Monthly Archives: February 2010

10ASTANA278, KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON U.S. VIEWS FOLLOWING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA278 2010-02-26 10:08 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0278 0571008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261008Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7562

UNCLAS ASTANA 000278 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN AND ISN/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP IR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON U.S. VIEWS FOLLOWING 
IRAN'S DECISION TO ENRICH URANIUM TO 20% 
 
REFTEL:  STATE 15979 
(SBU) PolOff delivered the talking points (reftel) on U.S. views 
following Iran's decision to enrich uranium to twenty percent via 
diplomatic note to Ontalap Onalbayev, Chief of the Middle East 
Division of the Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA276, KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON DESIGNATION OF FOUR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA276 2010-02-26 10:01 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0276 0571001
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261001Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7560

UNCLAS ASTANA 000276 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN, T, TREASURY, and NEA/IR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PARM EFIN MNUC KNNP IR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON DESIGNATION OF FOUR 
ENTITIES AND ONE INDIVIDUAL RELATED TO IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY 
GUARD CORPS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 13382 
 
REFTEL:  STATE 15554 
(SBU) PolOff delivered the talking points (reftel) on the designation 
of four entities and one individual pursuant to Executive Order 13382 
via diplomatic note to Ontalap Onalbayev, Chief of the Middle East 
Division of the Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
HOAGLAND

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10ASTANA275, KAZAKHSTAN: MINISTER OF JUSTICE PRAISES COOPERATION WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA275 2010-02-26 10:00 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4198
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #0275/01 0571000
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261000Z FEB 10
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7557
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2545
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
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RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1505
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJL/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
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RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2732
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3022
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000275 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, DRL, INL/AAE, G/TIP 
 
E.O. 12958: 02/26/2030 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI SNAR KDEM KTIP KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  MINISTER OF JUSTICE PRAISES COOPERATION WITH 
THE UNITED STATES, SUPPORTS AMNESTY FOR PRISONERSS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (B), (D) 
 
REFTEL:  ASTANA 00272 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On February 25, the Ambassador met with Minister of 
Justice Rashid Tusupbekov to discuss ongoing legal reforms and the 
possibility of a general amnesty that could include jailed prominent 
Kazakhstani human rights defender Yevgeniy Zhovtis.  Tusupbekov 
praised cooperation with the United States on judicial education, and 
countering human and narcotics trafficking.  He underlined 
Kazakhstan's commitment to "humanizing" and reforming its legal 
system, and said he had submitted a recommendation for an August 30 
amnesty, including for those who have committed "less grave crimes" 
(like Zhovtis).  He promised to support the U.S. request for Helsinki 
Commission staffers to visit Zhovtis in early March, and said 
Kazakhstan will continue to work closely with the United States on 
the annual trafficking in persons report and the bilateral Science 
and Technology Agreement.  Tusupbekov closed the meeting by noting 
that Kazakhstan's cooperation with the United States is very 
important, and said a bilateral meeting between President Obama and 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev in Washington in April, if it takes 
place, "could lead to opportunities for further cooperation."  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE WORKING TO HUMANIZE THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
2.  (SBU) Initially, adopting a formal style, the Minister of 
Justice, Rashid Tusupbekov, opened his first meeting with the 
Ambassador by enumerating a his Ministry's responsibilities and 
goals.  According to Tusupbekov, President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
instructed the Ministry to improve the quality of their legislative 
work, improve conditions for businesses to operate, and humanize the 
penitentiary system. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN DENOUNCES SOVIET LEGACY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
 
3.  (SBU) Tusupbekov spoke with conviction about the social and 
economic costs to Kazakhstan of the Soviet legacy of overly punitive 
legislation and sentencing, which he asserted are a legacy of the 
Soviet system.  The Minister noted that Kazakhstan's penitentiary 
system is currently responsible for over 100,000 convicts, about 
40,000 of whom are serving non-jail sentences.  Tusupbekov stated 
that the Kazakhstani Government established an inter-agency 
commission to reform the law enforcement system, in which his 
Ministry participates actively.  He asserted that his Ministry is 
committed to "humanization and decriminalization" of the 
law-enforcement system, and said he plans to liberalize Kazakhstan's 
criminal code, reduce the number of crimes punished by jail 
sentences, and replace them with more humane types of punishment, 
such as fines and corrective labor.  Tusupbekov said these steps will 
reduce the size of the prison population, and alleviate the burden on 
the prison administration. 
 
4.  (SBU) Tusupbekov listed recent accomplishments, including the 
opening of five new "international-standard" facilities, that 
replaced Soviet-style barracks housing with cells.  Finally, 
Tusupbekov noted that United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture 
Manfred Novak, who will present his report on his May 2009 visit to 
Kazakhstan to the United Nations Human Rights Commission next month, 
said Kazakhstan is making good progress. 
 
AMBASSADOR REITERATES U.S. SUPPORT FOR KAZAKHSTAN'S REFORMS 
 
5.  (SBU) In response, the Ambassador praised the Ministry of Justice 
for its commitment to legal reforms, and thanked the Ministry for 
supporting the bilateral Judicial Education Program that is training 
257 judges and 600 judicial sector personnel on commercial law.  The 
Ambassador noted that during INL Assistant Secretary David Johnson's 
 
ASTANA 00000275  002 OF 003 
 
 
December 2009 visit, Deputy Foreign Minister Umarov said Kazakhstan 
would welcome U.S. assistance on legal reform, and asked how the 
United States could further assist in supporting the Ministry's legal 
reforms.  In addition, the Ambassador asked Tusupbekov how the U.S. 
Government might be able to help the U.S.-Kazakhstan Legal 
Association
 that Kazakhstan's Ambassador to the United States, Erlan 
Idrissov, is working to establish. 
 
CONSTITUTION DAY AMNESTY FOR ZHOVTIS? 
 
6.  (SBU) In response to the Ambassador's query about a possible 
general amnesty this year, Tusupbekov confirmed that he had forwarded 
his recommendation to grant amnesty to approximately 20,000 prisoners 
convicted of "less grave crimes" to the Parliament and the 
President's Cabinet.  According to Tusupbekov, the amnesty would have 
a positive social impact, since it would also include female convicts 
with young children, war veterans, the disabled, and juvenile 
offenders.   Tusupbekov said that in his recommendation, he suggested 
that it would be appropriate if the amnesty coincided with the 
fifteenth anniversary of the adoption of Kazakhstan's Constitution 
(August 30).  However, Tusupbekov said the amnesty is now "a 
political decision" that will be made by the Parliament and the 
Cabinet. 
 
MINISTER PROMISES PERSONAL SUPPORT ON ACCESS TO VISIT ZHOVTIS 
 
7.  (SBU) The Ambassador thanked Tusupbekov for granting PolOff 
permission to visit Yevgeniy Zhovtis in Ust-Kamenogorsk on February 
24 (reftel), and noted that it would be very helpful for bilateral 
relations if the Penitentiary Committee could approve the Embassy's 
pending request for two staffers from the Helsinki Commission of the 
U.S. Congress to visit in early March.  In reply, Tusupbekov said he 
would do his best to make it happen. 
 
MINISTER SAYS POLITICAL PARTY LEGISLATION WILL FOLLOW THE LAW 
 
8.  (SBU) The Ambassador raised the case of the Alga Party, currently 
seeking registration under ratified amendments to the political party 
law, commenting that he hoped this case will be resolved quickly and 
in full accordance with the new law.  Tusupbekov said his Ministry 
will comply with the court ruling, whatever it may be. 
 
COUNTERING NARCOTICS AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
 
9.  (SBU) The Ambassador thanked the Ministry of Justice for its 
cooperation on countering narcotics and human trafficking, and said 
we want to continue this positive work.  In particular, the 
Ambassador congratulated Kazakhstan for opening its first 
government-supported trafficking in persons shelter in September 
2009.  Tusupbekov thanked the U.S. Government for helping on these 
critical issues, in particular, certain training programs. 
Tusupbekov mentioned that the INL-sponsored travel of a Kazakhstani 
delegation headed by Vice Minister Kusdaveltov to Italy was very 
useful.  Tusupbekov noted that the Cabinet recently established a 
three-year, 3 million tenge project to support NGOs and maintain a 
call center for TIP victims.  Tusupbekov added that the government 
will also provide 3 million tenge for a shelter, 6 million tenge for 
media campaigns against TIP, and 5 million tenge for a rehabilitation 
center.  He said his Ministry also utilized a $350,000 U.S. grant to 
provide training to prosecutors and judges. 
 
10.  (SBU) In relation to drug trafficking, which Tusupbekov 
acknowledged is a serious problem for Kazakhstan, especially because 
it is a transit country for Afghan opiates, Tusupbekov said he hopes 
that Kazakhstan's inter-agency Commission on Law Enforcement will 
approve a proposal to set up a separate agency, similar to agencies 
his experts observed in Russia, to combat drug trafficking. 
Tusupbekov encouraged the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency to open an 
 
ASTANA 00000275  003 OF 003 
 
 
office in Almaty, telling the Ambassador that the United States, with 
its extensive experience, would be a good partner in combating this 
evil. 
 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT 
 
11.  (C) The Ambassador also raised the issue of the bilateral 
Science and Technology Agreement, the final English text of which the 
Kazakhstani Government is reviewing.  Tusupbekov said that since 
there is a possibility that President Nazarbayev and President Obama 
might meet in Washington in April, it would be in our mutual best 
interests to have the agreement ready, and directed his staff 
accordingly.  Tusupbekov underscored that the Ministry of Justice 
recognizes the benefit to Kazakhstan from cooperation with the United 
States, and added, "if a meeting between our Presidents takes place, 
it could lead to opportunities for further cooperation."  (NOTE:  In 
fact, the Ministry of Education and Science has not yet transmitted 
the draft to the Ministry of Justice.  END NOTE.) 
 
12.  (C) COMMENT:  Throughout the meeting, the Minister was 
well-briefed and very engaged, taking notes, and nodding approval 
during the Ambassador's remarks.  Tusupbekov also appeared to be a 
proactive team-player, for instance, clarifying during the meeting 
which of his subordinates would follow up on key topics, including 
access to visit Zhovtis, and facilitating exchange of information for 
the Trafficking-in-Person's Report and the Science and Technology 
Agreement.  In a sometimes top-down culture, the Minister's 
willingness to permit subordinates to work directly with the Embassy 
is most welcome.  END COMMENT.

Wikileaks

10ASTANA272, KAZAKHSTAN: ZHOVTIS UNDERSTANDABLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT REFORM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA272 2010-02-26 09:09 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4116
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0272/01 0570909
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O 260909Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7552
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2543
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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1934
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2087
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000272 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  ZHOVTIS UNDERSTANDABLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT REFORM 
 
REF: A) ASTANA 0109 
 B) ASTANA 0184 
 C) 09 ASTANA 2197 
 
ASTANA 00000272  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  PolOff visited internationally known human rights 
activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis at the minimum-security penal colony in 
Ust-Kamenogorsk on February 24.  Zhovtis summarized his view of the 
possibilities for the resolution of his case, including the Supreme 
Court, an amnesty, or parole.  He said he would consider applying for 
a Presidential pardon, but only as a last resort.  If he is forced to 
apply for a pardon, Zhovtis said he would leave Kazakhstan for good. 
He asserted to PolOff that Kazakhstan's political and legal system 
"has become unpredictable," and he believes that it must be 
"dismantled and rebuilt."  He urged the international community to 
"respect your principles" and publicly criticize Kazakhstan when 
necessary.  Zhovtis said life in the penal colony is akin to Soviet 
army barracks:  the convicts follow a strict daily schedule for rest 
and meal times but are allowed to interact somewhat freely with the 
outside world.  END SUMMARY. 
 
OPTIONS FOR RESOLUTION 
 
2. (SBU) PolOff visited human rights activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis on 
February 24 at the minimum-security penal colony outside 
Ust-Kamenogorsk.  During the two-hour meeting, which was carefully 
transcribed by two penal-colony officials present in the room, 
Zhovtis said that he sees four possible resolutions to his case.  One 
is for the Supreme Court to annul his four-year sentence without 
vacating the guilty verdict (ref A).  "This would be the easiest 
option," according to Zhovtis.  The second is for the government to 
grant a general amnesty in 2010 for crimes of lesser gravity, like 
the one for which Zhovtis was convicted.  (NOTE:  Minister of Justice 
Rashid Tusupbekov told the Ambassador on February 25 that he proposed 
to the government an amnesty in 2010, but indicated that the ultimate 
decision will be with the Presidential Administration and the 
parliament (septel).  END NOTE.)  The third option is to be paroled 
before his four-year sentence expires.  Zhovtis noted, however, that 
he would not be eligible for parole until early 2011, when Kazakhstan 
will no longer be Chairman of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  The fourth is to request a 
Presidential pardon, which would require Zhovtis to admit his legal 
guilt.  Zhovtis said that if the first three legal options fail and 
he is forced to request a pardon, he would leave Kazakhstan for good 
upon his release. 
 
OFFICIALS "BLINDLY" FOLLOW ORDERS 
 
3.  (SBU) Zhovtis maintained that he is considering emigrating from 
Kazakhstan because "the system has become unpredictable."  Instead of 
following established rules, he argued, officials "blindly" follow 
orders from their direct supervisors, even if that means breaking the 
law.  He cited his own case as an example.  Zhovtis and his 
co-inmate, journalist Toniyaz Kuchukov, who was convicted for a 
similar crime at the same time as Zhovtis, are the only two convicts 
at the penal colony not allowed to leave the premises or find work 
outside the colony.  Zhovtis alleged that the colony administrators 
told him they had "orders from Astana" to keep him "isolated."  "Any 
attempt to argue reason (with the administration) would backfire and 
lead to a clamp-down on the whole colony," Zhovtis maintained.  He 
said his request to see an outside dentist when he developed a 
serious toothache languished for three weeks.  "At one point, they 
brought a Soviet-era dental chair into the auditorium with the idea 
that I would undergo treatment there," he related, "but of course I 
refused."  The administration eventually agreed to let him see a 
dentist outside, "with two guards in tow."  "Logic does not apply 
here," he ruefully observed. 
 
"THE SYSTEM IS NOT WORKING" 
 
4.  (SBU) Zhovtis argued that the political and legal system "is not 
working at all."  "I have realized here (at the penal colony) that 
attempts at (political) reform are useless, the system needs to be 
completely dismantled and rebuilt."  Zhovtis confided that he is not 
sure what direction to take his NGO Human Rights Bureau after his 
release.  One of the NGO's main tasks is to lobby the government for 
legislative reform that would bring Kazakhstan's laws in line with 
international standards.  But, he said, if those laws are not 
followed, then reform attempts are "futile.  I am not sure how to fix 
 
 
*********************** 
* Missing Section 002 * 
***********************

Wikileaks

10AQNA272, KAZAKHSTAN: ZHOVTIS UNDERSTANDABLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT REFORM

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10AQNA272 2010-02-26 09:09 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4118
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0272/02 0570909
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7553
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2544
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 AQNA 000272 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  ZHOVTIS UNDERSTANDABLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT REFORM 
 
*********************** 
* Missing Section 001 * 
*********************** 
 
 
ASTANA 02260272  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
this," he continued.  Zhovtis asserted that he fully understands the 
motivations behind "the political war" Mukhtar Ablyazov launched 
against President Nazarbayev's powerful son-in-law Timur Kulibayev. 
"Maybe this is the way to get results," he said.  (NOTE:  Ablyazov, 
the ousted former chairman of Bank Turam Alem (BTA) in self-imposed 
exile in London, has publicly accused Kulibayev of receiving major 
kick-backs from the Chinese for oil contracts signed in 2003-2005 
(ref B).  END NOTE.) 
 
"RESPECT YOUR PRINCIPLES" 
 
5. (SBU) Zhovtis offered the following advice to the international 
community.  "Lose your illusions," he said.  "This system will not be 
reformed quickly."  Secondly, he urged Western countries to "respect 
yourself and your principles" and to criticize Kazakhstan openly when 
such criticism is deserved.  He underlined that he was not speaking 
about his case specifically, but about the Internet law, the privacy 
law, and the trial against former director of Kazatomprom Mukhtar 
Dzhakishev (ref C).  He asserted that a new generation of 
Kazakhstanis was growing up in a "culture of legal nihilism.  What 
you (the diplomatic community) do and say behind closed doors 
certainly plays a role," he asserted, "but regular people only know 
what they see in the media." 
 
LIFE IN THE COLONY 
 
6. (SBU) On his living conditions, Zhovtis said the penal colony is a 
mix "between Soviet army barracks and a young pioneer camp."  He said 
he sleeps in a large dormitory with 69 other convicts.  Everyone must 
get up at 6 am, go to bed at 9:30 pm, and have their meals at 
strictly appointed times.  Most convicts perform manual jobs outside 
the penal colony, except for Zhovtis and Kuchukov, who have been 
given jobs as warehouse keepers on the compound.  There are no 
computers on the compound, even in the administrative offices, but 
the administration allows visitors to bring newspapers for the 
convicts.  (NOTE:  The guards also let PolOff bring a large stack of 
U.S. magazines for Zhovtis, although they carefully flipped through 
each one.  END NOTE.)  According to Zhovtis, opposition newspapers 
"Respublika," "Svoboda Slova," and independent newspaper "Vzglyad" 
are readily available and widely read.  Zhovtis' wife, who was in 
Ust-Kamenogorsk at the same time as PolOff, and his lawyer Vitaliy 
Voronov are able to visit him fairly frequently.  Zhovtis seems to be 
well-regarded by the guards and penal colony administration. 
 
7. (SBU) COMMENT: Zhovtis seemed to be in generally good spirits, 
although he is, understandably, deeply disillusioned with 
Kazakhstan's legal system.  The fact that he would consider leaving 
Kazakhstan for good, albeit only if he is forced to apply for a 
pardon, is jarring news, and it would be a serious blow to 
Kazakhstan's civil society development.  Nevertheless, Zhovtis is 
still hopeful that the Supreme Court will likely issue a positive 
decision in his case.  His lawyer filed a motion for review on 
January 27, and the Supreme Court was supposed to decide by February 
27 whether to accept the case for review.  That review period was 
extended indefinitely, however, when the court requested further 
documentation from the lower courts.  If the Supreme Court does 
accept the case, it must issue a verdict within a month.  In the 
meantime, the Kazakhstani authorities seem eager to showcase their 
transparency and are open to letting the international community 
visit Zhovtis.  Though the approval process for this visit was 
sluggish (it took six weeks), that could change as other diplomatic 
missions apply for permission to visit.  We have requested permission 
for two Helsinki Commission staffers to visit Zhovtis when they are 
in Kazakhstan March 2-10.  European missions in Astana are also 
considering sending a representative within the next month.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA271, KAZAKHSTAN: WEEKLY SPOT-REPORT DIGEST, FEBRUARY 22-26

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA271 2010-02-26 08:10 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4058
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2540
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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1886
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2592
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RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2727
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3017
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2082
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2353

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000271 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, ISN, EEB, INL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON EPET ENRG SOCI SENV KNNP KCOR
KZ 
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  WEEKLY SPOT-REPORT DIGEST, FEBRUARY 22-26 
 
ASTANA 00000271  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (SBU) This weekly cable disseminates spot reports based on 
Embassy conversations with contacts as well as reports from the 
Kazakhstani media.  Our goal is to draw attention to information 
that might not merit a full cable report or that will be developed 
later. 
 
MAJOR POLICY DEVELOPMENTS:  HOLBROOKE VISITS ASTANA 
 
2.  (U) February 23.  Local media reported that U.S. Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke 
visited Astana where he met with Kazakhstan's State 
Secretary/Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev.  During their meeting, 
the officials discussed cooperation between Kazakhstan and the 
United States, including issues related to bilateral and 
multilateral collaboration.  Saudabayev summarized Astana's 
priorities as OSCE Chairman, including the stabilization process in 
Afghanistan, which is one of its key priorities.  The two sides also 
discussed the agenda for the upcoming meeting of President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev with President Barack Obama during Nazarbayev's visit to 
the Global Nuclear Security Summit.  (COMMENT:  The press reports 
that seem to confirm an Obama-Nazarbayev meeting are premature.  END 
COMMENT). 
 
POLOFF VISITS HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ZHOVTIS 
 
3.  (SBU) February 24.  Poloff travelled to a penal colony outside 
Ust-Kamenogorsk to visit imprisoned human rights activist Evgeniy 
Zhovtis.  According to Poloff, he is in relatively good spirits and 
seems to be on good terms with the prison administration.  Zhovtis 
said that he sees four possible resolutions to his case:  1) the 
Supreme Court annuls the lower court's sentence without overturning 
its guilty verdict; 2) he is granted amnesty in March, May, or July; 
3) he is released before his four-year sentence expires (NOTE: 
Zhovtis is not technically eligible for parole until early 2011, 
when Kazakhstan will no longer be OSCE Chairman-in-Office.  END 
NOTE); 4) he requests a Presidential pardon.  Zhovtis told Poloff 
that if the first three legal options fail and he is forced to 
request a pardon as a last resort, he will leave Kazakhstan for good 
upon his release.  Zhovtis also said that he is eager for outside 
news and welcomes outside visitors.  The two-hour conversation was 
carefully transcribed by two prison officials who were present at 
the meeting. 
 
MINISTER OF JUSTICE DISCUSSES THE ZHOVTIS CASE 
 
4.  (SBU) February 25.  The Ambassador met with Minister of Justice 
Rashid Tusupbekov to discuss the possibility of an amnesty for 
crimes of lesser gravity (which would include Zhovtis).  Tusupbekov 
said he submitted his recommendation supporting an amnesty to 
Parliament and the Presidential Administration for consideration. 
The Ambassador thanked Tusupbekov for allowing PolOff to visit 
Zhovtis, and requested the Minister's support for the Embassy's 
request to allow two Helsinki Commission staffers to visit Zhovtis 
as well.  Tusupbekov also discussed Kazakhstan's legal reform 
strategy and ongoing bilateral cooperation on judicial matters. 
Tusupbekov expressed appreciation for U.S. government assistance, 
including the Judicial Education Program, and support of Kazakhstani 
efforts on counter-narcotics and counter-trafficking in persons. 
While underscoring his Ministry's commitment to continue to work 
closely with the United States, Tusupbekov also asserted that if a 
meeting between Presidents Obama and Nazarbayev takes place in 
April, it could "open up new opportunities for further 
cooperation." 
 
MAJOR MILESTONES: BN-350 DECOMMISSIONING PROGRAM 1/12TH COMPLETE 
 
5.  (SBU) February 19.  The deputy director of the National Nuclear 
 
ASTANA 00000271  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
Center of Kazakhstan told Department of Energy office director that 
the spent fuel shipment portion of the BN-350 decommissioning 
program "is now 1/12th complete."  Eleven shipments remain, each 
with five casks, all which will be stored at the Baikal-1 storage 
facility before the end of 2010.  Moreover, the 30th of 60 spent 
fuel casks was staged at the rail head in Aktau, marking the halfway &
#x000A;point of the spent fuel preparation activities.  Both Baikal-1 
storage and MAEK-Kazatomprom BN-350 reactor personnel plan held 
celebrations marking the event. 
 
DUPONT'S EXPANSION IN KAZAKHSTAN 
 
6.  (SBU) February 22.  Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) 
representatives met with Dupont to discuss possible areas of 
business expansion including the food processing and packaging, and 
construction sectors.  Dupont reports increased sales during the 
economic crisis of their safety products, primarily purchased by the 
extractive sectors.  Finally, as a result of their meeting requested 
by the Ministry of Trade at the November 2009 Investment Forum in 
New York, Dupont and the government are in talks regarding ways to 
increase presence of the company's Pioneer line of plant genetics. 
 
MFA SIMPLIFIES VISA REGIME 
 
7.  (U) February 22.  The Kazakhstan TV Channel and Commercial 
Television of Kazakhstan (KTK) reported that Kazakhstan's MFA has 
promised to simplify its visa procedure starting March 1.  Foreign 
diplomats and employees of international organizations will not need 
visas, just official MFA accreditation.  A new type of visa, called 
an "exit visa," will apply to foreigners who have lived in 
Kazakhstan for a long time and decide to go back home, or have lost 
their passports while in Kazakhstan, or have been deported.  Foreign 
missionaries arriving in Kazakhstan to promote religious ideas will 
have to apply a special "missionary visa." 
 
FROM THE WIRES IN KAZAKHSTAN:  A "RESPUBLIKA" BY ANY OTHER NAME 
 
8.  (U) February 23.  The editors of the opposition newspaper 
"Respublika" and related newspapers ("Golos Respubliki," "Respublica 
Business Review") held a press conference on February 22 to protest 
against what they see as pressure from the authorities on 
independent newspaper printers to stop printing or selling 
"Respublika" and any of its related papers.  The editors described 
several instances when independent printers declined to print their 
newspapers.  For example, the director of a printing house in 
Karaganda contracted by "Respublika" was summoned to the mayor's 
office, shortly after which he declined to print the newspaper. 
According to the editors, these incidents have intensified after a 
February 18 ruling by the Medeu Judicial Administration, which 
ordered all printing houses and other organizations to transfer any 
payments received from "Respublika" to a depository account of the 
Judicial Administration, to be turned over to BTA Bank as 
compensation for the newspaper's debt. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN'S PLANS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT REFORM 
 
9.  (SBU) On February 23, LegAtt and INL met with Alik Shpekbayev, 
Head of the Law Enforcement Section of the Presidential 
Administration, to discuss the government's plans for law 
enforcement reform.  Shpekbayev said the Presidential Administration 
is collecting, analyzing, and summarizing information on law 
enforcement systems in neighboring countries, especially Georgia, 
Armenia, the Baltic States, and the Russian Federation.  He asked 
for information about the law enforcement structure in the United 
States at all levels, including the jurisdiction of each agency and 
interaction and cooperation between agencies; the prison system, 
including alternative sentencing and how the United States manages a 
 
ASTANA 00000271  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
large prison population; basic and in-service training; crime 
statistics and how databases are maintained; performance criteria; 
and standards for determining the number of officers needed by a 
specific agency in a specific area.  When asked about the time frame 
for developing and implementing a reform plan, Shpekbayev said, "the 
sooner, the better."  INL said it would provide materials on the law 
enforcement structure in the United States and consider the 
possibility of study visits and IVLPs to the United States.  The 
Legal Attache offered to provide information on crime statistics and 
joint task forces in the United States and offered to facilitate 
study visits. 
 
FORMER DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE SENTENCED 
 
10.  (U) February 25.  Former Deputy Minister of Defense Kazhimurat 
Mayermanov was sentenced to 11 years in prison after being convicted 
of corruption, abuse of office, and bribe-taking, according to the 
Military Prosecutor's Office.  The court also convicted Israeli 
citizen Boris Sheinkman of fraud and bribery, sentenced him to 11 
years in prison, and confiscated his property.  In addition, the 
former acting commander of Kazakhstan's Rocket and Artillery Forces 
received a seven-year prison sentence on charges of abuse of office 
and was stripped of his military rank of colonel.  Mayermanov, who 
oversaw the Defense Ministry's research and development projects, 
was arrested on April 10, 2009, for allegedly signing unauthorized 
contracts worth $82 million with Sheinkman, who represented Israeli 
defense firms IMI and Soltam Systems.  Journalists were not allowed 
to attend Mayermanov's trial.  Partly as a result of this case, the 
Ministry of Defense has expressed a preference for using Foreign 
Military Sales channels rather than direct dialogue with 
Western/U.S. companies to procure systems such as C-130 aircraft. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA270, KAZAKHSTAN: SECOND PREPARATION MEETING FOR THE 2010

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA270 2010-02-26 08:05 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4053
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0270/01 0570805
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7547
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2538
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1884
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2590
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1498
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2724
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3014
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RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2080
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2351

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000270 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, OES, OES/S 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON PGOV SENV SOCI TSPL KPAO KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  SECOND PREPARATION MEETING FOR THE 2010 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 
 
REF: 09 Astana 02139 
 
ASTANA 00000270  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  Astana hosted the Second Advisory Council Meeting in 
Preparation for the Ministerial Conference on Environment and 
Development (MCED) to be held in Astana in 2010.  This year's MCED 
will focus on "green growth."  The meeting presented the MCED's 
projected schedule, which will include senior official meetings, 
ministerial meetings, side events and exhibitions.  The organizers 
want to include business and NGOs as partners and participants.  The 
MCED will have a dedicated website for interested parties to 
register online after April 15.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SECOND ADVISORY COUNCIL MEETING 
 
2.  The Kazakhstan Ministry of Environment, along with the United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP) and the Central Asian Regional Environmental Center (CAREC), 
hosted the Second Advisory Council Meeting on Preparation for the 
Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development (MCED) to be 
held in Astana in 2010.  This meeting follows the First Advisory 
Council Meeting, which took place in Astana on November 24, 2009 
(see reftel).  Ministry of Environmental Protection Department of 
Legal Policy and International Cooperation Director Alexander Bragin 
opened the Council meeting by saying that the Central Asia region is 
in a uniquely geopolitical position to further advance the process 
of European and Asian Pacific integration.  Kazakhstan, as 
Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) in 2010, has particular responsibility to promote 
sustainable economic development.  He said the MCED coincides with 
Kazakhstan's own plans to achieve sustainable development. 
Kazakhstan has already prepared allocated funds for the MCED and 
several parallel activities, and is fully committed to ensuring that 
the MCED will be a success.  Bragin said Kazakhstan's business 
community has also made a sizeable commitment, with the top 40 
enterprises collectively investing $1.2 billion toward sustainable 
development last year. 
 
MCED SCHEDULE OUTLINE 
 
3.  ESCAP Environment and Development Division Director Li Shaoyi 
reminded attendees that the MCED has met every five years since 
1985.  The MCED serves as a forum for all 62 member countries to 
review the status and trends of each member state's environment and 
economic development, assess progress, opportunities, and challenges 
in implementing their prior commitments, identify additional 
priorities, and formulate future agendas. 
 
4.  Li said this year's MCED objectives are to secure a commitment 
to sustainable development, assess progress to date, reduce existing 
gaps in implementing commitments, define the priorities and areas 
for cooperation, and focus on promoting "green growth."  He said 
sustainable development is the primary development strategy for the 
Asia and Pacific region, along with the sustainable use of 
resources, low carbon development, and a sustainable urban 
development strategy.  He stressed the latter, noting that many 
Asian cities have strained and overcrowded urban environments and 
uncontrolled growth. 
 
5.  Li outlined the MCED September 27-October 2 draft schedule, with 
the first three days for the Senior Official Segment, the last two 
days for the Ministerial Segment, and a day off in between.  The 
Senior Segment will deliberate policy and review and approve 
documents, and the Ministerial Segment will have ministerial 
statements and reports and the adoption of Senior Officials' 
reports.  In addition, there will be side events and a roundtable on 
environmental protection and economic development. 
 
MCED INVOLVES GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
6.  Central Asian Regional Environmental Center (CAREC) Executive 
Director Talaybek Makaev said the MCED will include an inter-sector 
dialogue on green growth between government, business, and civil 
society.  It will have exhibitions and expositions as side events 
 
ASTANA 00000270  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
running concurrently.  Themes will include "green and competitive," 
global and local (GloCal) green growth, sustainable ecological 
systems, green infrastructure, green decision-making, and civil 
society and green growth.  The MCED will also include a day of 
excursions and an evening reception for all representatives.  There 
will be a su
stained media campaign to highlight the event and 
broadcast it to the public. 
 
7.  CAREC's Program Manager Gulzhamal Issayeva presented MCED's new 
website, located at http://www.mced6.org, which will become active 
on March 15 in English and Russian.  Interested parties can register 
online for the MCED after April 15.  It will contain MCED 
publications from the conference and other relevant information. 
 
8.  COMMENT:  It is important that Astana will host the next MCED in 
2010, not only because it is the first time for a Central Asian 
country, but also because it highlights UN, OSCE, and European 
thoughts on Kazakhstan's rising status and leading role in Central 
Asia.  Coinciding with Kazakhstan's 2010 Chairmanship of the OSCE, 
it enhances its image as a country actively promoting sustainable 
development.  The United States is a member of MCED and will most 
likely send a delegation to Astana for the event.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA268, KAZAKHSTAN: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE’S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA268 2010-02-26 05:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3934
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #0268 0570526
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 260526Z FEB 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7545
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2537
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2081
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1928

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RPM, NEA, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2059 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR AF KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE'S 
MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MASIMOV, FEBRUARY 21 
 
REF: ASTANA 0267 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (U) This is an action request, see paragraph 5. 
 
2.  (C) Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan 
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met with Prime Minister Karim 
Masimov in Astana on February 21.  Deputy Foreign Minister 
Kairat Umarov and MFA Americas Director Askar Tazhiyev, as 
well as the Ambassador, attended the 30-minute meeting that 
was followed by a 50-minute Holbrooke-Masimov one-on-one. 
Masimov warmly welcomed Holbrooke and thanked him for 
visiting Kazakhstan, noting Astana's desire for more, and 
more frequent, very high-level meetings. 
 
3.  (C) In the 30-minute meeting, Holbrooke: 
 
-- pressed for Kazakhstan to move quickly to grant the U.S. 
request for a north-south overflight route to supply U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan; 
-- made clear that the withdrawal of some U.S. troops from 
Afghanistan that would begin in July 2011 should not be 
interpreted as a sign that the United States is wavering on 
its commitment to Afghanistan.  He said we would not repeat 
the mistakes of 1989, after the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, when the United States abandoned Afghanistan and 
curtailed our relationship with Pakistan.  Holbrooke said, 
"We are not leaving!" 
 
4.  (C) During the 50-minute one-on-one, Holbrooke and 
Masimov discussed the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), the 
possible OSCE summit, the U.S. request for north-south 
overflight, our request for armored but not weaponized 
wheeled military vehicles (MATVs) to transit Kazakhstani 
territory via the Northern Distribution Network, and the need 
to release imprisoned human rights activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis. 
 In a discussion of possible sequencing of moves, Holbrooke 
said that, at a minimum, Kazakhstan should approve the 
north-south overflight request before the NSS.  (NOTE:  In a 
subsequent meeting (reftel), State Secretary-Foreign Minister 
Kanat Saudabayev revealed that approval to transit MATVs 
would be one of the deliverables Nazarbayev would take prior 
to the NSS.  END NOTE.)  Masimov expected Zhovtis to be 
released after the proposed Obama-Nazarbayev meeting 
presumably in the general amnesty expected in the summer. 
 
5.  (C) ACTION REQUEST:  Also, Masimov told Holbrooke that at 
the request of former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, he 
will visit Lebanon and Jordan in March.  Holbrooke said he 
would ask NEA to provide, through Amb. Hogland, background 
papers for the Prime Minister,s trip.  (COMMENT:  It is 
unusual for Masimov to travel officially outside of 
Kazakhstan, and even more so for him to undertake a 
diplomatic mission.  We will also follow up with the Israeli 
Embassy in Astana.  END COMMENT). 
 
6.  (U) Ambassador Holbrooke has cleared this cable. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA267,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA267 2010-02-26 05:19 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3929
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
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FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7542
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RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2078
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1925

Zhovtis worth less to the opposition out of jail than in jail – Wikileaks
 
Almaty. April 12. KazTAG – Kazakhstani human rights activist Evgeny Zhovtis worth less to the opposition out of jail than in jail, according to the documents received by KazTAG from Wikileaks.
“SRAP R. Holbrooke told Saudabayev that the imprisonment of human rights activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis is one of the pressing issues affecting Kazakhstan's bilateral relationship with the United States. He told Saudabayev that Zhovtis has become a symbol for the opposition in Kazakhstan, “a fact that he certainly understands and exploits.” Holbrooke said that if Zhovtis could be released by presidential pardon, that would reduce his symbolic value, since "he is worth less to the opposition out of jail than in jail”, reads the cable from the US embassy in Kazakhstan to State department on February 26, 2010.
On Zhovtis, Saudabayev agreed that “neither you nor we need this problem”. But he said that this is an issue of principle. "We must respect the independence of our judicial system," he said. "If we make an exception to the law for Zhovtis," he claimed, "then 200 others with similar sentences will demand to be released from prison as well. They are watching to see if the government of Kazakhstan will be pressured into releasing Zhovtis." He also said that as a human rights activist, "Zhovtis never came under any political pressure" to cease his activities. Saudabayev said that Zhovtis unfortunately killed a man, was tried and sentenced by a court of law, and now must serve his four-year sentence. According to Saudabayev, "the law worked exactly the way it was designed." 
Attempting to draw a parallel, Saudabayev added that he admired the "persistence" of the U.S. judicial system in its persistent attempts to get film director Roman Polanski, "even though he was forgiven by the victim." Holbrooke took strong exception, noting that Polanski fled justice, escaped the law, and has been living free despite his conviction by a U.S. court. 
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev on February 21 to discuss Kazakhstan's support for operations in Afghanistan, including North-South polar-route overflights, the ground transit of wheeled and armored but not weaponized non-lethal military vehicles, Afghan police training, and other bilateral assistance. Holbrooke also strongly urged the government to consider a presidential pardon for imprisoned human rights activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis, discussed Kazakhstan's request for a bilateral meeting with the President in April.

Wikileaks

10ASTANA265, KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE DELIVERED IN SUPPORT OF ANTHONY LAKE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA265 2010-02-24 09:33 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1936
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0265 0550933
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RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2079
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2350

UNCLAS ASTANA 000265 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, OES, OES/S 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEMARCHE DELIVERED IN SUPPORT OF ANTHONY LAKE 
FOR UNICEF 
 
REF: STATE 015084 
 
Per reftel, on February 24, Emboff delivered the demarche to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in support of Anthony Lake to become the 
next Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF).  Post will report any substantive response. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA261, KAZAKHSTAN: CONOCOPHILLIPS ON OIL TRANSPORTATION,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA261 2010-02-23 09:03 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0790
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0261/01 0540903
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230903Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7535
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2530
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1876
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2582
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1490
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2074
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1921
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2343

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000261 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC, S/EEE, S/CIEA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET SOCI AJ TX KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  CONOCOPHILLIPS ON OIL TRANSPORTATION, 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE 
 
REF:  (A) 09 ASTANA 1774 
      (B) ASTANA 0061 
      (C) ASTANA 0198 
 
ASTANA 00000261  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On February 22, ConocoPhillips' John Dabbar 
called on the Ambassador to discuss relations between the Kashagan 
consortium and national oil company KazMunaiGas (KMG), expansion of 
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline, and the role of 
international oil companies (IOC) in the Kazakhstan Caspian 
Transportation System (KCTS).  Dabbar also discussed ConocoPhillips' 
plans in Turkmenistan, the impact of China's energy investments in 
Central Asia, and the investment climate in Kazakhstan.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
KMG TAKES CONTROL 
 
3.  (SBU) John Dabbar (please protect throughout) is the head of oil 
and gas transportation for ConocoPhillips Russia.  He was commercial 
director of the CPC pipeline in 1996, and currently serves on the 
Board of Directors of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
consortium.  He told the Ambassador that Conoco's biggest challenge 
in Kazakhstan in the near term is responding to KMG's "renewed 
interest in gaining control over Kazakhstan's oil export routes." 
 
LEARNING LESSONS FROM TRANSNEFT 
 
4.  (SBU) Dabbar said that KMG or one of its affiliates controls 
every transportation and storage option -- including railways, 
pipelines, storage tanks, and tanker fleets -- and takes advantage 
of every minor transaction to extract maximum value from the IOCs. 
In this manner, Dabbar said, the government can control the price 
and accessibility of oil export routes.  "TK (Timur Kulibayev, 
President Nazarbayev's billionaire son-in-law) figured this out 15 
years ago by watching Transneft's Sergei Yevlakhov operate," Dabbar 
said.  "Now Yevlakhov is suntanned and living large in Monaco."  He 
cited a short, privately-owned rail link in Aktau as a case in 
point, and said that exports via rail or ship from Aktau must 
transit this short rail line, which he said is owned by a small, 
private company.  "I assume TK has an interest in it," he said. 
Dabbar said that if something like this were to happen in the United 
States, Conoco could sue under open-access laws, but that is not 
possible in this region.  "In Russia," he said, "everybody in the 
Ministry of Energy needs a revenue stream and a lever, and sometimes 
they will pull that lever just to remind you that they can." 
 
DE FACTO VETO 
 
5.  (SBU) Dabbar also said that KMG Exploration and Production (KMG 
E&P) generally acts as a commercial equity partner when it votes on 
multi-year development plans, annual budgets, and individual 
contracts.  However, KMG E&P's parent company, national oil company 
KMG, acts as the government's authorized agent and effectively 
exercises veto power over these decisions.  Dabbar warned that this 
could become a "major issue" when the Kashagan consortium votes on 
plans to implement Phase II of the project. 
 
OPTIMISTIC ABOUT CPC EXPANSION 
 
6.  (SBU) Although Conoco is not a member of the CPC consortium, it 
owns 20% of Lukoil, which is a member.  Dabbar confirmed that the 
consortium approved expansion and said that he is more optimistic 
now than at any time during the past 15 years that capacity of the 
pipeline will be expanded.  Dabbar said that there is one additional 
"hold point" in October, when the consortium must vote to approve 
the construction budget, but he does not expect any further 
difficulties.  Dabbar said Conoco welcomes the additional capacity 
that CPC expansion will provide, since it would free up other 
transportation routes for oil from Kashagan and the N Block. 
 
KCTS REALITY CHECK 
 
ASTANA 00000261  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
 
7.  (SBU) On the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS), 
Dabbar said KMG is beginning to understand that the "sweetheart 
deal" they struck with a consortium of French companies is not going 
to play out they way they expected (ref A).  According to Dabbar, 
KMG expected to receive free engineering expertise and soft loans, 
but the French export credit agency has turned out to be as 
hard-nosed as any commercial bank and has asked for collateral in 
the form of shipper guarantees before it pr
ovides project financing. 
 According to Dabbar, "KMG is slowly beginning to understand that 
they must treat us as investors and partners, not just paying 
customers." 
 
LOYALTY PAYS 
 
8.  (SBU) Under KMG president Kairgeldy Kabyldin, Dabbar said, the 
government's position has shifted from allowing the IOCs to acquire 
a minority equity stake in KCTS to insisting on 100% state 
ownership.  Dabbar opined that Kabyldin has always been a strong and 
consistent advocate for government ownership of all oil 
transportation infrastructure on the territory of Kazakhstan.  "I 
have known Kabyldin for 15 years," he said, "since he was a 
mid-level manager at KazTransOil, and he has always been extremely 
loyal.  As a reward, he was named president of KMG and given a nice 
pension package."  Dabbar speculated that powerful members of the 
Mangistau oblast community -- including Vice Minister for Energy and 
Mineral Resources Lyazzat Kiinov -- have a vested interest in 
maintaining 100% state ownership of the $3 billion KCTS project, 
perhaps so they can benefit from investments in land and 
infrastructure. 
 
MAJOR STEP FORWARD 
 
9.  (SBU) Dabbar said that the IOCs took a "major step forward" in 
the last four to six weeks, when they were invited to act as 
technical advisors to KMG and the State Oil Company of the 
Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) for KCTS.  Previously, he said the IOCs 
were "stiff-armed" and shut out of the negotiations, and were told 
the project was strictly a government-to-government affair.  Now 
they have a legitimate reason to be at the table and will be 
involved in shaping the project.  Dabbar said the IOCs can draw upon 
previous feasibility studies and have some influence over the 
design, cost, timing, and sequencing of the project.  "This keeps us 
at the table," he said, "so that when negotiations over financing 
begin, we'll be right there, ready to engage." 
 
HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENT 
 
10.  (SBU) According to Dabbar, the IOCs are more concerned about 
health, safety, security, and environmental issues than they are 
about the cost of KCTS.  In particular, he noted that the Kashagan 
partners are concerned that Kazakhstan has not signed all of the 
protocols of the International Maritime Organization regarding 
oil-spill response.  He added that Kazakhstan is behind Russia and 
Azerbaijan in this regard.  Dabbar said that under ordinary 
circumstances, Conoco would devote resources and staff to clean up 
an oil spill if it affected a third country, but said this would be 
problematic if there were an oil spill in the Caspian Sea that 
drifted to Iran's northern coast. 
 
MOVING FORWARD IN TURKMENISTAN 
 
11.  (SBU) Conoco is moving forward with plans to develop Block 19 
in Turkmenistan's offshore zone, and will send an expatriate country 
manager to Ashgabad on March 1.  Dabbar said that Conoco remains 
interested in exploring Turkmenistan's onshore fields, but admitted 
that the government has made it clear that no onshore fields are on 
offer.  When asked about the likelihood of a trans-Caspian gas 
pipeline, Dabbar said that a "capital P" pipeline to bring gas from 
Turkmenistan's major fields such as Dauletebad would be a "political 
disaster" and would likely encounter resistance from Russia. 
However, he suggested that Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan could 
 
ASTANA 00000261  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
negotiate a project-specific agreement to construct a pipeline from 
one offshore block to another and would have better luck with Moscow 
if the pipeline connected new, rather than existing, fields. 
 
CHINESE INVESTMENTS GOOD FOR KASHAGAN 
 
12.  (SBU) Dabbar said that Chinese investments in oil 
transportation in Kazakhstan were "good for Kashagan" since they 
allow IOCs to sell oil directly to China, and also free up capacity 
for oil exports westward.  In particular, he said that the Eastern 
Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline will pull oil away from the 
Druzhba pipeline to Asia.  "Transneft wants more Kazakh oil to meet 
its annual quota of 15 million tons," he noted. 
 
ATYRAU-SAMARA AN OPTION 
 
13.  (SBU) When asked about the Atyrau-Samara oil pipeline, Dabbar 
said that Conoco considers that a viable export option, despite the 
lack of a quality bank.  He noted that the tariff on the pipeline is 
low and said it offers a competitive price to shipments by rail, 
even with the loss in quality.  "We're not happy about the lack of a 
quality guarantee," he observed, "but that's life.  It's not a 
condition precedent.  You can't always get everything you want." 
 
KAZAKHSTAN'S INVESTMENT CLIMATE 
 
14.  (SBU) Commenting on the changing investment climate in 
Kazakhstan, Dabbar cited an oil industry axiom:  "The deal never 
gets better from the moment you sign the contract.  It only gets 
worse."  He said that the government has carefully scrutinized the 
Kashagan production sharing agreement (PSA), which operates on a 
cost-recoverable basis.  He told the Ambassador that the government 
recently disallowed $4.5 billion out of a total of $5.3 billion in 
reimbursement claims.  Dabbar said the government claimed the 
consortium did not submit the requisite documents along with its 
claim, and said the government claimed that some costs were "more 
than they should have been" (ref B). 
 
15.  (SBU) Conoco is concerned about recent statements calling into 
question the tax stability clauses of existing PSAs (ref C), but 
Dabbar said he did not believe that Kazakhstan would unilaterally 
invalidate existing contracts.  He said it is more likely that the 
government will push to renegotiate the terms of contracts to 
increase tax and royalty revenue and limit cost recovery, for 
example.  "To be honest," he said, "PSAs are used more frequently in 
less stable and more hostile environments.  PSAs are for Burkina 
Faso, not Norway.  And Kazakhstan wants to be treated more like 
Norway." 
 
16.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Success in the oil business -- particularly in 
overseas environments -- requires patience, determination, and a 
commitment to long-term investments and personal relationships. 
Despite the obvious difficulties of doing business in Central Asia, 
ConocoPhillips understands what it takes to succeed in the region 
and remains optimistic about its ability to recover its sizeable 
investments in Kashagan and the N Block.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA260, KAZAKHSTAN: TRANSCRIPT OF S/SRAP HOLBROOKE’S FEBRUARY 21

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA260 2010-02-23 06:50 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0721
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0260/01 0540650
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7533
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2528
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1874
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2580
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1488
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2721
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3011
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2072
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1919
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2077
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2341

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000260 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, S/SRAP, EUR/CARC, EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KPAO GG UZ KG AF KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  TRANSCRIPT OF S/SRAP HOLBROOKE'S FEBRUARY 21 
MEDIA AVAILABILITY IN ASTANA 
 
ASTANA 00000260  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Following his meeting with State Secretary-Foreign Minister 
Kanat Saudabayev, Special Representative for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met briefly with the media. 
Transcript follows. 
 
2.  BEGIN TRANSCRIPT: 
 
Ambassador Holbrooke:  We've just completed some excellent meetings 
here with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan as 
part of a trip to the Central Asian republics.  We talked to all of 
the countries that have a concern in the situation in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan.  That's why we're here today.  Kazakhstan is a very 
important country in its own right in the region and it's also 
directly affected by events in Afghanistan, so it's natural that I 
would come here today to consult with the Kazakhstani government. 
 
"Washington Times":  Sir, did you talk about the question of Russia 
setting up defense agreements with Abkhazia? 
 
Ambassador Holbrooke:  No. 
 
"Washington Times":  May I broach that subject now? 
 
Ambassador Holbrooke:  The subject of Abkhazia and Georgia never 
came up.  I'm not here to talk about those issues.  I'm here to talk 
about Afghanistan.  I'm going from here to Georgia to review the 
Georgian battalion which is going to Afghanistan, but once again my 
trip has nothing to do with Georgian-Russian relations, it's about 
Georgia's extraordinarily important contribution to the 
international effort in Afghanistan. 
 
"Reuters":  Is the United States planning to open a military base in 
Uzbekistan to support its operations in Afghanistan? 
 
Ambassador Holbrooke:  Uzbekistan does provide us valuable 
opportunities to transit material to Afghanistan, and that's 
important.  But a military base?  No.  We have an important transit 
center in Kyrgyzstan - the Manas Transit Center - where many of the 
troops coming in and out of Afghanistan stop, and that's a very 
valuable part of our effort.  We're very grateful to Kyrgyzstan for 
its support in that regard. 
 
"Washington Times":  Sir, you mentioned several times the importance 
of Kazakhstan in the region.  Can you emphasize a little on that, 
and why? 
 
Ambassador Holbrooke:  First of all, Kazakhstan is the largest, 
wealthiest, and most successful country in the region.  It has 
directed a multi-directional foreign policy with great skill, under 
the leadership of President Nazarbayev.  It took decisive and 
historic actions 18 years ago, in regard to nuclear weapons for 
which the world should be eternally grateful.  Kazakhstan, because 
of its location and its history, is poised between several of the 
greatest powers in the world and has managed to work well with all 
of them.  Anyone who knows this region should admire the foreign 
policy conducted by President Nazarbayev. 
 
Secondly, the resources available to Kazakhstan, which are only 
beginning to be tapped, are going to be of immense importance to the 
world and give Kazakhstan an opportunity to emerge as a developed 
nation within a few years, if they manage their resources right. 
Many countries that have had natural resources, particularly oil, 
have been affected by what is called the "oil curse."  The Kazakh 
government is very aware of this and has spent a great deal of time 
studying it and working on ways to prevent it from happening.  I, 
myself, have been involved in some of those efforts when I was a 
private citizen.  I've been here many times.  I think this is my 
seventh trip here -- sixth or seventh trip -- and not just to 
Astana; some were to Almaty. 
 
Thank you very much. 
 
END TRANSCRIPT. 
 
ASTANA 00000260  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA259, KAZAKHSTAN: CITES DEMARCHE DELIVERED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA259 2010-02-23 03:44 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0587
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0259 0540344
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230344Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7532
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2527
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1873
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2579
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1487
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2720
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3010
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2071
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1918
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2076
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2340

UNCLAS ASTANA 000259 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, OES, OES/S 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON SOCI UNDP UNGA EU KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  CITES DEMARCHE DELIVERED 
 
REF: A) 09 STATE 125262 
 B) STATE 6668 
 
On February 19, Regional Environmental Officer (REO) delivered the 
demarche on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) by diplomatic note to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Americas Department and provided a 
non-paper containing the key issues of concern (ref B).  On February 
22, REO also met with Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources 
(the responsible Ministry) Forestry and Hunting Committee Deputy 
Chairman Khairbek Musabayev and Fauna Department Chief Bakytbek 
Duysekeyev, who said they had no objections to the proposed changes. 
 Musabayev noted that Kazakhstan would not be sending a delegation 
to the CITES Conference this year, but he said he would send a 
letter of support for the U.S. position to the U.S. Embassy via the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA258, KAZAKHSTAN PROPOSES DATES FOR OSCE INFORMAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA258 2010-02-23 01:50 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0543
OO RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL
RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #0258 0540150
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230150Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7531
INFO RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 2070

UNCLAS ASTANA 000258 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RPM, SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN PROPOSES DATES FOR OSCE INFORMAL 
MINISTERIAL IN ALMATY 
 
REF: OSCE DAILY DIGEST 02/22/10 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) At close of business on February 22, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kairat Umarov called the Ambassador to propose two 
possible dates for the OSCE Informal Ministerial in Almaty 
(vice Astana, as reported ref):  June 19-20 or July 10-11. 
 
3.  (SBU) Following on Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev's 
personal invitation on February 4 in Washington to Secretary 
Clinton to participate in the ministerial, Umarov emphasized 
that Kazakhstan wants to offer maximum flexibility to 
accommodate the Secretary's schedule and would willingly 
consider other dates that she might propose.  While 
Kazakhstan will maintain maximum flexibility, Umarov 
commented that Saudabayev's summer summit, high-level 
meeting, and travel schedule is already becoming "congested." 
 For that reason, Astana hopes for an early decision on the 
dates for the Informal Ministerial. 
 
4.  (U) Please advise. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA257, KAZAKHSTAN: CHINESE LAND-LEASE DEAL STIRS UP CONTROVERSY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA257 2010-02-22 09:38 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9581
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0257/01 0530938
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220938Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7529
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2525
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1871
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2577
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2068
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1916
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2338

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000257 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAGR SOCI CH KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  CHINESE LAND-LEASE DEAL STIRS UP CONTROVERSY 
 
ASTANA 00000257  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
 
REFTELS:  A.  09 ASTANA 2168 
  B.  ASTANA 0072 
  C.  ASTANA 0119 
  D.  ASTANA 0184 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Despite a December 23, 2009, Interfax press 
report that President Nazarbayev instructed the prosecutors to 
punish those who disseminate information about the sale of land to 
foreigners, opposition leaders have continued to advocate against 
the transfer of land to China.  At a press conference in Almaty on 
January 13, Azat Party leaders Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and Bulat Abilov 
spoke out against any form of land transfer to foreign countries. 
Subsequently, on January 30, the Azat National Social Democratic 
Party (NSDP) and several other opposition parties held a 
government-sanctioned rally, attended by approximately 2,000 
protesters in Almaty, to protest against rumors that the Kazakhstani 
government is considering a request to rent land to China.  The 
January 30 protest followed a similar demonstration on December 11, 
2009, in front of the Chinese Consulate General in Almaty on the eve 
of Hu Jintao's visit to Astana to inaugurate the Kazakhstan-China 
pipeline (ref A).  The government has not initiated any actions 
against opposition leaders in relation to protests against land 
deals with China, but Kazakhstani media report that the authorities 
detained 13 Arman Public Association activists, as a result of their 
actions following the January 30 demonstration.  The China 
land-lease deal, rumored to possibly having been under consideration 
by the Kazakhstani Government, along with allegations that the 
President's son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, received kickbacks over 
energy deals with China, remain extremely sensitive issues in 
Kazakhstan (refs B-D).  The rumors of corruption are especially 
troubling to Kazakhstanis, who are acutely sensitive to 
densely-populated China's geographical proximity and growing 
economic influence.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CHINESE LAND DEAL SPARKS A PROTEST... 
 
3.  (SBU) President Nursultan Nazarbayev's announcement at a meeting 
of the Foreign Investors' Council on December 4, 2009, that China 
had requested one million hectares of land for the cultivation of 
agricultural crops triggered large demonstrations in Almaty on 
December 11, 2009, and January 30.  During the first rally, 
organized by a group of Kazakhstani intellectuals, the protesters 
tried to present a petition expressing their concerns.  Because no 
officials from the Chinese Consulate talked to the protesters or 
accepted their petition, the group announced their plan to mail the 
original to the Consulate, with a copy to the Presidential 
Administration.  During Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to 
Astana on December 12, 2009, according to Kazakhstan's Minister of 
Agriculture Akylbek Kurishbayev, bilateral talks did not address the 
question of China's leasing of land (ref A). 
 
...AND A QUICK RESPONSE FROM THE GOVERNMENT 
 
4.  (SBU) In apparent response to the public outcry against the 
China land-lease deal, local press reported on December 23, 2009, 
that President Nazarbayev instructed Kazakhstani prosecutors to 
punish dissemination of information about the sale of land to 
foreigners.  On December 30, 2009, the Prosecutor General's Office 
also issued a statement -- apparently to refute charges that the 
government had ever considered a land-lease deal -- that according 
to Kazakhstani law, land and other natural resources are 
state-owned, and cannot legally be transferred to foreign 
ownership. 
 
PROTESTS AGAINST ALLEGED CHINESE LAND-LEASE DEAL CONTINUE 
 
5.  (SBU) Reflecting widespread wariness and concern among the 
public about the growing influence of China on Kazakhstan, 
opposition leaders have continued to protest against the purported 
government plan to lease land to China.  At a January 13 press 
conference in Almaty, the leaders of the opposition Azat National 
 
ASTANA 00000257  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
Social Democratic Party (NSDP), Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and Bulat 
Abilov, stated their party's opposition to any form of land transfer 
to foreign countries.  Tuyakbay said government officials discussed 
the establishment of a joint venture with a Chinese company to lease 
land-plots to China.  "The situation is unclear and the sense of 
alarm in the public remains," Tuyakbay adde
d.  Government 
representatives have strenuously denied that any plan to lease land 
to China had been seriously considered, let alone approved. 
 
6.  (SBU) On January 30, several opposition parties co-organized a 
government-sanctioned rally, attended by approximately 2,000 
protesters in Almaty, protesting Kazakhstan renting land to China. 
The Azat Party led the protest, with support from the unregistered 
Alga and Communist Parties, and the Socialist Resistance and Talmas 
movements.  Participants held banners saying "Stop lawlessness," 
"Government should be brought to account," and "The future of the 
land is the future of the nation."  For two hours, opposition 
leaders, including Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and Bulat Abilov of Azat, 
Vladimir Kozlov of Alga, Amantay Akhetov of the Communist Party, 
Aynur Kurmanov of the Socialist Resistance and poet Mukhtar 
Shakhanov spoke against renting Kazakhstani land to China.  Some 
spoke against private land ownership and leasing any land to foreign 
entities.   The speakers lambasted the government for its practices, 
but no one criticized President Nazarbayev.  The police watched the 
peaceful rally, only intervening on one occasion -- to force a 
person holding a poster depicting a Chinese dragon on Kazakhstan's 
flag to fold it up. 
 
POLICE DETAIN 13 ACTIVISTS AFTER SANCTIONED RALLY 
 
7.  (SBU) After Azat organizers announced the end of the rally and 
asked participants to disperse, several members of the Arman Public 
Association refused to leave.  The group's leader, Yermek 
Narymbayev, and several of his supporters, loudly and harshly 
criticized President Nazarbayev's policies for approximately 30 
minutes.  Narymbayev accused Nazarbayev of selling most of 
Kazakhstan's oil fields to China, and of planning to sell 
Kazakhstani land to China.  Several dozen Arman supporters 
encircling the speakers chanted "Down with Nazarbayev."  The 
Embassy's Political Assistant personally observed the police 
cordoning off the Arman activists, forcing them out of the theater 
into a park nearby, and forcing Narymbayev into a police vehicle. 
After this incident, approximately 100 law enforcement officers 
blocked the street sidewalks.  According to Azzatyq Radio Liberty, 
the police arrested 13 Arman activists.  Narymbayev was reportedly 
tried and sentenced to 10 days of detention for organizing an 
unsanctioned protest. 
 
8.  (SBU) Vladimir Kozlov of Alga asserted that the National 
Security Committee (KNB) organized the incident as a provocation, in 
order to accuse the opposition of being unable to control a peaceful 
protest, and support the denial of future opposition rally requests. 
 (COMMENT:  Since authorities have not hesitated to deny the 
opposition permission for rallies, Kozlov's assertion does not 
appear credible.  Law enforcement's detention of 13 Arman movement 
protesters is also unsurprising, since Narymbayev and his supporters 
crossed the unwritten line against publicly attacking President 
Nazarbayev -- a long-standing taboo.  END COMMENT.) 
 
9.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The government has not initiated any actions 
against established opposition leaders in relation to the officially 
sanctioned January 30 protest against leasing land to China.  The 
detention of Arman activists following their denunciations of 
Nazarbayev after the rally, however, indicate how sensitive 
authorities are about this issue.  The China land-lease deal, and 
allegations that the President's son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, 
received kickbacks over energy deals with China, remain hot-button 
issues.  Rumors of corruption in relation to economic deals with 
China are especially incendiary in Kazakhstan, where many residents 
are acutely attuned to their vast, resource-rich country's 
geographic position, bordering one of the world's most populous and 
resource-hungry nations.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA255, KAZAKHSTAN: WEEKLY SPOT-REPORT DIGEST, FEBRUARY 16-19

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA255 2010-02-22 09:12 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

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RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2718
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3008

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000255 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON EPET ENRG SOCI SENV KCRM KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  WEEKLY SPOT-REPORT DIGEST, FEBRUARY 16-19 
 
ASTANA 00000255  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU) This is the first edition of a new weekly cable to 
disseminate spot reports based on Embassy conversations with 
interlocutors, as well as from the mass media.  Our goal is to draw 
attention to information that might not merit a full cable report. 
 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS - NAZARBAYEV TALKS SUMMIT IN MOSCOW 
 
2.  (U) Russian Central Asia analyst Arkadiy Dubnov told Deutsche 
Welle that during President Nazarbayev's Moscow visit the most 
important issue was the OSCE summit in Astana.  Dubnov predicted 
that Foreign Minister Lavrov will visit Kazakhstan on February 21-23 
to discuss the summit agenda and "other delicate issues." 
 
... AND KAZAKHSTAN JOINS MOSCOW-BACKED RAPID REACTION FORCE 
 
3.  (U) On February 17, the Associated Press reported Kazakhstan 
ratified an accord Wednesday committing it to a NATO-style 
rapid-reaction force drawn from the armies of former Soviet nations, 
the Kazakh presidential press office said in a statement.  The force 
will operate under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, a Russian-backed military bloc that also includes 
Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as members. 
Uzbekistan now remains the only organization member not to sign the 
rapid reaction force agreement. Uzbekistan, which regards itself as 
Central Asia's main military power broker, has traditionally been 
wary of Moscow's attempts to dominate security in the region.  The 
force's stated aim is to combat threats of terrorism, extremism and 
drug trafficking, as well as helping to deal with the aftermath of 
natural and man-made disasters. 
 
ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, CUSTOMS DESCRIBES NEW CODE 
 
4.  (SBU) On February 17, Customs Control Committee Chairman 
Kozykorpesh Karbuzov presented highlights of the new Customs Code 
for the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.  According 
to Karbuzov, the new Customs Code will come into force on July 1, 
and will reduce administrative barriers to trade.  Karbuzov thanked 
USAID for technical assistance in designing an "electronic single 
window."  Igor Tyen, Deputy Chairman of the Customs Control 
Committee, said that customs clearance is no longer required for 
goods traded among Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, or for foreign 
goods released for consumption inside Customs Union member states. 
Tyen also reported that, although the Custom Union does not cover 
export duties, the Customs Union's Special Agreement on Export 
Control would prevent the illegal export of goods from the territory 
of Customs Union member states. 
 
EBRD COMMENTS ON FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION 
 
5.  (SBU) The Ambassador had lunch on February 18 with Olivier 
Descamps and Michael Weinstein of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to discuss the economic and 
financial situation in Kazakhstan.  Descamps, who is based in London 
and oversees EBRD projects in Central Asia, Turkey, Eastern Europe, 
and the Caucasus, said the EBRD is deepening its relationship with 
Samruk-Kazyna, although it will not provide carte blanche for a 
long-term, state-driven approach to economic growth.  He also 
insisted that the economic crisis is not yet over in Kazakhstan, and 
said greater diversification of the economy is necessary to achieve 
sustained growth. 
 
JAILED KAZAKHSTANI RIGHTS ACTIVIST LAUNCHES BLOG 
 
6.  (U) Jailed Kazakh human rights defender Yevgeny Zhovtis has 
begun publishing a blog on the Internet, RFE/RL's Kazakh Service 
reported on February 17.  Zhovtis was the director of the 
Almaty-based Kazakh Bureau for Human Rights.  He is serving a 
four-year jail term in a labor camp in East Kazakhstan Oblast for 
his involvement in a deadly traffic accident last year.  His 
supporters and human rights organizations have criticized his 
sentence, which they say Kazakh authorities ordered in retaliation 
for Zhovtis's human rights activities.  His blog is blocked in 
Kazakhstan and only available via a proxy server. 
 
ASTANA 00000255  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
COURT REVERSES NEWSPAPER'S SUSPENSION FOR OUTSTANDING DEBT 
 
7.  (U) On February 16, the Medeu district court in Almaty reversed 
the February 8 co
urt administrator's order that suspended 
publication of the Respublika newspaper for failure to pay in full 
its outstanding debt of 60 million tenge to BTA bank.  The newspaper 
filed a counter-suit, arguing that only a judge can order a 
suspension, and the court agreed with the newspaper.  As reported 
previously, the same court ruled on September 9 that Respublika owed 
BTA bank 60 million tenge in damages for publishing an article that 
caused a debilitating run on the bank. 
 
FINANCIAL POLICE ACADEMY DIRECTOR "COMMITTED HARA-KIRI" 
 
8.  (SBU) More details have come out about the mysterious 
resignation of Director of the Financial Police Academy (FPA) 
General-Major Ramazan Tleukhan on February 1.  On February 18, 
sources in the FPA told the Embassy that Tleukhan resigned his 
position because an administrative employee was arrested for sexual 
assault, allegedly committed against a 17-year-old girl.  Although 
the employee was not high-placed and the crime was not connected to 
the FPA, Tleukhan's personal code of honor demanded that he step 
down.   The Embassy has had an excellent relationship with the FPA 
since 2003, and Tleukhan was one of INL's most reliable 
interlocutors.   The previous FPA Director left his position in 2007 
after a female cadet was tortured to death by other female cadets 
after being accused of theft.  A new FPA Director has not yet been 
appointed; INL had a productive initial meeting with the Acting 
Director of the FPA on February 17. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA253, KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS TO BE COMPETITIVE IN SCIENCE AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA253 2010-02-22 08:09 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000253 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, OES, OES/S 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON PGOV SENV SOCI TSPL KPAO KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS TO BE COMPETITIVE IN SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
ASTANA 00000253  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  During the annual Public Roundtable on Collaboration 
in Science and Technology, participants heard that the development 
of science is one of Kazakhstan's most important priorities, and the 
government plans to increase the government budget allocated to 
scientific research and development (R&D) by 30% over the current 
level.  Kazakhstan recognizes that it must have good scientific 
cooperation with other countries, such as the United States, Europe, 
and Japan, if it is to become an international leader in science and 
R&D.  The recently established Kazakhstan National Medical Holding 
company claims it can serve as a model for health service delivery 
and successful restructuring of the health care systems inherited 
from the former Soviet Union.  The New University of Astana will 
establish three new science research centers and constitute an 
entirely new educational system in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, 
based on the U.S. model, to prepare students for Kazakhstan's social 
and economic challenges.  Properly applied tax incentives can 
significantly affect R&D, but tax incentives alone will not be 
sufficient to promote R&D; a country must also have a well-developed 
scientific infrastructure and a good education system.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
SCIENCE IS A PRIORITY FOR KAZAKHSTAN 
 
2.  The U.S.-Kazakhstan Public-Private Economic Partnership 
Initiative (PPEPI) hosted the annual Public Roundtable on 
Collaboration in Science and Technology in Astana on February 16, 
one of five roundtable events conducted to date under the PPEPI 
umbrella.  With USAID funding and American Chamber of Commerce 
administration, PPEPI's goal is to improve the business environment 
for foreign and domestic investment and trade through broad-scale 
economic policy reform.  PPEPI promotes policy reform in five 
priority areas, one of which is science and technology. 
 
3.  Deputy Minister of Education and Science Aidar Zhakupov opened 
the roundtable, calling the development of science one of 
Kazakhstan's most important priorities.  He said the government will 
raise the level of science education and investment so that 
scientific research can contribute to Kazakhstan's overall economic 
development.  The government plans to increase funding for 
scientific research and development (R&D) by 30% over the current 
level, to 18.5 billion tenge (approximately $123 million), or about 
1% of GDP.  (NOTE:  Kazakhstan's GDP based on purchasing power 
parity for 2008 was approximately $178 billion.  END NOTE.) 
 
4.  Zhakupov said Kazakhstan was committed to increasing R&D funding 
to international levels, ranging from 2-4% of GDP.  In addition, 
Kazakhstan intends to increase grant funding (including for the 
Bolashak Grant program) to further promote science education in 
Kazakhstan.  He said the government must make the current system of 
funding science more efficient and eliminate wasteful competition 
among science funds.  The government should also facilitate the 
commercialization of scientific research, according to Zhakupov, so 
that ideas can move from the laboratory directly to commercial 
production.   Zhakupov said this will require a sound legal 
framework, including the protection of intellectual property rights 
(e.g., patents, trademarks, formulas, etc.). 
 
SCIENCE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND KAZAKHSTAN 
 
5.  U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF) 
Director Kanat Shakenov said Kazakhstan recognizes that it must have 
strong scientific cooperation with other countries, such as the 
United States, Europe, and Japan, if it is to become an 
international leader in science and R&D.  In order to advance 
science, he said, it is "not only desirable, but necessary to seek 
funding, which includes international funding."  He said Kazakhstani 
scientists should publish their work in international journals in 
English and conduct scientific research in accordance with 
international standards so that science and R&D in Kazakhstan can 
reach an international level.  In addition, he said that Kazakhstan 
needs to develop a more effective distribution of scientific 
knowledge to scientific and business centers.  In particular, he 
suggested that the government provide assistance to scientific and 
 
ASTANA 00000253  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
business entities in order to stimulate the development and 
commercialization of science. 
 
NATIONAL MEDICAL HOLDING:  A MODEL FOR HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY &#x000
A; 
6.  Kazakhstan National Medical Holding (NMH) CEO Almaz Sharman said 
the Kazakhstan government established NMH in June 2008 to 
revolutionize the national health care system and make it a model in 
Central Asia for restructuring health care systems inherited from 
the former Soviet Union.  According to Sharman, NMH will introduce 
international standards of quality, safety, and financial 
sustainability that are absent in the current system.  He said NMH 
will introduce a market-driven health model that will provide a 
level of care such that Kazakhstanis will no longer have to go 
abroad for treatment.  NMH manages six health care centers, 
including the National Research Center for Maternal and Child Health 
in Kazakhstan.  Sharman said that internationally renowned experts 
will manage all six centers by 2015. 
 
7.  Sharman said a number of socio-economic factors affect health 
care in Kazakhstan, including the gradual ageing of the population, 
an increase in the cases of infectious diseases, and unequal access 
to medical services.  In addition, as medical costs increase, there 
is pressure to reduce the length of treatment while maintaining the 
same level of quality.  One concern of medical research, he said, is 
how to harmonize scientific research with actual practice that can 
lead to commercialization.  Sharman said that medical researchers 
should follow international standards to ensure that the resulting 
products are competitive. 
 
THE NEW UNIVERSITY OF ASTANA 
 
8.  New University of Astana President Aslan Sarinjipov said the New 
University of Astana expects to open July 1.  (NOTE:  The New 
University likely will be renamed Nursultan Nazarbayev University in 
July.  END NOTE.)  He said the New University's nine international 
university partners (including Duke University, Johns Hopkins, 
Harvard, etc.) will help design and implement a curriculum that will 
emphasize the scientific, technological, and economic development. 
According to Sarinjipov, the university will have medical, science, 
life science, business, and public policy schools, and will also 
host three science research centers:  a life sciences center, which 
will conduct research jointly with the leading world scientific 
centers in the sphere of organ transplantation, artificial heart and 
lungs, stem cells, and the medicine of longevity; an energy research 
center dealing with issues of renewable energy sources, physics, and 
high energy technologies; and an interdisciplinary engineering 
center that will include laboratory facilities and a design bureau. 
 
9.  Sarinjipov said the New University will not be just another new 
university, but it will constitute an entirely new educational 
system in Kazakhstan and Central Asia.  The first year will be 
devoted to intensive English training, and subsequent courses will 
be in English, providing the students with an education that meets 
international standards.  He said that 90% of the faculty will be 
foreign until the university can generate its own trained faculty, 
but even after that, Sarinjipov believes the university will still 
retain a high percentage of foreign professors.  The university will 
be based on the U.S. model, with a four-year bachelor's degree, a 
master's degree, and a Ph.D.  He said the curriculum will prepare 
students to meet Kazakhstan's social and economic challenges.  After 
5-10 years, he said he hopes the New University will qualify for the 
international ranking system.  Sarinjipov said the anticipated cost 
of this education will be equal to the cost of going abroad to study 
at a world class university.  (NOTE:  Local press reported that the 
New University will be the most expensive university in Kazakhstan 
and as expensive as elite universities in Russia, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom.  The annual tuition fee will be $19,000, 
which is twice as much as the Moscow Institute of International 
Relations.  END NOTE.) 
 
IMPACT OF TAX INCENTIVES ON SCIENTIFIC R&D 
 
 
ASTANA 00000253  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
10.  PriceWaterhouseCoopers Tax Services Director Richard Bergonje 
said governments have used direct funding as well as grants and 
subsidies in order to promote and stimulate R&D.  Tax incentives are 
also a key tool that allow direct or incremental deduction of R&D 
expenses, permit depreciation allowances on laboratories and 
equipment, and grant tax holidays.  According to the OSCE, R&D tax 
incentives are extremely popular, with 21 of the 31 member countries 
using them in 2008, up from only 12 in 1998.  Bergonje noted that 
emerging countries such as Brazil, India, Russia, and China are also 
using tax incentives to stimulate R&D. 
 
11.  Bergonje referred to the Alatau-IT City (Information Technology 
City) in Almaty, a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) with tax and customs 
incentives for information and telecommunication companies working 
in the park, as an example of the possible use of tax incentives to 
support R&D in Kazakhstan.  Companies registered in the SEZ do not 
have to pay corporate income tax, property tax, or customs duties. 
The government also allows companies in the SEZ to depreciate the 
cost of buildings and equipment.  Bergonje said studies demonstrate 
that properly applied tax incentives can significantly increase R&D 
investment.  However, while Kazakhstan has good tax incentive 
programs, he said the existing tax code can be improved. 
 
12.  COMMENT:  The PPEPI Science and Technology Working Group finds 
that its work dovetails closely with Kazakhstan's national priority 
to improve science research and education in order to stimulate 
further economic development.  Kazakhstan has ambitious goals and 
one might doubt the extent to which it will achieve them. 
Nevertheless, the will is there and the government is committed to 
achieving these goals, since the mandate for change is coming from 
President Nazarbayev himself.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA251, KAZAKHSTAN: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA251 2010-02-22 07:03 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana
Appears in these articles:
www.spiegel.de

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<>
2/22/2010 7:03
10ASTANA251
Embassy Astana
SECRET

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TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET PINR MARR SNAR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER 



S e c r e t section 01 of 14 astana 000251

Sipdis

State for sca/cen, s/srap

E.o. 12958: decl: 03/06/2059
Tags: pgov, prel, econ, epet, pinr, marr, snar, kz
Subject: kazakhstan: scenesetter for centcom commander
general petraeus

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (SBU) General Petraeus, on behalf of Ambassador
Hoagland, and the Department of Defense and Embassy Astana
country teams, we extend a warm welcome on the occasion of
your upcoming visit to Astana, Kazakhstan.

Visit overview

2. (S) The Office of the Defense Attache and your staff are
working toward finalizing your visit itinerary. You are
scheduled to arrive in Astana the evening of March 9, and are
scheduled to depart the morning of March 10. This visit will
further strengthen an already strong bilateral relationship
in support of our strategic interests. On March 10, we are
working to schedule meetings with the President, Minister of
Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the National
Security Council.

Domestic political perspective

3. (C) While the Government of Kazakhstan articulates a
strategic vision of a democratic society, it has lagged on
the implementation front. The leadership remains resistant
to competitive political processes, and the situation is
complicated by the fact that President Nazarbayev is
extraordinarily popular, while the opposition is weak,
fractured, and comprised principally of former Nazarbayev
loyalists who fell out of favor. In May 2007, significant
amendments were adopted to Kazakhstan's constitution which
were touted as strengthening parliament, but also removed
terms limits on Nazarbayev. In parliamentary elections held
in August 2007, Nazarbayev's Nur Otan party officially
received 88 percent of the vote and took all the seats in
parliament, which OSCE observers concluded did not meet OSCE
standards. On a positive note, President Nazarbayev has
taken positive steps that could facilitate a transition to a
more democratic system in the long term. His Bolashak
program provides scholarships for several thousand
Kazakhstanis to receive higher education abroad, mostly in
the West, where they absorb Western ideas and values.
Additionally, Nazarbayev has brought into government service
a new generation of young, ambitious bureaucrats ) many of
whom studied in the West through Bolashak or U.S.
Government-sponsored programs.

4. (C) When Kazakhstan was selected as 2010 OSCE chairman at
the November 2007 OSCE Madrid OSCE Ministerial meeting,
Foreign Minister Tazhin publicly committed that his
government would amend Kazakhstan,s election, political
party, and media laws in accordance with OSCE and Office of
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
recommendations. (NOTE: Tazhin also promised that as OSCE
chairman, Kazakhstan would support the OSCE's "human
dimension" and preserve ODIHR,s mandate. END NOTE). The
amendments were finally signed into law in February 2009.
While key civil society leaders were disappointed that the
new legislation did not go further, we consider them to be
steps in the right direction, and will continue pressing for
further reforms. While Kazakhstan prides itself on its
religious tolerance, parliament passed legislation in late
2008 which would have restricted the religious freedom of
minority religious groups not traditional to Kazakhstan.
Rather than sign the legislation, President Nazarbayev sent
it for review to the Constitutional Council (Court), which
ultimately declared the legislation to be unconstitutional.
On July 10, Nazarbayev signed into law Internet legislation&#x0
00A;that provides a legal basis for the government to shut down
and block websites whose content allegedly violates the
country,s laws. This appears to be a step in the wrong
direction at a time when the Kazakhstan,s record on
democracy and human rights is in the spotlight because of its
impending OSCE chairmanship. The legislation likely
originated from the government,s desire to be able to

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readily block access to web postings from Rakhat Aliyev,
Nazarbayev,s ex-son-in-law, who, from his self-imposed exile
in Austria, has put embarrassing materials and articles about
Nazarbayev on various Internet sites. We have expressed our
disappointment that the legislation was enacted, and have
urged the government to implement it in a manner consistent
with Kazakhstan,s OSCE commitments on freedom of speech and
freedom of the press.

International political perspective

5. (C) President Nazarbayev carefully balances Kazakhstan,s
relations with Russia, China, the United States and the EU )
what is termed a &multi-vector8 foreign policy. The
Kazakhstanis consider Russia their most important
international partner, and Russia,s influence is
unparalleled in Kazakhstan due to long historical ties,
Kazakhstan,s large ethnic Russian population, and the
predominance here of the Russian language ) which means most
Kazakhstanis obtain their news from Russian,s broadcast and
print media. Kazakhstan,s close relationship with the
United States serves as an essential counterweight,
reinforcing Kazakhstan,s sovereignty and independence and
helping it stave off pressure from both its giant neighbors
) Russia to the north and China to the east. For the
Kazakhstanis, high-level interactions with the United States
are not only substantively important, but also symbolically
important, sending a signal to Moscow that we remain closely
engaged despite Moscow,s assertion that Central Asia is its
&privileged sphere of influence.8

Economic perspective

6. (C) Kazakhstan is the region's economic powerhouse, with
an economy larger than that of all the other Central Asian
states combined. Economic growth averaged over 9% a year
during 2005-07, before dropping to 3% in 2008 with the onset
of the global financial crisis. The contracted by about 2%
in 2009, but positive growth is again expected in 2010.
While the country's economic success is partly due to its
fortuitous natural resource deposits, astute macroeconomic
policies and extensive economic reforms have also played an
important role. Kazakhstan has a modern banking and
financial system, a well-endowed pension fund, and a
transparent sovereign wealth fund with approximately $20
billion in assets. The government has taken aggressive steps
to tackle the domestic reverberations of the world economic
crisis, allocating $21 billion to take equity stakes in
private banks, prop up the construction and real-estate
sectors, and support small- and medium-sized enterprises and
agriculture. Kazakhstan,s long-run economic challenge is to
diversify its economy away from reliance on the energy
sector. In 2008, we launched a bilateral Private-Private
Economic Partnership Initiative (PPEPI), which brings
together the U.S. and Kazakhstani public and private sectors
to make policy recommendations on improving the country,s
business climate and reducing other barriers to non-energy
investment. On a less promising note, the Kazakhstanis
announced in June that they would suspend their bilateral
negotiations to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and on January 1, Kazakhstan joined a customs union with
Russia and Belarus. We have informed Kazakhstan that there
is, in fact, no mechanism allowing a customs union to accede
to the WTO without its member states doing so individually.

7. (C) U.S. and Kazakhstani strategic interests are largely
aligned on the development of Kazakhstan,s vast energy
resources. Both sides agree that U.S. and other Western
companies must continue playing a lead role in Kazakhstan,s
energy exploration and production projects, and that
diversification of transport routes will bolster
Kazakhstan,s sovereignty and enable it to capture the
maximum benefits of its energy and wealth. Kazakhstan
produced 88 million tons of oil in 2009 (approximately 1.5

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million barrels per day), and is expected to become one of
the world,s top ten crude exporters soon after 2015. While
the country also has significant gas reserves (1.5 trillion
cubic meters is a low-end estimate), current gas exports are
very limited for now, in part because gas is being reinjected
to maximize crude output. U.S. companies (ExxonMobil,
Chevron, and ConocoPhillips) have significant ownership
stakes in Kazakhstan,s three major hydrocarbon projects,
including Kashagan, the world,s largest oil field discovery
since Alaska,s North Slope. In June 2009, ConocoPhillips
signed a contract to explore and develop the offshore N
Block, estimated to contain 2.13 billion recoverable barrels
of oil. China has recently increased its investment in
Kazakhstan,s energy sector, and through the state-owned
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) now controls
approximately 20% of Kazakhstan,s total oil production.

8. (C) With major crude production increases on the horizon,
Kazakhstan must develop additional transport routes to bring
its crude to market. Currently, most of Kazakhstan,s crude
is exported via Russia, though some exports flow east to
China, west across the Caspian through Azerbaijan, and south
across the Caspian to Iran. We are focused on helping the
Kazakhstanis implement the Kazakhstan-Caspian Transportation
System (KCTS), which envisions a &virtual pipeline8 of
tankers transporting large volumes of crude from
Kazakhstan,s Caspian coast to Baku, from where it will flow
onward to market through Georgia, including through the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. While a trans-Caspian
crude pipeline might be a cheaper long-term transport option,
the Kazakhstanis maintain that an agreement on Caspian
delimitation among the five Caspian littoral states is a
prerequisite, politically if not legally, for moving forward
on the construction of such a pipeline.

9. (SBU) One issue that is certain to be at the center of
discussion for years to come is water management. Reviving
the northern portion of the Aral Sea, which Kazakhstan
controls, has been a resounding success. A greater priority
is ensuring continued access to water for public and
agricultural use. As most of Kazakhstan's rivers have
headwaters outside of the country, Kazakhstan remains
somewhat vulnerable to developments in upstream countries.
For the moment this is not a problem as glacial melt has made
up the distance in quantity versus demand. But the long-term
issue is that Kazakhstan is drawing against a bank account
that cannot be easily replenished. Anecdotally we have been
told that the Ishim River (the river that flows through
Astana has its headwaters in China) has decreased by one
meter over the past few ye
ars due to increased upstream use
in China. In addition to securing an adequate quantity of
water, Kazakhstan also remains concerned about water quality.
There is also concern that Lake Balkash, the 16th largest
lake in the world, might be endangered by China,s up-stream
water usage.

Regional influence and support

10. (SBU) Kazakhstan has also expressed its eagerness to
play an enhanced role in achieving regional integration.
President Nazarbayev continues to raise the subject of a
Central Asian union with a common market. Kazakhstan is
already a significant economic force in the region ) it is
the largest foreign investor in Kyrgyzstan and in Georgia,
for example. While progress has been slow, the Kazakhstanis
are continuing to seek opportunities for investment in
Afghanistan.

Csto and sco

11. (C) Kazakhstan's involvement in the Russian-led
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is a natural
extension of its historical relationship with Russia, as well
as its current Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

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involvement and mutual security ties with Former Soviet Union
(FSU) nations. Its membership in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) provides a means to balance its foreign
policy and not show favoritism unless absolutely necessary.
CSTO participation penetrates the political, economic and
military spheres, but actual contributions to the CSTO appear
to be more political than substantive. The CSTO mechanism
provides a means for Kazakhstan to stay connected to Russia
on issues of mutual concern (air defense, counter-terrorism,
etc...), but without the danger of getting too close. At the
CSTO,s 2008 summit in Moscow, the Government of Russia
pressured the CSTO partners to recognize South Ossetian and
Abkhazian independence and to make strong statements about
Georgia,s responsibility for the current conflict, however,
Kazakhstan and the other CSTO members did not cede to Russian
pressure. With regard to the SCO, Kazakhstan was surprised
at the vehemence of Russia and China in insisting upon an
anti-U.S. in Central Asia statement in the 2006 summit joint
statement. Kazakhstan remains "proud" of the fact that they
prevented a similar clause from appearing again. SCO
activity remains minimal in Kazakhstan with the government
remaining leery of its eastern neighbor.

Military/defense perspective

Ministry of defense

12. (S) Minister of Defense: Kazakhstan,s former
Ambassador to Russia, Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, was appointed as
the new Defense Minister on 24 June 2009. All indications
appear that Minister Dzhaksybekov is a pragmatist and
supports cooperation with a variety of nations that is in the
best interests of the Ministry of Defense and the
modernization and transformation of the Kazakhstan Armed
Forces.

13. (S) Chief of Defense: First Deputy Minister General
Mukhtar Altynbayev, previously Minister of Defense, thrice
removed, continues to serve as Kazakhstan,s Chief of
Defense. Relatively inconsequential as the Chief of Defense
and generally a neutral party who has neither a positive nor
negative impact on our bilateral relationship, he is reported
to oppose the deployment of forces to Afghanistan.

14. (S) Component Commanders: The Ground Forces Chief,
General-Lieutenant Saken Zhasuzakov; Air Forces Chief,
General-Major Alexandr Sorokin; and Chief of Naval Forces,
Captain Zhandarbek Zhanzakov. Generally, the Component
Commanders have so far proven to be inconsequential, as they
remain relatively uninvolved in the sphere of U.S.-Kazakhstan
security cooperation ) this is because the majority of our
security cooperation does not impact forces under the
component commanders, direct control.

15. (S) Unequal Partnership: The MOD remains an
under-funded ministry that has no policy-making authority.
The simple fact is that the U.S. DOD-KZ MOD relationship is
not one of equals. DOD has significant policy input in the
USG, while the MOD appears to have almost none. In short,
the KZ MOD is a supporting ministry, taking its direction
from higher levels within the government. The U.S. has, on a
number of occasions, successfully achieved its bilateral and
regional goals by appealing to those closer to the center of
power and using them to provide the MOD with marching orders.

Military operations/support

Iraq

16. (SBU) Kazakhstan directly supported coalition efforts in
Iraq from August 2003 through October 2008, most
significantly by deploying a military engineering/explosive
ordinance disposal (EOD) unit which cumulatively disposed of
over 5 million pieces of unexploded ordnance. With the

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reorganization of the coalition in Iraq, Kazakhstan completed
its tenth rotation and redeployed its forces in their
entirety in late October 2008.

Afghanistan

17. (S) The USG continues to solicit support for increased
participation in international operations, and it appears
that Kazakhstan may, in the near-term, deploy four to six
staff officers to support ISAF HQ in Afghanistan, however,
internal political discussions are ongoing and a decision has
yet to be made. Of great concern to the Government is public
opinion, which in general is opposed to a deployment to
Afghanistan primarily because of misconceptions fostered by
the Kazakh experience in Afghanistan during the 1980s Soviet
occupation. Supporters of a deployment to Afghanistan within
the Ministry of Defense look to increase Kazakhstan,s ISAF
coalition contributions over time, specifically the future
deployment of military medical personnel and EOD/Engineer
assets, very possibly in support of the Afghan Engineer
School located in Mazar-e-Sharif. These supporters consist
primarily of the pro-western faction within the Ministry of
Defense, xxxxxxxxxxxx, and understand the
value of conducting real-world operations in terms of
building political capital and capitalizing on deploying and
training the force. Additionally, in 2008 the Government of
Kazakhstan provided almost $3 million to Afghanistan
primarily for infrastructure improvement and development, and
is looking to provide additional funding. During a November
22 visit to Kabul, State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat
Saudabayev unveiled an assistance package, which included a
proposal to provide free university education in Kazakhstan
for up to 1,000 Afghan students over the period from
2010-2018. The government has also offered to provide
training to Afghan law enforcement officers at law
enforcement training institutes in Kazakhstan. The
Kazakhstanis hope to make Afghanistan a focus of their 2010
OSCE chairmanship.

Issues influencing expansion of kazakhstan's support for
afghanistan

Overflight expansion

18. (S) In November 2009 we requested the expansion of the
overflight agreement to
 include two North-South polar routes
to/from Russia through Kazakhstan and eventually to
Afghanistan via Diplomatic Note. This request has been
unofficially declined and stated that a new agreement must be
negotiated then ratified by parliament prior to entry into
force. This process could take well over a year from
negotiation to ratification, as exemplified by the German
transit agreement which was negotiated from 2004-2007, signed
in 2007, then ratified in 2008. This current impasse may
very be the result of several influencing factors. It
appears the Kazakhs are unhappy with being approached by the
USG requesting additional air corridors after the USG
negotiated an air transit agreement with Russia. The Kazakhs
have told us in the past that they do not appreciate being
treated like the little brother to Russia, and that the USG
needs to notify the Government of Kazakhstan in good faith at
the same time as discussions are ongoing with Russia. It is
our belief the Government of Kazakhstan has been unwilling to
approve additional overflight corridors as an addendum to our
current overflight agreement via Diplomatic Note exchange
because the USG negotiated with Russia prior to consulting
with Kazakhstan. Further exacerbating this issue is likely
the press coverage emphasizing the significance of Russia
assisting U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, when the Kazakhs have
been quietly doing so since 2001. The Kazakhs also likely
consider the U.S. request as a fait accompli ) something
that further aggravates the government.

Transit of m-atvs and other wheeled vehicles

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19. (S) In October 2009 we requested the authorization to
ship military and civilian wheeled vehicles to include MRAPs
and M-ATVS along the NDN via Diplomatic Note. This request
has also been unofficially declined and is likely tied to the
issues outlined in this section of the scenesetter as well as
the following. Information indicates that the National
Security Committee (KNB) does not support the transit of
M-ATVS or lethal cargo ) the excuse we have been given is
that it exposes the Kazakhs to potential terrorist reprisals
for supporting lethal cargo transit. This appears to be the
top cover for declining the U.S. request and frankly a flimsy
excuse given that the Germany-Kazakhstan air and ground
bilateral transit agreement for lethal and non-lethal goods
was ratified by the Kazakhstan Parliament in 2008. How does
this not expose Kazakhstan to the same risks?

Local procurement

20. (S) The Government of Kazakhstan has become extremely
frustrated at the perceived lack of U.S. forward movement to
date in local procurement in over 13 months since the NDN
informal agreement was approved by President Nazarbayev in
December 2008. Local procurement provides the U.S. the
opportunity to strengthen our strategic partnership and to
capitalize on providing domestically-produced items for U.S.
forces in Afghanistan. Opportunities abound for promoting
the benefits associated with supporting the U.S. goals and
specifically the NDN, while offering the cost-savings
associated with the procurement of locally-produced products
that meet and/or exceed our requirements. Local procurement
was a major selling point for the Kazakhs, however, since the
Government of Kazakhstan considers little to have so far been
accomplished in this respect, it is likely that this is also
a factor retarding the positive movement forward on securing
an agreement for the transshipment of M-ATVs as well as the
expansion of OEF overflight corridors. Additionally, the
disparate nature of our logistics system is making this a
challenging enterprise ) the responsibility for procuring
various classes of supplies is dispersed amongst different
government organizations. Although GSA and DLA have stepped
up to the plate and are beginning to capitalize on local
procurement opportunities, it would be in our best interests
to coordinate all procurement efforts to maximize our
effectiveness and efficiency to support this extremely
important mission.

Logistics hub/transit center offer

21. (S) In March 2008 President Nazarbayev extended an offer
of a logistics hub/transit center in Kazakhstan to the U.S.
Ambassador to Kazakhstan. Since then the Government of
Kazakhstan has been asking for a written request from the USG
outlining our requirements. A written USG request is
considered by the Kazakhs as the starting point for
determining exactly what level of logistic hub/transit center
the Kazakhs would possibly be willing to support. We have
yet to submit a request or to officially take this offer off
the table, and are periodically asked about our response to
the offer. It appears to the Government of Kazakhstan that
we are ignoring their offer, thereby, further aggravating the
issues outlined in this section of the scenesetter.

Cooperation with uzbekistan

22. (S) The Government of Kazakhstan has stated with concern
that our cooperation with Uzbekistan has increased while our
cooperation with Kazakhstan, in their view, remains stagnant
or is decreasing. The government has also indicated its
frustration and lack of understanding why this would be the
case since Kazakhstan has been and continues to be a reliable
partner, both now and into the future. Whether or not this
is the case, perception is reality, and the examples that are
routinely mentioned are that Kazakhstan has been the first

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Central Asian nation to authorize cost-free unlimited and
unfettered overflights in support of OEF (2001), as well as
an expansion to this agreement an opening of additional air
corridors (2005); the first Central Asian nation to authorize
aircraft diverts into Almaty airport in the event of an
emergency; the first and only Central Asian nation to deploy
forces to Iraq in support of OIF (2003-2008); the first
Central Asian nation to authorize the shipment of non-lethal
goods along the NDN (Dec 2008), little more than one month
following General McNabb,s visit and official request; and
the first Central Asian nation, and most likely the only,
that will deploy forces into Afghanistan in support of ISAF
sometime this year (most likely by June 2010).

Overflight agreement

23. (SBU) In support of OEF, the Government of Kazakhstan
has granted more than 9,000 cost-free overflights since the
agreement,s entry into force in 2001 and eventual
parliamentary ratification in December 2008 ) this equates
to an annual average of over 1000 U.S. military and DOD
charter aircraft overflights per year. This agreement does
not differentiate between types of cargo, allowing it to be
used for the transport of lethal goods.

Emergency divert agreement

24. (SBU) In 2002, an emergency divert agreement with the
Kazakhstan entered into force that allows aircraft bound for
Manas the option of landing at Almaty or Astana International
Airports in case of bad weather or emergency ) in excess of
85 diverts have been
 supported under this agreement. In
every case Kazakhstan has exceeded the expectations of the
original agreement, however one of the limiting factors under
the provisions of this agreement is the restriction which
does not allow disembarkation of troops from the diverted
aircraft. U.S. forces traveling on deployment orders usually
do not have passports or visas and, therefore, cannot legally
enter the country to stay at a hotel or be transported by
alternate ground means to Manas. Should the Kazakhstani
Government allow U.S. forces entry into Kazakhstan, USDAO has
no mechanism in place to fund costs associated with
transportation or lodging. Since the agreement,s entry into
force, the USDAO has relocated from Almaty over 600 miles
north to Astana and cannot react quickly to support incoming
diverted aircraft.

Northern distribution network (ndn)

25. (SBU) As you are aware, President Nazarbayev approved
the use of Kazakhstan,s commercial transport infrastructure
to support the U.S. NDN for resupplying our forces in
Afghanistan on 30 December 2008.

26. (C) As background to previous non-U.S. transit
agreements, NATO has been limited to one option ) the
transport of non-lethal supplies through Russia, Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan ) and finally secured a written agreement to
resupply forces in Afghanistan in late January 2010. Of note
is that the Government of Kazakhstan was extremely unhappy
that NATO sought permission of its big brother, to the
north before opening discussions with the Kazakhstanis ) the
government indicated negotiations should have occurred in
parallel rather than in serial. The German Government
negotiated an official government-to-government agreement
with Kazakhstan for the ground and air transit of both lethal
and non-lethal supplies destined for Afghanistan, which took
3 years to negotiate (2004-2007) and one year for
parliamentary ratification before the agreement entered into
force in 2008 ) a four year process. The Germans have yet
to execute the transit of lethal goods via ground means,
something we will monitor in the event the U.S. decides to
expand its current agreement to include the transit of lethal
supplies.

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27. (S) Additionally, it continues to be in our best
interests to use all available transit routes, to include
Russia. Should we purposely choose to bypass Russia, then it
is likely that Russia would pressure the Government of
Kazakhstan to not allow supplies to transit Kazakhstan. It
is our strong belief that including Russia as part of the NDN
is a win-win situation and provides the U.S. an alternate
route to resupply our forces in Afghanistan, however, we must
remain aware that Russia could attempt to manipulate and gain
exclusive control of the flow of supplies across its
territory by undermining our efforts to expand our options
with other nations.

Aviation fuel

28. (C) Since Kazakhstan has a limited refining capability,
it imports most of its aviation fuel from Russia. Some of
this fuel is in turn sold to Manas Transit Center,
Kyrgyzstan. In this way, Russia indirectly provides fuel for
Manas Transit Center and OEF operations.

29. (SBU) In response to the Georgian-Russian conflict,
Kazakhstan provided 165 tons of humanitarian aid to the
Government of Georgia consisting of food, medicine and
medical equipment worth approximately $460K. The Kazakhstani
government has also made strong statements in support of UN
resolutions sanctioning Iran and North Korea.

Non-proliferation issues

30. (SBU) Kazakhstan sees itself as a strong partner in
non-proliferation. Non-proliferation has been a cornerstone
of the bilateral relationship since Kazakhstan's
independence. With the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Kazakhstan was left with the world's fourth largest nuclear
arsenal. Nazarbayev's 1991 decision to give up Kazakhstan's
nuclear arsenal was groundbreaking. Kazakhstan returned all
tactical nuclear warheads to Russia by January 1992, and all
strategic nuclear warheads by April 1995. Through the
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program the
U.S. assisted Kazakhstan with the destruction of bombers,
silos, and related ICBM infrastructure and delivery systems.

31. (S) While the U.S.-Kazakhstan non-proliferation
relationship seems to be solid on the surface, at working
levels, the U.S. and Kazakhstani governments have encountered
continuous implementation issues. The Umbrella Agreement
amendment governing the CTR program, signed in December 2007,
was finally ratified on 2 June 2009. Ratification is the
first step to provide Kazakhstan with a legal basis to
establish a mechanism to implement value added tax (VAT) and
duty exemptions for imported equipment and services contracts
through the CTR program. Taxation issues have festered
unresolved since 2004, leading to frustration at high levels
in Washington, both in the Executive and Legislative
branches. There has, however, been a renewed commitment at
the senior levels of the Government of Kazakhstan to resolve
the taxation issues, yet we await the commitment to translate
into reality.

32. (S) Of all of the projects funded by the CTR
appropriation, the most critical is a classified project to
secure weapons-grade materials at the former Soviet nuclear
weapons test site in Semipalatinsk. The project is
tri-lateral, between Russia, Kazakhstan, and the United
States, with the Russians providing the necessary data
regarding material location and the United States providing
funding to repatriate the material to Russia or secure it in
situ. In addition to securing the materials at the site, DOD
is pressing the Government of Kazakhstan to increase its
security presence at the site (Ministry of Internal Affairs
Special Troops), and has provided ground sensor and UAV
technology that is used to assist Kazakhstan monitor the site

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for trespassers.

33. (SBU) In addition to the classified trilateral project
in Semipalatinsk, the Department of Defense is currently
implementing the Biological Threat Reduction Program, which
supports Kazakhstan,s efforts to combat bioterrorism and
prevent the proliferation of biological weapons technology,
pathogens and expertise by strengthening its outbreak
response and monitoring capabilities.

34. (SBU) The Department of Energy also has several projects
that are focused on securing nuclear materials, including a
major project to decommission and store spent fuel from
Kazakhstan,s BN-350 fast breeder reactor. Currently, OSD
(NCB) has offered assistance in the form security and
consequence management seminars, a table top exercise and of
a field exercise to test the readiness incident response
forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Troops,
which provides security escort for fuel shipments between&#x000A
;Aktau (where the reactor is located) and the Semipalatinsk
Test Site, where the fuel will be kept in long-term storage.
The Special Troops also have a rapid response force at the
storage site. The Government of Kazakhstan is considering
the offered exercise assistance.

35. (SBU) The Department of State funds additional
nonproliferation projects implemented by the International
Science and Technology Center (ISTC). State also takes a
leading role in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Weapons Terrorism, in which Kazakhstan participates.

Security assistance and engagement overview

36. (S) We harbor no illusions to the contrary ) Russia is
and will remain Kazakhstan's number one security partner.
Kazakhstan MoD will partner with the U.S. to modernize, but
we will need your help in rebuilding trust in the US Security
Assistance (SA) apparatus. We have the long-term goal of
transforming the Kazakhstan Armed Forces into a deployable
force which not only can adequately protect national
sovereignty, but also becomes an agent of democratic reform
and rule of law within Kazakhstan. We have identified three
areas where U.S.-Kazakh interests overlap: Defense Reform
(both doctrine and equipment), security of the ungoverned
spaces of the Caspian Sea Basin and Southern Kazakhstan, and
the development of a deployable Peace Support Operations
(PSO) capability to support multilateral UN-sanctioned
operations. We have seen progress over the past few years,
but lack of fiscal commitment, especially in the Huey II
helicopter program, continues to undermine U.S. credibility,
resulting in Kazakhstan,s lack of enthusiasm to commit
national funds to modernization and transformation. We
continue to work with OSD, CENTCOM, DSCA and the Military
Services Security Assistance Commands to overcome these
obstacles and to develop and execute solutions to the myriad
of problems on the Huey II. The bottom line is that the
United States, credibility and reliability are at stake with
regard to our SA endeavors.

Hmmwvs

37. (SBU) Kazakhstan HMMWV fleet currently includes 114
vehicles (45 up-armored vehicles, the rest being primarily
unarmored or ambulances). KAZBRIG uses the HMMWVs for
training peacekeepers and is expected to deploy with them as
part of a future PSO. MOD has made a commitment to the
sustainment of the HMMWVs through the development of the
&Asia HMMWV Center8 and a Unit Maintenance facility at
KAZBRIG. The initial success of the HMMWV program in
Kazakhstan led to the MOD requesting eight Huey II
helicopters (highly modified UH-1Hs) through the FMF program.


Huey ii helicopters

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38. (SBU) This program failed to meet the original goal of
achieving full operational capability with an eight-aircraft
unit by 2010, primarily due to underfunding. Movement
forward will require over $55M in funding and more deliberate
attention from U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
responsible for the program. The U.S. delivered the first
two of eight Excess Defense Article (EDA) Huey IIs in
November 2007, and an agreement for a third has been signed
lat this year due to Kazakhstan,s FMF funding being
decreased while refurbishment costs continue to rise.
Currently, at over $8M per aircraft for refurbishment and
delivery alone, plus the additional resources needed for
associated support equipment and training, Kazakhstan needs
over $55M to provide the remaining five aircraft. In
addition to the funding issue, the Huey II operational
readiness rates have hovered at zero since in July 2008 due
to shortages of ground maintenance equipment, adequate spare
parts and publications. A prime example of the issues at
hand - when the Huey II s required routine 150 flight hour
service, the initial parts package did not include all needed
parts for the service, but did include over $160K in
non-required or non-Huey II parts. As a short-term fix, we
are working with the Kazakhstani MOD and U.S. Army case
managers to coordinate contractor maintenance oversight and
provide the parts and equipment necessary to complete these
basic periodic inspections, while concurrently staffing
U.S.-required airworthiness release to allow U.S. maintainers
and pilots to train MOD personnel onboard their aircraft. We
are working to find alternative means to fund the Huey II
program including an FY09 1206 proposal which was disapproved
within DOD and a recent CENTCOM initiated supplemental
funding request which is currently making its way through the
DOD pipeline. CENTCOM and US Embassy staffs have developed a
supplemental funding request for $60 million to complete the
Kazakhstan Huey-II helicopter program. This request is
currently stalled at OSD due to OSD Comptroller
non-concurrence. The delivery of the two helicopters was a
major news item in Kazakhstan that reached the attention of
President Nazarbayev - the death of this program will surely
reach him as well. Additionally, should we prove unreliable
then there exists little reason for Kazakhstan to commit
national funds for the procurement/refurbishment of C130s )
the third pillar of the HMMWV- Huey II -C130 triad.

39. (C) The reduction in funding combined with an unreliable
and unresponsive SA system damage U.S. reliability and
credibility, as well as the credibility of pro-U.S./Western
allies within the MOD. The anti-U.S./pro-Russian faction
within MOD will use this to undercut our supporters within
the government ) and do not require an active role but
passively point to the unreliability of the U.S. as a
security partner. xxxxxxxxxxxx in order to show the
skeptics that the U.S. is a credible and reliable partner,
U.S./Western technology is superior and Kazakhstan,s
soldiers can be trained to use and sustain U.S./Western
equipment.

Defense transportation system (dts)

40. (SBU) FMS and 1206 equipment and spare parts shipments
are routinely delayed due to shortfalls or inaccuracies in
transport documentation. Lack of documentation from shippers
has contributed not only to significant delays in equipment
delivery, but has cost the Kazakhstani MOD over $50K in
unprogrammed impound storage fees in the last 18 months.
Kazakhstan does not have its own freight forwarder, and is
solely reliant on FMF-funded DTS for equipment delivery )
the negative impact on our credibility is further exacerbated
when we cannot deliver U.S. equipment using our own
transportation system in an efficient and timely manner. We
still encourage Kazakhstan to hire a freight forwarder, but

Astana 00000251 011 of 014


even if it did so, we are required to use DTS for U.S.
equipment delivered under some special programs like 1206 )
so a fix to DTS is still essential. We are working with
DSCA, TRANSCOM and the military services, security
assistance organizations to address these systemic shortfalls.

C-130s

41. (SBU) The Ministry of Defense requested six EDA C-130s
in 2006, but Congress only rec
ently released EDA C-130s. The
C-130s could provide a valuable capstone for our bilateral
security cooperation, should we be able to overcome systemic
shortcomings. xxxxxxxxxxxx USAF (Jun 09) and USN (Dec 09) provided
the Kazakh MOD with Pricing and Availability (P&A) data for
the procurement/refurbishment of six EDA C-130. Current
estimates for this program are between $210 and $265M )
purchase will require the commitment of Kazakh national
funds, since this far exceeds available or anticipated FMF.
While the Ministry of Defense indicated national funds are
available in 2011, it must soon refine its request to start
long lead processes such as congressional notification, spare
parts procurement, and the scheduling of training. This may
allow the U.S. system the opportunity to meet the MOD
requested initial operational capability date of 2013.
Kazakhstan currently has a C- rating under the Interagency
Country Risk Assessment methodology, which does not allow DOD
to schedule a payment plan with Kazakhstan. The Department
of Treasury and the Department of State have expressed
opposition to an improvement in the rating, for reasons
related to risk in the financial sector.

Military-to-military (m2m) cooperation

42. (SBU) The CENTCOM M2M contact plan has grown to 145
events in FY09 (this figure does not include FMF, IMET,
Peacekeeping or 1206 projects), and we expect to conduct
approximately 130 events in FY10. Despite the slight
decrease in quantity, there has also been a significant
increase in the quality of events ) the subject matter is
increasingly complex and comprehensive, and event
preparations are more professionally planned, coordinated and
executed. Kazakhstan has asked for U.S. assistance through
M2M activities in a number of key areas that stand to have a
long-term impact on the modernization and transformation of
their military, to include the development of national
military doctrine, curriculum and faculty development for
their Professional Military Education (PME) institutions, and
interoperability through acquisition of equipment and TTP
implementation.

Kazbrig evolution

43. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx Originally,
plans were to have most of KAZBRIG professionally-manned,
equipped, and trained by the end of 2009, however, little to
no progress in the sphere of professionalization has occurred
with KAZBRIG since late 2003 ) the same time that KAZBRIG
became a priority focus of U.S. Security Cooperation efforts.
Obstacles KAZBRIG must overcome include a variety of
manning, equipping and training obstacles, but by far the
most serious obstacle is the lack of professionalization.
Professionalization is the only means for KAZBRIG to become a
fully mission capable and deployable peace-keeping force.
The Kazakhs committed to accomplishing this objective by
2010, as well as obtaining NATO level-2 certification. The
Kazakhs, however, have continued to slide these objectives to

Astana 00000251 012 of 014


the right, with the endstate and intermediate steps to
reaching an endstate remaining undefined.
Professionalization has simply not occurred, and with 70
percent of the force still being conscripted, KAZBRIG
continues to remain non-deployable and non-mission capable )
by Kazakhstan law conscripts cannot deploy outside of
Kazakhstan. This non-deployable non-mission capable status
will continue until there is a serious commitment on behalf
of the Kazakhstan MOD and Government to professionalize. The
limited professionalization of KAZBRIG resembles a shotgun
pattern, spread throughout the officer and NCO cadre in 1st
and 2nd Battalions and KAZBRIG HQ. In light of a shifting
target and the Kazakhstan MOD demand for U.S. assistance, the
U.S. has remained committed and continues to train and equip
KAZBRIG for a deployment that remains undefined and
unobtainable in current circumstances. One battalion is
currently manned, albeit at a 70 percent conscript rate, and
trained for PSO, with the 2d Battalion continuing to undergo
transformation, and conversion of KAZBRIG,s third combat
battalion being indefinitely postponed. A result of the
predominance of conscripts, with losses caused by draftees
demobilizing annually at the rate of 70 percent, as well as
the loss of NCOs/officers disillusioned by the lack of a
meaningful deployment and substandard pay and benefits.
KAZBRIG officers tend to attribute recruitment and retention
problems to this lack of deployment. The NATO evaluation
from the 2008 Steppe Eagle exercise, a U.S./UK/KZ exercise,
indicated the one operational battalion of KAZBRIG is NATO
interoperable with limitations. MOD conducted an internal
evaluation of 2d Battalion during Steppe Eagle 2009, and
plans to conduct another assessment of 2d Battalion and
KAZBRIG staff during Steppe Eagle 2010 ) deferring further
NATO interoperability and capabilities assessments of two
battalions and the Brigade staff until 2011-2012.

44. (S) Recent information indicates the UK MOD is seriously
considering the termination of all security assistance with
Kazakhstan due to the lack of progress with KAZBRIG. It also
appears that the UK MOD will most likely provide the
Kazakhstan MOD with the ultimatum of professionalizing
KAZBRIG according to a strict timeline with the requirement
of deploying and sustaining a platoon-size element as part of
ISAF within the RC-South area to conduct base security/force
protection operations. It also appears that if the Kazakhs
do not commit to this request that all security cooperation
will cease. Additionally, the UK would like our support for
establishing strict professionalization and deployment
requirements and timeline, otherwise the concern is that the
Kazakhs will ignore the UK request and continue to rely on
U.S. Security Cooperation to bridge the gap should the UK
terminate its support.

Kazbrig deployment

45. (C) The Steppe Eagle exercise and NATO evaluation were
critical to a potential deployment announcement for the
KAZBRIG. A successful evaluation of the KAZBRIG is a
necessary, but not sufficient condition for a deployment
announcement. Given that the only deployable unit of KAZBRIG
is a single battalion, then to sustain operations over the
long-term the largest deployable unit is a company-size
element inherent to the 3:1 deploy-reset-train force
generation model. The past deployment of a platoon-size
element in support of OIF did not meet the 3:1 ratio,
however, future plans to deploy up to a company-size element
match current capacity. Since Kazakhstani law allows only
professional soldiers to participate in international
operations, and since currently only KAZBRIG officer and NCO
cadre are professional, MOD must also commit to full KAZBRIG
professionalization to provide a deployable unit. Lack of a
professionalized unit also undercuts effectiveness of
combined exercises and training ) over 70 percent of KAZBRIG
personnel participating in Steppe Eagle 2009 were conscripts
who will be demobilized prior to Steppe Eagle 2010. Our

Astana 00000251 013 of 014


general belief, following a deployment announ
cement, is that
manning problems would evaporate, training focus and
assistance would increase, and KAZBRIG would be ready to
conduct basic peace support operations in a low to medium
threat environment under the command of a lead nation.

Caspian response force development

46. (S) The FY 2008 1206 train and equip program has focused
on the development of a KAZ MOD special operations force
(SOF) element to respond to threats to critical energy
infrastructure and other vital sites in the Caspian region.
Equipment delivered includes four 7-meter rigid-hull
inflatable assault boats, and pending shipments include open-
and closed-circuit SCUBA equipment, HMMWVs, and additional
support items. 1206-funded contract basic SCUBA training was
completed in Jul 09, and SOCCENT and the US Navy conducted
Counter-NarcoTerrorism Training 2009 to assist KAZ SOF in
building effective capabilities for maritime operations.
While most equipment has not yet been delivered, KAZ SOF
units have undergone several resubordinations and
reorganizations in the interim ) our relationship with KAZ
SOF is still evolving. We are maintaining planned current
activities, but monitoring this relationship to ensure it
remains focused in line with agreed bilateral goals.

Civilian-to-military (c2m) cooperation

47. (U) The CENTCOM C2M contact plan has also seen great
growth over the past two years, primarily due to the interest
of the Minister of Emergency Situations (MES), Valdimir
Bozhko. Minister Bozhko has shown a personal interest in
working with U.S. Agencies. The C2M programs are mainly
conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE),
Arizona National Guard (AZNG), and local Arizona emergency
response agencies via the National Guard Bureau (NGB) State
Partnership Program. MES interest was highlighted by a visit
to Arizona and Washington, DC by the MES Minister, Vladimir
Bozhko, in July 2008 to discuss the C2M program and set the
stage for future C2M cooperation. Minister Bozhko was
engaged and extremely pleased with his visit, and clearly
outlined the areas he would like assistance from Arizona and
the Corps of Engineers. The FY09 cooperation plan with MES
marked a sizable expansion in the number and type of
engagement activities with MES. This included exchange
visits in Arizona and Kazakhstan of firefighting and 911
operations. Additionally, the USACE laid the ground work for
future training workshops for MES, and already held a
Regional Geographical Information Systems (GIS) Workshop in
Astana, Water and Levee Management Workshop in the U.S., as
well as an MES visit to Washington DC to discuss future
engagements in the areas of industrial safety, including oil
spills, GIS and others. Our FY10 cooperation plan envisages
a continuation of FY09 engagement, as well as an MES Senior
Representatives visit to AZNG and USNORTHCOM. Minister
Bozhko has currently expressed particular interest in the
interagency and local/state/federal coordination process
within the National Response Framework and the National
Incident Management System. Unfortunately, the NGB State
Partnership Program was only allocated $2.2M for C2M programs
in FY09 to distribute amongst 48 states with programs in 63
countries. Arizona received a relatively sizable $200K of
available funds, but will only be able to execute 3 of the 11
planned events with MES in FY10. OMC has asked the AZNG for
additional NGB funding for C2M programs.

Counter-narcotics (cn) programs

48. (S) In November 2007 OMC added the new position of CN
Program Coordinator. This expansion highlighted the growth
of CENTCOM CN programs in Kazakhstan in cooperation with the
Kazakh Border Guard Service (BGS). Since that time OMC has
worked closely within the Country Team, particularly INL and
EXBS, on CN and border security exchange, training, and

Astana 00000251 014 of 014


equipment programs aimed at helping Kazakhstan secure its
borders. CENTCOM funding has delivered night-vision and
avionics upgrades for three Mi-8MT helicopters ($7.9M), five
Sabre 4000 hand held detectors for use at border check points
($500K), and 10 UAZ 4x4 vehicles for the BGS quick response
forces ($500K). OMC is currently working with the BGS on a
ground-surveillance radar (GSR) program. FY09 CENTCOM
funding is projected at $10M and is scheduled for upgrading
one additional Mi-8MT, additional GSRs, mobile checkpoint
shelters, and remote sensor systems. The CN programs also
include training programs such as checkpoint inspection
training. Finally, the CN exchange program has facilitated
solid events such as visits to the USCG training center and
the U.S.-Mexico border. These exchanges have fostered a
closer relationship with the BGS and a greater interest in
working with the U.S. The BGS is organized under
Kazakhstan,s Intelligence Service, the Committee for State
Security (KNB), an unreformed former Soviet intelligence
service with close ties to the FSB and suspicious of U.S.
interaction. The KNB has recently asserted itself as
oversight for our cooperation with the BGS and begun to
severely limit the scope and participation in engagement
activities. In coordination with INL, OMC is starting to
develop cooperative training, equipment and construction
programs with the interagency Counternarcotics Committee,
under the Ministry for Internal Affairs, and the Customs
Committee, under the Finance Ministry.

Final words

49. (SBU) In conclusion, we are very much looking forward to
your upcoming visit. The entire Embassy team looks forward
to providing you with a rewarding and productive visit with a
valuable strategic partner who is vital to our national
strategic interests. We remain ready to answer any of your
questions.
Hoagland

Wikileaks

10ASTANA249, KAZAKHSTAN: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTS ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA249 2010-02-22 05:52 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9268
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0249/01 0530552
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220552Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7504
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2504
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1850
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1466
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2556
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2047
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1895
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2333

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000249 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTS ON 
RECIPROCITY IN DOING BUSINESS 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 0247 
     B. ASTANA 0175 
     C. ASTANA 0049 
 
ASTANA 00000249  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  This is an action cable (see para 6). 
The Ambassador met Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov on 
February 19 to discuss a range of issues, including the 
Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABC), the visit of Special 
Representative Richard Holbrooke, tarmac access, FSN income 
taxes, the Presidential Entrepreneurship Summit, and the 
pending AES arbitration case.  Post reported separately on 
the ABC (ref A).  END SUMMARY. 
 
NO MORE SUNDAY VISITS 
 
2.  (SBU) Regarding the visit on February 21 of Special 
Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, 
Umarov told the Amabssador that Kazakhstan welcomed the 
visit, and would accommodate the delegation at a Sunday 
meeting with Saudabayev.  However, he put his hands down 
firmly on the table and said, "This is the last Sunday 
meeting we will accept.  We are not going to tolerate this 
any more.  In the future," he said, "Sunday meetings will be 
impossible to arrange." 
 
TARMAC ACCESS BASED ON RECIPROCITY 
 
3.  (SBU) The Ambassador informed Umarov that the Embassy has 
found it increasingly difficult to obtain permission for 
Embassy staff and vehicles to access the airport tarmac to 
meet arriving flights delivering classified pouches.  Umarov 
admitted that the MFA had "absolutely revised its norms" and 
procedures regarding tarmac access.  Reciprocity," he said, 
"is the key issue."  Umarov explained that if a country wants 
to increase the number of people who have access to a special 
zone at the airport, then it must be prepared to grant 
Kazakhstan the same level of access.  According to Umarov, 
all of the European countries have agreed to this principle. 
 
4.  (SBU) The Ambassador pushed back, noting that flights 
delivering classified pouches are a different issue than 
access to greet visiting dignitaries, and that strict 
reciprocity is not possible.  Umarov disagreed.  He said that 
Kazakhstan also sends diplomatic pouches with classified 
material, but has not complained to the United States about 
its inability to meet the shipment on the tarmac.  "We play 
by your rules, and we don,t complain," he said.  The 
Ambassador promised to research the issue further and Umarov 
agreed to revisit the issue later.  Umarov said that 
Kazakhstan must play fair with all countries represented in 
Kazakhstan, but indicated that if there are special 
circumstances or exceptions for Russia or China, for example, 
then he would be willing to ask the MFA,s Protocol 
Department to make a similar exception for the United States. 
 
FSN TAXES 
 
5.  (SBU) On the issue of local taxes, the Ambassador 
informed Umarov that local Embassy employees in Almaty 
continue to complain about being harassed by the Financial 
Police for not having paid their personal income taxes in 
full, on time.  Umarov admitted that he was not well informed 
about the specifics of the issue, but promised that the MFA 
would raise it with the Financial Police.  He also said that 
the MFA was working with the Ministry of Finance to schedule 
a meeting in Almaty for local Embassy employees to discuss 
the taxation issue. 
 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP SUMMIT 
 
6.  (SBU) Umarov brought up the Presidential Entrepreneurship 
Summit on April 26-27, and said that one of the three 
 
ASTANA 00000249  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
Kazakhstani delegates would like to deliver an address at the 
Summit, particularly if other delegations will be given an 
opportunity to speak (ref B).  The Ambassador promised to 
relay this request to Washington.  Umarov also said that the 
Embassy of Kazakhstan in Washington is actively engaged in 
promoting Kazakhstan,s role in the Summit, and is working 
with the U.S.-Kazakhstan Business Association to organize 
representational events during the week of the Summit. 
During an informal conversation on February 21, Umarov asked 
the Ambassador if it would be possible to substitute a 
leading female entrepreneur for one of the three males.  He 
said, "It doesn't seem right that you haven't included a 
woman."  ACTION REQUEST:  Please advise if it will be 
possible for a member of the Kazakshtani delegation to speak 
at the Entrepreneurship Summit, and if it would be possible 
to add or substitute an appropriate female entrepreneur for 
the Kazakhstani delegation.  END ACTION REQUEST. 
 
AES SENDING MI
XED SIGNALS 
 
7.  (SBU) Umarov told the Ambassador that the government of 
Kazakhstan has received "contradictory signals" from the U.S. 
energy company AES.  He said the government has "no 
understanding of where the company stands and what they 
want."  Umarov said the U.S. power company contacted the 
Embassy of Kazakhstan in Washington and asked for Ambassador 
Idrissov,s assistance to craft a compromise position to 
resolve an impasse that appears headed toward international 
arbitration (ref C).  Umarov said that AES informed Idrissov 
that the company would like to reach a compromise that would 
enable AES to remain in Kazakhstan for the long-term.  But he 
said that in Kazakhstan, the government has a different 
impression.  "We would like to continue to work with this 
company," he asserted.  "But there are many negative feelings 
about what they did and how they did it.  All we hear from 
AES are demands and criticism of our laws," he said.  (NOTE: 
One of the key issues for both sides is electricity tariffs. 
Kazakhstan also complains that AES has failed to meet its 
capital investment commitments.  END NOTE).  Umarov said the 
Ministry of Finance will "soon" present AES with its proposal 
for resolving the pending dispute.  "If AES signs it," he 
said, "then we can put this to rest and move on.  If they 
don,t" he warned, "then we will have to find a different 
solution." 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA248, KAZAKHSTAN: S/GWI PROJECT PROPOSALS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA248 2010-02-21 02:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8843
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0248/01 0520226
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210226Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7499
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2499
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1845
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2551
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1461
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2710
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3000
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2042
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1890
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ASTANA 000248 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPAO KWMN KTIP KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  S/GWI PROJECT PROPOSALS 
 
REF: A) 09 STATE 132094 
 B) STATE 12531 
 
ASTANA 00000248  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Post nominates three projects, in order of priority, for 
funding consideration under the small grants initiative of the 
Office of Global Women's Issues.  A brief summary and budget for 
each project follows below. 
 
PROJECT 1: GENDER ISSUES IN THE SPREAD OF HIV/AIDS 
 
A) NGO:  Central Asia Association of People Living with HIV 
 
B) Proposal summary: The sexual transmission of HIV has grown from 
1% at the beginning of the epidemic to 30% in 2009.  HIV is growing 
among wives of drug users and among sex workers.  Last year, the 
Central Asia Association of People Living with HIV (PLWH) initiated 
focus group discussions on gender issues of HIV/AIDS epidemic, with 
funding from the Eastern European and Central Asian Network of PLWH. 
These focus groups tried to identify the role of gender aspects of 
the epidemic and identified the need for other assessment to do more 
in-depth analysis of role of gender in the growing transmission of 
HIV among women.  An S/GWI grant to the Central Asia Association of 
People Living with HIV will help identify specifics and 
particularities of gender related issues of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 
the country and in Central Asia that are related to the region's 
socio-cultural environment.  This will help identify the role of 
gender stereotypes in the transmission of HIV and will help develop 
programs that address these stereotypes to prevent the spread of the 
epidemic.  The findings of this analysis will help develop materials 
that international projects and partners will use to focus HIV 
prevention programs on women that are vulnerable to HIV. 
 
C) Specific activities: 
 
Under this grant, the Central Asia Association of PLWH will: 
-- Conduct series of seminars to improve the capacity of 
representatives from AIDS service organizations and organizations of 
PLWH in using methodologies for gender studies in HIV/AIDS.  The 
organization will conduct two 3-day seminars in Shymkent and 
Ust-Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan, one in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and one 
in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, for approximately 15 to 20 participants from 
each region. 
-- A cross-cultural assessment on gender will be conducted by two 
experts from the All-Ukrainian Association of PLWH and one expert 
from Kazakhstan, who will travel to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan to meet with NGOs, governmental organizations and 
religious leaders to interview them about their opinion on gender 
inequality and how it affects the HIV epidemic (including the role 
of violence against women in the spread of HIV). Findings of the 
assessment will be used for future programming of educational and 
training materials for AIDS service organizations. 
 
D) Performance indicators: 
 
-- Number of people trained in gender and HIV 
-- Results of the cross-cultural study disseminated to main 
stakeholders 
 
E) Detailed budget: 
1. Two 3-day training sessions on methodologies for gender studies 
and gender issues of HIV/AIDS in Kazakhstan $18,000 each ($36,000) 
2. Round trip of two consultants from Ukraine ($1,000) 
3. Travel of the two Ukrainian consultants and one Kazakhstani 
consultant to Shymkent, Ust-Kamenogors, Aktobe and Kzyl-Orda 
($5,000) 
4. Honoraria and per diem for consultants ($17,000) 
5. Round trip to Dushanbe and to Bishkek for three consultants 
($1,500) 
6.  3-day training in Dushanbe ($10,000) 
7.  3-day training in Bishkek ($10,000) 
8.  Data analysis in Kiev by the consultant on-line with Kazakhstani 
consultant ($1,000) 
9.  Round trip by two consultants to present results and conduct 
consultative meetings in Almaty, Bishkek and Dushanbe ($8,000) 
10.  Costs of three round tables to present results ($3,000) 
11.  Printing of report and miscellaneous costs ($5,000) 
Total ($100,000) 
 
ASTANA 00000248  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
F) Project length: 12 months 
 
G) USAID Mission in Almaty will administer this project. 
 
PROPOSAL 2: VOCATIONAL TRAINING FOR VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE 
 
A) The INL section would manage the following project, which would 
be implemented by the Association of NGOs Against Trafficking in 
Persons in Central Asia (AATIPCA) and provide vocational training 
and reintegration for victims of trafficking-in-persons (TIP).  This 
project supplements current INL programs to en
courage government 
funding for TIP shelters and train shelter employees. 
 
Project duration: 18 months (Phase I - 2 months, Phase II - 16 
months) 
 
Estimated start date: September 2010 
 
Project coverage: Kazakhstan (with impact on Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan and other CIS countries through assistance to 
citizens of those countries trafficked into Kazakhstan) 
 
Total budget:  $100,000 (Phase I - $2,000; Phase II - $98,000) 
 
B) Problem Identification and Project Summary: 
 
Since the mid-1990s, Kazakhstan has come a long way in preventing 
human trafficking, protecting victims, and prosecuting traffickers. 
Trafficking in persons (TIP) is criminalized and the definition of 
TIP provided in the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children is used in 
national legislation. Kazakhstan also provides for direct or 
indirect protection for victims of trafficking within the law. 
 
Victims trafficked to Kazakhstan and Kazakhstanis trafficked abroad 
require a variety of services to be successfully reintegrated and 
protected from re-victimization and stigmatization.  To date, the 
vast majority of services available for TIP victims in Kazakhstan 
have been provided by NGOs.  Along with the basic needs of 
accommodation, food, clothing, and medical assistance, victims need 
support to learn sustainable life skills. 
 
In addition to professional skills learned in vocational training, 
victims will need psychological counseling and long-term support and 
protection.  Stigmatization of victims put them at a high risk of 
re-victimization and deviant behavior.  In order to protect the 
victims and to gradually change the public attitudes towards them, 
advocacy activities are needed. 
 
This project will provide assistance to victims of trafficking to 
master sustainable employment and life skills through vocational 
training courses and help them to find employment. The project would 
also advocate for the fair treatment of victims of trafficking and 
other violent crimes in Kazakhstan. 
 
Project Description 
 
The project will consist of four activities to be implemented in two 
phases. 
 
- During phase one (first and second month) activity one will be 
conducted. 
 
- During phase two (third through eighteenth month) activities two 
and three will be conducted. 
 
Specific Project Activities 
 
Activity 1 - Development of Guidelines 
 
AATIPCA will develop guidelines for providing vocational training to 
TIP victims.  The guidelines will be country and region specific and 
can serve as a handbook for any NGO rendering assistance to TIP 
victims.  The treatment of foreign victims in Kazakhstan will be 
included. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000248  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
Activity 2 - Vocational Training and Related Support 
 
Vocational training has rarely been a priority in assistance 
programs for victims of trafficking.  Food and lodging in permanent 
or temporary shelters, medical treatment, psychological counseling, 
and legal services have all been more common in the past.  However, 
NGOs have found that vocational training is a powerful tool for 
preventing re-victimization. 
 
Within the proposed project, AATIPCA will assist victims to select 
and take vocational training courses, and, when possible, assist 
them in finding employment.  Vocational training will be provided by 
specialized companies selected by NGOs.  Training will include but 
won't be limited to accounting, cooking and restaurant services, 
computer skills, carpentry, sewing, hairdressing, manicuring, and 
training in how to find employment and run a business. 
 
As necessary, AATIPCA will provide victims with temporary lodging 
and food during training, pay for transportation, and supply 
clothing, as many victims have no clothing when they escape. 
AATIPCA will also cover the costs of necessary medical treatment. 
 
The majority of vocational courses require textbooks, instruments, 
and special uniforms and certain courses require medical 
examinations before training.  AATIPCA will cover the costs for all 
such items related to training. 
 
Activity 3 - Victim Advocacy 
 
In order to strengthen victim protection mechanisms, AATIPCA will 
analyze victims' cases and advocate for necessary amendments in 
national legislation.   This activity will be in cooperation with 
NGOs in Kazakhstan and in neighboring countries from which victims 
originate, e.g. Uzbekistan. 
 
C) Performance measures 
 
To measure the performance, AATIPCA will track the number of victims 
assisted by the project and the percentage receiving employment. 
When possible, AATIPCA will collect feedback information from 
victims. 
 
AATIPCA expects that, during the project lifetime, not less than 45 
victims will successfully pass vocational training at each of the 9 
locations where the NGO members operate.  This estimate is based on 
similar projects conducted by individual NGOs. 
 
D) Recipient organization and its capacity 
 
The Association of NGOs Against Trafficking in Persons in Central 
Asia (AATIPCA) was formed in 2008 as a network of NGOs members and 
partners in Kazakhstan and neighboring countries which coordinate 
anti-TIP and related activities and develop assistance, advocacy, 
training and research standards. 
 
Currently, AATIPCA is made up of 11 members and 7 partners.  The 
member NGOs have been working to prevent TIP and assist victims 
since 2001.  AATIPCA members are experienced in direct assistance to 
victims of trafficking and other violent crimes (sexual assaults, 
kidnapping, etc.), including the provision of shelters, 
psychological counseling, and medical assistance.  Two operate 
permanent shelters for victims of trafficking and another operates 
temporary shelters on an as-needed basis and depending on 
availability of funds. NGO members have experience supporting 
victims. 
 
AATIPCA coordinates the activities of its members and partners, 
maintains cooperation with governmental agencies and Parliament, 
provides counseling and assistance, and holds awareness raising and 
analytical workshops and other events. 
 
Since May 2009, AATIPCA has provided assistance funded by the Almaty 
International Women's Club.  Food, medicines, and medical treatment 
are provided.  This project will be completed in April 2010, but 
AATIPCA is raising funds for further support of the basic needs of 
victims. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000248  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
E) Detailed budget 
 
- Development & printing of assistance guidelines  $2,000 
- Coordination of assistance activities & reporting $3,600 
- Administrative costs $2,130 
 
- Training courses $13,500 
 
- Textbooks and supplies $4,500 
 
- Support for victims (includes housing, food, clothing, 
medical)$64,370 
 
- Administrative costs for individual NGOs $9,900 
 
 
 
 
 
PROPOSAL 3: ASSISTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
A) NGO: Union of Crisis Centers 
 
B) Proposal summary: Domestic viole
nce remains a serious problem in 
Kazakhstan.  The police registered over 40,000 cases of domestic 
violence in 2009, and the Union of Crisis Centers received over 
20,000 calls on its crisis hot-line.  In December 2009, the 
government adopted a new law on prevention of domestic violence. 
The new legislation introduces new concepts and mechanisms for the 
prevention of domestic violence that the Kazakhstani authorities 
will be implementing for the first time.  With the grant from S/GWI, 
the Union of Crisis Centers proposes to pursue three objectives: A) 
develop a training module and conduct 16 trainings on the 
domestic-violence law for experts from the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor, and NGOs; B) 
organize a wide-reaching information campaign aimed at law 
enforcement officials across the country to raise their awareness of 
the problem of domestic violence; and C) provide legal and 
psychological assistance to 18,000 domestic violence victims and 
establish shelters in 8 existing crisis centers.  The Union of 
Crisis Centers is a well-established federation of NGOs working on 
domestic violence issues. 
 
C) Specific Activities: 
-- Develop a training module and conduct 16 trainings on the 
domestic-violence law for experts from the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor, and NGOs; 
-- Organize a wide-reaching information campaign aimed at law 
enforcement officials across the country to raise their awareness of 
the problem of domestic violence and their responsibilities under 
the new domestic-violence law; 
-- provide legal and psychological assistance to 18,000 domestic 
violence victims and establish shelters in 8 existing crisis 
centers. 
 
D) Indicators: 
-- Number of trainings conducted 
-- Number of victims assisted 
-- Number of people reached through information campaign 
 
E) Detailed budget: 
-- Coordinator's salary, book-keeper, taxes ($7,461) 
-- Hotline costs ($4,500) 
-- 16 trainings in regions, 25 trainees each ($53,200) 
-- Information campaign supplies (booklets, billboards, video clips 
in Russian and Kazakh) ($11,130) 
-- Organization of information campaign ($3,800) 
-- Support of activities of 8 crisis centers ($29,000) 
-- Round-table ($5,310) and supporting activities ($2,250) 
-- Subtotal ($151,001) 
-- Contribution from Union of Crisis Centers ($34,050) 
-- Contribution from the Ministry of Interior ($17,000) 
-- Total requested ($99,951) 
 
F) Project duration: 12 months 
 
E) Embassy Astana will administer this grant. 
 
ASTANA 00000248  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
HOAGLAND

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10ASTANA227, KAZAKHSTAN: SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE

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10ASTANA227 2010-02-18 00:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6364
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0227/01 0490032
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 180032Z FEB 10 ZFR
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7451
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2466
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1826
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2532
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1442
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1871
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RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2300

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ASTANA 000227 
 
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SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE 
 
ASTANA 00000227  001.6 OF 006 
 
 
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SPRATLEN

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10ASTANA226, KAZAKHSTAN: SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE

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10ASTANA226 2010-02-18 00:31 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6345
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0226/01 0490031
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ASTANA 00000226  001.6 OF 006 
 
 
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10ASTANA225, KAZAKHSTAN: SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE

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10ASTANA225 2010-02-18 00:31 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6264
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DE RUEHTA #0225/01 0490031
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SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE 
 
ASTANA 00000225  001.3 OF 006 
 
 
1.  (U) Sen...

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10ASTANA198, KAZAKHSTAN: FIRST PRESIDENT OF KAZAKHOIL CALLS FOR

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10ASTANA198 2010-02-16 06:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4189
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000198 
 
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SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  FIRST PRESIDENT OF KAZAKHOIL CALLS FOR 
GREATER CONTROL OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 
 
ASTANA 00000198  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On February 10, Nurlan Balgimbayev -- former 
Prime Minister and first president of KazakhOil -- shared his 
strident opinions of the national oil company he helped to create, 
the degree of local content in oil and gas exploration and 
production, and the attitude and behavior of international oil 
companies operating in Kazakhstan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE SLOW, RIGID BUREAUCRACY OF KMG 
 
3.  (SBU) Balgimbayev, who served as Prime Minister from 1997-99 and 
president of KazakhOil, the predecessor to national oil company 
KazMunaiGas (KMG), from 1999-2002, remains one of President 
Nazarbayev's closest advisors on energy issues.  Meeting with Energy 
Officer alone in his private offices, Balgimbayev was surprisingly 
blunt in his criticism of KMG, its affiliates, and even the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR).  He called KMG "inflexible, 
bureaucratic, cumbersome, slow, and generally incapable" in its 
current form of managing Kazakhstan's natural resource wealth 
effectively.  Becoming more agitated as he spoke, Balgimbayev 
pointed at the stationery and office equipment on his desk and said, 
"I had to bring all this from home.  Otherwise, if I had to go 
through KMG, I wouldn't even have a pencil to write with!" 
 
LACK OF FIELD EXPERIENCE HINDERS DECISION MAKING 
 
4.  (SBU) Balgimbayev said that to obtain approval for procurement 
or personnel decisions, he has to go through 11 layers of KMG 
management, which he said takes up to three months.  According to 
Balgimbayev, KMG has become a large, unwieldy bureaucracy that 
cannot manage its many affiliates and daughter companies 
effectively.  In particular, he said that KMG owns many exploration 
and production projects that lack the independence and authority to 
operate efficiently.  He also criticized the management of KMG, its 
affiliates, and officials in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources (MEMR), who "have not worked their way up to the top. 
Some of them have never worked a day in the field," he exclaimed. 
Balgimbayev insisted that senior managers in KMG and MEMR must have 
at least five years of relevant practical experience. 
 
NOT A BANANA REPUBLIC 
 
5.  (SBU) Balgimbayev laid the blame for Kazakhstan's lack of 
qualified senior managers squarely at the feet of the international 
oil companies (IOC).  "Chevron has been in Kazakhstan for almost 20 
years," he said.  "Surely in that amount of time, they could have 
developed the skills and expertise of their local staff." 
Balgimbayev was visibly upset that there are no Kazakhstani citizens 
installed as managing directors of major oil and gas exploration and 
production projects in Kazakhstan.  Again, he blamed the IOCs. 
"Your companies are so arrogant," he said.  "They think they're 
working in a Banana Republic.  They think they're so big and 
powerful, so much better than us.  They have no confidence in 
Kazakhstan.  They think we're Africans." 
 
NAZARBAYEV CRITICIZES KMG, IOCS 
 
6.  (U) NOTE:  Balgimbayev's scathing remarks closely track with 
President Nazarbayev's strong, public criticism of KMG and the IOCs 
on January 22.  Nazarbayev told a Cabinet meeting that he was 
concerned that not enough qualified Kazakhstani petroleum engineers 
and project managers are working on the largest oil exploration and 
production projects in Kazakhstan.  "No matter how hard we try," 
said Nazarbayev, "we cannot find more than two or three specialists 
working at the top management levels.  There is not a single Kazakh 
(sic) citizen working as a top manager in either of the large 
foreign oil companies operating in Kazakhstan!" Nazarbayev 
continued.  "Why is this happening?," he asked.  "Why do the (IOCs) 
not train and develop managers from among their local staff?"  Then, 
addressing the Cabinet, he ordered, "You have to deal with it."  END 
NOTE. 
 
ASTANA 00000198  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
 
"WITHOUT TENGIZ, THERE WOULD BE NO CHEVRON" 
 
7.  (SBU) When asked if the attitude and approach of Western oil 
companies has changed during the past 20 years, Balgimbayev 
responded bluntly.  "Absolutely nothing has changed," he insisted. 
"Except that now, the President supports me."  Balgimbayev singled 
out ExxonMobil and Chevron for par
ticularly harsh criticism.  He 
recalled a meeting with ExxonMobil in 1992, when a low-level clerk 
approached the Kazakhstani delegation and threw down a packet of 
marketing materials -- in English, not Russian -- and said, "There. 
You can read all about us in that brochure."  He also alleged that 
Chevron is deliberately slowing development of Karachaganak in order 
to conserve resources for expansion of the Tengiz project.  He also 
said that Chevron and other IOCs bought Kazakhstan's most lucrative 
oil fields for a song.  "Chevron bought Tengiz for nothing - 
nothing!  And now it's worth a fortune.  Tengiz saved Chevron.  They 
had no reserves at the time.  Without Tengiz," he insisted, "there 
would be no Chevron." 
 
TAX STABILITY AND THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS 
 
8.  (SBU) Referring to the tax stability clauses in the oil 
exploration and production contracts for Tengiz, Kashagan, and 
Karachaganak, Balgimbayev said that change is inevitable, and that 
it is time to redress the balance.  "This is a new time, and a new 
day," he exclaimed.  "Companies that want to do business in 
Kazakhstan will have to obey our laws and play by our rules." 
Balgimbayev said that he hoped and expected that the government and 
the IOCs would be able to reach a negotiated settlement, but he 
warned that if push came to shove, "we always have one more bullet 
than they do, because this is our country." 
 
9.  (SBU) Balgimbayev insisted that Kazakhstan has a fundamental 
right to own at least a majority stake in the exploration and 
production of oil on its territory, and added that KMG was preparing 
to acquire a stake in Karachaganak.  "I don't just mean 10 or 15%," 
he said.  "I mean all of it." 
 
10.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Despite (or perhaps because of) his lack of a 
formal, top-level position within KMG, Balgimbayev remains a 
highly-influential advisor to President Nazarbayev on energy issues. 
 The timing and tenor of Nazarbayev's criticisms of KMG and the tax 
stability clauses of existing PSAs demonstrate that Balgimbayev 
still has the President's ear.  With oil prices remaining steady 
above $70/barrel, perhaps Nazarbayev has calculated that the time 
has come for even the most favored IOCs to play by Kazakhstan's 
rules, regardless of previously negotiated agreements.  It is 
unclear whether the government will take the dramatic and 
consequential step of dissolving the existing PSAs, but there is no 
doubt that Nazarbayev and his most trusted advisors are convinced 
that it is time for Kazakhstan to reassert its sovereign rights over 
its natural resources.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

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10ASTANA187, KAZAKHSTAN: MFA PUSHES ABC GOALS AS SUMMIT PROSPECTS LOOK

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10ASTANA187 2010-02-16 02:17 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3939
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SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  MFA PUSHES ABC GOALS AS SUMMIT PROSPECTS LOOK 
BRIGHTER AFTER FM VISIT 
 
ASTANA 00000187  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Over a working lunch on February 15, MFA 
Americas Director Askar Tazhiev told Charge that State 
Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev was very pleased with 
his February 1-4 visit to Washington and wants to get to work on 
what the MFA sees as growing U.S. support for the OSCE Summit.  On 
the Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABC), he fretted that the forum 
lacks the necessary high level coverage.  Charge urged MFA to work 
with member states to make the dialogue a success in its proposed 
form.  Tazhiev promised to assist with several lingering 
administrative issues.  END SUMMARY. 
 
TONE OF FM MEETINGS AUGURS WELL FOR THE SUMMIT AND A POSSIBLE 
PRESIDENTIAL BILATERAL 
 
3.  (SBU) MFA Director Tazhiev said State Secretary-Foreign Minister 
Saudabayev had been especially pleased with the tone of his 
Washington meetings during his February 1-4 visit.  According to 
Tazhiev, Saudabayev found the Secretary warm and receptive to 
Astana's ideas across the board.  Saudabayev was also pleased with 
preparations for the Global Nuclear Security Summit.  NSA Jones had 
made U.S. views very clear on what progress in Afghanistan would 
form the basis for a meeting with the President.  On the Summit, 
Tazhiev said it was clear that Afghanistan would be a key focus 
regardless of whatever other issues might be discussed.  Tazhiev 
also said that Saudabayev had found A/S Blake particularly warm, 
taking a strong personal interest in building the relationship.  On 
the Zhovtis case, there were few surprises and Tazhiev said that the 
embassy's request to visit the Ust-Kamenogorsk penal colony where 
the human rights activist is being held was nearly complete.   He 
expected resolution within a week. 
 
ABC SHOULD BE GRANDER 
 
4.  (SBU) Turning to the ABC scheduled for March 8-9, Tazhiev said 
Astana was ready to name its co-chairs once the United States 
provides information about its goals.  But he repeated what we have 
often heard:  Saudabayev still wants something more.  Looking to the 
Russia format and to past practice, he recounted the history of the 
joint commission during former President Clinton's presidency. 
According to Tazhiev, Saudabayev said this was the right formula for 
getting things done:  a broad policy forum with high-level backing 
and sufficient staff support to ensure progress on the agenda.  He 
said that the Annual Bilateral Consultations were a far cry from the 
past since they would take place at the level of Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kairat Umarov and A/S Blake.  He said Astana doubted that 
this forum carried the appropriate political heft to get things done 
in Astana, and urged Washington to hear that Astana still prefers a 
higher level forum.  Charge said the Bureau of South and Central 
Asian Affairs was committed to a successful dialogue across the 
board.  Washington was preparing for the Summit and we expect the 
bilateral consultations with Kazakhstan to be as successful as those 
with other Central Asian states. 
 
CENTCOM VISIT MAY CONFLICT WITH THE ABC 
 
5.  (SBU) Tazhiev welcomed the February 21 visit of SRAP Holbrooke, 
but said a meeting with President Nazarbayev was not possible.  He 
noted that CENTCOM General Patraeus would come to Astana March 9, 
but worried that this conflicted with the ABCs, yet another sign of 
the questionable importance of the forum.  Charge assured him that 
the Commander's visit would cover very specific issues, and said it 
was likely that the Ambassador would travel to Washington to 
participate in the broader forum. 
 
HELP ON MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
 
6.  (SBU) Charge left informal points on two lingering 
administrative issues:  first, the need for a meeting with Almaty 
tax authorities to assist locally-engaged staff, and second, 
lingering concerns over receipt of the diplomatic pouch.  Tazhiev 
 
ASTANA 00000187  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
promised to assist with both, particularly the taxation meeting. 
Charge assured him that many employees want to act in good faith and 
pay their personal income taxes on a timely basis, which is our 
policy and theirs, but conflicting information and extra pressure 
from the authorities have created needless anxiety and confusion. 
 
COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST 
 
7.  (SBU) The MFA view on the ABC is not new.  We have an 
opportunity to make the ABC forum a productive and successful forum, 
but engagement with the Kazakhstani government will be most 
effective if we propose our agenda and co-chairs in the coming days. 
 While Charge made clear that the current formula is the one to 
prepare for, we can expect a continued press for a higher level 
forum that mirrors the format of the U.S.-Russia dialogue.  Charge 
expressed the view that the ABC is a pragmatic and flexible format 
designed to address each country's situation.  It offers the best 
way forward to address many issues of mutual interest.  Keeping the 
Kazakhstanis positive and engaged will depend on our providing 
information soon about the agenda and our co-chairs.  Post requests 
Washington action soonest.  END COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST. 
 
SPRATLEN

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