEW LEGISLATION 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  On July 14, President Nazarbayev signed legislation 
that will toughen and improve general reporting requirements for 
joint stock companies (JSCs) as well as certain business 
transactions of JSCs.  The new provisions will also require 
disclosure of potential conflicts of interest by managers, officers, 
and members of corporate boards of directors.  These legislative 
changes further incorporate international best practices related to 
corporate responsibility and governance, and should lead to a more 
attractive business environment for investors.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  On July 14, President Nazarbayev signed legislation, "On 
Payments and Remittances, Accounting Reports, and Financial 
Statements for Financial Institutions and the National Bank," which 
was developed through assistance provided by the USAID Business 
Environment Improvement Project to the Agency for the Regulation and 
Supervision of Financial Markets and Financial Organizations (FSA). 
This legislation amended the law "On Joint Stock Companies" and is 
designed to improve the protection of investors through increasing 
the disclosure requirements for businesses as well as their key 
executives.  Since JSCs were not previously required to make annual 
reports publicly available, it was difficult for shareholders, 
investors, and the public to obtain essential information on the 
health of businesses, or to ensure appropriate ethical behavior of 
corporate officers and adherence of officers to their fiduciary 
duties.  With the new legislation, members of corporate boards of 
directors must disclose annual reports of their companies to their 
shareholders as well as to the public, and include any transactions 
in which members of the board or key officers have a personal 
financial interest. 
 
3.  These new reporting requirements will increase transparency and 
should help attract foreign and domestic investment in Kazakhstan by 
providing additional information to potential shareholders.  This 
additional information will allow investors to better assess the 
risks of investment in a company.  The new legislation will also 
permit shareholders to take legal action if a transaction in which a 
member of a board of directors, an officer, or key manager has a 
personal financial interest results in harm to a company.  These 
legal improvements are also an important step toward protecting 
minority shareholders, who previously had few opportunities to 
obtain information about company operations. 
 
4.  Previous amendments to the law "On Accounting and Financial 
Reporting" required JSCs to prepare accounts and financial reports 
in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, of 
which Standard 24, "Related Party Disclosures," required companies 
to report on transactions in which directors or key managers have a 
personal financial interest.  With the July 14 amendments, these 
annual reports and disclosures will become publicly accessible 
information.  These requirements conform to international best 
practices for corporate governance and bring Kazakhstan's business 
environment into greater harmony with international standards 
investors have come to expect in attractive markets. 
 
5.  Moreover, the change in reporting requirements is expected to 
improve Kazakhstan's rating in the World Bank Doing Business 
Report's "Protecting Investors" indicator, by improving the 
underlying "disclosures in published periodic filings" measurement 
from its current rating of zero to as high as 2.  This could 
potentially improve Kazakhstan's overall "Protecting Investors" 
country rank from 53rd to 24th (assuming all other variables in next 
year's report stay the same).  While these reforms were adopted 
after the June 1, 2009, cut-off for the Doing Business 2010 report, 
they will be taken into account in Doing Business 2011. 
 
FAGIN

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09ASTANA1265, KAZAKHSTAN: NEW UNIFIED PROCUREMENT SYSTEM FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1265 2009-07-27 04:19 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6764
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
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DE RUEHTA #1265/01 2080419
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FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1796
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RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1349
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1261
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1731

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 001265 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB, OES/PCI (PHUDAK, NFITE) 
MOSCOW FOR ESTH (DKLEPP) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON SENV KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  NEW UNIFIED PROCUREMENT SYSTEM FOR 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
ASTANA 00001265  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for Public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: According to the Ministry of Health's 
Pharmaceutical Control Committee, Kazakhstan's plan to consolidate 
most state procurement of pharmaceuticals under one provider will 
stimulate the economy and increase domestic pharmaceutical 
production.  The World Bank expressed reservations about the new 
system, saying the government is reforming institutions too rapidly 
and not waiting for the World Bank's own health reform program to be 
approved.  American Company UniPharm predicted that it will be 
difficult to establish an efficient distribution system, which will 
require setting up a huge storage capacity and sending drugs even to 
small villages in remote regions.  UniPharm did not think the new 
plan will attract many foreign investors, especially those that 
would make "high-tech" insulin and antibiotics.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NEW PROCUREMENT LAW ALSO DESIGNED TO ATTRACT INVESTMENT 
 
3. (SBU) Kazakhstan recently implemented a new unitary system to 
consolidate most state procurement of pharmaceuticals under a single 
distributor/provider.  In addition, President Nazarbayev tasked the 
government in May to increase the market share of local 
pharmaceutical producers to 50 percent by 2014. 
 
4. (SBU) According to Syzdyk Baimukhanov, Chairman of the Ministry 
of Health's Pharmaceutical Control Committee, the government hopes 
to save up to 40 percent of current budget expenditures on 
pharmaceuticals as well as stimulate domestic production.  He said 
the government will give a purchase guarantee -- a five-year 
contract at a fixed price -- plus tax waivers to domestic producers. 
 Baimukhanov said foreign companies (like Pfizer and Merck, for 
example) that choose to invest in Kazakhstan and produce locally 
will be fully regarded as domestic producers and will receive the 
same purchase guarantee and tax waivers.  He said the main goal of 
the new plan is to attract investment to Kazakhstan and to produce 
inside Kazakhstan rather than continue to import expensive 
pharmaceuticals from abroad. 
 
NATIONWIDE PILOT PROJECT UNDERWAY 
 
5. (SBU) Baimukhanov said a nationwide pilot project for the 
purchase and delivery of pharmaceuticals began in May.  Distribution 
costs will not be a major factor in the overall cost of 
pharmaceuticals, he said, and early results show a savings of up to 
45 percent in budget expenses.  Public hospitals will place their 
orders with the central agency, which then purchases pharmaceuticals 
for public hospitals, taking advantage of bulk purchasing to lower 
costs.  Hospitals can continue to order specialized medicines as 
needed throughout the year.  There will still be a private sector 
for pharmaceuticals because the unitary procurement system is 
expected to handle only about 70 percent of total purchases for 
public hospitals. 
 
SHOULD ALSO REDUCE OBLAST-LEVEL CORRUPTION 
 
6. (SBU) Baimukhanov repeatedly cited Malaysia and Britain as models 
of efficiency.  He said centralized procurement will mean less 
illegal redirection of pharmaceuticals and less local corruption 
from the previous system, where each oblast wanted to preserve its 
own non-transparent system of procurement, showing favoritism to 
certain local "distributors" who were able to purchase 
pharmaceuticals with government budget money and then sell them on 
the market, making a considerable profit. 
 
7. (SBU) COMMENT: Baimukhanov is a former president of KhimPharm, 
the largest local producer of pharmaceuticals.  KhimPharm won the 
pilot tender for production.  StoPharm, a private distributor, won 
the pilot tender to deliver medicines, underbidding other bidders by 
40 percent.  StoPharm has been accused in the past of not fulfilling 
contractual obligations and winning tenders unfairly.  The Ministry 
of Health even sent a letter to the Committee of Financial Control 
 
ASTANA 00001265  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
and State Procurement asking that this company be put on a list of 
unreliable service providers.  END COMMENT. 
 
WORLD BANK HAS CONCERNS 
 
8. (SBU) World Bank Social Project Coordinator Bibigul Alimbekova 
and Health Sector Technology Transfer and Institutional Reform 
Project Administrativ
e Coordinator Ninel Kadyrova told Regional 
Environmental Officer that they want to "step back" and wait before 
commenting further.  Alimbekova said the government's intention is 
to protect the local population and provide the best medical product 
at the best prices possible.  However, the government did not wait 
for the government's final agreement on the World Bank's own overall 
health reform program, part of which was to reform the 
pharmaceutical market before launching their unitary procurement 
system. 
 
9. (SBU) Alimbekova said the World Bank believes that institutional 
reform cannot be done so quickly.  She said the government wants to 
do this now and not wait, and it needs a fast turn-around, because 
it has an urgent agenda.  She said Kazakhstan wants to be among the 
top competitive nations in the world, but she believes it cannot 
complete the entire pharmaceutical reform agenda in such a short 
time.  She said "instant reform" cannot be done quickly, even if the 
order comes from the top.  There is still a "Soviet mentality" that 
impels people to carry out these orders "or die (in the process)," 
she added. 
 
10. (SBU) According to Kadyrova, the World Health Organization 
recommends that centralized procurement of pharmaceuticals comprise 
at least 50-60 percent of a country's procurement for inpatient care 
in order to take advantage of bulk purchases and, therefore, lower 
prices.  Hospitals can make their bulk purchases through centralized 
procurement and smaller purchases can be done locally. 
 
SYSTEM'S AUTHOR CONVINCED STATE WILL BENEFIT 
 
11. (SBU) Serik Sultanov, President of the "PharmMed Industry of 
Kazakhstan" Association, member of President Nazarbayev's 
Entrepreneur's Council, and an advisory member of SK-Pharmacia (the 
designated unitary distributer), told Regional Environmental Officer 
that he single-handedly authored the new unitary distributor 
initiative.  He said he visited Malaysia in 2007 to learn about 
their single-operator system and was struck by how much more 
efficiently and cheaply Malaysia procured medicines than Kazakhstan. 
 It spent about the same amount of money for a population almost 
twice as large and procured 70 percent more medicines than 
Kazakhstan. 
 
12. (SBU) Sultanov said Kazakhstan's pharmaceutical market is about 
one billion dollars, 50 percent of which is state procurement of 
medicines.  Under the current system, local distributers now 
purchase directly from producers, using state budget allocations, 
and then make a 100 percent profit selling the medicine at retail. 
This leads to excessive corruption, he said, whereby state 
procurement has become a "feeding trough" for government officials. 
For example, a hospital's head doctor can set up his own 
distributing company and then give it his hospital's contract to 
provide medicine.  By contrast, under the new system, the single 
distributor will purchase medicines directly from producers, thereby 
allowing them to avoid excessive retail margins. 
 
SK-PHARMACIA EXPLAINS ITS ROLE 
 
13. (SBU) SK-Pharmacia Deputy Director General Aibar Burkitbayev 
told Regional Environmental Officer that the Ministry of Health 
previously had national and regional programs to procure medicines 
for public hospitals.  A Ministry of Health survey showed 
significant regional variances in the prices of medicines, he said, 
resulting in huge budget losses because of the regional disparity in 
prices for the same medicines.  Burkitbayev said the Kazakhstani 
 
ASTANA 00001265  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
system of pharmaceutical state procurement is not transparent, 
because the regional departments of health do not report to the 
Ministry of Health on how the regional money is spent. 
SK-Pharmacia's goal is to save the government money, support local 
producers, and attract investors to set up domestic production 
facilities. 
 
TENDER PROCESS FAVORS LOCAL COMPANIES 
 
14. (SBU) Burkitbayev explained the elaborate tender rules designed 
to give local tender participants unprecedented preferences and 
admitted that foreign producers are in a disadvantageous position 
compared with local producers.  However, this measure is designed to 
encourage foreign companies to set up production facilities in 
Kazakhstan.  He cited one foreign company that successfully won a 
tender:  Nobel Almaty Pharmaceutical Factory won the tender for two 
lots, and it is 100 percent Turkish. 
 
GOVERNMENT SPEEDS UP IMPLEMENTATION 
 
15. (SBU) Burkitbayev said the original concept of the 
single-distributor system stipulated a gradual transition from the 
current procurement system.  However, the Government decided to 
speed up the process, though he did not explain why.  This year, 27 
out of 600 medicines will be purchased for public hospitals through 
the single distributor system, and SK-Pharmacia selected one private 
distributor to deliver the medicine to hospitals across the country. 
 In 2010, SK-Pharmacia will procure all 600 medicines and will 
contract with several private distributors to deliver purchased 
medicines across the country, since no one private distributor is 
capable of handling all the deliveries nationwide. 
 
AMERICAN COMPANY SAYS DISTRIBUTION IS THE PLAN'S WEAK LINK 
 
16. (SBU) Vadim Efimenko, Kazakhstan representative for the American 
pharmaceutical company UniPharm, which sells nutritional supplements 
and over-the-counter medicines, told Regional Environmental Officer 
that the key to the government's new procurement system is 
distribution.  He predicted that it will be difficult to set up an 
efficient distribution system, which will require a huge storage 
capacity and must send drugs even to small villages in remote 
regions.  It takes UniPharm up to three weeks to deliver products to 
remote villages.  Efimenko said distribution costs typically add 25 
percent to the final cost of medicines.  He believed the government 
could further reduce pharmaceutical costs by reducing customs duties 
and VAT, currently set at 10 percent and 13 percent. 
 
17. (SBU) Efimenko was critical of the government's five-year 
guaranteed, fixed-price contract.  The recent devaluation of the 
tenge caused costs to jump 25 percent, and some of UniPharm's 
American suppliers are demanding that UniPharm reimburse them for 
the losses due to devaluation.  He believes that such long-term 
contracts pose a serious risk to potential investors unless there is 
a mechanism in the contracts that can provide compensation due to 
devaluation. 
 
PLAN AS ENVISIONED WILL NOT ATTRACT INVESTMENT 
 
18. (SBU) Efimenko also questioned the nature of the investment that 
the new program would attract.  Producers of low-tech medicines 
(vitamins, energy supplements, etc.) can easily set up shop. 
However, high-tech pharmaceuticals (certain antibiotics, insulin, 
tuberculosis medicines, etc.) will require
 substantial investment. 
The Central Asian market is still relatively small, and potential 
investors will have trouble justifying an investment in Kazakhstan. 
He noted that approximately 10,000 pharmaceutical products are 
registered in Kazakhstan, but only 3,000, or less than one third, 
are sold on a regular basis. 
 
19. (SBU) Efimenko agrees that the Kazakhstani market for 
pharmaceuticals is stable and he foresees regular growth in the next 
 
ASTANA 00001265  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
few years.  However, UniPharm is not planning to invest because the 
population base is too small and labor costs relative to Asia are 
too high. 
 
FAGIN

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09ASTANA1255, KAZAKHSTAN: LAWYER FOR FORMER KAZATOMPROM HEAD RETAINS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1255 2009-07-24 10:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5589
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
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RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1255/01 2051045
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1794
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RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1259
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1347
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001255 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM SOCI KDEM KCRM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  LAWYER FOR FORMER KAZATOMPROM HEAD RETAINS 
CREDENTIALS, BUT HAS YET TO SEE HIS CLIENT 
 
REF: ASTANA 0943 
 
1.  (U)  Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  On July 22, the Almaty Bar Association rejected 
a motion filed by the Committee for National Security (KNB) to disbar 
Daniyar Kanafin, the lawyer hired by the family of Mukhtar 
Dzhakishev, the former head of state-owned nuclear company 
Kazatomprom, to defend Dzhakishev on corruption-related charges.  In 
its motion, the KNB argued for Kanafin's disbarment for "violating 
professional norms" by fostering "a negative image" of Kazakshtani 
legislation.  Kanafin had made several public statements criticizing 
the Kazakhstani authorities for barring him from seeing his client or 
reviewing the case because he lacks the necessary state-secrets 
clearance.  In his public statements, Kanafin argued that the KNB has 
effectively limited his client's right to choose his own 
representation, a breach of Kazakhstan's Constitution and 
international obligations.  He asserted to us privately that the 
regulations on state secrets are applied in such a way as to "steer 
the defendants" to particular "state-approved" lawyers. Dzhakishev's 
wife traveled to London and Vienna to publicize her husband's case 
and gain support among the international community.  END SUMMARY. 
 
ALMATY BAR ASSOCIATION REJECTS MOVE TO DISBAR 
 
3.  (SBU)  On July 22, the Almaty Bar Association rejected a motion 
filed by the Committee for National Security (KNB) to disbar Daniyar 
Kanafin, the lawyer hired by the family of Mukhtar Dzhakishev, the 
former head of the state-owned nuclear company Kazatomprom (KAP), to 
defend him on corruption and embezzlement changes.  Dzhakishev has 
been in detention since May (reftel).  Kanafin, who has not had 
access to his client or the case files because he does not have the 
necessary state-secrets clearance, had made several statements in the 
press criticizing Kazakhstan's state secrecy laws as inconsistent 
with international norms.  In the July 7 motion, a KNB chief 
investigator accused Kanafin of "grossly and deliberately violating 
professional norms" by fostering a "negative image" of Kazakhstan's 
legislation and government bodies both at home and among the 
international community.  On July 22, the Almaty Bar Association 
sided with Kanafin in rejecting the KNB's motion and filed a 
counter-motion for disciplinary action to be taken against the chief 
investigator for "putting undue pressure on a legal professional." 
 
STRONG REACTION FROM INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
 
4.  (SBU)  Shortly after the KNB filed its motion with the Almaty Bar 
Association, the International Committee of Jurists (ICJ), a 
Switzerland-based NGO that works on issues of international law and 
human rights, released a public statement calling on the Kazakhstani 
authorities to withdraw the disbarment proceedings against Kanafin. 
In its July 9 statement, which was widely covered in the opposition 
print media, the ICJ argued that an attempt to disbar a lawyer for 
his criticism of the law is contrary to the fundamental principles of 
the independence of lawyers and limits their freedom of expression. 
The statement urged the Kazakhstani authorities to uphold 
Kazakhstan's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), which stipulates that citizens should 
not be penalized for expressing their views on issues of law and 
policy. 
 
KANAFIN BARRED FROM SEEING HIS CLIENT 
 
5.  (SBU)  Meanwhile, Kanafin has yet to see his client Dzhakishev or 
to review the case files because he lacks the necessary state-secrets 
clearance.  The case was classified as "secret" by the KNB because it 
involves "information on uranium reserves and their exploitation," 
which the KNB argued could be classified as a state secret.  It 
therefore denied Kanafin's May 26 application to serve as 
Dzhakishev's lawyer. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Kanafin has argued publicly that the KNB has effectively 
limited his client's right to choose his own representation, a breach 
of Kazakhstani Constitution and Kazakhstan's obligations under the 
ICCPR.  He also asserted to us privately that the regulations on 
state secrets are applied in such a way as to "steer the defendants" 
to particular "state-approved" lawyers.  As he explained, there are 
no clear instructions on how a lawyer could apply for a state-secrets &#x0
00A; 
ASTANA 00001255  002 OF 002 
 
 
clearance, nor is there a master list of lawyers who do have 
clearances.  In Dzhakishev's case, the KNB provided the family with 
several names of "cleared" lawyers, but Kanafin asserted to us that 
all the lawyers listed "are on the company payroll."  Dzhakishev 
himself has dismissed one such lawyer assigned to his case, and has 
announced his intention to defend himself unless allowed to meet with 
lawyers hired by his family. 
 
7.  (SBU)  In its July 9 statement, the ICJ warned that barring a 
defendant's choice of legal representation for reasons of state 
secrecy laws threatens "fair trial rights and the independence of the 
legal profession."  The head of Kazakhstan's Human Rights Bureau NGO, 
Yevgeniy Zhovtis, told the press on July 22 that "the right (to 
representation) has been flagrantly violated since the very beginning 
of this case."  "The defense lawyers were named by the investigators, 
in this case by the KNB," argued Zhovtis. 
 
DZHAKISHEV'S FAMILY PUBLICIZES CASE IN EUROPE 
 
8.  (SBU)  The wife of Mukhtar Dzhakishev, Dzhamiliya Dzhakisheva, 
recently returned from London and Vienna, where she traveled with 
Kanafin to publicize her husband's case.  At a July 22 press 
conference in Almaty, Dzhakisheva said she met with representatives 
of human-rights NGOs, journalists, and several members of the British 
parliament, who were "shocked at the fact that the basic human 
rights, such as the right to choose a defense lawyer, are not being 
observed" in Kazakhstan.  She accused the KNB of "applying 
psychological pressure" on her husband by not allowing him to meet 
with his family since the beginning of his detention. Dzhakisheva 
said that she also met in London with Mukhtar Ablyazov, the ousted 
chairman of BTA bank who fled Kazakhstan in February, who "promised 
to help" on the case.  (NOTE: The accusations against Dzhakishev 
center around a claim that he collaborated with Ablyazov to sell 
state shares in key uranium mines at far below market price (reftel). 
 END NOTE.) 
 
9.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The details of the case against Dzhakishev and 
his associates at KAP remain murky because of the secrecy imposed by 
the KNB.  Regardless of whether Dzhakishev is actually guilty of 
charges, the government's motivation in going after him is, as noted 
in reftel, likely at least in part a result of his ties to ousted BTA 
bank head and opposition financier Mukhtar Ablyazov -- who himself 
appears to be guilty of looting BTA of several billion dollars.  The 
bar association's rejection of the request to disbar Kanafin is, in 
our view, a very positive sign -- a demonstration that a key element 
of civil society is able to act independently and stand up to a 
powerful government body like the KNB to protect the rule of law. 
END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1254, KAZAKHSTAN: AMBASSADOR DELIVERS DEMARCHE ON ASSISTING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1254 2009-07-24 10:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5588
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #1254 2051045
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241045Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5882
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1346
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1258
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS ASTANA 001254 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/A, S/SRAP 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR NATO AF KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  AMBASSADOR DELIVERS DEMARCHE ON ASSISTING 
AFGHANISTAN BEYOND THE ELECTIONS 
 
REF:  STATE 74362 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) The Ambassador delivered reftel demarche requesting 
assistance to Afghanistan beyond the elections to Deputy Foreign 
Minister Konstantin Zhigalov on July 23.  He provided Zhigalov with a 
non-paper detailing Afghanistan's priority needs and requested a 
formal response from the Kazakhstani government.  Zhigalov promised 
to follow up on the issue. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1253, KAZAKHSTAN REPORTS OF FIRST CASES OF H1N1

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1253 2009-07-24 10:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5587
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1253 2051045
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241045Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5881
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1793
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1160
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1862
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0821
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1345
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1257
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA

UNCLAS ASTANA 001253 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB, OES/PCI 
MOSCOW FOR ESTH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SENV KFLU KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN REPORTS OF FIRST CASES OF H1N1 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  The local press reported the first cases of H1N1 
influenza in Kazakhstan on July 23.  There are three confirmed and 
three suspected cases.  CDC Almaty reports that the Kazakhstanis 
will send viral samples from the infected individuals to an outside 
laboratory for independent confirmation of H1N1.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PRESS REPORTS FIRST CASES OF H1N1 
 
2.  Kazakhstan reported its first cases of H1N1 on July 23.  Three 
Kazakhstani students who returned from London were diagnosed with 
confirmed cases.  "The H1N1 flu has been confirmed in three children 
who returned to Astana after studying in London," Kazakhstan's Chief 
Public Health Officer, Anatoliy Belonog, told the 
Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency. 
 
3.  Three additional Kazakhstani children are suspected of having 
contracted the virus.  "Six suspected H1N1 flu cases were registered 
in Astana on July 23.  Of these, the (H1N1) diagnosis was confirmed 
in three children, and three others are under suspicion," stated a 
press release circulated by the Health Ministry.  The press release 
also noted that "all the sufferers are children between 12 and 15, 
who studied in Great Britain from June 18 to July 19."  The head of 
the Astana environmental health inspection directorate, Zhandarbek 
Bekshin, told the press that two children with confirmed cases were 
in the hospital, though their condition is improving.  A third child 
with a confirmed case and three children with suspected cases are 
being observed and given treatment at home. 
 
4.  Bekshin said that all Kazakhstani citizens who leave Kazakhstan 
will be registered by the health authorities.  Upon their return to 
Kazakhstan, they will be subject to H1N1 preventative measures. 
Bekshin said that the authorities do not plan to postpone the start 
of the academic year because thus far there are very few cases of 
H1N1. 
 
CDC SENDS SAMPLES TO LAB FOR CONFIRMATION 
 
5.  CDC Almaty reports that Kazakhstan's National Influenza Center 
(NIC) performed polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing on samples 
from the infected individuals.  Because pandemic H1N1 has not been 
confirmed in Central Asia previously, the NIC will send samples for 
confirmation to an outside reference laboratory.  CDC and NIC have 
agreed that the World Health Organization (WHO) pandemic/avian 
influenza reference lab in Novosibirsk, Russia will probably be able 
to provide the quickest turnaround. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1252, KAZAKHSTAN: STILL UNDECIDED ON ECOSOC BUT OPEN TO OUR VIEWS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1252 2009-07-24 09:33 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1252 2050933
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADDED TEXT AD0921C67 MSI0813 508)
O 240933Z JUL 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5880
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2410
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0991

UNCLAS ASTANA 001252 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (CHANGE TEXT ON PARAGRAPH 2) 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR USUN BRIAN YOUNG, IO/RHS COLLEEN NEVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI KCRM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN: STILL UNDECIDED ON ECOSOC BUT OPEN TO OUR VIEWS 
 
REF: STATE 74377 
 
1.  (U)  Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU)  On July 24, we raised reftel demarche asking Kazakhstan 
to support our position on the accreditation to ECOSOC of two NGOs 
with Zhanar Kulzhanova, the deputy director of the MFA's International 
Organizations Directorate.  Kulzhanova thanked us for forwarding 
her ahead of time a non-paper on the issue.  She told us that 
Kazakhstan was still formulating its official position, but said 
that the MFA "is open to U.S. views."  She apologized for not giving 
us a concrete response, but explained that the summer vacation season 
"has depleted the MFA of decision-makers."  (COMMENT: Since Kulzhanova 
is departing on July 25 for Geneva to take over as Kazakhstan's head 
of delegation at the ongoing ECOSOC meeting, we recommend that 
USMISSION Geneva follow up with her there.  END COMMENT.) 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1251, KAZAKHSTAN: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BOEHNER’S AUGUST 8-9

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1251 2009-07-24 08:53 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5491
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1251/01 2050853
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240853Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5877
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1790
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1157
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1859
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0818
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2407
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2725
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1342
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1254
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001251 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, H 
H PLEASE PASS TO CODEL BOEHNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  N/A 
TAGS: OREP PREL PGOV PHUM EPET KDEM KNNP KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BOEHNER'S AUGUST 8-9 
VISIT TO ASTANA 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Embassy Astana warmly welcomes your August 8-9 
visit to Kazakhstan, which comes at a particularly opportune time. 
With its upcoming 2010 chairmanship of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its thriving energy sector, 
Kazakhstan is showing increasing confidence on the international 
stage.  Kazakhstan has proven to be a reliable security partner and a 
steady influence in a turbulent region.  The pace of democratic 
reform, however, has been slow, with political institutions, civil 
society, and the independent media still underdeveloped.  Our 
fundamental strategic objective is a secure, democratic, and 
prosperous Kazakhstan that embraces market competition and the rule 
of law; continues partnering with us on the global threats of 
terrorism, WMD proliferation, and narco-trafficking; and develops its 
energy resources in a manner that bolsters global energy security. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
ECONOMY:  AGGRESSIVE STEPS TO TACKLE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
3. (SBU) Kazakhstan is Central Asia's economic powerhouse, with a GDP 
larger than that of the region's other four countries combined. 
Economic growth averaged over 9% per year during 2005-07, before 
dropping to 3% in 2008 with the onset of the global financial crisis. 
 The international financial institutions are predicting negative 2% 
growth for Kazakhstan in 2009, with an economic recovery beginning in 
2010.  Astute macroeconomic policies and extensive economic reforms 
have played an important role in Kazakhstan's post-independence 
economic success.   The country has a modern banking and financial 
system, a well-endowed pension fund, and a sovereign wealth fund with 
over $20 billion in assets.  The government has taken significant 
steps to tackle the domestic reverberations of the economic crisis, 
allocating around $20 billion to take equity stakes in private banks, 
prop up the construction and real estate sectors, and support small- 
and medium-sized enterprises and agriculture. 
 
4. (SBU) Kazakhstan's long-run economic challenge is to diversify its 
economy away from reliance on the energy sector.  In 2008, we 
launched a bilateral Private-Private Economic Partnership Initiative 
(PPEPI), which is bringing together the U.S. and Kazakhstani public 
and private sectors to make policy recommendations on improving the 
country's business climate and reducing other barriers to non-energy 
investment.  On a less promising note, the Kazakhstanis announced in 
June that they would be suspending their bilateral negotiations to 
accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and would instead launch 
negotiations together with Russia and Belarus to enter the WTO 
jointly as a customs union.  We have informed Kazakhstan that there 
is, in fact, no mechanism allowing a customs union to accede to the 
WTO without its member states doing so individually. 
 
AN EMERGING ENERGY POWER 
 
5. (SBU) Kazakhstan produced 70.7 million tons of oil in 2008 
(approximately 1.41 million barrels per day), and is expected to 
become one of the world's top ten crude exporters soon after 2015. 
While the country also has significant gas reserves (1.5 trillion 
cubic meters is a low-end estimate), current gas exports are very 
limited for now, in part because gas is being reinjected to maximize 
crude output.  U.S. companies -- ExxonMobil, Chevron, and 
ConocoPhilips -- have significant ownership stakes in each of 
Kazakhstan's three major hydrocarbon projects:  Tengiz, Kashagan, and 
Karachaganak. 
 
6. (SBU) Tengiz, with 50% Chevron and 25% ExxxonMobil ownership, 
increased production to 600,000 barrels per day in 2008.   Kashagan 
-- the largest oilfield discovery since Alaska's North Slope and 
among the world's most technically complex oil development projects 
-- is expected to come on-line around 2014, with production reaching 
one million barrels per day of crude by 2020.  On June 12, 
ConocoPhillips signed a contract to explore and develop the offshore 
 
ASTANA 00001251  002 OF 003 
 
 
N Block, es
timated to contain 2.13 billion recoverable barrels of 
oil.  China has recently increased its investment in Kazakhstan's 
energy sector, and through the state-owned China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) now controls approximately 20% of Kazakhstan's 
total oil production. 
 
7. (SBU) With these crude production increases on the horizon, 
Kazakhstan must develop additional transport routes to bring its 
crude to market.  Our policy is to encourage Kazakhstan to seek 
diverse transport routes, which will ensure the country's 
independence from transport monopolists.  Currently, most of 
Kazakhstan's crude is exported via Russia, although some exports flow 
east to China, west across the Caspian through Azerbaijan, and south 
across the Caspian to Iran. 
 
8. (SBU) We support the expansion of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium 
(CPC) pipeline, which is the only oil pipeline crossing Russian 
territory that is not entirely owned and controlled by the Russian 
government.  We are also helping the Kazakhstanis implement the 
Kazakhstan-Caspian Transportation System (KCTS), which envisions a 
"virtual pipeline" of tankers transporting up to one million barrels 
of crude per day from Kazakhstan's Caspian coast to Baku, from where 
it will flow onward to market through Georgia, including through the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.  International oil companies are 
currently in negotiations with the government of Kazakhstan to build 
the necessary onshore pipeline and offshore marine infrastructure for 
this $3 billion project.  While a trans-Caspian crude pipeline would 
likely be a cheaper long-term transport option, Kazakhstan is 
reluctant to openly pursue such a pipeline in the absence of an 
agreement on delimitation of the Caspian Sea among the five Caspian 
littoral states. 
 
DEMOCRACY:  SLOW GOING 
 
9. (SBU) While the Kazakhstani government articulates a strategic 
vision of democracy, it has lagged on the implementation front. 
President Nazarbayev's Nur Otan party officially received 88% of the 
vote and won all the parliamentary seats in August 2007 elections 
which OSCE observers concluded did not meet OSCE standards.   The 
next elections, both parliamentary and presidential, are scheduled 
for 2012. 
 
10. (SBU) When Kazakhstan was selected to be 2010 OSCE 
chairman-in-office at the November 2007 Madrid OSCE Ministerial 
meeting, Foreign Minister Tazhin promised his government would amend 
Kazakhstan's election, political party, and media laws in accordance 
the recommendations of the OSCE and its Office of Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).  (NOTE:  Tazhin also promised 
that as OSCE chairman, Kazakhstan would support the OSCE's Human 
Dimension and preserve ODIHR's mandate, including its critical role 
in election observation.  END NOTE.)  President Nazarbayev signed the 
amendments into law in February.  While key civil society leaders 
were disappointed that the new legislation did not go further, we 
considered it to be a step in the right direction and continue to 
urge the government will follow through with additional reforms. 
 
11. (SBU) While the Kazakhstanis pride themselves on their religious 
tolerance, religious groups not traditional to Kazakhstan, such as 
evangelical Protestants, Jehovah's Witnesses, Hare Krishnas, and 
Scientologists, have faced difficulties with the authorities. 
Parliament passed legislation in late 2008 aimed at asserting more 
government control over these "non-traditional" religious groups. 
Following concerns raised by civil society and the international 
community, President Nazarbayev chose not to sign the legislation, 
but instead sent it for review to the Constitutional Council (Court) 
-- which ultimately declared it to be unconstitutional. 
 
12. (SBU) Though Kazakhstan's diverse print media include many 
newspapers sharply critical of the government and of President 
Nazarbayev personally, the broadcast media are essentially 
 
ASTANA 00001251  003 OF 003 
 
 
government-controlled.  On July 10, President Nazarbayev signed  into 
law Internet legislation which will provide a legal basis for the 
government to shut down and block websites whose content allegedly 
violates the country's laws.  This appears to be a step in the wrong 
direction at a time when the Kazakhstan's record on democracy and 
human rights is in the spotlight because of its impending OSCE 
chairmanship.  We have expressed our disappointment that the 
legislation was enacted, and have urged the government to implement 
it in a manner consistent with Kazakhstan's OSCE commitments on 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 
 
AFGHANISTAN:  POISED TO DO EVEN MORE 
 
13. (SBU)  Kazakhstan has provided significant support to our 
stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, and in 
recent months, has expressed a willingness to do even more.  We 
signed a bilateral blanket over-flight agreement with Kazakhstan in 
2001 that allows U.S. military aircraft supporting Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) to transit Kazakhstani airspace cost-free.  This was 
followed in 2002 with a bilateral divert agreement that permits our 
military aircraft to make emergency landings in Kazakhstan when 
aircraft emergencies or weather conditions do not permit landing at 
Kyrgyzstan's Manas Air Base.  There have been over 6500 over-flights 
and over 60 diverts since these agreements went into effect.  In 
January, Kazakhstan agreed to participate in the Northern 
Distribution Network -- which entails commercial shipment through 
Kazakhstani territory of non-lethal supplies for U.S. troops in 
Afghanistan.  Kazakhstan is working on sending several staff officers 
to the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) headquarters 
in Kabul and is considering providing small-scale non-combat military 
support, as it did for five-plus years in Iraq. 
 
14. (SBU)  The Kazakhstani government provided just under $3 million 
in assistance to Afghanistan during 2008 for food and seed aid and to 
construct a hospital, school, and road.  The Kazakhstanis are 
finalizing a proposal to provide free university education in 
Kazakhstan to Afghan students.  The government has also offered to 
provide training to Afghan law enforcement officers at law 
enforcement training institutes in Kazakhstan.  The Kazakhstanis hope 
to make Afghanistan a focus of their 2010 OSCE chairmanship. 
 
NON-PROLIFERATION:  A HALLMARK OF BILATERAL COOPERATION 
 
15. (SBU)  Non-proliferation cooperation has been a hallmark of our 
bilateral relationship since Kazakhstan quickly agreed to give up the 
nuclear weapons it inherited from the USSR after becoming 
independent.  The Kazakhstanis recently ratified a seven-year 
extension to the umbrella agreement for our bilateral Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which remains the dominant component 
of our assistance to Kazakhstan.  Key ongoing CTR program activities 
include our efforts to secure t
he radiological material at the 
Soviet-era Semipalatinsk nuclear test site and to provide long-term 
storage for the spent fuel (sufficient to fabricate 775 nuclear 
weapons) from Kazakhstan's BN-350 plutonium breeder reactor. 
 
16. (SBU)  The Kazakhstanis are active participants in the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and are seeking additional 
ways to burnish their non-proliferation credentials.  On April 6, 
President Nazarbayev announced publicly that Kazakhstan is interested 
in hosting the Nuclear Threat Initiative's IAEA-administered 
international nuclear fuel bank.   We welcomed the offer, but 
explained to the Kazakhstanis that they need to work out the details 
directly with the IAEA.  President Nazarbayev also has called for the 
United Nations to designate August 29 as annual World 
Non-Proliferation Day, which we support. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1250, KAZAKHSTAN OFFERS ‘LOGISTICS BASE’ FOR NORTHERN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1250 2009-07-24 07:31 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5373
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1250/01 2050731
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 240731Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5875
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 1788
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1155
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0816
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1857
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1340
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1252
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2723
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2405

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001250 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR AF KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN OFFERS 'LOGISTICS BASE' FOR NORTHERN 
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
 
REF: ASTANA 0557 
 
Classified By: AMB. RICHARD E. HOAGLAND:  1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  During a meeting with USTRANSCOM Commander 
General Duncan McNabb, Kazkahstan's Security Council Deputy 
Chairman Nurlan Abdirov was pleased to learned that the 
United States has approved local procurement of non-lethal 
supplies along the Northern Distribution Network, including 
in Kazakhstan, for U.S. troops in Afghanistan.  Abdirov 
commented that this decision, and the implementation of it, 
would pay economic and political dividends.  At the same 
meeting, Kazakhstan offered a "logistics base," probably 
mostly for NDN containers of goods that tend to stack up at 
the port of Aktau.  In fact, President Nazarbayev briefly 
mentioned such an idea on March 30 before crowding at the 
port of Aktau had become an occasional problem.  Embassy 
Astana's DATT will follow up with appropriate ministries in 
Astana.  If this comes to fruition, we should avoid calling 
the facility a base, since that could imply the presence of 
U.S. military personnel.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) During his visit to USTRANSCOM at Scott AFB in 
Illinois on July 14, Security Council Deputy Chairman Nurlan 
Abdirov told USTRANSCOM Commander General Duncan McNabb it is 
the intention of the top political leadership in Kazakhstan 
that the non-lethal supplies transported commercially through 
Kazakhstan as part of the Northern Distribution Network 
(NDN), especially those arriving by container at the port of 
Aktau, move smoothly and expeditiously without interruption 
or obstacle.  General McNabb suggested USTRANSCOM would be 
willing to modulate the arrival of containers to prevent 
congestion problems at the port. 
 
3.  (C) Abdirov asked about the status of the United States 
procuring in Kazakhstan supplies for U.S. troops in 
Afghanistan, which he characterized as "both a political and 
economic issue."  He pointed out that the stated intention of 
the United States to purchase supplies in Kazakhstan was one 
of the factors that had led President Nursultan Nazarbayev to 
approve quickly Kazakhstan's participation in the NDN. 
General McNabb responded that USCENTCOM Commander General 
David Petraeus had just recently signed a policy of support 
for the purchase of locally-produced products within the 
countries supporting the NDN.  Additionally, the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Logistics had just signed a waiver 
authorizing the purchase of goods in Kazakhstan and other 
Central Asian states, as well as in the Caucasus.  We now 
need only to work out the details. 
 
4.  (C) Abdirov, obviously pleased, thanked General McNabb 
for this information and stated that the next step needs to 
be to establish a mechanism to implement the local purchase 
of supplies.  He said the Government of Kazakhstan will take 
the lead in identifying Kazakhstani suppliers that will meet 
U.S. standards and that can deliver the products.  Once a 
list of goods and quantities desired is developed, contracts 
can be executed.  Abdirov emphasized the Government of 
Kazakhstan must take this lead role because the NDN agreement 
is a government-to-government agreement.  General McNabb 
replied that every country has a different method of doing 
business, and the United States will work within Kazakhstan's 
framework. 
 
5.  (C) As the meeting seemed ready to conclude, Kazakhstan's 
Defense Attache in Washington, Colonel Mendygaliyev, asked 
for permission to speak.  He said that President Nazarbayev 
requests that the United States consider establishing a 
"logistics base" in Kazakhstan as a temporary holding area 
for containers that sometimes stack up in the port of Aktau 
because of transportation delays in Uzbekistan.  Clearly 
taken aback, Abdirov said he was unaware of such a request. 
He noted Nazarbayev had never discussed this with him and 
demanded a full briefing by Colonel Mendygaliyev.  General 
McNabb commented that the United States would work with our 
 
ASTANA 00001250  002 OF 002 
 
 
shippers either to mitigate the backlog of containers in 
Aktau or to establish a temporary storage area. 
 
6.  (C) In an originally unscheduled follow-on meeting later 
the same day, Abdirov praised the waiver that will allow 
local procurement, noting that it is a good sign that "will 
pay economic and political dividends."  He asked that the 
Government of Kazakhstan be notified by diplo
matic note of 
the details of the waiver, and asked for a timeline for 
implementation of local purchase.  General McNabb responded 
that we would personally call Admiral Thompson at the Defense 
Logistics Agency and assured Abdirov that within our 
government there was understanding at the highest levels of 
the importance of local procurement.  Abdirov also said that 
he would welcome the visit of a group of experts to help move 
the process along.  Clearly having reached a meeting of the 
minds with Colonel Mendygaliyev, and with whomever else he 
might have telephoned, Abdirov also asked that the United 
States respond via diplomatic note to the Government of 
Kazakhstan's offer to establish an NDN "logistics base" in 
Kazakhstan.  Apparently assuming the United States would 
respond favorably, he suggested that the U.S. Defense Attache 
at Embassy Astana work with Kazakhstan's Ministries of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs to gain further details about 
Kazakhstan's proposal. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  Although Abdirov and Mendygaliyev used the 
term "logistics base," we need to use a term like "logistics 
facility" or "container holding area" to be clear to all we 
are not contemplating a facility with U.S. military 
personnel, should this proposal become reality.  While it is 
very surprising that the defense attache made a policy 
proposal in the presence of the deputy chairman of the 
Security Council about which the deputy chairman was not 
briefed, this is something Nazarbayev has raised before, 
albeit briefly.  In a meeting with the Ambassador on March 30 
that included a long discussion on Afghanistan (reftel), 
Nazarbayev said, without elaborating, "We can play a most 
helpful role for you and for the interests of regional 
security and stability.  We can be a base for logistical 
support for Afghanistan...."  Subsequently, Presidential 
Foreign Policy Adviser Khairat Sarybay explained, to the 
extent he understood the president's thinking, Nazarbayev 
likely meant that Kazakhstan could be "a storage location and 
source of supplies for the ISAF coalition in Afghanistan." 
After this current direct offer to USTRANSCOM, DATT will 
follow up with USTRANSCOM and with relevant Kazakhstani 
officials.  We also note Abdirov's comment, that procuring 
supplies in Kazakhstan, as we originally offered when 
proposing that Kazakhstan become a part of the NDN, will pay 
"political dividends."  That's how things are done here. 
When we occasionally do what Kazakhstan asks of us, we are 
somewhat more likely to get our various requests considered 
favorably.  END COMMENT. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1222, KAZAKHSTAN: AMBASSADOR VISITS BN-350 NUCLEAR REACTOR,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1222 2009-07-23 07:29 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4404
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDF
RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRO
RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1222/01 2040729
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230729Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5845
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1785
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1152
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1854
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0813
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1337
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1249
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1720

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001222 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, T, ISN 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EMIN ENRG EINV KNNP KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  AMBASSADOR VISITS BN-350 NUCLEAR REACTOR, 
MANGISTAU ATOMIC ENERGY COMPLEX 
 
REF:  (A) 08 ASTANA 2298 
      (B) 08 ASTANA 2316 
      (C) 08 ASTANA 2345 
      (D) ASTANA 0943 
      (E) ASTANA 1220 
 
ASTANA 00001222  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On July 16, the Ambassador toured the Mangistau 
Atomic Energy Complex (MAEC), including the decommissioned BN-350 
fast-breeder nuclear reactor, the sodium processing facility (SPF), 
and a desalinization plant.  The Ambassador then met with MAEC 
General Director Saken Utebayev, who expressed his appreciation for 
U.S. assistance, confirmed the government's plans to build a new 
nuclear power plant on site, and promised to remove and store all 
spent nuclear fuel by 2010.  Utebayev also complained that he has 
been hounded by the Prosecutor General for the past three years for 
allegedly engaging in monopolistic behavior and not paying taxes on 
U.S. technical and financial assistance.  END SUMMARY. 
 
STORAGE CASKS FILLED AND READY FOR TRANSPORT 
 
3.  (SBU) Gennadiy Pugachev, director of the BN-350 facility, 
welcomed the Ambassador and showed him around the spent fuel storage 
site.  He thanked the U.S. government profusely for providing 
significant technical and financial assistance to MAEC in support of 
the BN-350 decommissioning program.  Pugachev pointed to 11 large 
casks lined up underneath a large crane and said they were filled 
with spent fuel -- "mostly uranium, with some plutonium" -- and were 
ready for transport to a permanent storage facility in Baikal-1 
(Eastern Kazakhstan).  He told the Ambassador that MAEC plans to 
begin transporting all 18 casks to Baikal-1 in October.  When the 
Ambassador asked him how much additional funding was required to 
transport the casks, Pugachev said, "We need another $7.5 million." 
(NOTE:  This figure is higher than the $5 million the government of 
Kazakhstan initially expected this work would cost during 2009, but 
is lower than the total expected cost of $14 million through 2010. 
END NOTE).  Pugachev also said that all of the storage casks on site 
were made in Russia, although MAEC ordered additional casks from a 
factory in Sumi, Ukraine, that missed its deadline and had not yet 
made delivery.  "It is not easy to work with the Ukrainians these 
days," he said. 
 
SODIUM-PROCESSING FACILITY OPERATIONAL... 
 
4.  (SBU) Pugachev also showed the Ambassador the $3.35 million 
sodium-processing facility, which was completed in November 2008 
with U.S. assistance as the final step in the irreversible 
decommissioning of the BN-350 plutonium fast-breeder reactor (reftel 
A).  At the entrance to the SPF, there is a large, brightly colored 
plaque acknowledging U.S. government support for the project.  As 
reported in reftel A, the SPF is designed to process solidified 
residual sodium from the BN-350 reactor into sodium hydroxide. 
 
BUT LACK OF GEO-CEMENT STONE FACILITY DELAYS STORAGE 
 
5.  (SBU) Pugachev told the Ambassador that the SPF functions 
properly, and that earlier problems with escaping gas have been 
resolved.  The government previously committed to building a 
geo-cement stone facility in which the sodium hydroxide solution 
generated by the SPF would be combined with blast-furnace slag and 
solidified in steel drums for long-term storage above ground. 
Unfortunately, despite ongoing assistance from the British 
government, construction of the geo-cement stone facility is on 
hold, due to a lack of government funding.  This, in turn, has 
delayed plans to put the radioactive waste in safe, long-term 
storage. 
 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF THE BN-350 REACTOR 
 
 
ASTANA 00001222  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
6.  (SBU) The building housing the reactor is remarkable for its 
complete lack of distinguishing features:  it is simply a series of 
faded yellow rectangular cement blocks stacked one on top of another 
in a functional yet uninspired Soviet style, flanked by red and 
white striped concrete cooling towers.  Nevertheless, standing 
outside this nondescript building, which produced weapons grade 
material at the height of the Cold War and has sin
ce been 
decommissioned with the help of U.S. nuclear scientists, one cannot 
help but be struck by the irony of fate. 
 
FROM PLUTONIUM TO HEAT, POWER, AND WATER 
 
7.  (U) Now that the BN-350 breeder reactor has been decommissioned, 
MAEC's main business is running a combined heat-, power-, and 
water-producing complex that provides electric power and potable 
water to the populated areas and enterprises of Mangistau oblast 
(province) and Atyrau oblast.  The power complex includes three 
combined heat and power (CHP) plants that generate up to 500 
megawatts of electricity, a desalinization plant that produces up to 
40,000 cubic meters of distillate per day (or 15 percent of Aktau's 
potable water consumption), heating mains and pipelines with central 
water supply units, a power transmission line with substations, a 
water intake structure, repair works, a petroleum storage depot, a 
fuel-oil storage tank, and other infrastructure facilities.  MAEC is 
also considering constructing a new dry gas power plant with a 
capacity of 200 megawatts. 
 
MAEC GENERAL DIRECTOR DISCUSSES NUCLEAR POWER PLANT... 
 
8.  (SBU) Following the tour, the Ambassador met with MAEC General 
Director Utebayev, who was appointed to his position four years ago 
by then-Minister of Industry and Trade Vladimir Shkolnik, a nuclear 
scientist who worked at MAEC for twenty years and is now the head of 
state nuclear company Kazatomprom (KAP).  Utebayev told the 
Ambassador that he expects the government to move forward with 
stated plans to build a new nuclear power plant on site at MAEC.  He 
said that preliminary engineering studies have already been done and 
they are now just waiting for a decree from Prime Minister Masimov 
authorizing construction.  Utebayev said the government could save 
up to 20 percent in costs by building the plant at the MAEC, because 
much of the necessary infrastructure is already in place. 
 
PROMISES TO MEET 2010 DEADLINE... 
 
9.  (SBU) Regarding the transportation and storage of spent fuel 
from the BN-350 reactor, Utebayev said, "We have met all of the 
targets in our work plan and are moving ahead of schedule.  We will 
meet our deadline to move all of the containers by the end of 2010." 
 Utebayev thanked the Ambassador for the "world class" expertise and 
financial support provided by the U.S. government during the past 
several years, and promised to do his part to honor MAEC's 
international commitments.  Commenting on the SPF project, Utebayev 
said the new facility works as designed, passed inspection by U.S. 
and U.K. experts, and is ready to load radioactive sodium waste. 
Unfortunately, according to Utebayev, the required geo-cement 
storage facility is not ready due to a lack of government funding. 
"We did our part," said a clearly frustrated Utebayev, "but now the 
project has stalled, because we are dependent on others." 
 
AND APPEARS TO BE UNDER SEVERE STRESS 
 
10.  (SBU) Utebayev, a competent technocrat and respected manager 
who appears to be in his forties, confided to the Ambassador that he 
has been under constant stress lately, not least because of the 
arrest and prosecution of former KAP president Mukhtar Dzhakishev, 
whom he considers a mentor (reftel D).  (NOTE:  Utebayev gave the 
Ambassador a copy of MAEC's latest annual report, which opens with 
an upbeat welcome in English from Dzhakishev.  MAEC is 100 percent 
owned by Kazatomprom.  END NOTE).  Utebayev also said that he has 
been hounded for the past three years by the Prosecutor General for 
 
ASTANA 00001222  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
allegedly engaging in monopolistic behavior regarding residential 
electricity prices, and for allegedly avoiding taxes on U.S. 
Government-provided technical and financial assistance.  He said the 
government issued a decree allowing MAEC to set up a special legal 
entity for one year to transfer the assets received under U.S. 
government assistance programs to its balance sheet -- but he called 
this only a temporary solution, and does not expect his problems 
with the Prosecutor to disappear.  (NOTE:  As reported in ref E, the 
Ambassador raised the asset transfer issue with Prime Minister 
Masimov on July 22.  END NOTE.)  Utebayev at this point became 
visibly upset.  "Don't they understand what kind of business this 
is?," he asked plaintively.  "This is an atomic energy company.  I 
cannot afford a single mistake.  I have as my primary concern the 
safety and welfare of the entire population of Mangistau oblast. 
Don't they know that?" 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1220, KAZAKHSTAN: AMBASSADOR RAISES BN-350 PROGRAM, WTO

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1220 2009-07-23 01:56 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4247
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1220/01 2040156
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230156Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5842
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1783
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1150
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1852
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0811
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2403
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2721
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1335
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1247
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001220 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FIR SCA/CEN, ISN, EUR/RUS 
PLEASE PASS TO USTR 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD KNNP WTRO AF RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  AMBASSADOR RAISES BN-350 PROGRAM, WTO 
ACCESSION WITH PM MASIMOV 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Ambassador asked Prime Minister Karim Masimov 
on July 22 to ensure Kazakhstan meets its funding commitment for the 
BN-350 spent fuel program and to sign a decree facilitating transfer 
of the program's fuel transport casks and railcars to Kazakhstani 
entities.  Masimov promised to take action and issue instructions to 
the appropriate ministries.  He told the Ambassador that Kazakhstan 
is proceeding with the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union in 
accordance with the June 9 Moscow announcement, though a final 
decision will be made on how to reconcile the customs union with the 
countries' WTO aspirations at a November heads-of-state summit in 
Minsk.  Masimov said that Under Secretary Burns's July 10 meeting 
with President Nazarbayev was very important for Kazakhstan, and 
reported that he had invited Special Representative Holbrooke to 
visit Astana in August.  He stressed the importance of continuing to 
move forward on the Public-Private Economic Partnership Initiative 
(PPEPI, see septel).  END SUMMARY. 
 
BN-350 PROGRAM 
 
3. (SBU) During a July 22 meeting, the Ambassador asked Prime 
Minister Karim Masimov to take action to ensure that Kazakhstan meets 
its commitment to provide $5 million in 2009 for our bilateral 
program to transport and store the spent fuel from Kazakhstan's 
decommissioned BN-350 plutonium breeder reactor.  He also asked 
Masimov to sign a decree, already prepared by the Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources, which will permit Kazakhstani entities to take 
ownership of program's fuel transport casks and railcars without 
incurring negative financial and tax consequences.  The Ambassador 
further suggested that the Kazakhstani government consider issuing a 
general decree that would resolve this problem for all future 
property transfer cases under our assistance programs. 
 
4. (SBU) Masimov responded that he was already aware of these issues 
to an extent.  He promised to take action to resolve them, including 
giving the necessary instructions to the Ministry of Economy and 
Budget Planning and Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. 
 
WTO ACCESSION AND THE CUSTOMS UNION 
 
5. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that at the G-8 summit in L'Aquila, 
Italy, Russian President Medvedev appeared to have partially walked 
back the June 9 announcement in Moscow that Russia, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan, would suspend their individual efforts to join the WTO in 
favor of acceding together as a customs union.  He asked Masimov 
about the impact of Medvedev's statement.  Masimov responded that 
Kazakhstan is still operating in accordance with the June 9 
announcement, since it had not received any official notification 
from the Russians that they have adopted a new approach.  Regular 
consultations with Moscow are ongoing, and a final decision on how to 
proceed will be taken by heads of state at a November summit in 
Minsk, he explained. 
 
6. (SBU) Masimov said that in any event, Kazakhstan remains intent on 
acceding to the WTO.  He explained, "I feel that we can find a 
mutually acceptable solution that will also be good for the WTO and 
the United States."  He stressed that Kazakhstan nevertheless needs 
open access to the Russian market, and argued that the customs union 
will help attract significant investment to Kazakhstan, because it 
has a better investment climate and more liberal tax regime than both 
Russia and Belarus.  Perhaps also admitting there are other factors 
motivating the customs union, Masimov quoted an excerpt from a book 
by former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee that he had recently read: 
"We can change history, but we can not change geography; we can 
change our friends, but we can not change our neighbors." 
 
BURNS VISIT, PPEPI 
 
7. (SBU) Masimov then turned to the bilateral relationship, noting 
 
ASTANA 00001220  002 OF 002 
 
 
that Under Secretary Bill Burns's July 10 meeting in Astana with 
President Nazarbayev was Kazakhstan's first high-
level meeting with 
the Obama Administration.  "This was very important, and we valued it 
very highly," he explained.  Masimov said it is essential that we 
continue moving forward on the Public-Private Economic Partnership 
Initiative (PPEPI).  "At some point, the global economic crisis will 
be over, and there will be new investment opportunities in 
Kazakhstan," he added. 
 
INVITATION TO SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE 
 
8. (SBU) Masimov said he had recently spoken by telephone with 
Special Representative Richard Holbrooke, and had invited him to 
visit Kazakhstan in August to discuss bilateral cooperation on 
Afghanistan. 
 
9. (SBU) Masimov informed the Ambassador that former EUR DAS David 
Merkel had accepted an invitation to join the international advisory 
board of Astana's new showcase university, and would occasionally be 
visiting Kazakhstan in this capacity.  He added that he had received 
word that former Secretary of State Rice might be interested in 
making a private trip to Kazakhstan at some point in the future. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1215, KAZAKHSTAN: PUBLIC-PRIVATE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1215 2009-07-22 10:18 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3346
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1215/01 2031018
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221018Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5839
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1780
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1147
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1849
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0808
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2400
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2718
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1332
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1244
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB, EUR/ACE 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID, USTDA, USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: 07/21/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  PUBLIC-PRIVATE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE 
HOLDS SECOND COORDINATION MEETING 
 
Classified by:  Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, Reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d) 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Coordinating Committee of the Public-Private 
Economic Partnership Initiative (PPEPI) held its second meeting on 
July 17 in Astana.  During the meeting, the PPEPI Secretariat 
summarized the initiative's progress to date.  The meeting revealed 
that there are obstacles and impediments which could ultimately 
challenge the viability of PPEPI in its current form.  On a separate 
note, on July 20, the MFA complained to us about comments made at 
PPEPI roundtables by the head of the American Chamber of Commerce 
(AmCham), which is PPEPI's implementing organization.  END SUMMARY. 
 
POLICY WHITE PAPERS PRESENTED 
 
2. (SBU) PPEPI is designed to capitalize on the expertise of the U.S. 
and Kazakhstani public and private sectors to prepare economic policy 
recommendations that will make it easier to do business in Kazakhstan 
and improve the country's overall investment climate.  The 
initiative's partners include the governments of the United States 
and Kazakhstan, two U.S. business associations -- the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Kazakhstan (AmCham) and the U.S.-Kazakhstan 
Business Association -- and two Kazakhstani business associations -- 
the Atameken Union and the Forum of Entrepreneurs.  PPEPI is 
administered and implemented by AmCham through a grant from USAID. 
AmCham envisioned further funding and support from the other 
partners; however most of this additional support has not 
materialized. 
 
3. (SBU) The July 17 Coordinating Committee meeting followed a 
roundtable discussion the previous day regarding two of PPEPI's five 
focal areas -- anti-corruption/rule of law and transparency.  The 
Coordinating Committee was briefed by representatives from each of 
the PPEPI's five working groups, which, in addition to the two focal 
areas mentioned above, also cover regional economic integration, 
cooperation in science and technology, and economic 
diversification/SME development.  During the Coordinating Committee 
meeting, the five working groups distributed white papers outlining 
policy recommendations. 
 
LACK OF CONSENSUS AMONG PARTNERS 
 
4.  (SBU) Prior to substantive discussions on the white papers, 
concerns were raised about the methodology utilized in developing the 
recommendations, and the lack of contributions from some working 
group members.  Azat Peruashev, Chairman of the Atameken Union, 
stated that he "was not satisfied with cooperation with (AmCham's 
PPEPI) Secretariat," since Atameken was not a participant in most of 
the meetings of the working groups.  He stated that the white papers 
"do not reflect a consensus view because they do not include the 
opinions of Kazakhstani businesses."  He also complained that the 
AmCham attempted to engage Atameken only by email, saying, "We have a 
different business culture.  We rely on face to face meetings and 
phone calls, not email and the internet."  Although he acknowledged 
that Atameken was partly at fault for not being proactive, he placed 
most of the blame on poor communication between the PPEPI secretariat 
and its partners.  (COMMENT:  The lack of participation by the 
Kazakhstani private-sector partners was an ongoing concern and the 
subject of numerous discussions between EmbOffs and AmCham.  AmCham 
representatives said they repeatedly attempted to contact the 
leadership of both Atameken and the Forum of Entrepreneurs, ever 
since the working groups were first established.  To this day, 
Atameken has not provided its pledged financial contribution to the 
initiative, and its reluctance to do so may also explain its lack of 
participation.  END COMMENT.) 
 
5.  (SBU) Having criticized the process of collaboration, Peruashev 
then highlighted what he believed to be shortcomings in the white 
papers.   Concerning the liberalization of trade, he said that the 
"single window experience" was not included, despite the fact that 
USAID and Atameken sponsored a conference on the subject in June.  He 
 
ASTANA 00001215  002 OF 003 
 
 
claimed that the white paper on trade and customs placed a "negative 
light on the [Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan] Customs Union and [those 
comments] should be excluded."  Peruashev supported many of the 
suggestions in the SME white paper, but stated that he had other good &#x000A
;suggestions.  "Kazakhstan needs SME development in industry, rather 
than trade, where 80 percent of SMEs now work." 
 
A FOUNDATION TO BUILD UPON? 
 
6.  (SBU) This first set of white papers was prepared by an 
independent consultant hired by the PPEPI Secretariat to synthesize 
working group discussions into coherent policy papers.  This 
methodology also led to questions regarding the extent to which the 
white papers were a product of each working group, rather than of the 
consultant himself.  The PPEPI Secretariat representatives described 
the white papers as general frameworks that the working groups can 
now refine and revise to their liking.  Deputy Prime Minister Yerbol 
Orynbayev, the senior Kazakhstani government representative to PPEPI, 
stated that, given the short period of time that PPEPI has been 
active, the working groups did a "good job," but he added that the 
recommendations must be more detailed and specific.  He declined to 
participate in the subsequent press conference, although we do not 
know if this was because he was pressed for time. 
 
7.  (SBU) The Ambassador reminded everyone that the PPEPI is a public 
policy experiment still in its early stages, and noted that all the 
partners still have time to revise and refine the white papers. 
AmCham President Ken Mack confirmed this, but maintained that while 
there is always room for improvement, the working groups have made 
good progress and established a foundation on which they can build. 
Peruashev assured his partners that Atameken representatives will 
participate more actively to refine the white papers, and proposed 
that Atameken host the next round of working group meetings. 
 
WHAT NEXT FOR PPEPI? 
 
8.  (SBU) Orynbayev stated that he would distribute the white papers 
to appropriate government officials and agencies for comment, and 
requested a month to receive their feedback.  The other partners 
agreed to use this time to review and comment on this first iteration 
of policy recommendations.  Orynbayev also stated that it was too 
early to judge the final results of this process, and suggested that 
an action plan be developed based upon the recommendations in the 
white papers. 
 
GOVERNMENT COMPLAINS ABOUT MACK'S COMMENTS 
 
9. (SBU) The MFA called in Pol-Econ Chief on July 20 to complain 
about remarks the AmCham's Ken Mack made during the July 16 PPEPI 
roundtables in which, among other things, he apparently complained 
about the level of corruption in Kazakhstan; called for the 
establishment of a completely independent anti-corruption body; 
maintained that companies do not want to invest in the country's 
non-energy sectors; and said Kazakhstan is too quick to bring 
criminal charges against foreign companies and executives for tax and 
other legal violations.  MFA Americas Department Deputy Director Alim 
Kirabayev told Pol-Econ Chief that Mack's remarks, which had received 
wide press coverage, were "not in the spirit of our strategic 
partnership." 
 
10. (SBU) Responding to Mack's specific points, Kirabayev maintained 
that Kazakhstan is, in fact, doing a lot to fight corruption; it 
passed new anti-corruption legislation in 2008, established a special 
government anti-corruption commission, and is implementing an 
anti-corruption plan.  Furthermore, Kazakhstan is continuing to 
attract significant investment in its non-energy sectors, and does 
not stand alone in providing for criminal liability for legal 
violations by corporations, since the United States does too. 
Kirabayev noted that Mack is a private citizen and does not speak on 
behalf of the U.S. government, but asked that the Embassy pass 
Kazakhstan's concerns about Mack's remarks directly to Mack.  The 
 
ASTANA 00001215  003 OF 003 
 
 
remarks have already gotten attention up to the level of Prime 
Minister Masimov, he added.  (COMMENT:  We saw nothing in Mack's 
remarks that was clearly factually inaccurate, but he made his points 
quite bluntly -- which is likely what caught the government's 
attention.  We informed Mack, who is out of the country, about the 
government's concerns by email.  END COMMENT.) 
 
11. (C) COMMENT:  The PPEPI will need to overcome several challenges 
if it is to achieve its objectives.  The initiative is testing the 
capacity of AmCham to implement the program.  AmCham lacks experience 
implementing a project which requires such broad participation and 
the management of potentially conflicting interests.  Moreover, the 
failure of some of the private-sector partners to provide promised 
financial support has meant that AmCham has not been able to hire 
additional personnel to staff the PPEPI Secretariat, as originally 
expected.  This staffing issue will be further exacerbated with the 
departure of AmCham's lead program manager at the end of July.  It is 
also not clear whether AmCham has buy-in for PPEPI from its broad 
membership, since very few AmCham member companies and organizations 
have thus far participated in the PPEPI working groups. 
 
12. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  Despite the problems, PPEPI retains the 
support of Kazakhstani's senior leadership, including Prime Minister 
Masimov (see septel).  Deputy Prime Minister Orynbayev remains the 
government's lead PPEPI representative, and PPEPI has a renewed 
commitment from at least one of its private-sector partners -- the 
Atameken Union -- to increase its involvement in the working groups 
and contribute to the white papers.  The next phase of the 
initiative, including obtaining feedback and input from the 
government and the Kazakhstani private sector, should provide a gauge 
about whether PPEPI can continue in its current form, or whether it 
will need a major reworking to succeed. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1210, KAZAKHSTAN: LOCAL UIGHURS CONCERNED ABOUT UNREST IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1210 2009-07-21 10:27 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2336
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
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DE RUEHTA #1210/01 2021027
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1776
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1845
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1143
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0804
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1328
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1240
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2396
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2714

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 001210 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, DRL 
 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SOCI KDEM CH KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  LOCAL UIGHURS CONCERNED ABOUT UNREST IN 
CHINA'S XINJIANG PROVINCE, ORGANIZE LARGE DEMONSTRATION 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Kazakhstani media outlets, think tanks, and 
interest groups are expressing concern that Uighur-related unrest in 
China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) may negatively 
affect Kazakhstan because of Kazakhstan's own large Uighur 
population and close economic relationship with China.  Many 
Kazakhstani businessmen earn their livelihood through trade with the 
XUAR.  Kazakhstani government officials have publicly discussed 
efforts to provide consular assistance to Kazakhstani citizens in 
Xinjiang, but have largely eschewed commenting on the political 
aspects of the unrest.  Kazakhstani Uighur groups have criticized 
the Chinese government and staged a large protest in Almaty.  An 
official from the Chinese Embassy in Astana brought up Xinjiang with 
PolOffs, arguing that the Chinese government had taken steps to try 
to maintain ethnic harmony.  Kazakhstani Uighur activist Anvar 
Khadzhiyev told PolOff that Kazakhstani Uighurs should de-emphasize 
the situation in Xinjiang to avoid creating trouble in Kazakhstan, 
but he also criticized China's policies.  END SUMMARY. 
 
KAZAKHSTANI EXPERTS WORRY UNREST IN XINJIANG WILL DISRUPT TRADE 
 
3. (SBU) Kazakhstan-China bilateral trade reached $12 billion in 
2008, making China one of Kazakhstan's largest trading partners. 
China is also one of the largest sources of foreign investment for 
Kazakhstan, with Chinese companies investing $692 million in 2008. 
Bulat Sultanov, Director of the Kazakh Institute of Strategic 
Studies, a government-sponsored think tank, told the press on July 8 
that "massive disorders in Urumqi (i.e. the capital of XUAR) may 
have negative consequences for Kazakhstan, since the XUAR accounts 
for 70 percent of trade between Kazakhstan and China."  Sultanov 
said order should be restored in the shortest time possible in 
accordance with the law, while not depriving citizens of their 
rights to carry out peaceful demonstrations in the future. 
 
KAZAKHSTANI OFFICIALS FOCUS COMMENTS ON CONSULAR ASSISTANCE 
 
4. (SBU) On July 7, Kazakhstani television and print media reported 
that many Kazakhstani citizens were trapped in Xinjiang as a result 
of the unrest, and MFA spokesperson Yerzhan Ashikbayev asked 
Kazakhstani citizens to postpone any travel to that region.  On July 
8, MFA press service head Ilyas Omarov said that the Kazakhstani 
government was organizing an evacuation of Kazakhstani citizens from 
Xinjiang by bus.  Ashikbayev reported that over 1,000 Kazakhstani 
citizens -- of an estimated 5,000 who were in Xinjiang at the time 
unrest began -- had left Xinjiang over the past several days. 
Kazakhstan's Ambassador to China, Ikram Adyrbekov, thanked the 
Chinese government for their assistance in evacuating Kazakhstani 
citizens, and said he was "worried and heart-struck" about the 
unrest, but stressed that it was "purely a matter of China's 
domestic politics."  It appears that the government has refrained 
from making any other political commentary about the unrest. 
 
UNION OF UIGHUR YOUTH ORGANIZES MOURNING CEREMONY 
 
5. (U) In reaction to recent events in China, Kazakhstani Uighur 
groups have criticized the Chinese government and staged protests in 
Almaty.  (NOTE:  Many Kazakhstani Uighurs emigrated from Xinjiang or 
are the descendants of immigrants.  Kazakhstani Uighur activist 
Kakharman Kozhamberdiyev told the press that an estimated 
70,000-120,000 Uighurs entered the Soviet Union from China in the 
early 1960's.  END NOTE.)  The opposition news website Respublika 
reported that the Kazakhstani Uighur diaspora declared 40 days of 
mourning for the slain Uighurs in China.  According to opposition 
news website Azattyq, the Union of Uighur Youth of Kazakhstan also 
organized a government-sanctioned mourning ceremony held in the 
suburbs of Almaty on July 10.  Uighur representatives from the 
Kazakhstan Assembly of Peoples did not attend, and political leaders 
were not invited.  Following the mourning ceremony, however, the 
representative of the Union of Uighur Youth Abrashid Turdiyev 
expressed to reporters his criticism of Chinese authorities for 
their slow response to the recent inter-ethnic conflict between 
 
ASTANA 00001210  0
02 OF 004 
 
 
Uighurs and Hans that took place in a factory in Guangdong. 
Turdiyev said Uighurs in Urumqi rose up to demand that Chinese 
authorities conduct an objective investigation into the incident, 
and criticized the Chinese government's handling of the unrest in 
Urumqi.  Turdiyev told reporters Kazakhstani Uighurs are appealing 
to the media, the world community, the United Nations and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to express their 
unbiased opinion of Chinese government actions.  Abdulla Usherov, a 
representative of the Almaty City Uighur Cultural Center and several 
local residents also denounced China's actions and called for an 
objective investigation into events in Urumqi. 
 
KAZAKHSTANI UIGHUR GROUPS CRITICIZE CHINA FOR SLOW RESPONSE 
 
6. (U) During a roundtable event held in Almaty following the 
mourning ceremony, Kakharman Kozhamberdiyev, Deputy Head of the 
World Congress of Uighurs and an activist from the Uighur 
Association of Kazakhstan, along with other leaders of the Uighur 
diaspora in Kazakhstan, reportedly condemned the actions of the 
Chinese authorities.  Kazakhstani Sinologist Murat Auezov told the 
media that China has a very large military contingent in Xinjiang 
and it could have stopped the unrest within two to three hours, "but 
there is the feeling that they were waiting for a worsening 
situation."  Auezov also said, "I'm afraid that China was waiting 
for an escalation of the tragedy in order to undertake 'adequate' 
actions."  On July 10, Kozhamberdiyev told the media that events in 
Xinjiang "were the result of the totalitarian regime in China and 
simply continue the long-lasting rights infringements against the 
Uighur people."  Kozhamberdiyev added that the WCU's ultimate goal 
is to separate Xinjiang from China and found a sovereign state, and 
asked, "how can a region, with more than nine million Uighurs and 
abundant natural resources and close ties with Central Asian 
culture, not pursue independence and establish its own country?"  He 
denied that the World Congress of Uighurs (WCU) was related to the 
violence in Xinjiang, stating, "The goal of our Congress is to 
achieve the rights of Uighurs to self-determination in a peaceful 
way.  According to one of the articles (of its charter), the WCU is 
against terrorism." 
 
KAZAKHSTANI EXPERTS CONCERNED ABOUT SEPARATISM IN XUAR 
 
7. (U) Kazakhstani political analyst Dosym Satpayev was quoted in 
the media on July 8 saying that Beijing's investment in Xinjiang 
over the past few years has triggered Han migration and a resulting 
ethnic imbalance, which he predicted will have two consequences for 
Kazakhstan -- an increase in separatist activities and a population 
migration from China to Central Asia.  Konstantin Syroezhkin, chief 
researcher at the government-affiliated Kazakh Institute for 
Strategic Studies, echoed Satpayev's concerns about separatism. 
Syroezhkin stated to the press that the unrest in XUAR might have 
been organized from abroad using tools such as the Internet.  He 
encouraged the Uighurs to drop their separatist aspirations, arguing 
that China's Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy stipulates that ethnic 
groups practice self-government in their regions." 
 
CHINESE EMBASSY SAYS STABILITY IN XINJIANG CRITICAL TO ECONOMY 
 
8. (SBU) Chinese Embassy Second Secretary Zhang Zhengkun raised the 
Xinjiang issue with PolOffs during a representational event on July 
15, saying that "Chinese officials had taken all possible steps to 
maintain ethnic harmony" since stability is a very important factor 
for China to ensure continued economic growth -- which in turn is 
necessary to prevent a wide range of problems.  Zhang also 
acknowledged Kazakhstan plays a critical role in guaranteeing the 
energy supplies necessary for China's continued economic 
development. 
 
MODERATE ACTIVIST PRAISES UIGHUR SITUATION IN KAZAKHSTAN... 
 
9. (SBU) On July 16, PolOff met with Anvar Khadzhiyev, a member of 
the Executive Board of Kazakhstan's Republican Uighur Cultural 
Center and a member of Kazakhstan's Assembly of Peoples -- an 
 
ASTANA 00001210  003 OF 004 
 
 
organization chaired by President Nazarbayev which represents the 
interests of Kazakhstan's minority ethnic groups.  Khadzhiyev, a 
professor of law at Eurasia University and moderate Uighur activist, 
was born in Xinjiang -- where his father died in prison after 18 
years of confinement -- and moved with his mother to Kazakhstan 
during the Soviet era.  He praised the government of Kazakhstan for 
its support in preserving Uighur culture, and argued that government 
support for a multicultural society and education in the Uighur 
language are two of the most important reasons for the positive 
situation of Uihgurs in Kazakhstan.  Khadzhiyev also pointed out 
that in Kazakhstan, there are ethnic Uighurs who hold high-level 
positions in government and law enforcement.  (NOTE:  Prime Minister 
Masimov is an ethnic Uighur.  END NOTE.) 
 
...AND CONTRASTS IT WITH THE SITUATION IN CHINA 
 
10. (SBU) According to Khadzhiyev, the reaction of Xinjiang Uighurs 
to Chinese policies of the last few years "is natural for people who 
have been oppressed."  The Urumqi riots are "the income of despair," 
Khadzhiyev told PolOff, remarking that "such problems will probably 
continue until issues of human rights and ethnic conflicts are 
addressed fairly."  Khadzhiyev said that, "like other empires, the 
current Chinese government is imposing its will on the Uighurs, 
trying to control them with education and propaganda."  He said that 
since 2003, the Chinese government has been transforming Uighur 
schools into Chinese schools; in recent years, only the lower grades 
of elementary school offer education in the Uighur language. 
Khadzhiyev also stated that the Chinese government is actively 
spreading the message that Uighur children should be educated in 
Chinese in order to have a good future. 
 
11. (SBU) Khadzhiyev claimed that Chinese policy goes beyond that of 
other "empires" in its attempt to "totally eliminate the Uighur 
ethnicity" by bringing in large numbers of Han Chinese to settle 
Xinjiang, putting Xinjiang's assets under Han Chinese control 
through the Develop the West program, allocating positions in 
Xinjiang in all economic spheres to Han Chinese, forcing Uighurs to 
leave Xinjiang to work, and unjustly imprisoning and killing Uighurs 
on charges of extremism and separatism.  Khadzhiyev said he has 
relatives in Xinjiang, but he does not dare to contact them, for 
fear that they would lose their jobs or suffer harassment from the 
authorities.  Khadzhiyev told PolOff that although the Chinese 
government labels Uighurs terrorists and separatists, it would be 
more appropriate to call the Chinese government's actions "state 
terrorism."  Khadzhiyev did not directly call for an independent 
Xinjiang, but argued that Chinese Uighurs should at least have real 
self-government.  "The Chinese say that the WCU is a terrorist 
organization," Khadzhiyev remarked with a shrewd
smile, "but I do 
not think the U.S. government would allow any terrorist organization 
to operate in Washington." 
 
12. (SBU) Khadzhiyev continued, "As a Kazakhstani citizen and 
representative of the Uighur community, it is my personal opinion 
that Kazakhstani Uighurs should not emphasize the situation in 
Xinjiang, otherwise it will result in trouble for Kazakhstan and for 
our Uighur community here."  Khadzhiyev hinted that Chinese 
authorities may attempt to stoke ethnic divisions, saying "In 
Kazakhstan, the Kazakhs and Uighurs are very close friends.  But 
even in Kazakhstan there have been conflicts when the authorities 
had to interfere.  The unrest in Xinjiang worries Kazakhstani 
authorities and does not reflect well on the Kazakhstani Uighur 
community."  Khadzhiyev also maintained that Chinese special 
services are seeking to create provocations and entrap Uighur 
community leaders in Kazakhstan.  Although he had been invited to 
China several times, Khadzhiyev told PolOff he had declined the 
invitations "because it is too dangerous."  (NOTE:  On July 17, the 
day following his meeting with PolOff, Khadzhiyev died at a public 
swimming pool in Astana, apparently of a heart attack.  While some 
Uighur activists expressed suspicions about his sudden death, at 
this juncture, we have no information that would indicate it 
resulted from foul play.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
ASTANA 00001210  004 OF 004 
 
 
KAZAKHSTANI UIGHURS ORGANIZE LARGE PROTEST 
 
13. (U) According to press reports, approximately 8,000 Kazakhstani 
Uighurs attended a July 19 demonstration in Almaty in support of 
their ethnic brethren in China.  The event was approved by local 
authorities, who moved it to an indoor venue, reportedly in order to 
provide better security -- although the venue was too small by half 
to accommodate the large crowd.  At the demonstration, the head of 
Kazakhstan's Uighur Cultural Center, Akhmetzhan Shardinov, demanded 
that the Chinese government carry out an unbiased investigation into 
the events in Urumqi.  The WCU's Kozhamberdiyev spoke, saying "We 
have come out to protest today because the Chinese authorities are 
continuing to deprive people of their human rights."  Speaking in 
Uighur, Union of Uighur Youth activist Abrashid Turdiyev concluded 
his speech with the slogan "Freedom for Uighurstan," prompting the 
packed hall to rise to their feet shouting and pumping their fists. 
Other rally participants called on the Chinese government not to use 
terms such as Uighur terrorism or extremism, and singer Gulmira 
Razieva demanded that China "observe international human rights and 
rigorously follow international conventions, including the 
convention against torture and cruel treatment of demonstrators." 
Websites reported on the peaceful event, which lasted an hour and a 
half, showing photos of the large crowd with participants waving the 
flag of "East Turkestan," chanting slogans condemning the Chinese 
authorities for violence against the Uighurs, and calling on the 
United Nations to conduct an independent investigation of the 
"Urumqi tragedy." 
 
14. (SBU) COMMENT:  That Kazakhstani Uighurs have become so 
exercised about the unrest in Xinjiang reflects the fact that many 
are from families who immigrated from Xinjiang and many still have 
relatives there.  While the government does not want Kazakhstan's 
close relationship with China disrupted by the unrest in Xinjiang, 
the authorities have apparently decided to provide a modicum of 
political space for Kazakhstani Uighurs to vent their concerns about 
the situation.  We understand that the government warned 
participants in the Almaty demonstration not to be openly critical 
of China -- a warning which went partially unheeded.  The event was 
Almaty's largest political demonstration in a number of years -- at 
least several times larger than anything organized by opposition 
parties or civil society groups.  This indicates that under the 
right (or wrong) circumstances, ethnic identity has the potential to 
be an important factor in political mobilization, which is why the 
Kazakhstani government focuses so much attention on maintaining the 
country's inter-ethnic harmony.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1208, KAZAKHSTAN: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE’S RESPONSE TO H1N1

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1208 2009-07-21 10:19 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2332
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1208/01 2021019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 211019Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5831
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1774
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1141
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1843
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0802
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2214
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1326
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1238
RUEHRC/USDA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001208 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB, OES/PCI (PHUDAK, NFITE) 
USDA FAS FOR OSTA/HAMILTON AND OCRA/MSMITH 
ANKARA FOR AG ATTACHE RGIFFORD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR ETRD ECON SENV KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE'S RESPONSE TO H1N1 
DEMARCHE 
 
REF: (A) STATE 44254 
     (B) ASTANA 0811 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) The Regional Environmental Officer (REO) on May 6 delivered 
ref A demarche urging Kazakhstan to lift its H1N1-related bans on 
the importation of pork and other meats.  Ref B reports the 
government's initial reaction to the demarche. 
 
3. (SBU) As further follow-up, Serik Suleymenov, Chairman of the 
Ministry of Agriculture's State Inspection Committee, sent the 
Embassy a diplomatic note dated June 4, which we received on July 
20.  An informal translation of the text is reproduced below. 
 
4. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT 
 
The Committee for State Inspection in Agricultural Production of the 
Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan (hereinafter 
the Committee) in response to the Embassy's diplomatic note No 
0369/09 dated May 27, 2009 and information enclosed with it provided 
by the APHIS Acting Attache at U.S. Embassy Austria, informs the 
Embassy that the Committee, similar to the U.S. veterinary agency, 
conducts regular monitoring of the epizootic situation in near and 
far foreign states, and continuously tracks official statements of 
the International Epizootics Bureau. 
 
At the same time, it is noteworthy that the Republic of Kazakhstan 
is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (the CIS), and 
therefore must meet all requirements and fulfill obligations under 
existing CIS agreements, including an agreement to ensure epizootic 
security of its territory. 
 
Therefore, the Republic of Kazakhstan, like other CIS states, has 
introduced temporary and partial restrictions on the importation of 
certain items from Mexico, the USA and Canada subject to national 
veterinary control, since A/H1N1 outbreaks have been registered 
there. 
 
Therefore, there are current restrictions on the importation to 
Kazakhstan of swine and swine products produced in Texas, California 
and Kansas which have not been thermally processed. 
 
Regarding thermally processed products, we would like to inform you 
that the restrictions imposed only apply to the transportation of 
these products in passengers' hand baggage and luggage, as well as 
in on-board meals of sea and air craft en route from Texas, 
California and Kansas; otherwise, thermally processed U.S.-produced 
items are allowed to enter Kazakhstan without any restrictions. 
 
Also, due to a poor epizootic situation around other infectious 
diseases, the Committee has imposed restrictions on the importation 
of certain U.S. items subject to state veterinary control, including 
banning importation of the following items: 
 
- Live bovine animals, as well as bone-in meat of bovine animals 
from all states due to registered outbreaks of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy across the country; 
- Live rabbits, rabbit meat, their fur, and other products of rabbit 
breeding from all states due to outbreaks of rabbit hemorrhagic 
disease; 
- Live horses, horsemeat, horse hides, and internal organs, as well 
as other products of horse breeding from Wisconsin, Illinois, 
Kentucky, California, Indiana, Georgia, and Texas due to outbreaks 
of horse contagious metritis registered there; 
- Live poultry, products of poultry breeding, fodder. and fodder 
supplements for poultry, and equipment used and produced to keep and 
slaughter poultry from Kentucky due to weak pathogenic bird flu 
registered there. 
 
ASTANA 00001208  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
In conclusion I would like to emphasize that after the situation 
around A/H1N1 has stabilized, the Committee will consider lifting 
restrictions related to U.S. products in a mandatory manner. 
 
Respectfully, 
Chairman S. Suleymenov 
 
END TEXT 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1207, KAZAKHSTAN: AMBASSADOR’S PRESS CONFERENCE IN AKTAU

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1207 2009-07-21 07:25 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2200
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1207/01 2020725
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210725Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5827
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1770
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1839
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1137
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0798
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1322
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1234
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2392
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2710
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1709

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 001207 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON SOCI KPAO KMDR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  AMBASSADOR'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN AKTAU 
 
REF:  ASTANA 1202 
ASTANA 1201 
ASTANA 1196 
 
ASTANA 00001207  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  The Ambassador travelled to Aktau on July 15-16. 
Aktau, located in Mangystau oblast (province) in western Kazakhstan, 
is a small city known primarily for its oil production and as 
Kazakhstan's only operational port on the Caspian Sea.  While in 
Aktau, the Ambassador met with Askar Nurgaliyev, Deputy Akim of 
Mangistau, and afterwards held a press conference at the Akimat 
(regional government offices).  The turnout for the press conference 
was larger than expected, and the journalists asked more than the 
perfunctory questions, showing a real interest not only in the 
substance of the Ambassador's trip, but also in President Obama and 
in the United States in general.  The journalists' questions were 
thoughtful and wide ranging, as the transcript of the press 
conference shows, and they illustrate the eagerness among everyday 
Kazakhstanis to engage with the United States and the Obama 
Administration.  END SUMMARY. 
 
COVENTIONAL -- AND UNCONVENTIONAL -- WISDOM 
 
2.  "Kazakhstan Today" news agency filed a standard, representative 
account of the Ambassador's visit.  The agency reported that the 
Ambassador supported investment in Mangistau region, and quoted him, 
"I, as the American Ambassador in your country, need to understand 
the details and get acquainted with projects being implemented so I 
will be able to explain to the U.S. government, to the President of 
the United States of America, as well as to large investment 
companies, the benefits of cooperation between our two countries." 
Along with the television coverage of the visit, "Kazakhstan 
Today's" report focused on the meetings and tours on the 
Ambassador's schedule, covering the event in the manner one would 
expect a provincial media outlet to report on a visiting dignitary. 
 
3.  However, the questions at the press conference were a surprise. 
Rather than asking a few questions about the purpose of the visit 
and shooting enough quick footage to file perfunctory reports, the 
reporters stayed to ask a series of questions that were not directly 
related to the visit.  Particularly striking was a question about 
how Kazakhstanis could reach out to ordinary Americans and teach 
them more about Kazakhstan, which led to a humorous exchange between 
the Ambassador and a would-be CNN correspondent.  Another example 
was a question about Kazakhstan's newly-enacted, controversial 
Internet law, in which the reporter prefaced his question by calling 
the United States a paragon of democratic development.  Reporters 
also asked eagerly when President Obama would be coming to 
Kazakhstan.  None of these questions is likely to find its way into 
newspaper stories, but they underlined a hunger for information 
about and engagement with the United States that contrasts with 
negative portrayals of the United States in Russia's leading media 
outlets -- which are a principal new sources for Kazakhstanis. 
(COMMENT:  This very human encounter with western Kazakhstani 
reporters illustrates that any efforts and resources we are able to 
focus on countering anti-Americanism in the local media will be 
amply rewarded.  END COMMENT] 
 
4.  The following is the transcript of the Ambassador's press 
conference in Aktau, July 15: 
 
Ambassador:  I wanted to say, very briefly, thank you to Deputy Akim 
Nurgaliyev because we have just completed a very, very impressive 
presentation on the economic, social, and financial growth of 
Mangistau Oblast (province) and its plans for the future. 
 
I don't really want to waste your time by making a boring speech 
that might not be very interesting for you.  What I would like 
better is if we could have almost a roundtable.  You could ask me 
many questions and any questions, and we can talk together. 
 
So what questions do you have? 
 
 
ASTANA 00001207  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Q:  Which project did you find most interesting? 
 
Ambassador:  It would be impossible to say that one project is more 
interesting than any other.  What was most interesting to me was the 
composite view for the future, and it's in the slogan, "Earth, Sea, 
and Sky," looking at the entire
 possibility for future growth. 
 
Q:  Why are you here? 
 
Ambassador:  As the U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan, it is my 
responsibility to learn as much as I can about the country and its 
people so that I can inform my government better about the objective 
realities of the country.  So for me this really isn't a vacation; 
this is part of my work. 
 
Q:  What other regions have you visited? 
 
Ambassador:  Since I have relatively recently come to Kazakhstan, I 
have not travelled very extensively.  I have visited Atyrau, and I 
have visited Almaty many times.  Next month I will go to 
Ust-Kamenogorsk.  I then plan to visit Shymkent.  And, of course, I 
was in Semipalatinsk with President Nazarbayev in June.  Also, in 
March I was in Baikonur. 
 
Q:  This is your first visit to Mangistau.  What are your 
impressions? 
 
Ambassador:  I'm just beginning the visit, so I'm sure my 
impressions will grow during the next two days.  But my initial 
impression is the great possibilities for this city and for the 
region around this city.  In fact, I told the Deputy Akim that I 
want to come back in 20 years, because I know I will not be able to 
recognize this area because of the huge growth and development that 
will happen. 
 
Q:  What is your impression of other regions which you have already 
visited? 
 
Ambassador:  When I travel around Kazakhstan, it makes me think of 
the United States, because we too are a vast territory with many 
different kinds of landscapes, from mountains to deserts to great 
agricultural areas.  So I look at Kazakhstan, and I think of the 
diversity and great variety that exists here.  I also recognize the 
real economic development that has happened since independence in 
Kazakhstan, and I am also impressed by the special attention that 
Kazakhstan pays to education for its citizens. 
 
Q:  Supplies for Americans in Afghanistan are going through 
Kazakhstani territory, and especially through the seaport in Aktau. 
What do you think of Kazakhstan's assistance to the U.S. effort in 
Afghanistan? 
 
Ambassador:  Kazakhstan has for many years been a very good partner 
in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan and in the region.  For many 
years, we have had over-flight agreements for our state aircraft 
that are involved in Afghanistan, and we have also had for many 
years what is called a divert agreement:  if our aircraft have 
problems, they can land at Almaty International Airport for help. 
This new transit agreement is another positive step, because it 
allows the transport of non-lethal supplies for our soldiers in 
Afghanistan through the territory of Kazakhstan.  The Obama 
administration is following a new policy in Afghanistan that we hope 
will be really successful.  President Obama and his advisors and 
generals know that there is not a really only a military solution 
for Afghanistan.  There must be humanitarian and there must be 
economic solutions to develop stability and prosperity for that very 
troubled country.  Kazakhstan is playing an increasing role in the 
humanitarian support for Afghanistan. 
 
Q:  What do you think about the recent G8 Summit? 
 
Ambassador:  I thought it was interesting that when a journalist 
 
ASTANA 00001207  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
asked President Obama what he thought of the summit, his response 
was, "I think sometimes we have too many summits."  The problem is 
that summits can meet and make many decisions, but then the 
governments involved are responsible for implementing those 
decisions, and it doesn't always happen.  But the real value of 
these summits is that they allow the leaders and their advisors to 
talk face to face and to try to solve specific problems, and that's 
very positive. 
 
Q:  I have travelled to America, and many people there don't know 
much about Kazakhstan.  How can we increase interest in and 
knowledge of Kazakhstan in the United States? 
 
Ambassador:  I agree with you.  I am sympathetic about that problem. 
 One thing that we need is more international journalists who are 
actually based here in Kazakhstan so that they can do regular 
reporting. 
 
Q:  How can I become an international journalist? (Laughter) 
 
Ambassador:  I have another part to my answer, but let me answer 
that specifically.  CNN International, Cable News Network, is very 
widely broadcast in the United States and all over the world.  They 
have a regular program where they work with international partners 
from many countries.  If your television stations produce reports, 
they can be broadcast on CNN International.  The press and 
information section of the American Embassy would be happy to 
discuss how to do this with you, to take advantage of these kinds of 
possibilities. 
 
Let me give you another answer to your question.  Your embassy, the 
Embassy of Kazakhstan in Washington, DC, is extremely active and 
very successful in publicizing Kazakhstan.  Your ambassador, Erlan 
Idrissov, is working on a project right now that will bring 
Kazakhstani culture to the United States.  It will be a six-month 
program of joint cultural ventures to publicize Kazakhstan.  It will 
involve cinema, music, and theater, and joint ventures between the 
museums of our countries.  So that will be one more step forward. 
 
Q:  When is the President of the United States coming to 
Kazakhstan? 
 
Ambassador:  President Obama pays close attention to Kazakhstan.  In 
fact, soon after he was elected, one of his very early telephone 
calls to foreign leaders was to President Nazarbayev.  He has said 
that he would be honored to visit Kazakhstan, but at this moment 
it's not on the schedule yet.  But I hope during the time that I am 
United States Ambassador in Kazakhstan, I can welcome and host my 
President on a visit to your country. 
 
Q:  For other countries, the United States is an example of 
democratic development.  In the United States, NGOs are very 
developed.  After our meeting, you are meeting with local NGOs. 
What will you talk about, and will you talk about the new Internet 
law? 
 
Ambassador:  I don't think that I will talk about the new Internet 
Law with these NGOs because that law has already been signed.  I 
will talk about the importance of civil society, meaning, in part, 
NGOs working closely with their government.  But let me say 
something about the Internet Law.  Our position, as the U.S. 
Government, is that it is important now for Kazakhstan not to use 
that law to limit freedom of speech and to limit freedom of the mass 
media.  We will watch closely how the law is implemented, and we 
will not be shy to make our views known. 
 
Q:  Could you briefly talk about U.S. assistance to Kazakhstan, 
including in the fields of health care and education? 
 
Ambassador:  We have so many programs with Kazakhstan that it would 
probably take me another hour to describe all of them.  We have 
cooperative programs in economic and financial development and in 
 
ASTANA 00001207  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
healthcare development.  We have many different kinds of educational 
and professional exchange programs.  We have extremely important 
programs together in non-pro
liferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and in many other areas.  We have just had a very good 
visit by Under Secretary of State Bill Burns with President 
Nazarbayev, and we agreed that we will establish a Bilateral 
Cooperation Commission to make our work together a little more 
rational.  This commission will cover all of our areas of 
cooperation including security, political cooperation, the human 
dimension, energy, and economic trade and investment. 
 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1206, KAZAKHSTAN: TIP PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGN COMPLETED

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1206.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1206 2009-07-21 07:21 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2188
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1206/01 2020721
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210721Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5824
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1767
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1134
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1836
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0795
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1319
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1231
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1706

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001206 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, G/TIP, SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ELAB SMIG SOCI KCRM KTIP KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  TIP PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGN COMPLETED 
 
REF (A) ASTANA 0222 
      (B) ASTANA 0187 
 
ASTANA 00001206  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. SUMMARY:  INL funded an information campaign conducted by a local 
NGO to increase public awareness of the risks of human trafficking, 
targeting in particular those at risk when seeking jobs in-country 
or abroad.  The campaign was conducted concurrently with the 
Ministry of Interior's anti-trafficking operation.  It ended with a 
conference at the headquarters of President Nazarbayev's ruling Nur 
Otan party, which demonstrated high-level support for cooperation 
among Kazakhstani law enforcement, NGOs, and the U.S. Government. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
QUARTERLY ANTI-TRAFFICKING OPERATIONS 
 
2.  The Ministry of Interior (MVD) has conducted quarterly 
anti-trafficking operations since 2004. During these operations, 
police officers check saunas, night clubs, and tourist, employment, 
and modeling agencies looking for evidence of trafficking rings or 
victims.  Since 2004, over 200 criminal cases have been filed based 
on evidence uncovered during these operations.  Law enforcement and 
NGOs cooperated during the most recent operation to reach every 
oblast (province) of Kazakhstan.  NGOs have been given the 
opportunity to speak with both traffickers and victims during the 
police operations and police have reached out to the public on 
trafficking issues. 
 
INFORMATION CAMPAIGN 
 
3.  During the most recent MVD anti-trafficking operation, INL 
provided a $24,000 grant to the Union of Crisis Centers, one of the 
strongest NGO networks in Kazakhstan which has worked on human 
trafficking and domestic violence issues for over nine years.  In 
addition, the MVD allocated approximately $6,000 to pay for the 
travel of project implementers.  The campaign included a 
press-conference and media coverage, development and dissemination 
of materials (flyers, banners and booklets), public polls, the 
collection of signatures in support of victims of trafficking, and 
the organization of round-tables, meetings, seminars, and 
conferences. 
 
4.  On March 10, the project was launched with a press conference at 
the MVD Press Center and at oblast-level departments of interior. 
Following the press conference, teams made up of two NGO 
representatives, a psychologist, a lawyer, and a police officer, 
boarded two trains to talk to passengers about the dangers of 
trafficking.  Prior to the departures, police officers, NGO members, 
and members of Zhas-Otan (the youth branch of the Nur Otan party) 
organized demonstrations on railway platforms and discussed human 
trafficking issues with travelers. The event was widely covered by 
the local media.  On March 11, the Ambassador gave an interview to a 
local television station to mark the beginning of the information 
campaign. 
 
5.  In preparation for the events, the Union of Crisis Centers 
developed and printed 80,000 informational flyers that described 
trafficking risks, recruitment methods used by traffickers, how to 
avoid becoming a victim, and what to do in case one is a victim. 
The flyer also contained contact information for anti-trafficking 
organizations in every city of Kazakhstan.  Conductors distributed 
flyers to passengers during check-in and to other people at the 
railway stations.  NGO representatives travelling on the trains also 
distributed the flyers.  Regional NGOs met the trains in each of the 
10 cities along the routes, distributing materials and talking to 
passengers. 
 
6.  Simultaneously, NGO representatives working in 13 cities with 
their partners from volunteer organizations distributed materials at 
conferences, workshops, seminars, and meetings.  They also talked to 
people on the street and in public locations. Polls were conducted 
to determine the general public's awareness of trafficking issues 
and the NGOs collected signatures from the public in support of 
victims of trafficking.  The project reached an estimated 50,000 
people in 13 cities and 2,000 railway passengers. 
 
NUR OTAN PARTY HOSTS TIP CONFERENCE 
 
7.  On April 7, a one-day conference was conducted at the 
 
ASTANA 00001206  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
headquarters of the Nur Otan political party. The conference was 
co-chaired by the Head of the Nur Otan Committee for Party 
Supervision, a Vice Minister of Interior, and a Member of 
Parliament.  Representatives of legislative and e
xecutive bodies, 
law enforcement, NGOs, international organizations, and the mass 
media participated.  The conference summarized the results of the 
information campaign and police operation, strengthened dialogue 
between government agencies and non-governmental organizations, and 
developed recommendations for further cooperation. 
 
8.  During his opening remarks, the Ambassador highlighted 
Kazakhstan's contributions to the fight against human trafficking 
and the U.S. partnership with Kazakhstani government agencies and 
NGOs in increasing awareness of human trafficking.  The co-chair 
from Nur Otan pointed out the necessity of consolidating 
governmental and NGO efforts, as well as the efforts of the 
international community, to create an atmosphere of intolerance 
towards human trafficking.  Participants also discussed the OSCE's 
policy on human trafficking in light of Kazakhstan's upcoming 2010 
OSCE chairmanship. 
 
9.  The Deputy Chairman of the Criminal Police Committee reported on 
the results of the police operation.  Police uncovered 56 
trafficking-related crimes and initiated 28 criminal cases.  Of 
those, there were two cases of trafficking in persons (violations of 
Article 128 of the Criminal Code), one case of trafficking in minors 
(Article 133), one case of illegal deprivation of freedom for the 
purpose of exploitation (Article 126.3b), two cases of involvement 
in prostitution (Article 270), and 22 cases of pimping (Article 
271).  Police closed 22 brothels, arrested 67 pimps, and registered 
468 prostitutes -- 151 of them from elsewhere in the CIS. 
 
10. After the passage of the new Social Services Law (Ref A), the 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) was directed to develop standards for the 
provision of assistance to victims of violence, including victims of 
trafficking.  The MOJ sought suggestions from government agencies 
and NGOs.  Seven such standards were presented by the Ust 
Kamenogorsk-based NGO Fenix.  Following the presentation, 
participants discussed the standards and made recommendations. 
 
11.  In light of recent discussions of the issue after a public 
appeal from a disability group (Ref B), the Women's Support Center 
NGO from Petropavlovsk raised the thorny issue of legalization of 
prostitution and reported that NGOs fully share the opinion of the 
Coalition against Trafficking in Women International (CATW) that 
legalization of prostitution can only strengthen the sex industry. 
 
12.  At the end of the conference, recommendations were made to 
conduct a large-scale research project to determine the most 
critical gender problems in society that hamper anti-trafficking 
activities; harmonize the legislation of countries of origin, 
destination and transit to guarantee protection for victims and 
appropriate punishment for traffickers; improve methodology to 
develop standards for social, medical, educational, and other 
services for victims and establish a mechanism for funding such 
services; develop a social partnership between civil society and the 
government, including successful implementation of the law to 
support NGOs; and provide for flows of information between state 
bodies, NGOs, and international organizations. 
 
RESULTS OF POLL 
 
13.  NGOs polled 1935 people (1002 women and 933 men) to determine 
public awareness of human trafficking.  When asked what they would 
do if they discovered human trafficking, 41% said they would inform 
the police, 24% would call a hotline, and 16% would take no action. 
Of those surveyed, 70% were not aware of human trafficking.  The 
majority of those who did have knowledge of the problem said they 
had heard of it from relatives, friends, and the mass media.  Almost 
half of those surveyed said that punishment must be strengthened to 
eliminate the problem, while 32% recommend expanding education and 
information campaigns, and 22% thought the solution was improvement 
of the law. 
 
PETITION 
 
14.  The Union of Crisis Centers collected 2,044 signatures, which 
will be presented to Parliament, calling for protection and 
 
ASTANA 00001206  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
assistance to victims of trafficking. 
 
RESULTS 
 
15.  In total, the information campaign included 43 separate events 
conducted in 13 oblasts.  In 14 oblasts and two cities, 80,000 
information booklets were passed out.  A total of 14,798 people 
participated in the events and, during the 10 day period, 
approximately 50 media outlets printed or broadcast 223 news stories 
about it. 
 
16.  COMMENT:  Not only did this project significantly contribute to 
raising awareness, but it was also a significant step forward in 
cooperation between police and NGOs.  Both the police and NGOs 
achieved valuable results:  the police improved their public image 
and the NGOs were able to reach a wide audience.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1205, KAZAKHSTAN: ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, JULY 5-18

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1205 2009-07-21 07:16 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2185
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1205 2020716
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210716Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5823
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1766
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1133
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1835
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0794
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1318
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1230
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1705

UNCLAS ASTANA 001205 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON EPET ENRG EINV EFIN ELAB KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, JULY 5-18 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  This information is drawn primarily from the 
Kazakhstani local press and has not been verified for accuracy. 
 
-- State Will Fund Shymkent Oil Refinery Modernization 
-- KazMunaiGas To Acquire Pavlodar Oil Refinery 
-- Kazakhstan Seeks To Reduce Kashagan Project Costs 
-- Karachaganak To Provide Expansion Plan 
-- New Appointments at Kazatomprom 
-- New Appointment at Rompetrol Group 
 
STATE WILL FUND SHYMKENT OIL REFINERY MODERNIZATION 
 
2.  According to a July 11 news report of the Kazakhstan Television 
Channel, the government is ready to provide financial assistance to 
modernize the Shymkent oil refinery.  Modernization of the refinery 
would increase its processing capacity from 5 to 6 million tons of 
crude oil annually and allow it to launch production of sulfur, 
polypropylene, and benzyl as well as to produce high-octane 
petroleum products. 
 
KAZMUNAIGAS TO ACQUIRE PAVLODAR OIL REFINERY 
 
3.  "KazMunaiGas will acquire a 100-percent stake in the Pavlodar 
oil refinery, without the participation of the Chinese," Kairgeldy 
Kabyldin, president of national oil and gas company KazMunaiGas 
(KMG), told reporters on July 10.  MangistauMunaiGas (MMG) still 
owns 58 percent of the shares in the refinery, with the remaining 
shares belonging to the Committee on State Property and 
Privatization of the Ministry of Finance.  KMG and the China 
National Petroleum Corporation plan to finalize their deal to 
acquire 100 percent of the common shares in MMG by the end of July. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS TO REDUCE KASHAGAN PROJECT COSTS 
 
4.  On July 10, Kabyldin told reporters that he believes "it is 
feasible to cut the costs (of Kashagan) by 30 percent."  Earlier, 
the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Sauat Mynbayev, 
announced that capital expenditures for the Kashagan experimental 
program would be reduced by $1 billion. 
 
KARACHAGANAK TO PROVIDE EXPANSION PLAN 
 
5.  On July 10, Kabyldin announced that Karachaganak Petroleum 
Operating B.V. (KPO) would provide a plan for the third stage of the 
Karachaganak development project in the fall.  The plan calls for 
increases in annual production of liquid hydrocarbons to 15 million 
tons and natural gas to 38 billion cubic meters. 
 
NEW APPOINTMENTS AT KAZATOMPROM 
 
6.  On July 13, Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan's state-owned nuclear 
company, announced the appointments of 48-year-old Nurlan Ryspanov 
as new vice president for production, and 37-year-old Galimzhan 
Pirmatov as new vice president for economy and finance.  Prior to 
his appointment, Ryspanov was the director of the mining assets 
department at the Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund.  Pirmatov 
previously served as the deputy chairman of BankTuranAlem. 
 
NEW APPOINTMENT AT ROMPETROL GROUP 
 
7.  On July 8, the former managing director of KMG, Saduokhas 
Meraliyev, was appointed as the new director general of the 
KMG-owned Rompetrol Group in Romania.  The outgoing director 
general, Dinu Patrichiu, will continue serving on KMG's board of 
directors.  KMG president Kabyldin called on Rompetrol's new 
management to improve the company's organizational structure, reduce 
expenses, and spin off non-core assets. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1196, KAZAKHSTAN: THE CONFLICTED POST-SOVIET MIND:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1196 2009-07-17 08:30 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9931
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1196/01 1980830
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 170830Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5811
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 1759
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1126
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0787
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1828
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1311
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1228
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2390
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2708

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001196 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  THE CONFLICTED POST-SOVIET MIND: 
NGOS, CONTROL, DEMOCRACY 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD E. HOAGLAND:  1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  After a regional official who was assigned 
as the Ambassador's "minder" during a two-day visit to Aktau 
interfered with the Ambassador's meeting with NGO 
representatives, the same official spoke frankly in private 
about Kazakhstan's post-Soviet history, NGOs, and democracy. 
Though he was a "single source," we suspect his views are not 
uncommon.  END SUMMARY. 
 
OLD-THINK, OLD-ACT WITH NGOS 
 
2.  (C) During his July 15-16 visit to the dynamic Caspian 
sea-port city, Aktau, the Ambassador met with Deputy Governor 
Askar Nurgaliyev, who provided a professional power-point 
briefing -- a real dog-and-pony show -- on the economic 
status and development plans for Aktau and Mangistau oblast 
(province).  The Ambassador was then scheduled to leave the 
government building for a meeting elsewhere with heads of 
local NGOs that the Embassy had organized in advance. 
However, he was told to stay put, because the governor's 
office had moved the NGO meeting at the last minute, and 
without the Embassy's knowledge, to the government office "as 
a matter of efficiency."  Despite the Ambassador's request to 
wait until all invited guests had arrived, the head of the 
governor's environmental office started the meeting.  (NOTE: 
The Embassy later learned that the NGOs had been contacted by 
the regional government in advance and were told not to say 
anything negative about the government.  END NOTE.) 
 
3.  (C) After praising the role of NGOs and the importance of 
civil society working responsibly with the government to 
improve the lives of citizens, the Ambassador asked the NGO 
representatives to introduce themselves and to give a short 
summary of their work.  Most spent their brief time not 
talking about their work but complaining about the difficulty 
of getting grants.  After about 20 minutes, Rakhimbek 
Amirzhanov, the special adviser to the governor who was 
assigned as the Ambassador's stick-like-glue escort, called 
an end to the meeting because "Deputy Governor Nurgaliyev 
wants to see you again."  When the Ambassador returned to 
Nurgaliyev's office, the deputy governor had nothing more to 
say than to wish him a pleasant visit in Mangistau oblast. 
 
4.  (C) The NGO heads were still in the corridor outside the 
office, and a few tried to chat briefly with the Ambassador, 
but Amirzhanov, who appeared to be in his early 40s and 
previously had worked for the Kazakhstani oil services 
company, Neftstroiservis Ltd., pointedly tapped his watch and 
hustled the Embassy delegation away.  When they were outside 
and out of ear-shot of anyone else, Amirzhanov, noting the 
Ambassador's irritation, tried to explain that he had learned 
his "ultra-efficiency" when he had been an exchange student 
in Japan. 
 
5.  (C) During the two-day visit, it became evident that 
Amirzhanov indeed was the Ambassador's "official minder," but 
it likewise became evident that he had a mind of his own and 
was not shy about expressing his opinions, so long as no one 
else could hear them.  During an hour-long road trip to Kuryk 
Village to view the massive Ersai fabrication yard that 
produces components for the oil-drilling platforms in the 
Caspian, and that will eventually become the main port for 
the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System to ship oil to 
Azerbaijan, Amirzhanov meditated on history, the role of 
NGOs, the need for devolution of power, and democracy. 
 
A MEDITATION ON HISTORY 
 
6.  (C) Amirzhanov told the Ambassador, "You know, it would 
have been much better if you had defeated the Soviet Union in 
a war.  After World War II, you distributed common-sense 
booklets to every survivor in Germany and Japan about 
democracy and the free market.  As early as 1942, you were 
planning and preparing for post-war rebuilding after your 
 
ASTANA 00001196  002 OF 002 
 
 
victory.  In our case, however, you had no plan (when the 
Soviet Union collapsed), we weren't physically destroyed, and 
you didn't occupy us to rebuild us.  It would have been 
better if you had, because now we are still Soviet trying to 
figure out how to be a free-market democracy.  We've done 
better than some, but we are still Soviet." 
 
ON NGOS 
 
7.  (C) Amirzhanov said,
"I like what you said, that NGOs 
should work responsibly with the government to improve 
society."  The Ambassador interjected, "I didn't mean NGOs 
shouldn't criticize or even sometimes oppose the government." 
 Amirzhanov said, "I understand that.  During good times, 
they can have as much freedom as they want; but during 
difficult times, like we have now, we must be vigilant that 
they don't get out of control and take to the streets.  That 
could lead to serious negative consequences."  The Ambassador 
suggested, "Your government is too strong to worry about 
that."  Amirzhanov replied, "I think I agree with you, but we 
have to prevent that first step that could lead to chaos." 
 
ON DEVOLUTION OF POWER 
 
8.  (C) Amirzhanov said, "You have to understand I was born 
in the Soviet Union.  I am a Soviet man, but I have been 
lucky to have had international experience, and so I 
understand more."  The Ambassador asked, "What do you 
understand?"  Amirzhanov replied, "I understand that all of 
our officials -- bureaucrats; national, regional, and local 
officials; judges -- all of them are responsible up the chain 
to "Papa" (President Nazarbayev) and not down the chain to 
the people.  He pays them to support him -- not directly, of 
course, but that's why we have such terrible corruption.  We 
need elected officials so that they will be responsible to 
the people.  We need independent judges -- they aren't 
stupid, of course, but they aren't independent." 
 
THE SOVIET MAN PROPOSES 
 
9.  (C) Amirzhanov said, "Do you remember the film, 
"Jefferson in Paris'?  He told his daughter, 'Give democracy 
to the educated, and they will lead.'  That's what we -- at 
least many of us -- want to do.  We have to wait until we 
have a well-educated critical mass to allow a freer 
democracy.  Our educational system collapsed with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  We now have to wait until we 
can build a new educated class, so that the mob doesn't 
destroy everything.  You could help us (improve education to 
achieve democracy), but you don't seem to be very interested. 
 You are the richest country in the world, but most of your 
money goes for war, doesn't it." 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1195, KAZAKHSTAN: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE ON POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1195 2009-07-17 07:37 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1195 1980737
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 170737Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5810
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0040
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1310
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1227
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T ASTANA 001195 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  07/16/2034 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM PINR ETTC MARR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  GOVERNMENT RESPONSE ON POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF 
LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO SYRIA 
 
REF:  (A) STATE 56723 
  (B) ASTANA 0956 
  (C) ASTANA 1000 
 
Classified by:  Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (S) MFA Americas Department Deputy Director Alim Kirabayev called 
in Pol-Econ Chief on July 16 to provide the Government of 
Kazakhstan's official response to our demarche on the possible sale 
of D-30 Howitzers to Syria by the firm Kazakhstan Special Engineering 
(reftels).  Kirabayev explained that the appropriate Kazakhstani 
government agencies had investigated the information the United 
States provided.  The investigation confirmed that there is, in fact, 
a Kazakhstani company known as Kazakhstan Special Engineering 
(KazSpecEngineering).  However, the investigation further determined 
that while the company had had preliminary discussions with the 
Syrians about a Howitzer sale, no agreement was reached and no 
contract was signed between the two sides.  Kirabayev added that the 
company had made no request for an arms export license to 
Kazakhstan's Export Control Commission, nor had it provided an 
end-user certificate to the MFA, as required by Kazakhstani law. 
Thus, while there was the potential for an arms transfer, it did move 
forward, Kirabayev explained. 
 
2. (S) Pol-Econ Chief thanked Kirabayev for the response and 
requested that the Kazakhstani government continue to monitor this 
case to ensure no arms transfer to Syria takes place in the future. 
Kirabayev promised to relay that message to his superiors. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1187, KAZAKHSTAN: GAS PRODUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1187 2009-07-15 04:56 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7542
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1187/01 1960456
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 150456Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5803
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1757
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1124
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1826
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0785
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1308
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1225
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001187 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON EPET EINV KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  GAS PRODUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION UPDATE 
 
REF:  (A) ASTANA 0862 
 (B) ASTANA 0166 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Officials from the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources and national oil company KazMunaiGas recently 
briefed Energy Officer on the latest natural gas production 
forecasts and pipeline projects.  END SUMMARY. 
 
ABOUT 30 BCM PRODUCED IN 2008 
 
3.  (SBU) According to the Managing Director for Gas Industry 
Development at KazMunaiGas (KMG), Mussabek Issayev, Kazakhstan has 
3.3 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves and in 2008, 
produced 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas.  Approximately 12 
bcm, or 40 percent of Kazakhstan's total production, was re-injected 
at the Karachaganak and Tengiz fields to maintain pressure for oil 
production.  An additional 2.5 bcm was flared for technical reasons, 
while 11 bcm from the Karachaganak, Tolkyn, and Tengiz fields was 
exported.  To meet domestic demand, Kazakhstan imports 1 bcm from 
Russia to supply its northern regions, and 3 bcm via swap operations 
with Uzbekistan to supply its southern regions. 
 
REINJECTION HINDERS GAS MARKET 
 
4.  (SBU) Issayev said he expects Kazakhstan to produce up to 100 
bcm of natural gas by 2020.  He anticipates that the Karachaganak, 
Tengiz, Zhanazhol, and Kashagan fields will be responsible for 92 
percent of all natural gas production.  Issayev also said he expects 
Tengizchevroil (TCO) to reinject 40 percent of Tengiz gas, 
Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (KPO) to reinject 40 percent 
of its gas, and the North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC) to 
reinject 80 percent of the gas produced at Kashagan.  "As a result," 
said Issayev, "only 35 bcm will be for sale, of which 15-18 bcm will 
be consumed domestically, and 15-17 bcm will be exported." 
According to Issayev, KMG is studying alternatives to gas 
re-injection to maintain field pressure.  "As the price of gas 
steadily increases, it is much more profitable to sell more gas and 
re-inject less," he said.  Issayev hypothesized that carbon dioxide, 
nitrogen, and water could be used instead of gas to maintain 
pressure in the wells for oil production. 
 
THE KAZTRANSGAS MONOPOLY 
 
5.  (SBU) As reported in reftel B, KMG subsidiary KazTransGas (KTG) 
owns and operates all of the gas pipelines in Kazakhstan.  KTG 
transports gas to export markets via subsidiaries such as Intergas 
Central Asia, which operates the Kazakhstani part of the Central 
Asia-Center gas pipeline, and Asian Gas Pipeline, a joint venture of 
KTG and the CNPC subsidiary that manages the Kazakhstan-China gas 
pipeline.  KTG transports gas to domestic markets via regional 
subsidiaries such as KazTransGas-Aimak.  Issayev told Energy Officer 
that "even though the Central Asia-Center gas pipeline was built 40 
years ago, it still safely transits 45 bcm of Turkmen gas, 10 bcm of 
Uzbek gas, and about 5 bcm of Kazakhstani gas a year." 
 
CASPIAN LITTORAL GAS PIPELINE 
 
6.  (SBU) On December 22, 2007, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan 
signed an agreement to build the 1,600-kilometer (km) Caspian 
Littoral (Prikaspiskiy) Gas Pipeline, with a 20-bcm designed annual 
throughput capacity.  Of the pipeline's 1,600 km length, only 10 km 
will be built by Russia, 795 km by Kazakhstan, and 795 km by 
Turkmenistan.  According to an April 9 statement by Gazprom CEO 
Alexei Miller, the capacity of the Caspian Littoral pipeline might 
be increased by another 20 bcm.  Kazakhstan will transit 10 bcm of 
Turkmen gas from Belek and export 10 bcm of its own gas via Beineu 
to Russia's Alexandrov Guy.  According to Timur Imashev, Director of 
Gas Industry Development at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources (MEMR), Kazakhstan will fill the pipeline with gas from 
Karachaganak and Tengiz, in addition to new offshore fields such as 
the N Block, Pearls, and Kashagan, if needed.  He told Energy 
 
ASTANA 00001187  002 OF 002 
 
 
Officer on June 8 that the project is expected to be completed in 
2013. 
 
7.  (SBU) Imashev sees the Caspian Littoral pipeline as an extension 
and modernization of the existing Central Asia-Center gas pipeline 
and does not anticipate any technical difficulties with the project. 
 However, he said that ongoing negotiations between Turkmenistan and 
Russi
a over the price of Turkmen gas might delay the launch of the 
project.  Imashev expects that 30 bcm of gas will be supplied by 
Turkmenistan and up to 10 bcm by Kazakhstan.  "Kazakhstan does not 
really care whether Turkmenistan has gas, or how much they have," he 
said.  "We just want guarantees that they will pay the transit 
fee." 
 
KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA GAS PIPELINE 
 
8.  (SBU) A 1,300-km Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline with an annual 
capacity of 40 bcm will transit Turkmen gas to Uzbekistan's border 
with Kazakhstan, and then to the Chinese city of Khorgos.  MEMR's 
Imashev told Energy Officer that 13 bcm a year would be supplied 
from a Turkmen gas deposit currently being developed by CNPC on the 
right bank of the Amu Darya River, and 17 bcm would be purchased by 
China from Turkmenistan.  On July 10, Beimbet Shayakhmetov, Director 
General of the Asian Gas Pipeline company, announced that the first 
segment of the pipeline would be completed by November 2009. 
According to Shayakhmetov, the pipeline would only carry 
approximately 4.5 bcm a year, but it is expected to reach full 
capacity by late 2013.  Once the pipeline is at full capacity, 30 
bcm will be transported to China and 10 bcm will be used 
domestically.  The Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline will consist of two 
parallel pipelines, with a diameter of 1,067 millimeters and a 
length of 1,304.5 kilometers.  The main contractors of the project 
will be Kazakhstan's KazStroyService and China Petroleum Pipeline 
Engineering. 
 
BEINEU-BOZOI-AKBULAK 
 
9.  (SBU) The 1,510-km Beineu-Bozoi-Akbulak gas pipeline will 
connect the Central Asia-Center and Kazakhstan-China gas pipelines. 
KMG's Issayev told Energy Officer that the pipeline would not only 
help Kazakhstan secure gas for Kyzylorda, South Kazakhstan, Zhambyl, 
and Almaty oblasts, but also help the Chinese ship Kazakhstani gas 
from the CNPC-operated oil and gas fields in Aktobe and Mangistau 
oblasts.  The Bozoi-Akbulak segment of the pipeline has a 5 bcm 
annual throughput capacity and was officially opened on January 22. 
Completion of the Beineu-Bozoi segment would increase the pipeline's 
capacity to 10 bcm and is expected to be completed when the second 
stage of the Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline comes on stream. 
 
10.  (SBU) MEMR's Imashev said that the Beineu-Bozoi-Akbulak 
pipeline would reduce dependence of the western regions of 
Kazakhstan on Uzbek gas obtained via swap operations.  He complained 
that "Uzbekistan is problematic, as it often plays games."  Imashev 
explained that Kazakhstan does not have a direct contract with 
Uzbekistan which would give Kazakhstan leverage to impose fines for 
breaching terms.  "If we had a contract," he explained, "then 
Uzbekistan would increase the price from $80 to $300." 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1184, KAZAKHSTAN: MEDIA REACTION FOR THE ASTANA VISIT OF

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1184 2009-07-14 10:08 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6719
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
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DE RUEHTA #1184/01 1951008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5800
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1754
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1823
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1121
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0782
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1305
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1222
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2387
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2705
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1691

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001184 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR P, SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP KDEM KPAO KMDR RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  MEDIA REACTION FOR THE ASTANA VISIT OF 
UNDERSECRETARY BILL BURNS 
 
ASTANA 00001184  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  The Kazakhstani media broadly reported Under Secretary 
of State Bill Burns's July 10 meeting in Astana with President 
Nazarbayev; however, the majority of the coverage was factual rather 
than analytical, due to the fact that the event happened on a 
Friday, after all of the weekly analytical newspapers had been 
published.  Burns made a statement and answered journalists' 
question at a brief press conference immediately following the 
Nazarbayev meeting.  The press coverage emphasized Burns's praise 
for Nazarbayev's leadership on non-proliferation issues and his 
statement that the United States attaches high priority to its 
relationship with Kazakhstan.  One outlet pointed out that the 
U.S.-Kazakhstani relationship does not need to be "reset."  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
ON THE AIR 
2.   Four of Kazakhstan's largest television stations, including the 
two official, nationwide channels, "Khabar" and "Kazakhstan," as 
well as pro-government "Era TV" and "Rakhat," highlighted the visit 
on their evening news broadcasts.   "Kazakhstan" broadcast Under 
Secretary Burns's statement praising President Nazarbayev for 
showing leadership on the issue on non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.   "Khabar" showed a more complete version of Under 
Secretary Burns' statement, including not only the praise for 
President Nazarbayev's non-proliferation leadership, but also the 
sections in which Burns reiterated U.S. support for Kazakhstan's 
2010 OSCE chairmanship and pointed out that Kazakhstan was the 
delegation's first stop on its Central Asian tour.  "Khabar" also 
mentioned Nazarbayev's support of President Obama's initiative for a 
global nuclear security summit next spring in New York.  Both 
official channels broadcast the reports in both the Russian and 
Kazakh languages. 
VALUED PARTNER 
 
3.  The four largest national dailies, official "Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda," pro-government "Liter," pro-government "Express K," and 
independent "Vremya" all covered the visit by quoting Under 
Secretary Burns as saying that, "U.S. President Barack Obama 
attaches high priority to the U.S. relationship with Kazakhstan." 
The "Kazakhstan Today" news service reported more fully on the U.S. 
delegation's meeting with Nazarbayev, saying that "Burns conveyed to 
the Kazakhstani president best wishes from U.S. President Barack 
Obama."  "Kazakhstan Today" also noted that Burns briefed Nazarbayev 
on the recently concluded Moscow summit meeting between President 
Obama and Russian President Medvedev, and quoted the Under Secretary 
saying, "The U.S. president's visit to Moscow was very successful. 
Washington attaches importance to good relations with Russia.  The 
United States also highly values relations and cooperation with 
Kazakhstan." 
 
NO NEED TO RESET 
 
4.  "Express K" briefly profiled Under Secretary Burns, saying he 
"is known as one of the most successful U.S. career diplomats.  The 
author asserted that "Time" magazine "included him in its list of 50 
prospective American leaders under 40, and in its list of the 100 
most promising young leaders in the world."  The author also 
connected the delegation's visit to a "Washington Times" article in 
which Chevron CEO Dave O'Reilly and Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) 
co-founder and former Georgia Senator Sam Nunn said that while the 
Obama Administration is trying to "reset" its relationship with 
Russia, it already has successful relationships with other former 
Soviet countries -- "and Kazakhstan first of all" -- which don't 
need to be "reset." 
 
5. The following is the transcript of Under Secretary Burns's July 
tenth press conference in Astana: 
 
Under Secretary Burns:  Good Afternoon.  I am delighted to be here 
in Kazakhstan with a delegation of senior colleagues from the U.S. 
Government.  I am especially happy to make Kazakhstan our first stop 
after a successful summit in Moscow and after the G-8 summit. 
 
ASTANA 00001184  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton asked us to emphasize 
the importance and the high priority that the new American 
administration attaches to our relationship with Kazakhstan. &#x
000A; 
We've had a very productive set of conversations today.  I 
especially wanted to emphasize my appreciation for the warmth and 
hospitality offered by President Nazarbayev.  I expressed to the 
president our appreciation for our cooperation in Afghanistan, which 
is a common challenge.  I expressed our appreciation for the 
president's leadership on the issue of non-proliferation.  President 
Obama looks forward very much to joining President Nazarbayev in an 
important nuclear security summit in the United States next spring. 
 
 
We talked about ways in which we can deepen our economic 
relationship, not only in the energy sector but also in other 
sectors of the economy.  I also had an opportunity to discuss the 
results of what was a very successful summit between President Obama 
and President Medvedev in Moscow earlier this week.  I stressed our 
conviction that a strong relationship between the United States and 
Russia is an important complement to our partnerships with 
Kazakhstan and our other friends in the region.  And finally, we 
talked about our support for Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the OSCE 
in 2010.  It is an important opportunity for Kazakhstan to show its 
leadership and also an important opportunity to demonstrate progress 
in the various areas of democratic reform to which Kazakhstan has 
committed itself. 
 
I was also pleased during my visit to have a chance to meet with 
civil society leaders.  That [meeting] very much reflected President 
Obama's view that a strong relationship between the United States 
and Kazakhstan depends on good relationship between our governments, 
as well as on good relations between our two societies. 
 
So once again, I believe we had a very productive and constructive 
set of discussions, and I leave Kazakhstan with a very strong sense 
of the potential for further strengthening our relationship. 
 
I would be glad to respond to your questions. 
 
Khabar News Agency:  In light of the new administration now in the 
White House, can we expect changes in the U.S.-Kazakhstan 
relationship as a result? 
 
Under Secretary Burns:  As I said, President Obama attaches high 
priority to the relationship between our two countries.  That's what 
the visit of our delegation reflects.  I strongly believe that we 
will be able to strengthen our relationship even further in the 
coming years.  And that's very much in the interest of both of our 
countries and both of our peoples. 
 
Khabar News Agency:  Recently, President Nazarbayev received here - 
in this same building - the President of Israel, and during that 
meeting a lot was said about international nuclear security.  The 
presidents called on all nuclear nations to decrease the level of 
nuclear tensions.  What is your take on that? 
 
Undersecretary Burns:  I think President Nazarbayev has demonstrated 
real leadership on the issue of non-proliferation.  The United 
States, for our part, has tried to demonstrate our own commitment to 
doing everything we can to prevent the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, and also to set a good example ourselves.  A good 
example of that is the joint understanding that President Obama and 
President Medvedev reached in Moscow a few days ago about a further 
agreement to limit strategic arms.  So we're determined to do our 
part, and we value greatly President Nazarbayev's leadership on this 
issue. 
 
Spasibo. 
 
 
 
ASTANA 00001184  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1183, KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV SIGNS INTERNET

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1183 2009-07-14 09:57 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6707
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1183 1950957
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5799
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1753
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1120
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1822
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0781
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2386
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2704
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1304
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1221
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 001183 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FIR SCA/CEN, DRL, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  07/14/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KPAO OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV SIGNS INTERNET 
LEGISLATION INTO LAW 
 
REF:  (A) ASTANA 1136 
  (B) ASTANA 1030 
  (C) ASTANA 1028 
  (D) ASTANA 0816 
  (E) ASTANA 0345 
 
Classified by:  Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, Reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d) 
 
1. (SBU) The Presidential Press Service reported on July 10 that 
President Nazarbayev has signed pending Internet legislation into 
law.  (NOTE:  As a technical matter, this legislation amends several 
existing Kazakhstani laws.  END NOTE.)  Nazarbayev's move came 
despite objections and concerns raised by Kazakhstani civil society 
and the international community, including U.S. concerns which USOSCE 
outlined at several OSCE Permanent Council meetings and which the 
Ambassador raised publicly during a June 11 press conference in 
Astana (ref C) and privately in a demarche he delivered to Deputy 
Foreign Minister Konstantin Zhigalov on July 8 (ref A). 
 
2. (U) Several Kazakhstani civil society leaders incorrectly 
predicted that Nazarbayev would veto the legislation or send it to 
the Constitutional Council for review, as he did in the case of 
religion legislation which the Council ultimately declared to be 
unconstitutional.  MFA Spokesperson Yerzhan Ashibayev told the press 
on July 13 that there are "many points of view" about the Internet 
law, and maintained that it will not directly affect Kazakhstan's 
2010 OSCE chairmanship.  He said that the MFA "will undertake all 
measures to explain to our OSCE partners the current situation:  that 
is, what occasioned the acceptance of the law." 
 
3. (C) COMMENT:  The Internet legislation will make all websites 
subject to Kazakhstan's mass media law and will provide the 
government with a legal basis to block and shut down websites, both 
foreign and domestic, that contain information "contradicting" 
Kazakhstani legislation -- including obscene material, extremist 
propaganda, and material that discloses state secrets.  Based on our 
conversations with Kazakhstani interlocutors, we believe the 
legislation was specifically aimed at ex-Nazarbayev son-in-law Rakhat 
Aliyev and not at introducing a broader crackdown on opposition and 
foreign news websites.  Aliyev and his associates continue to post 
"kompromat" (i.e., negative, compromising material) about Nazarbayev 
and anti-Nazarbayev articles on a variety of websites.  Talgat 
Kaliyev, advisor to Foreign Minister Tazhin, told us frankly on June 
18 that the legislation was "all about Aliyev." 
 
4. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  We presume Nazarbayev was well aware that 
his signing the legislation could damage Kazakhstan's international 
reputation in the run up to its OSCE chairmanship -- the country's 
most important international leadership role since becoming 
independent.  That Nazarbayev took this step in the end is simply 
further indication that he considers himself locked in an existential 
struggle with Aliyev which trumps all other considerations.  Over the 
past two years, the government, without admitting to doing so, has 
occasionally blocked websites that posted Aliyev-generated and 
-related materials.  (NOTE:  This includes blocking for about a month 
in 2008 the Kazakh- and English-language websites of Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, which have published a number of Aliyev-related 
articles and interviews with Aliyev.  END NOTE).  In effect, the new 
legislation brings out into the open and legalizes what the 
government was already doing surreptitiously in its fight against 
Aliyev. 
 
5. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  The Internet legislation is now law and 
new legislation would be required to return to the status quo ante. 
At this juncture, our best approach would be to urge the Kazakhstanis 
to implement the legislation in a manner consistent with their OSCE 
commitments on freedom of speech, expression, and the press.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1182, KAZAKHSTAN: CIVIL SOCIETY DISAPPOINTED WITH KAZAKHSTAN’S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1182 2009-07-14 09:57 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6705
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1182/01 1950957
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140957Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5797
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1751
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1118
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1820
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0779
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2384
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2702
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1302
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1219
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001182 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV KDEM OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  CIVIL SOCIETY DISAPPOINTED WITH KAZAKHSTAN'S 
PROGRESS ON DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On June 22, several leading civil society 
activists briefed members of the diplomatic community in Astana on 
the status of Kazakhstan's democratic reform efforts.  The activists 
asserted that, despite modest progress in some areas, the government 
has become tougher on opposition political parties, and there are 
problems in the areas of freedom of the press and freedom of 
religion.  They urged the diplomatic community to continue pressing 
the Kazakhstani government for further reform.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3. (SBU) The briefing was attended by representatives of embassies 
of the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.  The civil society 
attendees were Yevgeniy Zhovtis of the Human Rights Bureau, Ninel 
Fokina of the Almaty Helsinki Committee, Tamara Kaleyeva of the Adil 
Soz media-freedom NGO, Vera Tkachenko of the Legal Policy Research 
Center, and Daniyar Kanafin, an independent lawyer. 
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS ON THE DECLINE? 
 
4.  (SBU) Yevgeny Zhovtis asserted that little progress has been 
made in implementing democratic reforms since Kazakhstan was 
selected to be 2010 OSCE chairman in November 2007.  In fact, 
Zhovtis claimed that political reform has actually been "moving 
backward," and, further, that the government's approach to 
opposition political parties has become "more repressive."  He 
listed several recent examples illustrating how the state has sought 
to take "control of society," and asserted that the recently-passed 
amendments to the law on political parties actually made it easier 
for the government to shut them down.  Zhovtis maintained that OSCE 
member states are "closing their eyes" to continuing harassment, 
detentions, excessive and selective fines, and other human rights 
violations. 
 
IMPROVEMENTS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM LAGGING 
 
5.  (SBU) Lawyer Daniyar Kanafin said that while he believes the 
Kazakhstani government recognizes its obligation to expand access to 
the justice system and to ensure due process in fair criminal 
trials, it has done little to implement such reforms.  He pointed 
out that defendants continue to face a distinct disadvantage in the 
courtroom:  Kazakhstan's trial acquittal rate is just 0.9 percent, 
which, according to Kanafin, is a result of the fact that 
prosecutors and judges lack independence and are beholden to the 
executive officials who appoint them.  In addition, defendants 
sometimes do not have access to professional legal representation, 
and in cases that involve classified or confidential information, 
defense attorneys are often barred from representing their clients 
because they lack the necessary security clearance.  Kanafin also 
criticized the prosecutorial practice of using anonymous testimony 
in criminal court proceedings which cannot be cross-examined by the 
defense. 
 
CONCERNS ABOUT DRAFT INTERNET LAW 
 
6.  (SBU)  Adil Soz's Tamara Kaleeva told the participants that the 
government has recently taken a few positive steps to liberalize 
regulations on print media, but that more needs to be done to 
improve Kazakhstan's media environment.  In particular, she stressed 
the need to decriminalize libel and put legal caps on damages 
awarded in civil libel cases.  Kaleyeva expressed great concern that 
the draft law on the Internet would give the authorities the ability 
to block access to websites presenting views and positions they do 
not agree with.  (NOTE: We have raised our concerns about the 
Internet law with the Kazakhstani government on several occasions, 
urging the authorities to carefully consider the law in light of 
Kazakhstan's OSCE commitments to freedom of expression.  END NOTE.) 
 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:  CURB YOUR ENTHUSIASM 
 
7.  (SBU) Ninel Fokina of the Almaty Helsinki Committee said that 
while the Constitutional Council's February decision to strike down 
as unconstitutional amendments to Kazakhstan's religion law, 
 
ASTANA 00001182  002 OF 002 
 
 
"persecution" of "non-traditional" religious groups and individual 
believers remains a problem.  Fokina cautioned that outside 
observers became "too enthusiastic" following the Council's ruling 
and began overlooking other trends occurring in the country.  One of 
the m
ore prominent areas of concern, Fokina said, was the 
government's continued interference in the activities of 
missionaries from "non-traditional" religious groups.  She pointed 
to the case of Elizaveta Drencheva, the Unification Church 
missionary who was recently sentenced to two years in prison on the 
basis of her teachings.  While a court of appeals later commuted 
Drencheva's sentence, it did not vacate her guilty verdict -- which 
Fokina warned has left the door open to further government efforts 
to go after the group. 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT:  We take a more nuancedview than the civil society 
activists about Kazakhstan's reform trajectory.  The "pressure" on 
opposition parties this year simply cannot be compared to the 
problems of a few years ago, when key opposition leaders like 
Galymzhan Zhakiyanov and Mukhtar Ablyazov were jailed for several 
years following convictions on politically-motivated charges, and 
one -- Altynbek Sarsenbayev -- was assassinated.  While some 
non-traditional minority religious groups continue to have problems 
with the authorities, others, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, do 
not currently have significant outstanding issues.  Overall, we see 
positive incremental progress on a variety of fronts -- such as the 
adoption the Madrid-related legislation -- and, not surprisingly, 
the occasional step backward -- such as the adoption of new Internet 
legislation.   On a particularly positive note, Kazakhstan's civil 
society leaders directly participated in drafting the government's 
2009-2012 National Human Rights Action Plan, which was recently 
signed by President Nazarbayev.  The Presidential Human Rights 
Commission informed us on July 11 that the MFA will publicly present 
the Plan to the international community on September 9.   END 
COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1179, KAZAKHSTAN: NAZARBAYEV PLAYS AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE THIRD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1179 2009-07-13 10:52 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5694
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
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DE RUEHTA #1179/01 1941052
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5793
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1748
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
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RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0776
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1299
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2381
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2699

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001179 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL/IRF 
 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KIRF KNNP KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  NAZARBAYEV PLAYS AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE THIRD 
CONGRESS OF LEADERS OF WORLD AND TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS 
 
REF:  ASTANA 1131 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (U) SUMMARY:  Kazakhstan hosted the third triennial Congress of 
World and Traditional Religions in Astana July 1-2.  More than 70 
delegations with 400 participants representing Islam, Christianity, 
Judaism, Buddhism and other religious confessions participated in 
the event.  They discussed the role of religious leaders in building 
peace through tolerance, mutual respect, and cooperation. 
Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev made remarks at both the 
opening and closing ceremonies.  He called on religious leaders to 
set up a "new global order" to resolve various problems, and praised 
President Obama for seeking to enhance mutual understanding.  In his 
remarks to the Congress, Israeli President Shimon Peres urged Arab 
leaders to join Israel in peace negotiations; the Iranian delegation 
walked out during Peres's speech.  Israel's Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi 
Yona Metzger and Egypt's Minister of Religious Endowments (Awqaf) 
Mahmoud Hamdy Zakzouk condemned the use of violence.  Representative 
Eni Faleomavaega (D-American Samoa) attended the Congress of Leaders 
of World and Traditional Religions on July 2 (reftel).  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
NAZARBAYEV PRAISES OBAMA'S CAIRO SPEECH... 
 
3. (U) In his remarks to the Congress, Nazarbayev called on 
religious leaders to be conduits for setting up a "new global 
order," saying "a new global order can be created not after a global 
armed conflict, as it used to be in the past, but in a peaceful 
way."  He applauded recent initiatives from heads of leading 
"eastern" and "western" countries, specifically President Obama's 
Cairo speech, saying, "We are inspired by the new U.S. leadership's 
desire to reach mutual understanding with the Muslim world and it 
may be viewed as a sign of important changes in the world."  He 
added, "Kazakhstan also supports the proposal of the Saudi Arabian 
king to establish a dialogue of cultures and traditions." 
Nazarbayev suggested that the Secretariat of the Congress and 
Kazakhstan's International Center of Cultures and Religions 
establish a council of religious leaders to cooperate with other 
similar world forums.  Nazarbayev also called on religious leaders 
to deal with problems of lack of food security, prevalence of 
disease, and insufficient cultural understanding, as well as to find 
new ways to counter terrorism and drugs and to create a non nuclear 
world.  Nazarbayev referred to Kazakhstan's renunciation of nuclear 
weapons and legacy of leadership in non-proliferation, and called on 
the international community to create a new international nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty (NPT) since "the current NPT is not able to 
prevent the existence of nuclear weapons." 
 
...AND KAZAKHSTAN AS AN EXAMPLE OF INTERCONFESSIONAL ACCORD 
 
4. (U) Nazarbayev emphasized that Kazakhstan's experience in 
preserving interconfessional accord had "proved to be one of the 
most successful in the post-Soviet space," with 3,200 mosques, 
temples, and churches co-existing peacefully on Kazakhstan's 
territory.  Nazarbayev announced that on the eve of the Congress, he 
had personally laid the cornerstone for the construction of a new 
mosque in Astana which is expected to house 5,000 worshippers and 
thus be the largest mosque in Central Asia.  Construction of a large 
Orthodox Church will be completed next year, Nazarbayev added.  He 
argued that his government's establishment of an International 
Center for Cultures and Religions and a Fund for Islamic Culture and 
Education, as well as his government's call for the United Nations 
to declare 2010 a "Year of Rapprochement of Cultures,"  gave 
Kazakhstan "full credibility" to preside as chairman of the OSCE in 
2010 and of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 
2011. 
 
PERES CALLS FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE WITH ARAB LEADERS 
 
5. (U) In his remarks to the Congress, Israeli President Shimon 
Peres urged the leaders of Arab countries to join Israel in 
 
ASTANA 00001179  002 OF 003 
 
 
negotiations for peace in the Middle East.  "Here, from this 
rostrum, I am addressing Saudi Arabian King Abdullah with a call to 
gather in Jerusa
lem, Riyadh or maybe to come to Kazakhstan or 
another country, and together with other Arab leaders we will be 
able to discuss your vision," Peres said.  Describing an Israeli 
project to develop enriched wheat, Peres said enriched wheat is 
better than enriched uranium, and it is better feed people than 
threaten them.  "We must separate religion from terror; the God of 
killers is not the God of believers," declared Peres, adding, "We 
must hold and encourage peace initiatives." 
 
IRANIAN DELEGATION WALKS OUT ON PERES 
 
6. (U) Iranian representatives walked out during Peres' keynote 
address. "We have come to listen to religious leaders," Iranian 
delegation member Mehdi Mostafavi told reporters," and Peres is not 
a religious leader."  (COMMENT:  According to media reports, Peres 
was not originally scheduled to attend the conference, but since he 
was in Kazakhstan on a state visit at the time, he received an 
invitation.  END COMMENT.)  During the Iranian delegation's 
departure from the central hall of the Palace of Peace and Harmony, 
one of Mostafavi's aides reportedly told reporters, "Israel won't 
attack us; we're not afraid of Israel or the United States." 
Speaking of Peres, Mostafavi's aide said, "(Peres) is a stealer of 
lands and a conqueror, and we're not willing to hear him.  Peres 
represents an abominable Zionist personality, and his place is not 
here." 
 
ISRAELI, EGYPTIAN REPRESENTATIVES DENOUNCE TERROR AND VIOLENCE 
 
7. (U) Israel's Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi, Yona Metzger, also called for 
peace among nations in his opening remarks.  He praised Kazakhstan 
for being a place where people of different faiths live in peace and 
harmony.  He specifically thanked Nazarbayev for his role in 
organizing the Congress, saying "you are the one leader who calls 
everyone and everyone comes."  Metzger held up a picture of abducted 
Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and appealed to all the religious 
leaders to pressure Hamas to allow a "person of faith" to visit the 
soldier.  Metzger said it was impossible to hold talks with 
Hezbollah or Hamas "because they have a quite different language of 
negotiation; it is a language of terror." He called on all religious 
leaders "not to use houses of prayer as instigators of terror." 
Mahmoud Hamdy Zakzouk, Egypt's Minister of Religious Endowments 
(Awqaf), also declared that "no religion can call for violence." 
Zakzouk used a vivid analogy, saying that if all of humankind is 
sharing a boat, we cannot make a hole in it, or we will all drown. 
 
LUTHERAN REPRESENTATIVE URGES MOVEMENT FROM WORDS TO ACTIONS 
 
8. (U) Reverend Ishmael Noko, General Secretary of the Lutheran 
World Federation, also applauded President Obama's outreach to the 
Muslim world through his Cairo speech, and expressed hope that 
religious leaders will imitate his approach and reach out to one 
another.  The real test of the "Astana Agenda," Noko declared, is 
"when the Third World Congress of Religions will make a difference 
in people's lives, and when religious leaders will move from 
speeches to actions."  Chief Mufti of Kazakhstan Absattar Derbisali, 
Grand Imam and Sheikh of Cairo's Al-Azhar Mosque Muhammed Sayyed 
Tantawi, President of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious 
Dialogue Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran, Vice President of the World 
Federation of Buddhists Hamba Lama Choyzhilzhavyn Dambazhav, and 
Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva Sergei 
Ordzhonikidze made the remaining opening speeches. 
 
NAZARBAYEV MEETS ONE-ON-ONE WITH SEVERAL WORLD LEADERS 
 
9. (U) President Nazarbayev met with many world religious leaders 
and guests of honor on the margins of the Congress.  Media reporting 
highlighted the following meetings: 
 
- Director-General of the United Nations (UN) Office at Geneva 
Sergei Ordzhonikidze told Nazarbayev that the UN "supports this very 
 
ASTANA 00001179  003 OF 003 
 
 
important initiative, which is necessary for the international 
community and is aimed at improving relations between people, 
religions and states." 
 
- Secretary General of the Saudi Arabia-based World Muslim League 
Abdullah bin Abdul Mohsin Al-Turki thanked Nazarbayev for his 
invitation to take part in the Congress, passed on greetings from 
Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, and expressed his intention to open a 
World Muslim League regional office in Kazakhstan next year. 
 
- Turkey's Minister of Work and Social Security Faruk Celik 
discussed further cooperation between Kazakhstan and Turkey on 
behalf of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan. 
 
- Former Norwegian Prime Minister and current head of the Oslo 
Centre for Peace and Human Rights Kjell Magne Bondevik said, "We are 
expecting a lot from Kazakhstan's OSCE presidency and have the same 
positions on non-proliferation." 
 
PARTICIPANTS DESCRIBE ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
10. (U) The Congress concluded with an elaborate outdoor ceremony 
featuring a short concert of traditional Kazakh and Western music, a 
closing address by President Nazarbayev, and children releasing 
doves.  Nazarbayev noted that a dramatic increase in the number of 
delegations over the previous congress -- from 17 to over 70 -- 
showed the forum's increase of authority.  He said the discussions 
at the Congress showed that all the spiritual leaders who gathered 
in Astana had shown their readiness for dialogue.  Reiterating his 
opening remarks, Nazarbayev emphasized that "spiritual beginnings 
must rank as one of the most important mechanisms for the 
reconstruction of the post-crisis world."  Nazarbayev reminded the 
participants that the Congress had taken place during a holy month 
in the Islamic calendar, and therefore that the decisions made by 
the participants would be "blessed." 
 
11. (SBU) PolOff met with several participants during the Congress, 
all of whom expressed gratitude to Kazakhstan and President 
Nazarbayev for holding the Congress. 
 
- Representing a newly opened synagogue in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Rabbi 
Torenheim praised Kazakhstan for its tolerance, and said he has not 
felt his community to be the target of any anti-Semitism, and 
applauded President Nazarbayev for holding the congress. 
 
- The Chairman of UNESCO's Executive Board, Olabiyi Babalola Joseph 
Yai, said the Congress was much improved over the previous one held 
in Astana in 2006, particularly because the number of delegations 
had increased dramatically.  Yai expressed hope the next Congress 
will be even more inclusive, especially in representation from 
female delegates and traditional religions.  "There were practically 
no women here at all, which is very disappointing," declared Yai 
noted that "aside from Shinto, almost no representatives from 
traditional religions participated." 
 
- Paul Pieper, a representative of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints, said not all delegates were as receptive to 
inter-religious dialogue during working-group sessions as opening 
speeches encouraged.  Nevertheless, Pieper told PolOff
 that the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints was pleased to have 
participated in the congress for the first time, and he hoped it 
would be invited to the next congress. 
 
HOAGLAND

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09ASTANA1178, KAZAKHSTAN: EXBS ADVISOR’S REPORTING CABLE (JUNE 2009)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1178 2009-07-13 10:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5685
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1178/01 1941048
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131048Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5791
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1746
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1815
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1113
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0774
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1214
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1297
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001178 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC: JFRIEDMAN, ACHURCH,JHARTSHORN, SROBINSON 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC-AMT: LSPRINGER, DLYONS 
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE: DFISCHER 
DEPT FOR SCA/RA: JSPILSBURY 
CBP/INA: SBAKER AND BPICKETT 
USDOE/NNSA: CWALKER, TPERRY, EDESCHLER 
DOC FOR DCREED 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT, BISHKEK, BAKU, DUSHANBE AND ASHGABAT FOR EXBS 
ADVISORS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MNUC KNNP KSTC KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  EXBS ADVISOR'S REPORTING CABLE (JUNE 2009) 
 
I.  BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS: 
 
1. On June 2, President Nazarbayev signed legislation ratifying 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement, officially 
known as the Amendment to the Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Destruction of 
Silo Launchers of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Emergency 
Response and the Prevention of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
This agreement was originally signed in Washington on December 13, 
2007. 
 
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
A.  SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS CONDUCTED 
 
2.  June 2-4, the Astana EXBS advisor participated in the 2009 EXBS 
Advisor Conference in Tbilisi, Georgia. 
 
3.  June 5-13, the Astana and Yerevan EXBS advisors visited the 
Gogavan, Bagratashen, and Bavea Ports of Entry, the Ayrum railway 
station, and the Gyumry airport in Armenia.  Introductory meetings 
were also held with representatives from the National Security 
Service, the State Revenue Committee, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority, the Export 
Control Commission, the Border Guard Service and Customs. 
 
4. June 19, the EXBS Program Manager participated in a meeting in 
Astana between Kazakhstan government officials and Michael Stafford 
of the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative. 
 
5. June 25-27, the EXBS program sponsored three Kazakhstani 
officials to attend the Tenth International Export Control 
Conference in Istanbul, Turkey.  Kazakhstan was represented by 
Marina Davidovskaya and Kuandyk Apanasov of the Customs Control 
Committee and 
Alina Moldasheva of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
 
B. TRAINING COURSES CONDUCTED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
6.  June 18-19, EXBS, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of 
Energy's International Nonproliferation Export Control Program 
(INECP), sponsored an Export Control Enterprise Outreach Workshop 
for Institutes and Research Organizations in Almaty.  This workshop 
involved 28 local compliance experts from Kazakhstani organizations. 
 Representatives from the Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy and 
the Korea Strategic Trade Institute participated in this workshop 
and gave a presentation on the Strategic Trade Information System 
(Yestrade). 
 
C. EQUIPMENT DELIVERED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
7.  None 
 
D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT STATUS UPDATE 
 
8.  July 16-17, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Overseas 
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) will 
conduct an EXBS funded two-day nonproliferation workshop in Almaty 
for Kazakhstani prosecutors, investigators, and judges. 
 
E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT CONTROLS, NONPROLIFERATION, OR 
RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
 
 
ASTANA 00001178  002 OF 002 
 
 
9.  Major Ospanov Daniyar, Chief of the Anti-Contraband Division of 
the Customs Control Committee, informed the EXBS advisor that the 
Customs Control Committee is making plans to transfer customs 
officials from the border with the Russian Federation to other 
customs posts in Kazakhstan as a result of the impending customs 
union with Russia and Belarus. 
 
F. CASPIAN SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
10.  Caspian Regional Maritime EXBS Advisor Lt. Michael Fisher has 
departed Baku, Azerbaijan, and responsibility for maritime issues 
related to Kazakhstan has been transferred to the Astana EXBS 
advisor. 
 
III. RED
 FLAG ISSUES. 
 
11.  None 
 
HOAGLAND

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