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10ASTANA251, KAZAKHSTAN: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA251 2010-02-22 07:03 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana
Appears in these articles:
www.spiegel.de

VZCZCXRO9377
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #0251/01 0530703
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 220703Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7507
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2506
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1852
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1468
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2558
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2049
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1897

<>
2/22/2010 7:03
10ASTANA251
Embassy Astana
SECRET

VZCZCXRO9377
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #0251/01 0530703
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 220703Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7507
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2506
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1852
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1468
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2558
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2049
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1897
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET PINR MARR SNAR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER 



S e c r e t section 01 of 14 astana 000251

Sipdis

State for sca/cen, s/srap

E.o. 12958: decl: 03/06/2059
Tags: pgov, prel, econ, epet, pinr, marr, snar, kz
Subject: kazakhstan: scenesetter for centcom commander
general petraeus

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (SBU) General Petraeus, on behalf of Ambassador
Hoagland, and the Department of Defense and Embassy Astana
country teams, we extend a warm welcome on the occasion of
your upcoming visit to Astana, Kazakhstan.

Visit overview

2. (S) The Office of the Defense Attache and your staff are
working toward finalizing your visit itinerary. You are
scheduled to arrive in Astana the evening of March 9, and are
scheduled to depart the morning of March 10. This visit will
further strengthen an already strong bilateral relationship
in support of our strategic interests. On March 10, we are
working to schedule meetings with the President, Minister of
Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the National
Security Council.

Domestic political perspective

3. (C) While the Government of Kazakhstan articulates a
strategic vision of a democratic society, it has lagged on
the implementation front. The leadership remains resistant
to competitive political processes, and the situation is
complicated by the fact that President Nazarbayev is
extraordinarily popular, while the opposition is weak,
fractured, and comprised principally of former Nazarbayev
loyalists who fell out of favor. In May 2007, significant
amendments were adopted to Kazakhstan's constitution which
were touted as strengthening parliament, but also removed
terms limits on Nazarbayev. In parliamentary elections held
in August 2007, Nazarbayev's Nur Otan party officially
received 88 percent of the vote and took all the seats in
parliament, which OSCE observers concluded did not meet OSCE
standards. On a positive note, President Nazarbayev has
taken positive steps that could facilitate a transition to a
more democratic system in the long term. His Bolashak
program provides scholarships for several thousand
Kazakhstanis to receive higher education abroad, mostly in
the West, where they absorb Western ideas and values.
Additionally, Nazarbayev has brought into government service
a new generation of young, ambitious bureaucrats ) many of
whom studied in the West through Bolashak or U.S.
Government-sponsored programs.

4. (C) When Kazakhstan was selected as 2010 OSCE chairman at
the November 2007 OSCE Madrid OSCE Ministerial meeting,
Foreign Minister Tazhin publicly committed that his
government would amend Kazakhstan,s election, political
party, and media laws in accordance with OSCE and Office of
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
recommendations. (NOTE: Tazhin also promised that as OSCE
chairman, Kazakhstan would support the OSCE's "human
dimension" and preserve ODIHR,s mandate. END NOTE). The
amendments were finally signed into law in February 2009.
While key civil society leaders were disappointed that the
new legislation did not go further, we consider them to be
steps in the right direction, and will continue pressing for
further reforms. While Kazakhstan prides itself on its
religious tolerance, parliament passed legislation in late
2008 which would have restricted the religious freedom of
minority religious groups not traditional to Kazakhstan.
Rather than sign the legislation, President Nazarbayev sent
it for review to the Constitutional Council (Court), which
ultimately declared the legislation to be unconstitutional.
On July 10, Nazarbayev signed into law Internet legislation&#x0
00A;that provides a legal basis for the government to shut down
and block websites whose content allegedly violates the
country,s laws. This appears to be a step in the wrong
direction at a time when the Kazakhstan,s record on
democracy and human rights is in the spotlight because of its
impending OSCE chairmanship. The legislation likely
originated from the government,s desire to be able to

Astana 00000251 002 of 014


readily block access to web postings from Rakhat Aliyev,
Nazarbayev,s ex-son-in-law, who, from his self-imposed exile
in Austria, has put embarrassing materials and articles about
Nazarbayev on various Internet sites. We have expressed our
disappointment that the legislation was enacted, and have
urged the government to implement it in a manner consistent
with Kazakhstan,s OSCE commitments on freedom of speech and
freedom of the press.

International political perspective

5. (C) President Nazarbayev carefully balances Kazakhstan,s
relations with Russia, China, the United States and the EU )
what is termed a &multi-vector8 foreign policy. The
Kazakhstanis consider Russia their most important
international partner, and Russia,s influence is
unparalleled in Kazakhstan due to long historical ties,
Kazakhstan,s large ethnic Russian population, and the
predominance here of the Russian language ) which means most
Kazakhstanis obtain their news from Russian,s broadcast and
print media. Kazakhstan,s close relationship with the
United States serves as an essential counterweight,
reinforcing Kazakhstan,s sovereignty and independence and
helping it stave off pressure from both its giant neighbors
) Russia to the north and China to the east. For the
Kazakhstanis, high-level interactions with the United States
are not only substantively important, but also symbolically
important, sending a signal to Moscow that we remain closely
engaged despite Moscow,s assertion that Central Asia is its
&privileged sphere of influence.8

Economic perspective

6. (C) Kazakhstan is the region's economic powerhouse, with
an economy larger than that of all the other Central Asian
states combined. Economic growth averaged over 9% a year
during 2005-07, before dropping to 3% in 2008 with the onset
of the global financial crisis. The contracted by about 2%
in 2009, but positive growth is again expected in 2010.
While the country's economic success is partly due to its
fortuitous natural resource deposits, astute macroeconomic
policies and extensive economic reforms have also played an
important role. Kazakhstan has a modern banking and
financial system, a well-endowed pension fund, and a
transparent sovereign wealth fund with approximately $20
billion in assets. The government has taken aggressive steps
to tackle the domestic reverberations of the world economic
crisis, allocating $21 billion to take equity stakes in
private banks, prop up the construction and real-estate
sectors, and support small- and medium-sized enterprises and
agriculture. Kazakhstan,s long-run economic challenge is to
diversify its economy away from reliance on the energy
sector. In 2008, we launched a bilateral Private-Private
Economic Partnership Initiative (PPEPI), which brings
together the U.S. and Kazakhstani public and private sectors
to make policy recommendations on improving the country,s
business climate and reducing other barriers to non-energy
investment. On a less promising note, the Kazakhstanis
announced in June that they would suspend their bilateral
negotiations to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and on January 1, Kazakhstan joined a customs union with
Russia and Belarus. We have informed Kazakhstan that there
is, in fact, no mechanism allowing a customs union to accede
to the WTO without its member states doing so individually.

7. (C) U.S. and Kazakhstani strategic interests are largely
aligned on the development of Kazakhstan,s vast energy
resources. Both sides agree that U.S. and other Western
companies must continue playing a lead role in Kazakhstan,s
energy exploration and production projects, and that
diversification of transport routes will bolster
Kazakhstan,s sovereignty and enable it to capture the
maximum benefits of its energy and wealth. Kazakhstan
produced 88 million tons of oil in 2009 (approximately 1.5

Astana 00000251 003 of 014


million barrels per day), and is expected to become one of
the world,s top ten crude exporters soon after 2015. While
the country also has significant gas reserves (1.5 trillion
cubic meters is a low-end estimate), current gas exports are
very limited for now, in part because gas is being reinjected
to maximize crude output. U.S. companies (ExxonMobil,
Chevron, and ConocoPhillips) have significant ownership
stakes in Kazakhstan,s three major hydrocarbon projects,
including Kashagan, the world,s largest oil field discovery
since Alaska,s North Slope. In June 2009, ConocoPhillips
signed a contract to explore and develop the offshore N
Block, estimated to contain 2.13 billion recoverable barrels
of oil. China has recently increased its investment in
Kazakhstan,s energy sector, and through the state-owned
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) now controls
approximately 20% of Kazakhstan,s total oil production.

8. (C) With major crude production increases on the horizon,
Kazakhstan must develop additional transport routes to bring
its crude to market. Currently, most of Kazakhstan,s crude
is exported via Russia, though some exports flow east to
China, west across the Caspian through Azerbaijan, and south
across the Caspian to Iran. We are focused on helping the
Kazakhstanis implement the Kazakhstan-Caspian Transportation
System (KCTS), which envisions a &virtual pipeline8 of
tankers transporting large volumes of crude from
Kazakhstan,s Caspian coast to Baku, from where it will flow
onward to market through Georgia, including through the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. While a trans-Caspian
crude pipeline might be a cheaper long-term transport option,
the Kazakhstanis maintain that an agreement on Caspian
delimitation among the five Caspian littoral states is a
prerequisite, politically if not legally, for moving forward
on the construction of such a pipeline.

9. (SBU) One issue that is certain to be at the center of
discussion for years to come is water management. Reviving
the northern portion of the Aral Sea, which Kazakhstan
controls, has been a resounding success. A greater priority
is ensuring continued access to water for public and
agricultural use. As most of Kazakhstan's rivers have
headwaters outside of the country, Kazakhstan remains
somewhat vulnerable to developments in upstream countries.
For the moment this is not a problem as glacial melt has made
up the distance in quantity versus demand. But the long-term
issue is that Kazakhstan is drawing against a bank account
that cannot be easily replenished. Anecdotally we have been
told that the Ishim River (the river that flows through
Astana has its headwaters in China) has decreased by one
meter over the past few ye
ars due to increased upstream use
in China. In addition to securing an adequate quantity of
water, Kazakhstan also remains concerned about water quality.
There is also concern that Lake Balkash, the 16th largest
lake in the world, might be endangered by China,s up-stream
water usage.

Regional influence and support

10. (SBU) Kazakhstan has also expressed its eagerness to
play an enhanced role in achieving regional integration.
President Nazarbayev continues to raise the subject of a
Central Asian union with a common market. Kazakhstan is
already a significant economic force in the region ) it is
the largest foreign investor in Kyrgyzstan and in Georgia,
for example. While progress has been slow, the Kazakhstanis
are continuing to seek opportunities for investment in
Afghanistan.

Csto and sco

11. (C) Kazakhstan's involvement in the Russian-led
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is a natural
extension of its historical relationship with Russia, as well
as its current Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Astana 00000251 004 of 014


involvement and mutual security ties with Former Soviet Union
(FSU) nations. Its membership in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) provides a means to balance its foreign
policy and not show favoritism unless absolutely necessary.
CSTO participation penetrates the political, economic and
military spheres, but actual contributions to the CSTO appear
to be more political than substantive. The CSTO mechanism
provides a means for Kazakhstan to stay connected to Russia
on issues of mutual concern (air defense, counter-terrorism,
etc...), but without the danger of getting too close. At the
CSTO,s 2008 summit in Moscow, the Government of Russia
pressured the CSTO partners to recognize South Ossetian and
Abkhazian independence and to make strong statements about
Georgia,s responsibility for the current conflict, however,
Kazakhstan and the other CSTO members did not cede to Russian
pressure. With regard to the SCO, Kazakhstan was surprised
at the vehemence of Russia and China in insisting upon an
anti-U.S. in Central Asia statement in the 2006 summit joint
statement. Kazakhstan remains "proud" of the fact that they
prevented a similar clause from appearing again. SCO
activity remains minimal in Kazakhstan with the government
remaining leery of its eastern neighbor.

Military/defense perspective

Ministry of defense

12. (S) Minister of Defense: Kazakhstan,s former
Ambassador to Russia, Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, was appointed as
the new Defense Minister on 24 June 2009. All indications
appear that Minister Dzhaksybekov is a pragmatist and
supports cooperation with a variety of nations that is in the
best interests of the Ministry of Defense and the
modernization and transformation of the Kazakhstan Armed
Forces.

13. (S) Chief of Defense: First Deputy Minister General
Mukhtar Altynbayev, previously Minister of Defense, thrice
removed, continues to serve as Kazakhstan,s Chief of
Defense. Relatively inconsequential as the Chief of Defense
and generally a neutral party who has neither a positive nor
negative impact on our bilateral relationship, he is reported
to oppose the deployment of forces to Afghanistan.

14. (S) Component Commanders: The Ground Forces Chief,
General-Lieutenant Saken Zhasuzakov; Air Forces Chief,
General-Major Alexandr Sorokin; and Chief of Naval Forces,
Captain Zhandarbek Zhanzakov. Generally, the Component
Commanders have so far proven to be inconsequential, as they
remain relatively uninvolved in the sphere of U.S.-Kazakhstan
security cooperation ) this is because the majority of our
security cooperation does not impact forces under the
component commanders, direct control.

15. (S) Unequal Partnership: The MOD remains an
under-funded ministry that has no policy-making authority.
The simple fact is that the U.S. DOD-KZ MOD relationship is
not one of equals. DOD has significant policy input in the
USG, while the MOD appears to have almost none. In short,
the KZ MOD is a supporting ministry, taking its direction
from higher levels within the government. The U.S. has, on a
number of occasions, successfully achieved its bilateral and
regional goals by appealing to those closer to the center of
power and using them to provide the MOD with marching orders.

Military operations/support

Iraq

16. (SBU) Kazakhstan directly supported coalition efforts in
Iraq from August 2003 through October 2008, most
significantly by deploying a military engineering/explosive
ordinance disposal (EOD) unit which cumulatively disposed of
over 5 million pieces of unexploded ordnance. With the

Astana 00000251 005 of 014


reorganization of the coalition in Iraq, Kazakhstan completed
its tenth rotation and redeployed its forces in their
entirety in late October 2008.

Afghanistan

17. (S) The USG continues to solicit support for increased
participation in international operations, and it appears
that Kazakhstan may, in the near-term, deploy four to six
staff officers to support ISAF HQ in Afghanistan, however,
internal political discussions are ongoing and a decision has
yet to be made. Of great concern to the Government is public
opinion, which in general is opposed to a deployment to
Afghanistan primarily because of misconceptions fostered by
the Kazakh experience in Afghanistan during the 1980s Soviet
occupation. Supporters of a deployment to Afghanistan within
the Ministry of Defense look to increase Kazakhstan,s ISAF
coalition contributions over time, specifically the future
deployment of military medical personnel and EOD/Engineer
assets, very possibly in support of the Afghan Engineer
School located in Mazar-e-Sharif. These supporters consist
primarily of the pro-western faction within the Ministry of
Defense, xxxxxxxxxxxx, and understand the
value of conducting real-world operations in terms of
building political capital and capitalizing on deploying and
training the force. Additionally, in 2008 the Government of
Kazakhstan provided almost $3 million to Afghanistan
primarily for infrastructure improvement and development, and
is looking to provide additional funding. During a November
22 visit to Kabul, State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat
Saudabayev unveiled an assistance package, which included a
proposal to provide free university education in Kazakhstan
for up to 1,000 Afghan students over the period from
2010-2018. The government has also offered to provide
training to Afghan law enforcement officers at law
enforcement training institutes in Kazakhstan. The
Kazakhstanis hope to make Afghanistan a focus of their 2010
OSCE chairmanship.

Issues influencing expansion of kazakhstan's support for
afghanistan

Overflight expansion

18. (S) In November 2009 we requested the expansion of the
overflight agreement to
 include two North-South polar routes
to/from Russia through Kazakhstan and eventually to
Afghanistan via Diplomatic Note. This request has been
unofficially declined and stated that a new agreement must be
negotiated then ratified by parliament prior to entry into
force. This process could take well over a year from
negotiation to ratification, as exemplified by the German
transit agreement which was negotiated from 2004-2007, signed
in 2007, then ratified in 2008. This current impasse may
very be the result of several influencing factors. It
appears the Kazakhs are unhappy with being approached by the
USG requesting additional air corridors after the USG
negotiated an air transit agreement with Russia. The Kazakhs
have told us in the past that they do not appreciate being
treated like the little brother to Russia, and that the USG
needs to notify the Government of Kazakhstan in good faith at
the same time as discussions are ongoing with Russia. It is
our belief the Government of Kazakhstan has been unwilling to
approve additional overflight corridors as an addendum to our
current overflight agreement via Diplomatic Note exchange
because the USG negotiated with Russia prior to consulting
with Kazakhstan. Further exacerbating this issue is likely
the press coverage emphasizing the significance of Russia
assisting U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, when the Kazakhs have
been quietly doing so since 2001. The Kazakhs also likely
consider the U.S. request as a fait accompli ) something
that further aggravates the government.

Transit of m-atvs and other wheeled vehicles

Astana 00000251 006 of 014



19. (S) In October 2009 we requested the authorization to
ship military and civilian wheeled vehicles to include MRAPs
and M-ATVS along the NDN via Diplomatic Note. This request
has also been unofficially declined and is likely tied to the
issues outlined in this section of the scenesetter as well as
the following. Information indicates that the National
Security Committee (KNB) does not support the transit of
M-ATVS or lethal cargo ) the excuse we have been given is
that it exposes the Kazakhs to potential terrorist reprisals
for supporting lethal cargo transit. This appears to be the
top cover for declining the U.S. request and frankly a flimsy
excuse given that the Germany-Kazakhstan air and ground
bilateral transit agreement for lethal and non-lethal goods
was ratified by the Kazakhstan Parliament in 2008. How does
this not expose Kazakhstan to the same risks?

Local procurement

20. (S) The Government of Kazakhstan has become extremely
frustrated at the perceived lack of U.S. forward movement to
date in local procurement in over 13 months since the NDN
informal agreement was approved by President Nazarbayev in
December 2008. Local procurement provides the U.S. the
opportunity to strengthen our strategic partnership and to
capitalize on providing domestically-produced items for U.S.
forces in Afghanistan. Opportunities abound for promoting
the benefits associated with supporting the U.S. goals and
specifically the NDN, while offering the cost-savings
associated with the procurement of locally-produced products
that meet and/or exceed our requirements. Local procurement
was a major selling point for the Kazakhs, however, since the
Government of Kazakhstan considers little to have so far been
accomplished in this respect, it is likely that this is also
a factor retarding the positive movement forward on securing
an agreement for the transshipment of M-ATVs as well as the
expansion of OEF overflight corridors. Additionally, the
disparate nature of our logistics system is making this a
challenging enterprise ) the responsibility for procuring
various classes of supplies is dispersed amongst different
government organizations. Although GSA and DLA have stepped
up to the plate and are beginning to capitalize on local
procurement opportunities, it would be in our best interests
to coordinate all procurement efforts to maximize our
effectiveness and efficiency to support this extremely
important mission.

Logistics hub/transit center offer

21. (S) In March 2008 President Nazarbayev extended an offer
of a logistics hub/transit center in Kazakhstan to the U.S.
Ambassador to Kazakhstan. Since then the Government of
Kazakhstan has been asking for a written request from the USG
outlining our requirements. A written USG request is
considered by the Kazakhs as the starting point for
determining exactly what level of logistic hub/transit center
the Kazakhs would possibly be willing to support. We have
yet to submit a request or to officially take this offer off
the table, and are periodically asked about our response to
the offer. It appears to the Government of Kazakhstan that
we are ignoring their offer, thereby, further aggravating the
issues outlined in this section of the scenesetter.

Cooperation with uzbekistan

22. (S) The Government of Kazakhstan has stated with concern
that our cooperation with Uzbekistan has increased while our
cooperation with Kazakhstan, in their view, remains stagnant
or is decreasing. The government has also indicated its
frustration and lack of understanding why this would be the
case since Kazakhstan has been and continues to be a reliable
partner, both now and into the future. Whether or not this
is the case, perception is reality, and the examples that are
routinely mentioned are that Kazakhstan has been the first

Astana 00000251 007 of 014


Central Asian nation to authorize cost-free unlimited and
unfettered overflights in support of OEF (2001), as well as
an expansion to this agreement an opening of additional air
corridors (2005); the first Central Asian nation to authorize
aircraft diverts into Almaty airport in the event of an
emergency; the first and only Central Asian nation to deploy
forces to Iraq in support of OIF (2003-2008); the first
Central Asian nation to authorize the shipment of non-lethal
goods along the NDN (Dec 2008), little more than one month
following General McNabb,s visit and official request; and
the first Central Asian nation, and most likely the only,
that will deploy forces into Afghanistan in support of ISAF
sometime this year (most likely by June 2010).

Overflight agreement

23. (SBU) In support of OEF, the Government of Kazakhstan
has granted more than 9,000 cost-free overflights since the
agreement,s entry into force in 2001 and eventual
parliamentary ratification in December 2008 ) this equates
to an annual average of over 1000 U.S. military and DOD
charter aircraft overflights per year. This agreement does
not differentiate between types of cargo, allowing it to be
used for the transport of lethal goods.

Emergency divert agreement

24. (SBU) In 2002, an emergency divert agreement with the
Kazakhstan entered into force that allows aircraft bound for
Manas the option of landing at Almaty or Astana International
Airports in case of bad weather or emergency ) in excess of
85 diverts have been
 supported under this agreement. In
every case Kazakhstan has exceeded the expectations of the
original agreement, however one of the limiting factors under
the provisions of this agreement is the restriction which
does not allow disembarkation of troops from the diverted
aircraft. U.S. forces traveling on deployment orders usually
do not have passports or visas and, therefore, cannot legally
enter the country to stay at a hotel or be transported by
alternate ground means to Manas. Should the Kazakhstani
Government allow U.S. forces entry into Kazakhstan, USDAO has
no mechanism in place to fund costs associated with
transportation or lodging. Since the agreement,s entry into
force, the USDAO has relocated from Almaty over 600 miles
north to Astana and cannot react quickly to support incoming
diverted aircraft.

Northern distribution network (ndn)

25. (SBU) As you are aware, President Nazarbayev approved
the use of Kazakhstan,s commercial transport infrastructure
to support the U.S. NDN for resupplying our forces in
Afghanistan on 30 December 2008.

26. (C) As background to previous non-U.S. transit
agreements, NATO has been limited to one option ) the
transport of non-lethal supplies through Russia, Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan ) and finally secured a written agreement to
resupply forces in Afghanistan in late January 2010. Of note
is that the Government of Kazakhstan was extremely unhappy
that NATO sought permission of its big brother, to the
north before opening discussions with the Kazakhstanis ) the
government indicated negotiations should have occurred in
parallel rather than in serial. The German Government
negotiated an official government-to-government agreement
with Kazakhstan for the ground and air transit of both lethal
and non-lethal supplies destined for Afghanistan, which took
3 years to negotiate (2004-2007) and one year for
parliamentary ratification before the agreement entered into
force in 2008 ) a four year process. The Germans have yet
to execute the transit of lethal goods via ground means,
something we will monitor in the event the U.S. decides to
expand its current agreement to include the transit of lethal
supplies.

Astana 00000251 008 of 014



27. (S) Additionally, it continues to be in our best
interests to use all available transit routes, to include
Russia. Should we purposely choose to bypass Russia, then it
is likely that Russia would pressure the Government of
Kazakhstan to not allow supplies to transit Kazakhstan. It
is our strong belief that including Russia as part of the NDN
is a win-win situation and provides the U.S. an alternate
route to resupply our forces in Afghanistan, however, we must
remain aware that Russia could attempt to manipulate and gain
exclusive control of the flow of supplies across its
territory by undermining our efforts to expand our options
with other nations.

Aviation fuel

28. (C) Since Kazakhstan has a limited refining capability,
it imports most of its aviation fuel from Russia. Some of
this fuel is in turn sold to Manas Transit Center,
Kyrgyzstan. In this way, Russia indirectly provides fuel for
Manas Transit Center and OEF operations.

29. (SBU) In response to the Georgian-Russian conflict,
Kazakhstan provided 165 tons of humanitarian aid to the
Government of Georgia consisting of food, medicine and
medical equipment worth approximately $460K. The Kazakhstani
government has also made strong statements in support of UN
resolutions sanctioning Iran and North Korea.

Non-proliferation issues

30. (SBU) Kazakhstan sees itself as a strong partner in
non-proliferation. Non-proliferation has been a cornerstone
of the bilateral relationship since Kazakhstan's
independence. With the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Kazakhstan was left with the world's fourth largest nuclear
arsenal. Nazarbayev's 1991 decision to give up Kazakhstan's
nuclear arsenal was groundbreaking. Kazakhstan returned all
tactical nuclear warheads to Russia by January 1992, and all
strategic nuclear warheads by April 1995. Through the
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program the
U.S. assisted Kazakhstan with the destruction of bombers,
silos, and related ICBM infrastructure and delivery systems.

31. (S) While the U.S.-Kazakhstan non-proliferation
relationship seems to be solid on the surface, at working
levels, the U.S. and Kazakhstani governments have encountered
continuous implementation issues. The Umbrella Agreement
amendment governing the CTR program, signed in December 2007,
was finally ratified on 2 June 2009. Ratification is the
first step to provide Kazakhstan with a legal basis to
establish a mechanism to implement value added tax (VAT) and
duty exemptions for imported equipment and services contracts
through the CTR program. Taxation issues have festered
unresolved since 2004, leading to frustration at high levels
in Washington, both in the Executive and Legislative
branches. There has, however, been a renewed commitment at
the senior levels of the Government of Kazakhstan to resolve
the taxation issues, yet we await the commitment to translate
into reality.

32. (S) Of all of the projects funded by the CTR
appropriation, the most critical is a classified project to
secure weapons-grade materials at the former Soviet nuclear
weapons test site in Semipalatinsk. The project is
tri-lateral, between Russia, Kazakhstan, and the United
States, with the Russians providing the necessary data
regarding material location and the United States providing
funding to repatriate the material to Russia or secure it in
situ. In addition to securing the materials at the site, DOD
is pressing the Government of Kazakhstan to increase its
security presence at the site (Ministry of Internal Affairs
Special Troops), and has provided ground sensor and UAV
technology that is used to assist Kazakhstan monitor the site

Astana 00000251 009 of 014


for trespassers.

33. (SBU) In addition to the classified trilateral project
in Semipalatinsk, the Department of Defense is currently
implementing the Biological Threat Reduction Program, which
supports Kazakhstan,s efforts to combat bioterrorism and
prevent the proliferation of biological weapons technology,
pathogens and expertise by strengthening its outbreak
response and monitoring capabilities.

34. (SBU) The Department of Energy also has several projects
that are focused on securing nuclear materials, including a
major project to decommission and store spent fuel from
Kazakhstan,s BN-350 fast breeder reactor. Currently, OSD
(NCB) has offered assistance in the form security and
consequence management seminars, a table top exercise and of
a field exercise to test the readiness incident response
forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Troops,
which provides security escort for fuel shipments between&#x000A
;Aktau (where the reactor is located) and the Semipalatinsk
Test Site, where the fuel will be kept in long-term storage.
The Special Troops also have a rapid response force at the
storage site. The Government of Kazakhstan is considering
the offered exercise assistance.

35. (SBU) The Department of State funds additional
nonproliferation projects implemented by the International
Science and Technology Center (ISTC). State also takes a
leading role in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Weapons Terrorism, in which Kazakhstan participates.

Security assistance and engagement overview

36. (S) We harbor no illusions to the contrary ) Russia is
and will remain Kazakhstan's number one security partner.
Kazakhstan MoD will partner with the U.S. to modernize, but
we will need your help in rebuilding trust in the US Security
Assistance (SA) apparatus. We have the long-term goal of
transforming the Kazakhstan Armed Forces into a deployable
force which not only can adequately protect national
sovereignty, but also becomes an agent of democratic reform
and rule of law within Kazakhstan. We have identified three
areas where U.S.-Kazakh interests overlap: Defense Reform
(both doctrine and equipment), security of the ungoverned
spaces of the Caspian Sea Basin and Southern Kazakhstan, and
the development of a deployable Peace Support Operations
(PSO) capability to support multilateral UN-sanctioned
operations. We have seen progress over the past few years,
but lack of fiscal commitment, especially in the Huey II
helicopter program, continues to undermine U.S. credibility,
resulting in Kazakhstan,s lack of enthusiasm to commit
national funds to modernization and transformation. We
continue to work with OSD, CENTCOM, DSCA and the Military
Services Security Assistance Commands to overcome these
obstacles and to develop and execute solutions to the myriad
of problems on the Huey II. The bottom line is that the
United States, credibility and reliability are at stake with
regard to our SA endeavors.

Hmmwvs

37. (SBU) Kazakhstan HMMWV fleet currently includes 114
vehicles (45 up-armored vehicles, the rest being primarily
unarmored or ambulances). KAZBRIG uses the HMMWVs for
training peacekeepers and is expected to deploy with them as
part of a future PSO. MOD has made a commitment to the
sustainment of the HMMWVs through the development of the
&Asia HMMWV Center8 and a Unit Maintenance facility at
KAZBRIG. The initial success of the HMMWV program in
Kazakhstan led to the MOD requesting eight Huey II
helicopters (highly modified UH-1Hs) through the FMF program.


Huey ii helicopters

Astana 00000251 010 of 014



38. (SBU) This program failed to meet the original goal of
achieving full operational capability with an eight-aircraft
unit by 2010, primarily due to underfunding. Movement
forward will require over $55M in funding and more deliberate
attention from U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
responsible for the program. The U.S. delivered the first
two of eight Excess Defense Article (EDA) Huey IIs in
November 2007, and an agreement for a third has been signed
lat this year due to Kazakhstan,s FMF funding being
decreased while refurbishment costs continue to rise.
Currently, at over $8M per aircraft for refurbishment and
delivery alone, plus the additional resources needed for
associated support equipment and training, Kazakhstan needs
over $55M to provide the remaining five aircraft. In
addition to the funding issue, the Huey II operational
readiness rates have hovered at zero since in July 2008 due
to shortages of ground maintenance equipment, adequate spare
parts and publications. A prime example of the issues at
hand - when the Huey II s required routine 150 flight hour
service, the initial parts package did not include all needed
parts for the service, but did include over $160K in
non-required or non-Huey II parts. As a short-term fix, we
are working with the Kazakhstani MOD and U.S. Army case
managers to coordinate contractor maintenance oversight and
provide the parts and equipment necessary to complete these
basic periodic inspections, while concurrently staffing
U.S.-required airworthiness release to allow U.S. maintainers
and pilots to train MOD personnel onboard their aircraft. We
are working to find alternative means to fund the Huey II
program including an FY09 1206 proposal which was disapproved
within DOD and a recent CENTCOM initiated supplemental
funding request which is currently making its way through the
DOD pipeline. CENTCOM and US Embassy staffs have developed a
supplemental funding request for $60 million to complete the
Kazakhstan Huey-II helicopter program. This request is
currently stalled at OSD due to OSD Comptroller
non-concurrence. The delivery of the two helicopters was a
major news item in Kazakhstan that reached the attention of
President Nazarbayev - the death of this program will surely
reach him as well. Additionally, should we prove unreliable
then there exists little reason for Kazakhstan to commit
national funds for the procurement/refurbishment of C130s )
the third pillar of the HMMWV- Huey II -C130 triad.

39. (C) The reduction in funding combined with an unreliable
and unresponsive SA system damage U.S. reliability and
credibility, as well as the credibility of pro-U.S./Western
allies within the MOD. The anti-U.S./pro-Russian faction
within MOD will use this to undercut our supporters within
the government ) and do not require an active role but
passively point to the unreliability of the U.S. as a
security partner. xxxxxxxxxxxx in order to show the
skeptics that the U.S. is a credible and reliable partner,
U.S./Western technology is superior and Kazakhstan,s
soldiers can be trained to use and sustain U.S./Western
equipment.

Defense transportation system (dts)

40. (SBU) FMS and 1206 equipment and spare parts shipments
are routinely delayed due to shortfalls or inaccuracies in
transport documentation. Lack of documentation from shippers
has contributed not only to significant delays in equipment
delivery, but has cost the Kazakhstani MOD over $50K in
unprogrammed impound storage fees in the last 18 months.
Kazakhstan does not have its own freight forwarder, and is
solely reliant on FMF-funded DTS for equipment delivery )
the negative impact on our credibility is further exacerbated
when we cannot deliver U.S. equipment using our own
transportation system in an efficient and timely manner. We
still encourage Kazakhstan to hire a freight forwarder, but

Astana 00000251 011 of 014


even if it did so, we are required to use DTS for U.S.
equipment delivered under some special programs like 1206 )
so a fix to DTS is still essential. We are working with
DSCA, TRANSCOM and the military services, security
assistance organizations to address these systemic shortfalls.

C-130s

41. (SBU) The Ministry of Defense requested six EDA C-130s
in 2006, but Congress only rec
ently released EDA C-130s. The
C-130s could provide a valuable capstone for our bilateral
security cooperation, should we be able to overcome systemic
shortcomings. xxxxxxxxxxxx USAF (Jun 09) and USN (Dec 09) provided
the Kazakh MOD with Pricing and Availability (P&A) data for
the procurement/refurbishment of six EDA C-130. Current
estimates for this program are between $210 and $265M )
purchase will require the commitment of Kazakh national
funds, since this far exceeds available or anticipated FMF.
While the Ministry of Defense indicated national funds are
available in 2011, it must soon refine its request to start
long lead processes such as congressional notification, spare
parts procurement, and the scheduling of training. This may
allow the U.S. system the opportunity to meet the MOD
requested initial operational capability date of 2013.
Kazakhstan currently has a C- rating under the Interagency
Country Risk Assessment methodology, which does not allow DOD
to schedule a payment plan with Kazakhstan. The Department
of Treasury and the Department of State have expressed
opposition to an improvement in the rating, for reasons
related to risk in the financial sector.

Military-to-military (m2m) cooperation

42. (SBU) The CENTCOM M2M contact plan has grown to 145
events in FY09 (this figure does not include FMF, IMET,
Peacekeeping or 1206 projects), and we expect to conduct
approximately 130 events in FY10. Despite the slight
decrease in quantity, there has also been a significant
increase in the quality of events ) the subject matter is
increasingly complex and comprehensive, and event
preparations are more professionally planned, coordinated and
executed. Kazakhstan has asked for U.S. assistance through
M2M activities in a number of key areas that stand to have a
long-term impact on the modernization and transformation of
their military, to include the development of national
military doctrine, curriculum and faculty development for
their Professional Military Education (PME) institutions, and
interoperability through acquisition of equipment and TTP
implementation.

Kazbrig evolution

43. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx Originally,
plans were to have most of KAZBRIG professionally-manned,
equipped, and trained by the end of 2009, however, little to
no progress in the sphere of professionalization has occurred
with KAZBRIG since late 2003 ) the same time that KAZBRIG
became a priority focus of U.S. Security Cooperation efforts.
Obstacles KAZBRIG must overcome include a variety of
manning, equipping and training obstacles, but by far the
most serious obstacle is the lack of professionalization.
Professionalization is the only means for KAZBRIG to become a
fully mission capable and deployable peace-keeping force.
The Kazakhs committed to accomplishing this objective by
2010, as well as obtaining NATO level-2 certification. The
Kazakhs, however, have continued to slide these objectives to

Astana 00000251 012 of 014


the right, with the endstate and intermediate steps to
reaching an endstate remaining undefined.
Professionalization has simply not occurred, and with 70
percent of the force still being conscripted, KAZBRIG
continues to remain non-deployable and non-mission capable )
by Kazakhstan law conscripts cannot deploy outside of
Kazakhstan. This non-deployable non-mission capable status
will continue until there is a serious commitment on behalf
of the Kazakhstan MOD and Government to professionalize. The
limited professionalization of KAZBRIG resembles a shotgun
pattern, spread throughout the officer and NCO cadre in 1st
and 2nd Battalions and KAZBRIG HQ. In light of a shifting
target and the Kazakhstan MOD demand for U.S. assistance, the
U.S. has remained committed and continues to train and equip
KAZBRIG for a deployment that remains undefined and
unobtainable in current circumstances. One battalion is
currently manned, albeit at a 70 percent conscript rate, and
trained for PSO, with the 2d Battalion continuing to undergo
transformation, and conversion of KAZBRIG,s third combat
battalion being indefinitely postponed. A result of the
predominance of conscripts, with losses caused by draftees
demobilizing annually at the rate of 70 percent, as well as
the loss of NCOs/officers disillusioned by the lack of a
meaningful deployment and substandard pay and benefits.
KAZBRIG officers tend to attribute recruitment and retention
problems to this lack of deployment. The NATO evaluation
from the 2008 Steppe Eagle exercise, a U.S./UK/KZ exercise,
indicated the one operational battalion of KAZBRIG is NATO
interoperable with limitations. MOD conducted an internal
evaluation of 2d Battalion during Steppe Eagle 2009, and
plans to conduct another assessment of 2d Battalion and
KAZBRIG staff during Steppe Eagle 2010 ) deferring further
NATO interoperability and capabilities assessments of two
battalions and the Brigade staff until 2011-2012.

44. (S) Recent information indicates the UK MOD is seriously
considering the termination of all security assistance with
Kazakhstan due to the lack of progress with KAZBRIG. It also
appears that the UK MOD will most likely provide the
Kazakhstan MOD with the ultimatum of professionalizing
KAZBRIG according to a strict timeline with the requirement
of deploying and sustaining a platoon-size element as part of
ISAF within the RC-South area to conduct base security/force
protection operations. It also appears that if the Kazakhs
do not commit to this request that all security cooperation
will cease. Additionally, the UK would like our support for
establishing strict professionalization and deployment
requirements and timeline, otherwise the concern is that the
Kazakhs will ignore the UK request and continue to rely on
U.S. Security Cooperation to bridge the gap should the UK
terminate its support.

Kazbrig deployment

45. (C) The Steppe Eagle exercise and NATO evaluation were
critical to a potential deployment announcement for the
KAZBRIG. A successful evaluation of the KAZBRIG is a
necessary, but not sufficient condition for a deployment
announcement. Given that the only deployable unit of KAZBRIG
is a single battalion, then to sustain operations over the
long-term the largest deployable unit is a company-size
element inherent to the 3:1 deploy-reset-train force
generation model. The past deployment of a platoon-size
element in support of OIF did not meet the 3:1 ratio,
however, future plans to deploy up to a company-size element
match current capacity. Since Kazakhstani law allows only
professional soldiers to participate in international
operations, and since currently only KAZBRIG officer and NCO
cadre are professional, MOD must also commit to full KAZBRIG
professionalization to provide a deployable unit. Lack of a
professionalized unit also undercuts effectiveness of
combined exercises and training ) over 70 percent of KAZBRIG
personnel participating in Steppe Eagle 2009 were conscripts
who will be demobilized prior to Steppe Eagle 2010. Our

Astana 00000251 013 of 014


general belief, following a deployment announ
cement, is that
manning problems would evaporate, training focus and
assistance would increase, and KAZBRIG would be ready to
conduct basic peace support operations in a low to medium
threat environment under the command of a lead nation.

Caspian response force development

46. (S) The FY 2008 1206 train and equip program has focused
on the development of a KAZ MOD special operations force
(SOF) element to respond to threats to critical energy
infrastructure and other vital sites in the Caspian region.
Equipment delivered includes four 7-meter rigid-hull
inflatable assault boats, and pending shipments include open-
and closed-circuit SCUBA equipment, HMMWVs, and additional
support items. 1206-funded contract basic SCUBA training was
completed in Jul 09, and SOCCENT and the US Navy conducted
Counter-NarcoTerrorism Training 2009 to assist KAZ SOF in
building effective capabilities for maritime operations.
While most equipment has not yet been delivered, KAZ SOF
units have undergone several resubordinations and
reorganizations in the interim ) our relationship with KAZ
SOF is still evolving. We are maintaining planned current
activities, but monitoring this relationship to ensure it
remains focused in line with agreed bilateral goals.

Civilian-to-military (c2m) cooperation

47. (U) The CENTCOM C2M contact plan has also seen great
growth over the past two years, primarily due to the interest
of the Minister of Emergency Situations (MES), Valdimir
Bozhko. Minister Bozhko has shown a personal interest in
working with U.S. Agencies. The C2M programs are mainly
conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE),
Arizona National Guard (AZNG), and local Arizona emergency
response agencies via the National Guard Bureau (NGB) State
Partnership Program. MES interest was highlighted by a visit
to Arizona and Washington, DC by the MES Minister, Vladimir
Bozhko, in July 2008 to discuss the C2M program and set the
stage for future C2M cooperation. Minister Bozhko was
engaged and extremely pleased with his visit, and clearly
outlined the areas he would like assistance from Arizona and
the Corps of Engineers. The FY09 cooperation plan with MES
marked a sizable expansion in the number and type of
engagement activities with MES. This included exchange
visits in Arizona and Kazakhstan of firefighting and 911
operations. Additionally, the USACE laid the ground work for
future training workshops for MES, and already held a
Regional Geographical Information Systems (GIS) Workshop in
Astana, Water and Levee Management Workshop in the U.S., as
well as an MES visit to Washington DC to discuss future
engagements in the areas of industrial safety, including oil
spills, GIS and others. Our FY10 cooperation plan envisages
a continuation of FY09 engagement, as well as an MES Senior
Representatives visit to AZNG and USNORTHCOM. Minister
Bozhko has currently expressed particular interest in the
interagency and local/state/federal coordination process
within the National Response Framework and the National
Incident Management System. Unfortunately, the NGB State
Partnership Program was only allocated $2.2M for C2M programs
in FY09 to distribute amongst 48 states with programs in 63
countries. Arizona received a relatively sizable $200K of
available funds, but will only be able to execute 3 of the 11
planned events with MES in FY10. OMC has asked the AZNG for
additional NGB funding for C2M programs.

Counter-narcotics (cn) programs

48. (S) In November 2007 OMC added the new position of CN
Program Coordinator. This expansion highlighted the growth
of CENTCOM CN programs in Kazakhstan in cooperation with the
Kazakh Border Guard Service (BGS). Since that time OMC has
worked closely within the Country Team, particularly INL and
EXBS, on CN and border security exchange, training, and

Astana 00000251 014 of 014


equipment programs aimed at helping Kazakhstan secure its
borders. CENTCOM funding has delivered night-vision and
avionics upgrades for three Mi-8MT helicopters ($7.9M), five
Sabre 4000 hand held detectors for use at border check points
($500K), and 10 UAZ 4x4 vehicles for the BGS quick response
forces ($500K). OMC is currently working with the BGS on a
ground-surveillance radar (GSR) program. FY09 CENTCOM
funding is projected at $10M and is scheduled for upgrading
one additional Mi-8MT, additional GSRs, mobile checkpoint
shelters, and remote sensor systems. The CN programs also
include training programs such as checkpoint inspection
training. Finally, the CN exchange program has facilitated
solid events such as visits to the USCG training center and
the U.S.-Mexico border. These exchanges have fostered a
closer relationship with the BGS and a greater interest in
working with the U.S. The BGS is organized under
Kazakhstan,s Intelligence Service, the Committee for State
Security (KNB), an unreformed former Soviet intelligence
service with close ties to the FSB and suspicious of U.S.
interaction. The KNB has recently asserted itself as
oversight for our cooperation with the BGS and begun to
severely limit the scope and participation in engagement
activities. In coordination with INL, OMC is starting to
develop cooperative training, equipment and construction
programs with the interagency Counternarcotics Committee,
under the Ministry for Internal Affairs, and the Customs
Committee, under the Finance Ministry.

Final words

49. (SBU) In conclusion, we are very much looking forward to
your upcoming visit. The entire Embassy team looks forward
to providing you with a rewarding and productive visit with a
valuable strategic partner who is vital to our national
strategic interests. We remain ready to answer any of your
questions.
Hoagland

Wikileaks

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10ASTANA82, KAZAKHSTAN: APPRECIATION MIXED WITH CONCERN

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10ASTANA82.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA82 2010-01-26 04:06 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7679
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #0082 0260406
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 260406Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7280
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2406
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1767
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2473
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1383
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1963
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1813
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2692
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2982
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T ASTANA 000082 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, PM, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: 01/20/2030 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR EAID MARR AF RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  APPRECIATION MIXED WITH CONCERN 
 
REF:  A.  ASTANA 0020 
  B.  ASTANA 0002 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY:  During a January 25 meeting, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kairat Umarov noted the Kazakhstani government's 
appreciation for Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central 
Asian Affairs Robert Blake's recent remarks on Kazakhstan at the 
National Press Club in Washington and Special Representative for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke's civilian strategy for 
Afghanistan.  Umarov also told the Ambassador that the Kazakhstani 
government hopes to have a draft overflight agreement prepared by 
February 1 (ref A).  Umarov asserted the government is considering 
seriously whether or not to refuse all assistance under the 
human-rights certification (ref B).  END SUMMARY. 
 
RECENT POLICY STATEMENTS WELL RECEIVED 
 
2.  (SBU) On January 25, Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov both 
personally and officially conveyed to the Ambassador appreciation for 
SCA A/S Robert Blake's January 20 remarks on Kazakhstan's 
Chairmanship of the OSCE.  Calling it "helpful to mitigate the AP 
article" and other bilateral irritants, he emphasized that the 
statement pleased the government.  With obvious enthusiasm, Umarov 
also expressed "great interest" in the civilian strategy for 
Afghanistan recently announced by Special Representative Holbrooke. 
He underlined that this increased attention to humanitarian and 
civilian needs "coincides with Kazakhstan's view, especially our 
thinking on the summit.  This is what we were thinking regarding an 
OSCE summit on Afghanistan.  The military is the short-term response, 
while civilian is long-term."  Umarov further stated his hope that 
Presidents Nazarbayev and Obama can discuss these issues during a 
meeting on the sidelines of the April Global Nuclear Security Summit. 
 
DRAFT OVERFLIGHT AGREEMENT SOON 
 
3.  (S) Umarov asserted that he had hoped to present a text of a 
draft overflight agreement before the Ambassador's January 27 trip to 
Washington.  However, he explained, "We are still addressing minor 
details, but we hope to have a copy before the Foreign Minister 
travels to Washington (i.e., February 1)." 
 
SERIOUSLY STUDYING HUMAN RIGHTS CERTIFICATION ASSISTANCE 
 
4.  (SBU) On Kazakhstan's threat to refuse assistance subject to the 
Congressional human-rights certification process, Umarov stated, "We 
are looking more deeply at this step.  I do not like radical steps. 
Before we make an official decision, I will look into the details. 
We do not want to be humiliated to get financial assistance.  We 
would rather reject it outright and be done with it."  The Ambassador 
highlighted the negative consequences to Kazakhstan's image should it 
refuse the assistance.  However, Umarov insisted that the process can 
be "used as a tool to put us in a bad situation." 
 
5.  (SBU) Umarov explained that the Kazakhstani Embassy to the United 
States is considering the pros and cons after which the government 
will have inter-agency meetings to discuss their options.  Umarov 
emphasized, "We do not want certification to be used as leverage 
against us.  We know how small things can become big, big issues, 
such as the AP article [which alleged negotiations between elements 
related to KazAtomProm and Iran for the sale of yellowcake uranium]. 
At some point, someone [in the Kazakhstani government] will raise it 
and ask why we did not eliminate the process."  He asserted that the 
government will take a consolidated approach, using the advice of its 
Embassy and other agencies.  Umarov further argued, "We must not just 
wait and see, but we must work and be proactive.  I am not for 
radical steps, but when issues become troubling, we must do 
something."  The Ambassador responded that such a step would be a 
disaster for the bilateral relationship, with unforeseen negative 
consequences.  He urged that Kazakhstan retain some perspective on 
the situation. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA72, KAZAKHSTAN: MONEY AND POWER

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10ASTANA72.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA72 2010-01-25 08:14 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6688
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #0072/01 0250814
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 250814Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7265
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 2396
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1758
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1374
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2464
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1954
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1804
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2973
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2683

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000072 
  
 SIPDIS 
  
 STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB 
  
 E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2030 
 TAGS: PGOV PINR EPET EINV KCOR RS CH KZ
 SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  MONEY AND POWER 
  
 REF: ASTANA 0061 
  
 Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (b), (d) 
  
 1.  (S) SUMMARY:  During a private dinner, KazMunaiGaz First 
 Vice President Maksat Idenov named, in his view, the four 
 most powerful gate-keepers around President Nursultan 
 Nazarbayev:  Chief of Administration and General Services of 
 the President's Office Sarybai Kalmurzayev, the President's 
 Chief of Staff Aslan Musin, State Secretary-Foreign Minister 
 Kanat Saudabayev, and the tandem of Prime Minister Karim 
 Masimov and Nazarbayev's billionaire son-in-law Timur 
 Kulibayev.  According to Idenov, in Kazakhstan, market 
 economy means capitalism, which means big money, which means 
 large bribes for the best connected.  The following details 
 are a single snapshot of one version of current reality.  The 
 significant point is that Nazarbayev is standing with Idenov, 
 not Kulibayev, to maintain international standards to develop 
 the massive Kashagan and Karachaganak hydrocarbon projects. 
 END SUMMARY. 
  
 2.  (S) On January 21, KazMunaiGaz First Vice President 
 Maksat Idenov and the Ambassador had a one-on-one dinner in a 
 nearly empty restaurant (times are still hard!) at the 
 Radisson hotel in Astana.  When the Ambassador arrived, 
 Idenov was barking into his cell phone, "Mark, Mark, stop the 
 excuses!  Mark, listen to me!  Mark, shut up right now and do 
 as I say!  Bring the letter to my office at 10:00 pm, and we 
 will go together to take it to (Minister of Energy and 
 Mineral Resources, MEMR) Mynbayev at his house."  On ending 
 the call, Idenov explained he was talking to British Gas (BG) 
 Country Director for Kazakhstan Mark Rawlings who had missed 
 the deadline to deliver a letter about arbitration on the 
 Karachaganak super-giant oil-field project (reftel).  Still 
 clearly steamed, Idenov alleged, "He's still playing games 
 with Mercator's James Giffin," the notorious AmCit fixer 
 indicted for large-scale bribery on oil deals in the 1990s, 
 whose case drags on in the Southern District Court of New 
 York.  "I tell him, 'Mark, stop being an idiot!  Stop 
 tempting fate!  Stop communicating with an indicted 
 criminal!'"  Idenov asked, "Do you know how much he 
 (Rawlings) makes?  $72,000 a month!  A month!!  Plus 
 benefits!  Plus bonuses!  Lives in Switzerland but supposedly 
 works in London.  Comes here once a month to check in.  Nice 
 life, huh?" 
  
 3.  (S) Idenov calmed down and said, "Let's look at the 
 menus."  Then he immediately started typing on his PDA and 
 turned the screen toward the Ambassador, saying, "Let's look 
 at the 'four courses.'"  On the screen were four names: 
 Kalmurzayev, Musin, Saudabayev, and Masimov-Kulibayev." 
 Idenov said, "The Big Four around Number One."  (NOTE: 
 Sarybai Kalmurzayev, currently the head of Administration and 
 General Services in the Presidential Administration, was, 
 among other jobs, a former head of the Financial Police and, 
 before that, in the 1990s, in charge of privatization.  Aslan 
 Musin is the current Chief of Staff for Nazarbayev.  Kanat 
 Saudabayev, a personal friend of Nazarbayev for nearly 40 
 years, is Minister of State and Foreign Minister.  Karim 
 Masimov is Prime Minister, and Timur Kulibayev is currently 
 the favored presidential son-in-law, on the Forbes 500 list 
 of billionaires (as is his wife separately), and the ultimate 
 controller of 90% of the economy of Kazakhstan.  END NOTE.) 
 In response to a question, Idenov said that Masimov has a 
 degree of freedom, but never acts without permission from 
 "the hyphen" (Kulibayev).  Then Idenov stood up abruptly and 
 carried his PDA to a ledge about 20 feet from the table and 
 asked the Ambassador to turn off his cell phone. 
  
 4.  (S) Idenov said he wanted to explain why he has been less 
 visible for at least the last half year.  Starting last 
 spring, all the "Big Four" (on the menu) began blocking him 
 from seeing President Nazarbayev.  In October, KMG President 
  
 ASTANA 00000072  002 OF 003 
  
  
 Kairgeldy Kabyldin told Idenov, "Kulibayev doesn't want to 
 work with you any more."  Idenov said he replied, "Fine," 
 immediately returned to his office, wrote his letter of 
 resignation, and packed up his personal files and photos
 of 
 his family."  He said Mynbayev immediately called and asked, 
 "My dear friend, what are you doing?!"  Idenov said he was 
 fed up and was going to the Middle East to work -- "I want 
 out of here!"  PM Masimov called and said, "Nazarbayev wants 
 to know how you're doing.  He'd really like to see you when 
 you have time."  Idenov, who said he'd been trying to see the 
 President for months but had been blocked by the "Big Four," 
 went to see the President and told him, "Kabyldin says 
 Kulibayev doesn't want to work with me any more."  Idenov 
 said the President told him to calm down:  "It's probably 
 just evil gossip.  I'll have Karim (Masimov) talk to Timur 
 (Kulibayev).  Then Idenov went to Masimov and told him, "OK, 
 I'll stay, but how do I deal with this?"  Masimov said he'd 
 talk to both Kabyldin and Kulibayev. 
  
 5.  (S) Soon, intermediaries arranged an Idenov-Kulibayev 
 meeting.  Idenov said they both pretended to ignore the core 
 problem -- Kulibayev's, he alleged, avarice for large bribes. 
  Idenov averred he told Kulibayev, "Please watch your image 
 and reputation.  You have a real opportunity to improve your 
 own image and the image of the nation."  Idenov said 
 Kulibayev was "like a Buddha with a Paris manicure," and both 
 understood life would continue.  Idenov said he believes he 
 has, so far, the president's protection.  "But the games 
 continue," he said.  Idenov alleged that both BG and Italy's 
 ENI are corrupt -- and Kulibayev is salivating to profit from 
 them -- but, so far, Idenov stands in the way.  "So long as 
 Nazarbayev says he wants Kashagan and Karachaganak developed 
 according to international standards, that's what I'll do." 
  
 6.  (SBU) (NOTE:  Fugitive former CEO of BTA bank, Mukhtar 
 Ablyazov, accused of embezzling over $1 billion, recently 
 leaked "documentary evidence" to the international media that 
 China's state companies have bribed Kulibayev over $100 
 million in recent months for oil deals.  END NOTE.) 
  
 7.  (S) The Ambassador asked if the corruption and infighting 
 are worse now than before.  Idenov paused, thought, and then 
 replied, "No, not really.  It's business as usual."  Idenov 
 brushed off a question if the current maneuverings are part 
 of a succession struggle.  "Of course not.  It's too early 
 for that.  As it's always been, it's about big money. 
 Capitalism -- you call it market economy -- means huge money. 
  Listen, almost everyone at the top is confused.  They're 
 confused by their Soviet mentality.  They're confused by the 
 corrupt excesses of capitalism.  'If Goldman Sachs executives 
 can make $50 million a year and then run America's economy in 
 Washington, what's so different about what we do?' they ask." 
  
 OTHER TIDBITS 
  
 8.  (S) MODEST WEALTH.  Idenov alleged that MEMR's Mynbayev 
 is among the richest in Kazakhstan but "flies under the 
 radar" because he is a relatively modest and very 
 hard-working technocrat.  His great wealth derives, in part, 
 from his former ownership of KazKommerzBank -- "But he never 
 flaunts it." 
  
 9.  (S) VULTURES.  Idenov alleged that GazProm and China 
 National Petroleum Company "continue to circle like 
 vultures," hoping that the Kashagan and Karachaganak 
 consortia will implode, and then they can pick up the pieces. 
  "Won't happen on my watch!" Idenov vowed. 
  
 10.  (C) HOW TO ORDER LAMB.  Idenov insisted the Ambassador 
 order a bottle of wine for their dinner but then never 
 touched his first glass.  Instead, he gulped three cans of 
 Coca-Cola while inhaling his food.  When both he and the 
 Ambassador ordered lamb chops, Idenov advised, "Well done, 
  
 ASTANA 00000072  003 OF 003 
  
  
 never rare -- this is Astana, not London!" 
  
 11.  (S) COMMENT:  Idenov is effusive, even theatrical, by 
 nature.  When he trusts, he spills his heart.  Of course, 
 there's no doubt he also spins his own narrative, as we all 
 do.  And so, this dinner is simply a snapshot -- but, we 
 would judge, a relatively accurate glimpse of one version of 
 current reality.  The significant point is that Nazarbayev is 
 standing with Idenov, not Kulibayev, to maintain 
 international standards to develop the massive Kashagan and 
 Karachaganak hydrocarbon projects.  END COMMENT. 
 HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2273,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2273 2009-12-31 07:44 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana
Appears in these articles:
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988311.ece

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #2273/01 3650744
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 310744Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7141
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0549
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1617
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0244
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2379
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0098
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2662

S E C R E T ASTANA 002273

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM MNUC KNNP IR JA KZ

REF: A. ASTANA 2257 B. SECSTATE 131723 C. ASTANA 2158

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B), (D)

1. (S) SUMMARY: The government of Kazakhstan publicly and privately denied allegations of negotiations between Iran and KazAtomProm for the purchase of yellowcake uranium (refs A-B). During a December 31 meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Kairat Umarov told the Ambassador that an extensive interagency investigation found no evidence of discussions with, or even a proposal from, Iran. He stressed Kazakhstans strong commitment to non-proliferation and stringent export-control regime. Umarov requested further details to assist the investigation and a public statement of support from the United States (see suggestion in para 13). Umarov passed the Ambassador the Foreign Ministrys December 30 press release and a non-paper (see paragraphs 11-12). END SUMMARY.

"NO STONE UNTURNED"

2. (S) In response to the Ambassadors December 30 demarche regarding possible negotiations between a Kazakhstani subsidiary of KazAtomProm (KAP) and Iran for the sale of a large quantity of yellowcake uranium, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Kairat Umarov requested an urgent December 31 meeting with the Ambassador. Umarov first emphasized the Kazakhstani governments serious and immediate response to the allegations, stating, "All agencies have worked together to leave no stone unturned." He then passed the Ambassador the Foreign Ministrys December 30 press release and a non-paper on the governments investigation (see paragraphs 11-12). Summarizing the non-paper, he thanked the U.S. government for providing information about the allegations and underlined the Kazakhstani governments strong commitment to non-proliferation. Umarov further reaffirmed support for the prevention of uranium exports to Iran, in accordance with UNSCR 1737. Highlighting U.S. assistance, he stressed Kazakhstans strong export-control regime, which precludes the possibility of a uranium shipment to Iran. Umarov asserted, "There are no negotiations on an uranium shipment. We have quickly checked all questions and are taking additional measures, but there are no leads to confirm the intention to transfer uranium." Umarov concluded by requesting "documents and materials, with names and data, on those conducting the negotiations."

NO CONTRACTS, NO CONTACT, AND NO NEGOTIATIONS

3. (S) Umarov then turned to his private report on the interagency investigation, which concluded that KAP has neither contracts nor contact with Iran on any possible uranium shipment. Furthermore, he asserted, "No one has received a proposal from Iran, and a check of all potential mediators has not shown any evidence of a request from Iran." Turning to Baiken-U, owned jointly by KAP and Energy Asia Limited, a consortium of Japanese power companies, Umarov underlined its 95% Japanese ownership. "Even with that, KazAtomProm has no information that negotiations are in process," he stated.

ONE-THIRD OF KAZAKHSTANS URANIUM PRODUCTION

4. (S) To emphasize the improbability of the sale, Umarov then recited detailed information on Baiken-Us limited mining operations and small stock of unprocessed uranium ore -- 70 tons. The volume of yellowcake under alleged negotiations, he continued, equals one-third of all Kazakhstans production. "To ship that amount unaccounted is crazy," he argued. Highlighting the regular inventory of stockpiles by the competent Kazakhstani agencies, he revealed, "They have checked half, nothing is missing, and no documents have been distorted."

MANDATORY END-USE CERTIFICATES

5. (S) About transportation, Umarov told the Ambassador that all uranium exports occur exclusively by railway, and that no shipments have ever passed through Kazakhstani sea ports [on the Caspian Sea]. Kazakhstans multi-layered, strict export controls would ensure immediate identification of any shipment of any amount of uranium, he argued. Furthermore, he said, "No Kazakhstani company has requested a license to export uranium to Iran, and we never ship uranium to a non-nuclear power without an end-use certificate."

REPUTATION AT STAKE

6. (S) "This investigation led to our statement, and now we have big questions for you and Washington. Information is very important
because Kazakhstans reputation has been put at stake," he asserted. "If you consider us a strategic partner, as you say, you must share information. We are working for one and the same goals, and we have always been helpful on Iran. The appearance of this article and the mention of intelligence leads to questions about trust." Umarov then underlined the governments "disappointment" that the State Departments statement (drawn from press guidance) did not more firmly support Kazakhstan and underline Kazakhstans staunch support for non-proliferation. "Now, we are in a damage-control situation," he concluded with real chagrin.

INCIDENT ORCHESTRATED?

7. (S) Umarov relayed the Kazakhstani governments request to the IAEA for the report. "The IAEA says that they do not have the report, which leads us to the conclusion that it was orchestrated." He then repeated his request for additional information in order to continue the investigation in greater detail. "As partners, we must work together constructively to stop activity confidentially. Our previous experiences have shown the effectiveness of this approach. You trusted us before with such sensitive projects as Operation Sapphire."

STRONGER, BROADER INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WELCOMED

8. (S) After thanking the Ministry and government for its serious, speedy response, the Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. government is not accusing the Kazakhstani government of involvement in the alleged negotiations. He asserted that he met with the Foreign Minister in advance of the article, because the U.S. government sees Kazakhstan as a strong partner. The Ambassador mentioned the U.S. governments recognition and praise for Kazakhstans long history of positive cooperation, especially on non-proliferation. Recalling his meeting with the new head of the National Security Committee (KNB) (ref C), the Ambassador welcomed stronger, broader intelligence cooperation.

PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT?

9. (S) Looking for a way to restore Kazakhstans image, Umarov concluded with a request that the U.S. government make a public statement of support, "We have strenuously worked on our non-proliferation reputation, and now it is being questioned, now the word has gone out. We would appreciate strong support from our partners." The Ambassador agreed to relay the request.

10. (S) In a private pull-aside, Umarov told the Ambassador that Kazakhstan has some degree of suspicion that a third nation (unnamed) might have fabricated the initial report and, for its own purposes, leaked it to the Associated Press.

11. (U) BEGIN DECEMBER 30 PRESS STATEMENT:

STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorically repudiates certain news media reports alleging Kazakhstans connection to a possible deal to supply uranium to Iran and considers them groundless insinuations damaging the reputation of our country.

As is known, Kazakhstan has voluntarily renounced the worlds fourth largest nuclear and missile arsenal, shut down the worlds second largest Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, and is one of the recognized leaders of the global process of disarmament and nonproliferation.

Kazakhstan is firmly committed to the principles of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and tough control over the turnover of dual use materials. As a non-nuclear weapon state, Kazakhstan has been unwaveringly committed and remains committed to the principles of the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, the UN Convention on physical protection of nuclear materials, as well as the principles and rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

All the operations with nuclear materials in Kazakhstan, including our cooperation regarding peaceful use of atomic energy with foreign countries, are subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

In this connection, Kazakhstan expects the IAEA to give an appropriate assessment of the information being disseminated by the news media.

END STATEMENT.

12. (S) BEGIN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS NON-PAPER:

Thank you for providing the information on the attempts of Iranian company Nur Afzar Gostar (NAG) to purchase uranium ore from Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan unwaveringly fulfills its tight export-control obligations with respect to nuclear materials and is committed to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We fully support your efforts to prevent the export of nuclear materials to the Islamic Republic of Iran, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1737. Kazakhstans export-control system excludes any possibility of illegal deliveries of uranium products to that country. Kazakhstans government agencies and private companies are not conducting, nor have they ever conducted, official negotiations for the delivery of uranium ore to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Based on your inquiry, the government conducted a thorough investigation of the companies you identified and took additional steps to prevent the illegal transfer of purified uranium ore, including yellowcake. To date, no evidence of an illegal export of significant amounts of uranium ore have been found.

From our side, we request that you provide copies of materials containing further information on the companies and individuals engaged in the negotiations to transfer uranium ore from Kazakhstan.

END NON-PAPER.

13. (S) COMMENT: We know from other sources that Kazakhstans initial investigation was indeed swift and relatively thorough. Nonproliferation is one area where the United States and Kazakhstan have consistently and successfully cooperated for nearly two decades, and sensitive nonproliferation programs still continue. Given the very strong disappointment, almost chagrin, that Umarov expressed, we suggest it would not be remiss for the Department to issue a press statement (or for Embassy Astana to be authorized to issue one) that notes the government of Kazakhstans full cooperation in the investigation of this current allegation, as well as our long and successful partnership to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Please advise. END COMM

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2257,

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2257 2009-12-30 07:48 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana
Appears in these articles:
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988383.ece

VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #2257/01 3640748
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 300748Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7126
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1615
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2368
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0096
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2655

S E C R E T ASTANA 002257

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM MNUC KNNP IR JA KZ

REF: SECSTATE 131723

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B), (D)

1. (S) SUMMARY: The government of Kazakhstan initially respondedQeptically to a U.S. non-paper alleging that Iran is negotiating to buy a large amount of yellowcake uranium from KazAtomProm, but promised to undertake a serious investigation and report its findings to Embassy Astana. It is possible the investigation will be slightly slowed because the Kazakhstani government closes early on December 31 in observance of New Year and will not re-open again until January 4. END SUMMARY.

2. (S) In response to December 29 e-mailed information from USUN Vienna that the Associated Press (AP) was about to publish a report alleging that Iran was in the late stages of negotiating to buy a very large quantity of yellowcake uranium from an entity in Kazakhstan associated with KazAtomProm (KAP), the Department instructed the Ambassador to raise the matter urgently in Astana at the highest possible level. On December 29, the Ambassador met with State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev, a close confidante of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The Ambassador passed to Saudabayev the as yet unpublished AP report and told him that if this is true, it is a huge problem, a violation of UNSCR 1737, a violation of the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (of which Kazakhstan is a member), and would seriously harm the U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship. The Ambassador asked Saudabayev to bring this report urgently to the attention of the proper officials in the government of Kazakhstan.

3. (S) Saudabayev said, "My initial response is nyet, nyet, and nyet. This cannot be true. Give me the full report and we will follow up and look into every detail. If this is true, it would violate the principles of our policy since independence. We have always been the strongest supporters of non-proliferation. Please give us complete details soonest, and we will investigate fully."

4. (S) With the AP report having appeared later on December 29, the Ambassador delivered on December 30 to Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov, who had been in the previous days meeting, the U.S. interagency-cleared non-paper from para eight of reftel. Umarov said that following the December 29 meeting, the Foreign Ministry had immediately gotten in touch with the Ministry of Energy and Mineral ResQces (MEMR), which is responsible for KAP. According to Umarov, MEMRs initial response was that such a large volume of yellowcake uranium could not be transferred without notice. Kazakhstan maintains a strong export control regime and stringent control of its ports. There has been and there will be no negotiations with Iran on something this sensitive. It is not credible, MEMR added, that rogue individuals could be involved because Kazakhstan maintains strict government control over its uranium stocks. Umarov added that KAP expects to release an initial response to the AP report later on December 30.

5. (S) Umarov added that the Foreign Ministrys initial response on December 29 had been that the AP report must be "false information." With fuller information from the non-paper, the government of Kazakhstan will continue to investigate, but, he said, it would be easier if we could provide more detailed information. He also asked that we provide a read-out of any response from the government of Japan. The Ambassador urged that the government of Kazakhstan take this matter with the utmost seriousness and provide a full account of its investigation, preferably no later than January 5. (NOTE: It is possible the investigation will be slightly slowed because the Kazakhstani government, except for essential services, closes early on December 31 in observance of New Year and will not re-open again until January 4. END NOTE.)

6. (S) GRPOQesented the same non-paper to appropriate counterparts and strongly encouraged them to investigate thoroughly.

7. (SBU) On December 30, the Interfax-Kazakhstan News Agency, citing the AP report published by the "Guardian" in the UK, broke the story in Kazakhstan. A spokesman of the government of Kazakhstan responded that all of its uranium activities fully comply with IAEA safeguards, and is investigating the report. An official response will be
forthcoming within a few days, the spokesman said.

8. (S) COMMENT: Because the AP report was datelined Vienna where ex-First Son-in-Law Rakhat Aliyev is believed to be in exile, the initial knee-jerk reaction of some in the government of Kazakhstan was likely that this must be one more attempt by Aliyev to blacken Kazakhstans image. However, we believe the government of Kazakhstan is fully aware of the seriousness of this report and its potential ramifications and will investigate it fully. Any futher detail that we might be able to provide would assist in that investigation. END COMMENT.

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2198, KAZAKHSTAN: REQUEST FOR NORTH-SOUTH OVERFLIGHT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2198 2009-12-23 01:31 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3482
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2198/01 3570131
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230131Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7059
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1832
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1682
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 2932
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2637
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 2274
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1637
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1266
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2338

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR AF KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  REQUEST FOR NORTH-SOUTH OVERFLIGHT 
PATH COMPLICATED BY THE WORD "LETHAL" 
 
REF: SECSTATE 128489 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY:  The long-existing east-west (trans-Caspian) 
overflight path agreement the United States has had with 
Kazakhstan to support U.S. efforts in  Afghanistan never 
specified (or limited) the cargo of the aircraft.  The 
agreement was simply to support Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan.  And so, we initially judged that a request for 
an additional overflight path, north-south, could be 
relatively quickly achieved by a simple exchange of 
diplomatic notes.  That has not proved to be the case.  As 
soon as we specified "lethal" cargo, we triggered a policy 
debate within the government of Kazakhstan that is still not 
resolved.  We believe that the Committee for National 
Security (KNB, ex-KGB) and other conservative forces are 
arguing to President Nazarbayev that public knowledge of 
"lethal cargo" would make Kazakhstan a target for terrorist 
attacks.  We must stop publicly using the word "lethal" in 
seeking a new north-south overflight path.  If we can drop 
that word, we likely will achieve our goal, but it will take 
more time.  END SUMMARY. 
 
POLITICALLY DOABLE, BUT... 
 
2.  (S) During his December 15 meetings in Astana, Assistant 
Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert 
Blake raised the overflight request with President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev's foreign policy adviser Kairat Sarybai and State 
Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev.  Sarybai told 
Blake, "Politically this is not a problem for us.  We have 
always supported, and continue to support, your policy in 
Afghanistan.  But we have to take our law into account. 
Thus, we'll probably need parliamentary approval for this new 
request."  Sarybai stated firmly that the United States 
should not emphasize -- should not even state openly -- that 
our request is for lethal transit.  "Do not use that word. 
This would be a huge complication for us internally and 
externally."  Repeating that our request can ultimately be 
achieved, that Kazakhstan broadly supports U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan because it is in Kazakhstan's interest to do so. 
Sarybai added, "We have our historical experience how to live 
with the dragon (China) and how to live with the bear 
(Russia)." 
 
YIKES!  LETHAL?  DON'T SAY IT! 
 
3.  (S) When A/s Blake raised our need to have a quick reply 
to our November 9 diplomatic note requesting the addition of 
a north-south overflight path, Foreign Minister Saudabayev 
blanched and replied, "Lethal, huh?  That's a new issue for 
us!"  At A/S Blake's request, the Ambassador elaborated that 
there is nothing at all new in this request, because, in 
fact, the cargo of previous overflights had never been 
specified.  Saudabayev tasked Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat 
Umarov and the Ambassador to work this issue intensively. 
Saudabayev said, "You must convince us this is nothing new. 
The more detail you can give us, the easier it will be for us 
to convince our 'other agencies.'"  Saudabayev added, "You 
know from experience that not all head-of-state decisions 
find support in society.  That's why we need your very best 
arguments that this is nothing new.  Please pay attention: 
you cannot, I emphasize cannot, use the word 'lethal' in the 
agreement language, and especially never, ever in public." 
Saudabayev expanded, "Our entire history of cooperation -- on 
non-proliferation, on Iraq, on Afghanistan -- our strongest 
desire to support President Obama, all of this shows that we 
remain strongly committed to achieving mutual goals.  But you 
must make the strongest, most careful points possible, to 
achieve this agreement."  A/S Blake assured Saudabayev that 
we would with with his team and respect Kazakhstan's 
sensitivity about the word "lethal." 
 
 
ASTANA 00002198  002 OF 002 
 
 
4.  (S) COMMENT:  During these conversations, Kazakhstani 
officials noted that they vetoed a recent Chinese request to 
transit lethal equipment through Kazakhstan's territory for a 
joint military exercise in Russia.  They have that in mind 
because of their policy of equivalent multi-vector foreign 
policy.  But even more important, we judge that Kazakhstan's 
KNB is arguing strongly to President Nazarbayev that no 
agreements can be made that would possibly expose Kazakhstan 
to potential terrorist attacks.  In their view, the transit 
of "lethal" equipmen
t and troops would do so.  That, in the 
end, is probably the key issue.  We judge that an additional 
north-south overflight path agreement is doable, but it will 
take more time.  Above all, in both private and -- especially 
-- public statements, we should not use the word "lethal." 
If we can drop that word, as we did in the the proposed 
addendum (reftel) we likely will achieve our goal.  But it 
will probably take significantly more time now that we have 
used the "L word" in our bilateral conversations.  Achieving 
an additional north-south overflight path will be this 
Mission's highest immediate priority.  END COMMENT. 
 
5.  (U) Assistant Secretary Blake cleared this cable. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2158, KAZAKHSTAN: NEW KNB CHAIRMAN VOWS TO FOLLOW THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2158 2009-12-17 07:49 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8817
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2158/01 3510749
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 170749Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7004
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 2252
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1615
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1250
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2316
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1810
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1660
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2918
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2623

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002158 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D, P, SCA/CEN, S/CT, INR, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER PHUM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  NEW KNB CHAIRMAN VOWS TO FOLLOW THE 
LAW 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY:  Newly appointed KNB Chairman Adil 
Shayakhmetov told the Ambassador on December 12 that he will 
strive to increase U.S.-Kazakhstan counter-terrorism 
cooperation, and that the KNB under his chairmanship will 
work strictly within the law.  When the Ambassador raised 
several cases of journalists and human-rights advocate 
Yevgeniy Zhovtis, Shayakhmetov did not react negatively, but, 
as would be expected, neither did he seem eager to offer 
positive solutions.  We believe Shayakmetov will report this 
meeting to President Nazarbayev.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (S) On December 7, the Senate of Kazakhstan confirmed 
Major General Adil Shayakhmetov as the new chairman of the 
Committee for National Security (KNB, ex-KGB), replacing 
Amangeldy Shabdarbayev who has been appointed a senior 
adviser to President Nursultan Nazarbayev.  The actual 
transfer of authority took place on December 11, when 
Nazarbayev went to KNB headquarters to introduce 
Shayakhmetov.  As soon as Shayakhmetov was confirmed, as a 
matter of course the Ambassador submitted a request to pay a 
courtesy call on him.  With lightening speed for the 
Kazakhstani bureaucracy, the appointment was set for Saturday 
morning, December 12.  From the moment the Ambassador walked 
through the front door of the KNB headquarters, photographers 
and a videographer stayed glued to him.  The meeting took 
place in what appeared to be Shayakmetov's actual office, 
with phones ringing non-stop, although they remained 
unaswered. 
 
TIME TO EXPAND COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION 
 
3.  (S) The Ambassador congratulated Shayakhmetov on his 
appointment and officially introduced him to the Mission's 
GRPO chief.  The Ambassador emphasized that the United States 
fully respects Kazakhstan's other important relations (i.e., 
Russia), but believes it is the right time to increase our 
bilateral intelligence cooperation, especially as we take on 
new responsibilities in Afghanistan.  He noted that 
Kazakhstan and the United States have had a history of 
positive cooperation on counter-terrorism, with real 
successes.  We would now like to expand our counter-terrorism 
cooperation beyond information sharing. 
 
A SUGGESTION 
 
4.  (S) The Ambassador then said he would like to offer a 
suggestion.  In recent months, Kazakhstan's image has 
suffered internationally because of the arrests and 
convictions of several journalists and the internationally 
respected human rights advocate Yevgeniy Zhivtis, cases which 
some believe were politically motivated.  The Ambassador 
emphasized strongly that he does not have the right to 
interfere in Kazakhstan's internal affairs but, as a friend 
of Kazakhstan, suggested that Shayakmetov consider 
recommending to President Nazarbayev a review of these cases, 
fully within the limits of Kazakhstani law.  The Ambassador 
told Shayakhmetov that a positive resolution of these cases 
-- perhaps through a Presidential New Year Amnesty -- would 
make a strong and positive international impression and would 
help undo some of the recent damage, especially at the moment 
Kazakhstan assumes the chairmanship of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
 
A HINT? 
 
5.  (S) Dismissing the photographers, Shayakmetov responded 
that he was pleased to meet the Ambassador, noting that he 
was the first foreign diplomat he was meeting in his new 
position.  He emphasized that he was fully briefed on "all 
cases of the past three years," because he had been Deputy 
 
ASTANA 00002158  002 OF 003 
 
 
Chairman of the KNB.  He praised the effective cooperation 
between our two special services, and recalled his previous 
consultations in the United States on counter-terrorism. 
Re-emphasizing that he knows "all the cases of the past three 
years," Shayakhmetov again offered appreciation for 
U.S.-Kazakhstan cooperation.  He said, "As chairman of the 
KNB, I will strive to increase that cooperation."  (COMMENT: 
We suspect that Shayakhmetov's reference, repeated twice, to 
"all the cases of the last three years," might have been a 
veiled hint about KNB cases that were initiated against U.S. 
interests.  END COMMENT.) 
 
"THE KNB WILL WORK ST
RICTLY WITHIN THE LAW" 
 
6.  (S) Turning to the journalists and Zhovtis, Shayakhmetov 
stated, "They received what the law requires.  About Zhovtis, 
you must remember that he killed a man."  Shayakhmetov then 
said, "I have been in many CIS countries, and I understand 
how the various systems work.  In Kazakhstan, we are working 
to develop a real democracy.  I understand the importance of 
our OSCE chairmanship.  Under my chairmanship, the KNB will 
work strictly within the law.  When I represented the KNB at 
the provincial level (in Pavlodar), I learned the importance 
of following the letter of the law.  Because of your status 
as an important and highly experienced diplomat, I look to 
you to help improve the cooperation between our two 
countries." 
 
7.  (S) The Ambassador thanked Shayakhmetov for his emphasis 
on rule of law, the foundation of true democracies, and 
reiterated that he had brought up difficult cases solely as a 
friend of Kazakhstan to emphasize the serious image problem 
that has developed for Kazakhstan. 
 
AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT 
 
8.  (S) Although I do not want to read too much into this 
meeting, it strikes me as somewhat unusual that I was able to 
meet Shayakhmetov so quickly after his appointment and that I 
was supposedly the first foreign diplomat to do so.  This 
meeting, in which Shayakhmetov was relatively reserved and 
businesslike but not unfriendly, is is stark contrast to my 
courtesy call on Shabdarbayev in November 2008, when he 
abruptly opened the meeting by asking brusquely if I were 
prepared to cooperate operationally to use all possible 
special-services means to detain disgraced First Son-in-Law 
Rakhat Aliyev in Austria and "render him to Kazakhstan to 
face justice."  When I firmly declined, Shabdarbayev abruptly 
ended the meeting and stalked out after 10 minutes.  With 
Shayakhmetov, Aliyev was never once mentioned, and the 
chairman remained positive and reasonably friendly, even if 
relatively formal. 
 
9.  (S) COMMENT CONTINUEDD:  I raised the cases of 
journalists, and especially Zhovtis, because some recent 
Web-site analytical postings, which the KNB had certainly 
seen, have suggested that Shabdarbayev was removed from the 
KNB chairmanship because he had gone too far in pursuing 
these and other cases (including against former KazAtomProm 
Chairman Mukhtar Dzhakishev), supposedly to please 
Nazarbayev.  Without pressing too hard, I emphasized the 
image issue, suspecting that Shayakhmetov would report the 
meeting to President Nazarbayev.  If nothing else, the 
photographers and the videographer (surely recording every 
word) were present when I made this intervention.  They left 
only when Shayakhmetov dismissed them to begin his reply. 
 
10.  (S)  COMMENT CONTINUED:  I have no special reason to 
believe that our U.S. view will prevail on the human-rights 
cases, but at least we know that it will now more likely 
reach Nazarbayev's ear.  This meeting would not have happened 
so unusually quickly if there had not been a degree of 
 
ASTANA 00002158  003 OF 003 
 
 
interest at the top in what the United States would say in 
the context of the removal of Shabdarbayev from the KNB.  END 
COMMENT. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2105, KAZAKHSTAN: MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION APPROVES BN-350

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2105 2009-12-02 10:01 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5156
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2105/01 3361001
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021001Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6939
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2208
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1572
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2273
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1207
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1767
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1617
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002105 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
ENERGY FOR NNSA/GTRI 
 
E.O. 12958: 12/02/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP MNUC RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION APPROVES BN-350 
SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS TO BEGIN BY EARLY JANUARY 
 
REFTELS:  A. ASTANA 02070 
  B. STATE 120133 
  C. ASTANA 02000 
      D. ASTANA 02007 
  E. 08 ASTANA 02316 
  F. ASTANA 01541 
  G. ASTANA 01886 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Pamela L. Spratlen, 1.4 (b), 
(d) 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  On November 30, Kazakhstan's Minister of Transport 
and Communications, Abelgazi Kusainov, opened a meeting with Post's 
Department of Energy (DOE) representatives, at which Kazakhstani 
officials approved beginning the BN-350 dry run on December 1 and 
actual "hot runs" no later than early January.  The train departed 
Kurchatov on December 1 for the round-trip dry run.  It is expected 
to depart Aktau on December 8, carrying an empty cask after 
completion of loading procedures.  Vice Minister of Energy and 
Mineral Resources, Aset Magauov, affirmed that even if hot runs begin 
in January, the Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning has 
sufficient funds for this priority project.  Post believes the start 
of the dry run is a positive step towards conclusion of the spent 
fuel transportation project and looks forward to using the momentum 
from solving this decade-long project to further other bilateral 
non-proliferation-related programs.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NATIONAL RAILWAY COMPANY AGREES TO START DRY RUN DECEMBER 1 
 
2. (S) On November 19, KTZh agreed to begin the dry run on December 
1, but asserted that it would only allow actual BN-350 spent fuel 
shipments, if the Railcar Commission certified the specialized 
railcars during its biannual senior representatives meeting in Riga, 
scheduled for January 20 (ref A).  On November 25, the CIS Railcar 
Commission agreed to the request by representatives of Kazakhstan's 
Temir Zholy (KTZh) national railway company that the non-standard 
railcars be included in the Commission's catalog.  In response to 
Post's request for a meeting, on November 26, the Minister of 
Transport requested a meeting with Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources (MEMR) representatives to discuss the BN-350 spent fuel 
transportation project.  Immediately following the meeting, MEMR 
representatives reported to the U.S. DOE representative that Kusainov 
decided waiting until the Riga meeting would be an unnecessary delay 
(ref B).  KTZh's Kanat Almagambetov conceded that he was ordered to 
pursue hot runs immediately following the dry run, even without 
completing the railcar registration process. 
 
3. (S) Post believes the November 25 Railcar Commission decision is a 
positive step towards conclusion of the spent fuel transportation 
project, because registration of the specialized fuel-transport 
railcars will provide KTZh with a modicum of cover in case of an 
accident.  (COMMENT:  An American citizen employee of KTZh told 
EconOff that liability issues are of particular concern to KTZh 
employees, because the company's two previous Presidents were 
dismissed in connection with corruption scandals.  This environment 
explains KTZh's seemingly excessive concern about the minor details 
of transport operations under its supervision, despite the fact that 
MEMR, and its subordinate nuclear-related organizations, would also 
have responsibility and liability for the transport. 
 
MINISTER OF TRANSPORT ORDERS RAILWAY COMPANY TO PERMIT HOT RUNS 
 
4. (S) On November 30, by formally announcing his approval to begin 
hot runs as soon as possible after completion of the dry run, 
Minister of Transport Kusainov joined his counterparts among 
Kazakhstan's senior officials -- National Security Council Secretary 
Marat Tazhin and Minister of Energy Sauat Mynbayev -- in announcing 
his support for quick forward movement on the BN-350 spent fuel 
transportation project (Refs C-D).  Although Kusainov ordered KTZh to 
allow the railcars to be used based on the Railcar Commission's 
November 25 decision, pending a successful dry run, the National 
 
ASTANA 00002105  002 OF 002 
 
 
Nuclear Center must provide a letter of guarantee and purchase 
special insurance, in order to relieve KTZh of liability. 
 
CHRONOLOGY OF POSSIBLE TRANSPORT OPERATIONS 
 
5. (S) During the November 30 meeting, Ministry of Interior 
representatives confirmed their organization
's internal troops are 
already pre-staged for the dry run.  If the dry run, which began on 
December 1, takes the maximum possible scheduled time of 19 days, it 
will be completed on December 20.  The relevant Kazakhstani 
ministries have 15 days to complete various assessments of the dry 
run.  Therefore, hot runs could begin on January 5.  (NOTE:  January 
7 (Orthodox Christmas) is a nationally-observed holiday in 
Kazakhstan, which may also affect start dates.  END NOTE.)  Even with 
the expected start date of early January, it is still technically 
possible, if no other delays occur, to complete transport operations 
by the beginning of December 2010. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN EAGER FOR SUCCESSFUL HOT RUNS BEFORE APRIL SUMMIT 
 
6. (S) Kazakhstani government representatives, including KTZh 
officials, are fully aware that if a compressed schedule for 12 hot 
runs is not approved and initiated by the beginning of the year, or 
if any additional delays occur, the bilateral effort will not meet 
its scheduled completion date.  It will be clear by March, just prior 
to Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev's April trip to the 
United States to attend the Global Nuclear Security Summit, if the 
project is likely to be completed on-schedule.  (COMMENT:  President 
Nazarbayev, who believes his international prestige is closely linked 
to his record on non-proliferation, is eager to meet with President 
Obama.  Post believes Kazakhstani officials are very anxious to 
complete several hot runs, in order to be able to report positive 
results prior to Nazarbayev's visit.  END COMMENT.) 
 
NEXT STEPS -- AFTER THE SPENT FUEL TRANSPORT IS COMPLETE 
 
7. (S) The BN-350 project, which involves transportation of nuclear 
fuel over almost 4000 kilometers of rail and road, is one of the most 
technically-ambitious spent fuel transport operations ever attempted. 
 EmbOffs have observed the close relationships that Kazakhstani and 
U.S. scientists have built over their decade-long collaboration.  The 
teams developed confidence through solving unique technical 
challenges, such as cask design, together.  Post looks forward to 
applying the momentum that will hopefully be generated from 
successful completion of this decade-long project to resolve other 
non-proliferation tasks, such as specifically negotiating and moving 
the BN-350 spent fuel into permanent storage, completing the reactor 
conversion project at the Institute of Nuclear Physics, and urging 
the government of Kazakhstan to fund and complete the geo-cement 
stone facility, located on the territory of the decommissioned BN-350 
reactor (Refs E-G). 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2095, KAZAKHSTANI UIGHUR GROUPS REFUSE TO SING AND DANCE IN

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2095 2009-11-25 11:30 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8521
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2095/01 3291130
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251130Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6917
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2192
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2262
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1561
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1196
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1751
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1606
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2601
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2899

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ASTANA 002095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, DRL, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/25/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINR SOCI KDEM CH KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTANI UIGHUR GROUPS REFUSE TO SING AND DANCE IN 
CHINA, IN RESPONSE TO C-REF-01741 
 
REFTELS:  A.  ASTANA 01210 
  B.  ASTANA 01292 
  C.  ASTANA 02066 
  D.  STATE 88234 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Pamela L. Spratlen, 1.4 (b), 
(d) 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  Following unrest in July and August in China's 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Kazakhstan's ethnic Uighurs 
-- one of the largest and fastest growing ethnic groups in Kazakhstan 
and an important political force -- criticized the Chinese government 
and staged a large protest in Almaty (ref A).  Kazakhstani interest 
groups expressed concern that the situation could complicate 
relations between Kazakhstan and China.  Government officials largely 
declined to comment on the political aspects of the unrest.  During 
PolOff's subsequent visits to Almaty, where 90% of Kazakhstan's 
Uighur population lives, Uighur activists reiterated their concerns 
about China's treatment of the Uighurs, while acknowledging they try 
to avoid "creating trouble" between Kazakhstan and China. 
Kazakhstani Uighurs expressed concern for refugees fleeing "political 
persecution by the Chinese government" and appealed to the United 
States to urge China to alter its policies in the XUAR.  END SUMMARY. 
 
UIGHURS PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN KAZAKHSTANI SOCIETY 
 
2. (SBU) PolOff met with the Deputy Chairman of the Uighurs' 
Republican Cultural Center, Turgan Rozakhunov, and the Chairwoman of 
Kazakhstan's "National Association of Uighurs," Tamara Mametova, to 
discuss their views on the situation in the XUAR in September. 
(COMMENT:  The Center, established in 2003, has offices in 11 
regions, with its largest offices in Almaty, Shymkent, and Zhambyl, 
where most of Kazakhstan's estimated 300,000 Uighurs live.  Its 
administrative board's 39 members advocate for the interests of 
Kazakhstan's Uighurs.  They are typically well-connected to President 
Nazarbayev and other political elites, and they advocate moderate, 
non-separatist views on Uighur political activities.  END COMMENT.) 
Rozakhunov praised Anvar Khadzhiyev, with whom PolOff met shortly 
before his July death, and echoed his views about the excellent 
position of Uighurs in Kazakhstani society, especially since Uighurs 
receive education in their native language and have good relations 
with other ethnic groups (ref A).  According to Rozakhunov, Uighurs 
are the fifth largest ethnic group in Kazakhstan, and the third 
largest in Almaty city.  He also asserted that many of Kazakhstan's 
prominent scientists, businesspeople, and political figures -- 
including 16 deputies in Parliament and Prime Minister Karim Masimov 
-- are Uighurs. 
 
UIGHURS AND AUTHORITIES HAVE "MOSTLY POSITIVE" RELATIONSHIP 
 
3. (SBU) The Uighurs' Republican Cultural Center, Rozakhunov said, 
was not designed to engage in political activities.  Nonetheless, 
according to the Rozakhunov, "when approached by political parties 
and asked to support President Nursultan Nazarbayev, 99% of Uighurs 
voted for the President."  Despite a generally positive relationship 
with Kazakhstani authorities, Rozakhunov alleged that the Center's 
charitable actions twice provoked minor complaints of interference 
from government authorities.  In the first case, the Center funded 
construction of a school in the Yenbekshi region so that children 
could attend classes without moving to another village.  Uighur 
donors also bought a "community facility" and turned it over to the 
local akimat (mayor's administration).  Rozakhunov said the Vice 
Minister of Education raised this case and questioned the Center's 
involvement, pointing out that the Ministry is responsible for all 
matters related to education.  In the second case, the Uighurs' 
Republican Cultural Center worked with the local akimat in a very 
remote region to construct a system of piped water to prevent sewage 
from entering the potable water supply after 40 children there were 
diagnosed with hepatitis.  In both cases, Rozakhunov said the 
Ministries of Education and Health expressed appreciation for the 
Center's activities after they observed the projects' results. 
Rozakhunov told PolOff his center had raised one million dollars for 
 
ASTANA 00002095  002 OF 006 
 
 
various additional social projects, and is funding the higher 
education of 45 Uighur youths.  "We want to pa
rticipate in the 
activities of the authorities, not create a separate state within a 
state," the Center's Deputy Chairman explained.  Rozakhunov dismissed 
the role of the Kazakhstan Peoples' Assembly, as a consultative body, 
in its ability to deal with inter-ethnic tensions, and called for 
establishment of a governmental body to solve such issues.  (NOTE: 
President Nazarbayev created the Kazakhstan Peoples' Assembly (KPA) 
to serve as a consultative organization to make policy 
recommendations on strengthening social stability, and inter-ethnic 
and inter-confessional harmony.  Nazarbayev is the Chairman for life. 
 It has approximately 350 members selected by regional people' 
assemblies, and meets at least once a year.  END NOTE.) 
 
KAZAKHSTAN'S UIGHURS EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT SITUATION IN CHINA... 
 
4. (SBU) Kazakhstan's Uighur population remains concerned about the 
treatment of ethnic Uighurs in China, particularly in Xinjiang 
province.  Rozakhunov estimated that 60% of Kazakhstani Uighurs 
emigrated from China in 1952-1962.  Therefore, most Uighurs have 
relatives in China and maintain social, linguistic, and cultural 
ties.  Rozakhunov asserted that "large scale unrests have occurred 
every three to four years since the Uighurs' lands of Eastern 
Turkestan were expropriated and renamed Xinjiang.  Uighur 
demonstrations are not the demonstrations of criminals," argued 
Rozakhunov, but rather "a struggle for freedom and human rights." 
Rozakhunov alleged the Chinese government broadcast incorrect 
information about the July events in the XUAR.  Rozakhunov said that 
Kazakhstani Uighurs helped "to correct the mis-information and raise 
awareness about the situation in the XUAR by holding a 
government-sanctioned mourning ceremony on July 10." 
 
...AND WARN OF COMPLICATIONS FOR KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA RELATIONSHIP 
 
5. (SBU) Kazakhstani Uighurs are aware of China's growing importance 
to Kazakhstan as an investor, strategic, and trade partner, and 
fellow member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  They 
also know that Uighur activism can complicate Kazakhstan's relations 
with China.  According to Rozakhunov, the government allowed the 
Uighur community to demonstrate in July, "but consent was not granted 
easily."   Rozakhunov said the country's Uighur organizations "should 
not put Kazakhstan into a difficult situation."  Nevertheless, 
Rozakhunov explained that the Board of Directors unanimously voted 
against the Chinese government's proposal for the Center to 
participate in the celebration of the 60th anniversary of China's 
independence.  Rozakhunov and Mametova asserted that the Uighurs' 
Republican Cultural Center and the National Association of Uighurs 
will not sing and dance in China after the July events.  "The Chinese 
Ambassador to Kazakhstan appealed to us in person, and the Chinese 
government offered us a lot of money, but still we cannot accept," 
Rozakhunov told PolOff. 
 
REFUGEES FACE DIFFICULT CONDITIONS IN KAZAKHSTAN 
 
6. (SBU) Tamara Mametova, Chairwoman of Kazakhstan's "National 
Association of Uighurs," expressed concern about the plight of Uighur 
refugees (Ref B).  (COMMENT:  Mametova has been a long-term, reliable 
Embassy contact, and her organization has resettled more than 10 
families of XUAR refugees in Europe and the United States since 1997. 
 END COMMENT.)  According to Mametova, refugees lead very difficult 
lives in Kazakhstan.  Police often detain them for short periods of 
time, even if they have documents to confirm their official status. 
Despite help from the office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Almaty, many are frightened and have 
difficulty to hold steady jobs and send their children to school. 
The lengthy resettlement process, which can take years, compounds the 
refugees' situation.  Mametova lamented that U.S. processing times 
have increased tremendously since 2001.  She said one refugee, after 
waiting many years, recently asked her organization to retrieve his 
documents to try another country, such as Holland, Norway, or Canada. 
 
7. (SBU) Mametova also raised the specific case of Tair Medzhit and 
 
ASTANA 00002095  003 OF 006 
 
 
his three children, who have been waiting in Kazakhstan for refugee 
status for two years.  Mametova claims that his father is a political 
figure in the XUAR, and Chinese authorities arrested and killed his 
brother.  According to Mametova, Medzhit tried to escape to 
Kazakhstan, but was instead smuggled into Pakistan, and eventually 
Afghanistan.  Mametova claims he escaped, along with several other 
Uzbek Uighurs, and asked why his case has dragged on so long "when 
the cases of other young people imprisoned in Guantanamo have already 
resulted in their release."  Mametova noted that Kazakhstani 
authorities could deport Medzhit at any time. 
 
8. (SBU) Mametova also said many refugees cannot qualify with the 
UNHCR as official refugees, because they escaped over the border 
without documents or came as tourists, but are afraid to go back. 
According to Mametova, the number of such undocumented refugees has 
increased since the July events, but UNHCR, or Mametova's own 
organization, can do little to help these refugees.  The Chairwoman 
of Kazakhstan's "National Association of Uighurs" appealed to the 
United States to urge China to alter its policies in the XUAR and 
provide all possible assistance to refugees. 
 
TIGHT BORDER CONTROL PREVENTS INCREASE IN NUMBER OF REFUGEES 
 
9. (S) UNHCR's Senior Regional Legal Advisor, Narashima Rao, told 
PolOff in September and October that the UNHCR has not observed a 
marked increase in the number of asylum seekers since July (ref B). 
He attributed this situation to the vigilance of the Chinese and 
Kazakhstani Border Guards.  Rao said the Kazakhstani Ministry of 
Emergency Services convened an August meeting with UNHCR, at which 
they communicated their allocation of financial and personnel 
resources to prepare for a large inflow of migrants.  Rao asserted he 
had heard that the refugee surge never materialized, because 
Kazakhstan's Border Guard Service, which falls under the authority of 
Kazakhstan's Committee for National Security (KNB), increased its 
cooperation with Chinese authorities, and prevented most Chinese 
Uighurs from entering Kazakhstan.  "Almost no new visas are being 
issued, and the borders are essentially closed to Chinese Uighurs," 
Rao declared.  Nonetheless, Rao had not heard any report that 
authorities deported Chinese Uighurs with valid refugee status. 
 
UNHCR OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON TREATMENT OF REFUGEES 
 
10. (SBU) Rao asserted authorities detained Chinese Uighurs with 
UNHCR-approved refugee and asylum-seeker status on several occasions. 
 According to Rao, they were released quickly after intervention by 
UNHCR, which he attributed to UNHCR's intensive campaigns to educate 
refugees about their rights.  Rao, who has run UNHCR programs to 
train police in the Almaty City and Oblast, said that "rank-and-file" 
police routinely de
mand documents from all residents of Kazakhstan 
and are reluctant to accept the validity of UNHCR certificates of 
refugee status.  However, since the UNHCR has thoroughly trained 
senior Kazakhstani police officials, refugees usually are released 
quickly once better-trained and more senior officers become involved. 
 Thus, Rao confirmed Mametova's statement that refugees often face 
threats of detention from local police, but asserted that UNHCR 
involvement resolves these generally minor incidents. 
 
11. (S) Rao highlighted one significant September incident in Almaty, 
in which officers from the Almaty Department of the KNB allegedly 
took three refugees and two asylum seekers from their homes.  The 
refugees were released within approximately three hours after the 
authorities detained them, after their relatives -- acting on UNHCR's 
advice -- called the local police.  The UNHCR sent a note to the 
government of Kazakhstan to protest this treatment of refugees.  Rao 
told PolOff "this incident was a clear message to Chinese Uighurs not 
to come here, and to the Uighur community in Kazakhstan not to stir 
up trouble."  He also said at least two Uighur refugees had been 
attacked and badly injured, but that it is difficult to know if the 
refugees were unfortunate victims of random criminal violence, or if 
the attacks were politically-motivated.  Nevertheless, Rao told 
PolOff "the timing of the attacks was suspicious." 
 
 
ASTANA 00002095  004 OF 006 
 
 
WORLD CONGRESS OF UIGHURS DEPUTY CHAIRMAN CRITICIZES CHINA 
 
12. (SBU) PolOff also met in September with Kakharman Kozhamberdiyev, 
the Kazakhstani Deputy Chairman of the World Congress of Uighurs 
(WCU), and Abdrashid Turdiyev, the Chairman of the Union of Uighur 
Youth, to discuss the reaction of Kazakhstani Uighurs to the July 
events in the XUAR.  Kozhamberdiyev asserted that China's violent 
suppression of a peaceful July 5 protest in XUAR united all Uighurs 
in disapproval of China's actions.  Kozhamberdiyev accused the 
Chinese government of provoking violent conflict and portraying 
Uighurs as extremists and terrorists.  The Deputy Chairman told 
PolOff Chinese Uighurs are seeking more autonomy in the XUAR, not 
independence, and are protesting against local authorities, not 
against the Chinese people.  According to Kozhamberdiyev, the World 
Congress of Uighurs (WCU) supports an eventual dialogue with Chinese 
authorities, with certain preconditions, including a release of 
political prisoners and reforms to make the autonomous region a 
republic. 
 
13. (SBU) Kozhamberdiyev, who requested to meet PolOff in a public 
park, spoke at great length about his views on Chinese "oppression" 
of Uighurs.  He called Chinese policies and actions in the XUAR, such 
as forced sterilizations, and restrictions on Uighur-language 
education and practicing Islam, "acts of aggression."  Kozhamberdiyev 
said China is particularly afraid of the Uighurs' dedication to 
Islam, which Komzhamberdiyev said is "one of the most essential 
aspects of Uighur identity," and also one of the last remaining 
obstacles to assimilation.  Kozhamberdiyev described one incident in 
which Chinese authorities hosted a meal in a Uighur community during 
Ramadan.  Kozhamberdiyev, who says he has relatives in China, told 
PolOff that due to mass relocations of Han Chinese, the Han 
population in the XUAR changed from 261,000 in 1949 to 8.4 million 
currently.  He asserted discrimination against Uighurs in finding 
employment and prohibition of freedom of speech.  Noting that the 
Washington D.C.-based WCU has held numerous meetings and press events 
in the United States, Kozhamberdiyev urged the United States to speak 
out on behalf of the plight of Chinese Uighurs. 
 
UIGHUR ACTIVIST CONCERNED ABOUT VIOLENCE SPREADING TO KAZAKHSTAN 
 
14. (SBU) Kozhamberdiyev has vociferously criticized the Chinese 
government in media statements.  A post on a Kazakhstani opposition 
news-site quoted him as pointing to the right of Uighur people to 
self-determination as the main goal of the WCU and demanding that the 
Chinese authorities hold a referendum.  In the online posting, 
Kozhamberdiyev also said that Chinese special services created the 
East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) in order to discredit 
the movements of "real patriots" and criticized the ETLO activists 
for being too provocative.  In another article in August, 
Kozhamberdiyev asserted the WCU was working to prevent unrest in the 
XUAR from spreading to Kazakhstan.  (COMMENT:  Kozhamberdiyev, a 
mature and scholarly interlocutor , appears to be a complex -- and 
somewhat controversial -- figure.  He openly criticizes the Chinese 
government's administration of the XUAR.  However, he ardently 
advocates efforts to prevent the spread of unrest to Kazakhstan, as 
do more moderate figures, such as the Republican Cultural Center's 
Turgan Rozakhunov.  END COMMENT.) 
 
KAZAKHSTANI UIGHURS ALLEGE HARASSMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN 
 
15. (S) According to Kozhamberdiyev, the Chinese government is so 
concerned about his activities that his relatives in China -- and 
even people who just happen to share last name -- are under constant 
surveillance.  Kozhamberdiyev alleged that Kazakhstan, afraid of 
damaging its relations with China and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, also limits his organization's activities. 
Kozhamberdiyev cited a recent case when the WCU paid to hold a 
discussion at the office of an Almaty press club, which was closed 
for repairs when WCU staff arrived.  (COMMENT:  Post's Political 
Assistant in Almaty spoke with Kozhamberdiyev separately about what 
appears to have been the same incident. END COMMENT.)  According to 
Kozhamberdiyev, Yermek Narymbayev, a Kazakh-nationalist friend and 
 
ASTANA 00002095  005 OF 006 
 
 
head of the newly-founded Kazakh-Uighur Friendship and Solidarity 
Committee, suggested Kozhamberdiyev hold a photo exhibition and 
discussion at the Kalamger Press Club in Almaty.  Abdrashid Turdiyev, 
the Chairman of the Union of Uighur Youth and a key figure in the 
fiery July rally in Almaty (ref A), collected photos for the 
exhibition.  When Kozhamberdiyev approached the press club on the 
morning of the event, he observed police detaining Narymbetov and 
Turdiyev, who were released shortly afterward, after receiving 
warnings not to engage in "unsanctioned activities." 
 
16. (S) Kozhamberdiyev asserted that the WCU faces various 
administrative troubles every time it opens an office in Kazakhstan. 
He complained that his computers have frequently become infected with 
malicious viruses that interfere with his work.  He implied that the 
viruses may have been planted by Chinese Special Forces, possibly 
with the Kazakhstani KNB's assistance.  According to Kozhamberdiyev, 
China primarily wants to prevent an open flow of information about 
life in the XUAR to Kazakhstani Uighurs and the international 
community.  Abdrashid Turdiyev alleged Chinese national security 
services' responsibility for the burglary of his home several times. 

According to Kozhamberdiyev, however, Uighurs in the Kyrgyz Republic 
face a more difficult situation.  Kozhamberdiyev said that he was 
invited to attend a conference, but Kyrgyz Border Guards refused to 
admit him, because of pressure from China. 
 
KAZAKHSTANI UIGURS CRITICIZE KAZAKHSTANI "PRO-CHINA" POLICY 
 
17. (SBU) Kozhamberdiyev and Turdiyev also commented on the Uighur 
refugees' difficulties.  They agreed with Mametova and Rao about 
Kazakhstani reluctance to admit Chinese Uighurs, and the difficulty 
of obtaining UNHCR status (ref B).  Kozhamberdiyev criticized the 
role of certain prominent Kazakhstani think-tank analysts, especially 
Konstantin Syroezhkin, chief researcher at the government-affiliated 
Kazakh Institute for Strategic Studies in Almaty, for encouraging a 
pro-China foreign policy.  According to Kozhamberdiyev, Syroezhkin, 
with whom he had worked for half a year, previously lived in Beijing, 
is fond of Chinese culture, and has written many articles expressing 
support for China's perspective on various issues.  Kozhamberdiyev 
suggested his work may be "funded by China." 
 
18. (SBU) Syroezhkin's summer media statements on events in the XUAR 
have certainly correlated to the official positions of the People's 
Republic of China.  In one instance, Syroezhkin and Kozhamberdiyev 
argued during an Almaty seminar in July whether the Uighurs had ever 
previously established their own country.  During this forum, 
Syroezhkin stated that the People's Republic of China's law on 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy, enacted in 1984, stipulates that ethnic 
groups can practice self-government in their regions and constitutes 
a legal guarantee for ethnic groups to exercise their right of 
regional autonomy.  The article, under the headline, "Kazakh expert 
rebuts Xinjiang separatist leader's claims," appeared in China's 
Xinhua General News Service, on July 15.  A July 30 article in the 
pro-government newspaper "Argumenty i Fakty," quoted Syroezhkin that 
while the situation in Xinjiang spiraled out of control because of 
"tough and sometimes openly cruel actions by the authorities," the 
United States was also to blame for the riots.  Syroezhkin said, "I 
am not hinting, I am speaking directly.  Who participated in the 
World Congress of Uighurs that took place in May of this year?  Four 
Senators and two U.S. Congressmen.  Directors of almost every NGO 
that had been involved in organizing 'color revolutions' in the 
former Soviet Republics participated as well."  Several days after 
Syroezhkin's comments, China's Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Cheng 
Guoping, expressed gratitude to Kazakhstan for its support in 
preserving the country's sovereignty.  He also said "bilateral 
relations are experiencing the best period in the history of their 
development, meet people's interests in both states, and benefit the 
stability and development of the whole Central Asia." 
 
19. (S) COMMENT:  During his meeting with the Deputy Director of the 
Marshall Center, Kazakhstan's Deputy Secretary of the National 
Security Council, Marat Shaikhutdinov, asserted his government 
cooperates closely with the Chinese government (ref C).  He 
 
ASTANA 00002095  006 OF 006 
 
 
specifically praised the close relationship between Kazakhstani and 
Chinese-government affiliated think-tanks.  Shaikhutdinov's comments 
confirm Emboffs assessment that the anti-U.S., pro-China Syroezhkin, 
who works for a think-tank that falls under the Kazakhstani 
Presidential Administration, is one influential voice in the 
Kazakhstani government urging close cooperation, particularly on 
security issues, between China and Kazakhstan. 
 
20. (SBU) Comments from Kazakhstani Uighurs indicate that ethnic 
identity has the potential to politically mobilize.  This factor 
explains the Kazakhstani government's focus on maintaining the 
country's inter-ethnic harmony.  While the government does not want 
Kazakhstan's close relationship with China disrupted by the unrest in 
Xinjiang, the authorities have apparently decided to provide a 
modicum of political space for Kazakhstani Uighurs to vent their 
concerns.  Kazakhstani Uighurs are also struggling to find a balance 
between expressing shared discontent with China's response to July 
events in the XUAR without endangering their community's 
comparatively comfortable position in Kazakhstan.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2071, U.S.-KAZAKHSTANI MILITARY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS SUPPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2071 2009-11-23 00:40 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5317
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2071/01 3270040
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230040Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6895
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2178
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1548
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2249
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1183
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1738
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1593
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN AND PM CHRISTOPHER PETRONE 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/19/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KZ
SUBJECT:  U.S.-KAZAKHSTANI MILITARY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS SUPPORT 
MODERNIZATION OF ARMED FORCES AND COOPERATION IN PEACEKEEPING 
 
REFTELS:  A. ASTANA 01422 
  B. ASTANA 01478 
  C. ASTANA 01366 
      D. ASTANA 01450 
      E. ASTANA 01541 
  F. ASTANA 01770 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Pamela L. Spratlen, 1.4 (b), 
(d) 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  U.S.-Kazakhstani Bilateral Defense 
Consultations, held in Washington and Arizona November 16-18, 
discussed how to sustain and strengthen cooperative U.S.-Kazakhstani 
military-to-military engagement.  Key topics during Kazakhstan's 
Deputy Minister of Defense Sembinov's meetings in the United States 
included Kazakhstan's continued support of the Northern Distribution 
Network, NATO-Partnership for Peace cooperation, and U.S.-assistance 
on Kazakhstan's armed forces modernization.  High-level visits, 
including by CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus and NAVCENT Deputy 
Commander (refs A-B), generated continued Kazakhstani support for key 
U.S. strategic objectives in relation to Afghanistan, including the 
Northern Distribution Network, overflights, and deployment of 
Kazakhstani officers to ISAF headquarters in Kabul.  Kazakhstan's 
newly appointed Minister of Defense, and other high-level Kazakhstani 
officials, thanked the U.S. government for its assistance in 
modernization of Kazakhstani armed forces, and requested continued 
support.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NOVEMBER DEFENSE CONSULTATIONS ENHANCE STRATEGIC COOPERATION 
 
2.  (C) The cornerstone of U.S.-Kazakhstani high-level military 
engagement is the biennial or triennial Bilateral Defense 
Consultations (BDCs).  Chaired by a U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary 
and Kazakhstani Deputy Minister, they review ongoing security 
cooperation and develop new programs to assist Kazakhstan in 
modernization of its armed forces.  Previous Bilateral Defense 
Consultations -- held in Astana in 2008 -- developed the 2008-2012 
military bilateral cooperation plan.  During the November 16-18 
Bilateral Defense Consultations, U.S. and Kazakhstani representatives 
discussed Kazakhstan's continued support of the Northern Distribution 
Network, NATO-Partnership for Peace cooperation, and U.S. assistance. 
 Bilateral Defense Consultations have established a cooperative 
relationship between the U.S. Department of Defense and Kazakhstan's 
Ministries of Defense and Emergency Situations.  In addition, they 
contributed to Kazakhstan's five-year deployment of troops to Iraq 
and its support on overflights and the Northern Distribution Network 
(NDN). 
 
SUPPORT FROM THE TOP ON AFGHANISTAN AND CLOSER ENGAGEMENT 
 
3.  (S/NF) The United States and Kazakhstan conduct over 100 
military-to-military cooperation events annually -- from high-level 
visits to working-level exchanges.  Visits by CENTCOM Commander 
General David Petraeus and NAVCENT Deputy Commander Thomas Cropper 
(refs A-B) led to continued Kazakhstani support for key U.S. 
strategic objectives related to Afghanistan, including the Northern 
Distribution Network, and overflights.  Kazakhstan has offered the 
U.S. Government a new transit/logistics facility to complement the 
U.S. Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan and agreed to send staff 
officers to ISAF head-quarters in Kabul.  To reprise our successful 
five-year military cooperation in Iraq, the Kazakhstani government 
also currently is considering the U.S. request for deployment of 
non-combatant explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) instructors for the 
Afghan training facility in Mazar-i-Sharif. 
 
ENERGETIC AND PRAGMATIC DEFENSE MINISTER EMBRACES COOPERATION 
 
4.  (C) During his first meetings with U.S. officials following his 
June 24 appointment (refs A-C), Kazakhstan's Minister of Defense, 
Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, called bilateral military relations positive 
and expressed hope that relations would continue to develop 
"strategically."  He said he wishes to expand U.S.-Kazakhstani 
cooperation as part of his plan to modernize the Kazakhstani armed 
forces.  He also commented on Kazakhstan's "special relationships" 
 
ASTANA 00002071  002 OF 003 
 
 
with Russia and the United States, drawing on his personal experience 
as a former Ambassador to Russia and Head of the Presidential 
Administration.  During his meetings with Petraeus and Cropper, 
Dzhaksybekov's behavior confirmed assessments of Post's Kazakhstani 
interlocutors that he is logical and pragmatic, carefully considers 
various positions, and actively pursues "best practices" to 
accomplish strategic goals (r
efs A-C).  During the meetings, 
Kazakhstan's Minister of Defense was consistently relaxed and 
personable. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN URGES INCREASED MARITIME COOPERATION 
 
5.  (C) On August 28, U.S. NAVCENT Deputy Commander Rear Admiral 
Thomas Cropper met General-Major Mazhitov, Deputy Director of 
Kazakhstan's Border Guard Service to discuss bilateral military 
cooperation (refs B-C).  This first high-level military visit to 
focus entirely on naval cooperation helped to improve cooperation 
between the U.S. military and its Kazakhstani Navy and Coast Guard 
partners.  Mazhitov and Komratov praised current cooperation and 
expressed interest in increasing bilateral activities to combat 
shared threats.  Both interlocutors acknowledged similarities between 
the Caspian Sea and the Arabian Gulf that could make Kazakhstan's 
participation in a Combined Force event in Bahrain useful (refs B and 
D). 
 
CONSTANT ENGAGEMENT:  A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT 
 
6.  (C) High-level bilateral events reinforce frequent and 
wide-ranging working-level engagement.  In addition to the 
U.S.-Kazakhstani five-year military cooperation plan, the U.S. 
Department of Defense also signs yearly plans with the Kazakhstani 
Ministries of Defense and Emergency Situations, both of which 
actively cooperate  in the arrangement of bilateral events.  The 2010 
plans include:  invitation of Kazakhstani representatives for 
consultative talks at U.S. facilities, events related to development 
of Kazakhstan's peacekeeping brigade (KAZBRIG), and provision of 
training programs related to medical care, intelligence collection, 
humvee and helicopter maintenance, military policing, and aviation 
operations.  To help land-locked Kazakhstan develop the naval 
capabilities essential to protect its offshore oil and gas resources, 
naval forces will also conduct training courses on small-boat 
maintenance and anti-terrorism operations.  In support of 
Kazakhstan's conversion of its military from a conscription-based to 
a professional organization, the United States and Kazakhstan will 
also conduct a series of education events, specifically including 
development of a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps.  In addition, 
CENTCOM is sponsoring several peace support workshops next year and a 
July 2010 regional cooperation exercise. 
 
ASSISTANCE IMPROVES NON-PRO AND COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPABILITIES 
 
7.  (C) Military and security assistance programs, specifically 1206, 
Foreign Military Finance (FMF), and International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) funds, strengthened Kazakhstan's 
non-proliferation and counter-terrorism capabilities (refs E-F).  By 
providing vehicles, boats, communications equipment, and training 
courses, military assistance enhanced Kazakhstan's capability to 
detect and respond to terrorist or trafficking activities on the 
Caspian Sea.  Under the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, 
the Department of Defense supplied a simulation center for training 
exercises and supported the English-language development of 
Kazakhstani military personnel.  Similar projects are planned for 
next year based on slightly higher funding levels than fiscal year 
2009. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN PURSUES MULTI-VECTOR STRATEGY 
 
8.  (C) Kazakhstan maintains close military and security 
relationships with Russia and China.  Kazakhstan actively 
participates in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) regional security 
organizations, which are generally seen as being led by Russia and 
China to balance NATO.  At the same time, as part of a "multi-vector 
foreign policy," Kazakhstan also seeks active cooperation with 
 
ASTANA 00002071  003 OF 003 
 
 
Western military forces.  It is the only former Soviet republic in 
Central Asia to conclude a formal Individual Partner Action Plan 
within the NATO Partnership for Peace Program.  Although Kazakhstan 
has repeatedly announced that it has no intention of seeking to join 
NATO, it has also sought to play an active role in NATO's Partnership 
for Peace program by hosting a June NATO-Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council meeting in Astana. 
 
STEPPE EAGLE EXERCISE PROMOTES COOEPRATION AND INTER-OPERABILITY 
 
9.  (C) One of the most significant U.S.-Kazakhstani security 
engagements is the annual month-long Steppe Eagle exercise -- a 
multi-national training drill, conducted with Kazakhstani, U.S., and 
United Kingdom personnel, in order to equip and train a force able to 
participate in worldwide counter-terrorism and peacekeeping 
operations.  During his speech at this year's Steppe Eagle opening 
exercise, the Ambassador underscored that Steppe Eagle develops 
cooperation critical to shared U.S.-Kazakhstani interests (septel). 
He reminded participants that members of the Kazakhstani military 
shared the field of battle with U.S. soldiers as comrades-in-arms in 
Iraq, and may soon do so again as part of the NATO International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.  The Ambassador also 
emphasized that Steppe Eagle reflects the bilateral commitment to 
enhance our long-term military engagement.  This year's Steppe Eagle 
-- the first exercise conducted with two battalions -- successfully 
developed participants' skills and showcased U.S.-provided equipment, 
including one Huey-II helicopter and several humvees, for a large 
number of Kazakhstani and international military officials. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN HOSTS DISASTER RESPONSE EXERCISE 
 
10.  (C) In another instance of regional security-related 
cooperation, Kazakhstan also hosted the Zhetysu emergency disaster 
response exercise near Almaty in September (septel).  Teams from 
Kazakhstan's Ministry of Emergency Situations, NATO, the United 
States, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and various other countries, demonstrated 
their potential response to a massive earthquake and associated 
catastrophes, including a landslide, toxic explosion, and fire in an 
apartment complex.  Volunteers simulated the role of international 
assistance teams, UN and NGO workers, and the media in order to 
enable Kazakhstani authorities to gain experience managing a massive 
international disaster response effort.  Overall, U.S. military 
observers concluded the exercise -- the largest international 
disaster response exercise Kazakhstan ever conducted -- was 
successful.  Ministry of Emergency Situations personnel demonstrated 
an eagerness to learn from other international participants, typical 
of their willingness to cooperate with the U.S. military on training 
events. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2066, KAZAKHSTAN: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2066 2009-11-19 10:29 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2569
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2066/01 3231029
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191029Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6887
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2172
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1542
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2243
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1177
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1732
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1587
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/19/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR CH RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEPUTY SECRETARY OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
WARMLY WELCOMES MARSHALL CENTER DEPUTY DIRECTOR 
 
REF:  A.  ASTANA 621 
  B.  ASTANA 1210 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Pamela L. Spratlen, 1.4 (b), 
(d) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY:  On November 12, Deputy Director of the Marshall 
Center, Dr. James MacDougall, met with Kazakhstan's Deputy Secretary 
of the National Security Council (NSC), Marat Shaikhutdinov, to 
discuss continued support for participation in Marshall Center 
programs.  Shaikhutdinov -- and former Marshall program participants 
-- praised the center as one of the world's most prestigious 
institutions.  In order to help Kazakhstan strengthen the NSC's 
analytical capability, Shaikhutdinov asked for the Marshall Center to 
train NSC staff in Kazakhstan, and welcomed the idea of hosting 
regional Marshall Center conferences.  Shaikhutdinov said it is too 
late for an effective OSCE-related Marshall Center training event 
prior to Kazakhstan's assumption of the Chairmanship, but did not 
rule out an OSCE-related event in 2010.  He also discussed 
Kazakhstan's geo-political significance, its strong ties with think 
tanks in various powerful countries, and how these attributes could 
make Kazakhstan an ideal host for a regional security forum.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
KAZAKHSTANI MARSHALL GRADUATES PRAISE CENTER'S PROGRAMS 
 
2.  (S) MacDougall described the Marshall Center's programs, and 
thanked Kazakhstan for sending participants.  In recent years, 
approximately 10 National Security Council (NSC) staff participated 
in resident and outreach courses.  Currently, six Kazakhstani 
students are attending the annual Program on Advanced Security 
Studies.  Many of Kazakhstan's previous Marshall Center graduates 
currently hold influential positions in the government, such as Chief 
of the Security Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 
Multilateral Cooperation Department and acting Director of the 
Ministry of Defense's International Cooperation Department.  During a 
previous representational event this year, Kazakhstani officials from 
five different ministries thanked the Marshall Center for the 
opportunity to exchange opinions with other young leaders from around 
the world (ref A).  At a November 12 reception hosted by the 
Ambassador, high-level Kazakhstani graduates also praised the 
Marshall Center for expanding their world view and increasing their 
effectiveness. 
 
NSC PRAISES MARSHALL CENTER AND ITS COURSES 
 
3.  (S) In response to MacDougall's request that the National 
Security Council continue to send staff members to the Marshall 
Center, Shaikhutdinov warmly thanked MacDougall for his visit, and 
called the Marshall Center "one of the most advanced institutes in 
the world."  Shaikhutdinov said that since his appointment two months 
ago, under instructions from NSC State Secretary Tazhin, he has been 
working to build the Council's capacity.  "We are trying to attract 
new blood to the NSC," Shaikhutdinov stated frankly.  He said he 
looked forward to continuing to send his staff to the Marshall Center 
"very prestigious" courses. 
 
PLEASE BRING MARSHALL CENTER COURSES TO KAZAKHSTAN 
 
4.  (S) Noting the NSC's inability to function without its staff, 
which makes it difficult to send them to long-term training courses, 
Shaikhutdinov asked MacDougall if the Marshall Center can arrange 
conferences in, and send lecturers to, Kazakhstan.  MacDougall 
explained the process to request training courses and highlighted the 
Marshall Center's regional conferences, such as one on border 
security planned for Astana next year. 
 
TOO LATE FOR AN OSCE TRAINING COURSE 
 
5.  (S) MacDougall noted that last year during the Astana visit of 
Marshall Center Director Dr. John Rose, Rose discussed a Marshall 
Center OSCE training event related to Kazakhstan's 2010 Chairmanship. 
 Noting Kazakhstan's extensive preparations for its Chairmanship, 
 
ASTANA 00002066  002 OF 003 
 
 
MacDougall asked if Kazakhstan still desired such a training course. 
Shaikhutdinov thanked MacDougall, and said that Kazakhstan had indeed 
worked very hard to prepare during 2009.  He asserted that there is 
probably too little time remaining before Kazakhstan assumes the 
Chairmanship to justify a specific Marshall Center OSCE training 
program.  MacDougall replied that the Marshall Center remains 
available to a
ssist on whatever issues Kazakhstan requests, and noted 
that Kazakhstan may wish to ask for a Marshall Center conference on 
one or several of its OSCE priority themes.  Shaikhutdinov agreed to 
consider MacDougall's "constructive" proposals. 
 
BUT NSC OPEN TO TRAINING PROGRAMS ON TERRORISM AND AFGHANISTAN 
 
6.  (S) Shaikhutdinov said Kazakhstan's NSC -- and other agencies -- 
would particularly appreciate training courses related to terrorism. 
"We would like to hold events similar to recent Marshall Center 
conferences held in Uzbekistan," Shaikhutdinov told MacDougall.  One 
reason for Kazakhstan's eagerness to host such events, Shaikhutdinov 
explained, is its efforts to enhance the government's analytical 
structures.  "Kazakhstan and the United States share many problems," 
Shaikhutdinov said.  However, he emphasized Kazakhstan's commitment 
to hosting serious, quality events -- "fully-fledged analytical 
cooperation" rather than one-off conferences.  "Cooperation has to 
evolve," Shaikhutdinov declared, "When the Marshall Center Director 
visited last year, Kazakhstan's most pressing issue was preparation 
for the OSCE Chairmanship.  Now we are working to bring stability to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan." 
 
BUILDING CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THINK TANKS IN RUSSIA AND CHINA 
 
7.  (S) According to Shaikhutdinov, Kazakhstan could significantly 
contribute to enhancement of regional security through its close 
relations with various superpowers, including the United States, 
Russia, and China.  He said Kazakhstan's NSC, and its think tanks, 
cooperate closely with research centers, private and 
government-affiliated think tanks, and academic organizations in 
Russia, China, the United States, Europe, and many other countries. 
In particular, Shaikhutdinov praised cooperation with the Johns 
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the 
Carnegie Center in the United States, "think tanks in Russia that 
have a real influence on policymaking in the Kremlin," and "other 
influential think tanks in China, not just in Beijing, but also in 
Shanghai and other regions."  Shaikhutdinov said this statement aimed 
was not a boast, but underscored Kazakhstan's desire to host an event 
in order to discuss serious problems that affect not just Kazakhstan, 
but the entire region. 
 
DEPUTY SECRETARY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT REGIONAL SECURITY FORUM 
 
8.  (S) More generally, MacDougall mentioned that the region might 
benefit from a broad security conference, such as the Shangri La 
Forum in Asia, the Munich Security Policy Forum (former "Wehrkunde"), 
or Manama dialogues.  Shaikhutdinov seized the idea eagerly, stating 
that he had been considering such a proposal, because Kazakhstan 
would be an ideal venue.  Shaikhutdinov added, "Because I am an 
academic, not a politician, this idea is, of course, very interesting 
to me.   Given our strategic geo-political position, Kazakhstan would 
be a suitable host."  He asserted that Kazakhstan would invite not 
only government representatives, but also academics, NGOs, and 
business representatives, in order to make it "objective and 
unbiased." 
 
FORUM MUST INCLUDE CHINA, CASPIAN STATES, AND SOUTH ASIA 
 
9.  (S) Shaikhutdinov advocated for a forum encompass more than 
Central Asia, because "Central Asian interests are intimately 
connected to the interests of the Caspian littoral states."  (NOTE: 
Caspian littoral states include Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, and Iran.  END NOTE.)  Shaikhutdinov also declared that 
security conferences in Central Asia must involve South Asia. 
According to Shaikhutdinov, "We must include China as well, since 
events in China, especially in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR), also affect Central Asia" (ref B).  Shaikhutdinov suggested 
 
ASTANA 00002066  003 OF 003 
 
 
that given the geopolitical significance of Central Asia, high-level 
regional Central Asian security forums should become an annual event, 
because whether in 2010 or in 2015, problems are not going to go 
away. 
 
GOVERNMENT TOUTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS 
 
10.  (S) Shaikhutdinov expressed his hope that several international 
specialists with whom the Kazakhstani government has excellent 
relations would be interested in a possible regional security forum. 
In particular, he mentioned Kenneth Starr of SAIS and Martha Olcott 
of the Carnegie Endowment from the United States, Alexei Vassiliev 
from Moscow State University in Russia, former Kyrgyz Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Muratbek Imanaliyev, and independent Chinese 
think-tank analyst and former Secretary General of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization Zhang De Guang.  Shaikhutdinov also said, 
"My presence, and Professor Tazhin's, is to strengthen the NSC's 
analytical capability, and we just set up a new think tank, staffed 
by international experts, that will be critical in reaching this 
goal." 
 
NSC REACHES OUT TO PARTNER WITH MARSHALL CENTER 
 
11.  (S) To bolster the case for Kazakhstan's hosting a regional 
security forum, Shaikhutdinov cited his country's experience in 
holding international events.  He underscored his personal 
commitment, telling MacDougall, "In my primary capacity as an 
academic, I can promise all kinds of support."  Emphasizing his 
cautious ambition for Kazakhstan's role as a leader in the Central 
Asian region, Shaikhutdinov mused aloud that although the regional 
security forum would not rival the Munich dialogue, it was an 
excellent idea, which Kazakhstan would like to pursue in the long 
term.  Shaikhutdinov concluded by pledging continued good cooperation 
with the Marshall Center during his tenure at the NSC. 
 
12.  (C) COMMENT:  Shaikhutdinov's enthusiastic and off-the-cuff 
response -- to a casual suggestion about a regional forum -- 
demonstrates senior-level Kazakhstani interest in the country's 
assumption of a leadership role in Central Asia.  Given Kazakhstan's 
geo-strategic position, such an event could build better cooperation 
in this complex corner of the world -- as long as Kazakhstan obtains 
support from the other aspirant to regional leadership, Uzbekistan. 
END COMMENT. 
 
13.  (U) Deputy Director of the Marshall Center, Dr. James 
MacDougall, cleared this cable. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2050, KAZAKHSTAN: PREPARATIONS FOR DFM UMAROV’S VISIT —

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2050 2009-11-17 11:10 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0276
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2050/01 3211110
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 171110Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6873
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2162
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1532
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2233
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1167
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1722
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1577
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002050 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, AND DEPT FOR NEA/IR, ISN 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/17/2029 
TAGS: PARM PGOV PINR PREL KNNP START IR RS UP UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:   PREPARATIONS FOR DFM UMAROV'S VISIT -- 
NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES 
 
REFTELS:  A. ASTANA 2000 
  B. ASTANA 2007 
  C. 08 ASTANA 1967 
  D. 08 ASTANA 2295 
  E. 08 ASTANA 2573 
      F. ASTANA 1541 
  G. STATE 83600 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Pamela L. Spratlen, 1.4 (b), 
(d) 
 
1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 12. 
 
2.  (S) SUMMARY:  At the request of Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA), PolOff met on November 13 with the Director of the 
Multilateral Cooperation Department, Barlybai Sadykov, whose 
Department is responsible for all non-proliferation, security and 
disarmament issues.  In preparation for Deputy Foreign Minister 
Umarov's upcoming visit to Washington, Sadykov requested 
clarification concerning U.S. positions on non-proliferation issues, 
specifically Semipalatinsk, and the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR).  Sadykov provided a non-paper -- transmitted separately via 
e-mail to SCA/CEN on November 16 -- on Kazakhstan's views on the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).  Sadykov also requested an 
answer to Kazakhstan's proposal to recognize the participants of the 
START-1 Treaty for completing their obligations.  Sadykov's 
high-level engagement highlights the importance the MFA attaches to 
the U.S.-Kazakhstani non-proliferation and security relationship. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
ENSURING PHYSICAL SECURITY AT SEMIPALATINSK 
 
3.  (S) In preparation for Deputy Foreign Minister Umarov's November 
18-20 visit to the United States, Sadykov told PolOff that Umarov 
would like to discuss trilateral non-proliferation projects, which 
the United States, Kazakhstan, and Russia currently are undertaking 
at Semipalatinsk.  According to Sadykov, during a telephone 
conversation between President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Vice 
President Joe Biden, Nazarbayev proposed a trilateral agreement on 
work at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS).  Emphasizing that 
Nazarbayev proposed the concept "in order to optimize a 
mutually-beneficial plan of work," the Director asked the U.S. 
government to clarify its position on the President's proposal. 
Sadykov also inquired if the United States believes the current 
measures at Semipalatinsk are enough to fully guarantee STS' 
protection.  (NOTE:  Sadykov confirmed that "protection of the STS," 
does not refer to remediation, or ecological protection, but rather 
physical security of the site.  END NOTE.)  Finally, the Director 
also asked about U.S. satisfaction with the pace of work at the STS. 
 
4.  (S) On November 10 and 12, the Ambassador met respectively with 
Marat Tazhin, State Secretary of the National Security Council, and 
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Sauat Mynbayev,  to discuss 
bilateral projects at Semipalatinsk (refs A-B).  Since the U.S. and 
Kazakhstani governments consider information on these projects very 
sensitive, it was not clear the extent to which Sadykov, and the two 
assistants who accompanied him to the meeting, are informed on 
U.S.-Kazakhstani cooperation at Semipalatinsk. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN INQUIRES ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION ROADBLOCKS 
 
5.  (C) Sadykov told PolOff that the government of Kazakhstan views 
Semipalatinsk in the context of its commitment to maintain a 
cooperative, bilateral non-proliferation relationship.  He requested 
information from the U.S. government about non-proliferation 
projects, which require further cooperation from Kazakhstan, in order 
to brief Umarov before his visit.  According to Sadykov, a list of 
"stumbling blocks" would be sufficient, and he specifically asked 
about U.S. requests related to the BN-350 spent-fuel transfer and the 
Central Reference Laboratory.  "What are the United States' 
priorities in relation to non-proliferation projects?" queried 
Sadykov. 
 
ASTANA 00002050  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
6.  (C) Sadykov has been running the Foreign Ministry's Multilateral 
Cooperation Department for over a year.  Previ
ously, he served as 
Kazakhstan's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 
New York and Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Americas Desk.  As the 
primary point of contact for all Post's non-proliferation related 
issues, the Multilateral Cooperation Department plays an important 
role in policymaking related to non-proliferation issues.  Over the 
last year, under both former Deputy Director of the Multilateral 
Cooperation Department Sergey Savelyev and current Deputy Director 
Anvar Baisuanov, the Multilateral Cooperation Department has 
responded reasonably quickly -- and very cooperatively -- to all U.S. 
non-proliferation-related requests, including upholding commitments 
under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835, which aims to 
prevent Iran's acquisition of new supplies of uranium, and 
designating additional Iranian entities and individuals under 
Executive Order 13382 (refs C-F). Sadykov's two assistants, Anvar 
Tanalinov, Chief of the Security Division, and specialist Azat 
Makhmudov, who have worked very cooperatively with PolOff on a number 
of sensitive issues, also participated in the November 13 meeting. 
 
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 
 
7.  (C) In response to PolOff's inquiry about the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), Sadykov responded concisely that Kazakhstan favors 
strengthening the regime, but declined to elaborate further. 
(COMMENT:  Despite its overall strong cooperation on 
non-proliferation and Post's repeated requests for more information 
on Kazakhstan's NPT position, until this meeting, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had been reluctant to clearly define its position 
(ref F-G).  It appears Kazakhstan wants to consider the positions 
taken by other states' at future conferences before it finalizes its 
policy.  END COMMENT.)  Sadykov asserted that Kazakhstan would soon 
provide its views on the NPT, and delivered a non-paper -- 
transmitted separately via e-mail to SCA/CEN on November 16 -- on 
Kazakhstan's suggestions for an effective NPT. 
 
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME 
 
8.  (C) Sadykov expressed his government's hope that the United 
States will support Kazakhstan's candidacy to join the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).  The Director thanked the U.S. 
government for financing, through an Export Control and Related 
Border Security (EXBS) program, the translation into English of some 
of Kazakhstan's export control-related national legislation.  Sadykov 
asked for U.S. assistance in arranging seminars to identify 
Kazakhstani products subject to technical control under the MTCR. 
(NOTE:  According to Sadykov, Kazakhstan's lists are similar to those 
of the European Union.  END NOTE.) 
 
KAZAKHSTAN ASKS FOR STATEMENT ABOUT COMPLETION OF START-1 
 
9.  (C) In relation to the START-1 Treaty, Sadykov asked about the 
U.S. position on Kazakhstan's proposal, which he discussed with U.S. 
officials during his last visit to Washington.  , Specifically, 
Kazakhstan has requested that the text of the new agreement, which 
the United States and Russian Federation are negotiating, recognize 
the contribution of START-1's five participants, because Kazakhstan 
has fulfilled all obligations stipulated in the START-1 Treaty. 
Sadykov told PolOff Kazakhstan had approached the Russian Federation, 
who "responded positively" to this suggestion. 
 
10.  (C) Sadykov also inquired about U.S. plans to politically mark 
START-1's completion -- especially on or before December 5.  The 
Director noted Belarus' suggestion that the Foreign Ministers of all 
five START-1 participating states issue a joint statement.  According 
to Sadykov, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine "had agreed, in 
principle, that this could be a good idea."  Sadykov asked that the 
United States inform Kazakhstan of its views on this position, as 
soon as possible.  Sadykov added quietly, "If the United States is 
not on this team, it would send a negative message." 
 
 
ASTANA 00002050  003 OF 003 
 
 
11.  (C) According to Sadykov, the MFA had requested a statement that 
would affirm that Kazakhstan completed its START-1 obligations, is 
not a party to the new agreement under negotiation by the United 
States and Russian Federation, and that no further inspections of any 
facilities located on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
will occur.  Sadykov told PolOff that he had previously received 
verbal assurances that it should not be a problem for Kazakhstan to 
receive some kind of statement about Kazakhstan's completion of its 
START-1 obligations. (COMMENT:  When asked Sadykov could not identify 
the agency or individual who had given him the assurances, but he 
clearly took it seriously and is expecting a response.  END COMMENT.) 
 
12.  ACTION REQUESTS:  Post requests guidance on how to respond to 
Sadykov about STS issues, specifically, clarifying the U.S. position 
on Nazarbayev's proposal, current site protection measures, and the 
pace of work at the STS.  In relation to overall cooperation on 
non-proliferation, Post requests information on which projects 
require further cooperation from Kazakhstan, and where the projects 
rank in terms of U.S. priorities.  Post also requests guidance on 
Kazakhstan's request that the text of the new START-1 agreement, 
which the United States and Russian Federation are negotiating, will 
recognize the contribution of START-1's five participants.  Post 
requests guidance about whether the U.S. supports Belarus' suggestion 
that the Foreign Ministers of all five START-1 participating states 
issue a joint statement marking the agreement's completion.  Finally, 
Post also requests guidance on responding to Kazakhstan's request 
that the United States make a statement that verifies Kazakhstan 
completed its START-1 obligations, is not a party to the new 
agreement under negotiation by the United States and Russian 
Federation, and that no further inspections of any facilities located 
on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan will occur. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2007, MINISTER OF ENERGY ON BN-350, SEMIPALATINSK AND ALATAU

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2007 2009-11-13 06:29 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6940
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2007/01 3170629
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6820
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2152
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1522
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2223
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1157
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1712
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1570
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, S/EEE, S/CIEA, EEB 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/12/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON EPET MARR KNNP IT TU KZ
SUBJECT:  MINISTER OF ENERGY ON BN-350, SEMIPALATINSK AND ALATAU 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY:  On November 12, the Ambassador discussed 
non-proliferation issues, specifically the transfer of BN-350 
spent-fuel and the Semipalatinsk and Alatau projects, with Minister 
of Energy and Mineral Resources Sauat Mynbayev.  The Minister 
welcomed further cooperation on BN-350 security and transport, and 
agreed in principle to accelerate work at Semipalatinsk next year. 
In relation to the blending down of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) at 
Alatau, Mynbayev said that Kazakhstan's experts need to be convinced 
that the research at Alatau using low-enriched uranium (LEU) will 
work, but agreed to continue expert-level discussions to find a 
mutually-acceptable solution.  Mynbayev also discussed Italian oil 
company ENI's investments in Kazakhstan following President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev's November 6 visit to Italy, along with developments 
related to the Eskene-Kuryk and Samsun-Ceyhan pipelines.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
BN-350 SPENT-FUEL TRANSPORT 
 
2.  (S) The Ambassador thanked the government of Kazakhstan for 
providing its emergency response plan for the BN-350 spent fuel 
shipment.  Citing long-standing collaboration, he also recommended a 
bilateral expert-level meeting in the near future to review all 
transportation and security plans, which Mynbayev agreed to arrange. 
Mynbayev welcomed the Ambassador's proposal to consider security 
consultations with the possibility of an exercise conducted by U.S. 
and Kazakhstani specialists, and said he would include this 
suggestion in a second set of training requests, which the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) will relay soon. 
 
3.  (S) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry about whether MEMR 
has sufficient equipment for the spent-fuel transfer, Mynbayev 
replied that Kazakhstan has all the equipment necessary for transport 
and storage.  Mynbayev noted the U.S. donation of much of the 
security equipment.  He said MEMR has already submitted to the U.S. 
Department of Energy a list of required spare parts due to their 
scarcity on the local market.  Mynbayev also reiterated that 
registration of the railcars, which will be used to transport the 
fuel, has not been completed.  (NOTE:  The Moscow-based certification 
agency for all railcars used in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States is currently reviewing the railcar design.  END NOTE.) 
 
ACCELERATION OF WORK AT SEMIPALATINSK 
 
4.  (S) The Ambassador thanked the Kazakhstani government for 
increasing security and supporting a faster pace of work at 
Semipalatinsk this year.  Given that we expect identification of 20 
new tunnels, he pressed for even greater acceleration next year. 
Mynbayev said that as soon as MEMR receives information about these 
sites, its specialists will immediately prepare a work and monitoring 
schedule.  According to Mynbayev, in principle, MEMR is willing to 
continue to accelerate its schedule. 
 
ALATAU PROJECT 
 
5.  (S) The Ambassador also expressed appreciation for Kazakhstan's 
cooperation on the sensitive project to blend down highly-enriched 
uranium (HEU) at the Alatau Institute of Nuclear Physics.  He 
conveyed U.S. readiness for expert-level cooperation and interest in 
concrete information about next steps.  Mynbayev responded, "I 
understand we have mutual commitments on this issue."  Pushing back a 
little, Mynbayev told the Ambassador that Kazakhstan is interested 
not only in the removal of highly-enriched-uranium (HEU) fuel, but 
also in the continuation of research -- using low-enriched-uranium 
(LEU) fuel -- at the Alatau reactor.  When the Ambassador reiterated 
the need simply to encourage experts on both sides to find a 
mutually-acceptable solution, Mynbayev immediately agreed, saying, "I 
am ready to instruct my experts to discuss this issue." 
 
ITALIAN OIL COMPANY ENI'S INVESTMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN'S SHIPYARDS 
 
6.  (C) The Ambassador also asked Mynbayev about the status of MEMR'S 
 
ASTANA 00002007  002 OF 002 
 
 
June announcement that the Italian energy company, ENI, intends to 
build a shipyard in Kazakhstan's sector of the Caspian Sea to produce 
63,000 dead-weight ton oil ta
nkers.  Mynbayev confirmed that MEMR 
signed an agreement with ENI and created a working group to study the 
project.  However, he told the Ambassador, "The results of the 
project are still unclear," and they depend on commercial demand for 
the tankers.  Mynbayev admitted that the tanker project is a 
long-term endeavor, on which the partners will need to work well into 
2010.  The Minister said decisions about ownership and operation of 
the vessels will influence the pace of the project.  "We are still 
negotiating with SOCAR over this, and the Kashagan consortium is very 
interested as well," Mynbayev noted.  According to the Minister, 
although ENI representatives declared their readiness to invest in 
the project, they will not provide the necessary cash until 
resolution of all nuances.  Further illustrating the complexity of 
the project, Mynbayev told the Ambassador, "we're not even ready for 
the onshore Eskene-Kuryk pipeline yet -- and that is the first step 
on the road to a viable (trans-Caspian shuttle tanker) system."  He 
further explained that a French company has been awarded the 
exclusive right to negotiate Eskene-Kuryk pipeline construction with 
the government, but admitted that this large project will also take 
time. 
 
A POLITICAL REALITY:  THE SAMSUN-CEYHAN PIPELINE 
 
7.  (C) The Ambassador also asked about Nazarbayev's October 22 
announcement that Kazakhstan, along with Russia, will take part in 
the construction of the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline.  "Theoretically 
and politically," Mynbayev replied, "we're ready to do it."  However, 
Mynbayev again admitted that Kazakhstan has not worked out the 
commercial aspects.  Mynbayev responded positively to the 
Ambassador's query about Kazakhstan's willingness to commit its own 
crude to the pipeline, but declared it "far too early" for decisions 
about which specific fields will provide the oil for Samsun-Ceyhan. 
The Minister pointed out that Kazakhstan can ship oil through the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and across the Caspian via tanker 
to Baku, and is in negotiations with Azerbaijan to develop the 
Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS). 
 
HOAGLAND

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09ASTANA2000, SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY ON NO…

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2000 2009-11-12 06:12 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5673
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2000/01 3160612
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2133
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1503
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2204
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1138
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
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RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002000 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, PM (CHRISTOPHER PETRONE) 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/12/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR KNNP RS AF KZ
SUBJECT:  SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY ON NO...

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1541, KAZAKHSTAN: A KEY PARTNER ON NON-PROLIFERATION REF: A. A. ASTANA 00607 B. B. ASTANA 01090 C. C. ASTANA 01164 D. D. 08 ASTANA 01867 E. E. 08 ASTANA 01648 F. F. 08 ASTANA 01649 G. G. ASTANA 02232 H. H. ASTANA 00200 I. I. ASTANA 00623 J. J. STATE 76904 K. K. ASTANA 00521 L. L. 08 ASTANA 02298 M. M. 08 ASTANA 02316 N. N. ASTANA 00254 O. O. ASTANA 01536 Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b/d)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1541 2009-09-18 11:12 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
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RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 001541 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, ISN, NSC FOR MCFAUL, DONNELLY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2029 
TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL ECON MNUC KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  A KEY PARTNER ON NON-PROLIFERATION REF: A. A. ASTANA 00607 B. B. ASTANA 01090 C. C. ASTANA 01164 D. D. 08 ASTANA 01867 E. E. 08 ASTANA 01648 F. F. 08 ASTANA 01649 G. G. ASTANA 02232 H. H. ASTANA 00200 I. I. ASTANA 00623 J. J. STATE 76904 K. K. ASTANA 00521 L. L. 08 ASTANA 02298 M. M. 08 ASTANA 02316 N. N. ASTANA 00254 O. O. ASTANA 01536 Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b/d)

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Kazakhstan is a full and supportive partner of the United States on countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Kazakhstan actively participates in many international counter-proliferation organizations. Recently, it sought to enhance its role in non-proliferation, requesting to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), volunteering to host a nuclear fuel-bank, and developing its uranium and nuclear industries. Kazakhstan's leaders consistently reiterate that non-proliferation, especially through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement (CTR), is a fundamental pillar of U.S.-Kazakhstani relations. The United States and Kazakhstan have decommissioned reactors, secured borders, and built safe scientific laboratories. In 2009, Kazakhstan ratified the extension of the CTR Agreement, resolved issues related to customs and taxes on technical assistance, provided a first tranche of funding for the spent-fuel project, and moved ahead of schedule on securing the Semipalatinsk Test Site. Now, Kazakhstan must allocate additional funding for the spent-fuel transfer program and strengthen border protection and legal controls to prevent proliferation. END SUMMARY.

HIGH-LEVEL COUNTERPROLIFERATION SUPPORT

2. (SBU) In every possible forum, high-level Kazakhstani officials praise non-proliferation as a cornerstone of our bilateral relationship (reftels A-C). On June 18, Nazarbayev organized a massive memorial event on the 20th anniversary of the last nuclear test at Semipalatinsk (ref B) at which he thanked the U.S. and Russian governments -- represented by their Ambassadors -- for their assistance in the field of non-proliferation. Nazarbayev also urged adoption of a new universal non-proliferation treaty, proposed a prohibition on any improvements to existing nuclear arsenals, and advocated the United Nations designate August 29 -- the date on which he closed the test-site in 1991 -- as World Non-Nuclear Day. Kazakhstani officials have subsequently aggressively sought support from other nations, particularly the U.S. and Japan, for this proposal.

ACTIVE PARTICPATION IN NON-PRO ORGANIZATIONS

3. (SBU) Kazakhstan actively participates in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Kazakhstan hosted the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism's senior-level Plenary Meeting in June 2007, conducted two working-level exercises in 2008 (ref D), and is considering hosting additional activities in 2010. Within the NSG, Kazakhstan supported U.S. government initiatives on civil nuclear cooperation with India and enhancement of controls on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) equipment and technology. It has signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles (ICCBM), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In 2001, ASTANA 00001541 002 OF 004 Kazakhstan ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has hosted four exercises, most recently a large verification exercise in 2008. Kazakhstan also led efforts to establish the Central Asian Nuclear Free Zone in 2006. In February 2009, Kazakhstan expressed its strong interest in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

QUIETLY SUPPORTIVE ON IRAN

4. (S) Critical due to its large volume of uranium production and geographic location (reftels E-F), Kazakhstan consistently supports U.S. non-proliferation initiatives -- especially in relation to Iran, North Korea, and Syria. President Nazarbayev told Under Secretary Burns in Astana in July, that he has privately urged Iran's President Ahmadinejad to negotiate with the United States about its nuclear program (Ref O). State's ISN Office told PolOff that Kazakhstan has provided especially strong support for the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions on Iran over the last year.

NUCLEAR FUEL-BANK PROPOSAL

5. (SBU) During Iranian President Ahmadinejad's April 6-7 visit to Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev asserted Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and announced Kazakhstan's offer to host an international nuclear fuel bank -- an offer that Iran appeared to welcome (ref A). (COMMENT: Nazarbayev, an expert at balancing foreign policy priorities, also emphasized support for the President's non-proliferation policy and initiative to negotiate with Iran, during a joint press conference with Ahmadinejad. END COMMENT
.) Yerzhan Kazykhanov, Kazakhstan's Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna, outlined Nazarbayev's fuel-bank proposal during the June 18 IAEA Board of Governors' meetings. Vice President of Kazakhstan's National Nuclear Company, Kazatomprom, Sergei Yashin, said Vladimir Shkolnik, Kazatomprom's Director, planned to present a comprehensive nuclear strategy to Nazarbayev in June. Post has requested more information about the fuel bank, but has not received any official response.

WORKING LEVEL PRAISE -- AND SOME CONCERNS

6. (C) On September 2, PolOff met with a junior staffer, Alen Dauletov, in Kazakhstan's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, which has responsibility for most non-proliferation issues. Dauletov, who had attended two U.S.-sponsored non-proliferation meetings in 2009 (reftels J-K), approached PolOff unofficially -- without approval from his supervisors -- for guidance on his assignment to analyze "the risks and advantages of U.S.-Kazakhstani cooperation on non-proliferation." Dauletov said several governmental bodies, particularly the Committee for National Security (KNB), view cooperation with the United States "negatively." Dauletov confided that some MEMR officials worry close cooperation with the United States could undermine Kazakhstani-Russian cooperation, and the Russian Embassy in Astana inquired about U.S.-Kazakhstani projects. According to Dauletov, some Kazakhstani entities are concerned that locating a nuclear fuel bank in Kazakhstan, while beneficial for Kazakhstan's image, would "make Kazakhstan a U.S. colony" and render it a more appealing target of a terrorist attack.

7. (C) Dauletov also thanked the United States for holding several inter-agency training events on preventing nuclear smuggling in Kazakhstan, and said participants found them very useful. Other participants asserted that these events marked the first time such a broad range of Kazakhstani agencies met to discuss prevention of, and if necessary, reaction to, an attempt to proliferate WMDs. A follow-on workshop on legal reform is planned for September 29-October 1 in Astana.

WITH POWER COMES RESPONSIBILITY ASTANA 00001541 003 OF 004

8. (SBU) Kazakhstan, among the top three uranium producers in the world, has some of the world's largest reserves. Its National Atomic Energy Company, Kazatomprom, has established a large variety of joint ventures with Russian, Chinese, Japanese, French, and Canadian companies (ref G). It also continues to pursue cooperation with Westinghouse. Kazatomprom has established two joint ventures with Russia called the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk and the Kazakh-Russian Uranium Enrichment Center. Kazakhstan also is pursuing potential uranium deals with India and China (reftels G-H). A member of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership since 2007 due to its vast uranium reserves, Kazakhstan plays a significant role in supplying new reactors.

U.S. ASSISTANCE IN KAZAKHSTAN -- THE BIG PICTURE

9. (S) Under the aegis of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Agreement, the United States has provided assistance worth over 600 million dollars since 1993 that has resulted in the destruction of Kazakhstan's nuclear war-heads and decommission of its BN-350 nuclear reactor. The United States has dismantled bio-weapons facilities, and helped Kazakhstani scientists find sustainable employment in peaceful research projects. However, Kazakhstan still possesses enough spent fuel to fabricate 775 nuclear weapons, and access to dangerous biological and chemical substances by terrorists remains a concern. 2008 security assistance to Kazakhstan in the amount of $80 million -- more than half, i.e. $44 million, allocated under the CTR -- worked to secure potentially dangerous materials, strengthen borders, build safe scientific laboratories, enhance scientific cooperation, and improve Kazakhstan's ability to prevent and respond to attempts to smuggle WMDs.

CLOSURE OF NUCLEAR TEST TUNNELS

10. (S) The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) funds the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI), which has led to the elimination of 181 nuclear test tunnels and containment of dangerous materials at the former Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS). DTRA has also provided physical security enhancements on the STS. Since 2000, U.S and Kazakhstani teams of experts jointly completed five projects to eliminate or minimize the threat from the residue of nuclear activity (RONA).

KAZAKHSTAN EFFORTS TO "DOUBLE THE PACE"

11. (S) Currently, the government of Kazakhstan is actively cooperating with DTRA on a project to provide additional security at the STS -- known as K-3. Since the United States and Kazakhstan completed high-level negotiations in April, the pace of the project has doubled, and the project is running ahead of schedule. DTRA and Kazakhstan's National Nuclear Center (NNC) agreed on a schedule according to which K-3 sites will be completed by 2010. In several recent instances, the central government of Kazakhstan even pressured the NNC to proceed with work before contracts were completely finalized, resulting in an accelerated schedule.

THREE STEPS FORWARD ON SPENT-FUEL TRANSFER

12. (C) On September 9, the government of Kazakhstan committed $5 million in financing for the initial 2009 fuel runs. This positive development significantly advances the $118 million, decade-long project. On September 18, Kazakhstan's Prime Minister signed decrees on reserve funding and equipment transfer, removing the last obstacles to getting spent-fuel transfer underway. Post has received positive signals that the government intends to provide funding for 2010 in order to quickly and successfully complete the project. The only other remaining step necessary to safely dispose of all BN-350 materials is the ASTANA 00001541 004 OF 004 provision of funding to complete the Geocement Stone Facility (reftels L-M). Kazakhstan, with DOE assistance, returned nearly 75 kilos of highly enriched uranium to Russia in May.

OTHER KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND NEXT STEPS

13. (C) Kazakhstan and the United States have worked together at all levels of government to prevent WMD proliferation. The Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) provided training and equipment to help Kazakhstan develop a WMD detection and interdiction capability in the Caspian Sea region. Through the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program, the DOE installed Radiation Portal Monitors and trained border operators at seven border crossings sites, and EXBS provided Customs and Border Guards with inspection/detection devices and training (ref I). Post is providing expertise in biosafety regulatory reform and constructing several labs with adequate (Biosafety-level 3) standards. The United States funded 13 projecs to support scientists who previously worked in bio-weapons programs (ref N) and hosted an August workshop on sustainable development. U.S. specialists also helped Central Asian states establish the Biosafety Association for Central Asia and the Caucasus (BACAC) and supported a September bio-safety conference in Astana as part of an ongoing effort to help Kazakhstan ensure compliance with its Biological Weapons Convention obligations. Customs, and the Ministries of Emergency Situations, Health, Education and Science, Defense, the Interior, Energy, and Foreign Affairs and most government agencies, consistently work enthusiastically with Post. Only the Committee for National Security (KNB) and its subordinate, the Border Guards, opt not to participate in U.S. events.

14. (C) COMMENT: PolOff observed a group of usually serious U.S. and Kazakhstani nuclear scientists, celebrating the successful completion of several tasks, dancing together to Beatles music played by one of the scientist's bands. As monumentally important projects approach completion, Post looks forward to using the cooperative relationships built over many years with various Kazakhstani officials to move on to the next objectives in our long-term, cooperative non-proliferation relationship. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1513, KAZAKHSTAN: KEEPING PERSPECTIVE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1513 2009-09-11 09:27 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3294
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1990

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001513 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D, P, S/P, ISN, SCA/FO, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, DRL 
NSC FOR MCFAUL, DONNELLY 
FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KNNP OSCE AF RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  KEEPING PERSPECTIVE 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 1512 
     B. ASTANA1494 
     C. ASTANA 1487 
     D. ASTANA 1470 
     E. ASTANA 1429 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1.  (C) With the Yevgeniy Zhovtis case -- Zhovtis is the 
internationally renowned human rights advocate whose most 
unfortunate auto accident some in the government of 
Kazakhstan appear to be exploiting -- we can all agree that 
Kazakhstan has stepped on its tail in a most appalling and 
old-guard KGB way.  No one disputes that.  But I would urge 
that we keep our eye fixed on our long-term national 
interests (reftel E). 
 
2.  (S) President Nursultan Nazarbayev is authoritarian, even 
if generally progressive.  He is a product of his traditional 
culture, and apparently has been led to believe Zhovtis 
overtly challenged his position as "pater familias" of the 
nation of Kazakhstan by "seeking protection by the Western 
critics of Kazakhstan" after his auto accident.  The 
Committee for National Security (KNB, ex-KGB) and other 
Soviet-era dinosaurs, always looking for a way to turn 
Nazarbayev away from the West, appear to have seized on 
Zhovtis' auto accident as a godsend. 
 
3.  (S) I am working hard and urgently at very high levels 
here in Kazakhstan to communicate Washington's universally 
sharp displeasure with this disappointing turn of events 
about Zhovtis, and to make clear the need for the highest 
level of Kazakhstan's leadership to take specific, concrete 
steps to mitigate the very real damage that has occurred.  I 
will tell you honestly that I cannot predict with confidence 
at this time if they will "do the right thing," even though I 
have laid out what needs to be done.  After a a one-on-one on 
September 10 with State Secretary and Foreign Minister Kanat 
Saudabayev (reftel A), I am guardedly optimistic that this 
case might eventually play out in a positive way. 
 
OUR LONG-TERM NATIONAL INTERESTS (REF E) 
 
4.  (S) While some argue that Uzbekistan is key to 
USTRANSCOM's Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to supply 
U.S. and International Security Assistance Force troops in 
Afghanistan -- and I fully agree -- the NDN cannot succeed 
without Kazakhstan (the geographic size of all of Western 
Europe), which straddles the land, sea, and air routes 
between Russia and Afghanistan.  Kazakhstan -- meaning 
President Nazarbayev -- is leaning forward to do more with us 
for Afghanistan, but wants to hear from us what we want. 
Nazarbayev's ill-defined offer to host for us a "logistics 
base," as he called it, is clearly a new opening and requires 
that we respond as quickly as possible. 
 
5.  (S) We have enormously important, and critically 
sensitive, non-proliferation of weapons-of-mass-destruction 
initiatives under way in Kazakhstan.  We now believe -- after 
much persistent urging -- that we have begun to breach the 
bureaucratic dams that were preventing significant forward 
movement on these highly sensitive initiatives, including 
achieving the various Government of Kazakhstan decrees for 
VAT exemptions and to fund the transport for proper and safe 
disposal of enough highly-enriched uranium/plutonium to make 
hundreds of nuclear weapons.  President Nazarbayev, for all 
his considerable flaws, sees himself as one of the 
fundamental U.S. partners in President Obama's historic goal 
to achieve global nuclear security. 
 
6.  (C) With Kazakhstan about to assume the OSCE chairmanship 
for 2010 -- with Russia breathing hard and hot down 
 
ASTANA 00001513  002 OF 002 
 
 
Kazakhstan's neck, especially to call for a new European 
Security Treaty -- we have an historic opportunity to work 
successfully with a key post-Soviet state.  When former 
Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin met with Secretary Clinton in 
Washington on May 5, he said explicitly President Nazarbayev 
wants the equivalent of a "hot line" to coordinate U.S. and 
Kazakhstani views on OSCE.  That might have been lost in the 
normal flow of memcons, but a senior member of Kazakhsta
n's 
foreign ministry reminded me of this "unfulfilled 
understanding" on September 10.  Of course, we will not 
establish a physical "hot line," but I would recommend that 
we designate a specific, DAS-level point-person for this 
purpose.  The positive will for closest cooperation on OSCE 
exists in Astana.  We need to respond to it -- and fully 
exploit it to our advantage. 
 
7.  (C) And then there's Russia.  Even if President Obama -- 
through hard-eyed pragmatism -- has achieved the best 
U.S.-Russia relationship in nearly a decade, Russia is still 
Putin's Russia.  Nazarbayev has historically good relations 
with Putin and, now, Medvedev; however, he does not slavishly 
agree to everything Moscow asks.  A strong U.S. relationship 
with Kazakhstan, with Nazarbayev, would complement our reset 
with Russia, and could prove useful from time to time. 
 
8.  (C) I want to suggest, based on my 16 years of experience 
in Central Asia, that we keep our eye fixed on our long-term 
national interests and national security goals.  As Secretary 
Clinton so eloquently said during her Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee confirmation hearing, "President Obama 
and I believe that foreign policy must be based on a marriage 
of principles and pragmatism, not rigid ideology, on facts 
and evidence, not emotion or prejudice."  It seems to me, 
here on the other side of the world managing the 
U.S.-Kazakhstan bilateral relationship, to be a time for 
pragmatism. 
HOAGLAND

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09ASTANA1195, KAZAKHSTAN: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE ON POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1195 2009-07-17 07:37 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1195 1980737
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S E C R E T ASTANA 001195 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  07/16/2034 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM PINR ETTC MARR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  GOVERNMENT RESPONSE ON POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF 
LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO SYRIA 
 
REF:  (A) STATE 56723 
  (B) ASTANA 0956 
  (C) ASTANA 1000 
 
Classified by:  Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (S) MFA Americas Department Deputy Director Alim Kirabayev called 
in Pol-Econ Chief on July 16 to provide the Government of 
Kazakhstan's official response to our demarche on the possible sale 
of D-30 Howitzers to Syria by the firm Kazakhstan Special Engineering 
(reftels).  Kirabayev explained that the appropriate Kazakhstani 
government agencies had investigated the information the United 
States provided.  The investigation confirmed that there is, in fact, 
a Kazakhstani company known as Kazakhstan Special Engineering 
(KazSpecEngineering).  However, the investigation further determined 
that while the company had had preliminary discussions with the 
Syrians about a Howitzer sale, no agreement was reached and no 
contract was signed between the two sides.  Kirabayev added that the 
company had made no request for an arms export license to 
Kazakhstan's Export Control Commission, nor had it provided an 
end-user certificate to the MFA, as required by Kazakhstani law. 
Thus, while there was the potential for an arms transfer, it did move 
forward, Kirabayev explained. 
 
2. (S) Pol-Econ Chief thanked Kirabayev for the response and 
requested that the Kazakhstani government continue to monitor this 
case to ensure no arms transfer to Syria takes place in the future. 
Kirabayev promised to relay that message to his superiors. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1164, KAZAKHSTAN: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS’S JULY 10 MEETING WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1164 2009-07-13 03:52 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5280
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #1164/01 1940352
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 130352Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5762
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1720
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1087
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1789
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0755
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2365
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2683
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1271
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1188
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 001164 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  07/11/2034 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM KNNP OSCE AF RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  UNDER SECRETARY BURNS'S JULY 10 MEETING WITH 
PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  Under Secretary Burns brought greetings to President 
Nazarbayev from President Obama and underscored the importance of the 
U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship by noting Kazakhstan was his 
delegation's first stop in Central Asia.  He told Nazarbayev that 
President Obama is committed to strengthening the U.S.-Kazakhstan 
relationship.  Burns briefed Nazarbayev on the July 6-7 
Obama-Medvedev summit in Moscow.  Nazarbayev replied he was pleased 
with the summit results, noting, "A good U.S.-Russia relationship is 
good for Kazakhstan."  Although the delegation's visit to Astana 
broke no new ground, the symbolic value of the visit was important 
for the government of Kazakhstan, for Central Asia, and for 
Kazakhstan's big neighbors, Russia and China.  That Burns reiterated 
twice, once at the beginning of the meeting and again at the end, 
that President Obama is committed to a strong U.S.-Kazakhstan 
relationship will pay off significantly, especially if the U.S. side 
follows through with greater engagement and reasonably regular very 
high-level visits. 
 
2.  (S) SUMMARY CONTINUED:  Running through his checklist, Nazarbayev 
 
-- said his decision to opt for the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs 
Union over WTO accession was an economic, not a political, decision; 
 
-- reiterated his commitment to Central Asian integration but noted 
objective realities that have prevented it so far; 
 
-- declared no one wants a nuclear Iran and repeated his willingness 
to be helpful on this issue; 
 
-- reaffirmed Kazakhstan's commitment, and intention to increase it, 
to humanitarian assistance in the struggle to stabilize and develop 
Afghanistan; 
 
-- complimented President Obama's commitment to nuclear 
non-proliferation and the U.S. effort to reach a post-START agreement 
with Russia; 
 
-- mused on Kazakhstan's possible priorities during its OSCE 
chairmanship; 
 
-- called for greater diversification of U.S. investment in 
Kazakhstan; and 
 
-- said he hoped President Obama would visit Kazakhstan, "perhaps 
during a stop-over on his way to China."  END SUMMARY. 
 
3. (C) Under Secretary Burns met with Kazakhstan's President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev in Astana on July 10.  To save time, Nazarbayev 
conducted the majority of the meeting in Russian without translation. 
 Even so, the originally scheduled 30-minute meeting lasted 75 
minutes. 
 
U.S. PARTICIPANTS: 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns 
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs 
Robert Blake 
Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for Russia 
and Eurasia Mike McFaul 
Ambassador Richard Hoagland (notetaker) 
 
KAZAKHSTANI PARTICIPANTS: 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev 
Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin 
President's Foreign Policy Adviser Kairat Sarybay 
Kazakhstan's Ambassador to the United States Erlan Idrisov 
 
4. (C) Welcoming Under Secretary Burns, Nazarbayev noted this was the 
first high-level delegation of the new administration in Washington. 
Burns said that President Obama sends President Nazarbayev his best 
regards, and noted that stopping first in Kazakhstan during his trip 
to Central Asia shows the priority President Obama places on the 
 
ASTANA 00001164  002 OF 004 
 
 
U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship. 
 
BURNS BRIEFS NAZARBAYEV ON THE MOSCOW SUMMIT 
 
5. (S) Nazarbayev commented he was pleased with the results of the 
July 6-7 Obama-Medvedev summit in Moscow and hoped Burns could 
provide frank information about it.  He added he had urged both 
Russian President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin multiple times, 
including as late as the morning of July 6, just hours before Obama's 
arrival in Moscow, to seize the opportunity to make the summit a 
success, to acknowledge differences but look for areas of agreement 
and mutual interest.  "A good U.S.-Russia relationship is good for 
Kazakhstan," Nazarbayev explained. 
 
6. (S) Burns thanked Nazarbayev for his useful role and told him 
President Obama was pleased with his time in Moscow.  Burns said that 
Obama is determined to strengthen the U.S.-Russia relationship and 
that Obama told Medvedev and Putin he
wants a relationship of equals 
that focuses on common interests.  Burns said that the summit 
improved the tone of the relationship and had concrete results:  a 
joint understanding on a post-START agreement by the end of 2009; a 
first-ever agreement to transit lethal military supplies through 
Russia to Afghanistan; agreement to reestablish military-to-military 
relations; and the establishment of a new bilateral commission to 
cover a broad range of interests.  He added that the two presidents 
also discussed the Middle East, non-proliferation in relation to Iran 
and North Korea, and Obama's serious review of the technical 
efficiency and cost of placing elements of the U.S. missile defense 
system in Poland and the Czech Republic.  At that point, Nazarbayev 
interrupted to say, "That's what most affects Russia."  Burns also 
reviewed President Obama's long conversation with Prime Minister 
Putin on how to avoid future problems in the bilateral relationship, 
characterizing Putin as direct and (mostly) constructive.  Burns 
stressed that significant areas of disagreement remain, such as 
Georgia, but summarized the summit as having demonstrated more 
attention on both sides to shared interests than we'd seen in several 
years.  He again thanked President Nazarbayev for his helpful 
background role. 
 
7. (S) Nazarbayev thanked Burns for the comprehensive readout and 
complimented President Obama for his energy in the first six months 
of his administration.  Nazarbayev said he wanted to emphasize the 
importance of the United States in building strong relations in the 
region.  On Russia, he said Moscow sees itself as a superpower and 
needs to feel needed and respected.  It is a nation that historically 
suffers and in recent years has felt humiliated.  Just its nuclear 
weapons and energy resources alone make Russia a superpower, but, he 
said, "The United States needs to understand Russia's peculiarities." 
 Good U.S.-Russia relations help Kazakhstan.  Smiling, Nazarbayev 
said, "Bureaucrats can cause problems, but leaders must have vision." 
 Nazarbayev then worked his way through his checklist of issues. 
 
WTO ACCESSION AND THE RUSSIA-BELARUS-KAZAKHSTAN CUSTOMS UNION 
 
8. (S) Nazarbayev said that the fact that Kazakhstan is in the 
post-Soviet space inevitably influences its reality and its choices. 
He said that joining the customs union was actually his idea and that 
it was an economic, not a political, decision.  He said he had long 
advocated Eurasian economic integration, and the time was now ripe. 
"If we harmonize our trade law, investment will flow in.  Russia has 
roads, railroads, and ports -- we are landlocked and need to take 
fullest advantage of existing infrastructure.  I'm telling you the 
same thing I tell our European partners.  After all, a customs union 
is nothing special or new -- they exist in many parts of the world." 
Burns urged Nazarbayev not to abandon Kazakhstan's bilateral WTO 
accession negotiations. 
 
DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY 
 
9. (S) Still thinking of Russia, Nazarbayev explained that Russians 
equate democracy with disorder, and that's why both Russia and 
Kazakhstan emphasize economic development as a way to increase 
 
ASTANA 00001164  003 OF 004 
 
 
stability.  He mused, "Americans can't seem to understand the 
experiences we've lived through.  Terrorists, extremists, 
nationalists -- all can be terribly destabilizing.   We need to 
rebuild our societies [after the difficult dissolution of the Soviet 
Union].  We want stronger relations with the United States." 
 
CENTRAL ASIA 
 
10. (S) Nazarbayev said he remains fully committed to Central Asian 
integration, but the difficultly lies in the fact that the region is 
"still living out its Soviet contradictions."  He cited examples of 
current boundaries dividing ethnic groups, and noted in passing that 
Uzbekistan's Samarkand is in fact a Tajik city.  He added that the 
countries of the region have starkly differing levels of political 
and economic development, as well as greatly differing populations 
and geographies.  "Yet our security depends on getting along. 
Kazakhstan should be the model because of its multi-ethnic and 
multi-confessional harmony.  Perhaps our economic integration with 
Russia will help." 
 
IRAN 
 
11. (S) Nazarbayev declared that no one wants a nuclear Iran. 
However, a war with Iran would be devastating.  He summarized that he 
has frequently counseled Iran's leaders to follow Kazakhstan's 
example in renouncing nuclear ambitions.  He praised international 
diplomatic efforts to engage Iran, and suggested that Turkey might be 
helpful in this regard. 
 
CHINA 
 
12. (S) Nazarbayev pointed out Kazakhstan's long border with China 
and noted that many ethnic Kazakhs live in western China.  He 
acknowledged that western China is currently experiencing 
"nationalities problems."  He urged the United States to have 
"sensitive relations" with China, saying, "The world is a complex 
place, but you can play a positive role." 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
13. (S) Nazarbayev stated that Kazakhstan wants to be increasingly 
helpful in Afghanistan, "especially on the humanitarian side."  As he 
has said before, he noted that he is uncomfortable with the concept 
of "a good Talib and a bad Talib," implying he doubts the wisdom of 
President Karzai's desire for reconciliation with the Taliban. 
"They're all bad if they are terrorists."  Nazarbayev noted the 
necessity of security in Afghanistan, if economic and humanitarian 
assistance is not to be wasted.  But even given the current 
conditions, Nazarbayev said, Kazakhstan is prepared to continue, and 
to increase, its assistance.  He noted briefly that the massive 
production of narcotics in Afghanistan is worrying. 
 
NON-PROLIFERATION 
 
14. (S) Nazarbayev complimented President Obama's commitment to 
non-proliferation and said he was especially pleased with the 
President's Prague speech in April.  He noted he has proposed that 
the United Nations designate every August 29 as World 
Non-Proliferation Day.  He acknowledged that Vice President Biden had 
invited him to the nuclear security summit in the United States early 
in 2010, and said he is pleased the United States is working with 
Russia on a new post-START agreement. 
 
OSCE 
 
15. (S) Nazarbayev thanked the United States for supporting 
Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE chairmanship.  Listing possible priorities for 
the chairmanship year, he said, "We are rich in oil and gas but might 
want to promote alternative energy, possibly European security, and 
maybe questions of ethnic harmony and accord."  Referring to another 
possibility of a priority, "frozen conflicts," Nazarbayev said, "The 
Georgia-Russia question is difficult, but the independence of Georgia 
 
ASTANA 00001164  004 OF 004 
 
 
is fundamental."  (NOTE:  Foreign Minister Tazhin has the lead to 
develo
p Kazakhstan's OSCE priorities, and Nazarbayev did not seem to 
have been recently briefed on Tazhin's current thinking.  END NOTE.) 
 
16. (S) On Kazakhstan's OSCE chairmanship, Burns said the United 
States looks forward to working with Kazakhstan closely in the run-up 
to the 2010 chairmanship.  "This will be a good opportunity to show 
further progress on the reforms you've undertaken."  He stressed that 
it is in Kazakhstan's interest to show further movement on reform and 
its Madrid commitments before 2010, and the heightened scrutiny that 
the OSCE Chairmanship will bring. 
 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES 
 
17. (C) Nazarbayev judged that U.S.-Kazakhstan economic cooperation 
is a success story that has been mutually beneficial.  "However," he 
suggested, "we need to move forward, step by step, toward 
diversification of our investment."  He cited the newly opened 
General Electric locomotive plant in Astana as a success story for 
diversification, and added, "It will create many jobs." 
 
18. (S) In summing up, Burns said he wanted to repeat that President 
Obama is committed to strengthening the U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship. 
 Nazarbayev quipped, "Maybe he could stop in Kazakhstan on his way to 
China." 
 
19. (S) COMMENT:  It is clear Nazarbayev was eager to meet with the 
Burns delegation because he changed his usually immutable summer 
vacation schedule twice to accommodate the delegation's complex 
itinerary.  Although the delegation's visit to Astana broke no new 
ground, it was important for the government of Kazakhstan, for 
Central Asia, and for Kazakhstan's big neighbors, Russia and China. 
That Burns reiterated twice, once at the beginning of the meeting and 
again at the end, that President Obama is committed to a stronger 
U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship will pay off, especially if the U.S. 
side follows through with greater engagement and reasonably regular 
very high-level visits.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1029, KAZAKHSTAN: LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN PEACE CORPS CASE OVER,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1029 2009-06-16 11:19 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0474
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #1029/01 1671119
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 161119Z JUN 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5623
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1671
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0532
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0242
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0499
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0379
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0003
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0662
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1044
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1747
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0718
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1229
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1145
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, CA/OCS 
FRANKFURT FOR REGIONAL CONSULAR OFFICER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2034 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CASC KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN PEACE CORPS CASE OVER, 
VOLUNTEER DEPARTS COUNTRY 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 0983    (B) ASTANA 0592 
     (C) ASTANA 0547 (NOTAL) 
     (D) ASTANA 0443    (E) ASTANA 0381 
     (F) ASTANA 0373    (G) ASTANA 0175 
     (H) ASTANA 0135    (I) ASTANA 0055 
     (J) 08 ASTANA 2576 (K) 08 ASTANA 2410 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified by: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  Peace Corps Volunteer Anthony Sharp departed 
Kazakhstan on June 13, after an appellate court vacated his two-year 
probation at the Prosecutor General's request.  Sharp's departure 
ends an affair that began on November 26, when he was arrested in 
what appeared to be a classic Soviet-style set-up, likely 
orchestrated by the pro-Russian old-guard at the Committee for 
National Security (KNB) and aimed at discrediting the Peace Corps and 
damaging bilateral relations.  Over the course of more than six 
months, the Ambassador repeatedly raised Sharp's case with senior 
government officials, including with President Nazarbayev on March 
30.  Though there were a number of bureaucratic hurdles to overcome, 
the case moved slowly toward resolution following the Nazarbayev 
meeting.  Keeping everything out of the media was critical to the 
successful outcome.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER DEPARTS KAZAKHSTAN 
 
2. (C) Peace Corps Volunteer Anthony Sharp left Kazakhstan on June 
13, following the completion of all legal proceedings against him, 
and official confirmation from the Kazakhstani government that it had 
no objections to his departure. 
 
3. (C) On April 3, an Ust-Kamenogorsk appeals court upheld the 
criminal conviction against Sharp on explosives charges, but 
suspended his two-year prison sentence, putting him on probation for 
two years (ref B).  Following that ruling, we worked with Sharp's 
attorneys and the government to identify a legal avenue for him to 
depart Kazakhstan immediately, rather than at the end of the 
probation period.  On the advice of Talgat Kaliyev, advisor to 
Foreign Minister Tazhin and the MFA's point-person on the Sharp case, 
we sent the MFA a diplomatic note on April 13 requesting the 
government confirm it had no objections to Sharp's departure. 
Kaliyev subsequently told us that the MFA was on board with the 
departure, but working-level officials at other agencies, including 
the Prosecutor General's Office, were reluctant to make any decision 
on the issue.  On May 21, the Charge raised Sharp's case with 
Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Kairat Sarybay, who had been 
involved from the beginning.  He expressed surprise that Sharp was 
still in Kazakhstan, but apparently intervened to get the bureaucracy 
to resolve the case within the limitations of Kazakhstani law. 
Sarybay reaffirmed the government's "political will" to bring about a 
final resolution during a June 5 meeting with the Ambassador (ref A). 
 
FINAL RESOLUTION 
 
4. (C) On June 3, a prosecutor filed a motion with the 
Ust-Kamenogorsk appeals court recommending Sharp's sentence be 
reduced to time served -- i.e., one night in jail.  The court granted 
the motion, vacating Sharp's two-year probation.  Sharp's attorneys 
then obtained the necessary documentation confirming that there were 
no further restriction's on Sharp's travel, and on June 12, the MFA 
called us in to hand us their response diplomatic note to our April 
13 note, confirming that there were no impediments to Sharp's 
departure.  Sharp left Kazakhstan on June 13.  The Ambassador sent a 
letter to Foreign Minister Tazhin on June 16 thanking him for his 
assistance on the case. 
 
A SOVIET-STYLE PROVOCATION 
 
5. (S) As reported in reftels, on November 26, just days before the 
end of his Peace Corps tour, Sharp accepted an invitation from two 
 
ASTANA 00001029  002 OF 002 
 
 
Kazakhstani citizens, including his local counterpart, to take a 
late-night tour of a gold mine near the town of Ridder.  Upon exiting 
the mine, one of the locals gave Sharp his bag to hold while he 
climbed back over the security fence.  Local authorities were 
waiting, and promptly arrested Sharp, claiming that the bag contained 
industrial explosives.   The incident had all the makings of a 
Soviet-style set-up, engineered by the pro-Moscow old guard in the 
Committee for National Security (the KNB, successor to the KGB), and 
aimed at discrediting the Peace Corps in Kazakhstan and at damaging 
U.S.-Kazakhstan relations at a time when Kazakhstan's leadership saw 
the election
 of President Obama as an opportunity to enhance its 
relationship with the United States. 
 
6. (S) The Ambassador raised Sharp's case in December and January 
with State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev (refs H and I) and with Sarybay 
(ref G), stressing that we believed it was a provocation, and urging 
that the government intervene at the highest levels to have it 
dismissed and to have Sharp deported from the country.   The police 
concluded their investigation on January 14, and charges were brought 
against Sharp for illegal possession of explosives.  Kaliyev informed 
us on January 21 that he had worked out an arrangement with the 
relevant government agencies:  If Sharp agreed to a closed trial and 
we all kept the case out of the media, Sharp would be convicted, but 
given a suspended sentence and immediately deported.  Sharp accepted 
the deal, but the government failed to live up to its bargain.  After 
a month long-trial which ended on February 26, a judge convicted 
Sharp on the explosives charges and sentenced him to two years in 
prison.  He was immediately taken off to jail, but was released the 
following day after the Ambassador got Foreign Minister Tazhin to 
intervene. 
 
7. (S) Tazhin made clear that the KNB and Ministry of Internal 
Affairs had pushed back and were pressing their view that Sharp was 
an "American spy."  He nevertheless promised that on appeal, the case 
would be resolved in accordance with the earlier agreement.  It 
appeared, however, that President Nazarbayev would himself make the 
final decision.  Sarybay arranged a meeting for the Ambassador with 
Nazarbayev on March 30, where the Ambassador expressed regret that 
Sharp had trespassed at the mine, but conveyed our hope we could put 
the case behind us and move forward on enhancing the bilateral 
relationship (ref C).  Though there were a number of bureaucratic 
hurdles to overcome, the case moved slowly toward resolution 
following the Nazarbayev meeting. 
 
8. (S) COMMENT:  Though the case took months to resolve, our 
confidence that Nazarbayev would do the right thing in end was not 
misplaced.  He was likely the decider, siding with his more 
progressive advisors, like Tazhin and Sarybay, and against the KNB, 
to protect the bilateral relationship and thus maintain his 
long-standing policy of balancing Kazakhstan's relations with Russia, 
China, and the United States.  Key to the successful resolution of 
the case was keeping it out of the media -- enabling the Kazakhstanis 
to avoid the political embarrassment of trying to explain the 
provocation publicly and allowing them to back down and let Sharp go 
free.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA983, KAZAKHSTAN: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES BILATERAL

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA983 2009-06-08 10:13 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2956
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHTA #0983/01 1591013
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081013Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5576
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1644
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1020
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0694
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1723
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2324
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2648
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1205
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1121

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000983 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN, EUR/RPM, CA/OCS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2034 
TAGS: PREL PINR MNUC CASC KNNP NATO KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES BILATERAL 
RELATIONS, BN-305 FUNDING, SHARP CASE WITH PRESIDENTIAL 
ADVISOR SARYBAY 
 
REF: A. STATE 56723 
     B. STATE 54767 
     C. ASTANA 0956 
     D. ASTANA 0957 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  On June 5, the Ambassador delivered 
demarches on a possible Kazakhstani arms sale to Syria and on 
U.S.-Russian discussions on the transit of lethal supplies to 
Afghanistan to Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Kairat 
Sarybay (see reftels), and briefed Sarybay on his recent 
visit to Washington, upcoming high-level U.S. visits to 
Astana, the BN-350 plutonium reactor decommissioning program, 
the case of Peace Corps Volunteer Anthony Sharp, and 
President Obama's June 4 speech in Cairo.  The Ambassador 
also handed Sarybay a copy of a letter from him to President 
Nazarbayev, thanking Nazarbayev for Kazakhstan's ratification 
of the Cooperative Threat Reduction umbrella agreement. 
After the Ambassador raised all of his agenda items, Sarybay 
said he had "one small request" and asked whether the United 
States had delivered a demarche on the Rakhat Aliyev case to 
the government of Austria.  The Ambassador unequivocally 
denied that such a demarche had taken place, and said the 
U.S. government has no interest in becoming involved in the 
dispute between Aliyev and President Nazarbayev.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CONSULTATIONS AND CONFERENCES 
 
2. (C) Sarybay met the Ambassador in his office, a modest 
room in the regal Presidential Administration building. 
Daulet Kussainov, a young diplomat who had just returned from 
four years in Brussels, served as Sarybay's notetaker.  The 
Ambassador told Sarybay that he had just  returned from 
consultations in Washington, and said he hoped that Foreign 
Minister Tazhin was pleased with the results of his visit to 
Washington.  The Ambassador informed Sarybay that EUR 
Assistant Secretary Gordon would likely lead the U.S. 
delegation to the June 24-25 Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC) Security Forum event in Astana.  Sarybay 
immediately responded, "But we were expecting  (Under 
Secretary) Burns to visit." 
 
UPCOMING HIGH-LEVEL VISITS 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador explained that Under Secretary Burns 
would prefer to visit Astana immediately following the July 
7-8 Medvedev-Obama summit in Moscow, in order to provide an 
immediate readout of the summit directly to Kazakhstani 
officials.  Furthermore, the Ambassador said, if U/S Burns 
were to visit during the EAPC Security Forum, his schedule 
and his message would be crowded and constrained by the 
demands of the conference.  Sarybay said he understood, but 
he also told the Ambassador that a meeting with President 
Nazarbayev on July 9 might be "difficult," because President 
Nazarbayev usually takes vacation immediately following the 
annual Astana Day celebrations on July 6.  Nevertheless, 
Sarybay said he would discuss the issue with "my boss" 
(President Nazarbayev) and hoped a meeting could be arranged. 
 The Ambassador thanked Sarybay and informed him of two other 
upcoming, high-level visits in July -- by Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen (mid-July) and CENTCOM 
Commander General Petraeus (late July).  Sarybay said he 
would try to schedule meetings for them with President 
Nazarbayev and called the previous meeting with General 
Petraeus "very productive and fruitful." 
 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION AND THE BN-350 PROGRAM 
 
4. (C) The Ambassador thanked Sarybay for his government's 
leadership and partnership on nuclear nonproliferation 
 
ASTANA 00000983  002 OF 003 
 
 
issues, particularly President Nazarbayev's decision on June 
2 to sign legislation ratifying the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) Umbrella Agreement.  The Ambassador handed 
Sarybay a copy of a letter from him to President Nazarbayev 
thanking Nazarbayev for signing the legislation, and said the 
 original would be sent via a Diplomatic Note.  The 
Ambassador then said the United States appreciated the 
Kazakhstani government's commitment to fund part of the 
BN-350 program to ensure the safe transportation and storage 
of spent fuel from the decommissioned plutonium breeder 
reactor.  He told Sarybay that Minister of Economy Sultanov 
had informed him that $5 million for the program was 
a
vailable in 2009 via extra budgetary reserves, and that 
Ministry of Energy Mynbayev simply had to request the funds 
through the proper channels.  Unfortunately, however, the 
Ministry of Energy's subsequent request for funding was 
denied.  The Ambassador delivered a non-paper to Sarybay on 
the subject and asked for his assistance in securing the 
necessary funding.  Sarybay said he would look into the 
matter and joked, "You seem to know better than me and 
Minister Mynbayev what is in our budget reserves!" 
 
PEACE CORPS CASE 
 
5. (C)  The Ambassador thanked Sarybay for his assistance and 
discretion in expediting the resolution of the ongoing case 
of  Peace Corps volunteer Anthony Sharp, who was convicted of 
unlawful possession of industrial explosives on February 26. 
Sarybay told the Ambassador that "there is a real political 
intention to solve this case.  We hope that you can see that 
our bureaucracy handled the issue properly.  No one can say 
that Kazakhstan is not running according to the rule of law." 
 While carefully stating that he did not expect there to be 
any quid pro quo, Sarybay said that, in light of Kazakhstan's 
assistance with the Sharp case, if Kazakhstani citizens 
living in the United States find themselves in similar 
circumstances in the future, "we hope that they will be 
treated fairly."  Sarybay also told the Ambassador that some 
influential members of the government had wanted to require 
the U.S. Attorney General to send a letter to Kazakhstan's 
Procurator General, requesting assistance with Sharp's case. 
Sarybay, however, said that he had argued successfully 
against that, saying it would be an additional precondition 
for Sharp's release and would come as a surprise to the U.S. 
government.  Sarybay  suggested that the Ambassador draft a 
thank you letter to Foreign Minister Tazhin that would thank 
the government for its support and cooperation and note that 
"everything was done properly and correctly" concerning the 
case.  The Ambassador said he already had a draft thank-you 
letter prepared and would send it as soon as Sharp left 
Kazakhstan.  (NOTE:  On June 3, the appellate court in 
Ust-Kamenogorsk accepted the procurator's motion to reduce 
Sharp's sentence to "time served" and a fine (which he has 
already paid).  Barring any additional bureaucratic hurdles, 
we expect Sharp to depart Kazakhstan on June 11.  END NOTE). 
 
PRESIDENT OBAMA'S SPEECH WELL RECEIVED 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador asked Sarybay if he or President 
Nazarbayev had had time to read the President's speech in 
Cairo.  Sarybay said he had delivered the text of the speech 
to President Nazarbayev on June 4 and President Nazarbayev 
was looking forward to reading it.  (NOTE:  On June 8, the 
Presidential Administration released the following statement 
from President Nazarbayev:  "In his speech in Cairo, 
President Obama demonstrated his willingness to build 
understanding and rapport with the Muslim world.  I am 
encouraged by this constructive engagement by the U.S. 
President.  Kazakhstan looks forward to continuing its 
efforts to strengthening political, economic, and cultural 
cooperation with the United States.  There is a stark 
 
ASTANA 00000983  003 OF 003 
 
 
distinction between leaders who pursue violence and engender 
fear and those thoughtful leaders who are willing to engage 
in an effort to make the world safer, freer, and more 
prosperous.  In his speech, President Obama made it clear 
that he understands that distinction well, and I am 
encouraged by the invitation to join him."  END NOTE). 
 
ONE FINAL REQUEST 
 
7. (C)  Just as the meeting adjourned, Sarybay said he had 
"one small request" for the Ambassador.  He said, "We have 
information that the United States delivered a demarche or a 
diplomatic note on the Rakhat Aliyev case to the Austrian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna.  Is that true?"  The 
Ambassador strongly and unequivocally denied that the U.S. 
government delivered any such demarche and said the U.S. 
government has no interest in becoming involved in the 
dispute between Aliyev and President Nazarbayev.  Sarybay 
waited one full second, then smiled and thanked the 
Ambassador for taking the time to pay him a visit. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA956, KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON ARMS SALE TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA956 2009-06-05 10:34 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0956 1561034
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 051034Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5546
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0039

S E C R E T ASTANA 000956 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN, SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2059 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PARM PTER ETTC MARR MCAP MOPS
KZ 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON ARMS SALE TO 
SYRIA 
 
REF: SECSTATE 56723 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (S) Ambassador delivered demarche in reftel on June 5 to 
Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Kairat Sarybai, including 
verbatim point.  Ambassador stressed the importance of 
preventing the proliferation of weapons and military-related 
items and told Sarybai, "We do need to have a reply to this 
message." 
 
2.  (S) Sarybai said that the government of Kazakhstan takes 
the issue of the transfer of military-related items to Syria 
very seriously.  He said the government has "always worked 
well" with the government of the United States to prevent 
third-party proliferation of lethal military equipment. 
Sarybai further observed that nonproliferation is "a top 
priority of certain services" in the government and he 
promised to raise this issue directly with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and would "use other channels" to raise it 
with "other government agencies" (read:  the Committee for 
National Security, or KNB). 
 
3.  (S) The Ambassador will also deliver the demarche to an 
appropriate official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as 
soon as possible. 
HOAGLAND

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09ASTANA728, KAZAKHSTAN: ASD BENKERT PRESSES FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA728 2009-04-28 02:55 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7229
PP RUEHNEH
DE RUEHTA #0728/01 1180255
ZNY SSSSS ZZHZDF
P 280255Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5273
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 1541
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0918
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0605
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1621
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1103
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1017
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0073
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2629
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2299

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000728 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  ASD BENKERT PRESSES FOR 
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRESS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 31628 
 
ASTAN...

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09ASTANA674, KAZAKHSTAN: SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA674 2009-04-21 11:45 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0674/01 1111145
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211145Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5207
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1513
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0891
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0578
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1594
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1076
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0990
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2611
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2281

S E C R E T ASTANA 000674 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2034 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ECON EPET KNNP AF RS KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER 
TAZHIN'S MAY 4-5 VISIT TO WASHINGTON 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Kazakhstani Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin's 
May 4-5 visit to Washington is the Obama Administration's 
first opportunity for face-to-face engagement with the 
leadership of our most important partner in Central Asia.  We 
have a robust bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan, with 
close cooperation on such critical issues as Afghan 
reconstruction, nuclear non-proliferation, and developing 
Kazakhstan's vast energy resources to support global energy 
security.  With its upcoming 2010 OSCE chairmanship, 
Kazakhstan is poised for its most important international 
leadership role to date -- and Tazhin's visit will be a 
chance to discuss Kazakhstan's priorities for its 
chairmanship year.  We should also ask Tazhin about 
additional ways Kazakhstan can assist Afghanistan; stress the 
need for further democratic reforms; and reiterate our 
commitment to Kazakhstan's WTO accession.  END SUMMARY. 
 
RAISING BILATERAL RELATIONS TO A NEW LEVEL 
 
2. (C) Foreign Minister Tazhin's May 4-5 visit to Washington 
comes at a time when the Kazakhstani leadership sees the new 
Obama administration as an opportunity to enhance our already 
good bilateral relations.  President Nazarbayev welcomed then 
President-elect Obama's early phone call last November, and 
recently invited him to visit Astana -- an invitation passed 
directly to President Obama by Senate Chairman Kasym-Zhomart 
Tokayev at an Alliance of Civilizations reception in Istanbul 
on April 7.  Nazarbayev has told us he would also welcome 
visits from the Secretary and other senior Administration 
officials, including Secretary of Defense Gates.  Tazhin is 
likely to emphasize Kazakhstan's strong desire for regular 
high-level visits both ways.  He will almost certainly be 
prepared to consult on Kazakhstan's agenda for its 2010 OSCE 
chairmanship, and is also likely to raise Kazakhstan's 
perennial desire to be graduated from the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment and to be exempt from annual human-rights 
certification, both of which the government views as 
"incompatible" with a mature relationship between strategic 
partners. 
 
3. (C) President Nazarbayev carefully balances Kazakhstan's 
relations with Russia, China, the United States, and the EU 
-- what he terms a "multi-vector" foreign policy.  The 
Kazakhstanis consider Russia their most important 
international partner, and Russian's influence is 
unparalleled in Kazakhstan due to long historical ties, 
Kazakhstan's large ethnic Russian population, and the 
predominance here of the Russian language -- which means most 
Kazakhstanis obtain their news from Russia's broadcast and 
print media.  Kazakhstan's close relationship with the United 
States serves as an essential counterweight -- reinforcing 
the country's sovereignty and independence and helping it 
stave off pressure from both its giant neighbors, i.e., China 
as well as Russia.  For the Kazakhstanis, high-level 
interactions with the United States, such as Tazhin's visit, 
are thus not only important for their substance, but also for 
their symbolism -- sending a signal to Moscow that we remain 
closely engaged with them, despite Moscow's assertion of a 
"privileged sphere of influence." 
 
AFGHANISTAN:  POISED TO DO EVEN MORE 
 
4. (C) Kazakhstan has provided critical support for Coalition 
efforts in Afghanistan -- and is looking for ways to do even 
more.  Bilateral agreements from 2001 and 2002 allow U.S. 
military aircraft supporting Operation Enduring Freedom to 
transit Kazakhstani air space cost-free and to make emergency 
landings in Kazakhstan when conditions do not permit landing 
at Kyrgyzstan's Manas Air Base.  In January, Kazakhstan 
agreed to participate in the Northern Distribution Network -- 
 
which entails commercial shipment through Kazakhstani 
territory of non-lethal supplies for U.S. troops in 
Afghanistan.  Kazakhstan is considering sending several 
officers to ISAF headquarters and deploying a military 
medical unit to Afghanistan.  As a later step, the 
Kazakhstanis may also consider deploying a military 
engineering unit to teach at the military engineering school 
at Mazar-i-Sharif or to assist in unexploded ordnance 
disposal, a mission they carried out in Iraq for over five 
years.  The Kazakhstani government provided Afghanistan $3 
million in humanita
rian assistance in 2008 and is developing 
a program to provide Afghan students with free university 
education in Kazakhstan.  The Kazakhstanis also hope to make 
Afghanistan a focus of their 2010 OSCE chairmanship. 
 
DEMOCRACY:  SLOW GOING 
 
5. (C) While the Kazakhstani government articulates a 
strategic vision of democracy, it has lagged on the 
implementation front.  The leadership remains resistant to 
competitive political processes -- and the situation is 
complicated by the fact that Nazarbayev is extraordinarily 
popular (with a 90 percent approval rating in our own 
polling), while the opposition is weak, fractured, and 
comprised mostly of ex-Nazarbayev loyalists who fell out of 
favor.  Nazarbayev's Nur Otan party officially received 88% 
of the vote and won all the parliamentary seats in the August 
2007 elections, which OSCE observers concluded did not meet 
OSCE standards.   The next elections, both parliamentary and 
presidential, are scheduled for 2012.  Should Nazarbayev run 
again -- and at this juncture it appears likely he will -- he 
would almost certainly win, even with fully free and fair 
balloting.  (NOTE:  Nazarbayev is not yet grooming a 
successor.  END NOTE.) 
 
6.  (C) On a positive note, Nazarbayev has taken steps that 
could facilitate a transition to a more democratic system 
over the long run.  His Bolashak program provides 
scholarships for several thousand Kazakhstanis to receive 
higher education abroad, mostly in the West, where they 
absorb Western ideas and values.  He has also brought into 
government a new generation of young, ambitious bureaucrats 
-- many of whom studied in the West through Bolashak or our 
own programs. 
 
7. (C) When Kazakhstan was selected to be 2010 OSCE chairman 
at the November 2007 Madrid OSCE Ministerial meeting, Foreign 
Minister Tazhin promised his government would amend 
Kazakhstan's election, political party, and media laws in 
accordance with OSCE and ODIHR recommendations.  (NOTE: 
Tazhin also promised that as OSCE chairman, Kazakhstan would 
support the OSCE's Human Dimension and preserve ODIHR's 
mandate.  END NOTE.)  The amendments were finally signed into 
law in February.   While key civil society leaders were 
disappointed that the new legislation did not go further, we 
consider them to be steps in the right direction, and will 
continue pressing for further reforms, including complete 
decriminalization of libel and the establishment of fully 
independent electoral commissions with representatives from 
all political parties.  While Kazakhstan prides itself on its 
religious tolerance, parliament passed legislation in late 
2008 which would have restricted the religious freedom of 
minority religious groups.  Rather than signing the 
legislation, President Nazarbayev sent it for review to the 
Constitutional Council (Court) -- which ultimately declared 
it to be unconstitutional. 
 
ENERGY:  DIVERSIFYING TRANSPORT ROUTES 
 
8. (C) U.S. and Kazakhstani strategic interests are largely 
aligned on the development of Kazakhstan's vast energy 
resources.  Both sides agree that U.S. and other Western 
 
companies must continue playing a lead role in Kazakhstan's 
energy exploration and production projects and that 
diversifying transport routes will bolster Kazakhstan's 
sovereignty and enable it to capture the maximum benefits of 
its energy wealth.  Kazakhstan produced 70.7 million tons of 
oil in 2008 (approximately 1.41 million barrels per day), and 
is expected to become one of the world's top ten crude 
exporters soon after 2015.  While the country also has 
significant gas reserves (1.5 trillion cubic meters is a 
low-end estimate), current gas exports are very limited for 
now, in part because gas is being reinjected to maximize 
crude output.  U.S. companies -- ExxonMobil, Chevron, and 
ConocoPhilips -- have significant ownership stakes in 
Kazakhstan's three major hydrocarbon projects, including 
Kashagan, the world's largest oil field discovery since 
Alaska's North Slope. 
 
9. (C) With major crude production increases on the horizon, 
Kazakhstan must develop additional transport routes to bring 
its crude to market.  Currently, most of Kazakhstan's crude 
is exported via Russia, though some exports flow east to 
China, west across the Caspian through Azerbaijan, and south 
across the Caspian to Iran.  We are focused on helping the 
Kazakhstanis implement the Kazakhstan-Caspian Transportation 
System (KCTS), which envisions a "virtual pipeline" of 
tankers transporting large volumes of crude from Kazakhstan's 
Caspian coast to Baku, from where it will flow onward to 
market through Georgia, including through the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.  While a trans-Caspian 
crude pipeline would be a cheaper long-term transport option, 
the Kazakhstanis maintain that an agreement on Caspian 
delimitation among the five Caspian littoral states is a 
prerequisite -- politically, if not legally -- for moving 
forward on such a pipeline's construction. 
 
ECONOMY:  AGGRESSIVE STEPS TO TACKLE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
10. (C) Kazakhstan is Central Asia's economic powerhouse, 
with a GDP larger than that of the region's other four 
countries combined.  Economic growth averaged over 9% per 
year during 2005-07, before dropping to 3% in 2008 with the 
onset of the global financial crisis.  While the country's 
economic success is partly due to its fortuitous natural 
resource deposits, astute macroeconomic policies and 
extensive economic reforms have also played an important 
role.  Kazakhstan has a modern banking and financial system, 
a well-endowed pension fund, and a transparent sovereign 
wealth fund with $22 billion in assets.  The government has 
taken aggressive steps to tackle the domestic reverberations 
of the world economic crisis, allocating $21 billion to take 
equity stakes in private banks, prop up the construction and 
real-estate sectors, and support small- and medium-sized 
enterprises and agriculture. 
 
11. (C) Kazakhstan's long-run economic challenge is to 
diversify its economy away from reliance on the energy 
sector.   In 2008, we launched a bilateral Public-Private 
Economic Partnership Initiative (PPEPI), which is bringing 
together the U.S. and Kazakhstani public and private sectors 
to make policy recommendations on improving the country's 
business climate and reducing other barriers to non-energy 
investments.  Kazakhstan is currently negotiating WTO 
accession agreements with the United States, several other 
countries, and the EU.  The Kazakhstanis maintain that we are 
demanding greater concessions from them than we have 
requested from other WTO candidates, including Russia.  Some 
in the Kazakhstani government would prefer to first finalize 
a Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union and deal with the 
WTO later -- though this might give Russia significant 
leverage over Kazakhstan's WTO accession.  A high-level 
message from us that we remain committed to Kazakh
stan's WTO 
membership (and actions to back up our rhetoric) would help 
 
the Kazakhstanis keep their focus on WTO accession. 
 
NON-PROLIFERATION:  A HALLMARK OF BILATERAL COOPERATION 
 
12. (S) Non-proliferation cooperation has been a hallmark of 
our bilateral relationship since Kazakhstan became 
independent and agreed to give up the nuclear arsenal it 
inherited from the USSR.  The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) program remains the dominant component of our 
assistance to Kazakhstan.  Key ongoing CTR activities include 
our efforts to secure the radiological material at the former 
Soviet nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk and to 
decommission and store the spent fuel from Kazakhstan's 
plutonium breeder reactor.  We are pressing the Kazakhstanis 
to allow us to speed up work at Semipalatinsk -- consistent 
with President Obama's effort, announced in Prague, to secure 
all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide by the end of his 
first term.  The Kazakhstanis are seeking additional ways to 
burnish their non-proliferation credentials.  On April 6, 
President Nazarbayev announced publicly that Kazakhstan is 
interested in hosting the Nuclear Threat Initiative's 
IAEA-administered international nuclear fuel bank -- an offer 
we welcomed.  The Kazakhstanis are also considering running 
this year for a seat on the IAEA Board of Governors (a 
position we initially pressed them to take in 2008), and 
continue to press us to support their joining the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA604, KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SARYBAY SAYS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA604 2009-04-08 10:14 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2389
OO RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW
RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHTA #0604/01 0981014
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081014Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5115
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1465
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0843
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0530
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1546
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1028
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0941
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0068
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2259
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2589

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000604 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/A, NEA/IR, ISN, CA/OCS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2034 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CASC MARR KNNP IAEA AF IR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SARYBAY SAYS 
AHMADINEJAD WELCOMED OBAMA,S PRAGUE SPEECH 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 0601 
     B. ASTANA 0557 
     C. STATE 31102 
     D. ASTANA 0547 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  On April 8, Presidential Foreign Policy 
Advisor Kairat Sarybay gave the Ambassador a readout of 
President Nazarbayev's April 6 meeting with Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad.  Sarybay said that Ahmadinejad appeared to 
welcome President Obama's April 5 Prague speech.  Ahmadinejad 
maintained that he had taken the first step, by writing a 
letter to Obama.  The Kazakhstanis believe that U.S. 
cooperation with Iran in Afghanistan could lead to 
cooperation in other areas.  Sarybay explained that 
Nazarbayev's March 30 comment to the Ambassador that 
Kazakhstan could provide a "logistical base" for Afghanistan 
meant that Kazakhstan could be a storage location and source 
for supplies to the Coalition, in addition to being a transit 
country.  The Ambassador raised ref C demarche requesting 
specific Kazakhstani contributions to Afghanistan; Sarybay 
promised to review the request.   Sarybay recommended 
remaining in close touch with the MFA about the case of Peace 
Corps volunteer Anthony Sharp.  END SUMMARY. 
 
AHMADINEJAD APPEARED TO WELCOME PRAGUE SPEECH 
 
2. (S) On April 8, Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Kairat 
Sarybay gave the Ambassador a readout of President 
Nazarbayev's April 6 meeting in Astana with Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad.  (NOTE:  See ref A for State Secretary 
Saudabayev's readout of the meeting.  END NOTE.)  Sarybay 
explained, "It was interesting to speak with Ahmadinejad. 
He'll most probably be re-elected, but he was modest about 
it, saying 'Let's see what the Iranian people will do.'" 
According to Sarybay, the Kazakhstanis were worried that 
Ahmadinejad would misuse his Astana visit as a platform "for 
other claims" (NFI, but likely this means inappropriate 
public statements or outbursts), but this didn't come to 
pass. 
 
3. (S) Sarybay said that Ahmadinejad welcomed efforts to 
increase Kazakhstan-Iran trade -- including Kazakhstani wheat 
exports to Iran -- and to develop the necessary transport 
infrastructure for this.  It was the Iranian side, he 
explained, that had proposed building a railway from western 
Kazakhstan through Turkmenistan to Iran.  There are also 
plans to build a roadway parallel to the rail line, Sarybay 
added, looking a little skeptical. 
 
4. (S) Sarybay said that while he would not describe 
Ahmadinejad as "very optimistic," he nevertheless appeared to 
welcome President Obama's April 5 Prague speech.   According 
to Sarybay, Ahmadinejad said, "I took the first step, despite 
domestic pressure.  I wrote to Obama.   We are ready (NFI)." 
Explaining that while Ahmadinejad was cautious, Sarybay 
nevertheless read the situation as "promising," though 
perhaps not leading to immediate negotiations.   The 
Kazakhstanis asked Ahmadinejad whether both sides -- the 
United States and Iran -- are ready for a meeting between the 
Secretary and Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki.  "Ahmadinejad 
turned to Mottaki and asked, 'Are you ready?'; Mottaki 
silently shook his head yes."  Nazarbayev and Ahmadinejad 
agreed that Kazakhstan and Iran need to be more involved in 
Afghanistan.  "If the United States and the West can 
cooperate more with Iran in Afghanistan, this should lead to 
more cooperation in other areas, including non-proliferation, 
and all the countries in the region will benefit," Sarybay 
argued to the Ambassador. 
 
NUCLEAR FUEL BANK 
 
ASTANA 00000604  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
5. (C) Sarybay noted that during the Ahmadinejad visit, 
Nazarbayev had announced Kazakhstan's offer to host the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative's IAEA-supervised international 
nuclear fuel bank.  The Ambassador explained that he had 
discussed the issue with State Secretary Saudabayev on April 
7 (ref A).  He said the United States welcomes the proposal 
in principle, and that we are in the process of providing 
Saudabayev with our formal response. 
 
CLARIFICATION OF "LOGISTICAL BASE" REMARKS 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador asked Sarybay to clarify a remark from 
his March 30 meeting with Nazarbayev, when Nazarbayev said 
that Kazakhstan could provide a "logistical base" for 
Afghanistan (see refs A and B).   Sarybay said that as far as 
he understood, this meant that Kazakhstan could be a storage 
location and source for supplies for the Coalition in 
Afghanistan, in addition to being a transit country.  He 
admitted that Nazarbayev had been thinking out loud when he 
suggested this concept. 
 
SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHANISTAN 
 
7. (C) Per ref C, the Ambassador raised with Sarybay the U.S. 
government's Afghanistan-Pakistan strategic review, and 
provided him with non-papers on the review and our request to 
Kazakhstan for specific contributions to Afghanistan.  The 
Ambassador explained that we would also be raising this issue 
with the MFA.  Sarybay promised to review the request. 
 
ANTHONY SHARP CASE 
 
8. (C) The Ambassador thanked Sarybay for his advice 
regarding the criminal case against Peace Corps volunteer 
Anthony Sharp, explaining he had had a good conversation with 
Nazarbayev about it on March 30 (ref D).  Sarybay asked 
whether the matter is now closed.   The Ambassador responded 
that we are just waiting for the courts to finish the 
paperwork, and then we hope Sharp will be able to depart the 
country.  Sarybay recommended remaining in close touch with 
the MFA about the case. 
HOAGLAND

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09ASTANA601, KAZAKHSTAN: STATE SECRETARY SAUDABAYEV CONFIRMS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA601 2009-04-07 12:35 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1550
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RUEHROV
DE RUEHTA #0601/01 0971235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071235Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5112
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1463
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0841
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0528
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1544
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1026
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0939
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0066
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2257
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2587

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000601 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, NEA/IR, ISN, T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2034 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MARR KNNP IAEA AF IR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  STATE SECRETARY SAUDABAYEV CONFIRMS 
OFFER TO HOST NUCLEAR FUEL BANK 
 
REF: ASTANA 0557 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see para 9. 
 
2. (S) SUMMARY:  State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev told the 
Ambassador on April 7 that Kazakhstan is willing to host the 
international nuclear fuel bank, just as President Nazarbayev 
had announced to the press on April 6.  He said that the ball 
is now in the IAEA's court to review the offer and approach 
Kazakhstan to discuss further details, and that Kazakhstan 
also seeks Washington's reaction.  Saudabayev also told the 
Ambassador that Nazarbayev had pressed Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad to pursue only peaceful nuclear energy and 
cooperate with the IAEA and international community during 
their April 6 meeting in Astana.  Saudabayev said Kazakhstan 
would be interested in establishing a high-level commission 
for our bilateral relationship, similar to the 
Gore-Nazarbayev commission from the Clinton Administration. 
Regarding President Nazarbayev's March 30 comment to the 
Ambassador that Kazakhstan could provide a "logistical base" 
for Afghanistan (reftel), Saudabayev seemed not well-briefed 
on the issue and simply responded that Kazakhstan is willing 
to be a transit point for goods for Afghanistan.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
OFFER TO HOST NUCLEAR FUEL BANK 
 
3. (C) State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev called in the 
Ambassador on April 7 to discuss Kazakhstan's interest in 
hosting the international nuclear fuel bank proposed by the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative.  He explained that President 
Nazarbayev's April 6 public offer for Kazakhstan to host the 
fuel bank -- which he made in Astana during a joint press 
conference with Iranian President Ahmadinejad, following a 
bilateral meeting -- constituted Kazakhstan's official 
announcement on the issue.  He noted that Ahmadinejad 
supported Nazarbayev's proposal.  (NOTE:  Interfax quoted 
Nazarbayev as follows:  "If a nuclear fuel bank for nuclear 
energy were established, Kazakhstan would consider the 
possibility of having it located here, in a country which has 
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and voluntarily 
gave up nuclear weapons."  In response, Ahmadinejad said, 
"The proposal of the President of Kazakhstan regarding the 
establishment of a nuclear fuel bank is good"; Ahmedinejad 
added, "Any country that has on its territory uranium 
reserves and enrichment technology can turn itself into a 
nuclear fuel bank."  END NOTE.) 
 
4. (C) Saudabayev said that Nazarbayev's offer was carefully 
aimed at showing support for President Obama's 
non-proliferation agenda and that hosting the fuel bank would 
enable Kazakhstan to further burnish its non-proliferation 
credentials.  The ball is now in the IAEA's court to consider 
Kazakhstan's proposal and initiate expert talks, he 
explained.  Saudabayev asked the Ambassador to obtain 
Washington's official reaction.  He added that Nazarbayev 
supports Obama's proposal for a non-proliferation summit, and 
would be very willing to participate in it. 
 
5. (C) COMMENT:  Saudabayev appeared surprised by the April 5 
Wall Street Journal article which reported, relying on an 
"unnamed White House source," that Kazakhstan had previously 
made a formal offer to the White House to host the fuel bank. 
 Following the meeting, Roman Vasilenko, Saudabayev's chief 
of staff, explained to the Ambassador that Nazarbayev's 
announcement was occasioned not by the Ahmedinejad visit, but 
rather by the April 1 Obama-Medvedev joint statement and 
President Obama's April 5 speech on non-proliferation in 
Prague.  Vasilenko said that the government is discussing 
internally the issue of coming up with any funding necessary 
to serve as host.  END COMMENT. 
 
ASTANA 00000601  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
NAZARBAYEV PRESSES AHMADINEJAD ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
 
6. (S) Saudabayev told the Ambassador that during their April 
6 meeting, Nazabayev had stressed to Ahmadinejad that Iran 
should give up any ambitions to develop nuclear weapons, 
pursue only peaceful nuclear energy, and cooperate with the 
IAEA and international community.  In return, Iran will 
benefit economically, gaining new investment and access to 
technology.  Nazarbayev told Ahmadinejad that Obama
is open 
to dialogue -- which is a big step from the U.S. side -- and 
is thus giving Iran an opportunity which it should take 
advantage of.  Ahmadinejad purportedly said in response that 
Iran is suffering from the current situation, and if it had 
better relations with the United States, it would have more 
economic opportunities. 
 
INTEREST IN REVIVING HIGH-LEVEL BILATERAL COMMISSION 
 
7. (C) Saudabayev recalled that during the Clinton 
administration, there was a Gore-Nazarbayev commission which 
provided high-level oversight for the U.S.-Kazakhstan 
relationship.  He said Kazakhstan would be interested in 
reestablishing a similar body.  The Ambassador asked whether 
the Kazakhstanis would be willing to initiate bilateral 
consultations to discuss Kazakhstan's agenda for its 2010 
OSCE chairmanship.  Saudabayev responded that Kazakhstan 
would be interested, and added that Foreign Minister Tazhin's 
meetings in Washington in early May would constitute the 
first consultations. 
 
TRANSIT POINT FOR AFGHAN GOODS 
 
8. (C) The Ambassador asked Saudabayev to clarify a remark 
from his March 30 meeting with Nazarbayev, when Nazarbayev 
said that Kazakhstan could provide a "logistical base" for 
Afghanistan (reftel).  Saudabayev explained that Kazakhstan 
is simply interested in becoming a transit point for goods 
flowing to Afghanistan, which will assist Afghanistan 
economically, and added that he knew nothing further. 
(COMMENT:  We have seen from other sources that there might 
possibly be more toQzarbayev's cryptic remark about a 
"logistical base." Qcould be that Saudabayev is simply notQbriefed on this issue.  END COMMENT.) 
 
9.  (C) ACTION REQUEST:  Please provide an official response 
we can pass to Saudabayev to President Nazarbayev's offer to 
host a low-enriched uranium nuclear fuel bank. 
HOAGLAND

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