Monthly Archives: December 2009

09ASTANA2273,

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2273.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2273 2009-12-31 07:44 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana
Appears in these articles:
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988311.ece

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #2273/01 3650744
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 310744Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7141
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0549
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1617
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0244
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2379
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0098
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2662

S E C R E T ASTANA 002273

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM MNUC KNNP IR JA KZ

REF: A. ASTANA 2257 B. SECSTATE 131723 C. ASTANA 2158

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B), (D)

1. (S) SUMMARY: The government of Kazakhstan publicly and privately denied allegations of negotiations between Iran and KazAtomProm for the purchase of yellowcake uranium (refs A-B). During a December 31 meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Kairat Umarov told the Ambassador that an extensive interagency investigation found no evidence of discussions with, or even a proposal from, Iran. He stressed Kazakhstans strong commitment to non-proliferation and stringent export-control regime. Umarov requested further details to assist the investigation and a public statement of support from the United States (see suggestion in para 13). Umarov passed the Ambassador the Foreign Ministrys December 30 press release and a non-paper (see paragraphs 11-12). END SUMMARY.

"NO STONE UNTURNED"

2. (S) In response to the Ambassadors December 30 demarche regarding possible negotiations between a Kazakhstani subsidiary of KazAtomProm (KAP) and Iran for the sale of a large quantity of yellowcake uranium, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Kairat Umarov requested an urgent December 31 meeting with the Ambassador. Umarov first emphasized the Kazakhstani governments serious and immediate response to the allegations, stating, "All agencies have worked together to leave no stone unturned." He then passed the Ambassador the Foreign Ministrys December 30 press release and a non-paper on the governments investigation (see paragraphs 11-12). Summarizing the non-paper, he thanked the U.S. government for providing information about the allegations and underlined the Kazakhstani governments strong commitment to non-proliferation. Umarov further reaffirmed support for the prevention of uranium exports to Iran, in accordance with UNSCR 1737. Highlighting U.S. assistance, he stressed Kazakhstans strong export-control regime, which precludes the possibility of a uranium shipment to Iran. Umarov asserted, "There are no negotiations on an uranium shipment. We have quickly checked all questions and are taking additional measures, but there are no leads to confirm the intention to transfer uranium." Umarov concluded by requesting "documents and materials, with names and data, on those conducting the negotiations."

NO CONTRACTS, NO CONTACT, AND NO NEGOTIATIONS

3. (S) Umarov then turned to his private report on the interagency investigation, which concluded that KAP has neither contracts nor contact with Iran on any possible uranium shipment. Furthermore, he asserted, "No one has received a proposal from Iran, and a check of all potential mediators has not shown any evidence of a request from Iran." Turning to Baiken-U, owned jointly by KAP and Energy Asia Limited, a consortium of Japanese power companies, Umarov underlined its 95% Japanese ownership. "Even with that, KazAtomProm has no information that negotiations are in process," he stated.

ONE-THIRD OF KAZAKHSTANS URANIUM PRODUCTION

4. (S) To emphasize the improbability of the sale, Umarov then recited detailed information on Baiken-Us limited mining operations and small stock of unprocessed uranium ore -- 70 tons. The volume of yellowcake under alleged negotiations, he continued, equals one-third of all Kazakhstans production. "To ship that amount unaccounted is crazy," he argued. Highlighting the regular inventory of stockpiles by the competent Kazakhstani agencies, he revealed, "They have checked half, nothing is missing, and no documents have been distorted."

MANDATORY END-USE CERTIFICATES

5. (S) About transportation, Umarov told the Ambassador that all uranium exports occur exclusively by railway, and that no shipments have ever passed through Kazakhstani sea ports [on the Caspian Sea]. Kazakhstans multi-layered, strict export controls would ensure immediate identification of any shipment of any amount of uranium, he argued. Furthermore, he said, "No Kazakhstani company has requested a license to export uranium to Iran, and we never ship uranium to a non-nuclear power without an end-use certificate."

REPUTATION AT STAKE

6. (S) "This investigation led to our statement, and now we have big questions for you and Washington. Information is very important
because Kazakhstans reputation has been put at stake," he asserted. "If you consider us a strategic partner, as you say, you must share information. We are working for one and the same goals, and we have always been helpful on Iran. The appearance of this article and the mention of intelligence leads to questions about trust." Umarov then underlined the governments "disappointment" that the State Departments statement (drawn from press guidance) did not more firmly support Kazakhstan and underline Kazakhstans staunch support for non-proliferation. "Now, we are in a damage-control situation," he concluded with real chagrin.

INCIDENT ORCHESTRATED?

7. (S) Umarov relayed the Kazakhstani governments request to the IAEA for the report. "The IAEA says that they do not have the report, which leads us to the conclusion that it was orchestrated." He then repeated his request for additional information in order to continue the investigation in greater detail. "As partners, we must work together constructively to stop activity confidentially. Our previous experiences have shown the effectiveness of this approach. You trusted us before with such sensitive projects as Operation Sapphire."

STRONGER, BROADER INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WELCOMED

8. (S) After thanking the Ministry and government for its serious, speedy response, the Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. government is not accusing the Kazakhstani government of involvement in the alleged negotiations. He asserted that he met with the Foreign Minister in advance of the article, because the U.S. government sees Kazakhstan as a strong partner. The Ambassador mentioned the U.S. governments recognition and praise for Kazakhstans long history of positive cooperation, especially on non-proliferation. Recalling his meeting with the new head of the National Security Committee (KNB) (ref C), the Ambassador welcomed stronger, broader intelligence cooperation.

PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT?

9. (S) Looking for a way to restore Kazakhstans image, Umarov concluded with a request that the U.S. government make a public statement of support, "We have strenuously worked on our non-proliferation reputation, and now it is being questioned, now the word has gone out. We would appreciate strong support from our partners." The Ambassador agreed to relay the request.

10. (S) In a private pull-aside, Umarov told the Ambassador that Kazakhstan has some degree of suspicion that a third nation (unnamed) might have fabricated the initial report and, for its own purposes, leaked it to the Associated Press.

11. (U) BEGIN DECEMBER 30 PRESS STATEMENT:

STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorically repudiates certain news media reports alleging Kazakhstans connection to a possible deal to supply uranium to Iran and considers them groundless insinuations damaging the reputation of our country.

As is known, Kazakhstan has voluntarily renounced the worlds fourth largest nuclear and missile arsenal, shut down the worlds second largest Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, and is one of the recognized leaders of the global process of disarmament and nonproliferation.

Kazakhstan is firmly committed to the principles of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and tough control over the turnover of dual use materials. As a non-nuclear weapon state, Kazakhstan has been unwaveringly committed and remains committed to the principles of the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, the UN Convention on physical protection of nuclear materials, as well as the principles and rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

All the operations with nuclear materials in Kazakhstan, including our cooperation regarding peaceful use of atomic energy with foreign countries, are subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

In this connection, Kazakhstan expects the IAEA to give an appropriate assessment of the information being disseminated by the news media.

END STATEMENT.

12. (S) BEGIN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS NON-PAPER:

Thank you for providing the information on the attempts of Iranian company Nur Afzar Gostar (NAG) to purchase uranium ore from Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan unwaveringly fulfills its tight export-control obligations with respect to nuclear materials and is committed to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We fully support your efforts to prevent the export of nuclear materials to the Islamic Republic of Iran, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1737. Kazakhstans export-control system excludes any possibility of illegal deliveries of uranium products to that country. Kazakhstans government agencies and private companies are not conducting, nor have they ever conducted, official negotiations for the delivery of uranium ore to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Based on your inquiry, the government conducted a thorough investigation of the companies you identified and took additional steps to prevent the illegal transfer of purified uranium ore, including yellowcake. To date, no evidence of an illegal export of significant amounts of uranium ore have been found.

From our side, we request that you provide copies of materials containing further information on the companies and individuals engaged in the negotiations to transfer uranium ore from Kazakhstan.

END NON-PAPER.

13. (S) COMMENT: We know from other sources that Kazakhstans initial investigation was indeed swift and relatively thorough. Nonproliferation is one area where the United States and Kazakhstan have consistently and successfully cooperated for nearly two decades, and sensitive nonproliferation programs still continue. Given the very strong disappointment, almost chagrin, that Umarov expressed, we suggest it would not be remiss for the Department to issue a press statement (or for Embassy Astana to be authorized to issue one) that notes the government of Kazakhstans full cooperation in the investigation of this current allegation, as well as our long and successful partnership to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Please advise. END COMM

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2272, KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS NEW OVERFLIGHT AGREEMENT

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2272.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2272 2009-12-31 05:32 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8741
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2272/01 3650532
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 310532Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7139
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2312
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1674
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2377
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1303
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1869
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1719
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2660
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2953
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002272 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, PM 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 12/31/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR AF RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS NEW OVERFLIGHT AGREEMENT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
REFTEL:  ASTANA 2204 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  On December 30, the Ambassador and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov met again to discuss outstanding U.S. 
requests to amend the 2001 overflight and 2009 Northern Distribution 
Network (NDN) agreements (reftel).  Umarov told the Ambassador that 
Kazakhstani government agencies are still reviewing the U.S. request 
to add a north-south overflight route to the 2001 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on overflights in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  He added that they are now considering whether the July 
U.S.-Russia agreement on overflights might be adapted as a model for 
a new agreement to permit the north-south route.  Expressing his hope 
to provide an interagency response by early January, Umarov 
emphasized that moving quickly to resolution is his highest priority. 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN STILL WORRIED ABOUT LETHAL OVERFLIGHTS... 
 
2.  (S/NF) In his December 30 meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister 
Kairat Umarov, the Ambassador followed up on Umarov's December 22 
requests, by providing releasable information on the U.S. overflight 
and Northern Distribution Network (NDN) agreements with Russia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (reftel).  Umarov thanked the 
Ambassador for the information. Emphasizing the government of 
Kazakhstan's continued concern about lethal cargo on overflights, he 
questioned the Ambassador closely about the inclusion of "lethal 
cargo" in these U.S. agreements.  The Ambassador reiterated that the 
transportation of "hazardous cargo" is explicitly listed in the 
existing, ratified agreement, and that thousands of overflights have 
occurred without incident.  Umarov took the point, and did not raise 
further concerns about "lethal cargo." 
 
NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK:  WHEELED VEHICLES AND FEES 
 
3.  (S/NF) In relation to the Northern Distribution Network, MFA 
Americas Director Askar Tazhiyev asked about fees paid by the U.S. 
Government.  The Ambassador replied that the NDN operates purely as a 
commercial operation, noting that the commercial operators are 
responsible for paying whatever customs and transit fees might be 
required.  Tazhiyev also queried the Ambassador about U.S. plans for 
the surface transit of wheeled armored vehicles for transporting 
troops (MATVs), including whether they would enter Kazakhstan via 
Russia and/or Baku, and whether the United States had initiated 
discussions, and secured permission, to ship them through Uzbekistan. 
 Umarov explained that the MFA must be able to explain the 
implementation of this request in case questions arise during 
Kazakhstan's interagency consultation process.  Umarov and Tazhiyev 
appeared concerned the MATVs would stack up in Kazakhstan if 
Uzbekistan decided not to permit the vehicles to transit via the NDN. 
 
AGREEMENT MUST BE RATIFIED, BUT MFA WILL HELP TO EXPEDITE 
 
4.  (S/NF) Umarov told the Ambassador that Kazakhstan had already 
obtained the July U.S.-Russia agreement on overflights from Moscow, 
and will have a Kazakhstani interagency-approved draft agreement 
ready in early January.  Umarov asserted Kazakhstani legal experts 
have concluded definitively the necessity of a new agreement.  When 
the Ambassador reiterated this agreement's urgency to enhance 
Afghanistan's stability, Umarov promised that the MFA would do 
everything possible to accelerate the process.  The Ambassador 
reiterated his December 22 request that the agreement at least enter 
into force upon signature, but Umarov argued that Kazakhstani law 
requires that it must first be ratified by Parliament.  According to 
Umarov, the MFA had to "jump through a lot of hoops" to get the 2001 
overflight agreement ratified, and this year the MFA hopes "to do it 
right." 
 
"LET'S GET IT RIGHT, FROM THE BEGINNING" 
 
5.  (S/NF) Umarov recommended that the new agreement include a clause 
 
ASTANA 00002272  002 OF 002 
 
 
allowing future amendments without re-ratification, if legally 
possible.  Umarov said he intends to work this issue intensively, 
even over the Jan 1-4 New Year holiday.  He stated that the deeper 
his involvement, the more convinced he becomes that it is necessary 
to "handle the issues correctly, right from the beginning."  Umarov 
added that the new overfli
ght agreement could either take the form of 
an agreement or a memorandum of understanding from the Kazakhstani 
legal perspective. 
 
6.  (S/NF) COMMENT:  Umarov appeared satisfied by the answers to 
Kazakhstan's previous questions (reftel), and raised no new concerns. 
 Embassy Astana will continue to place highest priority on achieving 
our overflight and NDN goals, and will follow up with the MFA within 
the next week to respond to any additional questions that arise 
during Kazakhstan's inter-agency review.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2264, KAZAKHSTAN: BAD SUMMER FOR BANKING BECOMES A WINTER OF

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2264.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2264 2009-12-30 09:02 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7938
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2264/01 3640902
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300902Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7131
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2308
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1670
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2373
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1299
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1865
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1715
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2141
RUEAWJL/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEANQT/FINCEN VIENNA VA
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC 0062

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 002264 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, INL/C, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV EFIN KCRM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  BAD SUMMER FOR BANKING BECOMES A WINTER OF 
DISCONTENT 
 
REF:  A.  ASTANA 1915 
      B.  ASTANA 2197 
      C.  ASTANA 1762 
  D.  ASTANA 2258 
 
ASTANA 00002264  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public internet. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  A dreary summer has become a cold, dark winter 
for the banking system in Kazakhstan as investigations into three 
banks have led to criminal charges and convictions for embezzlement, 
fraud, and money laundering.  The Financial Police (FinPol) have 
opened embezzlement and illegal use of funds investigations against 
former managers of Alliance bank.  On December 25, a court in Almaty 
found 12 former officials from BTA Bank, Temir Bank, and affiliated 
companies guilty of fraud, embezzlement, and concealing evidence, 
but not guilty of money laundering.  In August, former co-chairman 
of the Valyut-Transit Bank was found guilty of illegal 
entrepreneurship and money laundering.  As a result, the Financial 
Supervision Agency (FSA) announced the introduction of a new 
requirement for transactions conducted with offshore companies.  As 
in the anti-corruption campaign (ref A), questions remain about 
whether the sudden increase in cases against commercial banks 
resulted from the economic crisis or whether the banks are being 
used as surrogates for political battles.  END SUMMARY. 
 
ALLIANCE BANK 
 
3.  (U) The summer banking scandals began on July 3 when the Agency 
for Regulation and Supervision of Financial Markets and Financial 
Organizations (FSA) removed Zhomart Yertayev, Chairman of the 
Managing Board of Eurasian Bank, and his deputy, Alexei Ageyev.  FSA 
based its actions on allegations that Yertayev and Ageyev violated 
banking laws during their 2005-2007 tenures at Alliance Bank.  The 
City Court of Almaty suspended the decision of the FSA regarding 
Yertayev.  One day later the court reversed itself on the grounds 
that it lacked jurisdiction over the issue, because such a case can 
only be heard by the court in Astana due to the Presidential 
Administration's oversight of the FSA.  Grigoriy Marchenko, the head 
of the National Bank, subsequently announced that all materials 
concerning the case had been submitted to law-enforcement agencies 
for further investigation. 
 
4.  (U)  In mid-July, the Financial Police (FinPol), following an 
investigation conducted by the Prosecutor General's Office (PGO), 
began initiating a series of cases against bank officials for 
embezzlement and illegal use of bank funds.  Allegedly, five loans 
totaling $143 million were made without collateral, and $1.1 billion 
was withdrawn through four offshore companies.  U.S. Treasury bonds 
were legally purchased 2005-2007 through two Russian investment 
banks -- Metropol and Renaissance.  The bonds were then used as 
collateral for Alliance Bank loans to four offshore companies 
(Acquinta, Bazora, Xilliana and Serbina) through investment banks. 
When these offshore companies defaulted on their loans, the 
investment banks seized the bonds. According to the National Bank 
and FSA, no one, not even the auditors or board of directors, knew 
about financial transactions involving the bonds, and no 
documentation was found at Alliance Bank.  FinPol arrested Yertayev 
on August 25 for embezzlement and offered Ageyev immunity in 
exchange for his testimony.  On September 10, FinPol arrested 
Abylkasym Mamyrbekov, a former deputy chairman of the Board of 
Directors, for his alleged part in the embezzlement.  In late 
October, Berik Sultankulov and Dauren Keribayev, former Chairmen of 
the Executive Board, and Anuar Beisebayev, the former Chairman of 
the Executive Board of Seimar Alliance Financial Corporation which 
owns 75% of Alliance Bank, were charged in abstentia for 
embezzlement.  All three are subject of Interpol warrants.  Assets 
in the amount of $4 million have been seized. 
 
5.  (U) The current Chairman of the Board of Directors and former 
 
ASTANA 00002264  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
primary shareholder of Alliance bank, Margulan Seisembayev, has 
stated his ignorance of the transactions and lack of suspicious 
signals.  Because of the bad loans, Seisembayev sold a 76% stake in 
the bank to the government for 100 tenge (less than a dollar). 
According to Seisembayev, Yertayev and Avgeyev negotiated the terms 
of funding directly with the Moscow banks, and he only learned about 
the financing scheme in 2008.  Yertayev has cast do
ubt about 
Seisembayev's ignorance of the transactions.  Seisembayev asserted 
that he personally notified the FSA, National Holding Company 
Samruk-Kazyna, and current bank management about the loans. 
However, the bank's current management claims no knowledge of the 
loans before March 2009, and FSA Chairwoman Elena Bakhmutova denies 
receipt of full information from Seisembyaev.  Yertayev has 
questioned the release of information during Alliance's 
restructuring, and not in 2008, when allegedly known by regulators 
and the bank's management.  While arguing his ignorance, Seisembayev 
confessed to a different violation -- the disbursement of borrowed 
funds to increase the bank's equity.  Following Yertayev's arrest, 
Seisembayev announced on August 27 his willingness to cooperate with 
the investigation. 
 
6.  (U) Despite Seisembayev's willingness to cooperate, he has also 
not returned to Kazakhstan from his August vacation.  In October, 
FinPol initiated an additional case against Seisembayev for the 
alleged embezzlement of $155 million.  The newest investigation also 
includes Seisembayev's brother Yerlan, who was a stock-holder, and 
Arsen Saparov, the Chairman of the Credit Committee.  Allegedly, the 
Seisembayev brothers used land as collateral for loans through 
affiliated companies.  After the bank reported payment of the loans, 
it cleared the land title for sale.  FinPol claims the report was 
fraudulent, but Saisembayev's attorney asserts the loans were 
transferred to other companies.  Seisembayev's lawyer, who had 
previously complained about access to case materials, recently was 
allowed to review the materials.  She believes that FinPol cannot 
prove the embezzlement charges. 
 
7.  (U) In September, FinPol and FSA opened a joint audit to trace 
all loans from issuance to recipient, specifically checking for 
recipients affiliated with bank management.  They sought to confirm 
allegations that the owners of Alliance bank abused their authority 
by taking loans via affiliated companies.  As a result, FinPol 
initiated a case against Askar Galin, another brother of 
Seisembayev, who received loans in the amounts of $1 million and 
653,000 euros.  Galin is also subject of an Interpol warrant. 
 
8.  (U) Arlan Rimpoche, a journalist at the geokz.tv website, 
alleged that Alliance Bank used more than 50 unsecured loans in the 
amount of $35 million to bribe senior government officials since 
2002.  Alleged recipients include Sarybai Kalmurzayev, former head 
of the FinPol and now a senior official in the Presidential 
Administration, and Kairat Mami, former Supreme Court Chief Justice 
and current Procurator General Minster of Justice.  Seisembayev has 
denied these allegations, claiming that the story is designed to 
ruin his relationship with the Presidential Administration or impede 
the bank's restructuring. 
 
BTA BANK 
 
9.  (U) Mukhtar Alblyzov, ex-chairman of the BTA bank Board of 
Directors, and Zhaksylyk Zharimbetov, ex-deputy chairman of the 
Managing Board, allegedly laundered over 83 billion tenge ($550 
million) through nine shell companies.  An interagency investigative 
group transferred the criminal case against BTA Bank and its 
subsidiary, Temir Bank, to the PGO in Almaty to file charges on 
August 3.  The criminal case alleges Alblyzov and Zharimbetov led an 
organized criminal group, which embezzled BTA and Temir Bank funds. 
 
 
10.  (U) The investigation led to indictments of 12 people, 
 
ASTANA 00002264  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
including Deputy Chairman of BTA Genrig Kholodzinskiy, Managing 
Director of BTA Bagdatkali Tassibekov, Chairman of the Board of 
Directors of Temir Bank Ablakhat Kebirov, a Deputy Director at BTA, 
two members of Temir Bank's Board of Directors, and six executives 
of other companies.  The investigation resulted in the seizure of 
bank accounts and property, including 136 pieces of land, 12 houses, 
924 apartments, 83 luxury cars, and three planes.  The PGO has 
petitioned for the return of 172 billion tenge ($1.1 billion) from 
foreign borrowers. 
 
11.  (SBU) The investigation continues into the activities of 
Ablyzov, Zharimbetov, and the former Chairman of the Managing Board 
of BTA bank Roman Solodchenko, who are believed to have fled 
Kazakhstan.  One of Ablyazov's alleged accomplices, former Director 
General of Betpak-Dala LLP Rifat Rizoyev, was arrested in April in 
Ukraine, but appealed the extradition request to the European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasburg.  On September 26, he unexpectedly and 
voluntarily returned to Kazakhstan.  Rizoyev allegedly helped 
Ablyazov launder money through various offshore companies.  Some 
believe he only returned because of threats to his family in 
Kazakhstan from either Ablyazov or law enforcement authorities.  His 
attorney denies these allegations.  Law-enforcement agencies may be 
particularly interested in Rizoyev due to his alleged involvement in 
both the BTA and Kazatomprom (ref B) cases, although his Ukrainian 
lawyer denies these allegations.  Rizoyev was not charged in the BTA 
case, but offered immunity in exchange for his testimony (see para 
12).  Another accomplice, former head of the corporate-business 
division Veronika Efimova, was arrested in Russia, but her 
extradition has been suspended awaiting a decision on her appeal to 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
12.  (U) The PGO launched an additional investigation into BTA 
bank's international activities, including loans made in Georgia and 
Ukraine, and announced that Russia and Ukraine also are 
investigating possible fraudulent activities committed by Ablyazov. 
On September 30, Russian law-enforcement authorities arrested 
co-owner and former Director General of the joint-stock company 
Lizingovaya Companiya Delo Dmitriy Pak for fraudulent activity and 
the embezzlement of more than $70 million from BTA bank.  In 
November, BTA's current management seized a 20% share in an aquarium 
being built in Moscow. 
 
13.  (SBU) On August 13, a British Court froze the assets of 
Ablyazov, Zharimbetov, and Solodchenko, as well as the assets of 
three British citizens and a company, in response to a lawsuit for 
$300 million filed by the current management of BTA.  Ablyazov 
announced his happiness that England took action against him because 
it allows him the opportunity to fight Kazakhstan in a British Court 
and "air Kazakhstan's dirty laundry."  Nonetheless, he appealed the 
decision.  On September 30, his appeal was denied, and the former 
senior management of BTA was required to disclose their assets 
worldwide.  On November 16, the KNB reported the return of $1 
billion in BTA assets. 
 
TRIAL 
 
14.  (U) On December 25, the Almalin District Court in Almaty city 
found the first 12 defendants guilty, as members of a criminal 
group, of fraud, embezzlement, and concealing evidence.  However, 
prosecutors were unable to p
rove the charges of money laundering. 
Six of the defendants were officials of BTA and Temir bank, and six 
headed affiliated companies.  Managing Director of BTA Bagdatkali 
Tassibekov, Deputy Director of the Bad Loans Department Yermek 
Dikanbayev, Member of the Board of Temir bank Aidos Mukatayev, and 
Zhanibek Djumamukhambetov were sentenced to eight years' 
imprisonment.  Alexei Domashenko, Yermek Zhanybekov, Janna 
Bekbayeva, and Yerlan Beisekeyev -- all from affiliated companies -- 
were sentenced to five years.  Chairman of Temir bank's Board of 
Directors Ablakhat Kebirov and Daulet Dashev were sentenced to 2 
 
ASTANA 00002264  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
years.  The judge handed down longer sentences than requested by the 
prosecution.  The defense attorneys are filing appeals on this and 
other grounds.  Deputy Chairman of BTA bank Genrig Kholodzinskiy was 
sentenced to only five years' probation because of evidence that he 
had voted against some of the bad loans, his age (63), and his many 
state awards, including medals from President Nazerbayev. 
 
15.  (U) This trial also is considered important as a source of 
additional evidence against Ablyzov, Zharimbetov, and Solodchenko. 
The prosecution granted immunity to Rifat Rizoyev and up to 40 
others in exchange for their testimony, which will likely also be 
used in the subsequent trials.  As a result, Ablyazov's attorney 
Salimzhan Mussin had complained about access to the evidence. 
 
VALYUT-TRANSIT BANK 
 
16.  (U) Indira Sagindykova, the former co-Chairperson of 
Valyut-Transit Bank (VTB), was tried on charges of illegal 
entrepreneurship, money laundering, and abuse of power.  A Karaganda 
District Court sentenced Sagindykova's ex-partner, Andrey Belyayev, 
to three and a half years in prison for the same charges in July 
2008.  Nonetheless, Belyayev continues to allege Sagindykova's sole 
responsibility for crimes committed at VTB and her personal issuance 
of loans to shell companies.  In August, a Karaganda Regional Court 
found Sagindykova guilty of illegal entrepreneurship and money 
laundering and sentenced her to three years in prison. 
 
PREVENTIVE MEASURES TO BE PUT IN PLACE 
 
17.  (U) The FSA plans to introduce new bank requirements in January 
2010 for offshore loans.  According to Chairwoman of the FSA Elena 
Bakhmutova, these regulations will prevent future schemes, such as 
those allegedly used at BTA Bank, in which loans made to offshore 
companies were transferred between other offshore companies before 
they finally funded businesses in Russia. 
 
18.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Certainly, the connections of many senior 
banking officials (ref C) cause some, including those accused, to 
argue a link between the explosion in cases against commercial banks 
and a bloody political battle.  However, egregious practices in the 
banking system, including significant theft, occurred, for which the 
Kazakhstani government now is paying.  Therefore, the government's 
bail-outs of Alliance and BTA banks probably played a stronger role 
than political infighting.  Along with the conclusion of 
restructuring (ref D), the government certainly sees these criminal 
cases as an important step toward the rehabilitation of its 
financial sector.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2258, KAZAKHSTAN: BTA BANK RESTRUCTURING UPDATES

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2258.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2258 2009-12-30 08:27 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7840
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2258/01 3640827
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 300827Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7128
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2305
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1667
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2370
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1296
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1862
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1712
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2657
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2950

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002258 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC 
STATE PLEASE PASS USTDA AND OPIC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EFIN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  BTA BANK RESTRUCTURING UPDATES 
 
ASTANA 00002258  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
REFTEL:  ASTANA 1626 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (U) SUMMARY:  Despite fears and concerns about the progress and 
results of BTA restructuring talks, BTA bank management signed the 
"Principal Commercial Terms Sheet" on December 7 in London. 
Creditor-agreed options include a special provision for trade 
finance, which local experts regard as an export-credit-agency 
victory.  BTA bank CEO Anvar Saidenov asserted that "the period of 
ambiguity for the bank is in the past."  BTA Bank now must submit 
restructuring plans for Creditors' Committee approval before March 
23, 2010.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SAIDENOV OPTIMISTIC 
 
3.  (U) On December 22, BTA bank's press service reported the 
successful completion of the main stage of restructuring talks due 
to the signature of an outline of "Principal Commercial Terms" in 
London on December 7.  Anvar Saidenov, BTA bank CEO, asserted that 
this document, which demonstrates "absolute consent on all economic 
terms between the bank and its creditors is a great stride toward 
the restoration of the financial institution."  Saidenov further 
stated that "the period of ambiguity for the bank is in the past." 
 
 
$7.7 BILLION IN WRITE-OFFS 
 
4.  (U) Under the restructuring plan agreed on December 7, creditors 
can choose from a menu of financial instruments in exchange for 
their existing debt claims.  The plan, with suggested creditor 
options, should be submitted to the Creditors' Committee for 
approval by March 23, 2010. 
 
5.  (U) As part of the plan, BTA bank and the Creditors' Steering 
Committee have agreed to write off $7.7 billion in debt and 
interest.  Upon completion of restructuring, BTA's debt liabilities 
should consist of $4.564 billion, of which $797 million will be 
subordinated debt.  Visor Capital estimates that this offer reduces 
write-offs by $1.4 billion compared to earlier proposals due to a 
reduction in provisioning and relief on required capital levels. 
Debt reduction and the conversion of part of the debt into the 
capital shares should generate $11.13 billion of additional 
regulatory capital.  Samruk-Kazyna (SK), as a main shareholder of 
the bank, will convert approximately $4.5 billion of BTA bank's debt 
into capital shares.  After restructuring, SK will own approximately 
85% of the bank's shares, with creditors holding the rest. 
 
A FEW DAYS BEFORE SIGNATURE 
 
6.  (SBU) On December 4, Directors of the Investors Relations and 
Financial Institutions Department and the Middle East and Asia 
Department of BTA bank, Janelle Utemuratova and Nariman 
Zharkinbayev, argued to representatives of the U.S. Treasury 
Department, OPIC, and EconOff that BTA's restructuring is much more 
complicated than that of Alliance Bank.  They explained this 
complexity resulted from BTA's greater number of foreign 
subsidiaries and repeated exercises of due diligence at the 
insistence of the Creditors' Committee.  They asserted the due 
diligence yielded identical results but slowed down the 
restructuring process. 
 
7.  (SBU) In contrast to Alliance Bank, BTA bank's initial 
restructuring proposals did not contain a special option for trade 
finance despite its importance to BTA.  Because "BTA bank used to 
play a big role in this market and covered around 40% of total trade 
finance in Kazakhstan," she said, "BTA's approach to trade-finance 
restructuring will definitely impact relations with Export Credit 
Agencies (ECAs)."  Utemuratova underlined the importance for BTA -- 
and Kazakhstani banks as a whole -- of reestablishing good relations 
with ECAs.  Although the global financial crisis has reduced trade 
 
ASTANA 00002258  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
finance's share of investment inflows, trade-finance demand remains 
high in Kazakhstan.  She argued that local money remains expensive 
and limited -- "the inter-bank market is almost dead, and the 
deposit basis is quite narrow."  As a result, Utemuratova predicted 
a separate restructuring option for trade finance. 
 
FOUR SENIOR, TWO JUNIOR DEBT RESTRUCTURING PACKAGES 
 
8.  (U) The signed restructuring proposal contains four packages of 
"Senior Debt" and two packages of "Junior Debt."  Senior Package 1 
covers approximately 74.8% of creditors who hold $7.7 billion in 
current debt.  Most bonds, bank loans, and a part of cer
tain non-ECA 
trade-finance debt instruments will fall under this restructuring 
package.  It will pay $946 million in cash through the issuance of 
new eight-year debt instruments with a 70% discount on principal and 
15-year subordinated debt instruments.  Creditors also will receive 
around 8.7% of the bank's shares and 82.43% of BTA-issued recovery 
notes. 
 
9.  (U) 15.9% of creditors, representing $1.6 billion in 
liabilities, are expected to participate in Senior Package 2.   This 
package should address the requirements of export-credit agencies, 
government obligations, and some trade-finance liabilities.  This 
package envisages the issuance of special debt instruments -- 
"Original Issue Discount Instruments" (OID) -- with a Day-1 value of 
$763 million (or 46.6 % of current principal) and a fully accreted 
value of $1.636 billion at the end of 11 years (i.e., the full 
accreted value equals current total nominal debt).  In addition to 
OID, Package-2 creditors can access 15-year subordinated-debt 
instruments in the amount of $105 million and approximately 1.8% of 
the bank's equity and 17.57% of recovery notes.  Senior Package 2 
offers various, not mutually-exclusive, instruments to ECAs, and is 
the only package that does not contain any "haircuts" for creditors. 
 (NOTE:  Post does not know which package U.S. Export Credit 
Agencies, including the U.S. Export-Import bank, OPIC, and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation, will be 
offered and accept.  END NOTE.) 
 
10.  (U) On December 22, BTA bank CEO Anvar Saidenov said that OID 
will be offered for 11 years, with a seven-year grace period. 
During the latter, the bank will pay a 3.75% per annum interest rate 
in cash.  Thereafter, it will pay a 3.2% interest rate 
semi-annually.  However, according to BTA bank, this mechanism 
remains under discussion and will be clarified in new Commercial 
Terms on January 31, 2010.  Creditors enrolled in Senior Packages 1 
and 2 also will receive some of the funds obtained by the bank 
through its collection of problem assets, including through court 
cases. 
 
11.  (U) Senior Package 3 will restructure current liabilities on 
trade finance in the amount of nearly $700 million.  It envisages 
the refinancing of liabilities through a new two-year Revolving 
Committed Trade Finance Facility (RCTFF).  Senior Package 4 is 
designed for Islamic banking creditors whose liabilities equal $250 
million.  This debt will be cleared with $54 million in cash (i.e., 
about 78.5% of the debt will be written off). 
 
12.  (U) Junior Package 1 proposes to repay the 28 billion tenge 
($186 million) currently owed to pension funds after a minimum of 20 
years.  Under Junior Package 2, holders of subordinated and 
perpetual bonds, which total $1.1 billion, will exchange their bonds 
for common shares equaling approximately 4.5% of BTA bank. 
 
AFTER RESTRUCTURING? 
 
13.  (U) On December 22, Chairman of the Board of BTA bank Arman 
Dunayev said that BTA bank may begin active negotiations with 
strategic investors in summer 2010.  Dunayev noted that 
Samruk-Kazyna Welfare Fund does not intend to remain a long-term 
investor.  "Immediately after settling all the issues with 
creditors, the bank may opt to sell its share.  The talks cannot be 
 
ASTANA 00002258  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
held officially, and investors cannot identify themselves unless the 
restructuring is completed.  As for Sberbank, we will continue to 
discuss its possible acquisition of the bank's share, but there is 
nothing more than that.  I believe that any strategic investor will 
wait for the outcome of the debt restructuring," Dunayev asserted. 
 
 
14.  (U) According to Dunaev, BTA bank will conduct an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) in London within the next three to four years. 
 At that time, creditors could convert their debt into 
"participation notes," and become effective shareholders of BTA 
bank.  Equity-linked creditors could exchange their debt for Global 
Depositary Receipt (GDRs) or into common shares, he claimed. 
Therefore, BTA bank must conduct the IPO at a foreign exchange, 
which Dunayev argued would be the London Stock Exchange.  Further 
details on IPO-related matters are expected in the final version of 
Commercial Terms. 
 
BTA SAGA:  TO BE CONTINUED 
 
15.  (U) According to the local press, markets reacted positively to 
this news.  According to "Respublika" newspaper, prices for BTA 
Eurobonds, which prior to December 7 were at 20% of nominal value, 
soared to 32% of nominal value.  The forecasts of professional 
analysts, such as Visor Capital, now also are optimistic about BTA 
bonds. 
 
16.  (SBU) Still, local experts cautiously assess the announcements 
of BTA's top management.  Mukhamedzhan Adilov, "Respublika's" 
economic observer, asserted that the agreed "Principal Commercial 
Terms Sheet" more closely reflects the initial position of creditors 
than that of BTA bank.  Adilov further argued that export-credit 
agencies, trade-financing-debt holders, and government-related 
agencies received the most favorable restructuring conditions.  He 
alleged that subordinated-debt holders and perpetual-bonds holders, 
who will receive only 4.5% of the bank's equity, were the most 
disadvantaged.  According to Adilov, "this adventure [successful 
restructuring] will cost Kazakhstan $9-10 billion."  Because the 
"Principal Commercial Terms Sheet" is not obligatory and a more 
detailed version will replace it early next year, creditors' 
assessment of these options and their votes on proposed terms 
remains unclear. 
 
17.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Kazakhstani government and BTA bank optimism is 
somewhat warranted -- signature of "Principal Commercial Terms 
Sheet" is a significant step toward the completion of BTA 
restructuring.  Although the phantom of conservatorship and 
liquidation of BTA bank no longer looms on the near-term horizon, 
the restructuring process is far from complete, and the destiny of 
Kazakhstan's second largest bank remains vague.  Saidenov's claim on 
the reestablishment of BTA bank's key position in the market thus 
appears exaggerated and perhaps premature.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2257,

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2257.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2257 2009-12-30 07:48 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana
Appears in these articles:
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988383.ece

VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #2257/01 3640748
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 300748Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7126
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1615
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2368
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0096
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2655

S E C R E T ASTANA 002257

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM MNUC KNNP IR JA KZ

REF: SECSTATE 131723

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B), (D)

1. (S) SUMMARY: The government of Kazakhstan initially respondedQeptically to a U.S. non-paper alleging that Iran is negotiating to buy a large amount of yellowcake uranium from KazAtomProm, but promised to undertake a serious investigation and report its findings to Embassy Astana. It is possible the investigation will be slightly slowed because the Kazakhstani government closes early on December 31 in observance of New Year and will not re-open again until January 4. END SUMMARY.

2. (S) In response to December 29 e-mailed information from USUN Vienna that the Associated Press (AP) was about to publish a report alleging that Iran was in the late stages of negotiating to buy a very large quantity of yellowcake uranium from an entity in Kazakhstan associated with KazAtomProm (KAP), the Department instructed the Ambassador to raise the matter urgently in Astana at the highest possible level. On December 29, the Ambassador met with State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev, a close confidante of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The Ambassador passed to Saudabayev the as yet unpublished AP report and told him that if this is true, it is a huge problem, a violation of UNSCR 1737, a violation of the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (of which Kazakhstan is a member), and would seriously harm the U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship. The Ambassador asked Saudabayev to bring this report urgently to the attention of the proper officials in the government of Kazakhstan.

3. (S) Saudabayev said, "My initial response is nyet, nyet, and nyet. This cannot be true. Give me the full report and we will follow up and look into every detail. If this is true, it would violate the principles of our policy since independence. We have always been the strongest supporters of non-proliferation. Please give us complete details soonest, and we will investigate fully."

4. (S) With the AP report having appeared later on December 29, the Ambassador delivered on December 30 to Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov, who had been in the previous days meeting, the U.S. interagency-cleared non-paper from para eight of reftel. Umarov said that following the December 29 meeting, the Foreign Ministry had immediately gotten in touch with the Ministry of Energy and Mineral ResQces (MEMR), which is responsible for KAP. According to Umarov, MEMRs initial response was that such a large volume of yellowcake uranium could not be transferred without notice. Kazakhstan maintains a strong export control regime and stringent control of its ports. There has been and there will be no negotiations with Iran on something this sensitive. It is not credible, MEMR added, that rogue individuals could be involved because Kazakhstan maintains strict government control over its uranium stocks. Umarov added that KAP expects to release an initial response to the AP report later on December 30.

5. (S) Umarov added that the Foreign Ministrys initial response on December 29 had been that the AP report must be "false information." With fuller information from the non-paper, the government of Kazakhstan will continue to investigate, but, he said, it would be easier if we could provide more detailed information. He also asked that we provide a read-out of any response from the government of Japan. The Ambassador urged that the government of Kazakhstan take this matter with the utmost seriousness and provide a full account of its investigation, preferably no later than January 5. (NOTE: It is possible the investigation will be slightly slowed because the Kazakhstani government, except for essential services, closes early on December 31 in observance of New Year and will not re-open again until January 4. END NOTE.)

6. (S) GRPOQesented the same non-paper to appropriate counterparts and strongly encouraged them to investigate thoroughly.

7. (SBU) On December 30, the Interfax-Kazakhstan News Agency, citing the AP report published by the "Guardian" in the UK, broke the story in Kazakhstan. A spokesman of the government of Kazakhstan responded that all of its uranium activities fully comply with IAEA safeguards, and is investigating the report. An official response will be
forthcoming within a few days, the spokesman said.

8. (S) COMMENT: Because the AP report was datelined Vienna where ex-First Son-in-Law Rakhat Aliyev is believed to be in exile, the initial knee-jerk reaction of some in the government of Kazakhstan was likely that this must be one more attempt by Aliyev to blacken Kazakhstans image. However, we believe the government of Kazakhstan is fully aware of the seriousness of this report and its potential ramifications and will investigate it fully. Any futher detail that we might be able to provide would assist in that investigation. END COMMENT.

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2255, KAZAKHSTAN: CASPIAN MARITIME TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2255.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2255 2009-12-30 05:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7728
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2255/01 3640545
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 300545Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7119
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2301
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1663
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2364
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1292
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1858
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1708
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2132

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 002255 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC, S/EEE, S/CIEA 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET SENV SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  CASPIAN MARITIME TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 1539 
     (B) ASTANA 2138 
     (C) ASTANA 2233 
     (D) ASTANA 1105 
 
ASTANA 00002255  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  This report summarizes international donor 
efforts to promote Caspian maritime trade and transportation, 
including projects to bring Kazakhstan's maritime legislation in 
line with international standards, improve vessel safety and 
security, increase oil transportation by tanker, and develop 
capacity and expertise in the government of Kazakhstan and 
Kazakhstani-flagged vessels.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CASPIAN MARITIME TRADE 
 
3.  (SBU) Kazakhstan's Caspian maritime trade is carried out via its 
only international commercial seaport in Aktau.  According to Talgat 
Abylgazin, director of the Aktau seaport, the port plans to ship 14 
million tons of goods in 2009, up from 10 million tons in 2008.  The 
current annual transshipment capacity of the Aktau seaport is 1.5 
million tons of general cargo and over 10 million tons of crude oil 
and petroleum products. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN CASPIAN TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (KCTS) 
 
4.  (SBU) Donor and corporate interest in improving safety, 
security, and skills on Caspian maritime transportation is driven by 
the expectation that Kazakhstan will double its oil production over 
the next 10 years.  It thus must increase its oil-transportation 
capacity, including the use of oil tankers from Kuryk to Baku. 
 
5.  (SBU) KazMunaiGas-Transcaspian (KMG-TC), a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of national oil company KazMunaiGas (KMG) is responsible 
for the development of trans-Caspian maritime transportation of oil 
from Kazakhstan.  On December 9, its newly-appointed General 
Director Berik Tolumbayev described ongoing negotiations with the 
Kashagan consortium to build the trans-Caspian maritime 
transportation project (KCTS), including oil terminals in 
Kazakhstan's port of Kuryk and in Azerbaijan, at or near Baku. 
Tolumbayev said that KMG-TC will conduct an open tender in January 
2010 to select a company to conduct the feasibility study for the 
project.  He indicated that the leading candidates include U.S. 
company J. Ray McDermott.  KMG-TC and national maritime company 
KazMorTransFlot (KMTF) both expressed interest in a vessel-tracking 
system to monitor and manage the growing fleet of vessels plying the 
Caspian.  KMTF pressed the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) 
for assistance to develop a national training plan to prepare 
Kazakhstani officers and crews. 
 
6.  (SBU) On December 11, Vasily Svistak, Kazakhstan Business 
Development Manager for the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), told 
Energy Officer that "all options will be considered and the best 
option will be chosen (for KCTS).  It can be 60,000 deadweight (dwt) 
shuttle tankers, or 20,000 dwt barges, or any other vessel for oil 
transportation."  He mentioned the preference of KMG and the State 
Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) to work with a large, 
experienced company or consortium, which could deliver a global 
solution to oil transportation issues, including the construction of 
two new oil terminals, shuttle vessels, shipbuilding facilities, and 
other related infrastructure.  Svistak asserted KMG would not want 
to work with a small company that could build vessels or terminals 
only. 
 
USDTA SUPPORT FOR MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 
 
7.  (SBU) USTDA has funded two grants for approximately $350,000 
each to increase maritime trade and transportation in the Caspian. 
Tenders have been announced for the selection of a U.S. company to 
carry out the terms of reference, and the projects are expected to 
begin by March 2010.  The first grant was awarded to KMG-TC to bring 
 
ASTANA 00002255  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
Kazakhstan's maritime legislation in line with international 
standards by defining the international treaty accessions, maritime 
laws, and regulations that Kazakhstan must implement. 
 
8.  (SBU) The second USTDA grant was awarded to KMTF to facilitate 
clearance of vessels at Caspian ports by evaluating the technical, 
economic, and financial feasibility of implementing the Electronic 
Documentation Procedure or Early Departure Procedure (EDP). &#x
000A;Implementation of this procedure will reduce time spent on 
documentation processes, thereby increasing efficiency at existing 
Caspian ports and reducing transportation costs. 
 
NORWEGIAN SUPPORT FOR MARITIME SAFETY 
 
9.  (SBU) The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is funding a Det 
Norske Veritas (DNV) project to draft framework regulations related 
to health, safety, and environment (HSE) for offshore petroleum 
activities in Kazakhstan.  It aims to introduce a modern safety 
regime for petroleum activities related to exploration, development, 
operations, decommissioning, and removal in connection with sub-sea 
petroleum deposits in the Caspian Sea under Kazakhstan 
jurisdiction. 
 
10.  (SBU) The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also may fund a 
gap analysis by DNV on Kazakhstan's maritime educational and 
legislative needs.  The Norwegian Embassy and DNV currently are 
discussing this project with the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communications.  The program would enable Kazakhstan to provide 
training programs that would lead to internationally-accepted 
certificates.  It would analyze Kazakhstan's legislative compliance 
with international conventions and International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) standards, including the quality of training 
programs, certification, and watchkeeping approved by maritime 
training institutions. 
 
OSCE WORKSHOPS ON OIL SPILL RESPONSE 
 
11.  (SBU) The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) is assisting a Kazakhstani government interagency commission 
on oil-spill preparedness.  The OSCE and Ministry of Emergency 
Situations held a regional workshop in October, which focused on 
national contingency plans.  The OSCE also organized a November 12 
workshop in Astana on IMO conventions to prepare for negotiations on 
the Oil Pollution Incidents protocol to the Teheran Convention (ref 
B).  The OSCE has financed a series of projects to support 
implementation of the Aarhus Convention (ref C), including training 
judges in the Caspian region on environmental issues.  On September 
21, the OSCE signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Akimat 
(office of the governor) of Atyrau Oblast, the NGO Ecoforum, and the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection to open a new Aarhus Center in 
Atyrau, the first of its kind in Kazakhstan. 
 
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S INOGATE PROGRAM 
 
12.  (SBU) As part of the enhancement of environmental protection 
measures in Central Asia's oil and gas industry, the European 
Union's INOGATE project is writing a revised national oil spill plan 
with the Kashagan consortium and the Oil Spill Preparedness Regional 
Initiative (OSPRI).  INOGATE also is using international examples of 
best practice to develop recommendations on environmental 
legislation for Central Asian states. 
 
13.  (SBU) The European Commission is funding a project to improve 
maritime safety and reduce ship pollution in the Black and Caspian 
Seas.  Mott MacDonald, Ramboll, Tethys Environmental Consulting, Oil 
Spill Training Company Ltd., and Milieu Ltd. Are implementing the 
project, which will provide technical support to Kazakhstan on the 
IMO convention implementation and will include 2010 training events 
in Aktau on ship inspection procedures and other issues.  The 
project will assess and support the organization of a National 
Maritime Administration.  It will also examine the needs and 
priorities for vessel traffic systems at ports.  Project experts 
 
ASTANA 00002255  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
will prepare and implement a training plan in coordination with the 
relevant training institutes in Kazakhstan.  They will provide 
additional training programs in port inspection, ship safety, ship 
and port security, waste management at ports, and oil pollution 
preparedness and response. 
 
DONOR COORDINATION EFFORTS 
 
14.  (SBU) UK government-funded Caspian maritime project brought 
together oil companies, shippers, classification societies, IMO, and 
the governments of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.  The project's results 
included endorsement of IMO rules for Caspian tanker traffic, 
commitments to fund crew training events and publish official 
Russian-language translations of international maritime manuals. 
The British Embassy also agreed to coordinate international donor 
support. 
 
15.  (SBU) On July 16, the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communications established a coordination group to discuss 
Kazakhstan's maritime educational needs.  The Ministry agreed to 
invite international oil companies (IOCs), shippers, and 
classification societies to join this group.  Relevant authorities 
approved the Ministry's action plan for maritime personnel 
development, which then was sent to classification companies, IOCs, 
and shippers. 
 
TRAINING MARITIME CREWS IS THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY 
 
16.  (SBU) On December 9, KMTF Deputy General Director Sherkhan 
Sugurbekov told USTDA that the shortage of qualified captains, 
officers, and crew members seriously concerns KMTF.  He said that on 
January 1, 2010, Article 25 of the Law on Maritime Shipping will 
come into effect, requiring that all crew members on 
Kazakhstani-flagged vessels must be Kazakhstani citizens.  KMTF said 
that currently only 40% of all crew members are residents of 
Kazakhstan, and only 17% of captains and officers are Kazakhstani. 
 
17.  (SBU) KMTF also reported that Chevron remains very much 
interested in funding a maritime academy in Kazakhstan, and has 
earmarked up to $25 million for the project.  Unfortunately, 
however, KMTF said the funds will not be released until resolution 
of pending sulfur fines and fees (ref D). 
 
STRIVING TO MEET INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
 
18.  (SBU) On January 14, 2010, Kazakhstan's parliament will host a 
roundtable on marine-transportation issues, with presentations from 
industry experts, such as Chevron's Kjell Landin and the UK's 
Caspian Energy Advisor Angus Miller.  This roundtable will review 
amendments to Kazakhstan's existing Law on Merchant Shipping.  These 
amendments are designed to ensure Kazakhstan full compliance with 
international norms, such as the IMO conventions.  Effects of the 
proposed changes include the regulation of shipping companies, 
hiring of crews, customs clearance of vessels, and sanitary 
inspections. 
 
19.  (SBU) KMTF's Sugurbekov relayed to Energy Officer his concern 
that members of parliament lack a clear understanding of, or vision 
for, the development of maritime transportation.  He said, "They 
find it difficult to make decisions, because they can hardly imagine 
the practical impact of changes to the Law."  He also highlighted 
members' numerous questions about the need to comply with 
international maritime conventions.  He attributed this situation to 
the fact that Kazakhstan is a "young maritime country," but he
 
asserted it must improve its management of maritime transportation. 
 
SAFETY AND SECURITY 
 
20.  (SBU) On December 9, Kairiden Nurkenov, Director of Water 
Transportation at the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, 
told USTDA that the Ministry's top priority is to ensure that 
Kazakhstani crew members receive proper, internationally-recognized 
 
ASTANA 00002255  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
training courses.  Nurkenov expressed interest in a USTDA-funded 
feasibility study to implement a vessel-tracking system, and 
conveyed Kazakhstan's plans to deploy a basic system at the ports of 
Kuryk and Bautino.  Kazakhstan also has a regional rescue-operation 
system along its 800-kilometer shore line, which contains three 
stations and dozens of transmitters.  This system allows the 
Ministry to discover possible oil spills, but not to conduct actual 
rescue operations. 
 
21.  (SBU) Yerlan Jumashev, Director of Water Transportation Control 
at the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, expressed the 
Ministry's urgent need to evacuate sunken vessels in the Caspian 
Sea.  They pose a danger to current vessels and the new, larger oil 
tankers expected to be used after Kashagan begins production in 
2013. 
 
22.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Because the Caspian Sea represents Kazakhstan's 
only access to international maritime trade, the government greatly 
appreciates donor assistance to address gaps in maritime 
legislation, skills, and expertise, as well as environmental safety. 
 The wide range of existing and planned projects demonstrates 
Kazakhstan's commitment to work with U.S. and European donor 
organizations to bring its maritime operations in line with 
international standards and increase maritime trade activity. 
However, given the need to develop entirely new laws, procedures, 
equipment, vessels, and crews from scratch, it may take years before 
the land-locked country of Kazakhstan becomes a world-class maritime 
trading partner.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2238, KAZAKHSTAN: MOJ SUSPENDS PARTY’S REGISTRATION, AGAIN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2238.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2238 2009-12-28 08:31 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6287
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2238/01 3620831
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 280831Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7108
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2298
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1661
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2362
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1290
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0547
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2127
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2653
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2948
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1856
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1706
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002238 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  MOJ SUSPENDS PARTY'S REGISTRATION, AGAIN 
 
REF:  A.  ASTANA 1762 
      B.  ASTANA 0870 
 
ASTANA 00002238  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Kazakhstan's Ministry of Justice (MOJ) suspended 
the registration of the opposition party "Alga" for the second time, 
alleging irregularities with the party-member lists.  Alga's first 
registration application was pending with the MOJ for three years 
before the party re-applied for registration on November 15.  In 
accordance with recent amendments to the political party law, Alga 
may have to re-start the registration process if the MOJ neither 
approves nor denies the application by February 18.  The party 
leadership alleged political motives for the suspension. 
Independent journalist Sergey Duvanov argued that the party's links 
to ousted chairman of BTA Bank, Mukhtar Ablyazov (ref A), explain 
the MOJ's reluctance to register the party.  END SUMMARY. 
 
REGISTRATION SUSPENDED 
 
3.  (SBU) Unregistered opposition party "Alga" told the media on 
December 22 that Kazakhstan's Ministry of Justice (MOJ) once again 
suspended its registration process.  Its first application, filed in 
2006, was pending with the MOJ for three years before the party 
applied for registration this second time on November 15.  (NOTE: 
The party chose to apply again after the courts sanctioned its chair 
Vladimir Kozlov for "unregistered political activity" (ref B).  END 
NOTE.)  According to the party's press release, "Alga" submitted to 
the MOJ over 59,000 party-member signatures, well above the 40,000 
minimum required by law. 
 
MOJ CHECKING SIGNATURES 
 
4.  (SBU) According to Alga's deputy chair Mikhail Sizov, the MOJ 
reportedly received letters from five individuals who claimed that 
their names appeared on Alga's party-member lists without their 
knowledge.  The MOJ also allegedly confirmed that seven party 
members have died since Alga filed for registration.  In addition, 
the MOJ has said that it is verifying the validity of signatures in 
six of Kazakhstan's 14 oblasts (regions).  At a December 22 press 
conference, the party leaders asserted they "were not surprised" at 
the suspension.  "No miracle has happened.  Since no directive has 
been issued from above (to register the party), the Ministry could 
think of nothing better to do than to suspend the registration for 
the second time," argued Sizov. 
 
START AGAIN? 
 
5.  (SBU) The Alga party may have to start the entire registration 
process from the beginning if the MOJ does not approve or deny its 
application by February 18, six months after it registered its 
organizing committee on August 18.  In the past, a party could carry 
on its activities indefinitely, as long as the registration request 
was pending with the MOJ.  However, amendments to the political 
party law signed by President Nazarbayev in February (as part of the 
"Madrid commitments" legislative amendments) state that a party must 
first formerly establish an organizing committee.  It then must 
complete registration within six months or be disbanded.  The law 
does not, however, set a deadline for the MOJ to respond to 
applications. 
 
7.  (SBU) Alga's chair Kozlov told PolOff previously that "Alga has 
no illusions" about registration.  "And it is okay with us," he 
claimed, "we are ready to start registration every six months." 
Kozlov underlined his priorities of legal status and the right to a 
bank account for the party's organizing committee.  "We waited for 
the last registration for one thousand and one days, as in the old 
Arabic tale," he joked. 
 
"THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL ENEMY" 
 
8.  (SBU) Independent journalist Sergey Duvanov argued on December 
24 that the order to block Alga's registration "comes from the very 
 
ASTANA 00002238  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
top," because it is "well-known" that ousted chairman of BTA Bank 
Mukhtar Ablyazov backs the party.  (NOTE: It is an open secret that 
Ablyazov is Alga's primary financial backer.  END NOTE.)  "Today, 
Ablyazov is the President's personal enemy," alleged Duvanov.  He 
argued that Alga is "not strong enough to be considered dangerous 
yet," but that may change if the economic crisis exacerbates "the 
people's protest sentiments."  He added that the other opposition 
parties also "do not pose a threat to power," with the exception of 
the Communist party, which maintains a strong, albeit aging, &#x00
0A;following. 
 
9.  (SBU) COMMENT:  We agree with Duvanov that Alga's registration 
woes are linked, at least in part, to Mukhtar Ablyazov.  That said, 
as the first test of the "Madrid" amendments to the political party 
law, the MOJ poorly timed its announcement just 10 days before 
Kazakhstan assumes the chairmanship of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  We should reserve judgment, 
though, until the MOJ shows whether it can resolve its potentially 
legitimate concerns about the party lists in a transparent and 
timely manner.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2235, KAZAKHSTANI BANKS: ADJUSTING TO A CHANGING LANDSCAPE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2235.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2235 2009-12-28 00:41 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5983
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2235/01 3620041
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 280041Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7105
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2295
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1658
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2359
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1287
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1853
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1703
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2650
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2945

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002235 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC 
STATE PLEASE PASS USTDA AND OPIC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EFIN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTANI BANKS:  ADJUSTING TO A CHANGING LANDSCAPE 
 
ASTANA 00002235  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
REFTEL:  ASTANA 2200 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Financial analysts, bank executives, managers, 
and customers alike agree that the Kazakhstani government's efforts 
to restructure debt and successfully keep afloat ailing BTA and 
Alliance banks are critical to the overall recovery of the financial 
sector.  A failure of both these institutions would not only 
translate into the loss of billions of dollars of Kazakhstani 
taxpayer funds, but could also result in a loss of foreign-investor 
and local confidence in the country's financial system.  In the wake 
of new government regulations intended to strengthen the banking 
sector, banks in Kazakhstan must adapt, or disappear.  Because of 
the narrow banking-customer base, overall tightness of financial 
markets worldwide, and marginal quality of existing bank assets, 
foreign sources of capital will remain important despite the 
government's efforts to limit access to relatively cheap foreign 
cash.  While ample evidence for continued pessimism remains, many 
perceive opportunity and growth over the horizon, as long as the 
restructuring of BTA and Alliance banks are seen as a success.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE 
 
3.  (SBU) On the eve of Kazakhstani Independence Day (December 15), 
Chairman of the Kazakhstan Association of Financial Institutions, 
which represents 238 local and foreign banking institutions,  Serik 
Akhanov termed this period critical for the local banking sector. 
He recounted President Nazarbayev's November 16 meeting with bank 
leaders, which outlined the government's strategy to address 
concerns over transparency and portfolio risk.  The four-point 
strategy, according to Akhanov, will implement new regulations to 
mandate minimum-liquidity ratios, invest billions in low-interest 
loans to provide an alternative source of funds for banks and 
businesses, establish standards for better qualified bank 
management, and continue to restructure large, defaulted banks. 
 
4.  (SBU) While he admitted that the picture is not pretty, Akhanov 
adamantly asserted that the Kazakhstani public remains confident in 
the banking system.  To illustrate his point, he pointed to the 23% 
increase in bank deposits in 2009, due in part to the National 
Bank's new guarantee of up to 5 million tenge (approximately 
$338,000) per deposit.  Separately, ATF bank branch manager Aderna 
Nurtaeva told EmbOff about her bank's 78% increase in deposits -- 
equivalent to an additional $1 million -- over the past year. 
However, she qualified her statement by explaining that these 
one-year-term deposits are usually under $1,000.  Nurtaeva claimed 
the lucrative flood of deposits resulted from the new 
deposit-guarantee rules and ATF's reputation as a large, foreign 
bank with 154 branches located throughout the country.  Although 
deposits significantly increased, she admitted that loan activity 
has ground to a halt despite the bank's "attractive" loan program 
offering 21-35% mortgage rates, depending on income and risk. 
 
5.  (SBU) Assuming a more somber tone, Akhanov asserted structural 
obstacles in the Kazakhstani economy could threaten the government's 
plans.  He claimed that many people continue to hold dollars "under 
the bed" as a possible hedge against devaluation and inflation, and 
highlighted the growing rate of unemployment, which officially is at 
just under 7% but may be twice this number, including underemployed. 
 He asserted that this situation further curbs any appetite to 
invest, let alone spend.  (NOTE:  The same day, Prime Minister 
Masimov claimed a falling unemployment rate of 6.3% (reftel).  END 
NOTE.) 
 
6. (SBU) On December 14, Deputy Akim of Almaty Marat Kudyshev -- and 
city budget chief -- pointed to rising unemployment as his main 
concern.  Now at historic levels, he said unemployment threatens the 
general mood of consumer confidence and undermines his ability to 
 
ASTANA 00002235  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
raise city funds.  A recent survey of employers published by 
"Focus," a business daily, showed that two-thirds of employers plan 
to cut or curtail salary expenses through lay-offs or salary cuts. 
In separate meetings with Emboff, KZ Rating Deputy Director Denis 
Rybalkin echoed these same concerns and lamented that the National 
Bank's recent decision to leave interest rates unch
anged will not 
improve the investment climate because of uncertainty over jobs.  He 
asserted that people are not spending and jobs are not being 
created, despite the apparent stabilization of inflation. 
Therefore, he argued for a stimulus in the form of lower interest 
rates. 
 
COMPETITION IN A NARROW MARKET 
 
7. (SBU) Separately, both Akhanov and Rybalkin claimed that the 
government's proposed policy to mandate at least $33 million in bank 
equity (5 billion tenge) is intended to encourage bank mergers and 
an overall "thinning" of the banking community.  KZ Rating's 
analysis suggested that many non-performing banks might be forced to 
leave the market because of their higher percentage of 
non-performing assets (i.e., loans, investments).  Akhanov also 
argued that current consumer demand does not support the existing 
number of banks.  He argued that Kazakhstan's relatively small, 
dispersed population translates into a wage-earning population of 
less than 5 million, which generally has little discretionary money 
to save or invest given GDP per capita of under $5,000.  (NOTE: 
According to the official statistics, 7.9 million people earn wages 
in Kazakhstan.  END NOTE.)  For example, 28-year old taxi driver 
Abay Okeu complained to Emboff that he has no disposable income left 
after he pays for rent, food, clothes, and gas. 
 
8.  (SBU) Nurtaeva also expressed concern about bank competition and 
market over-saturation.  Located in the NurliTau Business Center 
amidst one of the more upscale neighborhoods in Almaty, Nurtaeva 
competes with nine other bank branches in the building, making it 
hard for individual banks to stand out to potential customers.  She 
also complained about significant expenditures on training programs 
and supervision because the monthly salary of 45,000 tenge ($300) is 
insufficient to attract qualified cashiers.   KZ Rating's Rybalkin 
asserted that the government recognizes the problem of bank 
over-saturation in certain market areas and under-representation in 
others.  He mentioned discussion of bank "regionalization," 
concentrating activities in specific areas, due to the decision by 
many banks to work only in big cities. 
 
FOREIGN BANKS -- CHANGE OR DIE 
 
9.  (SBU) In separate meetings with Emboff on December 15, HSBC and 
RBS (Royal Bank of Scotland) Chief Executive Officers Simen Munter 
and Rudi Geerdink acknowledged the necessity of successful 
government intervention in the wake of the payment defaults.  Munter 
told Emboff that while "one man's bust may be another's gain," he 
loathes seeing any banks fail because of the overall impact on 
confidence.  Despite problems in the banking industry, Geerdink more 
bluntly declared the necessity due to the absence of any other 
obvious investment or money-holding options in the country.  While 
Munter viewed the long-term prospects of many local banks with a 
large degree of skepticism because of the banking system's rigid 
nature and lack of transparency, Geerdink remained cautiously 
optimistic about the government's bank takeovers.  Both men argued, 
using very different approaches, that foreign banks -- while 
comparatively small -- serve an important function, offering top 
services not available through domestic banks, such as RBS' on-line 
bill-pay services. 
 
10. (SBU) Unlike HSBC, RBS, Geerdink said, chose not to offer 
mortgages due to the unsound price point in the real estate market. 
Munter, however, argued for HSBC's focus on mortgage business, 
because he views these customers as long-term business partners 
provide selective, risk-averse underwriting.  He claimed that HSBC 
 
ASTANA 00002235  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
now offers the most competitive rates in the country, averaging 
11.5-15% (retail rates average just above 15% now according to KZ 
Rating). 
 
11.  (SBU) Despite its absence from the mortgage market and lower 
deposit interest rates, Geerdink asserted RBS continues to increase 
its market share.  He attributed RBS' success to strategic planning 
and the absence of alternatives because of local banks' "poor 
service and outrageous fees."  Geerdink viewed only Halyk bank as 
having a legitimate, long-term future.  While he was upbeat about 
RBS compared to its competition, Geerdink criticized the National 
Bank's decision to limit non-Kazakhstani deposits in banks to 50%. 
 
 
12. (SBU) According to Geerdink, higher oil prices and the tenge's 
creeping value against the dollar (148 up from a high of 152) have 
caused many of his customers to switch from dollar to tenge 
deposits.  In recent months, he observed a reversal of the 30/70 
split between tenge and dollar deposits last year to a 70/30 split 
today.  He noted the large cash holdings of all major foreign banks 
due to flat-lined lending coupled with increased retail and 
corporate deposits.  Because this trend extends beyond Kazakhstan, 
Geerdink believes foreign banks will act as a source of borrowing 
for other domestic banks. 
 
13. (SBU) COMMENT:  The effect of new banking regulations designed 
to address weaknesses in Kazakhstan's banking regime remains 
unclear.  Proposed measures to regionalize banks and require minimum 
thresholds for bank equity might not have the intended outcome on 
competitiveness nor result in better services/access to the public. 
In the end, market forces on oil prices could have a bigger impact 
on the direction and speed of the banking sector's recovery than any 
government regulation.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2234, KAZAKHSTAN: HOT DEBATE ON PRIVACY PROTECTION LAW

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2234.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2234 2009-12-24 08:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5058
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2234/01 3580848
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240848Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7103
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2293
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1656
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2357
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1285
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0545
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2123
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2648
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2943
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1851
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1701
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002234 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  HOT DEBATE ON PRIVACY PROTECTION LAW 
 
ASTANA 00002234  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The National Democratic Institute (NDI) in 
Kazakhstan co-hosted an "expert meeting" roundtable on December 15 
with the Majilis (lower house of the parliament) to discuss 
recently-signed legislation on protection of personal privacy. 
Journalists, opposition politicians, and human rights activists 
discussed with parliamentarians and law enforcement officials their 
interpretations of the new legislation.  The opposition has derided 
the law as a maneuver to curb free speech, yet those invited to the 
podium kept their commentary relatively tame and predictable.   The 
fiery rhetoric came during the open-microphone session where 
journalists and opposition politicians sounded off on conspiracy 
theories, allegations of bureaucrats' adulterous behavior, and 
personal strategies on methods to avoid telephone eavesdropping. 
END SUMMARY 
 
BACKGROUND ON THE NEW LEGISLATION 
 
3.  (SBU) On December 8, President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed 
legislation "On the Protection of the Rights of Personal Privacy." 
The law, which comes into effect on December 25, broadens the 
definition of personal information in the civil and criminal codes 
and prohibits the collection, dissemination, and publication of such 
information.  The law also prohibits the use of illegally-obtained 
personal information as evidence in criminal investigations. 
 
4.  (SBU) The new law prohibits any "unsanctioned interference into 
an individual's private life," including the use or acquisition of 
any written, audio, or video material related to a person's private 
life.  It introduces jail terms for those who illegally obtain and 
disseminate private information.  The new legislation limits the 
ability of investigators to use "technical means" to gather evidence 
against an individual.  The Procurator General's Office (PGO) is 
responsible for ensuring legal compliance during investigations and 
guaranteeing that the privacy rights of the accused remain within 
the law. 
 
LAW ON PRIVACY STAYS TRUE TO ITS NAME 
 
5.  (SBU) During parliamentary consideration of the legislation, 
media watch-dog NGOs and journalists expressed concern that the new 
law would limit investigative journalism.  In July, NDI offered to 
organize a roundtable to stimulate debate and create a constructive 
dialogue among lawmakers and concerned constituents, journalists, 
and opposition leaders.  However, the draft law was not publicly 
released, and details on the final version remained unknown until it 
reached President Nazarbayev's desk in mid-November.  Therefore, NDI 
only succeeded in its efforts to coordinate a privacy-legislation 
roundtable after the law's passage.  Perhaps coincidentally, the law 
was published on the same day as the roundtable.  (NOTE: 
Kazakhstani legislation mandates publication of new laws within ten 
days of the President's signature.  END NOTE.) 
 
PRAISE FROM THOSE WHO CREATED THE LAW 
 
6.  (SBU) Members of parliament at the roundtable uniformly agreed 
on the need for a precise definition of privacy rights.  Legislators 
argued that it will protect citizens from unauthorized disclosure of 
personal information, including bank account balances, medical 
files, and the publication of personal family matters and secrets. 
Retired Supreme Court Justice Raisa Yurchenko, who chaired the 
roundtable, commented that the law "allows [our] focus to remain on 
politics, not extraneous elements that ultimately taint dialogue and 
discussion." 
 
CAREFUL CRITICISM FROM LEGAL EXPERTS 
 
7.  (SBU) Daniyar Kanafin, member of the Almaty Bar Association, 
asserted that the legislation was rushed without proper discussion 
and analysis.  He criticized as a distinct conflict of interest the 
new role of the PGO as the investigation arbiter, and called for an 
independent office to handle such oversight.  He challenged 
 
ASTANA 00002234  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
politicians to consider themselves public servants and regularly 
disclose information to eliminate suspicion and serve as examples to 
their constituents.  Kanafin declared that this legislation releases 
politicians from "any expectations of morality." 
 
8.  (SBU) Leila Ramazanova, a lawyer for the Bureau for Human Rights 
and Rule of Law, expressed hope that the law would help to prosecute 
government officials that use blackmail as a tool of persuasion. 
Ramazanova related an
incident where an official from the Kostanai 
Oblast akimat (governor's office) used a salacious videotape to 
blackmail someone. 
 
CRITICS DECRY LAW AS A SHIELD FOR IMMORAL BUREAUCRATS 
 
9.  (SBU) Seitkazy Matayev, Chairman of the Union of Journalists, 
was significantly less reserved in his comments.  He derided the 
restraint of other speakers and wondered aloud why more people were 
not outraged at "the blatant efforts by the government to eliminate 
free speech."  After challenging everyone in the room to speak with 
candor, he followed his own advice and alleged that the law 
officially sanctions "politicians who frequent restaurants and 
saunas with their mistresses rather than their wives."  Zauresh 
Battalova, former opposition parliamentarian and director of the 
Polyton discussion club, agreed with Matayev, asserting that the law 
implicitly permitted double-marriages among bureaucrats, "the norm 
since the government moved from Almaty to Astana."  She claimed that 
the situation will not improve as long as the first lady of 
Kazakhstan continues to reside in Almaty while "unofficial first 
ladies" reside in Ak-Orda.  Vladimir Kozlov, leader of the 
unregistered opposition party "Alga," asserted the law's irrelevance 
because "the primary violator of personal privacy is the 
government."  He declared that he carries five mobile telephones -- 
"not because I am a fan of technology, but to challenge the 
authorities' monitoring." 
 
10.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Several analysts have speculated that the 
privacy law, much like the Internet law, has a singular purpose -- 
to prevent a repetition of the release of damaging recordings, such 
as those of made by Rakhat Aliyev, the President's former 
son-in-law.  Nonetheless, the law contains some provisions that 
could be used to significantly limit Kazakhstan's nascent 
investigative journalism.  We will encourage Kazakhstan to implement 
the legislation in full compliance with its OSCE commitments on 
freedom of expression and the mass media.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2233, KAZAKHSTAN SETS UP AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE OF POLLUTION

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2233.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2233 2009-12-24 05:56 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4914
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2233/01 3580556
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240556Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7100
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2290
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1610
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1653
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2354
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1282
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1848
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1698
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2120

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002233 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, OES/PCI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON SENV KDEM OSCE UN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN SETS UP AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE OF POLLUTION 
EMISSIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH AARHUS CONVENTION 
 
REF:  ASTANA 1776 
 
ASTANA 00002233  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Ministry of Environment recently hosted a 
round table on setting up an electronic register of emissions and 
pollution transmissions (PRTRs) with the participation of several 
environmental NGOs and the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE).  Under the Aarhus Convention, which grants the 
public rights to access environmental information, each party must 
set up a pollution register.  Industry is also required to report 
its emissions.  A Kazakhstani NGO published a booklet on PRTRs that 
can help inform the public of their rights.  Current Kazakhstani law 
only permits the registration of 86 substances as pollutants.  AES 
Thermal Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk also supported establishment of a 
register because it believes open access to information leads to a 
better partnership among business, government, and society. 
Unfortunately, the government has inventoried only 20% of all 
chemical storage sites in the country, and they are aging, 
deteriorating, and polluting the surrounding land and ground-water 
supply.  END SUMMARY. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN ESTABLISHES A POLLUTION EMISSIONS REGISTER 
 
3.  (U) The Ministry of Environment recently hosted a round table, 
"Strengthening Social Participation in the Aarhus Process, Setting 
Up an Electronic Register of Emissions and Pollution Transmissions," 
with the participation of several environmental NGOs and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
Ministry of Environment Legal Affairs Director Diana Mukanova opened 
the round table, saying Kazakhstan must establish an electronic 
pollution "register" in order to meet its obligations under the 
Aarhus Convention, to which it is a signatory.  (NOTE: The United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters -- usually known as the Aarhus 
Convention -- grants the public rights to access to information on 
matters concerning the local, national, and trans-boundary 
environment.  The Kiev Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Registers (PRTRs) obligates parties to set up pollution inventories 
from industrial sites and other sources, such as agriculture and 
transport.  The Protocol also requires private enterprises to report 
annually on their releases and transfers of pollutants, with 
"transfer" meaning "outside the industrial facility," including by 
wind or water.  END NOTE.) 
 
AARHUS CENTER WILL HOUSE THE REGISTER 
 
4.  (U) According to Aarhus Center Director Zhulgyz Murzabekeva, the 
Aarhus Center, whose primary function is to gather and distribute 
environmental information, will manage the emissions register.  Open 
in Atyrau since September 21, the Center now has more than 800 
"normative" documents and considerable ecological information in its 
online database.  Murzabekeva said the Aarhus Convention strives to 
support the right to access to information on the environment and 
any potential harm that may arise from pollution.  She asserted the 
Center works closely with all government bodies. 
 
REGISTER WILL ENHANCE PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
 
5.  (SBU) European Commission Environmental Bureau Coordinator and 
Eco-Forum NGO Representative Mara Silina commented on the importance 
of providing information not only to the government but to all the 
people and NGOs.  She said the register aims to "enhance public 
access to information," as well as encourage public participation in 
environmental decision-making.  Currently, 86 pollutants can be 
included in the register (determined by Annex II), including 
greenhouse gases, acid rain, ozone-depleting substances, heavy 
metals, pesticides, and various industrial chemicals.  The 
Convention also requires owners and/or operators of polluting 
factories and plants to report their emissions starting in 2010. 
The first meeting of the 21 ratifying parties to the Convention will 
 
ASTANA 00002233  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
take place on  April 20-22, 2010 (location to be determined). 
Silina underlined the major challenge of increasing signatories' 
ratification of the Convention, particularly among the Caucasus and 
Central Asian countries, which would strengthen the level of 
international cooperation. &#x00
0A; 
6.  (U) Eco-Forum has produced a 43-page booklet on PRTRs -- "Your 
Right to Information on Sources of Pollution," with some of the 
sections including "Information on Pollution and Ecological 
Democracy," "Life Cycle of Industrial Chemical Substances," "Actual 
PRTR Example: U.S. Toxic Emissions Register," and detailed aspects 
of the PRTR Protocol.  Salina said the Aarhus Center can distribute 
these booklets to the general population in order to help them 
better understand their rights under the Convention and ways to use 
these rights and information to better protect the environment.  She 
said Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan are currently 
implementing European-funded projects on PRTRs. 
 
CURRENT LAW NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED AND UPDATED 
 
7.  (SBU) Ust-Kamenogorsk NGO "Green Women" representative Lidia 
Astanina said that some legislative weaknesses remain in the 
organization of a data register.  She additionally highlighted 
needed improvements and updates to the legal code in order to 
broaden and clarify the term "pollution" and potential enforcement 
responses.  Currently, the law only lists 86 substances for 
potential registration. 
 
AES THERMAL PLANT ALSO SUPPORTS THE EMISSIONS REGISTER 
 
8.  (SBU) Applied Energy Services (AES)-owned and operated 
Ust-Kamenogorsk Thermal Power Plant representative Vadim Litvinov 
underlined his company's efforts to have an open and constructive 
dialogue with all social partners.  He asserted that this approach 
ensures AES a much more positive relationship with the government. 
(NOTE:  Applied Energy Services (AES), a U.S. company, is one of the 
world's leading power companies, employing more than 30,000, and 
generating and distributing electric power in 26 countries.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
9.  (SBU) Litvinov cited a recent poll in which a majority surveyed 
agreed on the need for access to information on emissions.  However, 
70% of the population does not trust industry-provided information, 
particularly with respect to their emissions.  He said these results 
imply a larger problem for industry with respect to public relations 
and social trust. 
 
10.  (SBU) According to Litvinov, AES prepares and submits a 
quarterly emissions report to the state tax bureau because of the 
tax on emissions.  He claimed the establishment of a PRTR register 
fully aligns with AES's environmental policy, because such open 
access to information corresponds to the promotion of a better 
partnership with the government and society. 
 
ONLY 20% OF STORAGE SITES INVENTORIED 
 
11.  (SBU) Center for Chemical Safety "Ecomir" (Ecoworld) 
representative Amina Beibitova said Kazakhstan has inventoried only 
20% of all the chemical storage sites in the country.  These 
locations are aging, deteriorating, and polluting the surrounding 
land and ground-water supply.  In addition, numerous landfills with 
transformers, condensers, various electrical appliances, paints, and 
plastics exist.  Local residents can help overcome the difficulties 
of monitoring these sites by reporting on them to the Aarhus Center. 
 She asserted laboratories can acquire specialized equipment, such 
as chromatic spectrometers and "Clor-N-Soil" (brand name) 
potentiometers, which can test the soil for chloride content.  Such 
surveillance can improve the work necessary to prevent dump sites 
from becoming a source of dangerous pollution. 
 
12.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The Aarhus Convention combines environmental 
protection with individual rights.  As such, it clearly intersects 
 
ASTANA 00002233  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
environmental security and grass-roots democracy and activism. 
While the local level may face difficulties in securing access to 
information on pollution, some NGOs (see reftel) have demonstrated 
the commitment of higher courts and the central government to 
guaranteeing access to sensitive pollution information.  This 
seemingly "small" event of setting up emission registers in 
Kazakhstan demonstrates progress toward greater empowerment of 
Kazakhstan's citizenry.  It also shows the Kazakhstani government's 
determination to carry out its commitment to 
environmentally-sustainable development.  Like in numerous other 
areas, the Kazakhstani government is cooperating closely with NGOs, 
which are playing an active role, in order to improve the lives of 
its citizens.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2232, KAZAKHSTAN: GENDER RIGHTS ADVANCE WITH PASSAGE OF TWO

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2232.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2232 2009-12-24 04:29 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4823
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2232/01 3580429
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240429Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7098
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2288
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1651
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2352
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1280
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0543
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2118
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2646
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2941
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1846
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1696
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002232 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/GWI, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV SOCI KWMN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  GENDER RIGHTS ADVANCE WITH PASSAGE OF TWO 
LAWS 
 
REF:  ASTANA 1810 
 
ASTANA 00002232  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  President Nazarbayev signed into law legislation 
on domestic violence and gender equality.  The gender-equality law 
introduces for the first time the legal concept of gender and 
outlaws gender-based discrimination.  The law on domestic violence 
clarifies the roles of the government, law enforcement agencies, and 
NGOs in assisting victims.  It commits government funding for 
NGO-run shelters, and introduces the concept of a restraining order. 
 Civil society activists believe the laws represent a good first 
step in the fight against gender violence and discrimination.  NGOs 
plan to utilize the healthy dialogue between civil society and the 
parliament to fight for further legislative improvements.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
3. (SBU) President Nazarbayev signed laws on domestic violence and 
gender equality on December 5 and 10, respectively.  Both pieces of 
legislation were a high priority for equal-rights groups and NGOs 
working with domestic-violence victims.  Languishing in the 
parliament since 2006, the laws received a new lease on life in 
September when President Nazarbayev, speaking at the first session 
of the Mazhilis (lower house), called on parliamentarians to pass 
them before the end of the year. 
 
GENDER-EQUALITY LAW 
 
4.  (SBU) The law on "Government Guarantees for Equal Rights and 
Opportunities for Men and Women" defines for the first time the 
terms "gender," "gender equality," "sexual discrimination," and 
"equal opportunity."  It outlaws discrimination based on gender. 
However, the parliamentarians removed a clause that would have made 
sexual harassment illegal.  Under the new law, men and women must 
have equal access to education, social benefits, and jobs in public 
and private sectors, and employers must consider gender balance when 
downsizing.  The law does not establish quotas on gender 
representation in the government or parliament.  (NOTE:  Currently, 
17 women and 90 men serve in the lower house of the parliament.  END 
NOTE.)  One female parliamentarian told us that opposition to 
quotas, which existed in earlier versions, was one major reason the 
law languished so long in parliament (reftel). 
 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW 
 
5.  (SBU) The law on "Prevention of Domestic Violence" defines the 
terms "domestic violence," "victim," and "prevention of domestic 
violence."  It identifies various types of domestic violence, 
including physical, psychological, sexual, and economic.  It also 
delineates the roles of the national and local government, law 
enforcement agencies, and NGOs in the prevention of and response to 
domestic violence.  Under the new law, NGOs are responsible for the 
protection of and provision of initial physical and psychological 
assistance to victims, while the government commits to support 
shelters with budgetary funds.  The legislation also introduces the 
concept of a restraining order, which the police can issue without a 
court order, for 24 hours to 10 days.  The Procurator General's 
Office can extend the order up to 30 days, and courts can establish 
additional restrictions, including prohibitions on all contact with 
the victim and transport of a weapon. 
 
GOOD FIRST STEP 
 
6.  (SBU) In commemoration of the 16-Day Campaign to End Violence 
Against Women, the DCM hosted a round-table on December 10 in Almaty 
to gather NGO views on the new gender-violence law.  According to 
the participants, the law is a "good first step," but needs further 
changes to be truly effective.  Civil society activists told the DCM 
that they actively contributed to working-group discussion of the 
law and proposed numerous concrete provisions, many of which the 
final draft did not incorporate.  The president of the Union of 
Crisis Centers' Zulfiya Baisakova and director of the "Podrugi" 
 
ASTANA 00002232  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
Crisis Center Nadezhda Gladyr pointed out that the victim, and not 
the abuser, must leave the shared household under the new law. 
Other participants noted that the law does not concretely spell out 
the government-funding mechanism for NGO shelters.  All agreed that 
once this method is clarified, the law could have a real impact. 
The NGO representatives called that parliamentarians "responsive" to 
NGO recommendations and several promised to continue to fight for 
amendments. 
 
7.  (SBU) In a separate discussion, equal-rights activists 
celebrated the adoption of the gender law as a long-sought victory. 
Although parliamentarians removed several significant provisions, 
most notably quotas and the establishment of a separate government 
agency to oversee gender issues, several activists praised the law 
as a major step forward in addressing gender inequality.  Yuriy 
Zaitsev of the Almaty Feminist League noted that the law defined for 
the first time gender-related legal terms.  Meruert Kazbekova of the 
Union of Women Entrepreneurs underlined that the law signified the 
government's will to guarantee equality for men and women.  Raushan 
Sarsembayeva of Kazakhstan's Business Women's Association was 
optimistic that the legislation will serve as a spring board for 
further legislative reforms. 
 
8.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Civil society activists agree that the two new 
laws represent forward movement in the battle against gender 
discrimination and domestic violence.  Although the legislation is 
not perfect, and numerous kinks will have to be worked out in 
implementation, civil society leaders remain optimistic because of 
the healthy dialogue with the parliament on gender issues they 
established.  This connection will play a key role in their push for 
further legislative improvements.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2205, KAZAKHSTAN: NEW POLITICAL PARTY, PIPE DREAM, OR

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2205.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2205 2009-12-24 02:47 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4755
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2205/01 3580247
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240247Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7072
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 2286
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1649
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1278
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2350
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1844
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1694
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2939
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2644

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002205 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV EPET SOCI KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  NEW POLITICAL PARTY, PIPE DREAM, OR 
OTHER? 
 
ASTANA 00002205  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for Public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  A Kazakhstani functionary with an 
intriguing resume says he wants to found a Green Party of 
Kazakhstan.  We are unsure if he is a sincere big dreamer, or 
if he might possibly have ties to others who want to 
challenge the current government and curry favor with the 
West.  If nothing else, he seems to be representative of the 
successor generation who are tired of the status quo.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (SBU) During the Kazakhstan Investment Forum in New York 
City on November 23, the Vice President of the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries of Kazakhstan, Serikzhan Mambetalin, 
asked to see the Ambassador privately.  He said he had never 
expected to enter politics, but "now's the time."  He once 
had been a great believer in President Nazarbayev, he said, 
"but it's now time for him to share power and let others do 
something good for the country."  He added that many in 
Kazakhstan think as he does and would like to express their 
political views, "but they have too many obligations" -- 
i.e., have bought into and are beholden to the current system. 
 
SOMETHING TO UNITE SOCIETY 
 
4.  (SBU) Asked to describe his own political views, 
Mambetalin said that, if anything, he's "a Green Party type" 
in favor of the environment and social welfare.  He said, 
"This is not the time to focus on sharp political issues. 
It's better to find a common cause that can unite ethnic 
Russians and Kazakhs, Christians and Muslims.  Mambetalin 
suggested that students "have enormous potential but are 
unfocused and, thus, susceptible to Islamic radicalism, 
especially since Kazakhstan has no common ideology to 
consolidate society."  He judged that the current generation 
of young adults has "no memory of the past, nothing that 
grabs their attention.  They need a modern, popular way to 
focus their energy."  Mambetalin said he would like to 
propose a Green Party of Kazakhstan to President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev to support the president's intention to build a 
civic identity for all Kazakhstanis. 
 
5.  (SBU) Mambetalin emphasized that he wants to found a 
political party, not just an NGO because "NGOs are not 
considered to be serious."  He said he has found "broad 
support for his idea, except at the very top."  For example, 
he said, he pitched his idea in June to then-Foreign Minister 
Tazhin, who allegedly told Mambetalin that he liked the idea 
but warned that it would be rather difficult to approach 
President Nazarbayev with such an initiative.  Mambetalin 
said he never heard back from Tazhin.  When asked if he 
thought he could gain legal registration for a Green Party, 
Mambetalin admitted it would be hard to register a new party, 
and so he might merge his party into the already registered 
Ruhaniyat Party. 
 
"WE MUST BECOME A NORWAY!" 
 
6.  (SBU) "What's important," Mambetalin said," is that 
Kazakhstan is at a turning point.  As an oil-rich country, we 
can choose to be a Norway or a Nigeria.  We must become a 
Norway!"  Changing tack, Mambetalin said, "Of course, as a 
Green Party we will have to focus on the north Caspian Sea. 
At a certain point, we will have to raise the danger to the 
environment of drilling in the the ecologically sensitive 
Caspian."  During the investment form session devoted to gas 
and oil, Mambetalin asked U.S. industry executives why they 
had not yet fulfilled their commitment to establish an 
incident-response center at Atyrau, which is the center for 
TengizChrevOil activity.  A Chevron representative replied 
that, in fact, the center is currently being established. 
 
BIO NOTE 
 
ASTANA 00002205  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
7.  (SBU)  Mambetalin described his background.  By 
education, he said, he is a medical doctor, but for the past 
seven years he has been working in London as a crude oil 
trader.  Between those two -- doctor and oil trader -- he 
said he had earned an MBA at the prestigeous KIMEP in Almaty, 
had worked for the World Bank for several years, and had been 
an adviser at various times to current Prime Minister Karim 
Masimov, as well as having served as Deputy Chairman for 
Financial Services at Kazakhstan's Postal Savings. 
Mambetalin emphasized that he is "a self-made man" but not 
wealthy, and "not beholden to any oligarchical group
."  His 
family still lives in London, but he says is "ready to return 
home." 
 
COMMENT 
 
8.  (SBU) While it could well be that Mambetalin is sincere, 
even if a dreamer with a big idea, it seems that several 
things would suggest caution.  First, Mels Yeleusizov, the 
leader of the environmental NGO "Tabigat," officially 
announced his intention to found a Green Party in March and 
established a web site on which people can sign up.  Second, 
Mambetalin's approach to the Ambassador seemed unnecessarily 
secretive.  He insisted on finding an isolated and empty 
parlor in the Harvard Club, where the investment forum was 
taking place, because he wanted to be sure no Kazakhstani 
officials saw him talking to the Ambassador, "especially 
Ambassador (to the United States) Idrissov."  Third, because 
of his time in London, we have to wonder if he might possibly 
have ties to exiled former Prime Minister Kazhegeldin and 
exiled Chairman of BTA Bank Ablyazov, both of whom continue 
to use their considerable ill-gotten financial resources to 
plot "democratic alternatives" to President Nazarbayev, 
mainly for Western consumption.  In fact, the ideals of a 
Green Party might find a certain amount of support in 
Kazakhstan, but it could not come into being, given the 
current political environment, unless it were officially 
blessed -- and we doubt that will happen anytime soon.  If 
nothing else, Mambetalin seems to be representative of the 
successor generation who are tired of the status quo.  END 
COMMENT. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2204, KAZAKHSTAN: TERRORISM AND SECURITY CONCERNS INFLUENCE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2204.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2204 2009-12-23 09:37 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3973
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2204/01 3570937
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230937Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7069
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2283
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1646
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2347
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1275
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1841
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1691
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2641
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2936
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002204 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, PM 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 12/23/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR AF RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  TERRORISM AND SECURITY CONCERNS INFLUENCE 
DELIBERATION ON OVERFLIGHT AND NDN AMENDMENTS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
REFTELS:  A. STATE 128489 
  B. ASTANA 2000 
  C. ASTANA 2158 
  D. ASTANA 2198 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  On December 22, the Ambassador and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov met to discuss outstanding U.S. 
requests to amend the 2001 overflight and 2009 Northern Distribution 
Network (NDN) agreements (refs A, B).  Umarov told the Ambassador 
that 10 Kazakhstani government agencies are reviewing the U.S. 
request to add a north-south route to the 2001 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on overflights in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  He said he hoped to provide an initial response by December 
31.  Umarov noted that "times have changed since 2001," and 
Kazakhstani concerns that terrorists will seek to disrupt supply 
routes to Afghanistan have increased.  Umarov said some Kazakhstanis 
worry that the overflight and NDN will encourage terrorists to target 
Kazakhstan, which seeks U.S. military advice on fortifying its 
southern border.  He told the Ambassador Kazakhstan's leaders owe it 
to their people to consider thoroughly these agreements.  Umarov, an 
experienced and frank diplomat, suggested Kazakhstan might want to 
use the July U.S.-Russia agreement on overflights as a model for any 
new agreement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS A NEW AGREEMENT 
 
2.  (S/NF) Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov said that he had 
originally hoped to amend the original overflight agreement, but the 
MFA's Legal Department determined Kazakhstan must conclude a new 
agreement because the requested additions include a different route. 
Umarov did not specify language needed in the agreement, or whether 
the agreement could enter into force upon signature.  Umarov said 
several government agencies had asked about the July overflight 
agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation. 
Emphasizing that he still lacked firm instructions and was merely 
"thinking outside of the box" in an effort to expedite the process, 
Umarov suggested that Kazakhstan might agree to sign a document with 
the same text as the July U.S.-Russian Federation agreement. 
 
THAT WAS THEN, THIS IS NOW 
 
3.  (S/NF) Arguing "the times are different now than they were in 
2001," when the September 11 attack on the United States and 
instability in Kyrgyzstan dictated the need for immediate action, 
Umarov emphasized that many Kazakhstani government agencies are 
concerned about the transportation of lethal goods across 
Kazakhstan's territory.  According to Umarov, instability in 
Afghanistan is "bringing the Taliban closer," and Kazakhstan fears it 
will become a target for terrorists if it signs an agreement to 
facilitate the transportation of lethal goods. 
 
PARLIAMENT (AND OTHERS) MUST BE SATISFIED 
 
4.  (S/NF) Umarov quickly asserted that this does not mean that 
Kazakhstan will not agree to add the north-south overflight path. 
Rather, Kazakhstan's leaders must carefully scrutinize any agreement, 
and must have the support of the Kazakhstani people, he said. 
"Members of Parliament will be very inquisitive about an overflight 
agreement; they are much more sophisticated now than they were in 
2001," commented Umarov.  He queried, "What is the legal basis for 
this agreement and how will it be regulated?"  Umarov mentioned that 
other agencies might ask detailed questions about the potential 
response to various hypothetical disaster scenarios, including a 
crash or other incident along the route, which would require more 
detailed answers than the text in paragraph 5 of the 2001 agreement. 
Umarov promised to convey the Kazakhstani ministries' questions to 
the Ambassador as soon as possible. 
 
U.S.-RUSSIA AGREEMENT IRRITATES 
 
ASTANA 00002204  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
5.  (S/NF) When the Ambassador reiterated the importance of adding 
the new route to the overflight agreement, Umarov, looking 
uncharacteristically frustrated, responded that the MFA is trying to 
facilitate a speedy agreement.  He argued that parallel negotiations 
with Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation might have precluded this 
situation.  "No
w you are just putting us up against the wall," Umarov 
retorted.  When the Ambassador directly asked if the agreement with 
the Russian Federation created a political problem, Umarov denied 
Kazakhstani leaders oppose amending the 2001 agreement because of 
annoyance that the United States signed an agreement with Russia 
first.  However, his non-verbal behavior suggested otherwise.  The 
Ambassador pointed out that the United States and Kazakhstan, unlike 
the United States and the Russian Federation, already had an 
overflight MOU when the Russian agreement was signed, which seemed 
somewhat to mollify Umarov.  Further, the Ambassador explained to 
Umarov, off the record, the history of the U.S.-Russia agreement as a 
deliverable for the July 2009 Obama-Medvedev summit in Moscow. 
 
HAZARDOUS OR LETHAL? 
 
6.  (S/NF) Echoing Foreign Minister Saudabayev's comments on the 
overflight issue during Assistant Secretary for South and Central 
Asian Affairs Robert Blake's visit (ref D), Umarov reiterated that 
"the transit of lethal equipment is a particular problem for 
Kazakhstan."  The Ambassador pointed out that the 2001 overflight 
agreement specifies that cargo might include "hazardous materials." 
When Umarov countered that hazardous cargo does not necessarily imply 
lethal cargo, the Ambassador replied that both sides in 2001 likely 
understood that "hazardous materials" could imply "lethal." 
(COMMENT:  The MFA's Askar Tazhiyev raised the issue of lethal versus 
non-lethal cargo for the first time on November 24 when he called the 
Embassy to confirm that the overflight request pertained to both 
lethal and non-lethal cargo, stating that different kinds of cargo 
would raise different "technical issues."  The Embassy's diplomatic 
note requesting the addition of the new route, dated November 9, 
referred directly to the 2001 agreement, and did not specify the type 
of cargo.  END COMMENT.) 
 
BORDER SECURITY AND AN UNFULFILLED U.S. PROMISE 
 
7.  (S/NF) Returning to fears of terrorism, Umarov asserted that 
"Kazakhstan is very concerned about fortifying its southern borders." 
 He welcome more information-sharing on counter-terrorism, and said 
that a U.S. military survey team to advise on border security would 
be welcome.  The Ambassador replied he had recently met with the new 
Chairman of the National Security Committee (KNB) (ref C) and 
expressed U.S. willingness to move beyond information sharing to 
broader cooperation.  Umarov said that border fortification is a 
military issue, as well as a border-security and intelligence-sharing 
issue, and the military would be the most appropriate U.S. partner. 
Umarov said Deputy Minister of Defense General Bulat Sembinov has 
often raised, including with USCENTCOM Commander General David 
Petraeus, the long delays in the U.S. Huey-II program for Kazakhstan, 
which are negatively affecting Kazakhstan's ability to secure its 
border against terrorists.  Umarov noted that President Nazarbayev 
had recently criticized Kazakhstan's Security Council, emphasizing 
that Kazakhstan wants to avoid Kyrgyz instability from again creating 
problems in Kazakhstan, as happened in 1999, especially given the 
Taliban's focus on disrupting supply routes to Afghanistan. 
 
OVERFLIGHT AND NDN ARE SECURITY, NOT POLITICAL, ISSUES 
 
8.  (S/NF) The Ambassador also raised the question of the Embassy's 
October 20 dipnote on an amendment to the Northern Distribution 
Network (NDN) to allow the surface transit of wheeled armored 
vehicles for transporting troops (ref B).  Umarov said that 
Kazakhstan would prefer transportation of the vehicles inside 
containers, but "you never know what kind of information may leak 
out."  Therefore, Kazakhstan must prepare for anything, which is why 
lethal equipment is so problematic, he argued.  According to Umarov, 
 
ASTANA 00002204  003 OF 003 
 
 
the overflight and NDN issues are not political, but are perceived as 
security issues.  Umarov told the Ambassador, "I understand we must 
move as quickly as possible.  Please believe me, I am not sitting on 
these issues." 
 
NEXT STEPS:  COMPARING AGREEMENTS AND COMPILING ANSWERS 
 
9.  (S/NF) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry about ways to 
positively and quickly reach an agreement on overflight, Umarov 
asserted that Kazakhstan must first review the U.S. agreement with 
the Russian Federation.  He said he expected to receive the agreement 
from Moscow within days, and would immediately distribute it to the 
unspecified Kazakhstani ministries that had asked to see it.  [NOTE: 
In a later conversation the same day, Russian Ambassador Mikhail 
Bocharnikov professed ignorance about Kazakhstan's request for a copy 
of the U.S.-Russia overflight agreement and suggested Astana must be 
working directly with Moscow on this issue.  END NOTE.]  According to 
Umarov, the Russian Duma's ratification of this agreement might 
resolve many Kazakhstani concerns.  He reiterated that he hopes to 
receive interagency guidance on the new route by December 31.  Umarov 
also asked the Ambassador for information on the U.S. NDN and 
overflight agreements with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. 
The Ambassador said he would gather as much information as possible 
to help speed Kazakhstan's decision making, especially since Foreign 
Minister Saudabayev had told Assistant Secretary Blake that a 
north-south overflight route is doable, but first many questions must 
be answered in detail. 
 
10.  (S/NF) AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT:  Based on both Foreign Minister 
Saudabayev and Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Sarybai telling 
Assistant Secretary Blake that our requests are achievable, and based 
on President Nazarbayev's continued support for U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan, I believe that we will, eventually, succeed -- but it is 
going to take considerable work and probably more time than we would 
like.  Embassy Astana is working to collect as quickly as possible 
answers to all the questions the Kazakhstanis so far have posed.  We 
know from other sources that Kazakhstan is indeed concerned about its 
own security, especially the security of its southern border, and 
worries that a renewed international effort in Afghanistan could push 
terrorists into Central Asia.  We can usually rely on MFA Americas 
Director Tazhiyev to blurt out the truth, and his comment in this 
meeting might be telling -- that the United States not fulfilling its 
commitment on the Huey-II program is affecting Kazakhstan's ability 
to secure its border against terrorists.  Likewise, I do not doubt 
that some Kazakhstani noses are out of joint because the United 
States concluded a lethal overflight agreement with Russia before 
raising the same issue with Kazakhstan.  For at least a year, 
Kazakhstani officials have told me that they expect to be treated on 
par with Russia and do not appreciate being "treated as an 
afterthought," which they strongly believe happened in this case. 
Embassy Astana will continue to place highest priority on achieving 
our overflight and NDN goals; however, should this bog down for too 
long, a high-level visit to Astana
 might be warranted to seal a deal. 
 END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2202, KAZAKHSTAN’S VIEWS ON ITS NEIGHBORS

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2202.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2202 2009-12-23 05:07 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3683
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2202/01 3570507
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230507Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7067
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2281
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1644
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2345
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1273
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2639
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2934
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1839
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1689
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002202 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/AF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD ECON OSCE AF CH IN IR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN'S VIEWS ON ITS NEIGHBORS 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 2090 
 (B) ASTANA 2161 
 (C) ASTANA 2198 
      (D) ASTANA 607 
      (E) ASTANA 2200 
 (F) ASTANA 281 
 
ASTANA 00002202  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Assistant Secretary of State for South and 
Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake thanked State Secretary-Foreign 
Minister Kanat Saudabayev and President Nazarbayev's foreign policy 
advisor Kairat Sarybai for Kazakhstan's assistance in Afghanistan 
and noted that it complements the civilian component of the U.S. 
strategy.  He suggested that Kazakhstan could strengthen the 
counter-narcotics and border-management expertise of the 
Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE).  Sarybai 
encouraged further dialogue with Iran, stressing that "sanctions are 
not effective."  Kazakhstani officials emphasized efforts to 
carefully manage the country's growing economic relationship with 
China and to increase its trade links with India.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY 
 
3.  (SBU) In separate December 15 meetings with State 
Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev and the President's 
foreign policy advisor Kairat Sarybai, Assistant Secretary for South 
and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake thanked Kazakhstan for its 
assistance in Afghanistan.  He noted particularly Kazakhstan's 
support for the Northern Distribution Network and the 
recently-announced Afghanistan-Kazakhstan agreement to provide 
university education for 1,000 Afghan students in Kazakhstan (ref 
A).  Sarybai told Blake that Afghanistan will stop being a source of 
instability in the region when Afghans see that "good governance is 
the necessary building block" for democracy.  Blake highlighted that 
Kazakhstan's initiative complements the civilian component of the 
U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.  Sarybai commended "the dual-prong 
approach" of President Obama's strategy.  Separately, Saudabayev 
said that reinvigorated U.S. engagement is "added incentive" to 
organize a 2010 OSCE summit, likely on Afghanistan (ref B). 
 
4.  (SBU) Blake told Sarybai that Kazakhstan's expertise with 
counter-narcotics and border management could prove useful for the 
OSCE.  He lauded Kazakhstan's offer to train Afghan police at the 
Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC). 
 Blake noted the need for increased logistical support due to the 
U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan, and he expressed hope to both 
interlocutors that Kazakhstan will approve an additional north-south 
overflight path under the existing overflight agreement (ref C). 
 
IRAN -- FURTHER DIALOGUE NEEDED 
 
5.  (SBU) A/S Blake solicited Sarybai's views on likely prospects to 
seek strengthened sanctions against Iran.  Sarybai stressed that a 
peaceful resolution is "highly, highly important" to Kazakhstan.  He 
encouraged the United States to continue the dialogue and send 
positive signals, "perhaps at different fora.  Sanctions are not 
effective," he argued.  He encouraged the United States to continue 
signaling a readiness for a bilateral relationship.  "The mullah 
regime is still strong."  Sarybai told Blake that President 
Nazarbayev has told Iran to be open with and fair to the 
international community, deal with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), and give up nuclear weapon ambitions (ref D). 
Nazarbayev holds up Kazakhstan as an example Iran should follow, 
Sarybai noted, which makes a prominent position for Nazarbayev at 
the Global Nuclear Security Summit especially relevant. 
 
CHINA -- "LESS TALK, MORE ACTION" 
 
6.  (SBU) Asked about China's role in Kazakshtan, Sarybai said China 
is actively engaged in securing hydrocarbon supplies from 
Kazakhstan.  He noted the recently-inaugurated 
 
ASTANA 00002202  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-China pipeline and China's $10-billion loan 
to Kazakhstan.  "They are less talk, more action," he said. 
According to Sarybai, the China pipeline will help Kazakhstan link 
its Western oil-rich regions with other parts of the country.  "But 
Kazakhstan knows its limits" and carefully manages the type and 
scope of Chinese investment, he emphasized.  Chinese goods are 
popular with the lower-
income stratum of society, he said, but 
Korea, Japan, and Europe dominate the markets for more expensive 
goods.  Trade with China is comparable to U.S.-Kazakhstan trade 
volumes.  Sarybai welcomed initiatives to diversify U.S. investment 
in Kazakhstan. 
 
7.  (SBU) In a separate December 15 meeting (ref E), Prime Minister 
Karim Masimov told Blake that Kazakhstan's traditional markets of 
Russia and Europe fell because of the economic crisis while China's 
importance grew in 2009.  "The lesson of 2009 was that China is an 
obvious market for Kazakhstani products," he plainly stated. 
Masimov also asserted that "the reality of 2009 was that only China 
helped financially, providing a $10 billion loan and an additional 
$3.5 billion program to assist extractive and non-extractive 
industries."  Masimov recounted that when Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin asked why Kazakhstan accepted China's money, he said 
he held out his hand and responded, "What do you have to offer?" 
Masimov, ever cautious, asserted that Kazakhstan must carefully 
watch its borrowing, taking only as much as necessary. 
 
INDIA -- HIDING IN PLAIN VIEW 
 
7.  (SBU) Sarybai told Blake that India's economic role in 
Kazakhstan equals that of China, but it is less conspicuous because 
"the Indians are less suspicious.  Everyone has doubts about the 
Chinese, but no one has doubts about the Indians."  Indian companies 
invest in the uranium, agricultural, and petro-chemical markets. 
Kazakhstani construction companies are active in India.  The 
bilateral trade is poised to grow as the two countries explore 
possible cooperation in the production of pharmaceuticals, said 
Sarybai. 
 
8.  (SBU) COMMENT:  While Kazakhstan's commercial relations with 
India are strong, and various Kazakhstani government officials have 
previously called for increased trade with India, Post is skeptical 
that Kazakhstani-Indian commercial relations will take off any time 
soon.  According to official statistics, the bilateral trade 
relationship between Kazakhstan and India is nowhere near the volume 
of Kazakhstani-Chinese trade (ref F).  Although Kazakhstan's 
bilateral trade balance with India reached $367 million in 2008, it 
amounted to only 0.3% of Kazakhstan's 2008 total trade turnover.  In 
contrast, according to President Nazarbayev's statements to the 
media during Chinese President Hu December 12 visit to Astana, the 
bilateral trade turnover between Kazakhstan and China in 2008 
reached $17.5 billion.  By emphasizing the Kazakhstani-India 
relationship, Sarybai might have been, consciously or unconsciously, 
downplaying China's rapidly increasing importance to Kazakhstan, a 
trend that concerns many Kazakhstani officials.   END COMMENT. 
 
9.  (SBU) A/S Blake cleared this cable. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2201, KAZAKHSTAN: INL ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON BILATERAL

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2201.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2201 2009-12-23 05:01 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3678
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2201/01 3570501
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230501Z DEC 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7065
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2279
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1642
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2343
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1271
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1837
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1687
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2113
RUEAWJL/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC 0060
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002201 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI SNAR KCRM OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  INL ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON BILATERAL 
MEETINGS 
 
ASTANA 00002201  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  During his visit to Kazakhstan for the 
inauguration of the Central Asian Regional Information and 
Coordination Center (CARICC) (septel), Assistant Secretary for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs David T. Johnson 
met with Kazakhstan's Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov and 
Ministry of the Interior's Chairman of the Committee on Combating 
Drugs Zhanat Suleimenov.  A/S Johnson used the opportunity to 
underscore the importance of Leahy vetting, which has recently 
become an obstacle in the selection of training participants for 
some ministries within the Kazakhstani government.  END SUMMARY. 
 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 
3.  (U) Following the inauguration of the Central Asian Regional 
Information and Coordination Center (CARICC) and the meeting of the 
parties to the CARICC memorandum of understanding on December 9 
(setpel), Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL) David T. Johnson met with Kazakhstan's 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kairat Umarov to discuss a wide 
range of issues, including bilateral and multilateral cooperation, 
Kazakhstan's upcoming chairmanship of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Leahy vetting. 
 
4.  (SBU) Umarov thanked A/S Johnson for U.S. assistance to CARICC 
and stressed the importance of sharing intelligence and information 
to fight drug trafficking.  He highlighted effective bilateral 
cooperation, as evinced by the visit of FBI Director Robert S. 
Mueller III, and said that the United States and Kazakhstan have 
almost concluded a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT).  A/S 
Johnson responded that we must continue to build on the CARICC 
Inauguration, ensuring daily interaction between the member states 
and observers in CARICC.  He mentioned the Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA's) plan to open its Almaty office by summer and the U.S. desire 
to be an active participant in CARICC despite our status as 
observers. 
 
5.  (SBU) A/S Johnson also pointed to signature of the annual INL 
letter of agreement (ALOA) as one of the best ways for the United 
States and Kazakhstan to cooperate in the law enforcement field and 
avoid misunderstandings.  The Foreign Ministry delayed the FY 2010 
ALOA, which remained unsigned by the end of the fiscal year.  Umarov 
took note of A/S Johnson's request, but did not make a specific 
comment on the ALOA. 
 
6.  (SBU) Umarov briefed A/S Johnson on Kazakhstan's 2010-2020 
justice reform program, which he said will make the justice system 
more transparent and compliant with international standards.  Umarov 
also highlighted Kazakhstan's efforts to improve the protection of 
human rights in law enforcement operations.  When Umarov requested 
U.S. assistance for legal reforms, A/S Johnson responded that he 
would explore potential ways that the United States could assist. 
Umarov explained that the Procurator General's Office is crafting a 
relationship with the American Bar Association (ABA) and that might 
be an effective avenue for bilateral cooperation. 
 
7.  (SBU) Umarov also briefed Johnson on his meetings during his 
recent trip to Washington.  Umarov reiterated the need for an OSCE 
Summit during its chairmanship next year and suggested that the 
issue of Afghan origin opium could be at the top of the agenda.  A/S 
Johnson explained that the OSCE chairmanship demanded hard work, but 
that the United States wants to support Kazakhstan in this effort. 
Again emphasizing the issue of a summit, Umarov explained that 
Central Asia acts as a buffer between security threats in 
Afghanistan and Europe.  Kazakhstan, which is especially sensitive 
to the issue of terrorism, is key to strengthening this buffer, he 
asserted.  Umarov also highlighted tolerance, counter-narcotics, and 
human rights as other possible priority issues.  He explained that 
President Nazerbayev is well-respected on the issue of tolerance, 
and that Kazakhstan needs to set the example for its neighbors.  A/S 
 
ASTANA 00002201  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
Johnson made clear that he could make no commitment on the issue of 
a summit. 
 
COMMITTEE ON COMBATING DRUGS 
 
8.  (SBU) A/S Jo
hnson also inaugurated the INL-funded Interagency 
Counter-Narcotics Training Center and met briefly with Chairman of 
the Committee on Combating Drugs Zhanat Suleimenov on December 9. 
Suleimenov works closely with the Embassy, welcomes international 
cooperation, and strongly advocated for the Embassy during ALOA 
negotiations.  He promised that all deadlines for this year's 
agreement would be met.  He described the assistance being provided 
by the Office of Military Cooperation and thanked A/S Johnson for 
INL assistance. 
 
9.  (SBU) Suleimenov described Kazakhstan's efforts to fight 
narco-trafficking from Afghanistan, mentioning its cooperation with 
CARICC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization, though he did not clearly define what 
cooperation with these organizations actually entailed.  Suleimenov 
explained that fewer foreigners have been arrested recently for drug 
trafficking.  He said that the number of "swallowers" (i.e., those 
that carry drugs in their stomachs) has fallen drastically either 
due to the recent drop in migration or the use of new trafficking 
techniques. 
 
10.  (SBU) Suleimenov pointed out that, since tightening its laws, 
Kazakhstan has the toughest sentencing guidelines in the region for 
drug crimes.  He claimed, "It doesn't matter who you are ... if you 
traffic heroin, you are going to prison for life."  Suleimenov 
ruminated about Kazakhstan's problems, including the need for 
stronger border control and the amount of narcotics being trafficked 
in TIR (International Road Transport Convention) vehicles. 
 
LEAHY VETTING 
 
11. (SBU) In both meetings, A/S Johnson briefed Kazakhstani 
officials on Leahy vetting, underscoring that it is a global legal 
requirement.  He assured both Umarov and Suleimenov that the 
obligation is an important congressional requirement, not intended 
to single out Kazakhstan, but a way to assure ourselves, and the 
Congress, about whom we are providing training assistance.  Umarov 
promised to assist and Suleimenov agreed to provide information. 
(NOTE:  Because both appeared to focus on training programs outside 
Kazakhstan, Post will follow up by letter.  END NOTE.) 
 
12.  (U) Assistant Secretary Johnson cleared on this cable. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2200, KAZAKHSTAN: PRIME MINISTER TELLS SCA A/S BLAKE ECONOMY

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2200.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2200 2009-12-23 02:10 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3518
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2200/01 3570210
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230210Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7062
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2276
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1639
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2340
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1268
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1834
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1684
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2110

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002200 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV ETRD EFIN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  PRIME MINISTER TELLS SCA A/S BLAKE ECONOMY 
RECOVERING 
 
REF:  A.  ASTANA 1762 
      B.  ASTANA 2157 
 
ASTANA 00002200  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  After briefly noting the government of 
Kazakhstan's obligatory talking points on the need for a 2010 OSCE 
summit and a bilateral meeting between Presidents Obama and 
Nazarbayev during the April Global Nuclear Security Summit, Prime 
Minister Karim Masimov told Assistant Secretary for South and 
Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake that 2009 economic growth will 
hover around zero, but will probably reach 2-3% in 2010.  He 
asserted that worldwide economic difficulties will cause oil prices 
to fall again in 2010 and continue to limit Kazakhstan's growth. 
Therefore, he is looking to 2011 for a full recovery and a return of 
international capital.  For long-term growth, he emphasized 
government investments in diversification, competitiveness, 
education, and health care.  In 2010, the Kazakhstani government 
also hopes to establish clear rules for its exit from the economy. 
Masimov also mentioned Kazakhstan's New University, which is slated 
to open in 2010.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (SBU) Prime Minister Karim Masimov welcomed Assistant Secretary 
for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake by reiterating his 
government's request for the United States to support a 2010 summit 
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
and a bilateral meeting between Presidents Obama and Nazarbayev in 
Washington during the April Global Nuclear Security Summit. 
 
CONSTRUCTION, FINANCIAL SECTOR PROBLEMS "MORE OR LESS MANAGED" 
 
4.  (SBU) Turning to his clear area of expertise, economics, Masimov 
told Blake that Kazakhstan's economy from 2000 to 2007 was 
"overheated," especially in the financial, banking, and construction 
sectors.  He asserted that problems in Kazakhstan's construction and 
financial sectors "are now more or less managed."  According to 
Masimov, the Kazakhstani government focused on completing more than 
300 buildings whose construction had stopped.  Connected to problems 
of financing, he said the government used internal resources to 
increase banks' liquidity.  By mid-2010, he claimed the resolution 
of construction sector problems will be "fully visible." 
 
5.  (SBU) The Kazakhstani government faced difficult decisions at 
the beginning of 2009, Masimov claimed, because some banks teetered 
on the verge of bankruptcy.  "We had to decide whether to do a 
Lehman Brothers or a Citibank or some other mechanism," he said. 
"So we hired a series of different international consultants," 
including JP Morgan, Credit Suisse, and Goldman Sachs.  According to 
Masimov, this program, which supported four major banks, is nearing 
completion.  He told Blake that two banks, in which the government 
invested 25% -- "like Bank of America, Citibank" -- are now 
negotiating to buy back these shares.  "Two others [i.e., Alliance 
and BTA Bank] are more difficult because of alleged massive fraud in 
the case of BTA.  Our 'Madoff case' [i.e., Mukhtar Ablyazov, former 
CEO of BTA] is in London.  We are suing each other.  He committed 
fraud, but is blaming politics.  We trust UK justice," Masimov 
asserted (ref A).  He confidently told Blake that Alliance bank 
would announce the conclusion of its restructuring that evening, and 
he expressed his opinion that BTA will finish by the end of March. 
"The full picture in April or May will show that we managed to 
stabilize the economy and that the financial and construction 
sectors will be in good shape," he said. 
 
SLIGHTLY POSITIVE GROWTH 
 
6. (SBU) Masimov predicted slightly positive growth in GDP for 2009. 
 "Some say that it will be a small minus, some a small plus, but 
that does not really matter since it is a less than 1% difference. 
The trend is more important," he argued.  In 2009, the Kazakhstani 
government invested in roads, schools, and hospitals, Masimov 
boasted, creating 400,000 new jobs and decreasing unemployment to 
 
ASTANA 00002200  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
6.3% from 7%.  Although growth in 2010 will reach 2-3%, he argued 
economic difficulties will continue worldwide and oil prices will 
again fall.  The government is thus budgeting for oil at $50 a 
barrel.  "Diversification, diversification, diversification is 
especially important.  There
 is much work to be done," he 
concluded. 
 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCING NOT TO RETURN SOON 
 
7.  (SBU) In response to Blake's query about the role of financial 
restructuring, Masimov said that the international financial sector 
will not regain "its appetite for emerging markets until maybe the 
end of 2010.  We are not counting on it, but it may help."  To 
emphasize his expertise in this area, he mentioned his weekly 
contact with the major international investment banks. 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE SHORT TERM, EDUCATION FOR THE LONG TERM 
 
8.  (SBU) Because Kazakhstan is not fully industrialized, Masimov 
insisted it needs investment.  Specifically citing the World 
Bank/EBRD-financed highway from China through Kazakhstan to Russia 
and Europe, he asserted investment creates new opportunities for 
employment and provision of goods and services by small- and 
medium-sized enterprises.  For the long term, Masimov highlighted 
the necessity to invest in competitiveness, education, and health 
care.  Because he believes that outsourcing for education and health 
care will increase in the next ten years, Kazakhstani President 
Nazarbayev will outline a strategy for Kazakhstan to position itself 
to provide these services in his February address to the nation. 
 
GOVERNMENT ENTRANCE IN ECONOMY TEMPORARY 
 
9.  (SBU) A/S Blake highlighted Kazakhstani entrepreneurs' 
complaints about the concentration of wealth in a small number of 
holding companies, which crowds out private investment and limits 
the energy of entrepreneurs (ref B).  Masimov responded that the 
government provided assistance in light of the economic crisis. 
Masimov emphasized the government's "temporary entrance into the 
economy," and as part of the government's 2010 program, said it must 
establish clear rules for its exit from the economy.  He further 
elaborated the effect of the crisis on his personal philosophy, 
"Before 2007, I was too conservative.  I asked why the government 
should interfere in private-sector dealings.  At the end of the day, 
we now see that the government is always involved.  From 1980 to 
2008, we had Reagonomics.  From 2010, there will be more social 
responsibility and control.  Maybe in 20 years time, the trend will 
again reverse itself." 
 
FUTURE U.S. INVESTMENT -- PROBABLY NO INTEREST IN 2010 
 
10.  (SBU) When A/S Blake offered to organize a business delegation 
to accompany Secretary Clinton when she has the opportunity to 
travel to Kazakhstan, Masimov highlighted his "pragmatic" opinion 
about the difficulty to attract U.S. companies in 2010.  "2010 will 
be about building good infrastructure to attract U.S. companies and 
investment in the future.  Strong political will will bring results 
in two to three years," he asserted.  According to Masimov, 
Kazakhstan's English-language New University, slated to open this 
summer, is included in these plans.  Masimov pointed to ongoing 
consultations with U.S. universities (including Duke and the 
University of Pittsburgh) as bolstering the effort to create a 
"first-class regional center."  He said he would provide more 
information about the university to the Embassy. 
 
11.  (SBU) Deputy Chairman Timur Kulibayev of Samryk-Kazyna 
(Kazakhstan's largest holding company), who joined Blake's December 
15 meeting with Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev, said Kazakhstan 
would welcome diverse U.S. investment, specifically in 
machine-building, petroleum processing petrochemicals, and 
agriculture.  The government is drafting a strategy for broad 
industrialization by 2020, Kulibayev asserted.  The Kazakhstani 
 
ASTANA 00002200  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
government and U.S. Export-Import bank could co-finance U.S. 
pilot-investment projects, he opined.  In response to Kulibayev's 
suggestion of regular meetings between U.S. and Kazakhstani business 
leaders, Blake noted that a private-business component could be 
added to the Annual Bilateral Consultations.  Foreign Minister 
Saudabayev said Kazakhstan's Ambassador to the United States, Erlan 
Idrissov, will pursue the suggestion. 
 
12.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Masimov's strong grasp of the big picture and 
smallest detail, as well as his ability to adapt to changing 
circumstances, always impresses, and might explain Kazakhstan's 
relative success in navigating the global economic crisis.  As long 
as Masimov, or someone of his vision and quality, maintains a 
relatively free hand in economic matters, we believe that the 
government will extricate itself from the economy.  For a country in 
which a free market arrived less than 20 years ago, this experience 
of temporary government intervention should strengthen Kazakhstanis' 
faith in the future of the private sector.  END COMMENT. 
 
13.  (U) A/S Blake has cleared this cable. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2198, KAZAKHSTAN: REQUEST FOR NORTH-SOUTH OVERFLIGHT

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2198.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2198 2009-12-23 01:31 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3482
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2198/01 3570131
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230131Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7059
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1832
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1682
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 2932
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2637
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 2274
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1637
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1266
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2338

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR AF KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  REQUEST FOR NORTH-SOUTH OVERFLIGHT 
PATH COMPLICATED BY THE WORD "LETHAL" 
 
REF: SECSTATE 128489 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY:  The long-existing east-west (trans-Caspian) 
overflight path agreement the United States has had with 
Kazakhstan to support U.S. efforts in  Afghanistan never 
specified (or limited) the cargo of the aircraft.  The 
agreement was simply to support Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan.  And so, we initially judged that a request for 
an additional overflight path, north-south, could be 
relatively quickly achieved by a simple exchange of 
diplomatic notes.  That has not proved to be the case.  As 
soon as we specified "lethal" cargo, we triggered a policy 
debate within the government of Kazakhstan that is still not 
resolved.  We believe that the Committee for National 
Security (KNB, ex-KGB) and other conservative forces are 
arguing to President Nazarbayev that public knowledge of 
"lethal cargo" would make Kazakhstan a target for terrorist 
attacks.  We must stop publicly using the word "lethal" in 
seeking a new north-south overflight path.  If we can drop 
that word, we likely will achieve our goal, but it will take 
more time.  END SUMMARY. 
 
POLITICALLY DOABLE, BUT... 
 
2.  (S) During his December 15 meetings in Astana, Assistant 
Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert 
Blake raised the overflight request with President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev's foreign policy adviser Kairat Sarybai and State 
Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev.  Sarybai told 
Blake, "Politically this is not a problem for us.  We have 
always supported, and continue to support, your policy in 
Afghanistan.  But we have to take our law into account. 
Thus, we'll probably need parliamentary approval for this new 
request."  Sarybai stated firmly that the United States 
should not emphasize -- should not even state openly -- that 
our request is for lethal transit.  "Do not use that word. 
This would be a huge complication for us internally and 
externally."  Repeating that our request can ultimately be 
achieved, that Kazakhstan broadly supports U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan because it is in Kazakhstan's interest to do so. 
Sarybai added, "We have our historical experience how to live 
with the dragon (China) and how to live with the bear 
(Russia)." 
 
YIKES!  LETHAL?  DON'T SAY IT! 
 
3.  (S) When A/s Blake raised our need to have a quick reply 
to our November 9 diplomatic note requesting the addition of 
a north-south overflight path, Foreign Minister Saudabayev 
blanched and replied, "Lethal, huh?  That's a new issue for 
us!"  At A/S Blake's request, the Ambassador elaborated that 
there is nothing at all new in this request, because, in 
fact, the cargo of previous overflights had never been 
specified.  Saudabayev tasked Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat 
Umarov and the Ambassador to work this issue intensively. 
Saudabayev said, "You must convince us this is nothing new. 
The more detail you can give us, the easier it will be for us 
to convince our 'other agencies.'"  Saudabayev added, "You 
know from experience that not all head-of-state decisions 
find support in society.  That's why we need your very best 
arguments that this is nothing new.  Please pay attention: 
you cannot, I emphasize cannot, use the word 'lethal' in the 
agreement language, and especially never, ever in public." 
Saudabayev expanded, "Our entire history of cooperation -- on 
non-proliferation, on Iraq, on Afghanistan -- our strongest 
desire to support President Obama, all of this shows that we 
remain strongly committed to achieving mutual goals.  But you 
must make the strongest, most careful points possible, to 
achieve this agreement."  A/S Blake assured Saudabayev that 
we would with with his team and respect Kazakhstan's 
sensitivity about the word "lethal." 
 
 
ASTANA 00002198  002 OF 002 
 
 
4.  (S) COMMENT:  During these conversations, Kazakhstani 
officials noted that they vetoed a recent Chinese request to 
transit lethal equipment through Kazakhstan's territory for a 
joint military exercise in Russia.  They have that in mind 
because of their policy of equivalent multi-vector foreign 
policy.  But even more important, we judge that Kazakhstan's 
KNB is arguing strongly to President Nazarbayev that no 
agreements can be made that would possibly expose Kazakhstan 
to potential terrorist attacks.  In their view, the transit 
of "lethal" equipmen
t and troops would do so.  That, in the 
end, is probably the key issue.  We judge that an additional 
north-south overflight path agreement is doable, but it will 
take more time.  Above all, in both private and -- especially 
-- public statements, we should not use the word "lethal." 
If we can drop that word, as we did in the the proposed 
addendum (reftel) we likely will achieve our goal.  But it 
will probably take significantly more time now that we have 
used the "L word" in our bilateral conversations.  Achieving 
an additional north-south overflight path will be this 
Mission's highest immediate priority.  END COMMENT. 
 
5.  (U) Assistant Secretary Blake cleared this cable. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2197, KAZAKHSTAN: RUSSIAN HAND IN KAZATOMPROM DRAMA?

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2197.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2197 2009-12-22 10:50 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2804
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #2197/01 3561050
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221050Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7056
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2271
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1634
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2335
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1263
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1679
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1829
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2634
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2929

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002197 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2009 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ENRG EMIN ETRD TRGY RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  RUSSIAN HAND IN KAZATOMPROM DRAMA? 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 0943 
 (B) ASTANA 1914 
 (C) ASTANA 0209 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  The case against Mukhtar Dzhakishev, former head of 
the state-owned nuclear company Kazatomprom (KAP), finally is heading 
to court, as rumors intensify about the reasons behind his arrest. 
In videos posted on YouTube on November 4, Dzhakishev asserts that 
his arrest is linked to an alleged Russian strategy to limit 
Kazakhstan's independence in production of nuclear-fuel products. 
According to some independent Kazakhstani and Russian analysts, the 
controversial videos might have contributed to the December 8 removal 
of the Chairman of the Committee for National Security (KNB).  KAP's 
new head, Vladimir Shkolnik, announced ambitious plans to proceed 
with the transformation of KAP into a producer of full fuel-cycle 
products.  However, German and Canadian interlocutors note the loss 
of some KAP autonomy since Dzhakishev's removal.  They do not dismiss 
allegations that Russia played a role in this multi-faceted drama. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
DZHAKISHEV CASE HEADS TO COURT 
 
2. (SBU) The Procurator General's Office (PGO) announced on December 
10 that it is proceeding with the case against Mukhtar Dzhakishev, 
former head of the state-owned nuclear company Kazatomprom (KAP), who 
was arrested on May 22 (ref A).  The PGO announced its intention to 
hold open hearings, despite the confidential nature of the 
allegations.  The charge of embezzlement, which is still under 
investigation, alleges that Dzhakishev illegally sold more than 60% 
of the state's uranium assets to private offshore companies.  The 
corruption charge contends that Dzhakishev illegally established a 
KAP office in Vienna and used it to pay salaries to Kazakhstani 
diplomats posted in Vienna and their relatives.  Purportedly, Rakhat 
Aliyev, the President's former son-in-law and Kazakhstan's erstwhile 
ambassador to Vienna, requested such action.  The PGO formally filed 
criminal charges on the second charge with the Astana City Court. 
 
3.  (C) Dzhakishev was widely perceived as a loyal, apolitical civil 
servant and an effective manager of KAP, and his arrest became prime 
fodder for rumors and conspiracy theories.  Daniyar Kanafin, a lawyer 
hired by Dzhakishev's family, has argued that Dzhakishev could not 
have sold sensitive state assets without the knowledge and approval 
of the highest echelons of Kazakhstan's political leadership, 
including President Nazarbayev.  Some have alleged that Dzhakishev's 
childhood ties to Rakhat Aliyev and his friendship with the former 
head of BTA bank, Mukhtar Ablyazov, finally caught up with him. 
Others, like Kanafin, believe Dzhakishev's removal is linked to an 
alleged Russian strategy to limit Kazakhstan's independence in the 
nuclear-energy industry. 
 
THE RUSSIA ANGLE 
 
4.  (C) The theory alleging Russian attempts to influence 
Kazakhstan's nuclear ambitions and Kazatomprom's business strategy in 
the nuclear industry received a significant boost with the appearance 
of YouTube videos of what appears to be Dzhakishev's interrogation by 
an unseen interlocutor, presumably a KNB officer.  In the videos, 
which first appeared on November 4, Dzhakishev details his strategy 
to turn KAP into a major global uranium player.  Dzhakishev sought to 
transform KAP into a link between major uranium producers -- the 
United States, Russia, France, China, and Japan -- and to use these 
connections to increase Kazakhstan's technological expertise.  In the 
video, he describes in great detail KAP's agreement with Japan's 
Toshiba for the production of uranium fuel pellets; the construction 
of a storage facility for these pellets in Japan; the construction of 
a uranium-enrichment plant in Angarsk, Russia; and the establishment 
of a KAP-Toshiba-Westinghouse training center in Kazakhstan to train 
new specialists.  This project, according to Dzhakishev, would have 
given Kazakhstan entry into the nuclear fuel market. 
 
5.  (C) Dzhakishev claims that he "received signals" in late 2008 
 
ASTANA 00002197  002 OF 003 
 
 
that Russia's RosAtom (Russia's state nuclear corporation) began 
separate negotiations to bypass KAP, and it approached the Japanese 
with a
 proposal to build a storage facility for Russian-made pellets 
in Japan.  Russia also proposed to buy shares of Uranium One, a 
Canadian-based uranium-producing company currently participating in 
two joint ventures with KAP.  Dzhakishev asserts that he tried to 
prevent Russia from gaining a controlling stake in the company by 
convincing Toshiba and a Chinese company to buy a 20% stake in 
Uranium One.  However, his arrest stalled those plans.  Dzhakishev 
believes Russia encouraged his arrest, because it wished to remove 
him from the business and leave Kazakhstan as a "banana republic." 
 
THE KNB ANGLE 
 
6.  (C) Adding fuel to the conspiracy-theory fire is the connection 
to Amangeldy Shabdarbayev, the Chairman of the KNB who was 
unexpectedly relieved of his duties on December 8.  In early 
November, the KNB announced its investigation into the authenticity 
of the recordings and how they made their way to the Internet. 
Dzhakishev's wife Dzhamiliya Dzhakisheva caused a stir on December 2 
with allegations that Shabdarbayev himself gave her the videos in 
order to pass them to President Nazarbayev, because he ostensibly 
could not.  Dzhakisheva said she passed several copies to people 
close to the President, but claimed that she did not know how the 
videos ended up on the Internet.  Shabdarbayev's quick removal after 
Dzhakisheva's explosive announcement led some independent Kazakhstani 
and Russian political scientists to call it the "final straw" in a 
long string of botched KNB cases -- Dzhakishev, human-rights advocate 
Yevgeniy Zhovtis (ref B), and "Alma-Ata Info" editor-in-chief Ramazan 
Yesergepov, not to mention Rakhat Aliyev in Vienna -- that pushed 
Nazarbayev to remove him.  In one of his first public statements, 
Shabdarbayev's replacement, Adil Shayakhmetov, notably vowed to bring 
Dzhakishev to trial immediately. 
 
SHKOLNIK'S BIG PLANS FOR KAP 
 
7.  (C) Despite Dzhakishev's allegations, KAP's new President, 
Vladimir Shkolnik, seems to have ambitious plans to move beyond the 
export of raw materials.  According to the press, Shkolnik told 
President Nazarbayev on December 7 that KAP's operating profits will 
increase 200% from last year, reaching 49 billion tenge 
(approximately $32 million).  The company plans to develop solar and 
wind-power energy and manufacture heat pumps.  In the first quarter 
of 2010, according to Shkolnik, KAP will also establish joint 
ventures with Japan's Toshiba and Sumitomo. 
 
THE GERMAN TAKE -- RUSSIA KEEN TO LIMIT KAP 
 
8.  (C) German DCM Wolfgang Brett (please protect) asserted to the 
Energy Officer on December 10 that two powerful actors in Russia 
actively shape and influence the development of Kazakhstan's nuclear 
energy sector:  RosAtom and Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoe Upravleniye 
(GRU, Russian military intelligence).  A commercial organization, 
RosAtom primarily is interested in the raw uranium ore Kazakhstan 
produces.  Brett asserted that lacking uranium fuel for its nuclear 
power plants due to decreasing imports, it has been feeling 
"squeezed" lately.  (NOTE:  Australia cancelled uranium shipments to 
Russia following the war with Georgia in August 2008.  END NOTE.) 
Brett said Nazarbayev has tried since independence to diminish the 
influence of the GRU -- the Foreign Military Intelligence directorate 
of the Russian armed services -- and dismantle its structures in 
Kazakhstan.  However, he has not fully succeeded.  "They still have 
people and structures in place from the Soviet days," Brett said.  In 
an effort to reclaim Russia's status as a world power, Brett claims 
that the GRU wants to "renuclearize" Russia.  He alleged open, public 
disagreements within the Russian government regarding the GRU's role 
and involvement in Russian foreign policy, particularly with respect 
to nuclear issues. 
 
9.  (C) According to Brett, regardless of which power center is 
driving Russia, Russia has declared its policy to erode KAP's 
contacts and contracts with Western and Japanese companies.  Brett 
conceded that KAP announced ambitious plans to become a 
 
ASTANA 00002197  003 OF 003 
 
 
vertically-integrated company with expertise and products in the 
entire nuclear fuel cycle, but he dismissed this as "just rhetoric." 
"Nothing is moving forward," he said.  "None of these ambitious plans 
is being carried out," including projects to build nuclear power 
plants in China.  Brett believes Russian influence largely has 
created this impasse.  Russia does not want Kazakhstan to develop 
independent partnerships with other countries or consumers, including 
those in Japan and China, he claimed.  Even at Angarsk, where KAP has 
a 50-50 joint venture with Russia, Russia fully controls the 
technology. 
 
10.  (C) Brett alleged Kazatomprom's President Vladimir Shkolnik has 
personal and professional ties to RosAtom (his son-in-law is a senior 
executive), and Shkolnik has strong links to Russia in general. 
Brett said the removal of KNB Head Shabdarbayev is "at least 50%" due 
to the Dzhakishev case and the controversy surrounding his arrest and 
detention.  He suggested that this change, and other indications of 
"conflicts and rifts inside the service," which he called the real 
power center in Kazakhstan, might be the early signs of a struggle 
for succession.  "You know," he said, "2012 is not that far off..." 
[COMMENT:  We would note that many are always eager to predict almost 
every single headline event portends "the beginning of the succession 
struggle."  END COMMENT.] 
 
THE CANADIAN TAKE -- KAP MOVING SLOWER 
 
11.  (C) Canadian Commercial Officer David Mallette (please protect) 
told Energy Officer on December 8 that he and senior executives from 
Canadian uranium company Cameco (which operates the Inkai joint 
venture with KAP) met with Shkolnik in October.  According to 
Mallette, Shkolnik was "very positive" about KAP's progress with the 
development of full fuel-cycle products.  Mallette did not receive 
the impression that Shkolnik wanted KAP simply to mine and export 
uranium ore.  He noted, however, that Canadian mining companies have 
complained since Dzhakishev's arrest about the increasing difficulty 
of obtaining decisions from KAP.  Managers appear more cautious, and 
Samryk-Kazyna (the state holding company) has exercised greater 
control over daily operations (ref C).  All in all, Mallette said, 
KAP now is operating with much less autonomy and freedom. 
 
12.  (C) COMMENT:  The case against Dzhakishev and the future of KAP 
can be analyzed from multiple angles.  KAP's diminished dynamism 
since Dzhakishev's removal probably is linked to internal factors as 
much as to external ones.  The bulk of the company's senior 
management was arrested six months ago.  Samruk-Kazyna's creation of 
a new entity to oversee and approve KAP activities certainly impacted 
the company's ability to take risks, make decisions, and show 
initiative.  Still, Russia's influence over Kazakhstan's behavior in 
this area, as in many others, cannot be denied.  KAP's near-term

development strategies will play an important role in analyzing the 
degree of Russian influence over Kazakhstan, including in the nuclear 
energy industry.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2196, KAZAKHSTAN: 2009-2010 INCSR PART 1, DRUGS AND CHEMICAL

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2196.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2196 2009-12-22 10:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #2196/01 3561048
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221048Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7048

UNCLAS ASTANA 002196 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL SNAR KCRM KCOR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: 2009-2010 INCSR PART 1, DRUGS AND CHEMICAL 
CONTROL 
 
REF: STATE 97228 
 
1.  In response to reftel, the text of Part 1 of the International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) for Kazakhstan follows in 
paragraphs 2-67. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
2.  Kazakhstan is primarily a transit country for drug trafficking 
and is located on the northern route from Afghanistan.  According to 
the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Kazakhstan and its Central 
Asian neighbors are increasingly becoming active consumers of Afghan 
opiates transited along the northern route.  In 2009, the government 
of Kazakhstan developed new approaches to fight drug trafficking and 
consumption, focusing its attention on prevention and supply 
reduction and prioritizing the strengthening of its southern border. 
 Law enforcement agencies acknowledge that civil society, NGOs, and 
mass media are essential partners in combating the problem of 
narcotics. 
 
3.  The government has paid a great deal of attention to the 
international fight against drug trafficking and the regional 
coordination of efforts.  Kazakhstan continues to implement two 
large-scale programs to combat corruption and drug trafficking. 
Kazakhstan is party to the UN Convention against Illicit Trafficking 
of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances and the Convention against 
Corruption. 
 
STATUS OF COUNTRY 
 
4.  Its geographic location, transportation infrastructure, open 
borders, and economic and social stability have made Kazakhstan a 
major transit zone for narcotics.  Kazakhstan, concerned about 
possible increases in crime caused by the global financial crisis, 
adopted a road map to decrease unemployment.  The Minister of 
Interior attributed the 10% decrease in crime to this program. 
 
5.  The traffic of Afghan opiates and growth of marijuana in 
Southern Kazakhstan affect the drug situation in Kazakhstan.  This 
year, Georgian, Nigerian, Mongolian, Afghan, Ghanaian, and Russian 
citizens have been arrested for narco-trafficking along with 
citizens from throughout Central Asia.  The main drugs consumed in 
Kazakhstan are marijuana and heroin.  Heroin has rapidly overtaken 
opium, the traditional drug of choice in Kazakhstan. 
 
GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
6.  Three law enforcement agencies combat drug trafficking in 
Kazakhstan -- the Committee for National Security (KNB), the Customs 
Control Committee (CCC) and the Ministry of Interior (MVD).  A part 
of KNB, the Border Guard Service (BGS) inspects people and vehicles 
for the presence of drugs on the border.  KNB also has a Division on 
Combating International Drug Trafficking, which works both on the 
border and inside the country, and participates in controlled 
delivery operations outside of the country.  This Committee focuses 
on disrupting drug channels and trafficking sources and  tracks the 
number of trafficking rings and criminal organizations thwarted 
rather than the amount of drugs seized.  The CCC of the Ministry of 
Finance is also present on the border.  MVD through its Committee on 
Combating Drugs and Control over the Circulation of Drugs (KBN) 
combats trafficking through its regional counter-narcotics 
divisions.  The MVD's Committee of Internal Troops provides security 
in prisons and, with the Ministry of Justice's Committee of Criminal 
and Executive Systems, combats drug trafficking in prisons.  The 
Ministry of Defense's Military Police focuses on drug trafficking in 
the military. 
 
7.  In existence since 2004, the KBN coordinates the 
counter-narcotics work of ministries, agencies, and NGOs.  It works 
with international organizations and conducts anti-drug information 
campaigns and other demand-reduction activities.  An interagency 
commission chaired by the Minister of Interior considers the 
progress of anti-drug programs. The KBN is interested in new methods 
to evaluate officers and investigate drug-related crimes and 
money-laundering cases.   It also wants to explore a new 
registration systems for drug addicts. 
 
8.  The KBN recently began to double its staff and increase the 
capacity of its special divisions in high-risk areas -- Delta-Dolina 
in the Chu Valley to combat the local production of marijuana, Yug 
in Shymkent, and Center in Karaganda.  The Yug special division will 
fight trafficking in the South Kazakhstan and Almaty Oblasts, and 
the Center division will work in the Karaganda, Pavlodar, North 
Kazakhstan, and Kostanai Oblasts.  The government determined six 
internal narcotics checkpoints to be not as effective as expected, 
because these stationary posts were easily detoured, the 
construction was not completed, and the budget was not sufficient to 
provide necessary equipment to the posts.  The KBN now plans to 
focus its efforts on mobile groups, which can better patrol 
high-risk areas.  It will move personnel from the checkpoints to the 
newly-established special units in Shymkent and Karaganda. 
 
 
9.  In 2005, the government of Kazakhstan launched a 2006-2014 
strategy to combat drug addiction and trafficking.  This year, the &
#x000A;government introduced the next three-year program to implement the 
strategy. 
 
10.  In 2008, the government amended its counter-narcotics laws, 
which strengthened the legislation as provided for in Article 24 of 
the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances.  Kazakhstan also adheres to Article 11 of 
the Convention when it participates in controlled deliveries, which 
have been conducted with neighboring countries including China. 
 
11.  The 2009-2011 program also provides for drug-demand reduction. 
Government agencies plan to implement computer-based training 
programs in schools and increase the number of projects with NGOs. 
Currently, 1,400 police officers are working in city schools.  The 
program will expand the number of police officers working in schools 
and will add police to large schools in rural areas.  The program 
will also strengthen treatment and rehabilitation for drug addicts. 
 
 
 
12.  Based on UN recommendations and positive results in some 
European countries, the KBN is developing a draft law to provide 
treatment instead of imprisonment for drug-addicted criminals.  The 
law would permit a suspended sentence to allow treatment. 
 
13.  The Criminal Procedural Code was also amended to allow for the 
retention of only the amount of seized narcotics required for 
forensic testing.  The minimum amount will be retained and entered 
into evidence, along with the forensic report, during trial.  The 
rest of the seized drugs will be destroyed immediately to avoid the 
serious problem of resale of seized heroin by corrupt police. 
 
14.  In June 2008, the Kazakhstani government amended the Criminal, 
Criminal Procedural, and Administrative Codes to strengthen 
punishment for drug-related crimes.  These amendments were 
introduced in line with article 24 of the UN Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which 
allows for stricter national measures than provided for in the 
Convention.  The new law provides for life imprisonment for serious 
drug-related crimes, including trafficking in large quantities, 
participation in drug-related crimes as part of a criminal 
organization, sale of drugs in educational institutions and/or to 
minors, and sale or distribution of drugs resulting in death. 
 
15.  Kazakhstan conducted a large-scale information campaign about 
the amendments because many drug couriers are citizens of 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, who traffic drugs to support 
their families. 
 
16.  Article 319-1 of the Administrative Code penalizes owners of 
entertainment facilities, such as bars and clubs, who do not take 
measures to stop the sales or consumption of drugs or psychotropic 
substances.  Fines are determined by the size of the business and 
based on the monthly calculated index (MCI), which is determined 
annually and is the basis of all fines, taxes, and benefits for both 
individuals and businesses.  MCI is currently 1,296 tenge ($8.64). 
During 2009, the government carried out operations and raids to stop 
distribution and consumption of drugs in entertainment centers.  As 
a result, 12 criminal cases were opened and the owners of four 
entertainment centers were fined. 
 
17.  The 2006-2008 Astana Drug Free City program, announced in 
September 2006, focuses on demand reduction, treatment of drug 
addiction, and combat against drug trafficking in the capital. 
Pleased by its effectiveness, the Astana Maslikhat (City Council) 
extended the program.  The MVD, working with other law-enforcement 
agencies, uncovered 201 drug-related crimes (a slight increase over 
last year's 198), including 66 drug sales (last year 54).  It seized 
over 112 kilos of drugs, including 7.7 kilos of heroin, closed three 
drug houses, blocked two trafficking channels, dismantled one 
organized criminal group, and closed 38 drug markets.  A broad 
anti-drug information campaign was also conducted. 
 
18.  The issue of border security came to the forefront this year 
during the negotiations among Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus to 
enter into a customs union.  As part of the agreement, Kazakhstan 
may withdraw customs from its border with Russia as soon as July 
2011, which has led Russia to express concerns about the security of 
Kazakhstan's southern border.  In May 2009, the Government of 
Kazakhstan approved the 2009-2011 Program on Combating Drug 
Addiction and Narco-Business with a total budget of 39.7 billion 
tenge (approximately $260 million).  The program especially 
prioritizes strengthening the southern border with radar, patrol 
vehicles, and communications equipment.  Customs checkpoints will be 
equipped with X-ray, automated cargo control systems, and other 
modern inspection equipment.  The government will provide 
counternarcotics divisions of the Ministry of Interior (MVD) with 
three mobile scanning machines for inspection of trucks in the 
 
South-Kazakhstan, Kyzylorda, Almaty and Zhambyl Oblasts.  This 
program requires that the MVD pay special attention to the 
disruption of internal drug-distribution networks. 
 
19.  Last year the government of Kazakhstan established a security 
zone along 107 kilometers of its 2,351 kilometer border with 
Uzbekistan.  This year, a second 209-kilometer zone is planned for 
the border with Kyrgyzstan.  The Border Guard Service has aviation 
divisions and plans to increase its use of helicopters to search for 
narco-traffickers. 
 
20.  The government of Kazakhstan has also focused on strengthening 
security in the run up to its 2010chairmanship of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  Kazakhstan has 
expressed its desire to strengthen regional security and develop 
non-military responses to the fight against terrorism, extremism, 
drug trafficking, and organized crime.  On August 29, President 
Nazarbayev signed a decree to establish the Path to Europe program 
for 2009-2011, which is aimed at increasing cooperation between 
Kazakhstan and Europe. 
 
21.  Kazakhstan strengthened its cooperation with the Russian 
Federation this year.  The Federal Service on Drugs Control (FSKN) 
of the Russian Federation has complained that the amount of drugs 
transported into Russia has not significantly decreased despite the 
work of international organizations and law enforcement agencies in 
Kazakhstan.  In response, Kazakhstan and Russia held numerous 
meetings in 2009 to discuss joint efforts to combat drug trafficking 
and concluded agreements on cooperation.  Kazakhstan and Russia 
conducted two joint operations within the agreements, and the FSKN 
is providing training courses to law enforcement agencies in 
Kazakhstan.  On August 21, at an international meeting on border 
cooperation, the law enforcement agencies of Kazakhstan and Russia 
signed a protoco
l to their agreement, which provides for cooperation 
between the Western-Kazakhstan oblasts of Atyrau, Aktobe, and 
Mangystau and the Astrakhan, Samara, Orenburg, Saratov, and 
Volgograd oblasts of the Russian Federation. 
 
22.  Inaugurated on December 9, the Central Asian Regional 
Information and Coordination Center (CARICC) was created to 
facilitate information exchange and analysis, and to assist in the 
coordination of operational activities of regional law-enforcement 
agencies.  Ratified by the parliaments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, the CARICC agreement 
entered into force on March 2.  The President of the Russian 
Federation signed the agreement on September 4.  The CARICC Council 
approved a two-year strategic plan and CARICC-staff rules and 
regulations.  The Council approved observer status for Austria, 
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Interpol, Pakistan, and the 
United States.  On September 16, the government of Kazakhstan signed 
the Host Country Agreement with CARICC, which covers the privileges 
and immunities of CARICC, its staff and liaison officers from the 
member states and observer countries in the host country.  The 
government of Kazakhstan allocated $2.7 million for the renovation 
of the CARICC building.  Canada, the Czech Republic, Great Britain, 
Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Turkey, and the United States 
have financially contributed to CARICC's creation.  The total budget 
through 2011 is $15.4 million. 
 
LAW-ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 
 
23.  Kazakhstan actively fights drug trafficking and works with 
neighboring countries to share information.  The BGS and Customs 
Control Committee of the Ministry of Finance secure the border.  The 
MVD works within the country, and the KNB focuses on organized 
criminal groups and drug cartels. 
 
24.  During the first nine months of 2009, law-enforcement agencies 
registered 7,840 drug-related crimes, a 0.5% decrease from last 
year.  Of the total, 7,389 were registered by the MVD, 279 by the 
KNB, and 160 by Customs.  Of the total drug-related crimes, 2,047 
were sales-related cases, an increase from last year's 1,849. 
During the same time period, drug trafficking cases (206 cases) 
dropped 30.6%.  Of those cases, 88 were registered by the MVD, 23 by 
the KNB, and 92 by Customs.  During the time period, the government 
shut 29 drug houses and seized 24.244 tons of drugs and psychotropic 
substances (a 4.5% increase from last year's 23.2 tons).  There was 
a 57.6% decrease in heroin seizures (641.3 kilos), a 92.9% increase 
in opium seizures (95.3 kilos), a 33% increase in hashish seizures 
(432.6 kilos), and an 8.2% increase in marijuana seizures (22.937 
metric tons). 
 
25.  During the past year, Kazakhstani law-enforcement agencies have 
increased their focus on operations against entire cartels and 
controlled deliveries instead of attempting to increase seizures by 
arresting as many low-level couriers as possible.  The KNB conducted 
20 international counter-narcotics operations, blocked 49 
international drug trafficking routes, and dismantled 57 drug 
trafficking groups.  The MVD dismantled eight organized criminal 
groups, members of which had committed 40 drug-related crimes 
throughout the country.  The MVD conducted 21 controlled delivery 
 
operations, including operations with Kyrgyzstan and Russia.  As a 
result of these operations, it seized 555.7 kilos of drugs, 
including 21 kilos of heroin. 
 
26.  During the first nine months of 2009, the number of people 
charged with administrative offenses has increased 93.3% (4,816). 
Of the total, 2,739 people were arrested for driving while under the 
influence of narcotics.  Article 320 of the Administrative Code 
covers the illegal manufacture, processing, purchase, storage, 
transportation, and/or distribution of drugs, psychotropic 
substances, and precursors for any purpose other than sales. 
Individuals charged under this section can be fined from five to 10 
MCI (1 MCI equals $8.64) or jailed for up to ten days.  Officials 
can be fined 15-20 MCI and jailed for up to 15 days.  Fines for 
small- and medium-sized businesses are 25-30 MCI, and for large 
enterprises 40-50 MCI.  During 2009, 2,006 people were charged under 
article 320.  As amended in July 2008, article 55 of the 
Administrative Code allows judges to sentence individuals up to 15 
days in jail for certain types of drug-related administrative 
violations.  However, pregnant women, women with children under the 
age of 14, minors, handicapped people, women over the age of 58, and 
men over the age of 63 cannot be jailed. 
 
27.  In 2009, 5,281 people were arrested for drug-related crimes. 
The number of women arrested decreased by 14.3% (from 638 to 547), 
and minors decreased by 21.9% (from 32 people to 25).  The number of 
foreign citizens arrested for drug-related crimes decreased by 30.7% 
(from 326 to 226), with the majority from Kyrgyzstan (109 people), 
Russia (72), and Uzbekistan (59). 
 
28.  During Operation Temir Tor, the KNB dismantled a large, 
regional drug group that transported opiates from Tajikistan through 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia.  As a result, the KNB seized 
over 42 kilos of heroin, opened five criminal cases, and arrested 
one leader and eight members of the group.  The KNB discovered that 
the group's profits were laundered through various investments, and 
a criminal case for tax invasion was filed against the wife of the 
group's leader. 
 
29.  The KNB also stopped a large, regional drug group transporting 
opiates to Eastern Kazakhstan during Operation Valkiriya.  As a 
result, KNB arrested the leader and six members who operated a sales 
network in the East Kazakhstan Oblast and seized four kilos of 
heroin, 1.65 million tenge ($11,000), over $11,000 in U.S. currency, 
1,500 rubles, and 600 grams of explosives. 
 
30.  The Collective Security Treaty Organization (SCTO) conducted 
the Kanal-2009 interstate operation September 22-29.  The operation 
reportedly resulted in the detection of 231 crimes and seizures of 
1.8 metric tons of drugs, including 25.6 kilos of heroin, and over 
523 metric tons of precursor chemicals. 
 
31.  A scheme to use fund transfers to pay drug dealers, previously 
seen in Russia, has been found in Kazakhstan.  In this scheme, the 
purchaser is given information on a newly-opened bank account.  When 
funds are transferred, the location of a hidden cache is revealed, 
thus minimizing the direct contact between seller and purchaser. 
When the scheme was uncovered, police discovered that 15 million 
tenge ($100,000) had been transferred through accounts.  During a 
search of an organizer's residence, police found 150 lost or stolen 
ID cards, which had been used to open new bank accounts. 
 
32.  Drug dealers also smuggle drugs into jails and temporary 
detention facilities, i
ncluding through hiding them in parcels 
brought into the facilities.  In one case in Akmolinskaya Oblast, an 
attorney was arrested with 5.32 grams of heroin hidden under his 
belt. 
 
33.  Traffickers continue to search for new concealment methods. 
Recently, traffickers attempted to mask the scent of heroin from 
canines by coating shipments with powdered wolves' teeth. 
Traffickers also soak clothing in a heroin solution.  When the 
clothing is delivered the heroin can then be extracted. 
 
34.  Customs had large seizures this year.  On June 16, Customs 
canine officers in the Kostanaiskaya Oblast on the border with 
Russia found 63 packets of heroin weighing 19.676 kilos in a 
vehicle's tire.  The owner of the vehicle was from Kyrgyzstan en 
route to Russia. 
 
CORRUPTION 
 
35.  The government of Kazakhstan does not encourage or facilitate 
illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs 
or other controlled substances.   It also does not support the 
laundering of proceeds from illegal drug trafficking.  There have 
been no cases this year of senior government officials engaged in 
the illicit production or distribution of drugs.  In March, Prime 
Minister Masimov stated that traffickers would not attempt to 
transport large quantities across the border without protection from 
law-enforcement officers.  Masimov thus called for the creation of a 
 
special unit to root out government officials working with 
traffickers.   However, creation of such a unit remains unconfirmed. 
 
 
36.  The MVD actively fights narco-corruption in its ranks. 
Recruits are vetted, and special divisions investigate crimes 
committed by police.  Ten police officers were arrested this year 
for drug-related crimes.  The MVD is also working on new methods to 
prevent bribery and corruption and will conduct preventative 
measures as part of its 2009-2010 anti-corruption plan.  Presently, 
the average police salary is approximately $200-$266 a month.  The 
new plan includes bonuses of $200-$333 for not taking bribes. 
 
37.  An anti-narcotics police officer in the Northern Kazakhstan 
Oblast was arrested for accepting a 200,000 tenge ($1,333) bribe 
from a trafficker.  A criminal case was opened. 
 
38.  The KNB arrested an MVD employee for selling 0.28 grams of 
heroin.  KNB officers found 58.97 grams of heroin and 1.54 grams of 
marijuana in the employee's residence.  A criminal case for storage 
and sales of narcotics was opened. 
 
39.  Two police officers were fired after traces of narcotics were 
found during a blood test.  No criminal case was opened, because no 
drugs were found on their persons or in their homes. 
 
AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES 
 
40.  Law-enforcement agencies in Kazakhstan cooperate within 
intergovernmental interagency agreements with the Drug Control 
Agencies (DCA) of the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Russia, and 
Uzbekistan.  The agencies of these countries conduct joint 
operations, investigations, demand-reduction programs, and exchange 
of operative information and methodology. 
 
41.  Kazakhstan plans to sign an agreement with Afghanistan on 
cooperation in the fight against trafficking and abuse of drugs, 
psychotropic substances, and precursors.  Kazakhstan is also working 
on new agreements with the DCAs of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
 
 
CULTIVATION/PRODUCTION 
 
42.  Kazakhstan produces wild marijuana, ephedra, and opium poppies. 
 Such drugs grow on over 1.2 million hectares in the Almaty, 
Zhambyl, South Kazakhstan, Kyzylorda ,and East Kazakhstan Oblasts. 
The largest source of marijuana is the Chu Valley in the Zhambyl 
Oblast, in which wild marijuana with a high THC content grows on an 
estimated 138,000 hectares.  Experts estimate that 145,000 metric 
tons of marijuana or as much as 6,000 tons of hashish could be 
produced annually.  The government of Kazakhstan continues to 
consider possible licit industrial uses for the Chu Valley 
marijuana.  Various projects have been proposed, but nothing has 
been approved. 
 
43.  The KBN established two special divisions in 2008 to combat 
marijuana trafficking.  The Ontustik (South) Special Division 
focuses on organized crime in South Kazakhstan, and Delta-Dolina 
specifically focuses on illicit activities in the Chu Valley.  The 
work of these divisions is believed to have contributed to the 
recent 17% increase in marijuana and hashish prices.  The divisions 
still require additional staffing, vehicles, and satellite 
communications equipment. 
 
44.  Operation Mak (Poppy) is conducted annually from June 1 through 
October 20 to combat the marijuana harvest and dismantle drug 
cartels in the Chu Valley.  During the operation, the KBN closely 
cooperates with the BGS and Customs to create a security belt around 
the valley to prevent the traffic of marijuana while Delta-Dolina 
patrols the valley.  As a result, law-enforcement agencies seized 
16.1 tons of drugs.  The MVD registered 3,300 drug-related crimes, 
including 32 cases of trafficking. 
 
DRUG FLOW/TRANSIT 
 
45.   The main types of drugs trafficked through Kazakhstan are 
Afghani opiates (heroin and opium), marijuana, and hashish.  There 
was no manufacture of synthetic drugs in Kazakhstan in 2009. 
 
46.  The primary trafficking route through Kazakhstan and Russia 
transits Almaty, Karaganda, Semey, Novosibirsk, Barnaul, and Omsk. 
Drugs travel over land by rail, bus, and vehicle.  Trafficking on 
the border with Kyrgyzstan is increasing as the border with 
Uzbekistan is strengthened.  The MVD believes that drug traffickers 
cross the mountains on foot or horse.  The number of drug mules 
swallowing drugs has increased on the border with Kyrgyzstan.  In 
June, a passenger on a train from Bishkek to Novokuznezk was 
transported to the hospital after suffering intestinal problems. 
After his death, it was discovered that he had swallowed 45 packets 
of heroin, totaling 284 grams.  Another drug mule traveling by bus 
from Pavlodar to Novosibirsk survived after seven of the nine 
 
packets of heroin dissolved in his stomach.  The two remaining 
capsules contained 13.6 grams of heroin. 
 
47.  With the transit of narcotics through Kazakhstan, the drug 
addiction rate in the country continues to increase.  Experts 
estimate that 10-15% of the opiates trafficked through Kazakhstan 
remain in the domestic market.  Narcotics are primarily trafficked 
over land on trains and in trucks with fruits and vegetables. 
Law-enforcement agencies continue to complain about the use of 
International Road Transport Convention (TIR) carnets by drug 
traffickers.  Customs officials can only inspect trucks traveling 
with a TIR carnet when the truck
 is sealed at its departure and at 
its destination.  Customs officials of a transited country can open 
and inspect the vehicle only in exceptional circumstances.  The 
2009-2011 Program on Combating Drug Addiction and Narco-Business 
provides for the purchase of scanners for border checkpoints and 
inside the country in order to detect contraband in sealed trucks. 
 
48.  According to the MVD, one kilo of heroin costs $1,000-$1,500 on 
the Afghan-Tajik border, $4,000 upon entry into Kazakhstan, and 
$20,000 when it enters Russia from Kazakhstan.  The wholesale price 
of heroin is $30,000 per kilo in Europe. 
49.  In July, the Head of the KNB Division on Combating 
International Drug Trafficking stated that the use of heavy drugs 
has decreased since the beginning of the financial crisis, because 
drug users no longer have cash.  The barter of vehicles and other 
property for drugs has also increased.  The KNB reported a 
corresponding increase in the production and traffic of light 
drugs. 
DOMESTIC PROGRAMS/DEMAND REDUCTION 
 
50.  The MVD closely works with the Ministries of Culture and 
Information, Health, Education and Science, and Tourism and Sport to 
conduct drug-demand-reduction information campaigns.  They have 
conducted 6,500 events in the country, including 275 seminars, 4,031 
lectures and meetings, 345 round tables, and 599 sport competitions 
and tournaments.  Each year Kazakhstan commemorates the 
International Day against Drug Addiction on June 26. 
 
51.  The total number of registered drug addicts has decreased by 
1.6% to 53,883 while the number of drug addicts under the age of 18 
has increased by 2.1% to 3,839.  Some theorize that this year's 
increase results from the government's efforts to reach minors. 
 
52.  National television stations and newspapers distribute 
information on the fight against drug trafficking.  They regularly 
publish articles about police operations and drug-demand reduction 
campaigns.  The MVD publishes the magazines Narkopost and Future 
without Drugs.  The Ministry of Education and Science introduced 
special demand-reduction curricula at schools, which include 
lectures by Treatment experts, psychologists, and police. 
 
53.  Civil society and human-rights activists opposed last year's 
proposal to drug test all students.  The Ministry of Health proposed 
testing only high-risk groups after only 0.5% of 5,300 students in 
Almaty tested positive during a 2006 pilot project.  Alexandr 
Katkov, Acting Head of the Pavlodar Republican Scientific and 
Practical Center of Medical and Social Problems believes simple drug 
testing is not the answer to solving childhood addiction.  He has 
pushed for psychological testing to determine whether a student is a 
drug user or a drug addict. 
 
54.  A government anti-drug program provides for anti-drug education 
for school psychologists and social workers.  The staff of 500 
schools over three years will be trained.  This year, the pilot 
project will be implemented in 75 schools in Pavlodar, Karaganda, 
and Taraz. 
 
55.  A pilot project to test methadone therapy was launched in 
Pavlodar and Temirtau and 29 heroin addicts, including 11 that were 
HIV-positive, took part.  Funded by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria, the project provides patients with 
medical and psychological treatment. So far, the project appears to 
have cured four participants of their addiction.  Despite these 
results, the project's funding is due to end soon. 
 
56.  Kazakhstan continues to have problems with its old treatment 
system, in which patients had to register and provide their personal 
information.  Many did not seek treatment for fear that their 
information would be provided to the police.  The 2009-2011 Program 
on Combating Drug Addiction and Narco-Business will provide 
confidentiality for those seeking treatment. 
 
57.  Kazakhstan's 2006-2010 AIDS Program provides for 
contraceptives, information, educational materials, needle 
exchanges, and free, confidential treatment.  Help-lines and clinics 
provide services. 
 
U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES AND PROGRAMS 
 
BILATERAL COOPERATION 
 
 
58.  Post has had relatively good cooperation during the past year 
with all law-enforcement agencies.  To increase the capacity of the 
canine services of law-enforcement agencies, INL funded a series of 
events that included extensive train-the-trainer courses in Austria, 
an International Canine Conference in Kazakhstan, training events in 
Kazakhstan, and the participation of Kazakhstani canine specialists 
in international conferences in Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, and 
Moscow. 
 
59.  The KNB's Military Institute, which trains border guards, has 
adopted the Austrian methods to select and train canines and has 
trained one group of cadets in the new curriculum.  The Military 
Institute's Canine Department has conducted an in-service training 
program of BGS canine officers, leading to a number of successful 
seizures on the border.  Three instructors trained in Austria have 
trained approximately 60 canine officers from the MVD and BGS. 
 
60.  INL-funded projects are leading to many innovations in the 
canine service, including a study on canine socialization when 
housed with their handlers, the use of dry food, which is healthier 
than the previously-used cooked food.  They now plan to use real 
narcotics to train and are drafting a textbook for used by all 
canine services. 
 
61.  Through UNODC, INL continues to provide support to the MVD's 
internal narcotics checkpoints.  UNODC has purchased and installed 
satellite-communication, radio-communications, and office equipment. 
 In 2008, over 10 metric tons of drugs, including heroin, marijuana, 
hashish, and opium, were seized at internal checkpoints. 
 
62.  To strengthen its capacity to conduct special operations and 
patrol vulnerable areas, INL provided the MVD with 17 mini-vans and 
four jeeps.  In order to support better data handling by the MVD, 
INL purchased a server to allow for the safe and secure storage of 
data.  INL also supported a two-week counternarcotics training 
course for counter-narcotics officers at the Turkish Academy on 
Combating Organized Crime and Drugs (TADOC).  INL is funding the 
purchase of office equipment and furniture for the MVD's Interagency 
Counter-Narcotics Training Center. 
 
63.  To increase the capacity of border guards, INL continues to 
cooperate with the Military Institute and the BGS.  INL funded the 
renovation of and provided equipment to an additional Border Guard 
Field Training Center in Uralsk, Western Kazakhstan and a classroom 
at the Military Institute of the Committee
 for National Security. 
INL equipped the Aviation Border Guard Training Center in Astana. 
In response to a request from the Military Institute, a study tour 
for five law-enforcement training academies was combined with a 
train-the-trainer course at TADOC.  The study tour provided ideas 
for the curriculum at the MVD's Interagency Counter-Narcotics 
Training Center.  The study tour also introduced various 
computer-based training systems (CBT) that the UNODC program has 
installed in some law-enforcement training centers.  The BGS 
requested CBT software for the border-guard field training centers 
renovated and equipped by INL.  INL provided a language laboratory 
to the Military Institute.  INL purchased 10 busters, nine of which 
will be used for drug detection on the border and one for training 
courses at the Military Institute.  INL purchased 50 flashlights for 
inspection of vehicles and trains, and 25 video cameras for the BGS 
to document inspections, seizures, and arrests. 
 
ROAD AHEAD 
 
64.  INL will continue cooperation with the government of Kazakhstan 
to increase its counter-narcotics capacity.  Post will continue to 
provide to operational staff training seminars on drug-courier 
profiling, use of newly-provided equipment, and new operations 
techniques.  INL will continue its cooperation with the BGS and 
provide technical assistance to border checkpoints. 
 
STATISTICAL TABLES 
 
Drug Crop Cultivation 
 
Cannabis: 
 
Experts estimate that 145,000 metric tons of marijuana or as much as 
6,000 tons of hashish could be produced annually in the Chu Valley. 
 
Drug seizures in kilograms: 
 
Heroin 
 
2009 - 641.297; 2008 - 1,514.731; 2007 -  378.895 
 
Opium 
 
2009 - 95.3; 2008 - 14.01; 2007 - 197.29 
 
Marijuana 
 
 
2009 - 22,937; 2008 -  21,196; 2007 -  20,467 
 
Hashish 
 
2009 - 432.591; 2008 - 327.161; 2007 -  187.282 
 
Registered Drug Users 
 
53,883 
 
CHEMICAL CONTROL 
 
65.  Kazakhstan complies with article 12 of the UN Convention 
against Illicit Trafficking of Narcotics and Psychotropic 
Substances, which provides that "the parties shall control 
substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotics 
drugs or psychotropic substances."  The KBN established a special 
office on licensing the legal trade of precursor chemicals, 
psychotropic substances, and drugs.  The office created a single 
unified register of the approximately 1,500 legal entities whose 
activity is related to the trade in chemical precursors. 
 
66.  Under current legislation, potassium permanganate and acetic 
anhydride are included in the list of precursor chemicals and are 
subject to state control.  Acetic anhydride is not produced in 
Kazakhstan and is not imported onto its territory.  Acetic anhydride 
has not been used in industry since 2005. 
 
67.  Kazakhstan annually conducts Operation Doping, during which 
authorities inspect legal entities for compliance with rules of 
storage, use, and destruction of drugs, psychotropic substances, and 
precursors. 
As a result, the MVD discovered 802 violations, opened 30 criminal 
cases, and seized 980 metric tons of precursor chemicals 
(hydrochloric and sulphuric acid), 11,466 ampoules of drugs, and 
59,000 ampoules of psychotropic substances. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2190, KAZAKHSTAN’S PRESIDENT COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2190.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2190 2009-12-22 08:27 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2677
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2190/01 3560827
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220827Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7039
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 2269
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1632
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1261
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2333
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1827
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1677
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2927
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2632

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002190 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, EEB 
PLEASE PASS TO USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET MARR SENV OSCE EU CH RS
KZ 
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN'S PRESIDENT COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS 
CENTER FOR AFGHANISTAN, THE OSCE, OTHER KEY ISSUES 
 
ASTANA 00002190  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U)  Sensitive but Unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) President Nursultan Nazarbayev gave his annual 
summing up to the diplomatic corps on December 22.  Since he 
broke no new ground on any issue, we are reporting only 
excerpts from his presentation about issues of special 
interest to Washington readers. 
 
-- AFGHANISTAN:  Kazakhstan fully supports U.S. and its NATO 
partners' efforts to bring stability and development to 
Afghanistan because it is in Kazakhstan's national interest 
to do so.  In addition to Kazakhstan's already announced $50 
million program to provide academic and technical education 
over five years for 1,000 Afghans, Kazakhstan reiterated its 
offer to provide a logistics center to support U.S. and 
coalition troops in Afghanistan.  (COMMENT:  We believe this 
is the first time Nazarbayev has made this offer public.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
-- OSCE:  Kazakhstan has prepared for its 2010 chairmanship 
with utmost seriousness, and will balance all three OSCE 
dimensions.  For the security dimension, Kazakhstan will 
promote the Corfu Process -- Russia's desire for a new 
European Security Treaty is only one of many proposals. 
Likewise on security, Kazakhstan will emphasize 
counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and border security, 
especially in Afghanistan.  For the economics and 
environmental dimension, Kazakhstan will give priority to 
transit and transportation and the Aral Sea, as well as 
initiate a dialogue on energy security.  For the human 
dimension, Kazakhstan will uphold the OSCE's traditional 
commitments and will pay special attention to religious 
tolerance and ethnic non-discrimination. 
 
-- MAJOR PARTNERS:  Kazakhstan attaches special importance to 
China's soft loans of $13 billion during the 
economically-difficult 2009.  The loans will be used solely 
for development.  Kazakhstan also considers its relationship 
with the European Union a priority and is certain that its 
"Path to Europe" policy will yield concrete results. 
(COMMENT:  Nazarbayev had very little to say about Russia, 
except in the context of the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan 
Customs Union.  His comments about the United States were in 
the context of Afghanistan and energy cooperation.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
-- CUSTOMS UNION:  The Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs 
Union is an historic achievement that will not preclude WTO 
membership in the future.  Other CIS countries will be 
welcome to join the customs union eventually, but will need 
to undertake the long procedure to harmonize their laws and 
regulations with the customs union. 
 
-- ENERGY:  Kazakhstan will continue its energy cooperation 
with the United States and Russia, while it seeks to 
establish new routes for the export of its hydrocarbon 
resources, especially to China and elsewhere.  Because of the 
surge in oil production expected for 2014, Kazakhstan is 
continuing seriously to pursue the Kazakhstan Caspian 
Transportation System and other routes to Europe. 
 
-- CLIMATE CHANGE:  Kazakhstan fully supports the Copenhagen 
conclusions and will work to modernize its technologies and 
to reduce emissions. 
 
DOYEN ASKS FOR DIPLOMATIC CLUB BUILDING 
 
3.  (SBU) The doyen of the diplomatic corps, Azerbaijan's 
Ambassador Latif Dandilov, gave the official response, noting 
 
ASTANA 00002190  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
that all but seven of the bilateral and multilateral 
diplomatic missions accredited to Kazakhstan have now moved 
from Almaty to Astana.  Because of the size of the diplomatic 
community -- over 50 missions -- he asked President 
Nazarbayev to donate a building in Astana for a Diplomatic 
Club. 
 
PROTOCOL PRECEDENCE 
 
4.  (SBU) Presidential protocol reserved the front row of the 
middle section of the audience for, from President 
Nazarbayev's right to left, the ambassadors from Ukraine, the 
United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan (the doyen), Russia, and the 
United States. 
 
NAZARBAYEV LOOKED HALE AND HEARTY &#
x000A; 
5.  (SBU) Although some continue occasionally to speculate 
about Nazarbayev's physical health and mental acuity, he 
strode firmly to the platform and looked perfectly fine.  He 
seemed a bit bored with his prepared remarks, but once he 
finished them and began his extemporaneous comments, he 
became much more animated, for example, joking that the seven 
"hold out missions" in Almaty should move to Astana soonest. 
"It's much more healthy here in Astana than in Almaty -- with 
our temperature today of (-23 F), there can't possibly be one 
germ or microbe left alive in this city!"  Following the 
official convocation, Nazarbayev spent 45 minutes in the 
receiving line at the not-extravagant buffet, and had 
personal words for each ambassador and international 
representative.  He told the Ambassador he was especially 
grateful for the tone of the recent letter from Secretary 
Clinton, and he asked the Ambassador to extend his personal 
invitation to her to visit Kazakhstan at her earliest 
convenience. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2168, KAZAKHSTAN: HU JINTAO’S PIPELINE DIPLOMACY SUCCESS

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2168.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2168 2009-12-22 01:02 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2301
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2168/01 3560102
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220102Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7018
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2266
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1629
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2330
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1824
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1674
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002168 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET SOCI CH RS TX KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  HU JINTAO'S PIPELINE DIPLOMACY SUCCESS 
 
REF:      A.  BEIJING 3326 
      B.  ASTANA 2095 
  C.  ASTANA 1775 
  D.  ASTANA 1035 
 
ASTANA 00002168  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Prior to Chinese President Hu Jintao's December 
12 visit to Kazakhstan, the media touted Kazakhstani and Chinese 
positive expectations for the visit, as well as reports of a 
demonstration in protest of a Chinese initiative to lease 
Kazakhstani farmland.  As expected, both leaders praised bilateral 
relations and advocated expanded cooperation during the visit.  On 
December 12, Presidents Nazarbayev and Hu formally opened the 
Kazakhstan-China pipeline, and then Hu and the presidents of 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan inaugurated the entire 
Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline -- the first in the region to 
completely bypass Russia -- on December 14 in Turkmenistan (ref A). 
Chinese news media reported that Nazarbayev praised China's policies 
in Xinjiang in the wake of July events, which, if accurately 
reported, could be a subtle shift towards an official policy more 
openly supportive of China's central government on Uighur issues 
(ref B).  Hu's highly celebrated visit indisputably underscored the 
importance of Kazakhstani-Chinese relations, and the concerns many 
Kazakhstanis feel about increasing Chinese activity in Kazakhstan's 
economy.  END SUMMARY. 
 
GREAT EXPECTATIONS -- FOR HU'S VISIT... 
 
3.  (SBU) On December 10, on the eve of Chinese President Hu 
Jintao's visit to Kazakhstan, Chinese Ambassador to Kazakhstan Cheng 
Guoping told the press the visit would emphasize rapidly advancing 
cooperation in the non-resource sector.  He cited 10 ongoing 
projects and 40 under development, specifically highlighting the 
intensive implementation of an aluminum smelter in Pavlodar oblast. 
Cheng Guoping also said China and Kazakhstan planned to sign 
cooperation agreements on finance, wind power, the pharmaceutical 
industry, agriculture, and cement production, and announced Hu's 
plan to attend the commissioning ceremony for the first branch of 
the Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline.  (NOTE:  Just before Hu's visit, 
Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev ratified an August 2007 bilateral 
agreement on construction and operation of the Kazakhstan-China Gas 
Pipeline.  END NOTE.) 
 
...BUT DEMONSTRATORS PROTEST AGAINST CHINESE LAND DEAL 
 
4.  (SBU) Despite the generally positive expectations for the visit, 
a group of Kazakhstani intellectuals organized a December 11 protest 
in front of the Chinese Consulate General in Almaty against the 
allocation of one million hectares of land allegedly requested by 
China for agricultural needs.  The influence of China in Kazakhstan 
arouses strong emotions, primarily of wariness and concern, among 
Kazakhstani interlocutors (reftels).    Because no officials from 
the Consulate talked to the protesters or accepted their petition, 
the group announced their plan to mail the original to the Chinese 
Consulate, with a copy to the Kazakhstani Presidential 
Administration.  During the visit, Kazakhstan's Minister of 
Agriculture Akylbek Kurishbayev said bilateral talks did not address 
the question of China's leasing of land. 
 
NAZARBAYEV AND HU PRAISE NEW STAGE OF RELATIONS 
 
5.  (SBU) During Hu's December 12 visit, as expected, both leaders 
praised bilateral relations and advocated expanded cooperation. 
President Nazarbayev extolled the role of China in strengthening 
security and maintaining stability in the region and world. 
Nazarbayev also thanked China for its loan to develop the 
Kazakhstani economy during the crisis period.  He praised the 
"good-neighborly" and "trust-based" nature of bilateral relations, 
noting the visit was Hu's fifth to Kazakhstan and the 18th meeting 
between Hu and Nazarbayev in seven years.  Finally, Nazarbayev said 
the countries are "witnessing a new stage of implementing 
strategically important joint economic projects."  (NOTE:  China's 
economic clout in Kazakhstan is undeniably increasing rapidly.  In 
2008, bilateral trade turnover exceeded $17.5 billion, and China 
 
ASTANA 00002168  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
became the leading destination for Kazakhstani exports, absorbing 
13.5% of Kazakhstan's total exports.  China also became Kazakhstan's 
second largest source
of imports behind Russia, accounting for 24.3% 
of Kazakhstan's total imports.  END NOTE.) 
 
6.  (SBU) Chinese President Hu Jintao advanced five proposals to 
further develop bilateral relations, including maintaining close 
high-level contacts, expanding cooperation in the energy sector 
through joint pilot projects an in non-raw materials sectors, and 
stepping up implementation of projects using China's $10 billion 
loan.  Hu also urged strengthening cooperation in the financial 
sector, as well as in the fields of humanities and culture. 
Nazarbayev thanked China for providing an additional $3.5 billion to 
Kazakhstan to create non-resource sector joint ventures.  During 
Hu's visit to Astana, Kazakhstan and China signed documents on 
cooperation in the fuel and energy sector, including a loan 
agreement on upgrading an Atyrau oil refinery, an agreement between 
the Samruk-Kazyna national welfare fund and China Guangdong Nuclear 
Power on the joint development of renewable energy resources, and a 
memorandum of understanding on financing the second section of the 
Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline. 
 
NAZARBAYEV TO LEARN CHINESE? 
 
7.  (SBU) During the visit, Nazarbayev and Hu watched a cultural 
performance of music and dances by students from Kazakhstan's 
Eurasia University Confucius Institute.   According to press 
reports, Hu asked about the origins of the students and the 
institute's activities, while Nazarbayev showed great interest in 
learning the Chinese language, and even asked whether he could 
become a student at Astana's Confucius Institute.  Hu declared 
China's willingness to expand cooperation with Kazakhstan in 
science, technology, education, culture, sports and tourism, and 
announced a decision to double the number of Kazakhstani students on 
Chinese government scholarships to 200 per year. 
 
PRESIDENTS TURN ON THE KAZAKHSTANI-CHINA GAS PIPELINE 
 
8.  (SBU) In the visit's main event, Presidents Nazarbayev and Hu 
initiated the pumping of gas in the Kazakhstan-China pipeline, by 
pushing a button in the KazMunaiGas (KMG) headquarters in Astana 
(ref A).  (NOTE:  The Kazakhstan-China Gas Pipeline (KCGP) is part 
of the $20 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CAGP) project, which 
will transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to China through 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  END NOTE.)  The first section includes 
two parallel pipelines totaling 1300 kilometers in length. 
Kazakhstan plans to complete its part of the pipeline by June 2010. 
The main contractors of the project are Kazakhstan's KazStroyService 
and CPPE (China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering).  KazMunaiGas 
subsidiary, KazTransGas, and the Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline Company 
Limited, with shareholders CNODC and PetroChina, established the 
50-50 owned Asian Gas Pipeline Company in 2008 to implement and 
oversee the project.  The pipeline's initial capacity will be 4.5 
billion cubic meters of gas per year, but total capacity is expected 
to eventually reach 30 billion cubic meters.  Experts predict gas 
supplies to China will begin at 13 billion cubic meters and increase 
to 30 billion cubic meters by the end of 2013.  The pipeline will 
reportedly satisfy a significant portion, perhaps up to a third, of 
China's increasing demand for natural gas.  The pipeline will extend 
from China's western Xinjiang province to its large eastern cities, 
including Shanghai. 
 
FOUR PRESIDENTS INAUGURATE FIRST PIPELINE TO BYPASS RUSSIA 
 
9.  (SBU) On December 14, Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev, along 
with Chinese President Hu, President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, 
and Turkmenistan's Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, attended an 
inauguration ceremony and formally commenced gas shipments from 
Turkmenistan to China via the 1,833-km pipeline (ref A).  (NOTE: 
The pipeline is the first major Central Asian gas route to 
completely bypass Russia, breaking a stranglehold maintained since 
the 19th century.  END NOTE.) 
 
NAZARBAYEV PRAISES CHINA'S HANDLING OF EVENTS IN XINJIANG? 
 
 
ASTANA 00002168  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
10.  (SBU) Kazakhstani Uighurs did not protest Hu's visit. 
According to China's official news outlet, Xinhua, Nazarbayev 
declared that China and Kazakhstan have made concerted efforts in 
the fight against the "three evil forces of terrorism, separatism, 
and extremism," cracking down on drug trafficking and other 
cross-border crimes.  Xinhua also reported that Nazarbayev agreed 
with China's handling of the July 5 incident in Urumuqi in northwest 
China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and said "China's efforts 
were necessary to maintain stability in Xinjiang, and were good for 
stability in Kazakhstan."  Kazakhstani official sources and media, 
significantly, did not report these alleged quotes from Nazarbayev. 
Bolat Dzhaksygaliyev, a specialist in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs' Asia and Africa Department, told PolOff that he personally 
prepared Nazarbayev's talking points for Hu's visit, and denied that 
such remarks were expected. 
 
11.  (SBU) COMMENT:  If accurately reported, these statements would 
have been the most explicit comments of support for China's handling 
of the July and August events in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR), which had previously stirred up significant concern 
in Kazakhstan's Uighur community.  Kazakhstani political scientists 
had previously told Emboffs that the central government has been 
cooperating with the Chinese government, and certainly sympathizes 
with the Chinese government's concern about Uighur aspirations for 
more autonomy.  However, the government has been careful to make 
very vague statements in support of stability and maintaining 
inter-ethnic harmony, without clearly praising or criticizing the 
government's actions (ref B). 
 
12.  (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED:  The prominent media attention and 
wide scope of the visit underscore the importance of 
Kazakhstani-Chinese relations.  Senior Kazakhstani officials, 
businessmen, and politicians have expressed concern over China's 
growing influence in the economy -- particularly Kazakhstan's 
natural resources -- and have discussed potentially limiting Chinese 
investments (refs C-D).  Nonetheless, cash and political support 
from China, without bothersome political conditionalities, continue 
to flow, making this ambivalent relationship worthy of continued 
close attention.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2163, KAZAKHSTAN: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2163.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2163 2009-12-21 09:13 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1703
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2163/01 3550913
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210913Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7015
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2263
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1626
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2327
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1821
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1671
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002163 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT (RHONDA SHORE), SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, AND NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER EFIN KCRM KHLS AEMR ASEC KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
ASTANA 00002163  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Kazakhstan continued to aggressively combat 
domestic terrorism and extremism, and took tangible steps to 
continue cooperation and information sharing with various countries 
and international organizations.  Kazakhstan also continued to 
strengthen its engagement in international counterterrorism 
activities.  Kazakhstan detained and prosecuted suspected 
terrorists, and promoted domestic counterterrorism activities.  The 
government of Kazakhstan designates 16 groups as banned terrorist 
and extremist organizations.  The full text of Post's 2009 Country 
Report on Terrorism is attached in paragraphs 3-9.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (SBU) Kazakhstan continued to aggressively combat domestic 
terrorism and extremism.  Kazakhstan's Ministry of Interior 
announced in the press on January 10 that Ministry of Interior 
troops have new responsibilities related to the fight against 
terrorism under a new military doctrine, and the Ministry held an 
anti-terror exercise in January.  Nationwide media also announced 
that in August the National Security Committee (KNB), and the 
Ministries of the Interior, Defense, and Emergency Situations held 
anti-terror exercises at the international trade port in Aktau. 
(NOTE:  Aktau is Kazakhstan's largest port on the Caspian Sea and an 
important shipping site in the transportation of oil from Kazakhstan 
to Azerbaijan and Russia.  END NOTE.)  On August 28, Kazakhstan's 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed two acts to counter terror 
funding, specifically laws "On countering money laundering and 
financing terrorism," and "On making amendments and addenda to some 
legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on issues of 
countering money laundering and financing terrorism." 
 
4.  (SBU) Kazakhstan's cooperation with the United States included 
its hosting of a September 29-October 1 Legislative Drafting Expert 
Workshop on Counter-Terrorism.  During the seminar, Kazakhstani 
legal experts from both houses of Kazakhstan's Parliament, the 
General Prosecutor's office, and the Customs Control Committee 
reviewed Kazakhstan's counter-terrorism legislation, based on advice 
from U.S. and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
experts.  During FBI Director Robert Mueller's November 17 visit to 
Astana, Kazakhstan's Prosecutor-General's Office and the U.S. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) signed a memorandum of 
understanding, stating the parties intend to cooperate in the fight 
against organized crime and money laundering.  Mueller also met with 
then-KNB Chairman Amangeldy Shabdarbayev, who agreed to intensify 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism and extremism.  Room for 
improvement remains in Kazakhstan's cooperation with the United 
States.  Kazakhstani government agencies have typically provided 
limited information on domestic terrorism cases and generally do not 
provide contextual information on cases reported by the press. 
 
5.  (SBU) Kazakhstan has continued to detain and prosecute suspected 
terrorists.  The press reported five cases in which individuals were 
detained or sentenced for acts of terrorism, including the 
following: 
- In February, Kazakhstani press reported it detained an extremist 
group in Uralsk for distributing extremist religious literature, 
robbing a local gas station, and fighting with local police. 
- On April 16, the KNB press service announced that two Almaty 
courts sentenced five members of the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir religious 
extremist group to various prison terms.  In closed trials, the 
courts found the accused guilty of "inciting enmity" and "organizing 
activities of banned organizations" under Kazakhstani Criminal Code 
Articles 164 Part 2 and 337-1 Part 2. 
- On September 22, local press reported that the Astana City police 
detained a 23-year-old Uzbek citizen without identification.  After 
an investigation determined he was wanted by Uzbek law-enforcement 
agencies on suspicion of carrying out terrorist activities, the 
police arrested him, pending an extradition decision. 
- On September 24, nationwide media published an article stating 
that an Aktobe Province court sentenced six local people to 12-17 
years in prison for terrorism.  According to the press, the group 
intended to punish foreign investors and announce the jihad against &#x000
A;infidels.  The six alleged terrorists reportedly planned to blow up 
oil companies' facilities in the region and possessed sufficient 
 
ASTANA 00002163  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
arms and explosives. 
- On December 2, Kazakhstan's Prosecutor General's Office announced 
that an Uralsk court sentenced a local resident to two years in 
prison for propagating terrorism.  The court asserted that during 
May-December 2008, the man "incited residents to take part in 
terrorist acts, and propagated terrorism by spreading materials of 
extremist content," in particular, video recordings of Said 
Buryatskiy, a propagandist of radical Islam. 
 
6.  (SBU) In addition to the arrest and prosecution of terrorists, 
the government of Kazakhstan fined several individuals for carrying 
out illegal religious activity and banned over 200 forms of 
"extremist propaganda." 
- On January 20, the Zhambyl Police Department's press service 
publicized that a regional court fined three men for promoting the 
religious practices of the banned Tablighi Jamaat organization. 
- On February 26, the Atyrau Prosecutor's Office announced that a 
Western Kazakhstan region court fined another six members of the 
Tablighi Jamaat religious organization for carrying out illegal 
missionary activities. 
- On September 18, the Saryagash Region court in Southern Kazakhstan 
fined an additional seven missionaries for "propagating tendentious 
teachings of Islam," as an administrative violation of Kazakhstan's 
"Law on Freedom of Faith and Religious Organizations." 
- An Astana court also banned the import and distribution of more 
than 200 books, audio records, and leaflets.  In August, 
"Kazakhstanskaya Pravda," an official newspaper, published a list of 
all items the Astana court designated as extremist. 
 
7.  (SBU) To prevent radicalization and support other domestic 
counterterrorism initiatives, Kazakhstan actively promoted 
intercultural and religious dialogues.  Most notably, Kazakhstan 
hosted the third triennial Congress of World and Traditional 
Religions in Astana July 1-2.  Many of the 400 participants -- 
representing Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, and other 
religious confessions -- praised Kazakhstan for its accomplishment 
in maintaining and promoting inter-confessional harmony. 
Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev has personally promoted 
inter-religious harmony by issuing congratulatory messages on 
religious holidays, which many Kazakhstani residents celebrate, such 
as Orthodox Christmas and Easter, and Eid al-Fitr.  During the 
October 26 opening session of the Kazakhstan People's Assembly 
(KPA), Nazarbayev also suggested the creation of a doctrine on 
national unity.  Nazarbayev advocated the doctrine focus on the 
shared priorities of Kazakhstan and the KPA, particularly 
multi-confessional concord.  During a November 12 visit to Astana, 
Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) Marc Perrin de Brichambaut said he believes 
Kazakhstan can serve as an example of the construction of 
interethnic and interfaith relations.  Subsequently, the Chairman of 
Kazakhstan's Senate, Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev, announced on December 3 
Kazakhstan's development of a program on the maintenance of 
interethnic and interfaith harmony within Kazakhstan's OSCE 2010 
chairmanship. 
 
8.  (SBU) Kazakhstan also continued to strengthen its engagement in 
international counterterrorism activities.  On February 11, 
Nazarbayev ratified a 2007 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
agreement to actively advance cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism and extremism.  On November 19, SCO members also signed a 
protocol in Almaty to confirm the scheduling in September 2010 of an 
antiterrorism exercise, "Peaceful Mission-2010," in Kazakhstan.  The 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) held an anti-terror 
drill in Aktau in October, with participation from various 
Kazakhstani security forces.  In addition to its activities within 
the framework of the SCO and CSTO, Kazakhstan also continued to 
participate in international nonproliferation groups, such as the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 
 
9.  (SBU) In Kazakhstan, organizations -- typically referred to as 
"terrorist" groups -- are divided into extremist organizations and 
terrorist organizations.  The government of Kazakhstan currently 
designates 16 banned groups.  The Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) group remains 
 
ASTANA 00002163  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
the only organization designated and outlawed as "extremist" under 
the "Law on Extremism."  The list of 15 terrorist organizations 
remains unchanged since 2008. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2162, KAZAKHSTAN: NUR OTAN’S LIBERAL DEMOCRAT?

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2162.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2162 2009-12-21 05:12 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1519
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #2162/01 3550512
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 210512Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7013
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2261
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1624
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2325
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1259
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1669
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1819
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002162 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2009 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR KDEM OEXC SCUL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  NUR OTAN'S LIBERAL DEMOCRAT? 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 2148 
 (B) ASTANA 2141 
 (C) ASTANA 0431 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Yerlan Karin, the secretary of the President's 
ruling Nur Otan party, is not shy about criticizing the policies of 
his party and the government.  A former think-tanker who came to the 
government because he became tired of "criticizing from the 
sidelines," Karin openly assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Kazakhstani political system.  He also freely verbalizes views far 
more liberal than those usually heard from high-level officials. 
This cable aims to paint a portrait of one "liberal" in President 
Nazarbayev's circle.  END SUMMARY. 
 
POLITICAL SCIENTIST FIRST... 
 
2. (C) The 33-year-old Yerlan Karin came to politics from academia. 
A graduate of Kazakh State University with a degree in political 
science, Karin began his career as a researcher and analyst and ran 
his own think tank, the Central Asian Agency for Strategic Research, 
from 2000 to 2003.  He entered politics in 2003 as the first deputy 
chairman of the now-defunct Asar party of President Nazarbayev's 
daughter, Dariga. He then began a two-year stint as an advisor of the 
Mangistau oblast akim (governor).  In 2008, Karin joined the 
Presidential Administration as the head of the Internal Policy 
Department.  In November 2008, he moved to his current position as 
one of two party secretaries of the Nur Otan party.  Despite his 
official responsibilities, Karin continues his analytical pursuits -- 
he told the CDA on December 5 (ref A) that he is finishing a book on 
the role of security forces in policy formation, with publication 
expected in January. 
 
... POLITICIAN SECOND 
 
3. (C) Karin explained that he moved from academia to politics, 
because he "got tired of criticizing (government policy) from the 
side-lines."  Karin's think-tanker background easily permeates 
conversation, especially in his frank and objective assessment of 
Kazakhstan's political reality.  He was surprisingly open in his 
criticism of both the Nur Otan party -- "It lacks a platform, it 
tries to be all things to all people" -- and of the government -- "It 
works in isolation, setting priorities without consultation."  At the 
same time, he sees party politics as the best "school of democracy," 
asserting, "It teaches you to negotiate, consult, face criticism." 
He aims to make Nur Otan more responsive to citizens' concerns, 
stating, "Policy that does not have public support is useless." 
Interestingly, Karin puts little stock in the power of the 
parliament, dismissing the parliamentarians as "talking heads." 
Although Karin clearly enjoys his work at Nur Otan, he does not plan 
to stay in politics permanently.  He told the CDA he intends to 
return to political studies "in the near future." 
 
LIBERAL ON POLICY 
 
4. (C) In the course of a free-flowing conversation with the CDA, 
Karin voiced opinions far more liberal than those usually heard from 
high-level Kazakhstani officials.  Karin believes that human-rights 
defender Yevgeniy Zhovtis was not treated equally under the law when 
he was sentenced to four-years of imprisonment for vehicular 
manslaughter (ref B), citing an example of a mid-level government 
official who received a suspended sentence for a similar crime.  He 
sharply criticized the trial balloon that was floated several months 
ago, supported by his own party, to make President Nazarbayev 
President-for-Life.  In his view, "the clans [geographic and economic 
power groups] will hatch clandestine plots, and the opposition will 
plot a revolution" if the option for a peaceful power-transfer is not 
available. 
 
5. (C) Karin was equally critical of the disproportionate libel suit 
that forced opposition newspaper "Taszhargan" to close (ref C).  A 
damage award of one tenge (less than 1 USD) "would have proven the 
point without making the government look vengeful," he assessed. 
Karin's views appear guided by a genuine wish that the government's 
actions be perceived as fair, just, and beyond reproach.  "These 
blunders open us to criticism," he argued.  Karin claimed he voices 
these opinions privately to his colleagues at the Ak Orda 
(Presidential Administration) and sometimes publicly to the media. 
 
ASTANA 00002162  002 OF 002 
 
 
"Periodically, I get a whack on the head," he joked. 
 
STRONG ON NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
6.  (C) Karin, an ethnic Kazakh, has strong fe
elings on the issue of 
Kazakh identity and culture.  "The identity question is coming to the 
fore" in Kazakhstan, and Nur Otan is sidestepping this 
highly-sensitive, but important, question, criticized Karin.  Like 
many Kazakhs, Karin is ambivalent about the President's Doctrine of 
National Identity, which calls for a development of a "civil" -- 
rather than ethnic -- Kazakhstani identity.  "Kazakhs must feel 
themselves the building blocks of this nation, the first among 
equals," he pressed.  He presented the CDA with a book on the history 
of Alash Orda, the autonomous Kazakh government that existed between 
the collapse of tsarist Russia and the establishment of Soviet 
Kazakhstan.  Among the portraits of Alash Orda members that line the 
entry way to his office, he readily pointed to the one of Alikhan 
Bukaykhanov, the leader who "personally negotiated with Lenin on the 
status of Soviet Kazakhstan."  (NOTE:  By comparison, the only 
portrait of President Nazarbayev was a small calendar on Karin's 
desk.  END NOTE.)  For Karin, Alash Orda was Kazakhstan's "first 
experience with democracy."   He lamented the lack of knowledge and 
acknowledgement of this period in Kazakhstan's history. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  Karin is a true intellectual who exemplifies the 
"liberal" wing of Kazakhstani political elite, with whom we are 
actively engaging -- Karin will travel on an International Visitor's 
program in February.  A young, well-educated official, he is honest 
about the shortcomings of Kazakhstan's political system but 
nevertheless committed to its improvement.  Although surprising at 
first that someone with such liberal views would be leading the 
President's Nur Otan party, it shows President Nazarbayev's pragmatic 
approach to power -- it is easier to work with the keenest young 
liberal minds than against them.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2161, KAZAKHSTAN PUSHES FOR OSCE SUMMIT WITH A/S BLAKE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2161.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2161 2009-12-19 12:10 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1075
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2161/01 3531210
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191210Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7011
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2259
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1622
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2323
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1257
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2630
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2925
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1817
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1667
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002161 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN PUSHES FOR OSCE SUMMIT WITH A/S BLAKE 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 2141 
 (B) ASTANA 1978 
 (C) ASTANA 2159 
 
ASTANA 00002161  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat 
Saudabayev and President Nazarbayev's foreign policy advisor Kairat 
Sarybai separately pressed Assistant Secretary Blake for U.S. 
support for a 2010 summit of the Organization for Cooperation and 
Security in Europe (OSCE).  Blake noted that the United States is 
looking for assurances any summit would have a substantive outcome. 
He also noted that progress in all three OSCE dimensions, 
preservation of ODIHR,  as well as progress on Kazakhstan's domestic 
human-dimension issues, particularly the Zhovtis case, would help 
garner support for a Summit.  Sarybai argued that Zhovtis was 
treated equally under the law, and Saudabayev urged for him to apply 
for a presidential pardon.  Both stressed that a high-level U.S. 
visit to Kazakhstan or a bilateral meeting between Presidents Obama 
and Nazarbayev in Washington would signal the "deepening mutual 
relationship" between the United States and Kazakhstan.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
OSCE SUMMIT 
 
3.  (SBU) In separate December 15 meetings with Assistant Secretary 
of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake, State 
Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev and President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev's foreign policy advisor Kairat Sarybai pressed for the 
United States to support a 2010 OSCE summit.  Both thanked the 
United States for its agreement to include a summit reference in the 
Athens Ministerial final declaration.  Saudabayev welcomed U.S. 
input on possible topics.  Blake reminded both that the OSCE 
Permanent Council must certify the achievement of sufficient 
progress in all three dimensions before deciding on a summit.  He 
suggested to Saudabayev that Kazakhstan ensure improvement in the 
OSCE human dimension, defend the mandate of the Office of Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and expand OSCE's role in 
Afghanistan in order to garner the necessary support.  He noted that 
the potential summit topic of a new European security structure 
would likely meet resistance and that substance focused on 
Afghanistan would be "much better."  Saudabayev acknowledged the 
difficulty of addressing the security architecture of Europe at a 
summit, and noted that Afghanistan will likely be the only topic in 
the end.  Blake underlined that a summit not preclude the annual 
Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM).  Saudabayev 
passionately reassured Blake that the "HDIM would go on as planned. 
We fully support ODIHR's work," he argued.  "It is the organization 
that keeps us all moving forward." 
 
ZHOVTIS CASE "CASTS A SHADOW" 
 
4.  (SBU) A/S Blake noted to both interlocutors that progress on 
Kazakhstan's domestic human-dimension issues, particularly the case 
of prominent civil-society activist Yvgeniy Zhovtis, also would help 
garner support for the summit (ref A).  "The case casts a shadow" on 
Kazakhstan's OSCE ambitions, said A/S Blake.  Sarybai firmly argued 
that Zhovtis' international stature should not warrant special legal 
treatment.  "He was treated as 'citizen Zhovtis'," said Sarybai.  He 
highlighted the government's Human Rights Action Plan as proof of 
"Kazakhstan's steady progress" towards democracy. 
 
5.  (SBU) Saudabayev agreed with Blake that "[the Zhovtis affair] is 
the last thing [Kazakhstan] needs."  The penal colony is "not 
letting a fly land on Zhovtis, but he continues to cause 
controversy," complained Saudabayev.  (NOTE:  Zhovtis was officially 
sanctioned twice for refusing to accept jobs offered by the 
penal-colony administration (ref A).  END NOTE.)  One way to resolve 
the case is for Zhovtis to ask for a presidential pardon, said 
Saudabayev.  "You can help by convincing (Zhovtis) to apply," he 
asserted, adding that he would personally assure the Pardon 
Commission reviewed the case quickly.  "It can be done by the end of 
this year."  (NOTE:  Zhovtis' lawyers have told us that Zhovtis 
refuses to apply for a pardon, because it would require him to admit 
his legal guilt, which he denies (ref B).  END NOTE.) 
 
ASTANA 00002161  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Blake also suggested that decriminalization of libel in 
Kazakhstan and implementation of the human rights national action 
plan would help convince the United States of Kazakhstan's sincerity 
in making progress domestically.  Noting his productive meeting with 
civil society representatives in Almaty (ref
C), he recommended that 
Saudabayev consider meeting civil society groups in the United 
States on the margins of the Annual Bilateral Consultations in 
February.  Saudabayev welcomed the idea, and said he would follow up 
with his Ambassador in Washington. 
 
PUSH FOR HIGH-LEVEL ENGAGEMENT 
 
7.  (SBU) Both Saudabayev and Sarybai pressed for a bilateral 
meeting between Presidents Obama and Nazarbayev on the margins of 
the April Global Nuclear Security Summit and highlighted that a 
high-level U.S. visit would signal a "deepening mutual 
relationship."  Saudabayev noted that China's President Hu Jintao 
travelled to Kazakhstan twice in the past year, and Russia's 
President Medvedev has visited "incalculable times" since taking 
office.  President Nazarbayev has never wavered in his partnership 
with the United States, argued Saudabayev.  A bilateral meeting in 
Washington or President Obama's visit to Kazakhstan would "prove the 
strength of the relationship."  Blake responded that resolution of 
some issues discussed could encourage high-level visits. 
 
8.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The Athens Ministerial declaration has given a 
major boost to the Kazakhstanis' hopes for a summit just as they 
prepare to take over the OSCE chairmanship.  They continue, 
sincerely we believe, to seek our support and guidance to turn this 
wish into a reality.  The Zhovtis case, however, casts a shadow over 
Kazakhstan's ambitions.  Although Foreign Minister Saudabayev seems 
to fully grasp the optics, his hope that Zhovtis will apply a pardon 
is unrealistic.  Despite sincere concern in some quarters, we see no 
evidence that Kazakhstan will undercut the OSCE's human dimension 
during their chairmanship.  Continued positive engagement on our 
part will help to ensure that Kazakhstan's words become reality. 
END COMMENT. 
 
9.  (SBU) A/S Blake cleared this cable. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2160, KAZAKHSTAN: DFM UMAROV DETAILS HIS DISSIDENT PAST TO A/S

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA2160.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2160 2009-12-19 03:15 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0984
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #2160/01 3530315
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 190315Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7009
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2257
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1620
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2321
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1255
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2923
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1815
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1665
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2628

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002160 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S, D, P, SCA/CEN, INR/B, EUR/RPM, DRL 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM KNNP SOCI OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DFM UMAROV DETAILS HIS DISSIDENT PAST TO A/S 
BLAKE 
 
ASTANA 00002160  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  A/S Robert Blake concluded his successful 
three-day visit to Kazakhstan with an elegant but relaxed dinner 
hosted by Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov on December 15. 
Umarov revealed in great detail his personal journey from Soviet 
anti-nuclear dissident in the 1980s to senior diplomat today. 
Umarov explained why he believes the opposition plays an important 
role in society and expressed hope for strengthened high-level 
contacts.  Blake and Umarov pledged to work through the tough issues 
on our bilateral agenda.  It is remarkable that Umarov was so open 
in front of the most junior officers from his Foreign Ministry's 
Americas Desk, and indicates where Kazakhstan could go in its 
democratic evolution.  This kind of "hospitality evening" is 
essential for building trust and will pay dividends as Blake and 
Umarov lead our Annual Bilateral Consultations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SOVIET-ERA ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT SHAPED UMAROV 
 
3.  (SBU) Umarov warmly welcomed Assistant Secretary of State for 
South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake and the other U.S. 
guests to his elegant table in a private room at the Rixos hotel. 
After initial pleasantries, Umarov began a long meditation on his 
evolution from Soviet-era anti-nuclear dissident to senior 
international diplomat.  He said that he was inspired to join the 
anti-nuclear movement in the dying days of the USSR because of the 
genuine outpouring of popular anguish over increased deformities in 
children and contamination in livestock and products from the 465 
nuclear tests that the Soviet Union had conducted near Semipalatinsk 
on the territory of what became independent Kazakhstan.  Umarov said 
he supported the Semei-Nevada International Anti-Nuclear Movement, 
founded by the Kazakhstani activist and poet (now Kazakhstan's 
ambassador to UNESCO) Olzhas Suleimenov.  He added that the 
Semei-Nevada movement is where he developed his respect for the 
opposition.  "We need them to hold us accountable and sharpen our 
minds." 
 
LINGUISTIC SKILLS CREATE A DIPLOMAT 
 
4.  (SBU) By 1996 Umarov had become a trade unionist, but his 
intellectual talents and excellent English-language skills brought 
him to the attention of Kanat Saudabayev, then head of the fledgling 
nation's consular service.  According to Umarov, Kazakhstan had no 
embassies at that time, but he accepted Saudabeyev's offer to join 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as its 18th officer.  In those early 
days Umarov sometimes served as President Nazarbayev's translator, 
and Nazarbayev, taking a shine to the young man, told him about the 
weight of responsibility he felt in taking the uncertain nation into 
its independence.  Nazarbayev told Umarov that he wanted Kazakhstan 
to be known not just for its leadership on nuclear weapons -- after 
all they had not chosen for the weapons to be in the country -- but 
for its economic and social progress.  In the face of staunch 
opposition from "red directors" and a "red parliament" to his 
proposed reforms, Nazarbayev had the constitution amended to permit 
more private investment, and for that, Umarov gave him real credit. 
 
 
PRAISE FOR SECRETARY CLINTON - PAST AND PRESENT 
 
5.  (SBU) Throughout the evening, Umarov returned to praise the 
United States and its role in Kazakhstan's evolution.  State 
Secretary-Foreign Minister Saudabayev expressed appreciation for the 
Secretary's Independence Day message, and Umarov's staff wanted to 
make sure we received Saudabayev's letter of appreciation to 
Secretary Clinton (NOTE:  Pouched to the Department.  END NOTE). 
Umarov praised former U.S. Ambassadors Elizabeth Jones and Larry 
Napper, who had pressed to move the U.S. Embassy to Astana, 
Kazakhstan's new diplomatic capital, noting that many other 
countries had dragged their feet on this controversial move. 
 
6.  (SBU) On a more personal note, Umarov warmly remembered his 
first contacts with Hillary Clinton during her 1996 visit to 
 
ASTANA 00002160  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Kazakhstan as America's First Lady.  Umarov had served as the 
interpreter during Mrs. Clinton's tour of the Almaty museum.  He was 
impressed with her genuine interest in Abai Kunanbayev 
(Qunanbayuli), Kazakhstan's great intellectual hero, k
nown as 
"Abai."  Umarov was doubly impressed when the next day the First 
Lady repeated some of the guide's words about Abai in her public 
comments.  Umarov said he became a fan forever when he received U.S. 
Presidential cuff links from the First Lady, which he still 
cherishes.  Umarov was especially pleased when Blake said that 
shortly after his swearing in, he had suggested to Secretary Clinton 
that she read "Apples are From Kazakhstan," the travelogue that 
offers an insightful picture of the country's historical, political, 
and cultural landscape.  Blake noted, to Umarov's delight, that the 
Secretary had praised it and recommended it to those around her, 
including her senior staff and her spouse. 
 
7. (SBU) COMMENT:  "Hospitality dinners" are essential in this 
political culture, because that is where the trust is forged to 
solve problems and achieve results.  Umarov is one of Kazakhstan's 
best up-and-coming diplomats, and he skillfully used the dinner to 
build the personal relationships that are key to advancing 
Kazakhstan's agenda and our interests, and that will pay off when he 
and Blake lead our Annual Bilateral Consultations.  He highlighted 
his government's key themes:  the desire for high-level engagement 
with the United States, more recognition of its non-proliferation 
legacy, the historical role of civil society even in 
pre-independence Kazakhstan, and the intellectual and social 
mobility that exists in this intriguing society.  The warm tone of 
the evening and the several toasts -- to Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, to her possible visit, to Kazakhstan's independence, and to 
the "free people of Kazakhstan" -- showed the government's earnest 
desire to strengthen its strategic partnership with the United 
States in every forum and at every level.  Equally intriguing to us 
was Umarov laying out his personal history and praising the 
constructive role of the opposition before the members of the MFA'S 
Americas Desk, including its most junior officers.  END COMMENT. 
 
8. (SBU) A/S Blake has cleared this cable. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks