Monthly Archives: November 2009

09ASTANA2100, KAZAKHSTAN TO STUDY PLANS FOR SAMSUN-CEYHAN PIPELINE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2100.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2100 2009-11-30 10:43 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2689
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2100/01 3341043
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301043Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6931
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2203
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1567
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2268
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1202
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2222
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1762
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1612
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2041

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002100 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC, S/EEE, S/CIEA 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET KZ RS TK AJ IT
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN TO STUDY PLANS FOR SAMSUN-CEYHAN PIPELINE 
 
REF:  (A) ANKARA 1592 
      (B) ASTANA 2005 
      (C) ASTANA 2007 
 
ASTANA 00002100  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Meeting in Yalta on November 20, Russian Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin and Kazakhstani Prime Minister Karim Masimov 
witnessed the signing of a protocol to study plans for the 
construction of an oil pipeline between the Turkish cities of Samsun 
and Ceyhan.  The pipeline could ultimately carry crude from 
Kazakhstan's largest oil fields, including Tengiz and Kashagan, from 
the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, where it would effectively 
enter the world market.  The agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan 
comes less than one month after President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
visited Turkey from October 22-24.  During his visit, Nazarbayev 
announced that Kazakhstan and Russia are prepared to participate in 
the construction of the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, although questions 
remain concerning the equity structure, volume commitments, and 
transit tariffs of the proposed venture.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NAZARBAYEV'S VISIT TO TURKEY IN OCTOBER 
 
3.  (SBU) President Nazarbayev's visit to Turkey on October 22-24 
highlighted the strong and growing cultural and economic ties 
between the two countries (ref A).  An economic officer from the 
Turkish Embassy involved in preparations for Nazarbayev's visit told 
Energy Officer on November 20 that six ministers, dozens of business 
leaders, and local government officials accompanied Nazarbayev. 
According to Turkish Econoff, the delegation included Foreign 
Minister Kanat Saudabayev, Minister of Defense Adilbek Jaksybekov, 
Minister of Education and Science Zhanseit Tuimebayev, Minister of 
Industry and Trade Aset Isekeshev, Minister of Information and 
Culture Mukhtar Kul-Mukhammed, Minister of Tourism and Sport 
Temirkhan Dosmukhanbetov, the Chairman of National Welfare Fund 
Samruk-Kazyna Kairat Kelimbetov, Almaty oblast governor Yesimov 
Akhmetzhan, and Astana oblast governor Imangali Tasmagambetov. 
Turkish Econoff said that Turkey and Kazakhstan signed a number of 
cooperation agreements during the visit, including ones on science 
and technology, environment, tourism, education, and energy. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN WILL SHIP GAS VIA TURKEY 
 
4.  (SBU) During his visit to Turkey, Nazarbayev acknowledged 
Turkey's important role as a transit country for Central Asian 
energy resources and underscored that Kazakhstan's oil and gas will 
flow through Turkey.  Turkish Econoff said the Turkish government 
was particularly impressed by Nazarbayev's clear, unequivocal 
statement that both Kazakhstani oil and gas would transit Turkey, 
and reported that Nazarbayev specifically expressed Kazakhstan's 
support for the Nabucco gas pipeline to Europe. 
 
FROM BAKU-CEYHAN TO SAMSUN-CEYHAN 
 
5.  (SBU) Addressing the Turkish parliament on October 22, 
Nazarbayev announced that Kazakhstan and Russia are prepared to take 
part in the construction of the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline. 
According to the BBC, Nazarbayev said, "Just as we supported the 
construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline at the appropriate 
time, we are also ready, jointly with Russia, to take part in the 
construction of the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline."  Later that day, 
according to Reuters, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
announced that Kazakhstan might supply oil to the pipeline.  The 
project aims to provide a Bosporus bypass for Russian and 
Kazakhstani oil to world markets.  Turkish Econoff said Turkey's 
State Minister Faruk Celik stressed during a visit to Astana on 
November 17 the importance of relieving pressure on the Bosporus 
caused by oil-tanker shipments. 
 
A HISTORY OF THE SAMSUN-CEYHAN PIPELINE 
 
 
ASTANA 00002100  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
6.  (U) On September 26, 2005, Italy's Eni and Turkey's Calik Enerji 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate on the project. 
They completed a pipeline feasibility study in March 2006 and the 
Front-End Engineering Design Phase in 2007.  On October 19 in Milan, 
Russia and Turkey signed an intergovernmental agreement to guarantee 
a stable regulatory framework and consent to the partic
ipation of 
Russian oil companies Transneft and Rosneft in the project.  The 
pipeline, which is expected to cost more than $2 billion, will be 
constructed, owned, and operated by the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline 
Company (TAPCO), a 50-50 joint venture of Eni and Calik Enerji 
incorporated in Turkey.  The 550-km (340-mile) pipeline will have a 
maximum capacity of 1.5 million barrels a day.  Eni Chief Executive 
Officer Paolo Scaroni has said oil from the Kashagan and 
Karachaganak fields in Kazakhstan could be used to fill the 
pipeline.  (NOTE:  Eni owns 16.67% of Kashagan and 32.5% of 
Karachaganak.  END NOTE). 
 
THE YALTA PROTOCOL 
 
7.  (U) Meeting in Yalta on November 20, Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin and Kazakhstani Prime Minister Karim Masimov 
witnessed the signing of a protocol to study plans for the 
Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline.  Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko 
announced the protocol, which amends an oil transit agreement of 
June 7, 2002.  "We have amended our plans in the protocol," he said. 
 "We amended the projected oil balance for the next few years, the 
routes of transportation, and it is an essential piece of news that 
the words 'Samsun' and 'Ceyhan' are appearing in our relations for 
the first time." 
 
RUSSIA READY TO DEAL WITH TURKEY 
 
8.  (SBU) On November 23, Arman Darbayev, Director of the Oil 
Transportation Department at national oil company KazMunaiGas (KMG) 
told Energy Officer that KMG was not directly involved in preparing 
the Yalta protocol.  He suggested that the decision was political, 
not economic, and was made at the highest levels of government. 
Darbayev speculated that Russia switched its support from the 
Bourgas-Alexandropolis oil pipeline project to Samsun-Ceyhan, 
because "the Turks are easier to deal with than the Bulgarians, and 
they are ready to do business.  They are ready to invest their own 
capital, work with all partners, and move quickly to the 
construction phase."  Darbayev said that Kazakhstani crude from the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline would likely flow through 
Samsun-Ceyhan instead of Bourgas-Alexandropolis, despite the fact 
that CPC members have a vague commitment to ship through 
Bourgas-Alexandropolis.  He also suggested that Russia will want to 
take an equity stake in the Samsun-Ceyhan project, as would 
Kazakhstan. 
 
9.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Although the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline is well past 
the design phase, many unanswered questions about the project 
remain.  It is unclear whether Russia or Kazakhstan will take an 
equity position in the consortium, what volume of crude they (or 
international oil companies) will commit to the pipeline, and how 
the pace of construction might be affected by other oil pipeline 
projects, such as the planned expansion of the CPC, expansion of 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), and construction of 
Bourgas-Alexandropolis.  However, all parties agree on the need for 
additional transportation capacity to deliver increased volumes of 
crude from Kazakhstan to world markets.  The situation will become 
acute if CPC and BTC are not expanded to accommodate increased 
production from Tengiz and Kashagan in 2013.  Russia's role in the 
Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline project is also well worth watching, 
particularly if state-controlled companies Transneft and Rosneft 
take an equity stake in the consortium.  That could give Russia the 
ability to influence tariffs, volumes, and markets for Kazakhstani 
oil, which would undercut Kazakhstan's efforts to diversify export 
routes.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2099, KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENTIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP SUMMIT

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2099.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2099 2009-11-30 10:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2677
OO RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHSK
RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #2099/01 3341026
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301026Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6926
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2198
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1757
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2036

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ASTANA 002099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/P, R/PPR, EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ECON EINV EAID KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  PRESIDENTIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP SUMMIT 
 
REF:  STATE 112495 
 
ASTANA 00002099  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY:  This cable responds to reftel request for nominees 
from Kazakhstan for the Presidential Entrepreneurship Summit in 
2010.  It also summarizes Mission plans to conduct a series of 
public diplomacy events and business roundtables to highlight the 
importance of fostering entrepreneurship and creating jobs in 
Kazakhstan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) The U.S. Mission to Kazakhstan is pleased to respond to the 
Department's request to prepare for the Presidential 
Entrepreneurship Summit.  We believe that this event will 
demonstrate that the United States is a full partner in advancing 
economic opportunity in Kazakhstan and will provide public support 
and a lasting social network to the business and community leaders 
who attend. 
 
INTERAGENCY ENTREPRENEURSHIP WORKING GROUP ESTABLISHED 
 
3.  (U) Together with USAID Mission Director for Central Asia Andy 
Sisson, Ambassador Hoagland has established and will oversee an 
interagency working group on expanding economic opportunity.  The 
working group currently includes representatives from USAID, the 
U.S. Commercial Service, and the Political-Economic and Public 
Affairs sections of the Embassy. 
We are committed to the advancement of local entrepreneurship and 
economic opportunity, in particular through a unique partnership 
with USAID and the government of Kazakhstan, which co-finances the 
Program for Economic Development (PED). 
 
WORKING WITH LOCAL PARTNERS AND KEY STAKEHOLDERS 
 
4.  (U) The PED program funds several activities in support of 
entrepreneurship, including projects to promote policy dialogue, 
strengthen the commercial law framework, streamline administrative 
processes, and promote operational improvements for the benefit of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Kazakhstan. 
 
5.  (U) The Mission will conduct a roundtable in December to engage 
key stakeholders in entrepreneurship and economic opportunity, and 
will submit a plan of relevant activities separately.  Together with 
local partners such as the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham), 
Eurasia Foundation, Forum of Entrepreneurs, and the New University, 
we will also conduct a series of events in 2010 to promote the goals 
of the Summit. 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN 
 
6.  (U) The U.S. Embassy's public diplomacy plan for the 
Presidential Entrepreneurship Summit will consist of three major 
components: 
 
-- Entrepreneurship Roundtable:  The Embassy plans to organize a 
roundtable to discuss entrepreneurship in the lead up to the Summit. 
 This will be an opportunity to introduce the Summit to critical 
Kazakhstani audiences.  The Embassy will issue a press release 
quoting President Obama's Cairo speech and linking this initiative 
directly to that of the President.  We will also organize media 
coverage of the roundtable and look for an opportunity for a 
one-on-one interview with a business weekly in which the Ambassador 
can explain the goals of the Summit. 
 
-- The Public Private Enterprise Partnership Initiative (PPEPI): 
The Ambassador and Deputy Prime Minister co-chair this initiative, 
which engages business leaders from the United States and Kazakhstan 
to identify policy reforms that will improve the investment climate 
in Kazakhstan.  As the Summit approaches, the Embassy will encourage 
executives of the project's Secretariat, AmCham, to speak with the 
Kazakhstani press to describe the importance and anticipated impact 
of the Summit.  Through PPEPI, the Embassy will also contact 
Kazakhstani business leaders who can speak to the press about the 
Summit.  Not only will this outreach be good for PPEPI, but it will 
give an authentic, local voice to the Presidential Summit. 
 
-- Returning Summiters:  After the summit ends, the Embassy will 
plan an event to welcome Summit participants home and give them the 
opportunity to discuss their experiences.  This event could take the 
form of a roundtable discussion or a press conference panel, and it 
will be co-sponsored by the U.S. Embassy and PPEPI.  Press will be 
invited to cover the event and conduct side interviews with 
returning participants. 
 
THE NOMINEES FROM KAZAKHSTAN 
 
 
ASTANA 00002099  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
7.  (U) We are pleased to recommend the following outstanding 
Kazakhstani entrepreneurs for participation in the 2010 Presidential 
Entrepreneurship Summit.  In addition to being successful 
entrepreneurs, they are also community leaders dedicated to the 
long-term development of Kazakhstan.  Please note that Mission 
Kazakhstan has nominated 12 candidates, listed in priority order, to 
participate in the Summit, because it was exceedin
gly difficult to 
select only 10 entrepreneurs from Kazakhstan's deep talent pool. 
All nominees speak fluent English, except as noted. 
 
A.  Nurlan Smagulov, 43, Almaty.  President of Astana Group, 2008 
Ernst & Young Entrepreneur Of The Year.  Mr. Smagulov is the founder 
of Astana Group holding company, which comprises automotive sales, 
grain production and trading, and real estate development.  In the 
early 1990s, he founded a car dealership that sells international 
automotive brands.  Today, the company is a national leader with 
dealerships throughout the country.  In the mid-1990s, Mr. Smagulov 
launched a new business and developed a vertically-integrated 
structure for grain production, processing, and trading on domestic 
and international markets.  The company is now a leader in flour and 
pasta production in Kazakhstan, and one of the largest grain 
exporters in the country.  Mr. Smagulov then invested in real estate 
development.  The first Mega shopping mall began operations in 2006 
in Almaty.  Since then, the brand has expanded to other cities in 
Kazakhstan and provides an international standard shopping 
experience for domestic consumers.  Mr. Smagulov has said, 
"Kazakhstan is a young country which is steadily developing toward a 
market economy.  The Entrepreneur Of The Year Award is recognition 
not only of our company's strategy and our past achievements, but 
also our daily determination during times of uncertainty.  And this 
award is a strong motivation to work further and contribute to the 
community." 
 
B.  Raimbek Batalov, 39, Almaty.  Founder and Chairman of Raimbek 
Group, a diversified food products company founded in 1992.  In 
2002, Mr. Batalov was elected Chairman of the Board of the Forum of 
Entrepreneurs, a position he continues to hold today.  As a 
successful businessman and Chairman of the Forum, he strives to 
create a favorable investment climate in which small and 
medium-sized enterprises in Kazakhstan can operate profitably, 
deliver quality consumer products, create jobs, and diversify the 
economy.  Mr. Batalov has been a member of the Presidential Council 
of Entrepreneurs since 2006.  In 2005, he was appointed Chairman of 
Kazakhstan's delegation to the Business Council of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, a multilateral organization promoting 
security, economic, and cultural cooperation between China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. 
 
C.  Yerzhan Mandiyev, 37, Ust-Kamenogorsk, East Kazakhstan. 
President of Asia Auto since November 2003, shortly after the 
company was established in December 2002.  Mr. Mandiyev joined the 
automotive industry after working in Kazakhstan's banking sector. 
He began with an ambitious plan to establish a domestic automobile 
industry capable of producing competitive vehicles locally, to meet 
consumer demand in Kazakhstan and neighboring countries.  At first, 
Asia Auto only assembled cars, but under Mr. Mandiyev's leadership, 
the company began producing ornamental rings and harnesses, and 
opened branch offices throughout Kazakhstan.  Mr. Mandiyev also 
rapidly expanded the range of cars assembled by Asia Auto, starting 
with the Niva in 2003, the Skoda Octavia in 2005, and a range of 
Chevrolet products in 2007.  Today, Asia Avto assembles the 
Chevrolet Lacetti, Epica, and Captiva automobiles, and has produced 
sample units of the Cadillac Escalade, Cadillac CTS, and Hummer H2 
and H3 vehicles.  Mr. Mandiyev plans to build a new plant with a 
design capacity of 120,000 cars a year, which will provide jobs to 
4,000 residents in East Kazakhstan Oblast.  The development of 
Kazakhstan's domestic automobile industry under Mr. Mandiyev's 
supervision has had a multiplier effect, as it promotes adjacent 
industrial sectors that manufacture auto components, spare parts, 
tires, auto glass, and electronics.  Mr. Mandiyev is an active 
promoter of entrepreneurial values and represents the interests of 
domestic entrepreneurs as a member of the management board of the 
Atameken Union of Entrepreneurs and the Presidential Council of 
Entrepreneurs. 
 
D.  Alexander Deriglazov, 40, Ust-Kamenogorsk, East Kazakhstan. 
Founder and CEO of Meloman, Kazakhstan's leading distributor of 
movies, music, and other copyrighted material.  With an unwavering 
commitment to the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), 
Mr. Deriglazov has become one of Kazakhstan's most prominent 
advocates for strengthening IPR protection.  He maintains a strong 
working relationship with the Ministry of Justice's IPR Committee 
and has made significant contributions to developing IPR legislation 
in Kazakhstan.  In July 2009, his efforts paid off when the 
 
ASTANA 00002099  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
Copyright Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan was amended to allow for 
the protection of phonographic media rights, which secured regional 
distribution rights for licensed audio and video media.  This has 
greatly improved the ability of both law enforcement and licensed 
media distribution outlets such as Meloman to pursue and prosecute 
businesses and individuals selling pirated media.  With U.S products 
comprising a significant portion of his retail business, Alexander 
has been a reliable Embassy contact for several years, always taking 
the time to provide valuable input to IPR reporting.  In January and 
February 2008, Alexander participated in the International Visitors 
Leadership Development program on Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights.   A native of Zyyanovsk, East Kazakhstan, Alexander 
graduated from Ust Kamenogorsk Technical University in 1992. 
 
E.  Andrei Chagai, 38, Almaty.  Co-owner and managing partner in a 
Kazakhstani-U.S. joint venture that operates coffee shops in Almaty 
under the Coffeedelia brand.  Mr. Chagai was on a SABIT internship 
from June-December 1998 with Statco International in Seattle, 
focusing on general business training, operational excellence, and 
Good Manufacturing Practices.  After several years of hard work and 
detailed negotiations, he and Statco established a joint venture 
(Marco Polo) in 2005, and opened a network of coffee shops.  When he 
returned to Kazakhstan in 2005, Mr. Chagai established a joint 
venture with Statco to open a network of coffee shops.  Their first 
enterprise employed 30 Kazakhstanis and introduced a new business 
culture and management standards for Kazakhstan.  Today, Coffeedelia 
is one of the most stylish and successful coffee shops of 
Kazakhstan.  In February 2008, the company opened its second coffee 
shop, and hired an additional 35 people.  Mr. Chagai and his 
partners are now considering expanding their business by registering 
Coffeedelia as a franchise. 
 
F.  Nurlan Kapparov, 39, Almaty.  Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of the Lancaster Group.  In 1990, Mr. Kapparov founded Accept 
Corporation, where he was President from 1991-97.  He served as 
President and CEO of Kazakh national companies KazTransOil from 
1997-98 and KazakhOil from 1998-99.  Mr. Kapparov was appointed 
Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral
 Resources in 
1999, where he worked until 2001 and was responsible for monitoring 
the oil and gas sector. In 2000-01, he served as Chairman of the 
North Caspian Operating Committee (Kashagan) and also led the team 
negotiating delimitation of the Caspian Sea between Russia and 
Kazakhstan.  In 2003, Mr. Kapparov became Chairman of the Lancaster 
Group and served as Independent Director of PetroKazakhstan from 
2003-05.  Currently, Mr. Kapparov is Chairman of the Board of 
Trustees of the Jambyl Foundation.  He is also co-founder of the 
Harvard Club of Central Asia (HCCA) and was its first President, and 
is co-founder of the Republican Physics and Mathematics School 
Alumni Fund.  Mr. Kapparov is a member of the Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of 
Government at Harvard University.  He was born in 1970 in Almaty, 
and is a graduate of Almaty Technological Institute and the Kennedy 
School of Government. 
 
G.  Janat Berdalina, Almaty.  President, KPMG Kazakhstan and Central 
Asia.  Ms. Berdalina manages one of the most successful 
international tax and audit firms in Kazakhstan.  Since 1993, when 
she started her own consulting firm, Ms. Berdalina has been an 
active and influential advisor to international businesses and 
government officials in Kazakhstan.  She was just the seventh 
auditor to receive a license to practice in Kazakhstan, and was 
instrumental in developing the new Tax Code and Law on Auditing.  As 
an official with the Ministry of Finance, she helped to draft the 
regulations leading to the adoption and implementation of 
International Standards on Auditing.  From 1998 to 2002, Ms. 
Berdalina served as co-chair of the tax working group under the 
Foreign Investors' Council, the most exclusive business association 
in Kazakhstan, headed by President Nazarbayev.  Ms. Berdalina has a 
degree in international business from Bristol University (UK) and an 
MBA from the Ecole Nationale de Ponts Chaussees, (France). 
 
H.  Marina Kim, 51, Almaty.   Since graduating from Almaty Medical 
University in 1982 with a degree in pharmacology, Ms. Kim has been a 
pioneering leader of Kazakhstan's pharmaceutical sector.  In 1988, 
she was named assistant director of the Semipalatinsk pharmaceutical 
production association Pharmacia.  Ten years later, in 1998, she 
helped to found Romat, one of Kazakhstan's first private 
pharmaceutical companies.  Today, Romat is a vertically integrated 
pharmaceutical holding company with business lines in research and 
development, drug production and product distribution.  Romat owns 
and operates three modern manufacturing facilities, 18 branches 
throughout Kazakhstan, and more than 30 drug stores around the 
country.  Under Ms. Kim's leadership, Romat has established business 
relationships with more than 90 of the world's most successful 
 
ASTANA 00002099  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
pharmaceutical companies, including Pfizer (USA), Eli Lilly 
(Switzerland), Glaxo Smith Kline (Great Britain), and Nestle 
(Switzerland).  Romat's researchers recently patented a new 
anti-tuberculosis medicine and Ms. Kim has ambitious plans to 
license and market the drug globally.  For eight consecutive years, 
Romat has been nominated for an award as Kazakhstan's best 
pharmaceutical company, and in 2009, the company was honored as the 
best distributor of pharmaceutical products in Kazakhstan.  Romat 
employs more than 1400 people, 70% of whom are women.  In addition, 
women hold 80% of the company's management positions. 
 
I.  Aigul Solovyeva, 57, Atyrau.  Member of the Mazhilis (Lower 
Chamber of Parliament) since 2007, and Chair of the Civic Alliance 
Movement since 2006.  She has been honored with several public 
service awards, and serves on the Anticorruption Council.  Ms. 
Solovyeva began her career as a sole proprietor in the dairy 
processing industry, and is an alumnus of the Special American 
Business Internship Training (SABIT) program (1999, Standards in 
Food Processing and Packaging).  She began her public life as head 
of the Union of Business Women of Kazakhstan in 2002.  Since then, 
she has become a well-known activist for greater accountability, 
transparency and openness in Kazakhstan's business environment.  Ms. 
Solovyeva is a member of the government's Expert Council for Small 
and Medium Enterprise Development and is on the Presidential Council 
of Entrepreneurs.  Ms. Solovyeva speaks Kazakh and Russian, and will 
require English interpretation during the Summit. 
 
J.  Meruert Kazbekova, 48, Kokshetau.  President of the Union of 
Business Women of Kazakhstan.  Widely considered one of the most 
influential women in Kazakhstan, Ms. Kazbekova leads a 
well-developed network of business women's organizations throughout 
Kazakhstan and is a tireless supporter of increased training on 
women's leadership issues.  As a SABIT alumnus (2001, NGO 
development), Ms. Kazbekova applied the knowledge and networks she 
gained to set up a regional non-government organization, the Union 
of Business Women.  Through this network, she was able to teach 200 
business women from remote regions in Kazakhstan on the basics of 
starting and running a successful business.  She also conceived and 
received U.S. Embassy funding for a project to establish a new 
school for women's leadership.  As a result of this project, several 
recent graduates have started their own businesses in the southern 
regions of Kazakhstan, where women have historically been dependent 
on their husbands.  Ms. Kazbekova is an adjunct professor at the 
Academy of State Service, where she delivers lectures on support to 
small businesses.  Ms. Kazbekova speaks Kazakh and Russian, and will 
require English interpretation during the Summit. 
 
K.  Yergali Begimbetov, 37, Almaty.  Chairman of the Management 
Board of the private insurance company London-Almaty since July 
2003.  Previously, he completed an internship at U.S. insurance 
companies Nationwide and Grange Insurance, as well as insurance 
training conducted by Arthur Andersen and Ernst &Young.  After Mr. 
Begimbetov's arrival, London-Almaty placed new emphasis on service 
quality and began to grow rapidly.  In 2004, the company opened 18 
branch offices throughout Kazakhstan and became a leader in the 
domestic insurance market. In 2006, the company received the ISO 
9001 quality certificate and introduced a new management system 
based on the philosophy of Edwards Deming. In 2007, the company's 
website was recognized as one of Kazakhstan's best corporate sites 
by National Business magazine.  Mr. Begimbetov is a member of the 
Association of Financiers of Kazakhstan, the non-governmental 
organization Underwriters Club, based in Khabarovsk, Russia, and a 
member of the UN Global Compact.  London-Almaty sponsored the 2009 
Eurasia International Film Festival, and has helped local disabled 
children receive medical treatment abroad. 
 
L.  Serzhan Zhumashov, 43, Almaty.  Founding Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board of Capital Partners.  After graduating from the 
Almaty
Institute of Economy, Mr. Zhumashov worked in the Auditing 
Department of the Ministry of Finance.  In June 1996, together with 
U.S. investment fund New Century Holding, he founded Capital Real 
Estate, now a market leader in the sale and rental of office space 
in Kazakhstan.  Mr. Zhumashov also established a network of modern 
movie theaters in Kazakhstan, established the successful World Class 
fitness clubs, and, with Russian partners, launched a popular chain 
of restaurants in Kazakhstan, including the American Bar and Grill, 
Patio Pizza, and Planet Sushi.  As founder of Capital Partners, Mr. 
Zhumashov has led a number of world class real estate projects, such 
as the Renaissance (Marriott) hotels in Aktau and Atyrau, the Ritz 
Carlton and five-star Marriott hotels in Almaty, and various 
industrial projects in Moscow.  Mr. Zhumashov has generously 
contributed to a number of social projects, such as the British 
Haileybury school in Almaty, which he founded.  Mr. Zhumashov is an 
avid defender of the entrepreneurial spirit, as he demonstrated in 
 
ASTANA 00002099  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
May, when he signed a letter to President Nazarbayev, expressing 
support for the former President of KazAtomProm, Mukhtar Zhakishev, 
who was arrested on corruption charges in April. 
 
8.  (U) The Embassy's primary contact for the Presidential 
Entrepreneurship Summit is Kevin Covert, Deputy Pol/Econ Chief, who 
may be reached at covertkt@state.gov, or 7 7172 70 24 97. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2098, KAZAKHSTAN: NOMINATION FOR INTERNATIONAL WOMAN OF COURAGE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2098.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2098 2009-11-30 09:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2649
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #2098 3340932
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300932Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6925
INFO RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2035

UNCLAS ASTANA 002098 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, G/TIP, SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM SMIG SOCI KPAO KTIP KWMN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  NOMINATION FOR INTERNATIONAL WOMAN OF COURAGE 
2009 
 
REF:  A) STATE 111471 
      B) ASTANA 1206 
 
1.  In response to ref A, Post submits the following nomination for 
the International Woman of Courage award: 
 
NAME: Galina Morozova 
TITLE: President 
ORAGANIZATION: NGO Feminist League 
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 15-Apr-1949, Russia 
ID NUMBER: 000813104 
LANGUAGES: Russian 
ADDRESS: 107, Lubov Shevtsova Str., Kokshetau, Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
Tel.: +7-7162-262784 
Cell: +7-701-662-1284 
Email: galina_morozova@mail.ru 
 
2.  Galina Morozova is a tireless, compassionate, and effective 
advocate for victims of human trafficking in Kazakhstan.  For the 
past 12 years, Morozova has devoted her life to the protection of 
others.  When she formed her NGO in 1998, Kazakhstan was a Tier 3 
country that did not yet recognize the seriousness of trafficking in 
persons.  At that time, Galina was unable to afford the $200 fee to 
register her NGO.  A grant from a Peace Corps volunteer allowed her 
to realize her dream.  With no support from the government, she 
overcame obstacles and took substantial risks to provide assistance 
and protection to over 60 victims of trafficking in a make-shift 
shelter in her home.  Despite threats to her life from traffickers, 
she refused to stop helping victims, continues to give them shelter, 
and fights for tougher sentences for traffickers.  Recently, a 
trafficker threatened Galina's life in open court when she advocated 
for the victim at the trafficker's sentencing hearing. 
 
3.  After 10 years of determined effort, Galina was able to 
establish a safe, functioning shelter with funding from the Embassy 
of the Government of the Netherlands in 2008.  Her shelter, which 
can house up to 15 victims, is in an unassuming house in the suburbs 
of the northern city of Kokshetau.  It is protected by a high wall, 
locking gates, and video surveillance (septel).  Since 2008, she has 
assisted 40 more victims, many of whom call to thank her or ask for 
advice.  Galina's shelter not only provides immediate medical and 
psychological help, but also vocational training.  Victims can stay 
in the shelter until they are ready to leave.  Galina remembers 
every story and every face, which she collected in a book about 
victims of trafficking.  She then persuaded a local playwright to 
create an anti-trafficking play of these stories.  Hundreds of young 
people have seen that play, which continues to be performed in 
Kazakhstan to rave reviews and standing ovations (ref B). 
 
4.  Galina has cultivated the trust of not only the international 
community, but also government officials.  Galina is a respected 
member of the Trafficking in Persons Commission of Akmolinskaya 
Oblast, which includes all aspects of the local government.  She has 
also developed a strong relationship with other NGOs and relevant 
partners.  The Feminist League is a member of three large 
anti-trafficking NGO networks. 
 
5.  Galina has implemented many U.S.-funded programs to fight 
trafficking both directly and through the NGO networks.  In 2000, 
she received her first grant from the Embassy's Democracy Commission 
to train police officers in Uralsk, Kostanai, and Pavlodar.  This 
year, she received an INL grant to train community police officers 
to identify victims of trafficking in Kokshetau and Astana.  Galina 
operated a hotline and conducted a series of anti-trafficking 
information campaigns under a 2001-2008 USAID grant. 
 
6.  Galina organizes conferences, meetings, and workshops to raise 
awareness of human trafficking in the government and NGO community. 
In addition, she is creating sustained anti-trafficking information 
campaigns for students through the development of school curricula, 
extra-curricular activities, and summer camps for at-risk children. 
 
 
7.  Galina Morozova truly is an international woman of courage and 
deserves a large share of the credit for advancing Kazakhstan's 
efforts to fight every aspect of trafficking.  Her creative public 
awareness campaigns, model shelter to protect victims and unyielding 
efforts to help the authorities find and prosecute traffickers make 
her an inspiration to potential victims, police officers and 
government officials alike.  Despite the risks to her own life, 
Galina has brought justice and security to vulnerable women 
throughout Kazakhstan and saved the lives of many young girls and 
women. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2095, KAZAKHSTANI UIGHUR GROUPS REFUSE TO SING AND DANCE IN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2095.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2095 2009-11-25 11:30 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8521
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2095/01 3291130
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251130Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6917
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2192
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2262
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1561
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1196
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1751
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1606
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2601
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2899

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ASTANA 002095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, DRL, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/25/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINR SOCI KDEM CH KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTANI UIGHUR GROUPS REFUSE TO SING AND DANCE IN 
CHINA, IN RESPONSE TO C-REF-01741 
 
REFTELS:  A.  ASTANA 01210 
  B.  ASTANA 01292 
  C.  ASTANA 02066 
  D.  STATE 88234 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Pamela L. Spratlen, 1.4 (b), 
(d) 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  Following unrest in July and August in China's 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Kazakhstan's ethnic Uighurs 
-- one of the largest and fastest growing ethnic groups in Kazakhstan 
and an important political force -- criticized the Chinese government 
and staged a large protest in Almaty (ref A).  Kazakhstani interest 
groups expressed concern that the situation could complicate 
relations between Kazakhstan and China.  Government officials largely 
declined to comment on the political aspects of the unrest.  During 
PolOff's subsequent visits to Almaty, where 90% of Kazakhstan's 
Uighur population lives, Uighur activists reiterated their concerns 
about China's treatment of the Uighurs, while acknowledging they try 
to avoid "creating trouble" between Kazakhstan and China. 
Kazakhstani Uighurs expressed concern for refugees fleeing "political 
persecution by the Chinese government" and appealed to the United 
States to urge China to alter its policies in the XUAR.  END SUMMARY. 
 
UIGHURS PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN KAZAKHSTANI SOCIETY 
 
2. (SBU) PolOff met with the Deputy Chairman of the Uighurs' 
Republican Cultural Center, Turgan Rozakhunov, and the Chairwoman of 
Kazakhstan's "National Association of Uighurs," Tamara Mametova, to 
discuss their views on the situation in the XUAR in September. 
(COMMENT:  The Center, established in 2003, has offices in 11 
regions, with its largest offices in Almaty, Shymkent, and Zhambyl, 
where most of Kazakhstan's estimated 300,000 Uighurs live.  Its 
administrative board's 39 members advocate for the interests of 
Kazakhstan's Uighurs.  They are typically well-connected to President 
Nazarbayev and other political elites, and they advocate moderate, 
non-separatist views on Uighur political activities.  END COMMENT.) 
Rozakhunov praised Anvar Khadzhiyev, with whom PolOff met shortly 
before his July death, and echoed his views about the excellent 
position of Uighurs in Kazakhstani society, especially since Uighurs 
receive education in their native language and have good relations 
with other ethnic groups (ref A).  According to Rozakhunov, Uighurs 
are the fifth largest ethnic group in Kazakhstan, and the third 
largest in Almaty city.  He also asserted that many of Kazakhstan's 
prominent scientists, businesspeople, and political figures -- 
including 16 deputies in Parliament and Prime Minister Karim Masimov 
-- are Uighurs. 
 
UIGHURS AND AUTHORITIES HAVE "MOSTLY POSITIVE" RELATIONSHIP 
 
3. (SBU) The Uighurs' Republican Cultural Center, Rozakhunov said, 
was not designed to engage in political activities.  Nonetheless, 
according to the Rozakhunov, "when approached by political parties 
and asked to support President Nursultan Nazarbayev, 99% of Uighurs 
voted for the President."  Despite a generally positive relationship 
with Kazakhstani authorities, Rozakhunov alleged that the Center's 
charitable actions twice provoked minor complaints of interference 
from government authorities.  In the first case, the Center funded 
construction of a school in the Yenbekshi region so that children 
could attend classes without moving to another village.  Uighur 
donors also bought a "community facility" and turned it over to the 
local akimat (mayor's administration).  Rozakhunov said the Vice 
Minister of Education raised this case and questioned the Center's 
involvement, pointing out that the Ministry is responsible for all 
matters related to education.  In the second case, the Uighurs' 
Republican Cultural Center worked with the local akimat in a very 
remote region to construct a system of piped water to prevent sewage 
from entering the potable water supply after 40 children there were 
diagnosed with hepatitis.  In both cases, Rozakhunov said the 
Ministries of Education and Health expressed appreciation for the 
Center's activities after they observed the projects' results. 
Rozakhunov told PolOff his center had raised one million dollars for 
 
ASTANA 00002095  002 OF 006 
 
 
various additional social projects, and is funding the higher 
education of 45 Uighur youths.  "We want to pa
rticipate in the 
activities of the authorities, not create a separate state within a 
state," the Center's Deputy Chairman explained.  Rozakhunov dismissed 
the role of the Kazakhstan Peoples' Assembly, as a consultative body, 
in its ability to deal with inter-ethnic tensions, and called for 
establishment of a governmental body to solve such issues.  (NOTE: 
President Nazarbayev created the Kazakhstan Peoples' Assembly (KPA) 
to serve as a consultative organization to make policy 
recommendations on strengthening social stability, and inter-ethnic 
and inter-confessional harmony.  Nazarbayev is the Chairman for life. 
 It has approximately 350 members selected by regional people' 
assemblies, and meets at least once a year.  END NOTE.) 
 
KAZAKHSTAN'S UIGHURS EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT SITUATION IN CHINA... 
 
4. (SBU) Kazakhstan's Uighur population remains concerned about the 
treatment of ethnic Uighurs in China, particularly in Xinjiang 
province.  Rozakhunov estimated that 60% of Kazakhstani Uighurs 
emigrated from China in 1952-1962.  Therefore, most Uighurs have 
relatives in China and maintain social, linguistic, and cultural 
ties.  Rozakhunov asserted that "large scale unrests have occurred 
every three to four years since the Uighurs' lands of Eastern 
Turkestan were expropriated and renamed Xinjiang.  Uighur 
demonstrations are not the demonstrations of criminals," argued 
Rozakhunov, but rather "a struggle for freedom and human rights." 
Rozakhunov alleged the Chinese government broadcast incorrect 
information about the July events in the XUAR.  Rozakhunov said that 
Kazakhstani Uighurs helped "to correct the mis-information and raise 
awareness about the situation in the XUAR by holding a 
government-sanctioned mourning ceremony on July 10." 
 
...AND WARN OF COMPLICATIONS FOR KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA RELATIONSHIP 
 
5. (SBU) Kazakhstani Uighurs are aware of China's growing importance 
to Kazakhstan as an investor, strategic, and trade partner, and 
fellow member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  They 
also know that Uighur activism can complicate Kazakhstan's relations 
with China.  According to Rozakhunov, the government allowed the 
Uighur community to demonstrate in July, "but consent was not granted 
easily."   Rozakhunov said the country's Uighur organizations "should 
not put Kazakhstan into a difficult situation."  Nevertheless, 
Rozakhunov explained that the Board of Directors unanimously voted 
against the Chinese government's proposal for the Center to 
participate in the celebration of the 60th anniversary of China's 
independence.  Rozakhunov and Mametova asserted that the Uighurs' 
Republican Cultural Center and the National Association of Uighurs 
will not sing and dance in China after the July events.  "The Chinese 
Ambassador to Kazakhstan appealed to us in person, and the Chinese 
government offered us a lot of money, but still we cannot accept," 
Rozakhunov told PolOff. 
 
REFUGEES FACE DIFFICULT CONDITIONS IN KAZAKHSTAN 
 
6. (SBU) Tamara Mametova, Chairwoman of Kazakhstan's "National 
Association of Uighurs," expressed concern about the plight of Uighur 
refugees (Ref B).  (COMMENT:  Mametova has been a long-term, reliable 
Embassy contact, and her organization has resettled more than 10 
families of XUAR refugees in Europe and the United States since 1997. 
 END COMMENT.)  According to Mametova, refugees lead very difficult 
lives in Kazakhstan.  Police often detain them for short periods of 
time, even if they have documents to confirm their official status. 
Despite help from the office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Almaty, many are frightened and have 
difficulty to hold steady jobs and send their children to school. 
The lengthy resettlement process, which can take years, compounds the 
refugees' situation.  Mametova lamented that U.S. processing times 
have increased tremendously since 2001.  She said one refugee, after 
waiting many years, recently asked her organization to retrieve his 
documents to try another country, such as Holland, Norway, or Canada. 
 
7. (SBU) Mametova also raised the specific case of Tair Medzhit and 
 
ASTANA 00002095  003 OF 006 
 
 
his three children, who have been waiting in Kazakhstan for refugee 
status for two years.  Mametova claims that his father is a political 
figure in the XUAR, and Chinese authorities arrested and killed his 
brother.  According to Mametova, Medzhit tried to escape to 
Kazakhstan, but was instead smuggled into Pakistan, and eventually 
Afghanistan.  Mametova claims he escaped, along with several other 
Uzbek Uighurs, and asked why his case has dragged on so long "when 
the cases of other young people imprisoned in Guantanamo have already 
resulted in their release."  Mametova noted that Kazakhstani 
authorities could deport Medzhit at any time. 
 
8. (SBU) Mametova also said many refugees cannot qualify with the 
UNHCR as official refugees, because they escaped over the border 
without documents or came as tourists, but are afraid to go back. 
According to Mametova, the number of such undocumented refugees has 
increased since the July events, but UNHCR, or Mametova's own 
organization, can do little to help these refugees.  The Chairwoman 
of Kazakhstan's "National Association of Uighurs" appealed to the 
United States to urge China to alter its policies in the XUAR and 
provide all possible assistance to refugees. 
 
TIGHT BORDER CONTROL PREVENTS INCREASE IN NUMBER OF REFUGEES 
 
9. (S) UNHCR's Senior Regional Legal Advisor, Narashima Rao, told 
PolOff in September and October that the UNHCR has not observed a 
marked increase in the number of asylum seekers since July (ref B). 
He attributed this situation to the vigilance of the Chinese and 
Kazakhstani Border Guards.  Rao said the Kazakhstani Ministry of 
Emergency Services convened an August meeting with UNHCR, at which 
they communicated their allocation of financial and personnel 
resources to prepare for a large inflow of migrants.  Rao asserted he 
had heard that the refugee surge never materialized, because 
Kazakhstan's Border Guard Service, which falls under the authority of 
Kazakhstan's Committee for National Security (KNB), increased its 
cooperation with Chinese authorities, and prevented most Chinese 
Uighurs from entering Kazakhstan.  "Almost no new visas are being 
issued, and the borders are essentially closed to Chinese Uighurs," 
Rao declared.  Nonetheless, Rao had not heard any report that 
authorities deported Chinese Uighurs with valid refugee status. 
 
UNHCR OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON TREATMENT OF REFUGEES 
 
10. (SBU) Rao asserted authorities detained Chinese Uighurs with 
UNHCR-approved refugee and asylum-seeker status on several occasions. 
 According to Rao, they were released quickly after intervention by 
UNHCR, which he attributed to UNHCR's intensive campaigns to educate 
refugees about their rights.  Rao, who has run UNHCR programs to 
train police in the Almaty City and Oblast, said that "rank-and-file" 
police routinely de
mand documents from all residents of Kazakhstan 
and are reluctant to accept the validity of UNHCR certificates of 
refugee status.  However, since the UNHCR has thoroughly trained 
senior Kazakhstani police officials, refugees usually are released 
quickly once better-trained and more senior officers become involved. 
 Thus, Rao confirmed Mametova's statement that refugees often face 
threats of detention from local police, but asserted that UNHCR 
involvement resolves these generally minor incidents. 
 
11. (S) Rao highlighted one significant September incident in Almaty, 
in which officers from the Almaty Department of the KNB allegedly 
took three refugees and two asylum seekers from their homes.  The 
refugees were released within approximately three hours after the 
authorities detained them, after their relatives -- acting on UNHCR's 
advice -- called the local police.  The UNHCR sent a note to the 
government of Kazakhstan to protest this treatment of refugees.  Rao 
told PolOff "this incident was a clear message to Chinese Uighurs not 
to come here, and to the Uighur community in Kazakhstan not to stir 
up trouble."  He also said at least two Uighur refugees had been 
attacked and badly injured, but that it is difficult to know if the 
refugees were unfortunate victims of random criminal violence, or if 
the attacks were politically-motivated.  Nevertheless, Rao told 
PolOff "the timing of the attacks was suspicious." 
 
 
ASTANA 00002095  004 OF 006 
 
 
WORLD CONGRESS OF UIGHURS DEPUTY CHAIRMAN CRITICIZES CHINA 
 
12. (SBU) PolOff also met in September with Kakharman Kozhamberdiyev, 
the Kazakhstani Deputy Chairman of the World Congress of Uighurs 
(WCU), and Abdrashid Turdiyev, the Chairman of the Union of Uighur 
Youth, to discuss the reaction of Kazakhstani Uighurs to the July 
events in the XUAR.  Kozhamberdiyev asserted that China's violent 
suppression of a peaceful July 5 protest in XUAR united all Uighurs 
in disapproval of China's actions.  Kozhamberdiyev accused the 
Chinese government of provoking violent conflict and portraying 
Uighurs as extremists and terrorists.  The Deputy Chairman told 
PolOff Chinese Uighurs are seeking more autonomy in the XUAR, not 
independence, and are protesting against local authorities, not 
against the Chinese people.  According to Kozhamberdiyev, the World 
Congress of Uighurs (WCU) supports an eventual dialogue with Chinese 
authorities, with certain preconditions, including a release of 
political prisoners and reforms to make the autonomous region a 
republic. 
 
13. (SBU) Kozhamberdiyev, who requested to meet PolOff in a public 
park, spoke at great length about his views on Chinese "oppression" 
of Uighurs.  He called Chinese policies and actions in the XUAR, such 
as forced sterilizations, and restrictions on Uighur-language 
education and practicing Islam, "acts of aggression."  Kozhamberdiyev 
said China is particularly afraid of the Uighurs' dedication to 
Islam, which Komzhamberdiyev said is "one of the most essential 
aspects of Uighur identity," and also one of the last remaining 
obstacles to assimilation.  Kozhamberdiyev described one incident in 
which Chinese authorities hosted a meal in a Uighur community during 
Ramadan.  Kozhamberdiyev, who says he has relatives in China, told 
PolOff that due to mass relocations of Han Chinese, the Han 
population in the XUAR changed from 261,000 in 1949 to 8.4 million 
currently.  He asserted discrimination against Uighurs in finding 
employment and prohibition of freedom of speech.  Noting that the 
Washington D.C.-based WCU has held numerous meetings and press events 
in the United States, Kozhamberdiyev urged the United States to speak 
out on behalf of the plight of Chinese Uighurs. 
 
UIGHUR ACTIVIST CONCERNED ABOUT VIOLENCE SPREADING TO KAZAKHSTAN 
 
14. (SBU) Kozhamberdiyev has vociferously criticized the Chinese 
government in media statements.  A post on a Kazakhstani opposition 
news-site quoted him as pointing to the right of Uighur people to 
self-determination as the main goal of the WCU and demanding that the 
Chinese authorities hold a referendum.  In the online posting, 
Kozhamberdiyev also said that Chinese special services created the 
East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) in order to discredit 
the movements of "real patriots" and criticized the ETLO activists 
for being too provocative.  In another article in August, 
Kozhamberdiyev asserted the WCU was working to prevent unrest in the 
XUAR from spreading to Kazakhstan.  (COMMENT:  Kozhamberdiyev, a 
mature and scholarly interlocutor , appears to be a complex -- and 
somewhat controversial -- figure.  He openly criticizes the Chinese 
government's administration of the XUAR.  However, he ardently 
advocates efforts to prevent the spread of unrest to Kazakhstan, as 
do more moderate figures, such as the Republican Cultural Center's 
Turgan Rozakhunov.  END COMMENT.) 
 
KAZAKHSTANI UIGHURS ALLEGE HARASSMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN 
 
15. (S) According to Kozhamberdiyev, the Chinese government is so 
concerned about his activities that his relatives in China -- and 
even people who just happen to share last name -- are under constant 
surveillance.  Kozhamberdiyev alleged that Kazakhstan, afraid of 
damaging its relations with China and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, also limits his organization's activities. 
Kozhamberdiyev cited a recent case when the WCU paid to hold a 
discussion at the office of an Almaty press club, which was closed 
for repairs when WCU staff arrived.  (COMMENT:  Post's Political 
Assistant in Almaty spoke with Kozhamberdiyev separately about what 
appears to have been the same incident. END COMMENT.)  According to 
Kozhamberdiyev, Yermek Narymbayev, a Kazakh-nationalist friend and 
 
ASTANA 00002095  005 OF 006 
 
 
head of the newly-founded Kazakh-Uighur Friendship and Solidarity 
Committee, suggested Kozhamberdiyev hold a photo exhibition and 
discussion at the Kalamger Press Club in Almaty.  Abdrashid Turdiyev, 
the Chairman of the Union of Uighur Youth and a key figure in the 
fiery July rally in Almaty (ref A), collected photos for the 
exhibition.  When Kozhamberdiyev approached the press club on the 
morning of the event, he observed police detaining Narymbetov and 
Turdiyev, who were released shortly afterward, after receiving 
warnings not to engage in "unsanctioned activities." 
 
16. (S) Kozhamberdiyev asserted that the WCU faces various 
administrative troubles every time it opens an office in Kazakhstan. 
He complained that his computers have frequently become infected with 
malicious viruses that interfere with his work.  He implied that the 
viruses may have been planted by Chinese Special Forces, possibly 
with the Kazakhstani KNB's assistance.  According to Kozhamberdiyev, 
China primarily wants to prevent an open flow of information about 
life in the XUAR to Kazakhstani Uighurs and the international 
community.  Abdrashid Turdiyev alleged Chinese national security 
services' responsibility for the burglary of his home several times. 

According to Kozhamberdiyev, however, Uighurs in the Kyrgyz Republic 
face a more difficult situation.  Kozhamberdiyev said that he was 
invited to attend a conference, but Kyrgyz Border Guards refused to 
admit him, because of pressure from China. 
 
KAZAKHSTANI UIGURS CRITICIZE KAZAKHSTANI "PRO-CHINA" POLICY 
 
17. (SBU) Kozhamberdiyev and Turdiyev also commented on the Uighur 
refugees' difficulties.  They agreed with Mametova and Rao about 
Kazakhstani reluctance to admit Chinese Uighurs, and the difficulty 
of obtaining UNHCR status (ref B).  Kozhamberdiyev criticized the 
role of certain prominent Kazakhstani think-tank analysts, especially 
Konstantin Syroezhkin, chief researcher at the government-affiliated 
Kazakh Institute for Strategic Studies in Almaty, for encouraging a 
pro-China foreign policy.  According to Kozhamberdiyev, Syroezhkin, 
with whom he had worked for half a year, previously lived in Beijing, 
is fond of Chinese culture, and has written many articles expressing 
support for China's perspective on various issues.  Kozhamberdiyev 
suggested his work may be "funded by China." 
 
18. (SBU) Syroezhkin's summer media statements on events in the XUAR 
have certainly correlated to the official positions of the People's 
Republic of China.  In one instance, Syroezhkin and Kozhamberdiyev 
argued during an Almaty seminar in July whether the Uighurs had ever 
previously established their own country.  During this forum, 
Syroezhkin stated that the People's Republic of China's law on 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy, enacted in 1984, stipulates that ethnic 
groups can practice self-government in their regions and constitutes 
a legal guarantee for ethnic groups to exercise their right of 
regional autonomy.  The article, under the headline, "Kazakh expert 
rebuts Xinjiang separatist leader's claims," appeared in China's 
Xinhua General News Service, on July 15.  A July 30 article in the 
pro-government newspaper "Argumenty i Fakty," quoted Syroezhkin that 
while the situation in Xinjiang spiraled out of control because of 
"tough and sometimes openly cruel actions by the authorities," the 
United States was also to blame for the riots.  Syroezhkin said, "I 
am not hinting, I am speaking directly.  Who participated in the 
World Congress of Uighurs that took place in May of this year?  Four 
Senators and two U.S. Congressmen.  Directors of almost every NGO 
that had been involved in organizing 'color revolutions' in the 
former Soviet Republics participated as well."  Several days after 
Syroezhkin's comments, China's Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Cheng 
Guoping, expressed gratitude to Kazakhstan for its support in 
preserving the country's sovereignty.  He also said "bilateral 
relations are experiencing the best period in the history of their 
development, meet people's interests in both states, and benefit the 
stability and development of the whole Central Asia." 
 
19. (S) COMMENT:  During his meeting with the Deputy Director of the 
Marshall Center, Kazakhstan's Deputy Secretary of the National 
Security Council, Marat Shaikhutdinov, asserted his government 
cooperates closely with the Chinese government (ref C).  He 
 
ASTANA 00002095  006 OF 006 
 
 
specifically praised the close relationship between Kazakhstani and 
Chinese-government affiliated think-tanks.  Shaikhutdinov's comments 
confirm Emboffs assessment that the anti-U.S., pro-China Syroezhkin, 
who works for a think-tank that falls under the Kazakhstani 
Presidential Administration, is one influential voice in the 
Kazakhstani government urging close cooperation, particularly on 
security issues, between China and Kazakhstan. 
 
20. (SBU) Comments from Kazakhstani Uighurs indicate that ethnic 
identity has the potential to politically mobilize.  This factor 
explains the Kazakhstani government's focus on maintaining the 
country's inter-ethnic harmony.  While the government does not want 
Kazakhstan's close relationship with China disrupted by the unrest in 
Xinjiang, the authorities have apparently decided to provide a 
modicum of political space for Kazakhstani Uighurs to vent their 
concerns.  Kazakhstani Uighurs are also struggling to find a balance 
between expressing shared discontent with China's response to July 
events in the XUAR without endangering their community's 
comparatively comfortable position in Kazakhstan.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2094, KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENT’S EID AL-ADHA MESSAGE DELIVERED

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2094.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2094 2009-11-25 09:14 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8311
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2094 3290914
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 250914Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6916
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2191
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1560
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2261
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1195
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0542
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2600
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2898
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1750
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1605
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS ASTANA 002094 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/ES-CR, SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPDC PREL KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  PRESIDENT'S EID AL-ADHA MESSAGE DELIVERED 
 
REF: STATE 121080 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) On November 25, we passed to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs President Obama's Eid Al-Adha message to President 
Nazarbayev under cover of a Diplomatic Note. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2093, KAZAKHSTAN: STAFFDEL WOOLFORK EXPENDITURES

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2093.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2093 2009-11-25 03:05 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7861
OO RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #2093 3290305
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 250305Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6915
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2034

UNCLAS ASTANA 002093 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, H, RM/F/DFS/FO/AA/CAA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AFIN OREP KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  STAFFDEL WOOLFORK EXPENDITURES 
 
REF:  STATE 112596 
 
1.  (SBU) STAFFDEL WOOLFORK EXPENDITURES FOR VISIT TO KAZAKHSTAN, 
NOVEMBER 8-12, 2009 (APPROPRIATION 00X488.1-2089-010047, SUB-OBJECTS 
2166/2167/2168 AS APPROPRIATE) 
 
PER DIEM (2167)   DOLS 2,575 
-- WOOLFORK, BRENT   DOLS 1,237 
-- WILLIAMS, LISA   DOLS 1,338 
 
AIR TRANSPORTATION (2166) DOLS 400 
-- WOOLFORK, BRENT   DOLS 200 
-- WILLIAMS, LISA   DOLS 200 
 
OTHER EXPENSES (2168)  DOLS 2,003.43 
-- INTERPRETERS   DOLS 500 
-- LOCAL TRANSPORTATION  DOLS 1,124.03 
-- OVERTIME (LOCAL MOTORPOOL) DOLS 98.40 
-- VIP LOUNGE    DOLS 134 
-- REPRESENTATIONAL   DOLS 147 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2090, ALL IN A DAY’S WORK: KAZAKHSTANI FOREIGN MINISTER IN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2090.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2090 2009-11-24 09:27 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6938
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2090/01 3280927
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240927Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6911
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2189
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2259
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1558
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1193
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1748
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1603
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2598
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2896

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002090 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/A, SRAP, EUR/RPM, DRL 
 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID OSCE AF KZ
SUBJECT:  ALL IN A DAY'S WORK:  KAZAKHSTANI FOREIGN MINISTER IN 
KABUL TO ANNOUNCE AID PACKAGE, PITCH OSCE SUMMIT 
 
ASTANA 00002090  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On November 22, State Secretary-Foreign Minister 
Kanat Saudabayev traveled to Kabul to discuss bilateral cooperation 
with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and unveil Kazakhstan's 2009-2011 
assistance package.  Saudabayev also met with Afghanistan's Foreign 
Minister, Dr. Rangin Dadfar-Spanta, and the Special Envoy of the UN 
Secretary-General to Afghanistan, Kai Eide.  The Foreign Ministers 
signed an intergovernmental education agreement for Kazakhstan to 
train 1,000 Afghan specialists in five years.  Kazakhstan's Chairman 
of the Foreign Ministry's Committee for International Information, 
Roman Vasilenko, told Charge November 23 that the short -- but 
productive -- visit especially advanced the bilateral relationship 
in the areas of commercial development and educational ties. 
Vasilenko, who traveled with the State Secretary, said that both 
President Karzai and Foreign Minister Spanta enthusiastically 
supported Kazakhstan's proposal for an OSCE summit.  With Afghan 
leaders' endorsement of a 2010 OSCE summit and conclusion of an 
education deal, which could add substance to the proposal, Post 
expects MFA will increase its already concerted effort to secure a 
summit.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE OFFICIAL VERSION OF THE DAY IN KABUL 
 
3.  (U) According to the press, Foreign Minister Saudabayev 
delivered President Nursultan Nazarbayev's congratulatory message on 
his inauguration to Afghan President Hamed Karzai.  Nazarbayev also 
reportedly confirmed Kazakhstan's intention to strengthen bilateral 
cooperation, and provide assistance with stabilization and 
development.  Saudabayev highlighted mutually-beneficial 
opportunities to enhance economic and commercial relations through 
increased Kazakhstani participation in natural reserve and 
infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, and promotion of Kazakhstani 
grain imports.  Foreign Ministers Saudabayev and Spanta signed a $50 
million intergovernmental education agreement -- reportedly 
Nazarbayev's personal initiative -- under which Kazakhstan will 
train medical workers, teachers, engineers, and specialists in law 
enforcement, border security, and agriculture.  During the meeting 
with the UN Special Envoy, Saudabayev discussed cooperation to 
stabilize Afghanistan and coordination on Afghanistan-related issues 
during Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
 
EVEN THE AFGHAN EMBASSY IN ASTANA KEPT IN SUSPENSE 
 
4.  (SBU) In the days preceding the visit, Kazakhstan's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was uncharacteristically tight-lipped.  As of 
November 20 -- the last full working day before the visit -- they 
refused to disclose details of the aid package even to the Afghan 
Embassy in Astana.  (COMMENT:  PolOff's interlocutor at the Afghan 
Embassy, Second Secretary Siddiqullah Noori, noted his embassy's 
occasional frustration about the exclusive coordination that occurs 
directly between the Kazakhstani Embassy in Kabul and the MFA in 
Astana, leaving the embassy in Astana "out of the loop."  END 
COMMENT.)  Noori, who prior to his 2006 arrival in Astana worked at 
the Foreign Ministry in Kabul with investors and NGOs, expressed 
gratitude for Kazakhstan's previous assistance.  While he welcomed 
the student aid package, he asserted the difficulty of finding 
opportunities for Kazakhstani-Afghan economic cooperation outside of 
the extractive sectors -- particularly mining.  A potential 
logistical challenge to the education deal previously highlighted by 
the MFA is flight arrangements for the students.  According to 
Noori, however, Kazakhstan has started weekly direct flights from 
Almaty to Kabul, and flights from Kabul to Almaty "when there are 
enough people to justify a flight." 
 
SAUDABAYEV FOCUSED ON SUMMIT 
 
5.  (SBU) Following the visit, long-time Embassy contact and 
Chairman of the Foreign Ministry's Committee for International 
Information, Roman Vasilenko, told the Charge that Saudabayev 
congratulated President Karzai on his new mandate and focused on 
 
ASTANA 00002090  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
bilateral issues during their opening meeting.  He also achieved his 
main goal -- an enthusiastic endorsement for Kazakhstan's bid to 
hold an OSCE summit on Afghanistan during its 2010 Chairmansh
ip of 
the OSCE.  However, Vasilenko offered no details on specific summit 
issues of interest to the Afghans.  In his brief meeting with 
Foreign Minister Spanta, Vasilenko said Kazakhstan's Foreign 
Minister again pressed -- and won enthusiastic support for -- a 2010 
OSCE summit on Afghanistan.  Otherwise, the meeting mainly focused 
on the need for strengthened bilateral trade.  (NOTE:  According to 
official statistics, Kazakhstan exported more than $617 million of 
goods to Afghanistan in 2008, including large amounts of grain.  END 
NOTE.)  Saudabayev lobbied for increased participation of 
Kazakhstani firms in Afghanistan's market, particularly in the 
natural resource and agricultural sectors. 
 
PROVIDE FISHING RODS, NOT FISH 
 
6.  (SBU) In Saudabayev's final meeting with Special Envoy of the UN 
Secretary-General to Afghanistan, Kai Eide, Vasilenko said 
Saudabayev discussed ways to expand Kazakhstani participation in UN 
projects.  Saudabayev also again discussed the OSCE summit proposal. 
 In response, Eide, a former Norwegian Ambassador to the OSCE, 
asserted that Kazakhstan should focus on Afghanistan's needs in 
building its summit agenda.  He told Saudabayev that it was 
important to "provide fishing rods, not fish," by working with the 
government of Afghanistan to determine its need as Kazakhstan 
develops its 2010 summit proposals.  Saudabayev fully concurred, 
adding that "it is not possible for the family to be happy, unless 
the head of household is pleased." 
 
KAZAKHSTAN UPBEAT ABOUT PRODUCTIVE VISIT 
 
7.  (SBU) Vasilenko confirmed that the visit's centerpiece was the 
education agreement, signed by Saudabayev and Spanta, which annually 
will bring 200 university and graduate students to Kazakhstan over 
the period 2010-2018.  In total, Kazakhstan plans to educate more 
than 1,000 students.  Vasilenko asserted that sufficient 
institutional memory remains from Kazakhstan's Soviet experience in 
educating Afghan (and Vietnamese) students for the Ministry of 
Education to successfully implement the program and resolve 
logistical challenges, such as the issue of language training.  He 
said the Afghan government will identify and supply the students -- 
with a focus on technical fields, including engineering, agriculture 
and medicine -- and Kazakhstan will pay their expenses.  Vasilenko 
said they did not discuss the issue of transportation.  Vasilenko -- 
and the Afghan Embassy -- have promised to send a copy of the 
education agreement. 
 
8.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Vasilenko called the visit's atmosphere 
"positive and productive throughout" and highlighted the strong 
press interest in Kabul related to the education program.  The 
Foreign Ministry appears to hope that conclusion of its long-planned 
Afghan education program will give its OSCE summit idea more 
substance.  Now that the State Secretary has won the endorsement of 
Afghanistan's leaders for the idea, especially if focused in part on 
Afghanistan, Post expects an even more determined MFA effort to 
bring doubters around.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2083, KAZAKHSTAN: FBI-PROSECUTOR GENERAL MEMORANDUM OF

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2083.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2083 2009-11-24 00:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6588
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2083/01 3280045
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240045Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6904
INFO RUCNFB/DIRECTOR FBI
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2187
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1556
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2257
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1191
RUEAWJL/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC 0048
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1601
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1746
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002083 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, INL, L 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  FBI-PROSECUTOR GENERAL MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING 
 
ASTANA 00002083  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On November 17, U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Director Robert S. Mueller III and Kazakhstani 
Prosecutor General Kairat Mami signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
on law enforcement cooperation in Astana, which is reproduced below. 
This agreement garnered positive news coverage in Kazakhstan. 
 
3.  (U) Begin text: 
 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the General Prosecutor's Office 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice 
 
The General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, 
hereinafter each referred to individually as a "Participant" and 
collectively as the "Participants," 
 
On the basis of generally recognized principles of international law; 
 
Following the principles of sovereignty and equality of states, their 
effort to expand cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of 
both Participants on the basis of mutual understanding and bilateral 
relations; 
 
Recognizing the importance of strengthening and further developing of 
mutual cooperation in the sphere of combating criminality; 
 
Attaching great importance to strengthening cooperation with the aim 
to secure protection of rights of citizens and legal persons, have 
signed this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU): 
 
Section 1 
 
The Participants intend to expand cooperation within the framework of 
their respective domestic laws and regulations. 
 
Section 2 
 
In order to enhance mutual cooperation and to deal with current 
issues connected with legal relationships in the field of criminal 
law, the Participants intend to provide each other with investigative 
assistance, primarily in the spheres of transnational organized crime 
fighting and money laundering. 
 
Section 3 
 
The Participants intend to exchange their work experience and 
research regarding law enforcement techniques. 
 
Section 4 
 
The Participants intend to cooperate by exchanging information about 
existing domestic legislation, legislative activity, and existing 
courts of justice, as well as about methods of investigation 
consistent with their respective domestic law. 
 
Section 5 
 
In order to encourage interaction, the Participants intend to 
facilitate meetings to address issues that are the subject of 
cooperation. 
 
Section 6 
 
The Participants intend to address the issues connected with the 
interpretation and application of this MOU in the form of mutual 
consultations based on the principle of mutual understanding, taking 
into account the interests of both Participants. 
 
ASTANA 00002083  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
Section 7 
 
The Participants intend to translate the transmitted documents into 
Kazakh, Russian, or English, as appropriate. 
 
Section 8 
 
The Participants intend to provide mutual cooperation on the basis of 
this MOU. 
 
Section 9 
 
This MOU is not intended to prevent the Participants from determining 
and developing other mutually acceptable directions and forms of 
cooperation. This MOU is an expression of the intent of the 
Participants and is not intended, and should not be construed, to 
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable 
at law or otherwise as between the Participants or by any third party 
against the Participants, their parent agencies, the United States, 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, or the officers, employees, agents, or 
other associated personnel thereof. 
 
Section 10 
 
This MOU is not an obligation or commitment of funds, nor a basis for 
transfer of funds, but rather is a basic statement of the intent of 
the Participants.   The Participants understand that, unless 
otherwise expressed in writing, each Participant is responsible for 
any costs such Participant incurs in relation to this MOU.  All 
expenditures by the Participants remain subject to their respective 
budgetary and fiscal processes and availability of funds pursuant to 
all laws, regulations, and policies applicable thereto.  The 
Participants acknowledge that there is no intimation, promise, or 
guarantee that funds will be available in future years. 
 
Section 11 
 
Nothing in this MOU should be interpreted to
affect the rights and 
obligations of the Participants as prescribed in their participation 
in international treaties and agreements, and the domestic laws, 
legal regulations and customs of the individual nations.  This MOU is 
not intended to be an international agreement and does not create any 
obligations under international or domestic law. 
 
Section 12 
 
This MOU may be modified by the mutual consent of the Participants. 
 
Section 13 
 
This MOU is to commence on the date of signature by both Participants 
for a term of five years.  This MOU may be extended for additional 
five-years increments, subject to mutual written consent of the 
Participants. 
 
Signed in Astana on November 17, 2009 in two original copies in 
Russian and English by Kairat Mami on behalf of the General 
Prosecutor's office of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Robert S. 
Mueller III on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 
Department of Justice. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2073, KAZAKHSTAN AGREES TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES REQUIRED FOR

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2073.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2073 2009-11-23 06:54 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5555
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2073 3270654
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230654Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6902
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2185
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2256
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1555
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1190
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1745
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1600
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2597
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2895

UNCLAS ASTANA 002073 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DEPT FOR ISN ROBIN DELABARRE 
 
TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL ENRG KNNP TRGY KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN AGREES TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES REQUIRED FOR 
PROVISION OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR FUEL DESIGN TECHNOLOGY 
 
REFTEL:  STATE 72405 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) On November 17, Post received Diplomatic Note 10-2/4116 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
It assures the U.S. government that the technology proposed for 
transfer by Westinghouse Electric Company LLC to Kazatomprom's Ulba 
Metallurgical Institute will only be used for civil nuclear programs 
and will not be transferred to any country without the prior consent 
of the U.S. government.  The unofficial translation of the full text 
of the diplomatic note follows in paragraph 3. 
 
3. (SBU) Begin text of unofficial translation of Diplomatic Note 
10-2/4116: 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of 
America in the Republic of Kazakhstan and in response to Note Number 
0833/09, dated October 5, 2009, has the honor to inform the U.S. 
Government that the Kazakhstani side gives its assurances that the 
technology proposed for transfer by Westinghouse Electric Company 
LLC to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant will only be used for civil 
nuclear programs and not be transferred to any country without the 
prior consent of the Government of the United States of America and 
written permission of the authorized agency of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy 
of the United States of America in the Republic of Kazakhstan the 
assurances of its highest consideration. 
 
End Text. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2072, KAZAKHSTAN: OIL PRODUCTION PLANS AT THE SUPERGIANT FIELDS

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2072.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2072 2009-11-23 05:53 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5495
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2072/01 3270553
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230553Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6898
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2181
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1551
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2252
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1186
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1741
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1596
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2020

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 002072 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC, S/EEE, S/CIEA 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  OIL PRODUCTION PLANS AT THE SUPERGIANT FIELDS 
OF TENGIZ AND KASHAGAN 
 
REF:  (A) ASTANA 2027 
      (B) ASTANA 2026 
      (C) ASTANA 1539 
      (D) 08 ASTANA 2259 
 
ASTANA 00002072  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The DCM and Energy Officer visited Atyrau, 
toured the Tengiz oil field, and met with senior government 
officials and energy executives in November.  Previous reports about 
the visit (ref A and B) have discussed the corporate culture, 
political players, educational programs, and investment climate of 
Atyrau oblast.  This report focuses on the plans, prospects, and 
problems at Tengiz and Kashagan, as the two largest oil fields in 
Kazakhstan prepare to increase production dramatically in the years 
ahead.  END SUMMARY. 
 
A TOUR OF TENGIZ 
 
3.  (SBU) Tom Hanson, Maintenance Superintendent for Tengizchevroil 
(TCO), gave the DCM a guided tour of the Tengiz field on November 6 
(ref B).  The Tengiz project-license area is immense, and even 
photographs of its vast, limitless expanse, stretching to the 
Caspian Sea, do not do it justice.  The Tengiz reservoir is 19 
kilometers wide by 21 kilometers long, and the oil column measures 
an incredible one-mile thick.  The reservoir area is so large that 
one would have to run nearly two marathons to cover the entire 
distance around it.  The project area includes the super giant 
Tengiz field, the smaller but sizable Korolev field, and several 
exploratory prospects.  According to TCO, the Tengiz and Korolev 
fields contain an estimated 750 million to 1.1 billion metric tons 
(6 billion to 9 billion barrels) of recoverable oil. 
 
4.  (SBU) Hanson described the process to separate, stabilize, and 
load oil into more than 22,000 rail cars and pipelines, such as the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline.  According to Hanson, 
dealing with the gas is the hard part.  He explained that some of 
the sour gas is re-injected back into the well to maintain pressure 
in the reservoir, and some is treated and separated into 
liquid-petroleum gas, such as propane and butane, sulfur, and dry 
gas.  Hanson said that Tengiz currently has the highest-pressure gas 
reinjected in the world, at 650 bar. 
 
TCO'S FUTURE GROWTH PROJECT 
 
5.  (SBU) Hanson said that the Future Growth Project is not yet 
sanctioned, but he expects the project to receive approval from the 
authority (KazMunaiGas) this year and to begin engineering work in 
2010.  TCO General Director Todd Levy told Energy Officer on 
November 9 that the government is "dragging its feet" on the Future 
Growth Project and is reluctant to defer short-term revenue from 
current production.  According to an internal TCO presentation that 
Levy delivered to Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Sauat 
Mynbayev, the Future Growth Project will cost $9.7 billion, mainly 
for new crude stabilizers gas compressors, and power stations.  If 
the TCO consortium and the approving authority -- represented by 
national oil company KazMunaiGas (KMG) -- sanction the project, it 
would start in 2017, increase proven reserves by 100-130 million 
tons, and increase production to 36 million tons per year (or more 
than 1 million barrels per day, or bpd).  Levy said that the 
reserves and future production growth could be lost forever if the 
project is not sanctioned in 2010. 
 
GAZPROM SHUTS DOWN TCO 
 
6.  (SBU) As previously reported, Russia's Gazprom suddenly stopped 
receiving natural gas shipments from TCO in September (ref C).  TCO 
was consequently forced to reduce oil production at Tengiz and flare 
more natural gas than anticipated.  (NOTE:  Levy said TCO was fined 
$20 million for unauthorized gas flaring caused by Gazprom's refusal 
to accept TCO gas.  Although TCO was within its annual environmental 
 
ASTANA 00002072  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
permit, the company was fined because it did not notify the 
authorities in advance that it planned to flare that amount of gas 
in such a short period of time.  END NOTE).  After Mynbayev raised 
the issue with Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller on September 11, gas 
shipments were resumed temporarily.  Levy told Energy Officer that 
Gazprom agreed on November 6 to receive all of TCO's natural gas 
exports (5 billion cubic meters, or bcm) through the end of 2009. 
TCO is negotiating with Gazprom to export 6.5 bcm in 2010, which 
Levy said Gazprom will
export to Ukraine.  "We practically give the 
gas away," Levy said, noting that TCO sells to Gazprom at $50 per 
cubic meter.  "We have to move the gas in order to keep the oil 
flowing." 
 
7.  (SBU) TCO's Hanson was previously assigned to Karachaganak 
Petroleum Operating Company (KPO), Kazakhstan's largest gas 
producer.  He told Energy Officer on November 6 that KPO did not 
have the same problem with Gazprom as TCO, since KPO sells 
untreated, sour gas to Gazprom for processing, whereas TCO sells 
sweet, dry gas ready for commercial sale and export to Ukraine. 
 
THE COMPLEXITY OF KASHAGAN 
 
8.  (SBU) Richard Fritz, public relations director of Agip KCO, 
formerly the lead operator at Kashagan and now an agent of the North 
Caspian Operating Company (NCOC), admitted that the Kashagan project 
now has "a very complex operating model."  He explained to the DCM 
on November 7 that NCOC defines overall strategy, ensures planning 
and coordination, and is the main point of contact with the 
government.  Agip KCO is responsible for producing 450,000 bpd under 
Phase I, while Shell Development Kazakhstan, a joint venture of 
Shell and KMG, is responsible for production operations under Phase 
II of the project.  ExxonMobil has responsibility for drilling under 
Phase II.  Fritz said he is confident that the Kashagan project will 
be able to combine the policies, cultures, and practices of seven 
international oil companies into one integrated operation. 
 
AGIP EXPECTS TO MEET FIRST OIL DEADLINE 
 
9.  (SBU) Fritz reported that Agip KCO has drilled 19 appraisal 
wells, all of which were successful.  He told the DCM that Agip KCO 
has committed to deliver first oil by December 1, 2012, but he 
quickly noted that Agip KCO has made no volume commitment on early 
oil, and it will "certainly not" produce 450,000 barrels per day 
(bpd) right away.  Fritz noted that Phase I is the only approved 
portion of the project, and said that Shell production staff are 
already embedded in Agip KCO to ensure a seamless transition to 
Phase II.  Fritz asserted that Agip KCO could produce 370,000 bpd 
with existing facilities although he admitted that the company would 
need additional reinjection assets from Phase II in order to reach 
its target of 450,000 bpd -- "We have drilled all the wells and have 
all the modules we need in order to achieve commercial production." 
 
SHELL READY TO RUN PHASE II 
 
10.  (SBU) Hans Bakker is the Managing Director of the North Caspian 
Production Operations Company (NCPOC), not to be confused with NCOC. 
 KMG and Shell Exploration and Production created the NCPOC joint 
venture to manage the production of Kashagan oil during Phase II of 
the project.  Bakker explained that the project was reorganized, and 
the new, cumbersome corporate structure devised in October 2008 due 
to "massive government discontent" with repeated delays and rising 
costs.  Agip, he said, "were just plodding along, and the cost just 
kept getting higher and higher.  Finally, it became too much for one 
company to deal with."  Bakker highlighted the total estimated cost 
of the project now exceeds $150 billion, and admitted that the 
rising price tag worries the project partners. 
 
DIFFICULTY DEVELOPING LOCAL CAPACITY 
 
11.  (SBU) Bakker expects NCPOC to grow rapidly, from approximately 
200 employees today to 2,500 by 2014.  When asked if Kazakhstan 
 
ASTANA 00002072  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
would have enough skilled specialists to meet rising demand, he 
admitted that this was an "enormous concern."  He mentioned NCPOC's 
receipt of 5,000 applications for just 100 entry-level positions 
this year, and reported that the company is under "enormous 
pressure" to meet local content requirements.  He also said that, 
due to project delays, local employees who have already completed 
Agip KCO's four-year training program (ref B) have not been able to 
apply their skills and may need to be reassessed or reassigned. 
"Another option would be to send trainees abroad to hone their 
skills," he explained, "but that carries additional risks and 
costs." 
 
THE COST OF DELAYS 
 
12.  (SBU) Another consequence of repeated delays on Kashagan is the 
deleterious effect on the project's already-procured, expensive 
equipment.  During lunch with international oil-service companies on 
November 10, it was alleged that the Kashagan consortium has 
drilling, power, and other equipment worth more than $100 million 
"just sitting in warehouses in Atyrau, degrading."  They said the 
blades on generators have not been rotated, and consequently may not 
function properly, and they pointed out that the warranty on much of 
the equipment has already expired before it has even been used. 
"They are going to have to buy and bring in brand new equipment," 
one company official said.  "It's like they're starting over." 
 
KMG'S TRIPLE PLAY 
 
13.  (SBU) According to Bakker, KMG has little independence and 
great difficulty in balancing its tripartite role as government 
regulator, approving authority, and equity partner.  "All of these 
roles become intermingled," he explained, "and anyway, KMG 
ultimately takes orders from the same people at the very top."  For 
example, Bakker described a negotiation over a real estate contract 
during which the international oil companies outvoted their equity 
partner KMG, but the approving authority, also KMG, refused to 
sanction the deal, giving the national oil company a de-facto veto 
over project management decisions.  "People seconded to Kashagan 
from KMG represent the government," he said, "not the project. 
Their first loyalty is to the government." 
 
FINANCIAL POLICE "IMMENSELY POWERFUL" 
 
14.  (SBU) Bakker pointed out that the government is not a single, 
unitary entity.  "There is an unusual level of disconnectedness 
across the government," he suggested.  Echoing comments from 
oil-service companies, he said the financial police report directly 
to President Nazarbayev, and are "immensely powerful" and "totally 
out of control" (ref A).  For example, Bakker said the Kashagan 
partners signed an agreement with Prime Minister Masimov in October 
2008 that guaranteed tax stability for the project.  However, 
according to Bakker, the financial police asserted the document was 
not a legal agreement, threatened to press criminal charges against 
individuals in Agip KCO's tax department, and said, "We don't work 
for the Prime Minister anyway.  Unless the President tells us to 
back off, we are on this case."  They then demanded that Agip KCO 
deliver 40,000 pages of documents -- translated into Kazakh -- 
within seven days, or they would move forward with a criminal case. 
"This sort of thing can put a stop to your business," Bakker said. 
 
15.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Kazakhstan is poised to become one of the 
world's top ten oil producers by 2015, and is one of only three 
non-OPEC countries with spare production capa
city greater than 1.5 
million barrels per day (Canada and Brazil are the other two).  Both 
the international oil companies and the government of Kazakhstan 
have a lot riding on the ability of Tengiz and Kashagan to achieve 
maximum production.  This visit to Atyrau made clear that a number 
of practical issues -- organizational, contractual, and financial -- 
must be resolved in order for those fields to reach their full 
potential.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
ASTANA 00002072  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2071, U.S.-KAZAKHSTANI MILITARY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS SUPPORT

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2071.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2071 2009-11-23 00:40 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5317
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2071/01 3270040
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230040Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6895
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2178
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1548
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2249
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1183
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1738
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1593
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN AND PM CHRISTOPHER PETRONE 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/19/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KZ
SUBJECT:  U.S.-KAZAKHSTANI MILITARY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS SUPPORT 
MODERNIZATION OF ARMED FORCES AND COOPERATION IN PEACEKEEPING 
 
REFTELS:  A. ASTANA 01422 
  B. ASTANA 01478 
  C. ASTANA 01366 
      D. ASTANA 01450 
      E. ASTANA 01541 
  F. ASTANA 01770 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Pamela L. Spratlen, 1.4 (b), 
(d) 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  U.S.-Kazakhstani Bilateral Defense 
Consultations, held in Washington and Arizona November 16-18, 
discussed how to sustain and strengthen cooperative U.S.-Kazakhstani 
military-to-military engagement.  Key topics during Kazakhstan's 
Deputy Minister of Defense Sembinov's meetings in the United States 
included Kazakhstan's continued support of the Northern Distribution 
Network, NATO-Partnership for Peace cooperation, and U.S.-assistance 
on Kazakhstan's armed forces modernization.  High-level visits, 
including by CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus and NAVCENT Deputy 
Commander (refs A-B), generated continued Kazakhstani support for key 
U.S. strategic objectives in relation to Afghanistan, including the 
Northern Distribution Network, overflights, and deployment of 
Kazakhstani officers to ISAF headquarters in Kabul.  Kazakhstan's 
newly appointed Minister of Defense, and other high-level Kazakhstani 
officials, thanked the U.S. government for its assistance in 
modernization of Kazakhstani armed forces, and requested continued 
support.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NOVEMBER DEFENSE CONSULTATIONS ENHANCE STRATEGIC COOPERATION 
 
2.  (C) The cornerstone of U.S.-Kazakhstani high-level military 
engagement is the biennial or triennial Bilateral Defense 
Consultations (BDCs).  Chaired by a U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary 
and Kazakhstani Deputy Minister, they review ongoing security 
cooperation and develop new programs to assist Kazakhstan in 
modernization of its armed forces.  Previous Bilateral Defense 
Consultations -- held in Astana in 2008 -- developed the 2008-2012 
military bilateral cooperation plan.  During the November 16-18 
Bilateral Defense Consultations, U.S. and Kazakhstani representatives 
discussed Kazakhstan's continued support of the Northern Distribution 
Network, NATO-Partnership for Peace cooperation, and U.S. assistance. 
 Bilateral Defense Consultations have established a cooperative 
relationship between the U.S. Department of Defense and Kazakhstan's 
Ministries of Defense and Emergency Situations.  In addition, they 
contributed to Kazakhstan's five-year deployment of troops to Iraq 
and its support on overflights and the Northern Distribution Network 
(NDN). 
 
SUPPORT FROM THE TOP ON AFGHANISTAN AND CLOSER ENGAGEMENT 
 
3.  (S/NF) The United States and Kazakhstan conduct over 100 
military-to-military cooperation events annually -- from high-level 
visits to working-level exchanges.  Visits by CENTCOM Commander 
General David Petraeus and NAVCENT Deputy Commander Thomas Cropper 
(refs A-B) led to continued Kazakhstani support for key U.S. 
strategic objectives related to Afghanistan, including the Northern 
Distribution Network, and overflights.  Kazakhstan has offered the 
U.S. Government a new transit/logistics facility to complement the 
U.S. Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan and agreed to send staff 
officers to ISAF head-quarters in Kabul.  To reprise our successful 
five-year military cooperation in Iraq, the Kazakhstani government 
also currently is considering the U.S. request for deployment of 
non-combatant explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) instructors for the 
Afghan training facility in Mazar-i-Sharif. 
 
ENERGETIC AND PRAGMATIC DEFENSE MINISTER EMBRACES COOPERATION 
 
4.  (C) During his first meetings with U.S. officials following his 
June 24 appointment (refs A-C), Kazakhstan's Minister of Defense, 
Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, called bilateral military relations positive 
and expressed hope that relations would continue to develop 
"strategically."  He said he wishes to expand U.S.-Kazakhstani 
cooperation as part of his plan to modernize the Kazakhstani armed 
forces.  He also commented on Kazakhstan's "special relationships" 
 
ASTANA 00002071  002 OF 003 
 
 
with Russia and the United States, drawing on his personal experience 
as a former Ambassador to Russia and Head of the Presidential 
Administration.  During his meetings with Petraeus and Cropper, 
Dzhaksybekov's behavior confirmed assessments of Post's Kazakhstani 
interlocutors that he is logical and pragmatic, carefully considers 
various positions, and actively pursues "best practices" to 
accomplish strategic goals (r
efs A-C).  During the meetings, 
Kazakhstan's Minister of Defense was consistently relaxed and 
personable. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN URGES INCREASED MARITIME COOPERATION 
 
5.  (C) On August 28, U.S. NAVCENT Deputy Commander Rear Admiral 
Thomas Cropper met General-Major Mazhitov, Deputy Director of 
Kazakhstan's Border Guard Service to discuss bilateral military 
cooperation (refs B-C).  This first high-level military visit to 
focus entirely on naval cooperation helped to improve cooperation 
between the U.S. military and its Kazakhstani Navy and Coast Guard 
partners.  Mazhitov and Komratov praised current cooperation and 
expressed interest in increasing bilateral activities to combat 
shared threats.  Both interlocutors acknowledged similarities between 
the Caspian Sea and the Arabian Gulf that could make Kazakhstan's 
participation in a Combined Force event in Bahrain useful (refs B and 
D). 
 
CONSTANT ENGAGEMENT:  A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT 
 
6.  (C) High-level bilateral events reinforce frequent and 
wide-ranging working-level engagement.  In addition to the 
U.S.-Kazakhstani five-year military cooperation plan, the U.S. 
Department of Defense also signs yearly plans with the Kazakhstani 
Ministries of Defense and Emergency Situations, both of which 
actively cooperate  in the arrangement of bilateral events.  The 2010 
plans include:  invitation of Kazakhstani representatives for 
consultative talks at U.S. facilities, events related to development 
of Kazakhstan's peacekeeping brigade (KAZBRIG), and provision of 
training programs related to medical care, intelligence collection, 
humvee and helicopter maintenance, military policing, and aviation 
operations.  To help land-locked Kazakhstan develop the naval 
capabilities essential to protect its offshore oil and gas resources, 
naval forces will also conduct training courses on small-boat 
maintenance and anti-terrorism operations.  In support of 
Kazakhstan's conversion of its military from a conscription-based to 
a professional organization, the United States and Kazakhstan will 
also conduct a series of education events, specifically including 
development of a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps.  In addition, 
CENTCOM is sponsoring several peace support workshops next year and a 
July 2010 regional cooperation exercise. 
 
ASSISTANCE IMPROVES NON-PRO AND COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPABILITIES 
 
7.  (C) Military and security assistance programs, specifically 1206, 
Foreign Military Finance (FMF), and International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) funds, strengthened Kazakhstan's 
non-proliferation and counter-terrorism capabilities (refs E-F).  By 
providing vehicles, boats, communications equipment, and training 
courses, military assistance enhanced Kazakhstan's capability to 
detect and respond to terrorist or trafficking activities on the 
Caspian Sea.  Under the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, 
the Department of Defense supplied a simulation center for training 
exercises and supported the English-language development of 
Kazakhstani military personnel.  Similar projects are planned for 
next year based on slightly higher funding levels than fiscal year 
2009. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN PURSUES MULTI-VECTOR STRATEGY 
 
8.  (C) Kazakhstan maintains close military and security 
relationships with Russia and China.  Kazakhstan actively 
participates in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) regional security 
organizations, which are generally seen as being led by Russia and 
China to balance NATO.  At the same time, as part of a "multi-vector 
foreign policy," Kazakhstan also seeks active cooperation with 
 
ASTANA 00002071  003 OF 003 
 
 
Western military forces.  It is the only former Soviet republic in 
Central Asia to conclude a formal Individual Partner Action Plan 
within the NATO Partnership for Peace Program.  Although Kazakhstan 
has repeatedly announced that it has no intention of seeking to join 
NATO, it has also sought to play an active role in NATO's Partnership 
for Peace program by hosting a June NATO-Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council meeting in Astana. 
 
STEPPE EAGLE EXERCISE PROMOTES COOEPRATION AND INTER-OPERABILITY 
 
9.  (C) One of the most significant U.S.-Kazakhstani security 
engagements is the annual month-long Steppe Eagle exercise -- a 
multi-national training drill, conducted with Kazakhstani, U.S., and 
United Kingdom personnel, in order to equip and train a force able to 
participate in worldwide counter-terrorism and peacekeeping 
operations.  During his speech at this year's Steppe Eagle opening 
exercise, the Ambassador underscored that Steppe Eagle develops 
cooperation critical to shared U.S.-Kazakhstani interests (septel). 
He reminded participants that members of the Kazakhstani military 
shared the field of battle with U.S. soldiers as comrades-in-arms in 
Iraq, and may soon do so again as part of the NATO International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.  The Ambassador also 
emphasized that Steppe Eagle reflects the bilateral commitment to 
enhance our long-term military engagement.  This year's Steppe Eagle 
-- the first exercise conducted with two battalions -- successfully 
developed participants' skills and showcased U.S.-provided equipment, 
including one Huey-II helicopter and several humvees, for a large 
number of Kazakhstani and international military officials. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN HOSTS DISASTER RESPONSE EXERCISE 
 
10.  (C) In another instance of regional security-related 
cooperation, Kazakhstan also hosted the Zhetysu emergency disaster 
response exercise near Almaty in September (septel).  Teams from 
Kazakhstan's Ministry of Emergency Situations, NATO, the United 
States, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and various other countries, demonstrated 
their potential response to a massive earthquake and associated 
catastrophes, including a landslide, toxic explosion, and fire in an 
apartment complex.  Volunteers simulated the role of international 
assistance teams, UN and NGO workers, and the media in order to 
enable Kazakhstani authorities to gain experience managing a massive 
international disaster response effort.  Overall, U.S. military 
observers concluded the exercise -- the largest international 
disaster response exercise Kazakhstan ever conducted -- was 
successful.  Ministry of Emergency Situations personnel demonstrated 
an eagerness to learn from other international participants, typical 
of their willingness to cooperate with the U.S. military on training 
events. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2070, KAZAKHSTANI RAILWAY OFFICIALS COMMIT TO BN-350 DRY-RUN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2070.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2070 2009-11-20 11:24 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4086
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2070 3241124
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201124Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6894
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2177
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2248
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1547
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1182
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1737
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1592
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2596
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2894

UNCLAS ASTANA 002070 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
ENERGY FOR NNSA/GTRI 
 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP MNUC RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTANI RAILWAY OFFICIALS COMMIT TO BN-350 DRY-RUN 
DATE 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On November 19, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
representative met with officials from Kazakhstan's Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy 
(KTZh) -- the national railway company and primary rail authority -- 
to discuss the BN-350 spent-fuel transport.  KTZh agreed to allow a 
dry run beginning on December 1.  U.S. and Kazakhstani 
representatives discussed who will participate in the dry run, and 
approved a list including DOE National Nuclear Security Agency 
(NNSA) staff, along with Kazakhstani Ministry of Interior Special 
Troops and representatives from Kazakhstan's Atomic Energy 
Commission and National Nuclear Center.  KTZh also agreed to allow 
actual BN-350 spent-fuel shipments immediately after the 
Commonwealth of Independent States' International Railcar Commission 
certifies the specialized railcars in January 2010.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3. (SBU) On November 19, Kazakhstani experts from the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources, its subsidiary organizations, and 
Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZh) agreed to allow a dry run from Aktau 
to the Baikal-1 storage facility at the Semipalatinsk Test Site 
using U.S.-provided railcars.  Kanat Almagambetov, Acting Director 
for Operations of KTZh reiterated his agency's unwillingness to 
allow any spent-fuel transport until completion of the formal 
railcar registration process.  Almagambetov stated categorically 
that KTZh will not take responsibility for any possible incident 
related to the quality of the railcars, because they were not 
produced or certified in Kazakhstan, but manufactured at the Russian 
Federation's Tver railcar production facility. 
 
4. (SBU) In order to satisfy concerns about potential liability in 
case of an accident, KTZh wants the Commonwealth of Independent 
States' International Railcar Commission to show its commitment to 
quality control through formal registration of the railcars in the 
CIS International Railcar Commission Register.  (COMMENT:  The 
register typically is used only for standard cars, such as passenger 
or restaurant cars, not specialized cars.  END COMMENT.) 
 
5. (SBU) During a dramatic speech, Almagambetov stood at the head of 
the table for emphasis and explained that KTZh has received phone 
calls from throughout the Kazakhstani government to complain about 
KTZh's foot dragging.  He then committed to sign off personally on 
the dry-run contract and take responsibility for the inaugural round 
trip of the railcars.  However, he asserted that KTZh would not 
accept liability for railcars with which it has no history or 
knowledge.  According to Almagambetov, the CIS Commission must 
formalize the railcars' testing and certification process through 
the registration process.  This, he explained, will give KTZh 
"someone else to point at" in case of an incident.  (COMMENT:  For 
decades, Russia has utilized dozens of this type of railcar for 
spent-fuel transport.  END COMMENT.) 
 
6. (SBU) The CIS Commission agreed to KTZh's November 12 request to 
register the specialized railcars and will formalize it during a 
committee vote on November 25.  The last step of the formal process 
will occur on January 20, 2010 during the Commission's biannual 
board meeting to be held in Riga.  After the Commission officially 
registers the railcars, KTZh will allow use of the railcars in 
Kazakhstan to transport BN-350spent fuel. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2069, KAZAKHSTAN: METEOROLOGICAL AGENCY WANTS

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2069.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2069 2009-11-20 11:15 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2369
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2069 3241115
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201115Z NOV 09 ZDK TO ALL
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6893
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2176
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1546
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2247
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1181
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2595
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2893
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1736
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1591
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2071

UNCLAS ASTANA 002069 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, L, OES, SCA/EX, DS/IP/SCA, DS/ISI/CI 
STATE OES/MSHENA PASS TO NOAA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SENV KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  METEOROLOGICAL AGENCY WANTS 
FORMAL COOPERATION WITH NOAA 
 
REF:  A) ASTANA 1504 
  B) ASTANA 2061 
 
1.  Regional Environmental Officer (REO) met with 
First Deputy Director General of the Ministry of 
Environment's Department for Hydro-Meteorological 
Service (KazHydroMet), Kuanysh Bektemirov, on 
November 20 to discuss future cooperation between 
KazKydroMet and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA).  REO passed several documents 
to Bektemirov, for his information only, 
demonstrating that Mr. Mamilov (reftels) had a 
contract with NOAA to carry out samplings in 
Kazakhstan.  REO also provided a draft copy of a 
Memorandum of Understanding that could serve as the 
basis to negotiate a future cooperation agreement for 
signature by KazHydroMet and NOAA.  REO indicated the 
U.S. desire to put this relationship on a sound 
foundation and stressed the United States' openness 
to suggestions and advice.  REO added that the U.S. 
Embassy would also pass these documents to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
2.  During the conversation, Bektemirov made a brief 
phone call to confirm that KazHydroMet does not now 
have, nor ever has had, a signed cooperative agreement 
with NOAA.  However, Bektemirov concurred with the 
desirability of such an agreement, saying that 
KazHydroMet always is interested in cooperative 
relationships with international partners.  After 
explaining he will need a few weeks to review the 
documents and the proposed draft agreement, he 
promised to contact REO. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2067, KAZAKHSTAN TO SUPPORT U.S. CANDIDACY FOR IMO

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2067.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2067 2009-11-20 07:54 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3761
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2067 3240754
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200754Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6890
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2175
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1545
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2246
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1180
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0541
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2594
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2892
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1735
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1590
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS ASTANA 002067 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
STATE ALSO FOR IO/GS THOMAS A. JOHNSON 
LONDON FOR EST J.WHITTLESEY 
USCG FOR CG-52 AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL AORC EWWT PHSA IMO KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN TO SUPPORT U.S. CANDIDACY FOR IMO 
 
REF: (A) STATE 116261 
 (B) STATE 098012 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) On November 20, Rimma Zhunussova of the MFA's UN office 
told PolOff that Kazakhstan will support the U.S. candidacy for 
re-election to Category A membership in the International Maritime 
Organization Council (ref A and B).  She added that the MFA's 
official notification of support via diplomatic note is going 
through the approval process and should be forwarded to the Embassy 
shortly. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2066, KAZAKHSTAN: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2066.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2066 2009-11-19 10:29 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2569
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2066/01 3231029
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191029Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6887
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2172
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1542
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2243
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1177
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1732
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1587
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/19/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR CH RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEPUTY SECRETARY OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
WARMLY WELCOMES MARSHALL CENTER DEPUTY DIRECTOR 
 
REF:  A.  ASTANA 621 
  B.  ASTANA 1210 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Pamela L. Spratlen, 1.4 (b), 
(d) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY:  On November 12, Deputy Director of the Marshall 
Center, Dr. James MacDougall, met with Kazakhstan's Deputy Secretary 
of the National Security Council (NSC), Marat Shaikhutdinov, to 
discuss continued support for participation in Marshall Center 
programs.  Shaikhutdinov -- and former Marshall program participants 
-- praised the center as one of the world's most prestigious 
institutions.  In order to help Kazakhstan strengthen the NSC's 
analytical capability, Shaikhutdinov asked for the Marshall Center to 
train NSC staff in Kazakhstan, and welcomed the idea of hosting 
regional Marshall Center conferences.  Shaikhutdinov said it is too 
late for an effective OSCE-related Marshall Center training event 
prior to Kazakhstan's assumption of the Chairmanship, but did not 
rule out an OSCE-related event in 2010.  He also discussed 
Kazakhstan's geo-political significance, its strong ties with think 
tanks in various powerful countries, and how these attributes could 
make Kazakhstan an ideal host for a regional security forum.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
KAZAKHSTANI MARSHALL GRADUATES PRAISE CENTER'S PROGRAMS 
 
2.  (S) MacDougall described the Marshall Center's programs, and 
thanked Kazakhstan for sending participants.  In recent years, 
approximately 10 National Security Council (NSC) staff participated 
in resident and outreach courses.  Currently, six Kazakhstani 
students are attending the annual Program on Advanced Security 
Studies.  Many of Kazakhstan's previous Marshall Center graduates 
currently hold influential positions in the government, such as Chief 
of the Security Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 
Multilateral Cooperation Department and acting Director of the 
Ministry of Defense's International Cooperation Department.  During a 
previous representational event this year, Kazakhstani officials from 
five different ministries thanked the Marshall Center for the 
opportunity to exchange opinions with other young leaders from around 
the world (ref A).  At a November 12 reception hosted by the 
Ambassador, high-level Kazakhstani graduates also praised the 
Marshall Center for expanding their world view and increasing their 
effectiveness. 
 
NSC PRAISES MARSHALL CENTER AND ITS COURSES 
 
3.  (S) In response to MacDougall's request that the National 
Security Council continue to send staff members to the Marshall 
Center, Shaikhutdinov warmly thanked MacDougall for his visit, and 
called the Marshall Center "one of the most advanced institutes in 
the world."  Shaikhutdinov said that since his appointment two months 
ago, under instructions from NSC State Secretary Tazhin, he has been 
working to build the Council's capacity.  "We are trying to attract 
new blood to the NSC," Shaikhutdinov stated frankly.  He said he 
looked forward to continuing to send his staff to the Marshall Center 
"very prestigious" courses. 
 
PLEASE BRING MARSHALL CENTER COURSES TO KAZAKHSTAN 
 
4.  (S) Noting the NSC's inability to function without its staff, 
which makes it difficult to send them to long-term training courses, 
Shaikhutdinov asked MacDougall if the Marshall Center can arrange 
conferences in, and send lecturers to, Kazakhstan.  MacDougall 
explained the process to request training courses and highlighted the 
Marshall Center's regional conferences, such as one on border 
security planned for Astana next year. 
 
TOO LATE FOR AN OSCE TRAINING COURSE 
 
5.  (S) MacDougall noted that last year during the Astana visit of 
Marshall Center Director Dr. John Rose, Rose discussed a Marshall 
Center OSCE training event related to Kazakhstan's 2010 Chairmanship. 
 Noting Kazakhstan's extensive preparations for its Chairmanship, 
 
ASTANA 00002066  002 OF 003 
 
 
MacDougall asked if Kazakhstan still desired such a training course. 
Shaikhutdinov thanked MacDougall, and said that Kazakhstan had indeed 
worked very hard to prepare during 2009.  He asserted that there is 
probably too little time remaining before Kazakhstan assumes the 
Chairmanship to justify a specific Marshall Center OSCE training 
program.  MacDougall replied that the Marshall Center remains 
available to a
ssist on whatever issues Kazakhstan requests, and noted 
that Kazakhstan may wish to ask for a Marshall Center conference on 
one or several of its OSCE priority themes.  Shaikhutdinov agreed to 
consider MacDougall's "constructive" proposals. 
 
BUT NSC OPEN TO TRAINING PROGRAMS ON TERRORISM AND AFGHANISTAN 
 
6.  (S) Shaikhutdinov said Kazakhstan's NSC -- and other agencies -- 
would particularly appreciate training courses related to terrorism. 
"We would like to hold events similar to recent Marshall Center 
conferences held in Uzbekistan," Shaikhutdinov told MacDougall.  One 
reason for Kazakhstan's eagerness to host such events, Shaikhutdinov 
explained, is its efforts to enhance the government's analytical 
structures.  "Kazakhstan and the United States share many problems," 
Shaikhutdinov said.  However, he emphasized Kazakhstan's commitment 
to hosting serious, quality events -- "fully-fledged analytical 
cooperation" rather than one-off conferences.  "Cooperation has to 
evolve," Shaikhutdinov declared, "When the Marshall Center Director 
visited last year, Kazakhstan's most pressing issue was preparation 
for the OSCE Chairmanship.  Now we are working to bring stability to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan." 
 
BUILDING CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THINK TANKS IN RUSSIA AND CHINA 
 
7.  (S) According to Shaikhutdinov, Kazakhstan could significantly 
contribute to enhancement of regional security through its close 
relations with various superpowers, including the United States, 
Russia, and China.  He said Kazakhstan's NSC, and its think tanks, 
cooperate closely with research centers, private and 
government-affiliated think tanks, and academic organizations in 
Russia, China, the United States, Europe, and many other countries. 
In particular, Shaikhutdinov praised cooperation with the Johns 
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the 
Carnegie Center in the United States, "think tanks in Russia that 
have a real influence on policymaking in the Kremlin," and "other 
influential think tanks in China, not just in Beijing, but also in 
Shanghai and other regions."  Shaikhutdinov said this statement aimed 
was not a boast, but underscored Kazakhstan's desire to host an event 
in order to discuss serious problems that affect not just Kazakhstan, 
but the entire region. 
 
DEPUTY SECRETARY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT REGIONAL SECURITY FORUM 
 
8.  (S) More generally, MacDougall mentioned that the region might 
benefit from a broad security conference, such as the Shangri La 
Forum in Asia, the Munich Security Policy Forum (former "Wehrkunde"), 
or Manama dialogues.  Shaikhutdinov seized the idea eagerly, stating 
that he had been considering such a proposal, because Kazakhstan 
would be an ideal venue.  Shaikhutdinov added, "Because I am an 
academic, not a politician, this idea is, of course, very interesting 
to me.   Given our strategic geo-political position, Kazakhstan would 
be a suitable host."  He asserted that Kazakhstan would invite not 
only government representatives, but also academics, NGOs, and 
business representatives, in order to make it "objective and 
unbiased." 
 
FORUM MUST INCLUDE CHINA, CASPIAN STATES, AND SOUTH ASIA 
 
9.  (S) Shaikhutdinov advocated for a forum encompass more than 
Central Asia, because "Central Asian interests are intimately 
connected to the interests of the Caspian littoral states."  (NOTE: 
Caspian littoral states include Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, and Iran.  END NOTE.)  Shaikhutdinov also declared that 
security conferences in Central Asia must involve South Asia. 
According to Shaikhutdinov, "We must include China as well, since 
events in China, especially in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR), also affect Central Asia" (ref B).  Shaikhutdinov suggested 
 
ASTANA 00002066  003 OF 003 
 
 
that given the geopolitical significance of Central Asia, high-level 
regional Central Asian security forums should become an annual event, 
because whether in 2010 or in 2015, problems are not going to go 
away. 
 
GOVERNMENT TOUTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS 
 
10.  (S) Shaikhutdinov expressed his hope that several international 
specialists with whom the Kazakhstani government has excellent 
relations would be interested in a possible regional security forum. 
In particular, he mentioned Kenneth Starr of SAIS and Martha Olcott 
of the Carnegie Endowment from the United States, Alexei Vassiliev 
from Moscow State University in Russia, former Kyrgyz Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Muratbek Imanaliyev, and independent Chinese 
think-tank analyst and former Secretary General of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization Zhang De Guang.  Shaikhutdinov also said, 
"My presence, and Professor Tazhin's, is to strengthen the NSC's 
analytical capability, and we just set up a new think tank, staffed 
by international experts, that will be critical in reaching this 
goal." 
 
NSC REACHES OUT TO PARTNER WITH MARSHALL CENTER 
 
11.  (S) To bolster the case for Kazakhstan's hosting a regional 
security forum, Shaikhutdinov cited his country's experience in 
holding international events.  He underscored his personal 
commitment, telling MacDougall, "In my primary capacity as an 
academic, I can promise all kinds of support."  Emphasizing his 
cautious ambition for Kazakhstan's role as a leader in the Central 
Asian region, Shaikhutdinov mused aloud that although the regional 
security forum would not rival the Munich dialogue, it was an 
excellent idea, which Kazakhstan would like to pursue in the long 
term.  Shaikhutdinov concluded by pledging continued good cooperation 
with the Marshall Center during his tenure at the NSC. 
 
12.  (C) COMMENT:  Shaikhutdinov's enthusiastic and off-the-cuff 
response -- to a casual suggestion about a regional forum -- 
demonstrates senior-level Kazakhstani interest in the country's 
assumption of a leadership role in Central Asia.  Given Kazakhstan's 
geo-strategic position, such an event could build better cooperation 
in this complex corner of the world -- as long as Kazakhstan obtains 
support from the other aspirant to regional leadership, Uzbekistan. 
END COMMENT. 
 
13.  (U) Deputy Director of the Marshall Center, Dr. James 
MacDougall, cleared this cable. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2065, KAZAKHSTAN: NAZARBAYEV TO PERSONALLY LOBBY FOR SUMMIT

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2065.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2065 2009-11-19 10:21 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2561
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #2065/01 3231021
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191021Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6885
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2170
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1540
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2241
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1175
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2592
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1585
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1730
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  NAZARBAYEV TO PERSONALLY LOBBY FOR SUMMIT 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 2008 
 (B) USOSCE 0254 
 (C) ASTANA 2053 
 
Classified By: Charge d' affaires, a. i., Pamela Spratlen:  1.4 (b), 
(d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On November 18, deputy head of the Astana OSCE 
Center further briefed the CDA on the November 12 visit to Astana of 
the Secretary General of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Marc Perrin de Brichambaut.  President 
Nazarbayev is prepared to personally lobby the leaders of OSCE 
participating states to garner their support for an OSCE summit in 
2010.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively sought de 
Brichambaut's advice on how to include mention of a 2010 summit into 
the upcoming Athens Ministerial's final document.  De Brichambaut 
stressed the need for substance and highlighted the work required for 
a summit.  However, he underlined the OSCE Secretariat's 
responsibility to implement the goals set by participating states and 
the Chairman.  Kloetzer said de Brichambaut "was not extremely happy" 
with his meeting with the President, but generally pleased by his 
interaction with the MFA.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) On November 18, deputy head of the Astana OSCE Center 
Jeannette Kloetzer outlined in more detail for the CDA the November 
12 working visit to Astana by Secretary General of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Marc Perrin de 
Brichambaut (refs A and B).  Kloetzer said that Kazakhstan's desire 
to host an OSCE summit in 2010 dominated de Brichambaut's discussions 
and was the sole topic of conversation with President Nazarbayev. 
Nazarbayev declared his readiness to personally lobby the leaders of 
participating states to obtain the needed consensus, she said. 
Kloetzer believes that Nazarbayev will pitch ideas that are of 
interest to everybody in order to achieve broad support -- 
Afghanistan to entice the United States, European security 
architecture to interest the Russians, and reaffirmation of 
commitment to the Helsinki principles to bring along all OSCE 
members.  The MFA also floated protracted conflicts, the effect of 
the financial crisis on migration, and cooperation with other 
regional organizations as possible topics.  According to Kloetzer, de 
Brichambaut stressed to President Nazarbayev, Foreign Minister-State 
Secretary Saudabayev, and Deputy Foreign Minister Zhigalov that 
"substance was important."  He encouraged the Kazakhtanis to focus on 
the Corfu process and broader discussions of European security, but 
stressed that a summit must cover all three OSCE dimensions equally. 
 
3.  (C) The Kazakhstanis are determined to have the final declaration 
of the Athens Ministerial in December mention the summit, said 
Kloetzer, and Saudabayev actively sought de Brichambaut's advice on 
how to accomplish this goal.  When De Brichambaut tried to prepare 
Saudabayev for the possibility that the final declaration will not 
mention the summit, Saudabayev became "visibly upset" and asserted, 
"We do not see, think, or envisage that possibility.  It has to 
work."  "It is clear he has explicit orders from the top," said 
Kloetzer.  The Kazakhstanis maintain that France, Spain, Italy, the 
Holy See, Serbia, Finland, Lithuania, Turkey, Romania, and the CIS 
countries support the idea of the summit.  (NOTE: Representatives 
from the Embassies of Italy, Spain, the UK, and the Netherlands told 
Pol/Econ Chief on November 16 that their governments will insist on 
substance before they commit to a summit (ref C).  END NOTE.) 
 
4.  (C) Kloetzer said both Saudabayev and Zhigalov actively sought de 
Brichambaut's advice on how to garner the necessary support for the 
summit and what topics to introduce.  De Brichambaut stressed that 
the Secretariat "serves the wishes of the participating states," and 
it is the participating states that make the ultimate decision on the 
timing and topics of the summit.  He underlined that a summit needs a 
great deal of preparation, but noted that his job as Secretary 
General is to assist the Chairman in fulfilling whatever goals are 
set.  Zhigalov asked de Brichambaut about the possibility of 
canceling the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) 
during a summit year.  De Brichambaut politely and firmly advised 
against doing so. 
 
5.  (C) Asked for de Brichambaut's overall impressions of the visit, 
Kloetzer said "he was not extremely happy."  De Brichambaut 
previously met Nazarbayev several times, the first time immediately 
following the 2007 Madrid Ministerial.  At that time, Nazarbayev and 
 
ASTANA 00002065  002 OF 002 
 
 
de Brichambaut had a "very constructive discussion as partners," said 
Kloetzer.
 "This time, Nazarbayev acted like the big boss.  The 
Kazakhstanis are so confident now.  They feel like they are in the 
driver's seat."   Kloetzer said that working-level MFA officials, 
like Zhigalov and OSCE Task Force Coordinator Abdykarimov, are fully 
aware of the amount of work the chairmanship year will bring. 
However, the higher-ups, like Nazarbayev and Saudabayev, may not 
understand the efforts required for a summit.  Kloetzer believes the 
Kazakhstanis will not agree to a high-level meeting instead of a 
summit unless the summit idea becomes a complete non-starter. 
 
6.  (C) Kloetzer said the Secretary General generally was happy with 
his interaction with the MFA.  She noted that Saudabayev was "still a 
bit uninformed on OSCE issues," but hastened to add that he performed 
better than when he met the group of visiting OSCE Permanent 
Representatives October 21-23.  His apparent unpreparedness at that 
time made the Russian Permanent Representative wonder out loud "why 
his minions did not prepare a cheat sheet for him." 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  It is clear from Kloetzer's comments that de 
Brichambaut attempted to walk a careful line between the mood among 
the delegations in Vienna and the strong wishes of the incoming 
Chairman, Kazakhstan.  It is hard to say whether the President and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs heard his message that substance must 
come before participating states will commit to a summit.  On this 
topic, we believe the government of Kazakhstan prefers to see all 
responses in the best possible light.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2064, KAZAKHSTAN:

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2064.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2064 2009-11-19 10:03 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2538
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #2064/01 3231003
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191003Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6883
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2168
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1538
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2239
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1173
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2590
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1583
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1728
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN: 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 2008 
 (B) USOSCE 0254 
 (C) ASTANA 2053 
 
Classified By: Charge d' affaires, a. i., Pamela Spratlen:  1.4 (b), 
(d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On November 18, deputy head of the Astana OSCE 
Center further briefed the CDA on the November 12 visit to Astana of 
the Secretary General of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Marc Perrin de Brichambaut.  President 
Nazarbayev is prepared to personally lobby the leaders of OSCE 
participating states to garner their support for an OSCE summit in 
2010.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively sought de 
Brichambaut's advice on how to include mention of a 2010 summit into 
the upcoming Athens Ministerial's final document.  De Brichambaut 
stressed the need for substance and highlighted the work required for 
a summit.  However, he underlined the OSCE Secretariat's 
responsibility to implement the goals set by participating states and 
the Chairman.  Kloetzer said de Brichambaut "was not extremely happy" 
with his meeting with the President, but generally pleased by his 
interaction with the MFA.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) On November 18, deputy head of the Astana OSCE Center 
Jeannette Kloetzer outlined in more detail for the CDA the November 
12 working visit to Astana by Secretary General of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Marc Perrin de 
Brichambaut (refs A and B).  Kloetzer said that Kazakhstan's desire 
to host an OSCE summit in 2010 dominated de Brichambaut's discussions 
and was the sole topic of conversation with President Nazarbayev. 
Nazarbayev declared his readiness to personally lobby the leaders of 
participating states to obtain the needed consensus, she said. 
Kloetzer believes that Nazarbayev will pitch ideas that are of 
interest to everybody in order to achieve broad support -- 
Afghanistan to entice the United States, European security 
architecture to interest the Russians, and reaffirmation of 
commitment to the Helsinki principles to bring along all OSCE 
members.  The MFA also floated protracted conflicts, the effect of 
the financial crisis on migration, and cooperation with other 
regional organizations as possible topics.  According to Kloetzer, de 
Brichambaut stressed to President Nazarbayev, Foreign Minister-State 
Secretary Saudabayev, and Deputy Foreign Minister Zhigalov that 
"substance was important."  He encouraged the Kazakhtanis to focus on 
the Corfu process and broader discussions of European security, but 
stressed that a summit must cover all three OSCE dimensions equally. 
 
3.  (C) The Kazakhstanis are determined to have the final declaration 
of the Athens Ministerial in December mention the summit, said 
Kloetzer, and Saudabayev actively sought de Brichambaut's advice on 
how to accomplish this goal.  When De Brichambaut tried to prepare 
Saudabayev for the possibility that the final declaration will not 
mention the summit, Saudabayev became "visibly upset" and asserted, 
"We do not see, think, or envisage that possibility.  It has to 
work."  "It is clear he has explicit orders from the top," said 
Kloetzer.  The Kazakhstanis maintain that France, Spain, Italy, the 
Holy See, Serbia, Finland, Lithuania, Turkey, Romania, and the CIS 
countries support the idea of the summit.  (NOTE: Representatives 
from the Embassies of Italy, Spain, the UK, and the Netherlands told 
Pol/Econ Chief on November 16 that their governments will insist on 
substance before they commit to a summit (ref C).  END NOTE.) 
 
4.  (C) Kloetzer said both Saudabayev and Zhigalov actively sought de 
Brichambaut's advice on how to garner the necessary support for the 
summit and what topics to introduce.  De Brichambaut stressed that 
the Secretariat "serves the wishes of the participating states," and 
it is the participating states that make the ultimate decision on the 
timing and topics of the summit.  He underlined that a summit needs a 
great deal of preparation, but noted that his job as Secretary 
General is to assist the Chairman in fulfilling whatever goals are 
set.  Zhigalov asked de Brichambaut about the possibility of 
canceling the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) 
during a summit year.  De Brichambaut politely and firmly advised 
against doing so. 
 
5.  (C) Asked for de Brichambaut's overall impressions of the visit, 
Kloetzer said "he was not extremely happy."  De Brichambaut 
previously met Nazarbayev several times, the first time immediately 
following the 2007 Madrid Ministerial.  At that time, Nazarbayev and 
 
ASTANA 00002064  002 OF 002 
 
 
de Brichambaut had a "very constructive discussion as partners," said 
Kloetzer.  "This time, Nazarbayev acted like the big
boss.  The 
Kazakhstanis are so confident now.  They feel like they are in the 
driver's seat."   Kloetzer said that working-level MFA officials, 
like Zhigalov and OSCE Task Force Coordinator Abdykarimov, are fully 
aware of the amount of work the chairmanship year will bring. 
However, the higher-ups, like Nazarbayev and Saudabayev, may not 
understand the efforts required for a summit.  Kloetzer believes the 
Kazakhstanis will not agree to a high-level meeting instead of a 
summit unless the summit idea becomes a complete non-starter. 
 
6.  (C) Kloetzer said the Secretary General generally was happy with 
his interaction with the MFA.  She noted that Saudabayev was "still a 
bit uninformed on OSCE issues," but hastened to add that he performed 
better than when he met the group of visiting OSCE Permanent 
Representatives October 21-23.  His apparent unpreparedness at that 
time made the Russian Permanent Representative wonder out loud "why 
his minions did not prepare a cheat sheet for him." 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  It is clear from Kloetzer's comments that de 
Brichambaut attempted to walk a careful line between the mood among 
the delegations in Vienna and the strong wishes of the incoming 
Chairman, Kazakhstan.  It is hard to say whether the President and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs heard his message that substance must 
come before participating states will commit to a summit.  On this 
topic, we believe the government of Kazakhstan prefers to see all 
responses in the best possible light.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2061, KAZAKHSTAN: MFA DIPNOTE ON NOAA CONTRACT EMPLOYEE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2061.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2061 2009-11-19 09:10 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2495
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2061 3230910
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 190910Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6882
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2167
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1537
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2238
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1172
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2589
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2891
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1727
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1582
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2070

UNCLAS ASTANA 002061 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, L, OES, SCA/EX, DS/IP/SCA, DS/ISI/CI 
STATE PASS TO NOAA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SENV KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  MFA DIPNOTE ON NOAA CONTRACT EMPLOYEE 
 
REFTEL:  ASTANA 1504 
 
1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 5. 
 
2.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
3.  (SBU) Embassy Astana has received the following diplomatic note 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the status of 
Mamilov, alledged to be a contract employee for the National Oceanic 
and Atmospherics Administration and who was arrested recently for 
taking air samples.  Following is the text of the note (informal 
translation). 
 
4.  (SBU) Diplomatic Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Kazakhstan No. 13/11853 dated 11/16/2009: 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to Note No. 0631/09, 
dated September 3, 2009, informs the Embassy that the national 
security service launched a criminal case No. 09751704110143 against 
Mr. A. Mamilov on suspicion that he committed a crime in accordance 
with Article 325 Part 3 of the Criminal Code.  In this connection, 
the Embassy car's license plate and its logbook can only be returned 
after the investigation of this case is completed.  Mr. Mamilov 
informed the investigators that he had not participated in any 
Embassy's projects or been its employee. 
 
However, according to the Embassy's Note No. 0631/09, dated 
September 3, 2009, Mr. Mamilov had worked on a project in the 
Embassy for a long time and had driven a car in official capacity. 
Taking all the above into account, investigators need additional 
information, namely: 
- Was Mamilov an employee of the Embassy?  If so, when did he start 
working and which staff category did he belong to (administrative, 
service, other)?  What were his responsibilities? 
- Which project did he work on, how long, and in what position? 
- Did the Embassy contract Mamilov to do any research projects?  If 
so, please indicate signing and completion dates of the contract. 
 - How were payments made to Mamilov?  Please indicate the currency 
and accounts in Kazakhstani and foreign banks. 
 
The Ministry also requests that the Embassy provide proof of the 
above issues. 
 
End Dipnote 
 
5.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  REFTEL sought Department guidance on 
authorizing the NOAA program.  In the meantime, our ESTH officer has 
begun work with KazHydroMet to determine the best way forward on a 
cooperative agreement.  We have not permitted additional sampling by 
Mr. Mamilov given the uncertainties about his status and the 
program's future.  We do not have NOAA confirmation on whether Mr. 
Mamilov remains an agency contractor.  The Embassy's Regional 
Security Office has already passed copies of the purchase order 
contract and security certification to the Kazakhstani Committee for 
National Security.  Post will also pass copies of these documents to 
the MFA.  It will be helpful if NOAA can provide additional answers 
and documentation.  Post believes that efforts to establish a 
cooperative agreement between NOAA and Kazakhstan will be delayed 
until the Government of Kazakhstan receives satisfactory answers to 
these questions.  Post requests Department guidance on Mr. Mamilov's 
status, NOAA plans for obtaining Kazakhstani agreement to continue 
its program, and guidance on a response to the MFA diplomatic note. 
 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2053, KAZAKHSTAN: SUBSTANCE BEFORE SUMMIT

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2053.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2053 2009-11-19 01:54 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2172
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2053 3230154
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 190154Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6878
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2166
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1536
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2237
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1171
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2588
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2890
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1726
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1581
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2069

UNCLAS ASTANA 002053 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  SUBSTANCE BEFORE SUMMIT 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  During a November 16 dinner, representatives 
from the Embassies of Italy, Spain, the UK, and the Netherlands 
reasserted that their governments' insistence on substance before 
they commit to a 2010 OSCE Summit.  Several participants noted the 
Foreign Ministry's emphasis on its willingness to hold the Summit 
outside of Kazakhstan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (SBU) At a dinner in honor of McKenzie Smith, Deputy Director of 
the Russia, South Caucuses, and Central Asia Directorate in the UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, representatives from the European 
Union, United Nations, and the Embassies of Italy, Spain, the UK, 
and Netherlands discussed Kazakhstan's proposal to host a summit 
during its 2010 Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  Recently returned from accompanying 
President Nazarbayev to Italy, Italian Ambassador Bruno Antonio 
Pasquino clarified that his government has agreed only in principle 
to a summit.  The Italian President and Prime Minister told 
President Nazarbayev that they need an agenda before fully 
committing.   Both UK Charge Mike Welch and Smith concurred that the 
Kazakhstani government must determine the event's substance first. 
They reported that the Foreign Ministry conveyed its willingness to 
consider any topics that the UK wishes to propose. 
 
4.  (SBU) Dutch Ambassador Frans Potuyt and Spanish DCM Beltran de 
Agueda also reported their respective governments' conditional 
support, which depends upon the summit's substance.  Most 
representatives cited European security as the most likely summit 
topic even though they believe that the Corfu process will not 
conclude before the end of 2010.  At the same time, they concurred 
with Pol/Econ Chief when she raised U.S. concerns that this topic 
could disrupt progress on the Corfu process. 
 
5.  (SBU) The Dutch Ambassador also pointed out, which the UK Charge 
confirmed, Kazakhstan's willingness to hold the summit outside its 
territory.  They highlighted Helsinki and Vienna as possible venues. 
 The Dutch Ambassador asserted that the government of Finland has 
welcomed the proposed summit.  Meanwhile, the UK's Deputy Director 
said the OSCE Secretariat would probably prefer to hold the summit 
in Vienna.  The Dutch Ambassador reminded guests that the government 
of Kazakhstan had approached The Hague about hosting its proposed 
high-level meeting on tolerance.  He appeared relieved that the 
government of Kazakhstan now prefers to have this event in Astana at 
the Palace of Peace and Harmony (aka, the Pyramid).  When the topic 
of the April 2010 Global Nuclear Security Summit arose, UN Resident 
Coordinator Haoliang Xu expressed skepticism that the international 
community could manage so many meetings in one year. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2051, KAZAKHSTAN STILL MULLING UN IRAN RESOLUTION

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2051.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2051 2009-11-18 07:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1252
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #2051 3220727
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180727Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6876
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2165
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1535
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2236
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1170
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2587
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1580
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1725
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 002051 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, IO/RHS, DRL/MLGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019 
TAGS: PHUM UNGA PREL IR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN STILL MULLING UN IRAN RESOLUTION 
 
REFTEL:  STATE 116263 
 
Classified By: Charge d' affaires, a. i. Pamela Spratlen:  1.4 (b), 
(d) 
 
1.  (SBU) On November 17, PolOff met with Assel Utegenova, head of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Cultural and Humanitarian 
Cooperation Division, to deliver reftel points on country-specific 
resolutions at the United Nations.  Utegenova conveyed that 
Kazakhstan is still considering its position on the Iran 
country-specific resolution.  On the no-action motion, she confirmed 
that the Government of Kazakhstan is considering moving from support 
to abstention.  She said the Foreign Ministry has faced "heavy 
lobbying from various interests" on the issue, presumably from the 
Iranian mission.  In considering its position, the MFA must weigh not 
only the country's geographical proximity to Iran, but also 
Kazakhstan's 2011 chairmanship of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), she stressed.  "We are both Muslim-majority 
countries," she remarked.  PolOff noted that before its OIC 
chairmanship, Kazakhstan will chair the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010.  Poloff stressed that a "no" 
vote on the no-action motion and a "yes" vote on the resolution 
condemning Iran's human rights record would demonstrate Kazakhstan's 
commitment to OSCE principles.  "This is one aspect we are 
considering," responded Utegenova. 
 
2.  (C) COMMENT:  The Charge will reinforce our points when she meets 
with President Nazarbayev's foreign policy advisor Kairat Sarybai 
later this week.  Considering President Nazarbayev's long-standing 
policy of balancing competing interests and Iran's apparent activism 
on the issue, it is unlikely that Kazakhstan will reverse its past 
voting record and support the country-specific resolution that 
condemns Iran's human rights record.  On the other hand, the 
government appears open to abstaining on the no-action motion.  We 
should continue to pursue this opening.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2050, KAZAKHSTAN: PREPARATIONS FOR DFM UMAROV’S VISIT —

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2050.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2050 2009-11-17 11:10 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0276
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2050/01 3211110
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 171110Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6873
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2162
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1532
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2233
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1167
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1722
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1577
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002050 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, AND DEPT FOR NEA/IR, ISN 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/17/2029 
TAGS: PARM PGOV PINR PREL KNNP START IR RS UP UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:   PREPARATIONS FOR DFM UMAROV'S VISIT -- 
NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES 
 
REFTELS:  A. ASTANA 2000 
  B. ASTANA 2007 
  C. 08 ASTANA 1967 
  D. 08 ASTANA 2295 
  E. 08 ASTANA 2573 
      F. ASTANA 1541 
  G. STATE 83600 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Pamela L. Spratlen, 1.4 (b), 
(d) 
 
1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 12. 
 
2.  (S) SUMMARY:  At the request of Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA), PolOff met on November 13 with the Director of the 
Multilateral Cooperation Department, Barlybai Sadykov, whose 
Department is responsible for all non-proliferation, security and 
disarmament issues.  In preparation for Deputy Foreign Minister 
Umarov's upcoming visit to Washington, Sadykov requested 
clarification concerning U.S. positions on non-proliferation issues, 
specifically Semipalatinsk, and the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR).  Sadykov provided a non-paper -- transmitted separately via 
e-mail to SCA/CEN on November 16 -- on Kazakhstan's views on the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).  Sadykov also requested an 
answer to Kazakhstan's proposal to recognize the participants of the 
START-1 Treaty for completing their obligations.  Sadykov's 
high-level engagement highlights the importance the MFA attaches to 
the U.S.-Kazakhstani non-proliferation and security relationship. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
ENSURING PHYSICAL SECURITY AT SEMIPALATINSK 
 
3.  (S) In preparation for Deputy Foreign Minister Umarov's November 
18-20 visit to the United States, Sadykov told PolOff that Umarov 
would like to discuss trilateral non-proliferation projects, which 
the United States, Kazakhstan, and Russia currently are undertaking 
at Semipalatinsk.  According to Sadykov, during a telephone 
conversation between President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Vice 
President Joe Biden, Nazarbayev proposed a trilateral agreement on 
work at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS).  Emphasizing that 
Nazarbayev proposed the concept "in order to optimize a 
mutually-beneficial plan of work," the Director asked the U.S. 
government to clarify its position on the President's proposal. 
Sadykov also inquired if the United States believes the current 
measures at Semipalatinsk are enough to fully guarantee STS' 
protection.  (NOTE:  Sadykov confirmed that "protection of the STS," 
does not refer to remediation, or ecological protection, but rather 
physical security of the site.  END NOTE.)  Finally, the Director 
also asked about U.S. satisfaction with the pace of work at the STS. 
 
4.  (S) On November 10 and 12, the Ambassador met respectively with 
Marat Tazhin, State Secretary of the National Security Council, and 
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Sauat Mynbayev,  to discuss 
bilateral projects at Semipalatinsk (refs A-B).  Since the U.S. and 
Kazakhstani governments consider information on these projects very 
sensitive, it was not clear the extent to which Sadykov, and the two 
assistants who accompanied him to the meeting, are informed on 
U.S.-Kazakhstani cooperation at Semipalatinsk. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN INQUIRES ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION ROADBLOCKS 
 
5.  (C) Sadykov told PolOff that the government of Kazakhstan views 
Semipalatinsk in the context of its commitment to maintain a 
cooperative, bilateral non-proliferation relationship.  He requested 
information from the U.S. government about non-proliferation 
projects, which require further cooperation from Kazakhstan, in order 
to brief Umarov before his visit.  According to Sadykov, a list of 
"stumbling blocks" would be sufficient, and he specifically asked 
about U.S. requests related to the BN-350 spent-fuel transfer and the 
Central Reference Laboratory.  "What are the United States' 
priorities in relation to non-proliferation projects?" queried 
Sadykov. 
 
ASTANA 00002050  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
6.  (C) Sadykov has been running the Foreign Ministry's Multilateral 
Cooperation Department for over a year.  Previ
ously, he served as 
Kazakhstan's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 
New York and Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Americas Desk.  As the 
primary point of contact for all Post's non-proliferation related 
issues, the Multilateral Cooperation Department plays an important 
role in policymaking related to non-proliferation issues.  Over the 
last year, under both former Deputy Director of the Multilateral 
Cooperation Department Sergey Savelyev and current Deputy Director 
Anvar Baisuanov, the Multilateral Cooperation Department has 
responded reasonably quickly -- and very cooperatively -- to all U.S. 
non-proliferation-related requests, including upholding commitments 
under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835, which aims to 
prevent Iran's acquisition of new supplies of uranium, and 
designating additional Iranian entities and individuals under 
Executive Order 13382 (refs C-F). Sadykov's two assistants, Anvar 
Tanalinov, Chief of the Security Division, and specialist Azat 
Makhmudov, who have worked very cooperatively with PolOff on a number 
of sensitive issues, also participated in the November 13 meeting. 
 
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 
 
7.  (C) In response to PolOff's inquiry about the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), Sadykov responded concisely that Kazakhstan favors 
strengthening the regime, but declined to elaborate further. 
(COMMENT:  Despite its overall strong cooperation on 
non-proliferation and Post's repeated requests for more information 
on Kazakhstan's NPT position, until this meeting, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had been reluctant to clearly define its position 
(ref F-G).  It appears Kazakhstan wants to consider the positions 
taken by other states' at future conferences before it finalizes its 
policy.  END COMMENT.)  Sadykov asserted that Kazakhstan would soon 
provide its views on the NPT, and delivered a non-paper -- 
transmitted separately via e-mail to SCA/CEN on November 16 -- on 
Kazakhstan's suggestions for an effective NPT. 
 
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME 
 
8.  (C) Sadykov expressed his government's hope that the United 
States will support Kazakhstan's candidacy to join the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).  The Director thanked the U.S. 
government for financing, through an Export Control and Related 
Border Security (EXBS) program, the translation into English of some 
of Kazakhstan's export control-related national legislation.  Sadykov 
asked for U.S. assistance in arranging seminars to identify 
Kazakhstani products subject to technical control under the MTCR. 
(NOTE:  According to Sadykov, Kazakhstan's lists are similar to those 
of the European Union.  END NOTE.) 
 
KAZAKHSTAN ASKS FOR STATEMENT ABOUT COMPLETION OF START-1 
 
9.  (C) In relation to the START-1 Treaty, Sadykov asked about the 
U.S. position on Kazakhstan's proposal, which he discussed with U.S. 
officials during his last visit to Washington.  , Specifically, 
Kazakhstan has requested that the text of the new agreement, which 
the United States and Russian Federation are negotiating, recognize 
the contribution of START-1's five participants, because Kazakhstan 
has fulfilled all obligations stipulated in the START-1 Treaty. 
Sadykov told PolOff Kazakhstan had approached the Russian Federation, 
who "responded positively" to this suggestion. 
 
10.  (C) Sadykov also inquired about U.S. plans to politically mark 
START-1's completion -- especially on or before December 5.  The 
Director noted Belarus' suggestion that the Foreign Ministers of all 
five START-1 participating states issue a joint statement.  According 
to Sadykov, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine "had agreed, in 
principle, that this could be a good idea."  Sadykov asked that the 
United States inform Kazakhstan of its views on this position, as 
soon as possible.  Sadykov added quietly, "If the United States is 
not on this team, it would send a negative message." 
 
 
ASTANA 00002050  003 OF 003 
 
 
11.  (C) According to Sadykov, the MFA had requested a statement that 
would affirm that Kazakhstan completed its START-1 obligations, is 
not a party to the new agreement under negotiation by the United 
States and Russian Federation, and that no further inspections of any 
facilities located on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
will occur.  Sadykov told PolOff that he had previously received 
verbal assurances that it should not be a problem for Kazakhstan to 
receive some kind of statement about Kazakhstan's completion of its 
START-1 obligations. (COMMENT:  When asked Sadykov could not identify 
the agency or individual who had given him the assurances, but he 
clearly took it seriously and is expecting a response.  END COMMENT.) 
 
12.  ACTION REQUESTS:  Post requests guidance on how to respond to 
Sadykov about STS issues, specifically, clarifying the U.S. position 
on Nazarbayev's proposal, current site protection measures, and the 
pace of work at the STS.  In relation to overall cooperation on 
non-proliferation, Post requests information on which projects 
require further cooperation from Kazakhstan, and where the projects 
rank in terms of U.S. priorities.  Post also requests guidance on 
Kazakhstan's request that the text of the new START-1 agreement, 
which the United States and Russian Federation are negotiating, will 
recognize the contribution of START-1's five participants.  Post 
requests guidance about whether the U.S. supports Belarus' suggestion 
that the Foreign Ministers of all five START-1 participating states 
issue a joint statement marking the agreement's completion.  Finally, 
Post also requests guidance on responding to Kazakhstan's request 
that the United States make a statement that verifies Kazakhstan 
completed its START-1 obligations, is not a party to the new 
agreement under negotiation by the United States and Russian 
Federation, and that no further inspections of any facilities located 
on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan will occur. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2027, KAZAKHSTAN: INVESTING IN ATYRAU

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2027.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2027 2009-11-16 01:44 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8612
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2027/01 3200144
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 160144Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6848
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2159
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1529
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2230
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1164
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1719
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1574
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 2011

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002027 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC, S/EEE, S/CIEA 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  INVESTING IN ATYRAU 
 
REF:  (A) ASTANA 2026 
      (B) ASTANA 2005 
      (C) 08 ASTANA 2252 
 
ASTANA 00002027  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  During two trips to Atyrau November 5-10, Energy 
Officer met with U.S. and international companies doing business in 
the region to discuss their opinion of Atyrau's investment climate. 
They said the region is led by a strong governor who expects foreign 
investors to follow the letter of the law and support his ambitious 
plans to improve the region's social infrastructure.  In general, 
they gave the governor high marks for creating a stable investment 
climate that offers attractive opportunities and the possibility of 
lucrative returns.  However, they accused the financial police -- 
who report to Astana, not Atyrau -- of using threats and 
intimidation to extract maximum rent from Western investors.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
DCM MEETS DEPUTY AKIM 
 
3.  (SBU) The DCM met First Deputy Akim Bolat Daukenov, a former 
federal prosecutor, on her first visit to Atyrau on November 5 (ref 
A).  Daukenov began the meeting by praising the production and 
performance of Tengizchevroil (TCO), in which Chevron (50%) and 
ExxonMobil (25%) have large stakes.  He said that the local 
government (Akimat) would like TCO to increase its local content and 
investment in other areas of the economy, including technology (ref 
B).  Daukenov said that U.S. companies are careful to follow 
Kazakhstani law and the terms of their contract.  "To the best of my 
knowledge," he said, "we have no issues, problems, or complaints 
with U.S. companies in Atyrau." 
 
COMPANIES COMMENT ON THE ATYRAU AKIMAT 
 
4.  (SBU) Mark Peck is an Australian national and General Director 
of YKK Kazakhstan, which provides fire-safety and emergency-rescue 
training to oil companies operating in Kazakhstan (ref A).  He told 
the DCM on November 5 that it is easier doing business in Kazakhstan 
than in any other country he has worked, including Indonesia and 
Brazil.  In particular, he cited his company's ability to move 
products and cash in and out of the country.  "It's reasonably 
straightforward," he said, "once you understand the rules."  Peck 
said it helps to have a strong local partner and a legitimate local 
presence, and he attributed much of his company's success to the 
fact that YKK is a Kazakhstani company. 
 
5.  (SBU) On November 10, during lunch with Brent Woolfork, 
professional staff member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
representatives of international oil service companies expressed 
their appreciation, if not admiration, for the work that Akim 
Ryskaliyev has done to develop Atyrau Oblast.  Colin Lind, a British 
citizen (and permanent resident of Kazakhstan, who owns property in 
Atyrau), is General Director of an engineering support services 
company called KIS/Orion LLP. 
 
6.  (SBU) Lind praised Ryskaliyev's emphasis on developing Atyrau's 
physical infrastructure, especially roads, bridges, water, and gas 
lines.  He even said he would vote for Ryskaliyev if he were allowed 
to.  When asked about the financial police, however, Lind gave a 
rueful laugh and joked, "You mean the evil guys in the big hats? 
When other officials call us, we try to put them off, reschedule the 
meeting.  But when they call, we come running.  We'll crawl 
backwards on all fours if we have to.  They have the power to come 
after you and shut you down." 
 
SECRETS OF SUCCESS AT TENGIZCHEVROIL 
 
7.  (SBU) Mariya Karazhigitova, TCO's Director of Local Government 
and Public Affairs, told the DCM on November 6 that TCO has a strong 
relationship with Atyrau Oblast Akim Bergey Ryskaliyev and a good 
reputation among the citizens of Atyrau oblast (ref A). 
 
ASTANA 00002027  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
Karazhigitova attributed this to TCO's ability to understand and 
empathize with the local government.  "We respect the Akim, we 
understand where he is coming from," she said.  "He always has a 
reason for everything he does.  We cannot pretend that we are here 
by ourselves."  Nevertheless, she admitted that the local government 
does not have sufficient funds to finance its ambitious development 
plans, and often relies on TCO to fund social projects.  "The Akim 
will get his money one way or another," she said.  "There are many 
ways he can make your life miserable.  And if you think they'll cu
t 
you a special deal because you're TCO, you're wrong." 
 
BAKER HUGHES AND THE FINANCIAL POLICE 
 
8.  (SBU) On October 29, Baker Hughes (BH) Vice President for the 
Caspian Don McKelvie reported to Energy Officer that the company is 
having tax trouble with Atyrau Oblast.  He said that the situation 
has escalated since early October, and requested Embassy assistance. 
 According to McKelvie, the Atyrau tax authority recently audited BH 
tax records for 2004-07 and found minor reporting violations.  The 
case was reviewed by an Atyrau court, which ruled in favor of the 
tax authority.  BH does not believe it is in violation of the law 
and is preparing an appeal. 
 
9.  (SBU) In the meantime, according to McKelvie, the financial 
police began a criminal investigation of the company's country 
manager and chief accountant.  On August 28, he said, the financial 
police entered Baker Hughes' office in Atyrau and demanded it turn 
over all tax records.  A company attorney refused to turn over the 
records without a court order, which McKelvie said irritated the 
financial police, who nevertheless left the office.  McKelvie said 
the financial police then used an active case against one of their 
customers to demand the documents via court order. 
 
10.  (SBU) With this order in hand, the financial police visited 
Baker Hughes in Aktau and demanded the records.  The Baker Hughes 
office there also declined to provide the files so the financial 
police travelled to Almaty and made the same demand.  A BH corporate 
attorney from Moscow arrived that night to meet with the tax 
authorities and negotiated a release of some documents not critical 
to the appeal.  The authorities sealed the documents, stamped the 
packages, and returned to Atyrau.  According to McKelvie, the case 
is still pending. 
 
11.  (SBU) The DCM raised this issue with Daukenov on November 5 
(ref A), who said the Ministry of Finance, not the Akimat, had the 
lead on the matter and was merely trying to follow Kazakhstani law. 
Daukenov said, "We have had similar issues with other companies in 
the past and have always been able to resolve them.  Moreover, we 
have worked very hard to bring our laws in line with international 
standards."  Daukenov emphasized that the Akimat wants to continue 
to attract foreign investment.  "Foreign investors pay taxes, build 
social infrastructure, and employ Kazakhstani citizens.  As a local 
resident of Atyrau oblast," he said, "I can tell you that this 
region has benefitted from foreign investment." 
 
DIFFICULTIES WITH DIVERSIFICATION 
 
12.  (SBU) Daukenov said the local government would like to 
diversify its economy away from oil and gas, but he acknowledged 
that it will not be easy.  "Atyrau is the oil and gas capital of 
Kazakhstan," he admitted.  "Investors come here primarily to explore 
for oil."  Nevertheless, the Akimat is promoting investment in 
sectors such as fishing, agriculture, construction, metallurgy, and 
petrochemicals. 
 
13.  (SBU) COMMENT:  In general, international businesses expressed 
a high opinion of the local government of Atyrau oblast.  Akim 
Ryskaliyev received high marks for investing in the city and in the 
region and is perceived as a tough, but fair administrator.  He is 
firmly in charge of governing Kazakhstan's most economically-dynamic 
oblast, and companies doing business in Atyrau would be ill-advised 
to cross or contradict him.  Most companies said their biggest 
 
ASTANA 00002027  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
problems have been with the central government -- particularly the 
tax police, who report to the Ministry of Finance -- not with the 
Akim.  Although Ryskaliyev is a powerful local boss, even he has to 
answer to The Boss in Astana.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2026, KAZAKHSTAN: ENERGY, EDUCATION, AND EXPECTATIONS IN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2026.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2026 2009-11-13 08:41 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7062
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2026/01 3170841
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 130841Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6845
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2156
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1526
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2227
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1161
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1716
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 2008

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002026 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, EEB/ESC, S/EEE, S/CIEA 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET EAID SOCI KDEM KWMN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  ENERGY, EDUCATION, AND EXPECTATIONS IN 
ATYRAU 
 
REF:  (A) ASTANA 1983 
      (B) ASTANA 2005 
      (C) 08 ASTANA 2252 
 
ASTANA 00002026  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Mud, oil, gas, and ambition blend to form the 
strange clay that molds the Western Kazakhstani city of Atyrau.  In 
a three-day visit from November 5-7, DCM, Energy Officer, and local 
staff met with the Deputy Governor of Atyrau oblast, toured oil and 
gas-related facilities, visited two U.S. government-funded projects, 
met with Western energy executives, and spoke to students at the 
cozy American Corner.  Atyrau is a place of two worlds.  The 
hard-nosed oil and gas industry representatives inhabit one world. 
They propel the work of multi-billion dollar international energy 
companies, certain that they can satisfy Kazakhstani government 
demands for local content as well as their own corporate goals.  The 
insular, traditional Kazakhstani community lives in the other world, 
fights for a piece of the action, and clutches its culture with the 
clipped sounds of the Kazakh language that one hears everywhere.  In 
the absence of a consulate or other official permanent presence, 
U.S. technical cooperation and exchange programs offer the United 
States small-scale opportunities to help that very traditional part 
of Kazakhstani society open up.  Longer term, we should consider how 
to strengthen our staff language capabilities and continuously 
monitor whether we need a more robust U.S. official presence in 
Western Kazakhstan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DEPUTY AKIM:  BAKER HUGHES IS NOT OUR PROBLEM! 
 
3.  (SBU) At the last minute, a confirmed meeting with Akim 
(governor) Berghey Ryskaliev turned into a courtesy call with his 
first deputy, Bolat Daukenov.  With an official Akimat photographer 
and note-taker present, the DCM discussed the overall economic 
development of Atyrau oblast, the role of foreign direct investment 
and the current tax troubles of the American oil services firm Baker 
Hughes, which has asked for support and told the Embassy it faces 
tax evasion fines by the oblast financial police.  The DCM prefaced 
her comments on Baker Hughes with a brief summary of the Public 
Private Economic Partnership Initiative (PPEPI).  She told Daukenov 
that PPEPI is a joint initiative of the governments of the United 
States and Kazakhstan that enjoys strong support from Deputy Prime 
Minister Yerbol Orenbayev (ref A).  The first deputy hesitated, 
telling the DCM that, to the best of his knowledge, the Atyrau 
oblast has no outstanding issues or problems with any U.S. company. 
Then, after he received an expertly-timed call (from the Akim per 
our local staff), he firmly asserted that the case is now with the 
Ministry of Finance, out of the Akimat's hands.  He said it involved 
questions the U.S. Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service 
currently are discussing in Frankfurt, and repeated this when the 
DCM pressed.  She closed by saying that we believe the Akimat can 
play a helpful role and hope the issue can be amicably resolved. 
(COMMENT:  We later learned that U.S. companies in Atyrau 
increasingly believe the Akimat's influence over the financial 
police is truly limited, because they report directly to the 
Ministry of Finance.  END COMMENT). 
 
TCO AND AGIP KCO:  A CONTRAST IN CORPORATE CULTURES 
 
4.  (SBU) From the General Director on down, from the first shuttle 
ride to the last gift exchange, we heard the mantra, "safety first," 
at Tengizchevroil (TCO).  Chevron is the lead operator of TCO, 
having invested billions of dollars in both the project and the 
local community.  TCO's director of government relations, Maria 
Karazhigitova, proudly told us that the Akim recently praised TCO 
General Director Todd Levy at an Akimat command performance meeting 
intended to persuade other companies to match the oil giant's record 
on corporate social responsibility.  TCO has shrewdly managed 
regional politics in other areas, including environmental protection 
and succession planning.  For example, as of January 1, 2010, TCO 
will replace its retiring, expatriate physician with a Kazakhstani 
 
ASTANA 00002026  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
national, and will follow suit with other senior positions over 
time. &#x0
00A; 
5.  (SBU) Despite Chevron's heft, track record, resources, and 
professionalism, problems occasionally arise.  On Friday November 6, 
fresh from tough negotiations in Astana, General Director Levy 
informed the DCM and Energy Officer that he had just lost the latest 
round with the national-level government on sulfur, which Kazakhstan 
wants to call a waste rather than a product.  The difference of one 
word could spell fines approaching $1 billion, "but we always win," 
said Levy, grimacing through his clear frustration.  (COMMENT: 
Later, we learned of more positive developments (ref B).  END 
COMMENT). 
 
6.  (SBU) At Agip KCO, which has the lead on developing the first 
phase of the Kashagan project, our team encountered a different 
culture.  On Saturday, November 7, American-citizen, 
public-relations manager Richard Fritz briefed the DCM and Energy 
officer on the vast Kashagan project.  Fritz' briefing stressed the 
well-known environmental sensitivities and corporate complexity of 
the project, but tensions in the ever-shifting partnership 
arrangement seeped through.  Agip KCO is now only an agent of the 
overall operator, the North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC).  When 
the DCM asked about profitability and getting the product to market, 
Fritz said "that's not our problem.  Our goal is to get up to 
450,000 barrels per day, but how it gets to market is the 
responsibility of each individual producer."  Whatever rules 
international companies play by in Atyrau, success apparently 
depends on how well they manage pressures, both from within and 
without. 
 
TRAINING AND LOCAL CONTENT:  THE PLANNING/EXECUTION GAP 
 
7.  (SBU) At dinner on November 5, Western business executives 
disagreed about whether their companies can meet local labor-content 
requirements, but all agreed they grapple with the issue and said 
the problem will grow as new projects come on line.  The DCM and 
Energy officer toured Agip KCO's state-of-the-art training facility 
built to help meet labor demand, complete with a year of 
English-language instruction and a virtual lock on a good-paying job 
after graduation.  Agip plans to spend up to $150,000 each to train 
more than 1,000 Kazakhstanis in various skills over a four-year 
period.  Another training facility demonstrated that Atyrau's two 
worlds can meet successfully.  Serik Abildinov of the Wood Group and 
his Australian joint venture partner Mark Peck train local employees 
on fire safety and marine rescue operations.  The two agreed that 
Kazakhstan's major oil exploration and production projects could 
reach local content goals if the government were more strategic in 
its approach, and if the companies were better forward-planners. 
The real trick, they suggested, is to manage expectations.  Projects 
will need skilled crafts, but not as many high-level managers as the 
Akimat might want. 
 
8.  (SBU) Meanwhile, local educational authorities seem trapped 
between the past and the future.  The DCM and Emboffs visited a 
USAID-funded project called, "Know About Business," ostensibly 
intended to ignite the spirit of small business entrepreneurship in 
teens.  The Ambassador's visit to the school a year ago was proudly 
chronicled in photos, which the director had specially laminated 
(ref C).  Baker Hughes and Chevron flew employees in from Almaty for 
the event, which the press covered.  The surreal hour featured a 
well-rehearsed presentation by a clearly Soviet-era trained teacher 
who whipped up her students' enthusiasm about the essentials of 
business:  "knowledge, ideas, capital and labor!"  At the rector's 
request, the DCM spoke in English with Russian interpretation.   He 
said some students from the villages did not understand Russian 
well.  The class was conducted in Kazakh. 
 
CULTURE AND EDUCATION 
 
9.  (SBU) On November 6, the DCM joined part of a day-long 
 
ASTANA 00002026  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
conference led by Democracy Commission grantee, the Zherles Social 
Foundation, on how to improve gender equality in Kazakhstan. 
Project presenter Gulnar Yeserkepova lamented that Kazakhstan is "so 
close, but so far away," from international standards on gender 
equality.  She said that the presidentially-approved action plan for 
gender equality lacks both resources and political will.  During a 
lively discussion, participants asked how they could emulate U.S. 
success.  The DCM said that gender equality is a long-term quest and 
noted that the right to vote for American women came well over 100 
years after the founding of the United States as a republic.  She 
stressed that while instruments developed by the government are 
important, society needs activists to foster ideas and advocate for 
change. 
 
10.  (SBU) The DCM and Emboffs stopped by the American Corner before 
departing Atyrau.  A group of about 50 students poured eagerly into 
a conference room to learn about U.S.-funded exchange programs.  We 
met with the newly-hired American Corner deputy director and toured 
the small, but well-appointed room which houses the newly-installed 
American Corner.  It featured bright natural light and a large 
supply of materials in Russian, Kazakh, and English from the 
Embassy's Public Affairs Section.  Spouses at TCO's American village 
compound have offered to volunteer as English language tutors.  All 
of this augurs well for building the previously underused center's 
utility and popularity. 
 
11.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The visit, the DCM's first to Atyrau, showed 
that the oil and gas giants can fend for themselves, but they face 
constant demands from the government at all levels to ensure that 
all citizens of Kazakhstan benefit from oil and gas production.  We 
will report septel on Atyrau's business climate.  A striking feature 
of this isolated city in the North Caspian is the large number of 
American citizens.  They proudly claim to constitute the largest 
concentration of Americans in Kazakhstan.  This may provide a basis 
for extending our official presence westward to serve Americans and 
develop our civil society outreach in a place that's important 
economically and politically, but hard to reach.  Such an effort 
would require expanded capability with the Kazakh language. 
Increasingly, private citizens and government officials in Atyrau 
oblast use Kazakh throughout their daily life, fulfilling a goal 
President Nazarbayev has recently articulated in his national unity 
policy.  Most of all, the visit showed that Atyrau is a great 
success story for the international community and for Kazakhstan. 
To keep it that way will require long-term planning, resolve, and 
foresight as the needs and expectations of Atyrau's two worlds 
continue to compete for resources and attention.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2008, KAZAKHSTAN: OSCE SYG HEARS SUMMIT IS NAZARBAYEV’S TOP

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2008.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2008 2009-11-13 07:49 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7016
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #2008/01 3170749
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 130749Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6822
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2154
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1524
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2225
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1159
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1572
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1714
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  OSCE SYG HEARS SUMMIT IS NAZARBAYEV'S TOP 
PRIORITY 
 
REFTEL:  ASTANA 2002 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (SBU) This is an action request.  See para seven. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  According to the deputy head of the Astana OSCE 
Center, Kazakhstan's desire to organize a summit of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during its 2010 
chairmanship was the main topic of discussion for the November 12 
working visit by OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut to 
Astana.  The meeting with President Nazarbayev focused solely on the 
summit, which the government also raised in de Brichambaut's other 
meetings.  The SYG stressed that an OSCE Summit "must have substance" 
and should cover all three OSCE dimensions equally, and he advised 
the Kazakhstanis to concentrate on the Corfu process.  The 
Kazakhstanis are pushing for a formal decision on the summit at the 
Athens Ministerial in December, and Foreign Minister Saudabayev plans 
to seek Secretary Clinton's support in Athens.  Brichambaut is 
concerned the focus on summit will take Kazakhstan's attention away 
from the results of the Athens Ministerial, Kazakhstan's "homework" 
for 2010.  The Kazakhstanis also raised the idea of the summit with 
the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Joao Soares, who 
visited Astana on November 11.  END SUMMARY. 
 
"THE PRESIDENT'S FIRST AND ONLY ISSUE" 
 
3.  (C) Jeannette Kloetzer, deputy head of the Astana OSCE Center, 
told us on November 13 that the idea of an OSCE summit in 2010 was 
the main topic of discussion for the one-day working visit to Astana 
of OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut.  She told us 
that de Brichambaut's November 12 visit "was not really planned," far 
in advance but that de Brichambaut had intended to meet President 
Nazarbayev and establish closer ties with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs before Kazakhstan assumes the OSCE Chairmanship.  (NOTE: 
Separately, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) Secretary General 
Spencer Oliver told us on November 11 that it was standard procedure 
for the PA to visit the capital of an in-coming OSCE chair, followed 
very soon after by the Secretary General.  END NOTE.)  Kloetzer 
ventured that the trip's short notice related to President 
Nazarbayev's schedule.  Kloetzer did not participate in the meeting 
with the President, but de Brichambaut told her afterwards that the 
meeting "concentrated solely on the summit.  It is the President's 
first and only issue," she said.  De Brichambaut also met with 
Foreign Minister-State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev, Senate Speaker 
Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev, and Mazhilis Speaker Ural Mukhametzhanov, all 
of whom raised the summit idea.  "It is now officially on the table," 
she said. 
 
4.  (C) According to Kloetzer, de Brichambaut told his Kazakhstani 
interlocutors that obtaining OSCE participating states' support for a 
summit is "a long process."  He stressed that an OSCE summit "must 
have substance" and should cover all three OSCE dimensions equally. 
De Brichambaut suggested the Corfu process as the main topic for the 
summit.  Kloetzer told us that Kazakhstanis are "fixated on the idea" 
of the summit and want to include a reference to it in the concluding 
document of the December Athens Ministerial.  When de Brichambaut 
tried to prepare Saudabayev for the possibility that the reference 
might not be included, Saudabayev became visibly unnerved, telling 
Brichambaut that many of President Nazarbayev's ideas were initially 
received with great skepticism but are now a reality.  As examples, 
he pointed to the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building 
Measures in Asia (CICA) -- a Kazakhstan-initiated intergovernmental 
forum that is headquartered in Almaty and has 16 participating states 
-- and the tri-annual Congress of Traditional and World Traditional 
Religions that brings together political and religious leaders in 
Astana. 
 
5.  (C) Kloetzer said that Brichambaut will formerly alert other 
participating states to Kazakhstan's wish to host a summit, but 
Kazakhstan must gather the necessary support.  She said Saudabayev 
will discuss the issue with Russia's Foreign Minister Lavrov when 
they meet on November 17, and he will most likely raise it with 
Secretary Clinton at the Athens Ministerial in December.  (NOTE: 
Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov separately told the Ambassador 
on November 11 that Saudabayev will seek Secretary Clinton's support 
for the summit in Athens (reftel).  END NOTE.)  Saudabayev told de 
Brichambaut that the CIS countries, France, Slovenia, Italy, and the 
 
ASTANA 00002008  002 OF 002 
 
 
Vatican have all supported the idea
.  "Now comes the hard part," said 
Kloetzer, "deciding on the topics, setting the agenda, and picking 
the time and place."  She said Saudabayev floated the idea of holding 
a preparatory conference in the summer, which would include the 
Ministers of the participating states and would replace the annual 
Ministerial.  In her view, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is "very 
aware of how much work this will take" and is determined to succeed. 
She said de Brichambaut was concerned, however, that this summit 
focus will divert Kazakhstan's attention from the results of the 
Athens Ministerial.  "Whatever happens in Athens will be Kazakhstan's 
homework, its primary responsibility, for the year," she said, "all 
else is extra." 
 
6.  (C) Kloetzer told us that the Kazakhstanis also raised the idea 
of the summit with the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 
Joao Soares, who visited Astana on November 10-11.  Soares met with 
President Nazarbayev and Senate Chairman Tokayev, as well as with 
NGOs and political parties.  Kloetzer told us Soares supported the 
idea of the summit, but his main message to his Kazakhstani 
interlocutors was that a one-party parliament "was incomprehensible" 
to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.  Kloetzer said he received "a 
familiar message" in response -- Kazakhstan is moving slowly, but 
steadily, towards democracy. 
 
7.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Embassy Astana requests the Department's 
official position on Kazakhstan's desire to organize an OSCE summit 
in 2010 so that we can use it with government interlocutors prior to 
the Athens Ministerial. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2007, MINISTER OF ENERGY ON BN-350, SEMIPALATINSK AND ALATAU

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2007.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2007 2009-11-13 06:29 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6940
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2007/01 3170629
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 130629Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6820
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2152
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1522
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2223
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1157
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1712
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1570
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, S/EEE, S/CIEA, EEB 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/12/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON EPET MARR KNNP IT TU KZ
SUBJECT:  MINISTER OF ENERGY ON BN-350, SEMIPALATINSK AND ALATAU 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY:  On November 12, the Ambassador discussed 
non-proliferation issues, specifically the transfer of BN-350 
spent-fuel and the Semipalatinsk and Alatau projects, with Minister 
of Energy and Mineral Resources Sauat Mynbayev.  The Minister 
welcomed further cooperation on BN-350 security and transport, and 
agreed in principle to accelerate work at Semipalatinsk next year. 
In relation to the blending down of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) at 
Alatau, Mynbayev said that Kazakhstan's experts need to be convinced 
that the research at Alatau using low-enriched uranium (LEU) will 
work, but agreed to continue expert-level discussions to find a 
mutually-acceptable solution.  Mynbayev also discussed Italian oil 
company ENI's investments in Kazakhstan following President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev's November 6 visit to Italy, along with developments 
related to the Eskene-Kuryk and Samsun-Ceyhan pipelines.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
BN-350 SPENT-FUEL TRANSPORT 
 
2.  (S) The Ambassador thanked the government of Kazakhstan for 
providing its emergency response plan for the BN-350 spent fuel 
shipment.  Citing long-standing collaboration, he also recommended a 
bilateral expert-level meeting in the near future to review all 
transportation and security plans, which Mynbayev agreed to arrange. 
Mynbayev welcomed the Ambassador's proposal to consider security 
consultations with the possibility of an exercise conducted by U.S. 
and Kazakhstani specialists, and said he would include this 
suggestion in a second set of training requests, which the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) will relay soon. 
 
3.  (S) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry about whether MEMR 
has sufficient equipment for the spent-fuel transfer, Mynbayev 
replied that Kazakhstan has all the equipment necessary for transport 
and storage.  Mynbayev noted the U.S. donation of much of the 
security equipment.  He said MEMR has already submitted to the U.S. 
Department of Energy a list of required spare parts due to their 
scarcity on the local market.  Mynbayev also reiterated that 
registration of the railcars, which will be used to transport the 
fuel, has not been completed.  (NOTE:  The Moscow-based certification 
agency for all railcars used in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States is currently reviewing the railcar design.  END NOTE.) 
 
ACCELERATION OF WORK AT SEMIPALATINSK 
 
4.  (S) The Ambassador thanked the Kazakhstani government for 
increasing security and supporting a faster pace of work at 
Semipalatinsk this year.  Given that we expect identification of 20 
new tunnels, he pressed for even greater acceleration next year. 
Mynbayev said that as soon as MEMR receives information about these 
sites, its specialists will immediately prepare a work and monitoring 
schedule.  According to Mynbayev, in principle, MEMR is willing to 
continue to accelerate its schedule. 
 
ALATAU PROJECT 
 
5.  (S) The Ambassador also expressed appreciation for Kazakhstan's 
cooperation on the sensitive project to blend down highly-enriched 
uranium (HEU) at the Alatau Institute of Nuclear Physics.  He 
conveyed U.S. readiness for expert-level cooperation and interest in 
concrete information about next steps.  Mynbayev responded, "I 
understand we have mutual commitments on this issue."  Pushing back a 
little, Mynbayev told the Ambassador that Kazakhstan is interested 
not only in the removal of highly-enriched-uranium (HEU) fuel, but 
also in the continuation of research -- using low-enriched-uranium 
(LEU) fuel -- at the Alatau reactor.  When the Ambassador reiterated 
the need simply to encourage experts on both sides to find a 
mutually-acceptable solution, Mynbayev immediately agreed, saying, "I 
am ready to instruct my experts to discuss this issue." 
 
ITALIAN OIL COMPANY ENI'S INVESTMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN'S SHIPYARDS 
 
6.  (C) The Ambassador also asked Mynbayev about the status of MEMR'S 
 
ASTANA 00002007  002 OF 002 
 
 
June announcement that the Italian energy company, ENI, intends to 
build a shipyard in Kazakhstan's sector of the Caspian Sea to produce 
63,000 dead-weight ton oil ta
nkers.  Mynbayev confirmed that MEMR 
signed an agreement with ENI and created a working group to study the 
project.  However, he told the Ambassador, "The results of the 
project are still unclear," and they depend on commercial demand for 
the tankers.  Mynbayev admitted that the tanker project is a 
long-term endeavor, on which the partners will need to work well into 
2010.  The Minister said decisions about ownership and operation of 
the vessels will influence the pace of the project.  "We are still 
negotiating with SOCAR over this, and the Kashagan consortium is very 
interested as well," Mynbayev noted.  According to the Minister, 
although ENI representatives declared their readiness to invest in 
the project, they will not provide the necessary cash until 
resolution of all nuances.  Further illustrating the complexity of 
the project, Mynbayev told the Ambassador, "we're not even ready for 
the onshore Eskene-Kuryk pipeline yet -- and that is the first step 
on the road to a viable (trans-Caspian shuttle tanker) system."  He 
further explained that a French company has been awarded the 
exclusive right to negotiate Eskene-Kuryk pipeline construction with 
the government, but admitted that this large project will also take 
time. 
 
A POLITICAL REALITY:  THE SAMSUN-CEYHAN PIPELINE 
 
7.  (C) The Ambassador also asked about Nazarbayev's October 22 
announcement that Kazakhstan, along with Russia, will take part in 
the construction of the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline.  "Theoretically 
and politically," Mynbayev replied, "we're ready to do it."  However, 
Mynbayev again admitted that Kazakhstan has not worked out the 
commercial aspects.  Mynbayev responded positively to the 
Ambassador's query about Kazakhstan's willingness to commit its own 
crude to the pipeline, but declared it "far too early" for decisions 
about which specific fields will provide the oil for Samsun-Ceyhan. 
The Minister pointed out that Kazakhstan can ship oil through the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and across the Caspian via tanker 
to Baku, and is in negotiations with Azerbaijan to develop the 
Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS). 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks