Monthly Archives: October 2009

09ASTANA1945, KAZAKHSTAN: NUCLEAR SUMMIT SHERPA AND SOUS-SHERPA

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1945.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1945 2009-10-30 09:57 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4597
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1945 3030957
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 300957Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6730
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2091
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1462
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2163
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1097
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0265
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0045
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0001
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0161
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0010
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0043
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0001
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0006
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 1048
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0206
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 0001
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0075
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0097
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0017
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0016
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1651
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1968
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0095

UNCLAS ASTANA 001945 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ENRG KNNP TRGY IAEA KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  NUCLEAR SUMMIT SHERPA AND SOUS-SHERPA 
 
REF:  STATE 56239 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) Per reftel, on October 28, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
informed Post that Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kairat Umarov 
will represent Kazakhstan as Sherpa at the Nuclear Security Summit 
Sherpa meeting in Tokyo on December 3.  Deputy Minister Umarov may 
be reached by phone at +7 7172 72 00 05 or +7 7172 72 04 56.  His 
assistant Azat Mametov may be reached by email at mametov@mid.kz. 
 
3.  (SBU) Timur Zhantikin, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee 
of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, will represent 
Kazakhstan as sous-Sherpa at the Nuclear Security Summit experts 
meeting in Washington on November 4-5.  Mr. Zhantikin may be reached 
by phone at +7 7172 503 071, or +7 7172 502 953, or by email at 
T.Zhantikin@kaec.kz. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1944, KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE RESPONSE ON GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1944.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1944 2009-10-30 07:17 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4442
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1944 3030717
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 300717Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6729
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2090
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1461
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2162
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1096
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2566
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2869
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1650
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1510
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS ASTANA 001944 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP IAEA KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEMARCHE RESPONSE ON GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY 
PARTNERSHIP 
 
REF: 106834 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) We delivered reftel points to the MFA via diplomatic note 
on October 20.  On October 29, the MFA informed us that our 
non-paper was forwarded to the Ministry of Energy and Minerals for 
consideration and did not yet have a response.  DFM Kairat Umarov 
told Deputy Assistant Secretary George Krol on October 29 that 
Kazakhstan welcomes the proposed changes to the Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1935, KAZAKHSTAN: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE PANDITH SPEAKS TO

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1935.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1935 2009-10-28 00:49 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1921
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1935/01 3010049
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 280049Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6723
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2088
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1459
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2160
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1094
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2564
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2867
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1648
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1508
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001935 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRMC, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV KISM KIRF OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE PANDITH SPEAKS TO 
STUDENTS, MEDIA 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 1912 
 (B) ASTANA 1618 
 
ASTANA 00001935  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: During her October 13 visit to Almaty, Special 
Representative to Muslim Communities (SRMC) Farah Pandith broke new 
ground by visiting Kazakhstan's only Islamic University and engaging 
the students in a lively discussion on Muslims in the United States. 
 Muskie and Flex alumni told SRMC Pandith that Islam is the new 
"fashion" among Kazakh youth even though most only attend mosques on 
high holidays.  Kazakh academics welcomed President Obama's new 
engagement with Muslim communities and highlighted the importance of 
education in the combat with extremism.  Kazakhstan's new Islamic TV 
channel and Kazakh-language print media positively covered SRMC 
Pandith's visit.  END SUMMARY. 
 
WARM WELCOME AT ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY 
 
3.  (SBU) As part of her visit to Kazakhstan October 12-13 (ref A), 
Special Representative to Muslim Communities (SRMC) Farah Pandith 
received a warm welcome at the Nur-Mubarakh University in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan's only Islamic University.  Meeting the first 
high-ranking U.S. government visitor to the university on its front 
steps, the director, Dr. Mahmoud Hegazi, and several professors 
whisked SRMC Pandith into the director's office where a full tea 
service awaited.  As two students served sweets, Dr. Hegazi told 
SRMC Pandith that Nur Mubarakh University, a bilateral 
Kazakhstani-Egyptian university established in 2001, offers 
undergraduate degrees in several social sciences and graduate 
degrees in Arabic studies.  Women are underrepresented, Dr. Hegazi 
asserted, at only a quarter of the university's 400 students.  With 
a curriculum taught in English, Russian, Kazakh, and Arabic, many of 
the university's graduates utilize their language skills to pursue 
careers in business, public relations, and the media. 
 
4.  (SBU) Dr. Hegazi claimed that interest in Islam and Islamic 
studies is growing, because many young Kazakhs are striving to 
"rediscover their roots."  He praised the Kazakhstani government for 
supporting educational institutions like his -- "You have to give 
people the information they seek, or someone else will."  He advised 
SRMC Pandith to "be cautious about generalizations.  Kazakhstan is 
Muslim, but different -- it does not mix religion and politics," he 
said.  (NOTE:  SRMC Pandith heard similar views from Muslim civil 
society leaders in Astana (ref A).  END NOTE.)  Dr. Hegazi expressed 
an interest in closer cooperation with the Embassy and asked 
specifically for a training program for the university's six English 
professors.  (NOTE:  Post's Regional English Language Officer will 
pursue this welcome opportunity and inquire about the placement of 
an English-language fellow.  END NOTE.) 
 
STUDENTS ASK ABOUT MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
5.  (SBU) After the meeting with Dr. Hegazi, SRMC Pandith spoke with 
a group of approximately 40 university students and several faculty 
members.  Equal numbers of female and male students sat on separate 
sides of the room, exchanging jokes and laughter across the aisle. 
They exemplified the difference between younger post-independence 
Kazakhstanis and the older Soviet-educated generation, with all 
female students wearing head coverings while the older faculty 
members refrained.  During the lively thirty-minute exchange, 
students peppered SRMC Pandith with questions in nearly-perfect 
English about Muslims in the United States.  "Why are you visiting 
Kazakhstan?"  "What kinds of Muslims live in the United States?" 
"Are there Muslim women's rights groups in the United States?" 
"What are your thoughts on girls wearing hijabs to school?"  The 
students, clearly eager to learn more about the United States, 
continued to launch questions as Dr. Hegazi brought the meeting to a 
close. 
 
ALUMNI SPEAK ON THE "FASHION" OF ISLAM 
 
6.  (SBU) Several alumni of Flex and Muskie programs called Islam 
the "new fashion" among educated Kazakh youth, with most only 
 
ASTANA 00001935  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
attending mosques for high holidays, "like Christmas for 
Christians."  One participant asserted that the government's secret 
services (i.e. the Committee for National Security, KNB) remain 
"largely ignorant" of different teachings within Islam and tend to 
treat all "non-traditional" Muslims as extremist threats.  All 
agreed about the rarity of religious extremist i
deology in 
Kazakhstan.  They ventured, however, that the growing divide between 
urban and rural income levels, and falling standards of education, 
could make the rural, primarily Kazakh, youth more susceptible to 
extremist views. 
 
ACADEMICS WELCOME CAIRO SPEECH 
 
7.  (SBU) At a round-table with leading Kazakh academics and 
journalists from Kazakh-language newspapers, SRMC Pandith 
highlighted her office's mission to implement President Obama's 
vision articulated in his Cairo speech.  Marat Tokashbeyev, the 
Editor-in-Chief of "President Zhane Khalyk" (The President and the 
People) Kazakh-language newspaper told SRMC Pandith, "We Muslims 
rejoiced at the Cairo speech."  He asserted that the existing 
"friction" between the West and the Muslim world stems from the 
"West's unabashed support for Israel" and asked whether President 
Obama planned to change that policy.  SRMC Pandith objected to his 
thesis, responding that the true root issue is "the use of religion 
for political purposes."  Political scientist Murtaza Bulatay 
agreed, adding that all Muslim countries must adopt "the universal 
principles of Enlightenment."  Mukhametzhan Tazabekov, director of 
the new Islamic television channel Assyl Arna, stressed that 
education, "like the one my channel is providing," is a key tool in 
the fight against extremism. 
 
MEDIA OUTREACH 
 
8.  (SBU) SRMC Pandith held a short on-the-record 
question-and-answer session with journalists at the round-table. 
Much like the students at Islamic University, the journalists posed 
numerous questions about Muslims in the United States, the role of 
the government in regulating religion, and SRMC Pandith's strategy 
for implementation of President Obama's vision.  SRMC Pandith also 
gave an exclusive television interview to the Assyl Arna channel. 
The subsequent, largely positive, press coverage included several 
newspapers' highlighting the warming relations between the United 
States and Muslim world and quotations from SRMC Pandith on 
extremism, Muslim life in the United States, and the purpose of her 
office. 
 
9.  (SBU) COMMENT:  President Obama's Cairo speech clearly 
reverberated widely among the Kazakhstani Muslims.  We held several 
well-attended events on the occasion, and Muslim community leaders 
and Kazakh-language press positively responded to the Ambassador's 
Iftaar dinner (ref B).  SRMC Pandith's outreach to students and 
community leaders built on this momentum, furthered our connection 
with Kazakhstan's growing population of young, observant, 
Kazakh-speaking Muslims, and started to respond to their intense 
curiosity about life in the United States.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1921, KAZAKHSTAN: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE PANDITH HEARS FROM

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1921.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1921 2009-10-27 04:39 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0849
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1921/01 3000439
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 270439Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6708
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2086
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1457
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2158
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1092
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2562
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2865
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1646
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1506
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001921 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRMC, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV KISL KIRF OIC OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE PANDITH HEARS FROM 
NGOS, GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 1179 
 (B) ASTANA 0260 
 
ASTANA 00001921  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  During her first overseas trip as Special 
Representative to Muslim Communities, Farah Pandith visited 
Kazakhstan October 12-13.  In Astana, Muslim civil society leaders 
told her that Kazakhs are "a different kind of Muslim" whose nomadic 
history bred a tradition of tolerance and equalQy.  In their view, 
Islam is enjoying a renaissance in Kazakhstan, and the government 
encourages this re-birth while keeping "strong control" over the 
influence of extremist ideology.  MFA's Deputy Foreign Minister 
Yermekbayev noted Kazakhstan's upcoming chairmanship of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the 
subsequent Chairmanship of the Organization for the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), stressing that Kazakhstan welcomes close 
cooperation with the United States on the agendas for both 
chairmanships.  The director of the Center for International 
Cultures and Religions briefed SRMC Pandith on Kazakhstan's 
tri-annual Congress of Traditional and World Religions, and she 
visited the Astana Nury Mosque and Madrassa.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
"WE ARE A DIFFERENT KIND OF MUSLIM" 
 
3.  (SBU) The DCM hosted on October 12 a lively lunch for SRMC 
Pandith with Muslim civil-society leaders, which included Mazhilis 
member Aigul Solovyova, the head of the NGO Women Entrepreneurs 
Union Meruert Kazbekova, the chair of the NGO Muslim Women's League 
Klara Yerzhanova, and Islam Zhussip from the Atameken public 
association.  Guests freely exchanged views on the Kazakhs' Muslim 
identity and the future of Islam in Kazakhstan.  SRMC Pandith told 
the participants that her office was created to implement President 
Obama's vision as articulated in his Cairo speech -- a new approach 
to engagement with the Muslim world based on "mutual respect and 
mutual interest."   Parliamentarian Solovyova said the SRMC's visit 
was a clear signal of President Obama's commitment to a new dialogue 
with Muslim communities. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Solovyova also noted that Kazakhs are a "different kind 
of Muslim," whose nomadic roots bred a culture of independence, free 
thinking, and gender equality.  Zhussup asserted that Kazakhs follow 
"easy Islam," one that adopts the values and teachings of the 
religion without the "sometimes onerous rites."  Kazbekova agreed, 
calling it "enlightened Islam."  According to Yerzhanova, Islam is 
enjoying a renaissance in Kazakhstan, with many young people 
exploring Muslim traditions.  She noted with some concern the choice 
of some younger women to put on the hijab, something that was "never 
part of our tradition."  She mentioned her NGO's outreach with high 
schools and universities to explain "the Kazakh Muslim tradition." 
 
 
5.  (SBU) After explaining that he worked for 20 years in the 
government's "special services," where his specialty was 
counter-terrorism, Zhussip praised the Kazakhstani government for 
its "strong control" of the religious sphere, which, in his view, 
averted tQsocial unrest and terrorism that "plague Kazakhstan's 
neighbors."  (NOTE: Although he never explicitly said it, it was 
clear from the conversation that Zhussip used to work for the 
Committee for National Security (KNB) and perhaps for its Soviet 
precursor, the KGB.  END NOTE.)  He said that the extremist group 
Hizb ut-Tahrir was present in Kazakhstan, most notably in the south 
of the country, but asserted that the government "special services" 
keep a close eye on the group.  Solovyova interjected that "a fine 
line" exists between political stability and the individual's 
freedom of religion.  She noted that she was a strong opponent of 
the restrictive draft religion law that the Constitutional Council 
rejected in February (ref A) because, in her view, the religion law 
"should be about freedoms, not restrictions." 
 
"BUILDING CANALS" 
 
6.  (SBU) Kazbekova said the Kazakhstani government is pursuing a 
 
ASTANA 00001921  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
"very smart policy" of encouraging the Kazakhs to explore their 
Muslim heritage by building new mosques and supporting the 
newly-inaugurated Islamic TV channel.  (NOTE: SRMC Pandith gave an 
interview to the Islamic channel in Almaty (septel).  END NOTE.) 
"Religion will always find its way to the surface, either as a 
spring or as a flood," she
said.  "The government is building 
canals." 
 
7.  (SBU) The participants expressed great eagerness to cooperate 
with the U.S. Embassy on future projects.  "We are ready to learn 
from you," said Zhussip, "and perhaps we have something to teach." 
He noted that he previously worked with at-risk youth, finding 
talented young people to recruit into government service.  Kazbekova 
said that she recently launched a project, supported by an Embassy 
Democracy Commission grant, to organize a leadership school for 
rural women.  She hopes to expand the project nationally.  SRMC 
Pandith welcomed the proposals for future cooperation, noting that 
the success of her office depends on close cooperation with 
grass-roots organizations and Embassies. 
 
MFA EAGER TO CONSULT ON OIC AGENDA 
 
8. (SBU) SRMC Pandith met with MFA's Deputy Foreign Minister Nurlan 
Yermekbayev, whose portfolio covers the OIC, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), and cooperation with Turkic 
countries.  Yermekbayev highlighted Kazakhstan's role in the 
promotion of inter-ethnic and inter-religious understanding, noting 
that tolerance will be one of the themes for its OSCE chairmanship. 
He told SRMC Pandith that the Kazakhstani government is eager to 
consult with the United States on the agendas for both its OSCE and 
OIC chairmanships.  SRMC Pandith recommended that the OSCE expand 
Muslim engagement, particularly among Muslim youth in Europe.  She 
suggested that as OIC chair, Kazakhstan could also encourage the OIC 
to take a greater interest in integration of European Muslim youth. 
Yermekbayev promised to seriously consider her proposals. 
 
CENTER STRESSES INTER-FAITH DIALOGUE 
 
9. (SBU) SRMC Pandith met with Dr. Aidar Abuov, the director of the 
International Center for Cultures and Religions.  The newly-created 
Center promotes Kazakhstan's model of inter-ethnic and 
inter-religious understanding and organizes the tri-annual Congress 
of Traditional and World Religions, an initiative of President 
Nazarbayev that brings together international religious and 
political leaders.  An expert on religions who recently returned 
from a conference in the United States on law and religion, Dr. 
Abuov told SRMC Pandith the most recent World Congress in July 
initiated the Center (ref B).  He said that attendance at the 
Congress is growing, and that the Center plans to expand the agenda 
of future Congresses to include side events on gender and youth. 
 
MOSQUE ATTENDANCE IS GROWING 
 
8. (SBU) SRMC Pandith also visited the Astana Nury Mosque, Astana's 
central mosque, where she met with Imam Kalizhan Zankoyev.  Zankoyev 
gave SRMC Pandith a tour of the mosque and the madrassa, giving her 
a short history of the building.  He said that mosque attendance is 
steadily growing as more young people seek to learn about their 
traditions.  "On Fridays, we are fully packed," he said, estimating 
that close to five thousand people come for Friday prayers. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1920, KAZAKHSTAN: PLANS FOR THE NATIONAL SULFUR STORAGE CENTER

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1920.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1920 2009-10-26 07:58 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9838
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1920/01 2990758
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 260758Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6705
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2083
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1454
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2155
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1089
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1643
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1503
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1961

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001920 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC, S/EEE, S/CIEA, OES/PCI 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET SENV KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  PLANS FOR THE NATIONAL SULFUR STORAGE CENTER 
 
REF:  A. 08 ASTANA 1368 
      B. ASTANA 0450 
 
ASTANA 00001920  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  As Kazakhstan continues to debate sulfur 
storage, the Caspiy Socially Responsible Corporation has contracted 
feasibility and technical studies for the government's planned 
National Sulfur Storage Center (NSSC) in Atyrau, which it will 
operate.  The Center will be able to provide up to 50 years of 
long-term sulfur storage, and oil companies will have to put their 
sulfur in the facility and pay storage fees.  The NSSC currently 
envisions a covered storage facility, and companies would be able to 
store sulfur temporarily and retrieve it later.  Tengizchevroil 
(TCO) believes that the NSSC is rife with problems and has formed 
its own working group to study this issue, concluding that uncovered 
above-ground sulfur storage (TCO's current storage method) has no 
significant negative impact on the environment.  TCO insists that 
the NSSC will need much more research because of the many legal, 
economic, and construction-related questions that still exist.  TCO 
is willing to pay for such a study and has formed several working 
groups to cover the legal, financial, construction, and ecological 
aspects of this storage plan.  Complicating this, TCO plans to 
liquidate all its current sulfur storage by 2017, and in subsequent 
years it will have no sulfur to put in the national storage center. 
With the Kashagan partners planning to re-inject 100% of sulfur gas 
back into the well to maintain pressure for oil production, this 
raises questions about potential users of the national storage 
center if there is no TCO sulfur left to store.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CASPIY DESIGNATED TOOPERATE THE NEW NATIONAL SULFUR STORAGE CENTER 
 
3.  (U) According to Caspiy Socially Responsible Corporation Lead 
Manager Assylbek Jakiyev and Senior Manager Lilia Balgimbayev, 
President Nazarbayev tasked the government with the creation of a 
national sulfur storage center.  Caspiy, a state-owned enterprise, 
has formed a working group consisting of itself, Tengizchevroil 
(TCO), AGIP (an Italian oil company responsible for the Kashagan 
offshore oil site), and the Kazakhstan Oil and Gas Institute (KOGI), 
to work out the concept of the NSSC.  Caspiy has contracted with 
KOGI to carry out phase one of this project, which consists of the 
preparation of the Center's technical requirements and a feasibility 
study of several aspects of the Center, including its location and 
capacity.  KOGI has not yet completed phase one.  In the second 
phase, KOGI will prepare design documents outlining all the 
technical aspects of the NSSC.  Public hearings to obtain citizen 
input will follow, and then the government will start construction. 
After completion of NSSC, Caspiy will operate it, and oil companies 
(e.g., TCO and AGIP) will put their sulfur in the NSSC and pay 
storage fees. 
 
4.  (U) Balgimbayev criticized the oil companies' current open 
storage methods (e.g. TCO), saying that they permit the wind to 
carry sulfuric dust to surrounding communities and allow residual 
gases to escape into the atmosphere.  She said the NSSC will be 
profitable, environmentally safe, and economically feasible.  The 
Center will be able to provide up to 50 years of long-term storage, 
have a monitoring system, minimize the spread of sulfur dust that 
now occurs, be located higher than TCO's current storage sites to 
ensure safety in the event of rising Caspian sea waters, and prevent 
the dissemination of sulfur gases now being emitted from the open 
sites. 
 
5.  (U) Balgimbayev said the Center's conceptual development is now 
97% complete, and the feasibility study for the site's construction 
is now 72% finished.  The preliminary environmental impact 
assessment study is 50% complete, and the environmental survey of 
the site and its suitability is now 90% done. 
 
6.  (U) According to Balgimbayev, the NSSC will be a covered storage 
facility consisting of covered sulfur storage in blocks with covers 
and/or reinforced concrete panels.  The Center will use heated 
 
ASTANA 00001920  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
pipelines to transfer liquid sulfur to the storage facility, she 
said, and will use rail transport to move brimstone sulfur. 
Companies would be able to store sulfur
 temporarily and then 
retrieve it later, thereby retaining ownership of the sulfur, or 
they could relinquish ownership to the government. 
 
THROWN OUT OF THE OFFICE:  IS SOMETHING FISHY HERE? 
 
7.  (SBU) So far, so good.  But then the head of the Atyrau Caspiy 
Office, Sagyndyk Lukpanov, entered and said that Caspiy cannot 
continue to discuss this matter "without the approval of the 
Akimat," given that the U.S. Embassy is "such a serious 
organization."  And just like that, the meeting ended.  Outside, we 
began to suspect that Lukpanov did not want us to pry too deeply 
into matters connected with the storage center.  We started to 
speculate that Caspiy relied on the connections of its Aktau Central 
Office Head Bolat Palymbetov as former Deputy Akim of the Atyrau 
Region, Deputy Minister of Economy and Trade, and Deputy Minister of 
Economics and Budget Planning, to obtain this potentially lucrative 
contract, especially given its controversial status.  (NOTE:  Just 
one day after we were essentially thrown out of Caspiy's Atyrau 
office, Jakiyev contacted us to say that Caspiy's Head Office is 
eager to meet with us at our earliest convenience.  It appears that 
Caspiy's main headquarters was not pleased with Lukpanov's decision 
to eject a U.S. diplomat.  END NOTE.) 
 
8.  (SBU) To obtain another perspective on the NSSC, we subsequently 
contacted AGIP.  The Atyrau office representative Walter Rizzi 
agreed that this was a sensitive topic and would only talk about it 
in person during our next trip to Atyrau.  AGIP's recently 
restructured entity, the North Caspian Operating Company's (NCOC) 
Astana office, also politely declined to meet, because the person 
responsible for this issue was relatively new in the job. 
 
NO SURPRISE:  TENGIZCHEVROIL DISLIKES THE NATIONAL STORAGE PLAN 
 
9.  (SBU) However, Tengizchevrooil (TCO) Astana Office Deputy 
General Manager Rzabek Artygaliev was eager to explain the potential 
problems of the proposed NSSC, which he alleged was the brainchild 
of former KuzMunaiGas President Burkitbayev.  (NOTE:  Serik 
Burkitbayev, also former advisor to President Nazarbayev and 
president of KOGI, was arrested in 2008 for embezzling $16 million 
and sentenced to six years in prison.  He was also suspected of 
supplying Rakhat Aliyev, Nazarbayev's exiled former son-in-law, with 
an eavesdropping device used to spy on high-ranking Kazakhstani 
officials.  END COMMENT.)  TCO and several other Kazakhstani 
oil-related companies and institutes, along with Alberta Sulfur 
Research Ltd. and Moscow State University, formed their own council 
to study this question, and concluded that uncovered, above-ground 
sulfur storage (TCO's current storage method for eight million tons 
of granulated sulfur) has no significant negative impact on the 
environment.  For this reason, TCO has not agreed to the national 
storage plan.  He added that Caspiy, to which the government has 
awarded the contract to manage the storage facility, is a 100% 
government enterprise, and that KOGI is Caspiy's subcontractor 
carrying out the government's own studies on the center. 
 
10.  (U) Artygaliev said the government instructed TCO to 
participate in the NSSC, and TCO agreed.  However, before TCO 
actually uses the facility, it must have a well-developed concept 
and evaluation of this plan because of numerous pending legal, 
economic, and construction-related questions, which will require 
considerable research.  He said TCO is willing to pay for such a 
study and has formed several working groups to cover the legal, 
financial, construction, and ecological aspects of this storage 
plan.  Some remaining thorny questions include the facility's method 
of sulfur storage (above ground, covered, or underground), legal 
status of this "national storage facility," and its impact on TCO's 
own foundation agreement with Kazakhstan. 
 
11.  (U) In addition, complicating these issues, Artygaliev said 
that TCO plans to liquidate all its current sulfur storage by 2017. 
 
ASTANA 00001920  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
In subsequent years, it will have no sulfur to put in the national 
storage center.  In fact, he asserted that TCO has already 
liquidated six of its nine pads of sulfur (approximately six million 
tons out of almost nine million tons of accumulated sulfur).  He 
highlighted that this fact poses a serious question to the 
government about the potential users of the national storage center 
if no TCO sulfur remains to store.  He acknowledged that Kashagan 
and AGIP may use it in the distant future, but he could not comment 
on their plans. 
 
12.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Because Nazarbayev issued the decree, the 
government remains intent on NSSC construction in spite of TCO 
objections.  Caspiy and local Akimats appear to view this project as 
a very large, future cash cow, especially once Kashagan production 
comes online.  Acknowledging the importance of sulfur management, 
the United States, Canada, and UK, along with Shell and TCO, 
sponsored a conference in Astana on September 21.  The event sought 
to identify ways to improve the legislative framework for the 
storage and treatment of sulfur, change the image of sulfur from a 
hazardous waste to a valuable product, and promote the use of sulfur 
in industrial applications, such as fertilizers, road construction, 
and uranium mining.  Shell recently reported that the conference has 
informed ongoing discussions about the construction of early 
sulfur-handling facilities for Kashagan.  This evolving situation 
merits observation due to its potential impact on U.S. interests. 
END COMMENT.

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1919, KAZAKHSTAN: MEDIA REACTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1919.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1919 2009-10-23 10:34 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8239
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1919/01 2961034
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231034Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6703
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2081
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2153
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1452
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1087
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1641
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1501
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2560
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2863
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1959

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001919 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KPAO KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  MEDIA REACTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST 
YEVGENIY ZHOVTIS' USUCCESSFUL APPEAL 
 
ASTANA 00001919  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
REFTEL:  ASTANA 1898 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  On October 20, an Almaty regional court upheld the 
conviction of prominent Kazakhstani human rights activist Yevgeniy 
Zhovtis on charges of vehicular manslaughter (reftel).  Most major 
pro-government and government-controlled news outlets did not report 
the story.  Notable among those that did cover the court's decision, 
pro-government "Astana TV" reported not only on the case but on the 
international observers at the appeals hearing and subsequent 
international reaction.  Some non-government outlets, such as the 
"Kazakhstan Today" news service and independent "Vremya" newspaper, 
quoted Zhovtis' lawyer and other dissenting voices, including 
criticism of the court proceedings lodged by international groups 
like Freedom House.  More progressive and opposition outlets covered 
the story heavily and alleged government pressure on both the 
judicial process and on the supporters of Zhovtis.  Almost all of 
the independent voices in Kazakhstan's press published or quoted 
from the U.S. Embassy's statement on the court's decision, the text 
of which was included in reftel.  END SUMMARY. 
 
VOICES IN THE WILDERNESS 
2.   The major government-owned television stations did not report 
on the Zhovtis appeal.  However, pro-government "Astana TV" and 
independent, popular "KTK" not only reported the case, but also 
included information sympathetic to Zhovtis, such as his apology to 
the victim's family and his financial support for the victim's 
family.  "Astana TV" also mentioned that the case was drawing public 
attention in Kazakhstan and abroad, and "some international and 
Kazakhstani organizations have already made statements in support of 
Zhovtis."  Almaty's independent "Tan TV" also reported on the case, 
mentioning many of the pro-Zhovtis facts noted above, and pointed 
out that the government had decided to change the penal colony 
assignment for Zhovtis from a camp located near Astana to one near 
Ust-Kamenogorsk, isolated far from either the political or media 
capitals of Kazakhstan. 
"I DO NOT BELIEVE IN MY COUNTRY" 
 
3.  Like their broadcast brethren, the major government print 
dailies ignored the Zhovtis appeal completely.  It was left to the 
independent, Russian-language newspaper "Vremya" to report the 
outcome of the appeal.  "Vremya" focused on the drama surrounding 
the trial, mentioning that many journalists, human rights activists, 
politicians, and representatives of foreign embassies and 
international organizations came to the courthouse.  The author 
observed that "the police didn't let Zhovtis supporters place 
posters on their bus, calling it an unsanctioned activity, and half 
of the journalists on hand were not allowed to enter the court." 
The author also sought comment from notable observers.  "When we saw 
that Zhovtis was not present in the courtroom, it was clear that 
nobody would change the previous decision," said Bolat Abilov, 
leader of the Azat Party.  Zhemis Turmagambetova, director of the 
Charter for Human Rights, lamented, "It is sad and painful that we 
could not save our colleague from imprisonment.  I do not believe in 
my country." 
 
4.  The independent Kazakhstani news agencies, "Kazakhstan Today" 
and "Interfax," both reported the story.  "Kazakhstan Today" cited 
Zhovtis' lawyer, Vitaly Voronov, who questioned the original judge's 
decision.  "It is obvious that [the previous] sentence is illegal, 
groundless, and unfair.  The decision had already been made before 
the hearing, because the judge took only 15 minutes in the jury room 
and came out with 4-5 pages of documents, which would have been 
impossible to write up in such a short period of time," said 
Voronov.  "Interfax" reported Freedom House's criticism of the 
decision. 
 
A LONG AND WINDING ROAD 
 
5.  The opposition media expressed outrage about the verdict and 
focused on allegations of pressure brought to bear on Zhovtis' 
defenders by the authorities.  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's 
 
ASTANA 00001919  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
"Radio Azzatyq" quoted the director of Human Rights Charter, Zhemis 
Turmagambetova, who complained "The (appellate judge) didn't take 
into consideration mitigating circumstances.  He didn't take into 
account that the mother of the victim came to the court and said, 'I 
forgive him.'  He didn't take into consideration [Zhovtis'] 
financial compensation (to the family)."  Vyacheslav Abramov, 
director of the MediaNet NGO, re
marked that the authorities had only 
provided a very small courtroom, resulting in just 30 of the 100 
observers being able to attend the trial. 
 
6.  Several independent outlets reported on the difficult journey 
experienced by a group of Zhovtis supporters on their way to the 
courthouse on the day of the trial.  "Radio Azzatyq" reported, "The 
motorcade of Zhovtis' supporters experienced several obstacles on 
its way from Almaty to Taldykorgan," pointing out numerous road 
police checks and "blockages due to road incidents."  Independent 
Internet newspaper "Zona.kz" chronicled the commute of Roza 
Akylbekova, acting director of Zhovtis' Human Rights Bureau, who 
took the victim's mother to the trial.  Suggesting that the 
travelers "faced obstacles on their way to Taldykorgan (the trial 
site) created by law enforcement officials," the author asserts that 
"they had to overcome pressure from people who were not interested 
in their attendance at the trial, a car accident, and an attempt at 
forced detainment, among other things." 
 
7.  Centrist weekly "Panorama" pointed out that Zhovtis' supporters 
are all convinced that the case is really just a government attack 
on Zhovtis.  Independent journalist Sergei Duvanov accuses the 
government of having a secret video of the accident that it is using 
to pressure the victim's family.  The author also noted that 
Zhovtis' lawyer said that he would recommend that his client not 
appeal again in Kazakhstan, but instead address the UN Human Rights 
Committee. 
 
U.S. EMBASSY STATEMENT 
 
8.  The U.S. Embassy statement on the appellate decision (reftel) 
was widely cited by media outlets that chose to cover the story. 
The news services quoted from it liberally, while the newspapers and 
television stations simply noted, "the U.S. Embassy has already 
expressed concern about the decision." 
 
9.  COMMENT:  Our Almaty PAO officer who attended the appeal 
observed that, after the decision had been handed down, the 
observers who had been able to squeeze into the courtroom came 
outside where Zhovtis supporters were beginning a press conference. 
A ring of 52 police officers in riot gear circled the crowd and 
gently but firmly moved the supporters away from the courthouse, 
leaving no one in doubt as to who was in charge.  END COMMENT 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1916, KAZAKHSTAN: NGOS GIVE GOVERNMENT A PASSING GRADE AT HDIM

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1916.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1916 2009-10-22 09:38 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7004
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1916/01 2950938
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220938Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6700
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2079
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1450
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2150
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1085
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2558
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2861
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1639
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1499
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001916 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  NGOS GIVE GOVERNMENT A PASSING GRADE AT HDIM 
 
REF: ASTANA 1903 
 
ASTANA 00001916  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  We interviewed several outspoken NGO participants 
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation and Security (OSCE) 
Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in Warsaw to check 
reports that members of the Kazakhstani delegation might have 
intimidated or threatened NGO participants.  Our interlocutors told 
us that, on the contrary, they were positively impressed with the 
professionalism and openness of the delegation.  Most gave 
delegation head Ambassador Dzharbusynova high marks for the 
professional and even-handed way she dealt with the NGOs.  Our 
contacts noted that two members of the delegation did berate 
participants for fostering "a bad image" of Kazakhstan, but no one 
among the NGO community takes these threats seriously.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
"ON THEIR BEST BEHAVIOR" 
 
3. (SBU) Having heard several negative reports about the interaction 
between Kazakhstan's official delegation and NGOs at the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Human 
Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in Warsaw, we interviewed 
several HDIM participants to gather their views on the behavior of 
the Kazakhstani delegation and on the event as a whole.  In general, 
our NGO interlocutors -- most of whom are veteran HDIM participants 
and never shy about criticizing the Kazakhstani government to anyone 
who will listen -- were favorably impressed with how the delegation 
comported itself.  Almaty Helsinki Committee's Ninel Fokina told us 
that the Kazakhstanis were "particularly open, attentive, and even 
friendly," despite the fact that Kazakhstan faced intense criticism 
and scrutiny because of its upcoming OSCE Chairmanship.  Fokina said 
some of the debates got heated, but "not out of the ordinary," and 
in general the exchange of opinions was "civilized."  We heard 
similar views for Freedom House's country director Iva Dobichina, 
Human Rights Bureau's deputy director Roza Akylbekova, and Astana 
Human Rights Bureau's Anara Ibrayeva, all of whom told us that the 
delegation was "on their best behavior" -- cordial and professional, 
and present at every side-event organized by the NGOs. 
 
HIGH MARKS FOR DZHARBUSYNOVA 
 
4. (SBU) Our interlocutors specifically praised Ambassador Madina 
Dzharbusynova, the head of the delegation, for her equanimity and 
professionalism in dealing with the NGOs at all the side-events and 
presentations.  Human Rights Bureau's Akylbekova, who was the 
organizer of the protest during the opening plenary when a large 
group of civil society activists with "Fair Trial for Zhovtis" 
t-shirts stood up in the middle of Dzharbusynova's speech, said 
Dzharbusynova was "a true diplomat," keeping her cool both during 
and after the speech.  Akylbekova apparently spoke to Dzharbusynova, 
whom she knows personally, after the protest action "to assure her 
our action was not aimed at her personally, but at the government's 
policy," and Dzharbusynova was "polite and professional," telling 
Akylbekova that "you have your job to do, and we [the MFA] have 
ours."  Freedom House's Dobichina told us Dzharbusynova, and most 
other members of the delegation, were "very respectful" of the NGO 
participants, and Almaty Helsinki Committee's Fokina specifically 
credited Dzharbusynova for "making the delegation look decent." 
 
LOW MARKS FOR YERTYSBAYEV AND DOSZHAN 
 
5. (SBU) We specifically asked our interlocutors about reports that 
some delegation members threatened NGO participants with retribution 
for their negative statements about Kazakhstan.  Upon reflection, 
all pointed to two bad apples in the delegation -- Presidential 
Advisor Yermukhamet Yertysbayev (reftel) and Ardak Doszhan, the 
Chairman of the Religious Issues Committee (RIC) in the Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ).  Rozlana Taukina, the President of NGO Journalists in 
Trouble, told us Yertysbayev pulled her aside after her presentation 
on freedom of the media and asked her aggressively how she can "face 
returning to Kazakhstan" after saying such damaging things.  When 
asked whether she did, in fact, fear retribution, she shrugged her 
shoulders and asked "what can they do?" 
 
ASTANA 00001916  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Fokina and Akylbekova told us that RIC's Doszhan berated 
another NGO participant, Alexandr Klyushev, the President of the 
Association of Religious Associations of Kazakhstan, for 
participating in the Zhovtis protest.  Doszhan apparen
tly told 
Klyshev that "a priest should not participate in political actions" 
and said "we'll talk about this at home."  Fokina, who interacts 
with the RIC and Doszhan frequently on issues of religious freedom, 
dismissed the threat and told both Klyushev and us "not to take 
Doszhan too seriously." 
 
7. (SBU) When asked whether Dzharbusynova cut off NGO participants 
during side-events, Freedom House's Dobichina remembered one such 
instance, but said that the NGO representative had "veered far from 
the topic."  "I was glad Dzharbusynova brought us back on track," 
said Dobichina.  She underlined that on the whole, Dzharbusynova did 
a "very good job" of leading the delegation. 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT: It seems that, on the whole, the NGO participants 
came away with a favorable impression of how the Kazakhstani 
delegation conducted itself in Warsaw.  It is true that Yertysbayev 
and Doszhan comported themselves extremely poorly, and we are 
perplexed as to why they were sent to this high-profile forum.  As a 
rule, our interlocutors are not shy about criticizing the 
government, both at home and abroad, and they are not people who are 
easily intimidated.  We believe that they speak frankly and honestly 
with us, and we have no reason to suspect that this time is any 
different.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1915, KAZAKHSTAN: SIX MONTHS AFTER THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DECREE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1915.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1915 2009-10-22 09:11 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6970
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1915/01 2950911
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220911Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6696
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2075
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1446
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2146
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1081
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1635
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1495
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1954
RUEAWJL/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC 0032
RUEANQT/FINCEN VIENNA VA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 001915 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI KCRM KCOR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  SIX MONTHS AFTER THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DECREE 
 
ASTANA 00001915  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
REFTEL:  ASTANA 1773 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public internet. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The anti-corruption decree signed by President 
Nazarbayev six months ago tasked the government with drafting 
legislation to improve anti-corruption measures.  A series of 
high-profile corruption investigations may show the government's 
commitment to fighting corruption, but has also caused concerns in 
some quarters about law enforcement's ability to conduct effective 
investigations, while staying politically neutral and respectful of 
the rule of law.  Nevertheless, Kazakhstan used the International 
Anti-Corruption Conference in Astana September 16-18 as a platform 
to declare its commitment to fighting corruption.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CORRUPTION DECREE 
 
3. (SBU) President Nazarbayev issued a decree on April 22 directing 
the government to pursue a broad range of anti-corruption measures. 
The decree is meant to give both government officials and those 
working for state-controlled companies personal responsibility for 
preventing corruption.  The decree also foresees disciplinary action 
against those who do not report corruption.  The decree also directs 
the government to encourage citizens to report corruption. 
 
4. (SBU) As part of corruption-prevention measures, officials will 
be required to report their property holdings while employed by the 
government and for a period following their service if the value of 
the property exceeds their official income.  Law-enforcement 
agencies will conduct undercover operations within ministries to 
root out corruption at all levels.  All government agencies will 
have to maintain databases of personal and professional information 
on all employees, including any investigations and disciplinary 
actions.  In an effort to curb corporate corruption, government 
agencies will be required to identify positions with a high 
corruption risk and to develop special applicant requirements. 
 
5. (U) One of the most important aspects of the decree is an initial 
attempt to eliminate conflicts of interests within the government. 
Kazakhstani law previously had no prohibition on conflicts of 
interest, and government procurement procedures had no built-in 
protections.  The decree establishes a period of time that 
government officials cannot work for commercial companies over which 
their ministries or agencies had oversight.  The Presidential 
Commission on Corruption must now analyze and monitor corruption, as 
well as develop anti-corruption measures.  Legislation to implement 
the decree remains in draft at the Ministry of Justice. 
 
6. (U) This decree is not the only anti-corruption initiative.  A 
working group in the Parliament is studying legislation drafted by 
the Financial Police to increase its ability to fight corruption. 
The legislation would require confiscation of property -- in 
addition to imprisonment -- of government officials convicted of 
embezzlement, operation of shell companies, or other abuses of 
power.  The legislation would also add fraud committed by state 
officials to the list of corrupt practices due to corrupt officials' 
claims in some cases that they committed fraud when accepting 
bribes, because they could not deliver on promises made in exchange 
for the bribe.  The legislation will also provide criminal liability 
for legal entities. 
 
7. (U) Furthermore, the decree addresses the need to strengthen 
anti-corruption measures within law enforcement.  Unified selection 
criteria for law-enforcement job applicants will be developed 
similar to the eligibility requirements for other government 
positions.  Newly hired officers will be required to serve a 
probationary period.  In recognition of the need for higher salaries 
to prevent law enforcement corruption, officers will receive raises 
across the board. 
 
ASTANA 00001915  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
 
8. (U) The Financial Police will have concurrent jurisdiction with 
the Committee for National Security (KNB) for corruption and abuse 
of power cases against political appointees.  However, the Financial 
Police will have sole jurisdiction in all cases against other 
governmental employees. 
 
RESPONSES TO THE DEC
REE 
 
9. (U) Soon after the decree, the Prosecutor General's Office (PGO) 
chaired a Coordination Council meeting of all law-enforcement 
agencies.  Participants decided to create a Secretariat with a 
representative from each law-enforcement agency and to ensure that 
the Coordination Council takes an active role in coordinating 
high-profile corruption investigations.  The PGO announced that the 
decree not only addresses the current problems of frequent 
corruption cases, but also will allow for a systematic approach to 
combat corruption.  The PGO also stressed the need for civil 
society, the government, and mass media to unite in their efforts. 
Additionally, the PGO stated that it is increasing its role in 
protecting the rights of citizens by reviewing all recent court 
decisions to ensure fair treatment of defendants and appropriate 
sentencing. 
 
10. (U) The Chairman of the Financial Police expressed his pleasure 
with the decree, highlighting the fact that his agency will now have 
more work.  This development marks a sharp change from November 2008 
when President Nazarbayev attacked the anti-corruption work of law 
enforcement and proposed the creation of a new anti-corruption force 
in a speech at a seminar.  Despite the subsequent rumors about the 
future of the Financial Police, the expansion of its jurisdiction 
and the reported satisfaction of the President with the intensity of 
its recent anti-corruption efforts indicate that the Financial 
Police has little to worry about. 
 
STATISTICS AND ONGOING CORRUPTION CASES 
 
11. (SBU) During the first nine months of 2009, the Financial Police 
investigated 1,303 cases, which is a 4.8% increase over the same 
period last year.  Of those investigations, 356 were bribery cases, 
a 39.5% increase (from 255 to 356).  The Financial Police's 
corruption investigations of high profile public officials include 
two Vice-Ministers and the Minister of Environmental Protection, two 
Deputy Chairmen of the Statistics Agency, the Chairman of the Water 
Resources Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture, and a 
Vice-Minister of Emergency Situations. 
 
12. (SBU) At the opening of an INL-funded FBI training course at the 
Financial Police Academy on October 12 (septel), Deputy Chairman of 
the Financial Police Andrey Lukin shed light on the most recent 
corruption investigations.  On October 2, Vice-Minister of Emergency 
Situations Ablai Sabdalin was arrested for conspiracy to provide a 
bribe.  During the investigation, the Financial Police used video 
surveillance for three months and gained the cooperation of the 
Ministry's Director of the Technical and Material Support 
Department, who was asked by the Vice-Minister to pay the bribes on 
his behalf.   The Director was placed in witness protection after 
the Vice-Minister's arrest. 
 
13. (U) Anatoliy Ryabtsev, Chairman of the Ministry of Agriculture's 
Water Resources Committee, is currently on trial for abuse of power, 
embezzlement, and bribery.  The investigation into Ryabtsev was 
jointly conducted by the Financial Police and KNB.  Ryabtsev pled 
guilty to only some of the KNB charges and not guilty to the 
Financial Police charges.  The Financial Police filed the bribery 
case after Ryabtsev attempted to pay officers $40,000 to close an 
embezzlement investigation. 
 
14. (U) On October 16, former Minister of Environmental Protection 
 
ASTANA 00001915  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
Nurlan Iskakov was sentenced to four years imprisonment for abuse of 
power.  He was found not guilty on charges of leading an organized 
criminal group, which made it impossible to prove related charges 
against two Vice-Ministers.  The Vice-Ministers were found guilty on 
charges of neglect of duty. 
 
RESULTS, BUT AT WHAT COST? 
 
15. (SBU) There has been, however, a public backlash against the 
Financial Police, who have been criticized for the poor quality of 
their investigations, use of weak evidence, and violations of legal 
procedures.  When pressured to enhance their results early on, the 
Financial Police only increased their operational tempo, without 
improving investigative methods.  In a recent high-profile case, the 
publisher of the opposition newspaper "Respublica" has accused the 
Financial Police of searching its offices and seizing property 
without a warrant during a libel case. 
 
16. (SBU) The KNB has also been criticized for its actions in the 
arrest of Kazatomprom Director Mukhtar Djakishev.  Djakishev's 
attorney and family have publicly accused the KNB of denying him his 
right to have an attorney and to communicate with his family. 
Independent mass media representatives have also complained of 
pressure from law-enforcement agencies, including the KNB. 
 
17. (SBU) The passage of the anti-corruption decree also increased 
the competition among law-enforcement agencies and has led to the 
arrest of law-enforcement officers, such as the KNB's arrest of the 
Chief of the Financial Police of the North Kazakshtan Oblast for 
soliciting a $120,000 bribe for not investigating a case.  Other 
negative consequences from increased competition include a 
disagreement between Financial Police and traffic police officers 
that led to a brawl in a restroom at the Department of Interior.  In 
order to resolve the issue, the Minister of Interior and Chairman of 
the Financial Police had to agree on the creation of a special 
interagency group.  The increased tempo has also caused some 
consternation throughout the government and public statements from 
all quarters.  Yerlan Karin, the Executive Secretary of the 
President's Nur Otan Party, complained about a plan to send KNB 
officers to KazAgro to oversee the use of $1 billion in state aid. 
Minister of Health Zhaksylyk Doskaliyev responded to complaints 
about doctors accepting "gratuities" by proposing to legalize the 
practice and provide separate cashiers in hospitals to collect 
gratuities from patients. 
 
ANTI-CORRUPTION CONFERENCE 
 
18. (SBU) An international anti-corruption conference was held in 
Astana September 16-18, 2009.  The conference was extremely 
important for the Financial Police to demonstrate its progress and 
lead role in the fight against corruption.  The Financial Police 
noted that the Government of Kazakhstan's plans to ratify the "Civil 
Law Convention on Corruption," "Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption," and the Council of Europe's "Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on 
the Financing of Terrorism."  Chairman of the Financial Police 
Kairat Kozhamzharov bragged about the 100% conviction rate of the 
many high-level government officials arrested.  (NOTE:  The event 
was political in nature with all participants confirming their 
commitments to good governance and fighting corruption and no 
agreement on effective measures against corruption. END NOTE.) 
 &#x000A
;A CAUTIONARY TALE 
 
19.  (SBU) Transitioning from a post-Soviet culture of corruption to 
institutionalized equality under rule of law will be an uphill 
battle.  Things did not work out well for Alpamys Bekturganov, one 
of the first whistle-blowers, who was in prison two months after 
accusing his boss, Akim (governor) of the Western Kazakhstan Oblast 
 
ASTANA 00001915  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
Baktykozha Izmukhambetov.  Bekturganov, an advisor the Akim, 
referred to the anti-corruption decree when he publicly accused 
Izmukhambetov of nepotism and corruption crimes.  Law-enforcement 
agencies, including the Committee for National Security (KNB), 
accepted evidence but did not file charges.  Bekturganov was fired, 
taken to court by Izmukhambetov for slander, and sentenced to one 
year in prison.  He was also sentenced to an additional three years 
for embezzlement of $800 used to publish a book. 
 
20. (SBU) COMMENT:  Competing theories exist about the recent 
increase in anti-corruption activities.  From one side, it appears 
that the Financial Police reacted to the President's criticism and 
are attempting to prove their value.  However, many theorize that 
some in the government are using the Financial Police and KNB as a 
weapon in an internal political battle.  At the same time, they note 
the efficacy of this weapon due to the alleged pervasiveness of 
corrupt practices (reftel).  In truth, there might be "a little from 
column A, and a little from column B."  Despite these problems, INL 
has established a good working relationship with both the Financial 
Police and its Academy and is providing technical assistance to 
increase its professionalism and improve its ability to fight money 
laundering and terrorism financing while respecting the rule of law. 
 END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1914, KAZAKHSTAN: “BIG FRIEND” MEDDLES AGAINST U.S.

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1914.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1914 2009-10-22 07:07 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6784
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1914/01 2950707
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220707Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6694
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 2073
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1444
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1079
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2144
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1633
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1493
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2859
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2556

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001914 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, EUR/RPM, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM MARR KDEM OSCE RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  "BIG FRIEND" MEDDLES AGAINST U.S. 
INTERESTS 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 1899 
     B. ASTANA 1897 
     C. ASTANA 1772 
     D. ASTANA 1512 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov 
suggested on October 21 that disinformation from Russian 
intelligence played a role in Yevgeniy Zhovtis' conviction 
and prison sentence being upheld.  He also said that Russian 
intelligence is getting the word to President Nazarbayev that 
the United States has a secret deal to establish a new 
military base in Uzbekistan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) At the European Commission reception on October 21 to 
celebrate the 15th anniversary of relations with Kazakhstan, 
which the visiting OSCE Ambassadors' delegation also 
attended, I again pulled aside Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat 
Umarov to follow up on my conversation with him the previous 
evening (ref A) about the October 20 court decision upholding 
the conviction and four-year prison sentence of human rights 
advocate Yevgeniy Zhovtis (ref B).  I gave Umarov a heads-up 
copy of the statement the Embassy subsequently released at 
opening of business on October 22 (text in ref B, para 
eight).  He read it carefully and asked, "Can't you drop the 
reference to the government of Kazakhstan?"  I replied, "No. 
Period." 
 
3.  (C) I assured Umarov that I am doing my best to provide 
full-spectrum reporting to Washington to help manage this 
crisis.  Umarov said that he, too, had fully briefed State 
Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev on our 
conversation the night before.  Umarov said Saudabayev had 
been dismissive at first, but then had turned sober and said 
he would inform President Nazarbayev of the "strong U.S. 
view." 
 
A DEAL WITH UZBEKISTAN FOR A NEW U.S. MILITARY BASE? 
 
4.  (C) Umarov then interrupted our conversation about 
Zhovtis to press me to confirm -- "give me your word of 
honor" -- that the United States has not reached a secret 
agreement with Uzbekistan's President Islom Karimov to 
establish a new major U.S. military base at Navoi to replace 
Karshi-Khanabad.  I asked why he would pose this question 
again when I had already authoritatively shot it down with 
Saudabayev (ref C).  Umarov responded that the "Big Friend" 
(i.e., Russia) is pressing this report at every possible 
opportunity, saying they have "proof" that SCA Assistant 
Secretary Robert Blake had reached a secret agreement with 
Karimov during their recent meeting in Tashkent.  Umarov said 
the "Big Friend" is portraying it as evidence that the United 
States cannot be trusted when it comes to Kazakhstan's 
national interests. 
 
"BIG FRIEND" LINKS ZHOVTIS TO "COLOR REVOLUTION"? 
 
5.  (C) I returned the conversation to the Zhovtis affair, 
reminding Umarov that I had trusted Saudabayev who had 
advised me to "stand down and be quiet" and that a solution 
would be found in the appeal process (ref D).  Umarov 
confided that it was his understanding that a plan had indeed 
been considered, but that "Big Friend," in relation with "the 
liaison body" (i.e., Kazakhstan's Committee for National 
Security, KNB), had gotten the ear of the president that the 
United States wants to remove him from power, and has latched 
onto Zhovtis as the way to do so, portraying U.S. interest in 
Zhovtis as evidence that the United States is angling to 
stage a "color revolution" in Kazakhstan.  "They're stronger 
than we thought," Umarov lamented.  I told him that we, 
together, with the other progeressive elements around the 
president, must refute these views -- we must continue to be 
bedrock honest with each other, focused intently on truth and 
 
ASTANA 00001914  002 OF 002 
 
 
pragmatic reality. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1904, KAZAKHSTAN: KAZENERGY VERSUS KIOGE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1904.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1904 2009-10-22 00:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6507
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1904/01 2950048
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220048Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6685
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2071
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1442
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2142
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1077
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1631
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1952

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001904 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC, S/EEE, S/CIEA 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  KAZENERGY VERSUS KIOGE 
 
ASTANA 00001904  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  This fall, two major energy conferences in 
Kazakhstan clashed head-on.  On September 24-25, the KazEnergy 
business association, chaired by Timur Kulibayev, President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev's son-in-law, held its fourth annual Eurasian 
Energy Forum in Astana.  Just two weeks later, on October 7-8, the 
London-based ITECA Corporation held the 17th annual Kazakhstan 
International Oil and Gas Conference and Exhibition (KIOGE) in 
Almaty.  The close proximity of the two events forced frustrated 
energy executives to choose between a more elite, policy-oriented 
conference in the capital and the larger, more technical conference 
and exhibition in the former capital.  In the end, both conferences 
drew large crowds.  Though attendance declined from past years, the 
business community attended the KIOGE event in Almaty, but most 
government officials and senior executives chose to attend the 
KazEnergy conference in Astana, perhaps signaling the growing 
influence of Kulibayev.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PUTTING ON THE RITZ 
 
3.  (SBU) This year's KazEnergy Forum was headlined by Prime 
Minister Karim Masimov, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources 
Sauat Mynbayev, Kulibayev, and keynote speaker and former Chancellor 
of Germany Gerhard Schroeder.  Other notable participants included 
Rovnag Abdullayev, President of the State Oil Company of the 
Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), Columbia University professor Robert 
Legvold, and Martha Brill Olcott of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.  (NOTE:  Former Vice President Richard Cheney 
was expected to attend as well, but canceled at the last minute for 
personal reasons, sorely disappointing the conference organizers. 
END NOTE). 
 
4.  (SBU) More than 600 people paid $1,500 each to attend the 
two-day conference, and Tengizchevroil paid $200,000 for the 
privilege of sponsoring the event, which was held in the huge Palace 
of Independence conference center.  This year, for the first time, 
the KazEnergy conference also included an exhibition by 
international oil companies and oil service companies, which many 
participants saw as a shot across the bow at KIOGE.  KazEnergy week 
officially ended on Saturday, September 26, with an annual golf 
tournament sponsored by ExxonMobil, which Mynbayev and Kulibayev 
attended. 
 
THE KAZENERGY CHALLENGE 
 
5.  (SBU) Richard Fritz, Public Relations Manager for Agip 
Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company, told Energy Officer on 
September 24 that he expects the KazEnergy Forum to become more 
popular than KIOGE, because it has the ability to attract high-level 
political and business leaders.  "KIOGE is still an important venue 
for the oil service companies," he said, "but it's become more 
technical, and is less relevant" to the international oil companies 
(IOCs).  Carlos Lozano, Financial Director of Spain's Repsol, 
confided to Energy Officer that the representatives of many IOCs 
have become increasingly critical of KIOGE in recent years.  "They 
don't draw the big names anymore," he said, "and the focus is more 
technical.  Plus, the hotels in Almaty require 100% prepayment and a 
three- to four-night minimum stay at 'special' KIOGE rates.  It's a 
racket!"  Lozano also noted that KIOGE is managed by London-based 
ITECA Corporation, while KazEnergy is organized by a local company, 
Expo.kz, which responds to the government's call for increasing 
local content in goods and services. 
 
KIOGE ATTENDANCE DOWN 
 
6.  (SBU) With the notable exception of Deputy Secretary of Energy 
Daniel Poneman, the KIOGE conference did not draw as many headliners 
as KazEnergy, due in part to the arrival in Astana on October 6 of 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy.  The government was represented at 
KIOGE by Vice Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Lyazzat 
 
ASTANA 00001904  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
Kiinov and President of KazMunaiGas Kairgeldy Kabyldin.  Attendance 
at the KIOGE conference was comparable to last year (approximately 
800 people), but U.S. companies with booths at the exhibition told 
the DCM on October 7 that attendance was noticeably down from 
previous years, and that business was not as brisk. 
 
7.  (SBU) COMMENT:  This year, assisted by French President Nicholas 
Sarkozy's trip to Astana on t
he eve of KIOGE, might mark the turning 
point in the KazEnergy Forum's efforts to replace KIOGE as 
Kazakhstan's premiere energy event.  Whether or not Sarkozy's visit 
simply provided an excuse for government officials to tarnish the 
luster of KIOGE in favor of rising-star Kulibayev's event, most 
observers see the KazEnergy/KIOGE evolution as a continuation of the 
relocation of power to Astana -- following in the long line of 
energy companies who have moved their base of operations out of 
Almaty.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1903, KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR LETS LOOSE ON

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1903.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1903 2009-10-21 10:07 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5867
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1903/01 2941007
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211007Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6682
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2068
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1439
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1074
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2139
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2553
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2066
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2856
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1628
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1490

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001903 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR LETS LOOSE ON 
HDIM, ZHOVTIS CASE 
 
REF: ASTANA 1897 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On October 20, the DCM met with 
Presidential Advisor Yermukhamed Yertysbayev, who explained 
his views on the development of democracy in Kazakhstan, 
presidential power, and the Human Dimension Implementation 
Meeting (HDIM) in Warsaw, September 28-October 9. 
Yertysbayev also discussed the ongoing trial of human rights 
activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis, who was convicted of vehicular 
manslaughter and sentenced to four years in prison.  Just 
hours after the meeting with Yertysbayev, Zhovtis's appeal of 
the verdict was denied, and the original conviction was 
upheld.  Although Yertysbayev is known as a loose-cannon 
gadfly and is himself under a dark cloud in the current 
corruption clean-up campaign, he represents a line of 
thinking that persists in Kazakhstan.  With such a 
reputation, we remain perplexed why the government sent him 
to the HDIM in the first place.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 
 
2.  (C) Yertysbayev, who was outspoken and provocative during 
the one-hour meeting, is a senior advisor to President 
Nazarbayev on domestic political issues.  His portfolio 
includes parliamentary elections, independent media, 
political party development, independent labor unions, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil-society 
development.  According to Yertysbayev, the most pressing 
issue for Kazakhstan's democratic development is 
parliamentary election reform.  He cited Ukraine as an 
example of a country with a diverse, dynamic, 
democratically-elected parliament, and said Kazakhstan would 
benefit by having a parliament with "real dialogue and real 
opposition." 
 
3.  (C) Yertysbayev said a truly competitive parliament could 
help resolve the potentially explosive issue of presidential 
succession.  "If, heaven forbid, something were to happen to 
our president," he said, "we have no mechanism for solving 
political problems.  There would be no way to allocate power 
peacefully among the competing social groups.  Already, 
powerful elites from different clans are preparing to take 
power.  They are getting ready for a civil war."  Yertysbayev 
asserted that the merger of the National Social Democratic 
Party (NSDP) and the Azat (Freedom) Party will help to unify 
the voice of the opposition (septel).  He also said he 
expects the People's Assembly to announce on October 26 that 
it will call for parliamentary elections to be held within 
two months, on or about December 31.  According to 
Yertysbayev, if they did so, no one would go to the polls 
except for disciplined government bureaucrats, who would 
naturally vote for the President's party, Nur Otan.  "The 
opposition parties would stay at home, celebrating New Year's 
Eve," he joked.  (NOTE:  Rumblings about early elections are 
ever-present in Kazakhstan, especially in the run-up to its 
2010 OSCE Chairmanship.  However, those rumblings have 
recently intensified, especially after the above-mentioned 
party merger.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
WHAT HAPPENED IN WARSAW 
 
4.  (C) Yertysbayev said that Kazakhstan has ambitious, 
serious plans for 2010 when it will become Chairman of the 
Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). 
He said that during the HDIM in Warsaw last week, for 
example, the United States promised 
to assist Kazakhstan with a number of important initiatives 
in the areas of counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics. 
 
ASTANA 00001903  002 OF 003 
 
 
When asked about the atmospherics of the HDIM in Warsaw, 
Yertysbayev responded that the government sent 10-12 official 
representatives, and claimed that Freedom House, as well as 
President Nazerbayev's former son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev and 
former BTA Bank Chairman Mukhtar Ablyazov -- both of whom 
fled to Europe to escape criminal charges in Kazakhstan -- 
paid for 42 NGO representatives to attend the meeting. 
Yertysbayev was visibly upset when he recalled that some of 
them appeared in front of the media wearing t-shirts 
demanding that Zhovtis receive a fair trial.  He suggested 
that government officials watching this scene from Astana 
would have been incensed.  "I'm sure there are people in 
power who would look at that and say, 'Forget about our 
diplomatic relations, let Zhovtis sit in jail.'" 
 
5.  (C) Yertysbayev
then pointed a finger of blame at 
Kazakhstan's two most notorious exiles:  "I know for a fact," 
he said, "that Aliyev and Ablyazov were behind this." 
Pressed to explain his own behavior at the conference, 
Yertysbayev replied that the NGO representatives were openly 
critical of their home country and unfairly took advantage of 
the Warsaw venue to speak out against Kazakhstan.  When asked 
if the NGOs raised any new charges or criticisms in Warsaw, 
Yertysbayev conceded they had not, but he asserted that he 
had felt compelled to present a "more balanced view" of 
Kazakhstan.  "These people take three or four facts and they 
think that tells the whole story.  They accuse Kazakhstan of 
being a dictatorship, an authoritarian regime, that does not 
allow freedom of speech.  They are drawing the wrong 
conclusions from just a few facts."  Yertysbayev contended 
that most people in Kazakhstan are not interested in 
democratic reform or human rights.  "Maybe 8%-12% of the 
population cares about democracy," he said.  "When you ask 
people what they care about most, it's their safety, 
security, health, education, and housing.  Those are the 
things people really care about!" 
 
THE ZHOVTIS CASE 
 
6.  (C) According to Yertysbayev, one of the "facts" the NGO 
representatives frequently cited was the Zhovtis case. 
Yertysbayev recited the government's official talking points 
on the Zhovtis case, noting that there have been 177 similar 
cases in recent years, and in nearly every case, the 
defendant was sentenced to jail.  "However," he said, "I am 
personally in favor of giving Zhovtis a reduced sentence, 
maybe one year, not four.  Look," he said, "Zhovtis was 
driving 90 kilometers an hour on a back road and he hit and 
killed a man.  He had been out fishing that day, and in our 
country, that means he was drinking vodka by the glass.  The 
next morning, the doctors determined that his blood-alcohol 
level was 0.042%.  He should serve one year for that," he 
said.  (COMMENT:  Although the accident's police report 
confirmed Zhovtis' sobriety, a subsequent press report 
alleging otherwise obviously has gained traction in some 
government circles.  END COMMENT.) 
 
7.  (C) Yertysbayev acknowledged that the Zhovtis case has 
complicated Kazakhstan's foreign relations, and added that 
the complaints and concerns of the United States and Europe 
should be taken into account.  "If so many people are asking 
for his freedom," Yertysbayev said, "then we should listen to 
them.  We should try to find a compromise."  Yertysbayev 
insisted that Zhovtis had not helped his own cause, and 
implied he was asking for trouble, by criticizing the judge 
for sentencing a "Vremya" journalist in a separate case to 
four years in jail for vehicular manslaughter.  Before his 
trial began, Zhovtis said he expected to receive a similar 
sentence.  "That judge is a human being," Yertesbayev 
asserted.  "Can you really expect him not to be affected by 
such public criticism?"  Yertesbayev then reached into his 
 
ASTANA 00001903  003 OF 003 
 
 
pocket for his cell phone and joked, "I could call the judge 
right now and ask him to release Zhovtis.  Then you can issue 
him a green card, and everyone will be happy.  But then," he 
said, "you would say that our justice system is corrupt." 
(NOTE:  On October 20, a court upheld the conviction of 
Zhovtis and the original sentence of four years in jail.  See 
reftel.  END NOTE). 
 
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
8.  (C) Yertysbayev told the DCM that the he understands the 
importance of the human dimension of democratic development, 
and said the government takes that aspect very seriously. 
"We all must live under the rule of law," he stated.  "Even 
me.  I am a former Minister (of Culture and Information)," he 
said, "yet I recently lost a libel case in the courts. 
Clearly, I was not given any special treatment.  And my son 
is being questioned by the Financial Police.  No one is above 
the law."  He added that the current anti-corruption campaign 
has affected even the most high-ranking officials in 
government.  "Everyone's anxious," he asserted.  "They're all 
thinking, if it could happen to someone like (former 
Kazatomprom president Mukhtar) Dzhakishev, then it could 
happen to me."  He smiled.  "That's when people start to care 
about the rule of law -- when they realize that they might 
need a lawyer and a fair trial."  Yertysbayev added that 
improving transparency and accountability in the justice 
system should be a top priority for Kazakhstan's continued 
democratic development. 
 
NAZERBAYEV TO MAINTAIN TIGHT CONTROL 
 
9.  (C) Yertysbayev stopped short, however, of suggesting 
that radical, systemic changes could be forthcoming.  He 
recalled that 20 years ago Nazerbayev was a member of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party.  Nazerbayev was at 
the very center of power when the Soviet Union collapsed, and 
he remembers all too well the confusion and disorder that 
followed.  "He will never let that happen to Kazakhstan," 
Yertysbayev said, "Not as long as he is president.  Not as 
long as he is alive."  As the meeting concluded and the 
conversation turned to small talk, Yertysbayev said he would 
recommend that President Nazerbayev see the movie "The 
Godfather."  "I don't think he has ever seen it," Yertysbayev 
said.  "But he should.  In the end, the boss is betrayed by 
his son-in-law.  It's just like real life." 
 
10.  (C) COMMENT:  Post will report septel on Kazakhstan's 
participation in the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting 
in Warsaw, and allegations that Yertysbayev intimidated NGO 
representatives there.  It was clear during our meeting that 
he was offended by the behavior of the NGOs in Warsaw, and 
held them in contempt.  However, we do not expect Yertysbayev 
to play a prominent role as Kazakhstan assumes the 
chairmanship of the OSCE.  Although Yertysbayev is known as a 
loose-cannon gadfly and is himself under a dark cloud in the 
current corruption clean-up campaign, he represents a line of 
thinking that persists in Kazakhstan.  With such a 
reputation, we remain perplexed why the government sent him 
to the HDIM in the first place.  END COMMENT. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1902, KAZAKHSTAN: U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY DISCUSSES

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1902.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1902 2009-10-21 09:22 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5808
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1902/01 2940922
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210922Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6679
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2065
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1436
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2136
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1625
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1487
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0092

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001902 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, EUR/CARC, ISN, EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL ECON MNUC SOCI KNNP AJ RS TX KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY DISCUSSES 
NUCLEAR FUEL, OIL, AND, JET-SKI RACING WITH GOVERNOR OF MANGYSTAU 
 
ASTANA 00001902  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
REFTEL: ASTANA 1886 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On October 6, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy 
Daniel Poneman met Mangystau Oblast Akim (governor) Krymbek 
Kusherbayev to discuss U.S.-Kazakhstani energy and non-proliferation 
projects in western Kazakhstan.  Poneman thanked Kusherbayev for his 
support and said the United States attaches great importance to 
securing the 300 metric tons of weapons-grade spent-fuel from the 
BN-350 reactor.  The Akim reaffirmed his commitment to 
non-proliferation cooperation and described his priorities in 
Mangystau Oblast.  Kusherbayev also related an anecdote from the 
recent Caspian Sea Summit, regaling Poneman with a description of 
the presidents on jet skis.  Even though oil pipelines under the 
Caspian are technologically feasible, Kusherbayev said their 
benefits must be balanced with the risk of environmental damage to 
the Caspian.  The Akim, a former Ambassador to Moscow, was amiable 
and relaxed throughout the conversation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
AKIM AGREES COOPERATION ON BN-350 IS A BILATERAL SUCCESS 
 
3.  (SBU) Poneman told the Akim his tour of the BN-350 reactor 
(reftel) impressed on him the region's scientific accomplishments, 
strong partnership with the United States, and potential for future 
energy development.  Poneman reiterated that Presidents Obama and 
Nazarbayev have consistently said that countering the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction is a key priority for their 
governments and a cornerstone of bilateral cooperation.  The Akim 
and Poneman agreed that the decade-long project, one of the last 
steps in decommissioning the BN-350 reactor, is a major 
non-proliferation milestone.  They also reaffirmed their mutual 
support for non-proliferation and the BN-350 project. 
 
THE GOVERNOR TOUTS MANGYSTAU'S COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES 
 
4.  (SBU) Kusherbayev told Poneman that Mangystau is one of 
Kazakhstan's wealthiest provinces, with a national per capita GDP of 
$25,000.  (NOTE:  According to the Minister of Energy and Mineral 
Resources in his address to the Kazakhstan International Oil and Gas 
Exposition (KIOGE) Conference on October 7, the national per capita 
GDP is $8,000.  END NOTE.)  According to Kusherbayev, Mangystau 
Oblast possesses the potential to develop competitive advantages in 
natural resources, transportation, and tourism. 
 
FROM HYDROCARBONS TO URANIUM 
 
5.  (SBU) In relation to natural resources, the Akim -- a former 
academic -- told Poneman proudly that Mangystau possesses all the 
elements of the periodic table.  Kusherbayev said Mangystau, which 
recently opened for development one of its oil and gas fields, will 
increase its exports from approximately 29 to 90 million tons of oil 
over the next few years.  Kusherbayev emphasized that Conoco 
Phillips, Kazakhstan's national oil company, and the United Arab 
Emirates's Magdala oil company play active roles in Mangystau's 
economy.  Due to its location in deep-water portions of the Caspian, 
Kusherbayev expects Mangystau to become an oil-transport hub -- 
similar to Qatar -- and a service center for building and servicing 
off-shore oil platforms, including fields located within the 
territory of its neighbor and competitor, Atyrau Oblast. 
Kusherbayev also predicted oil shipping volumes in the Caspian Sea 
region will increase to 150 million tons per year. 
 
THE NEW SILK ROAD 
 
6.  (SBU) Kusherbayev, whose staff lobbied intensively for Poneman 
to meet the Akim in his office rather than at the airport or the 
BN-350 reactor, described the region's plans to develop road, sea, 
and rail infrastructure.  "In the past, the Silk Road passed through 
Mangystau, and provided a lot of revenue for our ancestors," 
Kusherbayev told Poneman.  The Akim said the region is building a 
railroad to link Aktau to Turkmenistan, from which point rail lines 
already exist to carry goods to Iran and the Persian Gulf. 
 
ASTANA 00001902  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
According to Kusherbayev, the potential revenue from transportation 
of Chinese goods passing through Mangystau en-route to
Western 
Europe and the Persian Gulf could equal its earnings from oil and 
gas. 
 
PRESIDENTS ON JET SKIS 
 
7.  (SBU) Kusherbayev said Mangystau Oblast is working on a project 
with Arab investors, mostly Kuwaitis, to develop a first-class 
tourist resort area called Kenderlik, located south of Aktau along 
the Caspian seacoast.  Kusherbayev said the resort will have 5-star 
hotels, golf courses, and possibly even casinos.  "We would like to 
make Kenderlik the Las Vegas for countries of the Middle East," 
Kusherbayev told Poneman.  To emphasize Mangystau's tourism 
potential, Kusherbayev recounted that in mid-September the 
presidents of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, and 
Turkmenistan had gathered for an informal Caspian Sea Summit in 
Aktau.  "I personally created a six-kilometer-long jet-ski race for 
the four Presidents along the Caspian Sea near Kenderlik," 
Kusherbayev told Poneman, smiling.  Kusherbayev added,  "The 
presidential security forces were so nervous, but the presidents had 
a wonderful time!"  Kusherbayev said that President Nazarbayev 
craftily allowed Medvedev to win just at the end of the race.  "Our 
President is very intelligent," Kusherbayev laughed. 
 
EARTH, SEA, AND SKY 
 
8.  (SBU) Kusherbayev said Mangystau is working on a program called 
"earth, sea, and sky" that will coordinate its development of 
natural resources, transportation, and tourism.  "Earth relates to 
hydrocarbon resources, sea relates to our development of our marine 
transportation and tourism resources, but by sky, we mean God, 
without whose help nothing would be possible," Kusherbayev 
explained.  The Akim said Aktau city, as the center of the plan, is 
also growing rapidly, with an entirely new Aktau city under 
construction in cooperation with the United Arab Emirates.  Because 
the demand for electricity more than doubled in the last two years, 
the government will build a new nuclear power plant on the BN-350 
reactor site.  In response to a question about how he plans to 
maintain rational growth within the expansion of an oil-driven 
economy, Kusherbayev explained that the program's architects from 
the United Arab Emirates are actually top-notch architects from 
Boston, and they plan to take lessons-learned from Abu Dhabi into 
account.  Kusherbayev said his region is also interested in 
developing its shipbuilding industry, especially in relation to 
larger, oil-carrying vessels. 
 
THE AMERICAN WAY? 
 
9.  (SBU) Pipelines under the Caspian for oil transport are feasible 
in theory, Kusherbayev told Poneman, but he cautioned, "I will not 
risk the unique marine environment of the Caspian, with its caviar 
and sturgeon resources.  If we cannot find a safe ecological way to 
construct pipelines, we should follow the American way -- close and 
preserve the resource area."  Kusherbayev told Poneman that during 
his recent visit to Baku as a member of President Nazarbayev's 
delegation, the "oily and disgusting" state of the Caspian coast 
distressed him.  "I do not want that future for my region and 
country.  Oil and gas are the main assets of our economy, but they 
should not lower the standard of living of our people," the Akim 
told Poneman. 
 
AN AUTOGRAPHED GIFT 
 
10.  (SBU) Kusherbayev closed the meeting by urging Poneman to visit 
Kenderlik on his next trip to Kazakhstan.  "If you don't like jet 
skis, we can take you scuba-diving," he offered.  The urbane, 
sophisticated Akim then presented copies of a 
beautifully-illustrated several hundred page academic work on 
Mangystau.  The Akim happily autographed for his visitors the work, 
which he had co-authored during his academic career.  "I came here, 
and fell in love with this beautiful area, which is why I am so 
happy to be able to work here," Kusherbayev explained. 
 
ASTANA 00001902  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
11.  (U) Deputy Secretary Poneman has cleared on this cable. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1901, KAZAKHSTAN: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY PONEMAN’S MEETING

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1901.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1901 2009-10-21 09:17 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5798
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1901/01 2940917
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 210917Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6676
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2062
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1433
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2133
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1622
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1484
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0089

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001901 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN, EEB 
NSC FOR MCFAUL, DONNELLY, CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 09/13/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ENRG EPET KNNP IAEA IR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY PONEMAN'S MEETING 
WITH STATE SECRETARY-FOREIGN MINISTER SAUDABAYEV, OCTOBER 7, 2009 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  During an unusually warm and cordial 
meeting between Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman and State 
Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev in Astana on October 7: 
 
-- Poneman pressed Kazakhstan to commit the required funding to 
finish fully the final steps to decommission the BN-350 fast-breeder 
reactor at Aktau, and to accelerate the down-blending of highly 
enriched uranium at Alatau; 
 
-- Poneman recommended ways for Kazakhstan to broaden its peaceful 
nuclear cooperation, and asked that Kazakhstan designate a lead 
inter-agency entity so that the construction of the biological 
Central Reference Library can move forward; 
 
-- Saudabayev assured full cooperation on all fronts, and asked for 
U.S. support for Kazakhstan's proposal to host an IAEA-approved 
nuclear fuel bank, and support for Kazakhstan's effort in the UN to 
have August 29 designated as an annual non-proliferation day (Poneman 
assured Saudabayev of U.S. support for both); and 
 
-- Saudabayev reiterated his effort to ensure that Presidents Obama 
and Nazarbayev meet during the time-frame of the April 2010 Global 
Nuclear Security Summit in the United States. 
 
2.  (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONTINUED:  This meeting was unusually 
warm and cordial, and we intend to build on it to move forward 
specific items on our bilateral agenda.  An Obama-Nazarbayev meeting 
in April 2010 would provide momentum not only for our 
non-proliferation and broader energy agendas, but possibly for other 
key interests as well.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
3.  (SBU) Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman met with State 
Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saydabayev in Astana on October 7. 
Poneman told Saudabayev that the fact he is leading a broad 
interagency delegation (Department of Energy, Department of Defense, 
Department of State, National Security Council) is strong evidence of 
the importance the United States attaches to its strategic 
relationship with Kazakhstan.  In return, Saudabayev praised 
President Obama's non-proliferation initiatives, noting that 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev has made several public statements in 
support of them, "which is natural, since our presidents' views are 
so closely aligned."  Saudabayev said, "We are ready to expedite our 
cooperation as much as possible.  We have a lot to do and want 
concrete steps forward before the April 2010 Global Nuclear Security 
Summit in Washington (which President Nazarbayev plans to attend). 
Together, we will deal with all serious issues.  I assure you that 
our relationship was, is, and will be a priority -- this is why 
President Nazarbayev assigned me to this additional position." 
 
4.  (SBU) Poneman welcomed Saudabayev's words of support on bilateral 
nuclear cooperation.  He said that he knows well Nazarbayev's 
non-proliferation history, which is "exemplary leadership for the 
world."  He recalled a dinner at Kennebunkport, Maine, in 2006, 
during which Nazarbayev "reminisced about those early decisions of 
our shared history."  He said that Kazakhstan's non-proliferation 
history, as well as its resource base of oil, natural gas, and 
uranium, gives Kazakhstan an increasingly important role on the world 
stage, and specifically in the nuclear energy industry. 
 
TO DO BEFORE THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 
 
5.  (C) NON-PROLIFERATION:  Poneman said he hopes that Kazakhstan 
will play an important role in the Global Nuclear Security Summit "to 
showcase as a model for others how we work together."  He suggested 
Kazakhstan show clear movement now with the BN-350 fast-breeder 
reactor decommissioning project.  The goals for "the next time we 
meet" should include Kazakhstan committing to finance the 
construction of the geocement stone facility, sustainment funding for 
the U.S.-built sodium processing facility, and on-time and secure 
movement of spent fuel from Aktau to the storage facility at Baikal-1 
near Semipalatinsk .   Additionally, it would be important to 
 
ASTANA 00001901  002 OF 003 
 
 
accelerate the blend-down of highly enriched uranium at the VVR-K 
reactor at the Institute for Nuclear Physics to su
pport both 
nonproliferation goals and commercial opportunities. 
 
6.  (C) PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION:  Citing President Obama's 
speech in Prague in April, the Deputy Secretary said that a new 
framework for global nuclear cooperation was being developed.  He 
pointed out that Kazakhstan has all of the qualities to make itself a 
successful leader of this global agenda, including a strong 
nonproliferation history, world-class uranium resources, and 
technical expertise -- all of which could be leveraged to expand our 
bilateral non-proliferation cause with other countries.  Poneman told 
Saudabayev he had discussed these issues in detail in Almaty on 
October 6 with KazAtomProm Chairman Vladimir Shkolnik (septel), and 
hoped we could develop further cooperation in these areas, which 
could be discussed more concretely during the next meeting in China 
of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).  (NOTE:  Kazakhstan 
was one of the original members of the GNEP, but has not attended a 
meeting in more than a year.  END NOTE.) 
 
SAUDABAYEV ASSURES COOPERATIVE PARTNERSHIP 
 
7.  (C) Responding to Poneman's comments about peaceful nuclear 
cooperation, Saudabayev recalled that Kazakhstan wants to host a 
nuclear fuel bank, and asked if the United States could support 
Kazakhstan and help accelerate the International Atomic Energy 
Agency's (IAEA) decision-making process on this.  He also noted that 
during his bilateral meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Manoucher 
Motakki in New York during the UN General Assembly, he had once again 
pressed Iran on the importance of transparency about its professed 
civilian nuclear energy program and had encouraged Iran to follow 
Kazakhstan's model.  Saudabayev also asked that the United States 
support Kazakhstan's proposal that the United Nations designate 
August 29 as an annual nuclear non-proliferation day.  Finally, 
referring to the Global Nuclear Security Summit, Saudabayev told 
Poneman that Kazakhstan is preparing seriously so that President 
Nazarbayev's participation will be substantive and significant. 
Saudabayev said he would welcome any further suggestions for concrete 
steps to achieve before the summit. 
 
8.  (SBU) Covering the broader bilateral energy agenda as "areas for 
our future close cooperation," Saudabayev noted that Kazakhstan is 
taking seriously climate change and renewable energy -- "We have 
built a biofuel plant at Petropavlovsk, and wind power has real 
potential in Kazakhstan." 
 
9.  (SBU) The Deputy Secretary responded that there is a great deal 
of convergence between the interests of Kazakhstan and the United 
States -- "that's why we are good friends."  Poneman assured 
Saudabayev the United State will work with the IAEA toward the goal 
of having the IAEA's board of governors seriously consider 
Kazakhstan's desire to host a nuclear fuel bank.  He assured 
Saudabayev of U.S. support for Kazakhstan's proposal to the UN that 
August 29 be designated an annual commemoration for nuclear 
non-proliferation, and thanked Kazakhstan for its efforts on 
renewable energy, as well as for seeking multiple routes for the 
export of its growing oil production. 
 
SAUDABAYEV PITCHES AN OBAMA-NAZARBAYEV MEETING 
 
10.  (SBU) Citing French President Nicholas Sarkozy's visit to Astana 
earlier in the week and his own "warm and productive" meeting with 
Secretary of State Clinton when they were in New York for the UN 
General Assembly, Saudabayev made his case again for an 
Obama-Nazarbayev meeting in the White House before or after the 
Global Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010.  "Our presidents' views 
truly do converge on nuclear security, and we will take any steps 
necessary to ensure that this meeting is fully successful." 
Saudabayev said that the State Department probably can't fully 
advocate for this proposed meeting, because it has such broad global 
responsibilities that it needs to balance.  But, he urged, "I hope 
the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and the National 
Security Council will take the lead to advocate for this bilateral 
 
ASTANA 00001901  003 OF 003 
 
 
meeting of our presidents." 
 
11.  (C) Poneman replied, "That I am here is a signal of how 
important this bilateral relationship is to the United States.  From 
your own experience, you know Washington well.  There will be a small 
number of bilateral meetings with President Obama at the Global 
Nuclear Security Summit.  The issues we have just been discussing 
will provide a strong base-line for achievements that both of our 
presidents expect of us.  Our relationship is broad and productive, 
but the Department of Energy is only one of many agencies in 
Washington." 
 
CENTRAL REFERENCE LABORATORY 
 
12.  (SBU) Poneman told Saudabayev that it is important for the 
government of Kazakhstan to designate one lead agency with authority 
to require cooperation among the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, 
and Education and Science so that the construction of the biological 
non-proliferation Central Reference Laboratory can more forward. 
 
MOVING FORWARD TOGETHER 
 
13.  (SBU) Summarizing the entire meeting, Poneman said, "I give you 
my personal word that I will work as hard as possible to advance our 
shared interests."  Saudabayev responded, "We have no doubts about 
the importance of this relationship.  The future of our partnership 
is hopeful.  It is a positive and important sign that President Obama 
has appointed people like you and the others in your delegation who 
know Kazakhstan well."  He reiterated that it was important that 
President Nazarbayev was one of the first world leaders Obama 
telephoned after his election, and he noted the follow-on importance 
of Vice President Biden's telephone call to Nazarbayev in April. 
Saudabayev concluded, "We will prepare well for the Global Nuclear 
Security Summit.  We will move on multiple fronts and achieve our 
shared goals." 
 
14.  (C) COMMENT:  This meeting was unusually warm and cordial, and 
we intend to build on that to move forward specific items on our 
bilateral agenda.  We had heard speculation that Nazarbayev had named 
Saudabayev Foreign Minister specifically to enhance Kazakhstan's 
relationship with the United States, but now Saudabayev himself has 
confirmed it.  An Obama-Nazarbayev meeting in April 2010 would 
provide momentum not only for our non-proliferation and broader 
energy agenda, but possibly for other key interests as well.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
15.  (U) Deputy Secretary Poneman has cleared this cable. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1900, KAZAKHSTAN: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY PONEMAN’S MEETING

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1900.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1900 2009-10-21 09:16 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5796
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1900/01 2940916
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 210916Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6674
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2060
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1431
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2131
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1620
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1482
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0087

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001900 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/CEN, NEA/IR, EUR/WE, ISN 
NSC FOR MCFAUL, DONNELLY, CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 09/13/2029 
TAGS: PREL ENRG KNNP FR IR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY PONEMAN'S MEETING 
WITH PRIME MINISTER MASIMOV, OCTOBER 8, 2009 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  During a meeting between Deputy Secretary of 
Energy Daniel Poneman and Prime Minister Karim Masimov in Astana on 
October 8: 
 
-- Poneman urged rapid forward movement on the final steps for the 
full decommissioning of the BN-350 fast-breeder nuclear reactor at 
Aktau, as well as on bureaucratic steps necessary for Kazakhstan's 
inter-agency coordination so that the United States can commence 
building the biological Central Reference Laboratory in Almaty; 
 
-- Poneman briefed the Prime Minister on new-generation small 
nuclear-reactors grid that could interest Kazakhstan and provide a 
fruitful venue for new collaboration; 
 
-- Poneman noted that the example of Kazakhstan's non-proliferation 
history and its support for international nuclear fuel banks could 
help Iran make responsible decisions about its future; and 
 
-- Masimov suggested that, should the White House approve an 
Obama-Nazarbayev bilateral meeting during the April 2010 Global 
Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, Kazakhstan would be prepared 
to work closely with the United States to negotiate in advance a 
fruitful and comprehensive agenda for the two presidents to approve. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
MUTUAL ADMIRATION SOCIETY 
 
2.  (C) Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman met with Prime 
Minister Karim Masimov in Astana for 30 minutes on October 8. 
Masimov welcomed Poneman warmly and said he had already been 
well-briefed on Poneman's previous meetings during his current visit. 
 He commented, "I am very hopeful for the future of our 
relationship."  Poneman responded that he was very heartened by this 
visit and noted the broad agenda of our bilateral relationship.  He 
recalled that at the birth of our cooperation two decades ago, urgent 
issues of nuclear non-proliferation had dominated.  Now, we are 90% 
through the decommissioning of the BN-350 fast-breeder nuclear 
reactor at Aktau and "want to go the final distance with you."  He 
noted, in passing, our on-going sensitive cooperation at the former 
Soviet nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk, and stated our readiness 
to move forward with building the biological Central Reference 
Laboratory in Almaty, but only if Kazakhstan can guarantee full 
inter-agency cooperation. 
 
3.  (SBU) Poneman told Masimov, "Our presidents hold similar views on 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  President Obama is 
pleased that President Nazarbayev plans to participate in the April 
2010 Global Nuclear Security Summit."  He summarized for Masimov his 
keynote speech at the Kazakhstan International Oil and Gas Exhibition 
in Almaty on October 6, noted his October 5 visit to Tengizchevroil 
on the Caspian, and commented, "We are both pragmatic peoples -- that 
is why we work so well together."  Masimov interjected approvingly, 
"I just finished a cabinet meeting where we discussed all of these 
issues."  (COMMENT:  We would kill to get a transcript of that 
cabinet meeting.  END COMMENT.) 
 
NEW POSSIBILITES FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY COLLABORATION 
 
4.  (SBU) Poneman told Masimov that he had had an excellent and 
wide-ranging conversation in Almaty with KazAtomProm Chairman 
Vladimir Shkolnik, where they had explored new possibilities for 
collaboration on the concept of building small nuclear reactors.  He 
told Masimov that Secretary of Energy Chu is especially interested in 
the low carbon energy potential of nuclear energy, well-suited to the 
grid servicing Aktau, and noted that Kazakhstan is especially 
well-positioned to collaborate on this because of its impeccable 
non-proliferation credentials, its vast uranium reserves, and its 
existing nuclear technology. 
 
SEAL DEALS IN WASHINGTON IN APRIL? 
 
 
ASTANA 00001900  002 OF 002 
 
 
5.  (SBU) Masimov concurred and suggested that the April 2010 Global 
Nuclear Security Summit in the United States would be the ideal venue 
for Presidents Obama and Nazarbayev to meet and seal agreements that 
would give guidance to their governments how to move forward together 
on these promising initiatives that would strongly advance President 
Obama's nuclear security goals.  Poneman responded that he had 
already checked with the White House, and that it is still too early 
by several months to confirm scheduling for bilateral meetings at the &#x000
A;time of the Global Nuclear Security Summit.  In fact, there will be 
only a very small number of bilaterals.  "However," he said, "we will 
work hard.  In theory, we would want a very rich agenda with concrete 
results for our presidents to discuss, should that develop."  Masimov 
said, "I am certain, I really believe, I have no doubt that we can 
work well together.  There is no question about our will."  Poneman 
commented, "Our relationship seems poised to move forward, and not 
just in energy.  We have a broad and robust agenda." 
 
KAZAKHSTAN SHOULD BE A ROLE-MODEL FOR IRAN 
 
6.  (C) Masimov said that French President Nicholas Sarkozy earlier 
in the week had asked President Nazarbayev specifically to do 
whatever he could to convince Iran to move toward conformity with 
international nuclear-security standards.  He added, but did not 
elaborate, that Sarkozy had proposed several concrete suggestions. 
Poneman responded that the concept of the new international civil 
nuclear framework proposed in Prague by President Obama, including 
the proposal for international nuclear fuel banks, which Kazakhstan 
not only supports but also wants to participate in, could provide a 
face-saving path for Tehran.  Further, Kazakhstan's impeccable 
non-proliferation standards could provide Iran a model to follow. 
 
WOLFENSON, KISSINGER, MERKLE 
 
7.  (C) Masimov noted that Kazakhstan has appointed former EUR Deputy 
Assistant Secretary David Merkle to the board of directors of 
Kazakhstan's new International Information Technology and Science 
University that will be staffed largely by Western faculty.  He noted 
that the World Bank's James Wolfensohn is a strong personal partner 
for him as he manages Kazakhstan's macro-economy, providing personal 
advice and institutional seminars.  Masimov also said that Kazakhstan 
expects to welcome Henry Kissinger in the nearest future (NFI). 
Poneman asked when Masimov next plans to visit the United States. 
Masimov responded, circumspectly, "Prime Ministers usually need to 
stay home."  (NOTE:  In 2008, Masimov was scheduled to travel to 
Washington for a high-profile visit, but his trip was cancelled on 
short notice.  The rumor at that time was that President Nazarbayev 
had worried that Masimov was getting uppity, scheduling such a 
high-profile visit, and needed to be reminded who was in charge.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
8.  (C) COMMENT:  We are gratified that Deputy Secretary Poneman, 
well-known in Kazakhstan, was so well received -- and was also such a 
trooper for a four-city schedule that included accepting, repeatedly, 
traditional Kazakhstani hospitality with horse meat on the menu, 
dombra-playing, and rivers of some of the finest premier-cru French 
Bordeaux.  We continue to note that the highest levels -- Nazarbayev 
confidante and State Secretary-Foreign Minister Saudabayev, and Prime 
Minister Masimov -- continue to press, diplomatically but very 
directly, for an Obama-Nazarbayev April 2010 meeting in Washington. 
We have continued to sense that Kazakhstan, i.e., Nazarbayev, has 
been ready to recalibrate his great-power relationships more toward 
the United States since the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. 
Should there be a well-prepared April bilateral, we judge we could 
achieve forward movement on a broad number of issues on the bilateral 
agenda.  END COMMENT. 
 
9. (U) Deputy Secretary Poneman has cleared this cable. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1899, KAZAKHSTAN: BLUNT TALK TO DEPUTY FOREIGN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1899.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1899 2009-10-21 09:06 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5759
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1899 2940906
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210906Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6673
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 2059
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1430
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1073
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2130
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1619
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1481
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1011
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2855
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2065
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2552

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 001899 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  BLUNT TALK TO DEPUTY FOREIGN 
MINISTER ON ZHOVTIS CASE 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 1468 
     B. ASTANA 1470 
     C. ASTANA 1487 
     D. ASTANA 1497 
     E. ASTANA 1512 
     F. ASTANA 1538 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1.  (C) On October 20, an hour after a provincial appeals 
court upheld the conviction of human rights advocate Yevgeniy 
Zhovtis and affirmed his four-year sentence to a penal colony 
for vehicular manslaughter (septel), I pulled aside Deputy 
Foreign Minister Kairat Umararov at the Slovak National Day 
reception.  I told him directly that this decision was a 
disaster, especially coming immediately on the heels of 
reports that Presidential Adviser Yermukhamed Yertysbayev had 
made confrontational comments to representatives of several 
Kazakhstani non-governmental organizations participating in 
the OSCE's Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw, 
September 28-October 9. 
 
2.  (C) I told Umarov further that I had, in good faith, 
followed State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev's 
initial advice to lay low on the Zhovtis case, after my 
initial public statement following his conviction and 
sentencing on September 3, and trust that the appeal would 
produce a satisfactory outcome.  I told Umarov bluntly that 
this is all coming together to threaten everything we have 
together worked on for so many months to enhance the 
U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship. 
 
3.  (C) Umarov, slightly deer-in-the-headlights, initially 
responded with Kazakhstan's well-rehearsed talking points: 
all are equal under the law, Zhovtis killed a Kazakhstani 
citizen and must now pay the normal price like every other 
citizen who is equal under the law, the Kazakhstani judicial 
system is professional and independent.  I didn't argue the 
fine points of the case.  I told Umarov, "Kairat, everyone 
knows, although we normally don't say it directly because of 
diplomatic discretion, that your court system is corrupted by 
political influence.  This kind of thing endangers what your 
president says he wants in the bilateral relationship." 
Umarov suggestedm "This will blow over."  I replied, "No, it 
won't.  It will be a long-lasting dark spot." 
 
4.  (C) Umarov tried again with the approved talking points. 
I responded, "Washington, Brussels, and the separate European 
capitals are buzzing with criticism of Kazakhstan.  Your very 
real and positive good intentions easily get overwhelmed by 
this kind of old-guard, Soviet-style idiocy.  Your boss 
(Saudabayev) needs to hear this." 
 
5.  (C) I asked Umarov whom I could see on October 21 to pass 
on this message.  Now glum, Umarov told me that Saudabayev 
would be tied up in the morning with the OSCE ambassadors' 
delegation and then would fly off to join President 
Nazarbayev in Turkey.  Deputy Foreign Minister Konstantin 
Zhigalov, whose portfolio includes OSCE, is traveling.  And 
Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Kairat Sarybay is also 
out of the country. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1898, KAZAKHSTAN: COURT UPHOLDS ZHOVTIS’ CONVICTION

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1898.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1898 2009-10-21 09:04 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5736
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1898/01 2940904
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210904Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6670
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2056
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1427
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2127
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1070
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2549
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2852
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1616
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1478
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001898 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  COURT UPHOLDS ZHOVTIS' CONVICTION 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 1470 
 (B) ASTANA 1487 
 (C) ASTANA 1494 
 (D) ASTANA 1512 
 (E) ASTANA 1538 
 (F) ASTANA 1816 
 
ASTANA 00001898  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On October 20, the Almaty Oblast Court upheld 
the conviction and four-year sentence of prominent human rights 
defender Yevgeniy Zhovtis on charges of vehicular manslaughter. 
Over 100 observers attended the hearing, including representatives 
of civil society, opposition political parties, local and 
international media, and the diplomatic community.  Civil society 
activists condemned the decision and referred to Zhovtis as a 
"political prisoner."  Zhovtis will be transferred within a week 
from the pre-trial detention in Taldy-Korgan to a minimum-security 
facility in Eastern Kazakhstan.  His defense team will request that 
a judicial panel review the case for procedural violations, although 
one of his lawyers expressed doubt that the panel will change the 
decision.  The Embassy will release a statement on the case at the 
opening of business October 22 (full text in paragraph 8).  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
APPEAL DENIED 
 
3.  (SBU)  On October 20, the Almaty Oblast Court upheld the 
conviction and four-year sentence of prominent human rights defender 
Yevgeniy Zhovtis on charges of vehicular manslaughter (ref A). 
Zhovtis was not present at the appeal.  His defense team had filed a 
petition for him to be present, but the court contended that his 
presence at the appeal hearing was not obligatory since the 
prosecution was not seeking a harsher sentence.  The hearing was 
attended by the victim's mother, who made an official statement that 
she had forgiven Zhovtis and presented a notarized letter to the 
effect.  During the hearing, the defense petitioned to dismiss the 
original verdict for trial irregularities, to order a new 
technical-expertsreview of the accident, and to have Zhovtis present 
at the hearing.  The defense also urged the court to reconsider 
Zhovtis' four-year sentence in light of the fact that the victim's 
mother forgave him.  The judge rejected most of the defense's 
motions, but did include the victim's mother's statement into the 
record.  Following a three-hour hearing, the judge ruled to leave 
unchanged the lower court's decision. 
 
HEARING DRAWS LARGE CROWD 
 
4.  (SBU) The appeal hearing drew over 100 observers, including 
leading civil rights activists, local and international media, and 
the head of the opposition party Azat and two of his deputies. 
Representatives of diplomatic missions of the United States (Almaty 
PAO and P/E LES), European Commission (EC), Germany, and France, 
including France's Ambassador-at-Large for Human Rights Francois 
Zimeray, were also present, as well as Human Rights Watch's deputy 
director for Europe and Central Asia Rachel Denber, who flew from 
New York to Kazakhstan specifically for the appeal.  The group of 
observers was too large to fit into the court room, and only about 
40 people, including representatives of foreign missions and 
international media, were able to observe the hearing.  Following 
the court's decision, civil society activists organized an impromptu 
press conference in front of the court house, condemning the court 
decision and calling Zhovtis "a political prisoner."  France's 
Ambassador Zimeray told BBC and Agence France Presse (AFP) that he 
was "very disappointed [with the decision] because we expected a 
more fair discussion from a country which has the ambition to chair 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a 
prominent democracy and human rights organization."  Roza Akylbekova 
of Zhovtis' Human Rights Bureau recounted to the press how she and 
the victim's mother were stopped several times by road police while 
they were driving to the court, in what she believes was an attempt 
to prevent the victim's mother from testifying. 
 
WHAT NOW? 
 
 
ASTANA 00001898  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
5. (SBU) Vera Tkachenko, a member of Zhovtis' defense team, told us 
on October 21 that within a week, Zhovtis will be moved from the 
pre-trial detention center in Taldy-Korgan to minimum-security penal 
colony in Ust-Kamenogorsk, in Eastern Kazakhstan.  She told us that 
until recently, the only such minimum-security colony was in Aqmola 
oblast, near Astana, but that "the authorities quickly reclassified" 
an existing colony in Ust-Kamenogorsk, ostensibly to keep Zhovtis 
"away from undue attention." 
 
6. (SBU) Tkachenko explained that under Kazakhstani legislation, the 
oblast-leve
l courts are the courts of final instance for lesser 
crimes like Zhovtis', and that these cases cannot be appealed to the 
Supreme Court.  The law does allow, however, for the defense to 
request a judicial panel review (obzornaya komissiya) to look for 
any procedural violations in the case.  Tkachenko said Zhovtis' 
defense team will file the request for the review very soon.  She 
noted, however, that the panel can only look at procedural 
violations and cannot reassess the merits of the case, and she 
expressed doubt that the panel will overturn the court's decision. 
Theoretically, the panel has one month to decide whether to grant 
the defendant's request for a review.  However, the one-month term 
is counted from the day the court receives all the necessary 
documents, so the decision could be dragged out while the panel 
awaits the paperwork.  Once the decision for review is granted, the 
panel has another month to review the case and issue its decision. 
 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY "SHOCKED" 
 
7. (SBU) Several civil society activists told us that they were 
"flabbergasted" and "shocked" by the court decision.  Freedom 
House's country director Iva Dobichina said she was "deeply 
disappointed Kazakhstan would take such a step on the eve of its 
OSCE chairmanship."  She urged the international community "not to 
stay silent, to make sure this case does not go away."  Vera 
Tkachenko said the court case "was an eloquent example of what is 
going on in Kazakhstan."  Human Rights Watch said the verdict was "a 
terrible miscarriage of justice."  Sergei Duvanov, an independent 
journalist, told us he was "disappointed with the West, particularly 
OSCE, for the support of the Nazarbayev regime."  He also said that 
Zhovtis' supporters will not mount a new wave of protest actions 
(ref F), because "they obviously proved to be ineffective." 
 
EMBASSY'S STATEMENT 
 
8. (SBU) The Embassy plans to release the following statement on the 
case at the opening of business October 22: 
 
BEGIN STATEMENT TEXT: 
 
The United States Embassy in Astana notes with concern that on 
October 20 the Almaty Oblast Court in the city of Taldy-Qorghan 
upheld the vehicular manslaughter conviction and sentencing to four 
years of imprisonment of Yevgeniy Zhovtis, head of the 
non-governmental organization, Human Rights Bureau.  After the 
original trial in September, there were credible allegations of 
procedural flaws in that trial, and the appeal hearing failed to 
address those concerns. 
 
We urge the government of Kazakhstan to pursue the upcoming 
procedural review of the case fully in accord 
with Kazakhstani law and its commitment to international judicial 
standards. 
 
END TEXT 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT:  The court's decision to uphold Zhovtis' 
conviction shocked many in the civil-society and diplomatic 
communities.  As late as last week, several civil-society activists 
told us they were receiving encouraging signs from the authorities 
that Zhovtis' sentence would be amended and/or suspended.  Many of 
the same people were at a loss today what to do next.  On October 
20, the Ambassador privately told Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat 
Umarov in no uncertain terms that this court decision is a major 
stain on Kazakhstan's record and that it will have wide 
 
ASTANA 00001898  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
reverberations in Washington, Brussels, and Vienna (septel).  END 
COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1897, KAZAKHSTAN: COURT UPHOLDS ZHOVTIS’ CONVICTION

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1897.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1897 2009-10-21 08:56 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5714
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1897/01 2940856
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210856Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6667
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2053
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1424
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2124
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1067
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2546
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2849
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1613
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1475
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001897 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  COURT UPHOLDS ZHOVTIS' CONVICTION 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 1470 
 (B) ASTANA 1487 
 (C) ASTANA 1494 
 (D) ASTANA 1512 
 (E) ASTANA 1538 
 (F) ASTANA 1816 
 
ASTANA 00001897  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On October 20, the Almaty Oblast Court upheld 
the conviction and four-year sentence of prominent human rights 
defender Yevgeniy Zhovtis on charges of vehicular manslaughter. 
Over 100 observers attended the hearing, including representatives 
of civil society, opposition political parties, local and 
international media, and the diplomatic community.  Civil society 
activists condemned the decision and referred to Zhovtis as a 
"political prisoner."  Zhovtis will be transferred within a week 
from the pre-trial detention in Taldy-Korgan to a minimum-security 
facility in Eastern Kazakhstan.  His defense team will request that 
a judicial panel review the case for procedural violations, although 
one of his lawyers expressed doubt that the panel will change the 
decision.  The Embassy will release a statement on the case at the 
opening of business October 22 (full text in paragraph 8).  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
APPEAL DENIED 
 
3.  (SBU)  On October 20, the Almaty Oblast Court upheld the 
conviction and four-year sentence of prominent human rights defender 
Yevgeniy Zhovtis on charges of vehicular manslaughter (ref A). 
Zhovtis was not present at the appeal.  His defense team had filed a 
petition for him to be present, but the court contended that his 
presence at the appeal hearing was not obligatory since the 
prosecution was not seeking a harsher sentence.  The hearing was 
attended by the victim's mother, who made an official statement that 
she had forgiven Zhovtis and presented a notarized letter to the 
effect.  During the hearing, the defense petitioned to dismiss the 
original verdict for trial irregularities, to order a new 
technical-expertsreview of the accident, and to have Zhovtis present 
at the hearing.  The defense also urged the court to reconsider 
Zhovtis' four-year sentence in light of the fact that the victim's 
mother forgave him.  The judge rejected most of the defense's 
motions, but did include the victim's mother's statement into the 
record.  Following a three-hour hearing, the judge ruled to leave 
unchanged the lower court's decision. 
 
HEARING DRAWS LARGE CROWD 
 
4.  (SBU) The appeal hearing drew over 100 observers, including 
leading civil rights activists, local and international media, and 
the head of the opposition party Azat and two of his deputies. 
Representatives of diplomatic missions of the United States (Almaty 
PAO and P/E LES), European Commission (EC), Germany, and France, 
including France's Ambassador-at-Large for Human Rights Francois 
Zimeray, were also present, as well as Human Rights Watch's deputy 
director for Europe and Central Asia Rachel Denber, who flew from 
New York to Kazakhstan specifically for the appeal.  The group of 
observers was too large to fit into the court room, and only about 
40 people, including representatives of foreign missions and 
international media, were able to observe the hearing.  Following 
the court's decision, civil society activists organized an impromptu 
press conference in front of the court house, condemning the court 
decision and calling Zhovtis "a political prisoner."  France's 
Ambassador Zimeray told BBC and Agence France Presse (AFP) that he 
was "very disappointed [with the decision] because we expected a 
more fair discussion from a country which has the ambition to chair 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a 
prominent democracy and human rights organization."  Roza Akylbekova 
of Zhovtis' Human Rights Bureau recounted to the press how she and 
the victim's mother were stopped several times by road police while 
they were driving to the court, in what she believes was an attempt 
to prevent the victim's mother from testifying. 
 
WHAT NOW? 
 
 
ASTANA 00001897  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
5. (SBU) Vera Tkachenko, a member of Zhovtis' defense team, told us 
on October 21 that within a week, Zhovtis will be moved from the 
pre-trial detention center in Taldy-Korgan to minimum-security penal 
colony in Ust-Kamenogorsk, in Eastern Kazakhstan.  She told us that 
until recently, the only such minimum-security colony was in Aqmola 
oblast, near Astana, but that "the authorities quickly reclassified" 
an existing colony in Ust-Kamenogorsk, ostensibly to keep Zhovtis 
"away from undue attention." 
 
6. (SBU) Tkachenko explained that under Kazakhstani legislation, the 
oblast-leve
l courts are the courts of final instance for lesser 
crimes like Zhovtis', and that these cases cannot be appealed to the 
Supreme Court.  The law does allow, however, for the defense to 
request a judicial panel review (obzornaya komissiya) to look for 
any procedural violations in the case.  Tkachenko said Zhovtis' 
defense team will file the request for the review very soon.  She 
noted, however, that the panel can only look at procedural 
violations and cannot reassess the merits of the case, and she 
expressed doubt that the panel will overturn the court's decision. 
Theoretically, the panel has one month to decide whether to grant 
the defendant's request for a review.  However, the one-month term 
is counted from the day the court receives all the necessary 
documents, so the decision could be dragged out while the panel 
awaits the paperwork.  Once the decision for review is granted, the 
panel has another month to review the case and issue its decision. 
 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY "SHOCKED" 
 
7. (SBU) Several civil society activists told us that they were 
"flabbergasted" and "shocked" by the court decision.  Freedom 
House's country director Iva Dobichina said she was "deeply 
disappointed Kazakhstan would take such a step on the eve of its 
OSCE chairmanship."  She urged the international community "not to 
stay silent, to make sure this case does not go away."  Vera 
Tkachenko said the court case "was an eloquent example of what is 
going on in Kazakhstan."  Human Rights Watch said the verdict was "a 
terrible miscarriage of justice."  Sergei Duvanov, an independent 
journalist, told us he was "disappointed with the West, particularly 
OSCE, for the support of the Nazarbayev regime."  He also said that 
Zhovtis' supporters will not mount a new wave of protest actions 
(ref F), because "they obviously proved to be ineffective." 
 
EMBASSY'S STATEMENT 
 
8. (SBU) The Embassy plans to release the following statement on the 
case at the opening of business October 22: 
 
BEGIN STATEMENT TEXT: 
 
The United States Embassy in Astana notes with concern that on 
October 20 the Almaty Oblast Court in the city of Taldy-Qorghan 
upheld the vehicular manslaughter conviction and sentencing to four 
years of imprisonment of Yevgeniy Zhovtis, head of the 
non-governmental organization, Human Rights Bureau.  After the 
original trial in September, there were credible allegations of 
procedural flaws in that trial, and the appeal hearing failed to 
address those concerns. 
 
We urge the government of Kazakhstan to pursue the upcoming 
procedural review of the case fully in accord 
with Kazakhstani law and its commitment to international judicial 
standards. 
 
END TEXT 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT:  The court's decision to uphold Zhovtis' 
conviction shocked many in the civil-society and diplomatic 
communities.  As late as last week, several civil-society activists 
told us they were receiving encouraging signs from the authorities 
that Zhovtis' sentence would be amended and/or suspended.  Many of 
the same people were at a loss today what to do next.  On October 
20, the Ambassador privately told Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat 
Umarov in no uncertain terms that this court decision is a major 
stain on Kazakhstan's record and that it will have wide 
 
ASTANA 00001897  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
reverberations in Washington, Brussels, and Vienna (septel).  END 
COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1891, KAZAKHSTAN: WORLD BANK OFFICIAL DISCUSSES REGIONAL

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1891.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1891 2009-10-20 05:18 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4282
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1891/01 2930518
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200518Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6658
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2048
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1419
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2119
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1062
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1608
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1947

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001891 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ENRG EAGR ECIN EINV KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  WORLD BANK OFFICIAL DISCUSSES REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC STABILITY 
 
REF:  ASTANA 1365 
 
ASTANA 00001891  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On October 7, the DCM met Motoo Konishi, the 
World Bank's Regional Representative for Central Asia, who described 
his surprisingly positive views on each Central Asian country's 
economic situation, the potential impact of global climate change, 
and the prospects for a regional energy market.  END SUMMARY. 
 
TAJIKISTAN'S STABILITY IS MAIN CONCERN 
 
3.  (SBU) Konishi said his main concern in the region is 
Tajikistan's economic and political stability.  He said 45% of 
Tajikistan's GDP comes from remittances abroad, including oil 
workers in Russia, many of whom have returned home as Russia's 
economy has gone into recession.  He told the DCM that Tajikistan is 
dependent on international donor assistance, and the $116 million 
loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ensured the 
country's survival last winter.  Konishi questioned the government's 
decision to spend $100 million on the Rogun hydroelectric power 
plant and suggested the money would be better spent heating schools 
and diversifying the economy.  Konishi said the Chinese have made 
significant investments, especially in infrastructure projects such 
as road construction in eastern Tajikistan.  To improve stability, 
Konishi said Tajikistan would have to increase food security, ensure 
reliable energy supplies, and strengthen border controls.  Regarding 
the latter, Konishi said he was concerned that the conflict in 
Afghanistan would drive Taliban forces northward, towards 
Tajikistan.  "If Tajikistan goes extreme," he said, "there's nothing 
left for them.  Kyrgyzstan will cut off the border, and suddenly, 
we've got a big problem on our hands." 
 
KAZAKHSTAN REQUESTS WORLD BANK LOAN 
 
4.  (SBU) Konishi praised the government of Kazakhstan for its 
"smart, savvy" management of the financial and economic crisis. 
"The government," he said, "has been able to shift gears on the run, 
and learn and adapt very quickly."  Konishi said that Kazakhstan 
must still diversify its economy away from a reliance on the 
extractive industries, but he complimented the government's fiscal 
discipline and cooperation with international financial institutions 
(IFI).  Konishi said Prime Minister Masimov is concerned that the 
price of oil will fall in the near future, and the economy will 
experience a "W"-shaped recovery, with the second dip yet to come. 
According to Konishi, the government and World Bank are negotiating 
the terms of the government's recently requested $1-2 billion loan. 
When asked why the government did not draw upon its $25 billion 
National Oil Fund, Konishi suggested that a World Bank loan would be 
politically more palatable.  "Once you begin to erode the Oil Fund," 
he said, "you create a crisis of confidence." 
 
MASIMOV'S STRATEGIC PLAN 
 
5.  (SBU) Konishi said Masimov convenes regular brainstorming 
sessions with deputy prime ministers and World Bank vice presidents. 
 He said the debate during these half-day sessions is "lively and 
very sophisticated."  According to Konishi, Masimov typically 
watches, listens, and learns from the debates, and "then he 
implements."  Masimov, according to Konishi, asked the next World 
Bank brainstorming session to discuss Kazakhstan's "territorial 
development" and "economic geography," in order to ensure even, 
sustainable growth throughout the country.  Konishi said the 
majority of jobs and wealth are concentrated in Astana, Almaty, and 
Atyrau, while southern cities such as Shymkent are of particular 
interest for further development.  (NOTE:  Masimov also raised this 
issue with CODEL Boehner on August 8, reftel.  END NOTE). 
 
THE MALAYSIAN MODEL 
 
 
ASTANA 00001891  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
6.  (SBU) Commenting on the government's negotiations to restructure 
BTA Bank debt, Konishi said, "I think they've done well to protect 
their interests, and are unlikely to bend" to accommodate export 
credit agencies and other creditors.  Konishi also suggested that 
Kazakhstan is moving toward a "Malaysian model," which involves 
"picking winners and backing national champions." 
 
UZBEKISTAN'S ECONOMIC STABILITY 
 
7.  (SBU) Konishi said that Uzbekistan has the most stable economy 
in the region, "much more stable than Kazakhstan, because the 
economy is so closed."  He said that none of the country's banks 
suffered during the global financial crisis, because they were not 
tied to the international financial system.  In public, Uzbek 
officials have boasted about the country's isolation from the 
international economic crisis.  In private conversations with the 
bank, however, Konishi said that Uzbek officials have sought the 
bank's advice, concerned that Uzbekistan must diversify its economy 
to reduce its dependence on commodities such as cotton, gold, and 
gas.  He added that the food processing industry has potential, as 
long as the agricultural sector remains stable. 
 
HYDROPOWER POLITICS 
 
8.  (SBU) According to Konishi, Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov 
recently sent a letter to World Bank President Robert Zoellick, 
offering to participate in an international consortium to build a 
hydropower plant, if the World Bank could guarantee the security and 
quality of water supply and the seismic stability of the plant. 
Konishi considered this project feasible, given Russian, Chinese, 
Iranian, and even Pakistani interest in Central Asia's downstream 
energy supplies. 
 
TURKMENISTAN MAY BE OPENING UP 
 
9.  (SBU) Konishi said Turkmenistan is similar to Uzbekistan, in 
that both have stable but closed economies and must diversify away 
from a dependence on commodities.  According to Konishi, 
Turkmenistan's President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov is interested in 
engaging with the outside world, and has made some progress in doing 
business with international companies.  However, he remains somewhat 
leery of large, private companies from big countries. 
 
THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
10.  (SBU) Konishi, who worked from 1997-2009 as the World Bank's 
Sector Manager for Water Supply and Sanitation, said that global 
climate change will eventually have a mixed, but decisive, impact on 
Central Asia, particularly affecting water resources.  He speculated 
that northern areas in Central Asia will ultimately become warmer 
and wetter, improving their chances for agricultural growth. 
However, southern areas, which now rely on agriculture, could become 
too hot and dry for some crops. 
 
A REGIONAL ENERGY MARKET 
 
11.  (SBU) Konishi sees huge potential for a common Central Asian 
energy market.  He noted that the region contains abundant supplies 
of oil, gas, and coal in addition to untapped energy from hydro, 
geothermal, solar, and wind power.  He mused that a Central Asian 
common energy market would offer the world's cheapest energy prices 
and would include one of the most diverse baskets of energy 
products.  However, he emphasized a lack of technology and tense 
relations among the Central Asian countries as two major factors 
that affect the development of a regional energy market.  Regarding 
technology, Konishi noted China's experimentation with solar and 
wind power, which it could potentially develop in Central Asia.  As 
for relations among the Central Asian countries, Konishi admitted 
that an expansive, common energy market in Central Asia is "all pie 
in the sky if they won't trust each other." 
 
ASTANA 00001891  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
 
12.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Konishi brings over 15 years of regional 
experience to his unique perspectives on the region.  His tour 
d'horizon shows that the economic success of each country will 
depend on the talents and decisions of individual decision-makers. 
But regional cooperation can produce tremendous gains, especially in 
the development of new forms of energy, if Central Asian states can 
slowly build trust through reliance on neutral actors, such as the 
World Bank.  END COMMENT. 
 
13.  (U) Embassies Ashgabat, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Tashkent have 
cleared this cable. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1886, KAZAKHSTAN: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY’S BILATERALS

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1886.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1886 2009-10-19 05:03 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3133
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1886/01 2920503
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 190503Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6649
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2045
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1416
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2115
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1605
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1470
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0084

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001886 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN, EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL ECON MNUC KNNP KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY'S BILATERALS 
EMPHASIZE NON-PROLIFERATION AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT 
 
ASTANA 00001886  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
REFTEL:  ASTANA 1814 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman 
discussed cooperation on counter-proliferation and peaceful nuclear 
energy production with several of Kazakhstan's most influential 
non-proliferation policymakers during his October 6-8 visit to 
Kazakhstan.  Poneman and his delegation, which included 
representatives from the Department of Defense, Department of State, 
and the National Security Council, met Sauat Mynbayev, Minister of 
Energy and Mineral Resources; Vladimir Shkolnik, Director of 
Kazatomprom; and Timur Zhantikin, Director of the Kazakhstani Atomic 
Energy Committee.  The delegation toured the decommissioned BN-350 
reactor in Aktau and inspected the remaining 300 metric tons of 
spent-fuel  -- which contains enough plutonium and highly enriched 
uranium to fabricate 775 weapons of mass destruction -- which the 
United States and Kazakhstan are preparing to ship to a secure 
storage facility.  Deputy Secretary Poneman's interlocutors thanked 
the U.S. government for its assistance in securing nuclear 
materials, and asked for increased cooperation to enhance nuclear 
safeguards and facilitate commercial developments in the nuclear 
industry.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SECURING SPENT-FUEL AT BN-350 REACTOR CONTINUES 
 
3.  (SBU) On October 6, the Deputy Akim of Mangystau Oblast, a Vice 
Director of the Mangystau Atomic Energy Company (MAEC), and the 
BN-350 nuclear reactor Plant Director led Deputy Secretary Poneman 
on tour of the reactor, which the United States decommissioned in 
1999.  In addition to the reactor itself, they saw the spent fuel 
storage area and the casks of spent fuel that will be loaded for 
transportation to a secure site for up to 50 years of safe storage. 
MAEC's BN-350 representatives demonstrated the U.S. technology used 
to ensure physical security at the BN-350 facility.  Due to the long 
history of U.S.-Kazakhstani cooperation at the site in Aktau, the 
atmosphere throughout the visit was positive and upbeat.  Poneman's 
interlocutors thanked the United States for "its tremendous help on 
all aspects of decommissioning BN-350" and proudly discussed plans 
to build a new (non-plutonium -producing) reactor on the BN-350 site 
to produce nuclear energy and desalinate water for Mangystau Oblast 
-- as BN-350 once did. 
 
4.  (SBU) MAEC and BN-350 officials also gave the delegation a 
guided tour of the U.S.-funded $3.35 million sodium processing 
facility (SPF).  Once the government of Kazakhstan completes a 
planned geo-cement stone facility, the SPF will be used to process 
radioactive sodium for safe storage in cement blocks fabricated in 
the geo-cement stone facility -- the final step in the safe disposal 
of waste from the nuclear reactor. 
 
KAZATOMPROM WANTS TO SELL URANIUM TO U.S. COMPANIES 
 
5.  (SBU) Vladimir Shkolnik, President of Kazakhstan's National 
Atomic Company, Kazatomprom, met the delegation in Almaty on October 
7.  Shkolnik -- a nuclear physicist and former director of BN-350 
with close relationships with U.S. officials from his prior tenure 
as the Minister of Industry and Trade -- said the United States and 
Russia are Kazakhstan's leading partners in nuclear 
non-proliferation.  Appearing friendly and relaxed throughout the 
meeting, Shkolnik expressed disappointment that Kazatomprom does not 
supply uranium to any U.S. companies, and advocated for an event to 
introduce U.S. and Kazakshtani nuclear companies to one another. 
 
CRADLE-TO-GRAVE FUEL CYCLE 
 
6.  (SBU) In response to Poneman's comments that the international 
commercial nuclear sector should provide fuel assurances to 
compliant members of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Shkolnik 
welcomed the concept as a necessary prerequisite to the expansion of 
the nuclear energy industry.  He replied jokingly that Kazakhstan 
"cannot refuse" to cooperate with the United States on the 
development of a reliable system of fuel assurances.  Shkolnik told 
 
ASTANA 00001886  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Poneman that, as a physicist, he is convinced that the closed 
nuclear cycle, which generates no waste, is the future.  Therefore, 
re-fabrication should be considered as one element of the proposed 
"cradle-to
-grave" fuel assurance cycle. 
 
GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP 
 
7.  (SBU) Poneman proposed that U.S. and Kazakhstani experts 
continue to discuss such issues over the next few weeks and on the 
margins of the October 23 Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) 
Ministerial in China.  (COMMENT:  Kazatomprom's President said he 
would be in China on October 15, but he appeared unfamiliar with 
GNEP.  Kazakhstan is a member of the GNEP, but Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resource officials told PolOff that Kazakhstan has not 
participated actively over the last year.  END COMMENT.) 
 
NO PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR FUEL BANK 
 
8.  (SBU) Concerning Kazakhstan's offer to create a nuclear fuel 
bank, Shkolnik said although the fuel bank would be feasible for 
Kazakhstan, the government has not initiated negotiations with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Shkolnik said Kazakhstan 
-- number one in uranium output this year -- possesses both the 
technology and the uranium resources to host the bank. According to 
Schkolnik, "for us, an international nuclear fuel bank is just a 
derivative from our production."  Shkolnik concluded by stating that 
Kazakhstan's decision to renounce its nuclear weapons allows it to 
serve as a good example to other countries -- and a good host for a 
fuel bank. 
 
KAZATOMPROM SEEKS COOPERATION ON BUILDING SMALL REACTORS 
 
9.  (SBU) Kazatomprom's President, a well-known advocate of nuclear 
power, affirmed that Kazakhstan plans to build a nuclear reactor at 
Aktau.  He explained that since the electric grid in Mangystau 
cannot accommodate a high-capacity reactor, Kazakhstan is 
considering constructing two 300-megawatt reactors.  Shkolnik said 
that Kazatomprom, which sees a need to develop reliable small to 
medium-size reactors in Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America, 
is considering expanding into this new commercial arena.  Poneman 
suggested that DOE and Kazatomprom experts discuss potential 
cooperation in the development of small, modular reactors -- an area 
in which DOE already has significant experience. 
 
ONLY 20 KILOGRAMS 
 
10.  (SBU) When asked about DOE's project to down-blend highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) from the experimental reactor at the 
Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP), Shkolnik -- a former director of 
the INP -- quickly told Poneman "this project is not in my 
jurisdiction."  Kazatomprom's President nonetheless remarked, "the 
supply of HEU for the INP reactor is only 20 kilograms of uranium, 
and it is very important for Kazakhstan to have new low enriched 
uranium fuel that will enable research." 
 
KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND SAFEGUARDS 
 
11.  (SBU) On October 8, Timur Zhantikin, another nuclear physicist 
well-known to U.S. officials and Director of Kazakhstan's primary 
regulatory body in charge of nuclear physical security, thanked the 
United States for cooperation on the BN-350 and INP projects. 
Zhantikin reiterated Shkolnik's call to cooperate on the physical 
security of small nuclear reactors.  Zhantikin said the Kazakhstani 
Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC) is working to produce nuclear 
isotopes for medicines and develop a research center for biophysics 
and nuclear medicine at INP.  Deputy Secretary Poneman expressed 
interest in potential cooperation in these fields. 
 
12.  (SBU) Poneman also told Zhantikin that the United States would 
like to discuss fuel assurances and Kazakhstan's nuclear fuel bank 
proposal, and that liability protection is an important 
pre-requisite for civil nuclear cooperation.  Zhantikin confirmed 
that Kazakhstan plans to ratify the convention on liability 
 
ASTANA 00001886  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
protection this year, but said Kazakhstan has not been considering 
any other liability-related conventions.  Zhantikin, Kazakhstan's 
highest-ranking delegate to this year's U.S.-Kazakhstan energy 
partnership working group on atomic energy and nuclear security, 
said he had already discussed -- and reached basic agreement with 
U.S. delegates -- on next steps for U.S.-Kazakhstani cooperation on 
nuclear safeguards (reftel). 
 
KAZAKHSTAN RELUCTANT TO GIVE UP HEU 
 
13.  (SBU) Poneman told Zhantikin that the U.S. government would 
like to proceed with the down-blending of the bulk HEU at the INP 
reactor as soon as possible.  Zhantikin explained that the INP 
project consists of several stages:  design of the reactor to use 
low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel instead of highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) fuel, verification of its operability, and down-blending of 
the remaining HEU after the new LEU fuel is qualified.  When asked 
about "de-linking" fuel qualification from HEU down-blending, 
Zhantikin admitted that the Kazakhstani government is not yet 
convinced that the new fuel will work.  Poneman promised further 
explanation and evidence that the new fuel will work.  Zhantikin 
also admitted that Kazakhstan's possession of HEU may be perceived 
as "a political problem," but reiterated that the INP's bulk HEU is 
protected under strict nuclear safeguards.  Zhantikin also asserted 
that HEU is less efficient for production of isotopes.  He proposed 
the introduction of a tariff -- or other market mechanism -- on 
HEU-produced isotopes to compensate for the efficiency losses faced 
by Kazakhstan and other countries utilizing LEU.  According to 
Zhantikin, such a proposal would use market forces to promote 
nuclear non-proliferation.  Alternatively, Zhantikin suggested 
nuclear certification "licenses," "just as companies are rewarded 
with ISO certifications for compliance with industrial standards." 
 
ENERGY PARTNERSHIP PROMOTES COOPERATION 
 
14.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Poneman's interlocutors on non-proliferation 
issues -- in Aktau, Almaty and Astana -- praised U.S.-Kazakhstani 
cooperation and asked for collaboration on small and medium-sized 
reactors and nuclear safeguards.  Shkolnik and Zhantikin, both 
scientists who were part of Kazakhstan's former nuclear program, are 
anxious to help Kazakhstan build a strong, peaceful nuclear program 
and reluctant to give up Kazakhstan's supply of bulk HEU until new 
LEU fuel is qualified.  Kazakhstan's influential nuclear 
policymakers want to ensure that the new LEU fuel will work before 
down-blending the bulk HEU.  By signing the October 8 Joint 
Statement and Action Plan in the context of the 6th U.S.-Kazakhstani 
Energy Partnership, the United States reiterated the importance the 
U.S. government attaches to a partnership which has promoted, and we 
hope will continue to promote, nuclear security and peaceful nuclear 
development.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1858, KAZAKHSTAN: ENERGY DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN BRIEFED ON

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1858.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1858 2009-10-16 05:19 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1594
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1858/01 2890519
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 160519Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6622
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2042
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1413
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2112
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1059
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1602
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1936

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001858 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC, S/EEE, S/CIEA, EUR/WE 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET EINV FR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  ENERGY DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN BRIEFED ON 
PIPELINE CONTRACT 
 
REF:  (A) ASTANA 1438 
      (B) ASTANA 1449 
 
ASTANA 00001858  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On October 6, during the visit of French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy to Astana, the government of Kazakhstan 
signed a memorandum of understanding with a consortium of French 
companies to study construction of a 730-kilometer, on-shore 
pipeline to carry crude oil from Eskene, near Atyrau, to the port of 
Kuryk, south of Aktau.  International oil companies (IOCs) had been 
engaged in negotiations with the government for months prior to the 
announcement, and have expressed concern that the deal will delay 
the $2 billion project.  Senior government officials told Deputy 
Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman that the government will retain 
100% ownership of the pipeline and guarantee tax stability, access 
rights, and market-based tariffs.  Also during Sarkozy's visit, 
Total SA, Europe's third-largest oil company, and GDF Suez SA agreed 
to buy 25% of the offshore Khvalynskoye natural gas field from 
national oil company KazMunaiGas (KMG).  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE ESKENE-KURYK PIPELINE 
 
3.  (SBU) On October 6, a consortium of predominantly French 
companies -- including Vinci SA, Entrepose Contracting SA, Spie 
Capag, Mannesmann France, Europipe GmbH, GTS Group, and 
ArcelorMittal -- signed an agreement with the government to study 
construction of an on-shore pipeline that would transport oil from 
Eskene, near the supergiant fields of Kashagan and Tengiz, to the 
Kazakhstani port of Kuryk, for onward shipment via tanker to Baku. 
The pipeline is a key component of the Kazakhstan Caspian 
Transportation System (KCTS) that will deliver Kazakhstani crude oil 
to Baku across the Caspian via tanker.  The contract is expected to 
be worth as much as $2 billion. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN WANTS TO BE A COMMON CARRIER 
 
4.  (SBU) On October 7, KMG President Kairgeldy Kabyldin told Deputy 
Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman that the French consortium 
received financial backing from the export credit agencies (ECA) of 
France and Japan for the construction of the Eskene-Kuryk pipeline. 
He also confirmed that the companies will not acquire equity in the 
pipeline.  "It will be 100% owned by Kazakhstan.  Besides," he 
added, "the international oil companies are not in the pipeline 
business."  Kabyldin said the government's negative experience as a 
partner in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) convinced him that 
this was not the best model to follow for the Eskene-Kuryk pipeline 
project.  In particular, Kabyldin criticized the inefficiencies, 
delays, and cost overruns associated with the construction, 
management, and expansion of the CPC pipeline (ref A). 
 
5.  (SBU) Kabyldin said that before signing the agreement with the 
French consortium, KMG offered ExxonMobil and Chevron -- 
representing Kashagan and Tengiz respectively -- guaranteed access, 
preferential tariffs, and tax stability in exchange for a 
ship-or-pay commitment.  Unfortunately, he said, they were not able 
to come to an agreement.  Despite the MOU with the French 
consortium, Kabyldin said that KMG remains ready to continue 
negotiations with the IOCs on the KCTS project.  However, he 
stressed that the government will insist on maintaining complete 
ownership of the transportation infrastructure.  "If we own the 
system," he said, "we can guarantee equal access and fair treatment 
to all.  We can act as a common carrier," and provide a service to 
all shippers, without discrimination or favoritism. 
 
MINISTER OF ENERGY EXPLAINS AGREEMENT WITH FRENCH 
 
6.  (SBU) During a private dinner at his residence in Astana on 
October 7, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Sauat Mynbayev 
told Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman that Kazakhstan was 
 
ASTANA 00001858  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
originally prepared to offer the IOCs a 49% equity stake in the 
pipeline (ref B).  Mynbayev said that the government would have 
retained a majority stake of 51% and the right to purchase the 
remaining shares at any time.  He also asserted that the government 
asked the IOCs to provide a loan to finance the share purchase, but 
they refused.  When Poneman noted that President Aliyev had told him 
in Baku on October 5 that Azerbaijan would not object
to the IOCs 
having equity participation in the KCTS, Mynbaev replied that the 
Government of Azerbaijan had insisted that the Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan governments would split their equity shares 50/50, and 
Astana was free to share the GOK's 50% share with the IOCs if it 
wished. 
 
7.  (SBU) According to Mynbayev, the government began in July to 
explore alternative financing arrangements to build the pipeline. 
The agreement signed with the French consortium on October 6 allows 
the government to borrow from France's export credit agency (ECA) to 
finance construction of the Eskene-Kuryk pipeline.  If it takes the 
loan, the government will sign an exclusive construction contract 
with the French consortium to build the pipeline, and, according to 
Mynbayev, award France a "pre-emptive right" to negotiate an 
exploration and production contract for an unspecified block. 
However, Mynbayev said that if Kazakhstan is able to borrow from the 
Kashagan partners, or another source, then the government is not 
obligated to use the French companies, or negotiate an exclusive 
exploration and production contract with France.  Mynbayev confirmed 
to Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman that Kazakhstan will own 100% 
of the pipeline, but provide long-term, stable tariffs and 
guaranteed access. 
 
IOC CONCERNS ABOUT DELAYS 
 
8.  (SBU) On October 12, Patty Graham, Director of Government 
Relations for ExxonMobil Kazakhstan, told Energy Officer that the 
agreement with the French consortium may delay construction of KCTS 
and will be an unwelcome distraction for the Kashagan consortium, 
which must make critical decisions by the end of the year on Phase 
II production.  "KMG now has a new opening to discuss third-party 
financing," she said.  "Normally, that takes one or two additional 
years, because investment banks need more reassurance and 
guarantees."  Graham said the French export credit agency will need 
at least six months to assess the risks and returns of the project 
before it commits financing for the pipeline.  As a result, she 
said, KMG will wait at least that long before it responds to an IOC 
offer to build the pipeline in exchange for a minority equity stake. 
 "We don't even know if we're in the ballpark," said Graham.  The 
agreement with the French consortium "creates significant delays," 
she said, "even before we've settled on a business model.  What if 
KMG decides at the end of the road that the terms are too onerous? 
The whole thing could unravel."  Graham added that the French 
agreement was not completely unexpected, since Total has always had 
its eyes set on the transportation component of the Kashagan field. 
 
9.  (SBU) Graham said that the consistency of messages from Mynbayev 
and Kabyldin on IOC participation in the Eskene-Kuryk pipeline was a 
clear indication that the decision came from the top (indicating 
specifically, Timur Kulibayev, Deputy Chairman of Samruk-Kazyna). 
She also suggested that the terms that will be offered by the ECAs 
will be more stringent than those that would have been offered by 
the IOCs, and she believes that the Kazakhstanis will ultimately not 
be able to meet the terms of the ECA loan. 
 
SHIPPERS V. OWNERS 
 
10.  (SBU) Graham said ExxonMobil and the other Kashagan partners 
are willing to participate in KCTS, even if they do not own equity 
in the project.  "Our concern is not that we might not be given 
ownership in the system," she said, "but rather that after months of 
negotiations, we still have not been able to agree on a business 
model."  Graham said that if the Kashagan partners were to be 
 
ASTANA 00001858  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
shippers only -- not owners -- they would need "a whole slew of 
guarantees on tariff stability and capacity access." 
 
KCTS COULD SHIP OIL TO IRAN 
 
11.  (SBU) On October 7, Jay Johnson, Managing Director of Chevron's 
Eurasia Business Unit, told Energy Officer that the French 
consortium will pay 85% of pipeline costs, but will not acquire an 
equity stake in the infrastructure.  He said the government insisted 
on retaining 100% ownership of the pipeline, which it will transfer 
to KMG.  Johnson also expressed concern that without the involvement 
of U.S. companies, the pipeline could be used to send oil to Iran. 
Although Graham agreed that the "Iran option" is an open 
possibility, she noted that the government's primary focus will be 
to build a transportation system to which all shippers will have 
access. 
 
DEAR FRIENDS 
 
12.  (U) According to wire reports, during the visit of French 
President Sarkozy on October 6, Total agreed to purchase a 17% 
stake, and GDF Suez an 8% share, of the Khvalynskoye gas field, 
jointly owned by KMG and Russia's Lukoil, which owns 50% of the 
field.  "The gas will be sent to Russia," Total Chief Executive 
Officer Christophe de Margerie said, adding that the French 
companies will contribute about $1 billion of the $3.5 billion to $4 
billion in estimated development costs.  Output may start in 2016 
and reach 8-9 billion cubic meters a year, he said.  Sarkozy and 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev oversaw the signing ceremony and 
referred to each other as "dear friends" at a business forum held 
after the talks.  Sarkozy praised Kazakhstan's role in securing 
stability in the volatile region and said Astana could help resolve 
the Afghan crisis.  When asked about criticism Kazakhstan has faced 
over its human rights record ahead of chairing the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Sarkozy said he was 
convinced Astana was moving towards OSCE standards.  "We have made 
our political choice, my dear friend, and I hope you will see that 
when France makes a political choice it sticks to it to the end," he 
told Nazarbayev. 
 
13. (SBU) COMMENT:  The agreement with the French consortium is not 
a done deal.  In fact, it is not a deal at all.  It is simply a 
memorandum of understanding that allows the government, in theory, 
to borrow money from an ECA at favorable rates in exchange for 
hiring French companies to build the pipeline.  As both KMG 
President Kabyldin and Minister of Energy Mynbayev made clear to 
Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman, the government is eager to 
resume negotiations with the IOCs whose volume commitments are 
essential if KCTS is to become operational.  Third-party financing 
from France's export credit agency may delay the government's 
negotiations with the IOCs, which in turn could adversely affect the 
pace of negotiations on CPC expansion.  The government's 
determination to own what it considers strategic infrastructure is 
understandable, and its commitment to provide stable, predictable 
access to KCTS should be taken seriously.  Despite a number of 
high-profile disputes -- most recently, BG Group's request for 
reimbursement of $1 billion in crude export duties -- the government 
has generally honored its commitments and kept its promises, 
particularly when the stakes are this high.  END COMMENT. 
 
14.  (U) Deputy Secretary Poneman has cleared this cable. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1857, KAZAKHSTAN: GEARING UP INSTITUTIONALLY FOR OSCE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1857.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1857 2009-10-16 05:05 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1577
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1857/01 2890505
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 160505Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6620
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2040
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1411
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2110
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1057
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2542
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2845
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1600
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1468
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2063

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001857 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE AF RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  GEARING UP INSTITUTIONALLY FOR OSCE 
CHAIRMANSHIP 
 
REF:  A.  ASTANA 1843 
      B.  ASTANA 1856 
 
ASTANA 00001857  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  During lunch on October 15, Doulat Kuanyshev, 
Kazakhstan's Ambassador-at-Large for OSCE Issues, described 
Kazakhstan's special state commission for the OSCE and again pressed 
the Ambassador for an OSCE summit in 2010.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (SBU) Doulat Kuanyshev, Kazakhstan's Ambassador-at-Large, whose 
portfolio includes OSCE Issues, and a former Ambassador to Paris and 
Vienna, told the Ambassador on October 15 that he is responsible for 
areas within the OSCE with the potential for conflict, especially 
the states of the former Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia).  At the 
moment, he does not have an official OSCE appointment, but 
Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister, Kanat Saudabayev, could 
institutionalize an OSCE position for him once Kazakhstan assumes 
the Chairmanship.  Kuanyshev confirmed Kazakhstan plans to appoint 
the current Secretary-General of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), Bolat Nurgaliev, as the OSCE Special 
Representative on Protracted Conflicts once his SCO responsibilities 
end January 1, 2010. 
 
4.  (SBU) According to Kuanyshev, President Nazarbayev created a 
special state commission for the OSCE to coordinate issues during 
Kazakhstan's Chairmanship.  This inter-agency body, headed by 
Foreign Minister Saudabayev, includes the Ministries of Defense, 
National Security (KNB), Internal Affairs, Transportation and 
Communications, Energy and Mineral Resources, Industry and Trade, 
Culture and Information, Environment, Education and Science, and 
Health.  The Foreign Minister will brief, and Presidential Foreign 
Policy Adviser Kairat Sarybai will advise, President Nazarbayev on 
guidance provided by the special commission.  Security Council 
Secretary Marat Tazhin, Prime Minister Karim Masimov, and Head of 
the Presidential Administration Aslan Musin will also be involved. 
Kuanyshev described the special commission as designed to provide 
internally for Kazakhstan "checks and balances, both of institutions 
and personalities." 
 
5.  (SBU) Kuanyshev predicted Kazakhstan will preserve a "continuity 
on OSCE priorities, with a bit more emphasis on topical, pivotal 
issues."  He said that Saudabayev is especially focused on making 
the OSCE relevant internally for Kazakhstan, and "not just on the 
external projection of Kazakhstan's image."  Continuing Kazakhstan's 
push for a summit (ref A), Kuanyshev stated that the OSCE needs an 
"event," and equated a successful Chairmanship with a summit.  He 
pointed to the change in U.S. administrations as a source of 
optimism due to its "new, inclusive, participatory style."  The 
Ambassador replied that both Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister and its 
Ambassador to the United States have been pressing this idea, which 
the U.S. government is currently examining.  Kuanyshev prodded, "The 
OSCE is a game where everyone should win."  Kuanyshev concluded, 
"The OSCE needs a summit.  Where and when is not critical for 
Kazakhstan." 
 
6.  (SBU) On potential summit topics, the Ambassador stated that the 
United States does not agree an OSCE summit, should there be one, 
should address European security architecture, because the Corfu 
process is the appropriate venue for that discussion.  Kuanyshev 
responded that Kazakhstan understands the U.S. position, but 
believes that other potential issues exist on which Kazakhstan could 
show leadership, such as Afghanistan or inter-ethnic/inter-religious 
tolerance.  Kuanyshev commented that the topic of Afghanistan could 
show Kazakhstan's "cooperative style, intentions, and its efforts on 
Afghanistan in terms of education (ref B)."  At the same time, he 
said, Kazakhstan is determining how to promote its role on 
inter-ethnic and inter-religious issues beyond the "human dimension 
basket." 
 
7.  (SBU) Kazakhstan hopes to use its Chairmanship to make "Central 
Asia more central on the OSCE map -- not as a student, but as a 
 
ASTANA 00001857  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
player with problems that it could work to solve, like the Aral 
Sea," Kuanyshev argued.  When the Ambassador replied that some 
regional leaders have expressed frustration of years and years of 
fruitless seminars and studies, Kuanyshev praised President 
Nazarbayev's ability to influence his presidential colleagues 
positivel
y, including in Moscow.  "Political decisions could 
overrule bureaucratic reservations," he claimed.  He noted the 
regular consultations between Kazakhstani Deputy Foreign Minister 
Konstantin Zhigalov and the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister in 
charge of OSCE issues, whom he said was currently in Astana for OSCE 
discussions. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1856, KAZAKHSTAN: NEW AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE AGENCY?

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1856.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1856 2009-10-16 02:09 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1453
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1856/01 2890209
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 160209Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6618
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2038
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1409
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2108
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1055
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2540
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2843
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1598
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1466
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001856 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, EUR/ACE, S/P 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID SOCI AF KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  NEW AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE AGENCY? 
 
ASTANA 00001856  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On October 14, Talgat Kaliyev, head of the 
Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign Affairs' new policy planning staff, 
told the DCM that with FM Saudabayev's endorsement, he is exploring 
plans to establish a bureau within the Foreign Ministry to 
coordinate Kazakhstan's planned $50 million in assistance to 
Afghanistan.  If successful, this Agency could eventually become 
Kazakhstan's variant of the Agency for International Development, 
primarily focused on South and Central Asia.  Kaliyev asked for U.S. 
government "recommendations, advice, and vision" on the concept, and 
stated his plan to travel to Washington for consultations.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (SBU) Talgat Kaliyev, head of the Foreign Ministry's new policy 
planning staff, briefed the DCM on his plan to develop an agency to 
coordinate government-wide assistance to Afghanistan on October 14. 
In his new job for just three weeks, Kaliyev, echoing both President 
Nazarbayev and FM Saudabayev, called Afghanistan one of the most 
urgent issues.  In the Kazakhstani government, many Ministries are 
involved in this arena, but they lack coordination, he said. 
Kaliyev stated his perception based on two years in Astana that "If 
you want to do something, you must do it yourself with the shortest 
chain of command.  Otherwise, it takes a very long time." 
Therefore, with the Foreign Minister's support, he is proposing the 
creation of a unit within the Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, with the working title "Kazakh-Afghan Bureau of 
Assistance."  This bureau would primarily focus on civilian aid in 
fields such as education, health, agriculture, and construction, and 
ensure "proper use" of Kazakhstan's $50 million commitment to 
Afghanistan. 
 
4.  (SBU) To establish the agency in the near future, Kaliyev plans 
to work with Kazakhstan's Ambassador-at-Large to the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, Shakrat Nurushev.  Once Nurushev returns 
from his trip to Beijing, Kaliev hopes to send a proposal to the 
Prime Minister's office with a draft decree that would establish the 
bureau.  At the same time, he proposes to recruit seven staffers 
with regional experience, primarily from the Foreign Ministry.  The 
bureau's first task would be to collect information from every 
Ministry and relevant Embassies.  It would then share this 
information with the United States and ask for feedback.  Based on 
these needs, it would seek information from companies.  Finally, the 
agency would direct assistance "without the bureaucracy.  It will be 
the American way of making business," he concluded proudly. 
 
5.  (SBU) Kaliyev said that once the proposal is completed, he hopes 
it will be implemented by a decree of the prime minister.  He 
requested U.S. support for the proposal when it becomes official. 
In order to establish relations and gain "recommendations, advice, 
and vision" on the concept, Kaliyev plans to travel to Washington. 
He promised to share a concept paper with the Embassy once he 
develops one.  In the long term, Kaliyev hopes that President Obama 
might send a letter of appreciation for the agency.  Kaliyev also 
shared his aspiration that the agency could become in a few years 
Kazakhstan's Agency for International Development focused primarily 
on South and Central Asia. 
 
6.  (SBU) In response to questions about Kazakhstan's current plan 
to bring to Kazakhstan thousands of Afghani undergraduate students, 
Kaliyev stated that the program remains a priority.  However, there 
has been a delay in signing the agreement, which Kaliyev speculated 
may have resulted from language questions.  Still, Kaliev affirmed 
the Ministry of Education's strong commitment, and the Minister's 
plans to travel to Kabul, possibly in December. 
 
7.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The policy planning function is a new one in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Kaliyev, formerly Political Counselor 
in Washington when FM Saudabayev was ambassador, is looking for 
concrete ways to advance initiatives of the president and foreign 
minister, including a larger role for Kazakhstan in Afghanistan. 
The bureau is not a fully formed idea, but Kaliyev may be attempting 
to influence both domestic and international politics with this 
ambitious proposal.  Inside the government, this plan would give the 
 
ASTANA 00001856  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Foreign Ministry significant power over diffuse assistance efforts. 

At the same time, it would allow the Foreign Ministry to better 
extend its reach internationally, by ensuring that Kazakhstan's 
efforts are known throughout the world, and potentially earning it a 
seat at the international donors' table.  Kaliyev is reaching out in 
the early planning stage, which could present us a useful 
opportunity to participate in another phase of Kazakhstan's 
development as a strategic partner.  About a decade ago, U.S. 
consultation and technical assistance helped to establish 
Kazakhstan's now well-functioning Security Council, modeled on 
Washington's National Security Council.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1853, KAZAKHSTAN: DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER REQUESTS MEETING WITH

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1853.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1853 2009-10-15 10:24 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0736
OO RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHSK
RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1853/01 2881024
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151024Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6613
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2033
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1593
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2061
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2535

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001853 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR G, SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, ECA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OEXC SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER REQUESTS MEETING WITH 
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  Deputy Prime Minister Yerbol Orenbayev would like to 
meet in Washington the last week of November with Secretary of 
Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius to seek linkages between 
the National Institutes of Health and Kazakhstan's new national 
university.  We encourage this meeting, because the university 
project is consistent with the Government of Kazakhstan's 
long-standing emphasis on education as a fundamental tool for 
national development.  Further, the desire for educational linkages 
and contacts with the West is in line with Kazakhstan's long-term 
goal to develop a national post-Soviet mentality for the future. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  Chief Executive Officer of National Medical Holding Almaz 
Sharman called on the Ambassador on October 14.  Sharman, an 
American citizen who maintains a residence in Bethesda, Maryland, 
provided extensive documentation on the establishment in Astana of 
New University, which will likely be officially named Nursultan 
Nazarbayev University (NNU) in 2010.  The initial academic block is 
already well under construction.  Planned to be a comprehensive, 
world-class university and research center, the initial phase will 
encompass a School of Public Policy, a School of Engineering, a 
School of Natural Sciences, and the NNU Health System.  The health 
system will include a Life Sciences Institute (for research), a 
School of Medicine, and the National Medical Holding.  The School of 
Medicine is already working with Partners Harvard Medical 
International on a long-term development plan, and is also working 
to include the University of Pittsburg Medical Center and Duke 
University.  Sharman's immediate goal is to establish relations with 
the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) with the view of 
developing a research partnership for the Life Science Institute. 
 
3.  Deputy Prime Minister Yerbol Orenbayev, who is well and 
favorably known to us, and Sharman would like to travel to 
Washington Thanksgiving week to meet with the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services (Orenbayev's letter to Secretary Sebelius is in 
para five below) and senior officials at the NIH.  Sharman asked 
that Embassy Astana make these appointments for them.  We said we 
would be glad to pass this information to Washington, but that 
Kazakhstan's Embassy in Washington should take responsibility for 
making the appointment, with the State Department assisting as 
needed. 
 
4.  COMMENT:  Although grandiose, the NNU project is consistent with 
the Government of Kazakhstan's long-standing emphasis on education 
as a fundamental tool for national development.  Further, the desire 
for educational linkages and contacts with the West is in line with 
Kazakhstan's long-term goal to develop a national post-Soviet 
mentality for the future.  END COMMENT. 
 
5.  BEGIN (LIGHTLY EDITED) TEXT OF LETTER: 
September 30, 2009 
 
Your Excellency 
Kathleen Sebelius 
U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services 
 
Dear Secretary Sebelius: 
 
First, let me congratulate you on your recent appointment as the 
United States Secretary of Health and Human Services.  We hope that 
in this position you will play an important role in addressing the 
challenges of global health in addition to domestic issues in the 
United States. 
 
I am writing this letter to inform you about a new initiative of the 
Government of Kazakhstan to establish Kazakhstan National University 
under the auspices of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. One of 
priorities of the new University will be medical education and 
biomedical research focusing on stem-cell engineering, molecular 
biology, nanomedicine, and other areas of cutting-edge biomedical 
research.  This letter is to express our interest in partnership 
between the new University and the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) in the areas of biomedical research and training of 
biomedical scientists. 
 
In mid-November I plan to travel to the United States and would be 
happy to meet with you and your staff to discuss details of the 
proposed partnership.  In the meantime, please find, below, 
information with a general description of the project. 
 
Medical School and the University 
 
ASTANA 00001853  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
The University will be located in Kazakhstan's capital city of 
Astana.  The new permanent campus will be ready in mid-2010 with 
120,000 square meters of space for classrooms, teaching labs, 
wet-lab research, and administrative offices.  The University will 
comprise four major schools:  Public Policy, Technology, Natural 
Sciences, and Biomedicine.  The campus will be located immediately 
adjacent to the National Medical Holding, the region's leading 
state-of-th
e-art tertiary-care hospital system with a total 1,200 
acute hospital beds.  The faculty and students will work closely 
with leading physicians and biomedical scientists in Kazakhstan. 
Our goal is to establish this Medical School in Astana in 
partnership with one of the leading academic centers in the United 
States.  The Government of Kazakhstan is expected to make 
investments to establish the partnership as part of Kazakhstan's 
strategy to become a leading center for medical education and 
biomedical research. 
 
The new Medical School in Astana will adopt the American model of 
post-baccalaureate medical education where students begin their 
medical studies after earning a bachelor's degree.  In fact, they 
will be studying towards the USMLE licensing.  The graduates will 
have the opportunity to build their careers as scholars in medical 
research, education, and patient care and acquire an option to apply 
for U.S. medical residency programs.  The goal is to create a new 
generation of physician-scientists to assume leadership positions in 
research, academia, and in health-care settings such as 
tertiary-care hospitals at the National Medical Holding. 
 
Biomedical Research 
 
We are seeking partnership with NIH in the field of biomedical 
research.  Specifically, we need assistance with establishing a 
state-of-the-art biomedical facility and developing joint research 
programs in such areas as cancer and stem-cell biology, 
cardiovascular and metabolic disorders, the science of ageing, and 
neurosciences.  This is expected to be a long-term program funded by 
the Government of Kazakhstan. 
 
The Medical School in Astana will be heavily involved in biomedical 
research.  The University expects to appoint 40-50 faculty staff who 
will be actively involved in research programs.  At least half of 
these Principal Investigators (PIs) are expected to be Kazakhstan 
residents, while the rest will be recruited internationally.  Each 
PI will manage a laboratory of 6-8 research staff, the bulk of which 
will likely be from the region, and comprised of students in medical 
(MD) and medical-scientist (MD/PhD) training programs, postdoctoral 
fellows, doctors undertaking research fellowships, and research 
assistants.  The Medical School in Astana hopes to train a 
significant number of clinical researchers from its program every 
year, thereby contributing to Kazakhstan's growing pool of clinical 
researchers. 
 
We sincerely believe that this project provides a unique opportunity 
to improve health and quality of life in Kazakhstan and the 
countries of the former Soviet Union.  Physician-scientists play a 
unique role in modern medicine, having received extensive training 
in both medicine and research.  Students entering the Medical School 
in Astana are expected to be among the best and brightest and highly 
motivated.  Graduates of the Medical School in Astana will be 
pioneers, as they are the core of a new generation of clinical 
researchers in Kazakhstan and the former Soviet Union who will 
spearhead efforts to develop new treatments for diseases and better 
methods of delivering healthcare, and contribute significantly to 
alleviating the suffering of patients in Kazakhstan and around the 
world.  Partnership with NIH would enhance the long-term positive 
aspects of the proposed program. 
 
We recognize that this proposal will need your careful review.  We 
would be happy to provide additional information you may need. 
 
Sincerely, 
Yerbol Orynbayev 
Deputy Prime Minister 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1844, KAZAKHSTAN: REQUEST FOR SECTION 1004 COUNTERNARCOTICS

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1844.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1844 2009-10-13 09:15 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8375
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #1844/01 2860915
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 130915Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1461
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6608
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1404
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2103
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1050
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1591
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001844 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, INL, EUR/ACE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL MASS MCAP PARM EAID KOMC KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN: REQUEST FOR SECTION 1004 COUNTERNARCOTICS 
SUPPORT 
 
ASTANA 00001844  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Embassy Astana Country Team and Deputy Chief of Mission have 
approved the Kazakhstan FY10 request for DOD support under Section 
1004 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as 
amended for support concerning the Government of Kazakhstan 
Counternarcotics (CN) effort. 
 
2.  Embassy Astana is concerned with narcotics trafficking activity 
in Central Asia.  The current level of drug-related activity and 
internal distribution in Kazakhstan jeopardizes U.S. objectives in 
the region.  Furthermore, narcotics destined for the United States, 
Europe, and other international markets are transshipped from 
Afghanistan through Kazakhstan. 
 
3.  The Government of Kazakhstan CN Program represents a significant 
resource in fighting terrorism.  The U.S. Government sees a 
connection between narcotics trafficking and terrorism in this 
region.  The programs and organizations outlined in this request 
support the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Office, and Department of Defense objectives in 
the region.  The request includes the following in order of 
priority. 
 
4.  Ministry of Internal Affairs Kennel Renovation:  The Committee 
on Combating Drug Business and Control over Circulation of Drugs, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan lacks the facilities to 
accommodate its drug-detecting dogs appropriately and to provide 
adequate office and classroom space for dog handlers and 
instructors. Current facilities require complete renovation to 
increase the capabilities of Canine Service Centers in support of 
counternarcotics operations by specialized units in border regions. 
Three Canine Service Centers in southern Kazakhstan require 
renovation and construction of some of the life support elements. 
Therefore, the Committee has requested minor construction and 
renovation support.  Developing the Canine Service Centers will 
allow local law enforcement units and counter-narcotic units to 
prevent contraband trafficking, to include narcotics coming from 
Afghanistan through Kazakhstani territory to international markets 
in Europe. 
 
5.  Military Institute Canine Training Center Development: 
Kazakhstan?s Military Institute of the National Security Committee 
is the main training institution providing personnel to fulfill 
positions primarily within the Border Guard Service, one of the 
Government of Kazakhstan agencies performing the CN mission. The 
Military Institute also partners with other countries in the region 
to train their border services officers and cadets. The Canine 
Training Section of the Institute requires a construction of several 
small-size buildings to increase its capabilities in training cadets 
and other services? dog handlers and their canines. Within this 
item, the first priority is the construction of a classroom 
building. Secondary effort should be the construction of 
administrative building for instructor offices. The third priority 
is to construct the billeting facility for international cadets or 
instructors coming to attend or provide canine training. The 
Government of Kazakhstan considers assistance provided to its law 
enforcement training institutions as an effective long-term method 
of improving drug interdiction capabilities. 
 
6.  Border Service Aviation Maintenance Facility:  The long and 
porous borders of Kazakhstan in the south with mountainous and flat 
terrain make them hard to control for vehicular and dismounted 
patrols. Therefore the Border Service of the National Security 
Committee, as the agency responsible for border security, is looking 
to equip its short-handed forces with aviation assets and ground 
surveillance equipment. The Border Service?s aviation unit has a 
number of helicopters that support interdiction of narcotics 
trafficking along land borders, maritime patrolling, and other 
border security related activities. The helicopters are serviced at 
a single Border Service airbase, located near Almaty. That Aviation 
Maintenance Center requires complete renovation of its hangar. The 
hangar is used to shelter helicopters when they undergo maintenance 
and repair. The priority effort in this area is in improving the 
hangar roof, reinforcing its structure and heating the hangar for 
winter sustained. 
 
7.  The Government of Kazakhstan CN programs require this 1004 
assistance now as a vital component of national and regional 
 
ASTANA 00001844  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
stability.  This assistance will also lessen the
amount of narcotics 
which transit through Kazakhstan and weaken support to local 
organized crime elements counterproductive to the rule of law. 
 
8.  Embassy Astana certifies that as of September 30, 2009 there is 
no evidence of gross violations of human rights by the personnel of 
Border Service of the National Security Committee or the Committee 
on Combating Drug Business and Control over Circulation of Drugs of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan. 
 
9.  POC for this request is LTC James G. Yentz, Chief, Office of 
Military Cooperation, +7 7172 70-2321 or email yentzj@state.gov. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1843, KAZAKHSTAN PRESSES AGAIN ON OSCE SUMMIT, ANNUAL

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1843.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1843 2009-10-13 08:12 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8318
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1843/01 2860812
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130812Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6605
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 2030
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1401
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1047
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2100
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1588
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1458
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2837
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2532

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001843 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR P, S/P, SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RPM, EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE RS CH AF KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN PRESSES AGAIN ON OSCE SUMMIT, ANNUAL 
BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS 
 
REF: ASTANA 1840 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland 
 
1.  (C) To follow up on the October 7-8 visit to Astana by 
Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman, the Ambassador met 
on October 12 with Deputy Foreign Kairat Umarov to seek 
clarification how the Foreign Ministry would coordinate 
Kazakhstan's inter-agency process to designate a single lead 
entity for the U.S.-funded biological threat reduction 
Central Reference Laboratory to be built in Almaty (reftel). 
Umarov raised two other points -- Kazakhstan's keen desire to 
organize an OSCE summit during its 2010 chairmanship, and the 
proposed U.S.-Kazakhstan Annual Bilateral Consultations 
(ABC).  He provided a non-paper on the ABC (text in para six 
below) that included a proposal that the ABC be designated 
the "Nazarbayev-Obama Commission."  Please see action request 
in para seven below. 
 
OSCE SUMMIT 
 
2.  (C) Umarov reiterated Kazakhstan's standard arguments for 
organizing an OSCE summit during its 2010 chairmanship, and 
requested U.S. support for this effort.  He said that 
Kazakhstan has considered several summit agendas, including 
religious tolerance and non-proliferation, but is leaning 
increasingly strongly toward Afghanistan, especially after 
Foreign Minister Saudabayev's recent meetings in New York 
with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard 
Holbrooke.  Umarov said, "This (topic) frankly would not be 
easy for us.  It would not be very popular domestically and 
most certainly not with 'our big partner' (Russia) that is 
pushing us hard for an OSCE summit to promote a new European 
Security Treaty.  The 'big partner' does not want OSCE to 
become involved in Afghanistan.  However, we understand that 
Afghanistan is President Obama's most serious and 
far-reaching foreign-policy priority -- it will be his 
defining moment.  We want to be helpful to your president. 
We have said from the beginning we want to be in lock-step 
with you to thank you for allowing us to become the OSCE 
chairman.  This is a great honor for us, and it is only 
because the United States agreed."  The Ambassador assured 
Umarov that he would convey this information and seek 
Washington's views. 
 
ANNUAL BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS 
 
3.  (C) Passing over a non-paper in Russian and in English, 
Umarov said that Kazakhstan warmly welcomes the U.S. 
initiative to establish the ABC as soon as possible. 
Kazakhstan is ready to engage fully on all dimensions of the 
ABC, but believes it is necessary that Presidents Obama and 
Nazarbayev head the ABC as a Presidential Commission "to keep 
things moving forward, because bureaucracies always tend to 
bog down.  We're at the smoothest point in our bilateral 
relationship that we've seen for the past 10 years.  Most of 
us what to take advantage of that to move forward in all, I 
emphasize all, key areas."  The Ambassador cautioned that 
Washington is not likely to approve a Presidential 
Commission, but that we would be fully committed to move 
forward our bilateral relations, using the mechanism of the 
ABC to the fullest extent possible. 
 
4.  (C) At the end of the meeting, Umarov dismissed Americas 
Director Askar Tazhiyev and his own note-taker.  Walking the 
Ambassador into his private office, he said he had been 
authorized to explain further.  "We want you to understand 
that the bilateral relationship is at a very sensitive point. 
 President Nazarbayev is increasingly pleased with its 
substance, tone, and balance, and feels he can trust the 
 
ASTANA 00001843  002 OF 003 
 
 
United States more than ever before.  That's why he named 
Saudabayev Foreign Minister.  The election of President 
Obama, who is respected in Kazakhstan, has given President 
Nazarbayev the political space he needs to enhance the 
U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship.  The Nobel Peace Prize has only 
improved the public's good feelings about President Obama and 
the United States.  Nazarbayev increasingly feels political 
pressure from Russia and economic pressure from China.  He 
needs the symbolic visibility of a strong U.S. relationship &#x000A
;to maintain balance -- thus, our proposal for a presidential 
commission.  Further, while the majority of the government is 
enthusiastic about an enhanced relationship with the United 
States, a few agencies oppose it strongly and argue 
forcefully to Nazarbayev that he cannot trust the United 
States because it wants to overthrow him and steal 
Kazakhstan's natural resources." 
 
5.  (C) The Ambassador suggested that this is the worst 
possible kind of old-think.  Umarov replied, "Maybe.  But it 
is our reality, and we're asking you to understand and help 
us move forward.  The president is thinking and calculating 
geopolitically, as he has always done.  We hope that you will 
communicate this to your decision-makers."  The Ambassador 
responded that he understood the wider context of this 
explanation and would pass these views to Washington.  He 
cautioned that the Washington inter-agency process is long 
and complicated, but that these views would be factored into 
the on-going policy debates. 
 
6.  (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER: 
 
(Title) Annual Bilateral Consultations 
 
Kazakhstan has reviewed the United States' proposals to 
establish regular bilateral policy consultations in order to 
enlarge and deepen our strategic partnership. 
 
We agree with the proposal to arrange consultations in 
alternating capitals on an annual basis with a six-month 
review between annual sessions to monitor agreed work-plan 
time-lines. 
 
We support the suggestion to divide the Commission's activity 
in the form of Working Groups covering the following 
subjects:  political, security, human dimension, economic and 
development issues, energy. 
 
We agree with the idea to involve into the Working Group on 
Economic and Development Issues questions of business and 
business organizations, and to include American and Kazakh 
NGOs in the Working Group on the Human Dimension. 
 
We also support that these consultations will take into 
account existing bilateral and regional initiatives such as 
the bilateral talks being planned under the auspices of the 
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), the Public 
Private Economic Partnership Initiative (PPEPI), and the 
Kazakh-American Joint Commission on Energy Partnership. 
 
We propose to institutionalize such consultations in a format 
of Kazakh-American Commission at the higest level -- 
"Nazarbayev-Obama Commission."  At the same time, heads of 
the foreign offices of our States will coordinate the 
Commission's work. 
 
Also, according to the previous agreements, we expect to 
receive the proposals for the heads of each Working Group 
from the American side. 
 
END TEXT. 
 
 
ASTANA 00001843  003 OF 003 
 
 
7.  (SBU)  ACTION REQUEST:  Because we have received this 
proposal officially, we request Washington's guidance on how 
to respond.  END ACTION REQUEST. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks