Category Archives: SECRET//NOFORN

10ASTANA138, KAZAKHSTANI FOREIGN MINISTER’S TRIP CLEARS CTR LOGJAM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA138 2010-02-01 10:17 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2932
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #0138/01 0321017
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011017Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7334
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2423
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1783
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2489
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1399
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1980
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1828
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000138 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/16/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KNNP KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTANI FOREIGN MINISTER'S TRIP CLEARS CTR LOGJAM 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY:  Over the past eight years, implementation of the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, also known as the 
Nunn-Lugar Program, has been grinding along, ever more slowly, as the 
Kazakhstani bureaucracy matures.  In advance of State 
Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev's February 2-4 visit to 
Washington, the Kazakhstani government, under increasing pressure 
from his office, fully engaged to start BN-350 hot runs and resolve 
implementation issues, such as value-added tax (VAT) and property tax 
exemptions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CTR PROBLEMS ARISE 
 
2.  (S) The Departments of Defense and Energy currently are 
implementing several projects under the 1993 CTR Umbrella Agreement 
in Kazakhstan, which was extended in 2000 and 2007 for seven-year 
intervals.  Since 2005, both the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA) and DOE have struggled with the inability to receive taxation 
and customs duty exemptions for contractors and subcontractors 
working in Kazakhstan.  Additionally, property tax issues have kept 
technical assistance recipients from accepting equipment and 
facilities, most notably tens of millions of dollars of equipment for 
the transportation of spent fuel from the Aktau-based BN-350 fast 
breeder reactor to a facility south of Kurchatov.  Additionally, the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, responsible for the BN-350 
reactor decommissioning, fell behind its original fuel-shipment 
schedule due to poor budget planning.  (NOTE:  Emergency funding from 
the Ministry of Finance was not made available until it was too late 
to obligate.  If followed, the latest schedule shows the completion 
of spent-fuel transfers by the end of 2010.  END NOTE.) 
 
LONG TRAIN RUNNING 
 
3.  (S) In the early evening of January 29, the first "hot" run to 
pick up spent fuel at Akatu began when the train pulled out of 
Kurchatov.  Although both State Secretary-Foreign Minister Saudabayev 
and Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Mynbayev had promised 
Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman that the train would be underway 
before the end of January, the realization of the plan required a 
herculean effort from very highest levels of the Kazakhstani 
government.  Because the government normally cannot obligate funding 
until at least late February, the government faced the option of 
directing its implementing agent, the National Nuclear Center (NNC), 
to spend money before it was available, which could carry serious 
penalties for unauthorized use of funds.  Alternatively, it could 
direct Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZh) -- the Kazakhstan railway 
authority -- to begin operations without payment. 
 
PRESIDENTIAL BACKING 
 
4.  (S) As early as November 2009 when an interagency group, 
consisting of the Vice Ministers of Energy, Transportation, and 
Finance and KTZh leadership, were discussing ownership issues and 
operational financing, Saudabayev began to send representatives to 
meetings.  In December 2009, his envoy clearly articulated 
Saudabayev's seriousness to the interagency, essentially saying, 
"Saudabayev says get this done.  Figure out how you are going to do 
it, but get it done before he leaves for Washington.  This project 
has the backing of the president himself." 
 
CTR IMPLEMENTATION -- A TAXING ISSUE! 
 
5.  (C/NF) According to the June 2009 amendment to the CTR Umbrella 
Agreement, the Tax Committee has the authority to establish tax 
exemption procedures and allow tax exemptions for goods and services 
acquired in Kazakhstan.  Despite the proactive involvement of Daulet 
Ergozhin, 30-something former Vice Minister of Finance and current 
Tax Committee Chair (and son of former Academy of Sciences President 
Edil Ergozhin), mid-level Kazakhstani bureaucrats feared prosecution 
for granting non-standard tax exemptions and thus refused to 
implement these provisions.  In response to DOE attache's expression 
of concern that the issue be resolved in advance of Saudabayev's 
 
ASTANA 00000138  002 OF 002 
 
 
Washington trip, Ergozhin called in the head of the regional tax 
offices and demanded he report "positive results" by Monday, in time 
to provide Saudabayev with a good new story to tell in Washington. 
 
6.  (C/NF) As a result, local tax authorities forwarded requests to 
Post to provide confirmation of more than a dozen subcontracts for 
the Biological Threat Reduction program, calling every few hours to 
press th
e Embassy DTRA and DOE offices for an immediate response. 
Under this elegant solution, the Embassy takes responsibility for 
confirming that the work is in accordance with the agreements.  The 
tax authorities thus can provide a tax exemption without the onus of 
"proving" that the contracts fall within the framework of CTR, 
avoiding responsibility and liability. 
 
7.  (C/NF) COMMENT:  Post fully credits the direct involvement of 
Saudabayev and his office for the resolution of issues surrounding 
implementation of the CTR program.  As such, Post recommends 
high-level recognition for these efforts, especially with respect to 
the start of BN-350 hot runs.  Secretary Chu's personal involvement 
in the trip could provide a great deal of political capital, allowing 
Post to ride the wave of good will and continue to press for even 
more tangible results in advance of the Global Nuclear Security 
Summit, which President Nazarbayev plans to attend.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

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10ASTANA74, KAZAKHSTAN: CHINA PRAISES ASTANA’S FOREIGN POLICY, WORRIES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA74 2010-01-25 09:22 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6750
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #0074/01 0250922
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 250922Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7269
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2400
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2467
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1761
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1377
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1957
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1807
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2686
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2976

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000074 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958; DECL: 01/25/2025 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EPET ECON NATO CH RU UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  CHINA PRAISES ASTANA'S FOREIGN POLICY, WORRIES 
ABOUT RUSSIA 
 
REF:  A.  08 ASTANA 0812 
      B.  09 ASTANA 2168 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (A), (B), (D). 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  In his farewell courtesy call with the 
Ambassador on January 22, China's Ambassador to Kazakhstan Cheng 
Guoping (please protect) highly praised Kazakhstan's skillful 
balancing of the "great powers."  Repeatedly emphasizing the personal 
nature of the conversation, Cheng highlighted his view that China and 
Russia must "coexist" in Central Asia.  He expressed a positive view 
of the U.S. role in the region, but cautioned against a permanent 
military presence.  Cheng recommended that the United States urge 
Uzbekistan to invite NATO "as a guest" to attend the June summit in 
Tashkent of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in order to 
increase NATO-SCO cooperation.  Cheng departs Astana February 2 to 
return to Beijing to become Deputy Foreign Minister for Eurasia (the 
CIS).  We suspect Embassy Beijing will find him to be an interesting 
but reserved interlocutor.  END SUMMARY. 
 
FUTURE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
2.  (S) Arriving in the Ambassador's office with a large gift bag of 
green tea "for the Ambassador's health," China's Ambassador to 
Kazakhstan Cheng Guoping (please protect) stressed his interest in 
maintaining close contact with the Ambassador after he returns to 
China February 2 to become Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of 
Eurasia (i.e., countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States). 
Among the key issues that he will handle, he mentioned relations with 
Russia, the SCO, and Kazakhstan.  Cheng argued, "Kazakhstan's role 
and importance is growing daily and is of great significance to China 
for political, economic, and security reasons."  He underlined the 
need to develop mutual trust in order to enhance Chinese influence in 
the region, especially because of the area's effect on China's 
security. 
 
SOPHISTICATED, SMART FOREIGN POLICY 
 
3.  (S) Cheng strongly agreed with the Kazakhstani Foreign Ministry's 
portrayal of Kazakhstan as a bridge between East and West, the OSCE 
and the SCO.  He emphasized the sophistication of Kazakhstan's 
foreign policy of balancing Russia, the United States, European 
Union, and China.  Highlighting Kazakhstan's membership in the 
Commonwealth Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic 
Community, and the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union, Cheng 
stated that Kazakhstan still "attaches great importance to relations 
with the United States, China, and the European Union." 
 
4.  (S) Asserting that Kazakhstan is not a pro-Russian country, Cheng 
called its foreign policy "smart and successful, because good 
relations with China, the European Union, and the United States 
increase his (i.e., President Nazarbayev's) influence when he engages 
with Russia.  All countries in the region want to maintain their 
independence, but Russia wants to regain its regional influence.  CIS 
countries need Russian cooperation and good relations, but they all 
suspect Russia's intentions.  No CIS country wants to return to the 
Soviet period."  Comparing the current situations in Ukraine, 
Georgia, and Azerbaijan, Cheng again called Kazakhstan "smart" for 
cooperating with Russia as well as the United States, European Union, 
and China.  Cheng further argued that Kazakhstan's growing economy 
and influence allow it to resist Russian control. 
 
"CHINA MUST COOPERATE HERE" 
 
5.  (S) Elaborating on China's role in Central Asia, Cheng said, "The 
new oil and gas pipelines are breaking Russia's monopoly in energy 
exports and are decreasing the countries' dependence on Russia. 
Because Russia wants to maintain a monopoly on oil and gas exports in 
Central Asia, it dislikes the China-Kazakhstan pipeline (refs A-B)." 
According to Cheng, as China increases its regional "cooperation," 
the Russian Foreign Ministry wants to maintain close contact to 
 
ASTANA 00000074  002 OF 003 
 
 
ensure that it does not "harm Russia's core interests."  Cheng 
emphatically declared, "China must cooperate here.  The growth of 
Chinese influence will break the Russian monopoly in the region." 
 
COMPE
TITION AND COLLABORATION WITH RUSSIA 
 
6.  (S) Reflecting on his upcoming responsibilities, Cheng stated, "I 
will have to balance carefully increasing our cooperation with 
Central Asia with Russian interests.  However, we cannot harm our own 
interests because of Russia.  Competition and collaboration coexist 
in Chinese-Russian relations in Central Asia.  Our policy is to 
coexist here.  We must maintain a dialogue and consultations."  Cheng 
asserted that Russia and China can work together on security issues, 
such as terrorism and narcotics, to the benefit of all.  On the 
economic front, though, Cheng underlined their rivalry, and again 
asserted that Russia's reaction will not force it to limit its 
regional cooperation.  "In the future, great power relations in 
Central Asia will be complicated, delicate.  Kazakhstan is very 
smart, aware of the opportunities and that it must maintain a 
balance," he concluded. 
 
SUPPORT FOR U.S. REGIONAL ROLE 
 
7.  (S) In contrast to his unease with Russian influence, Cheng 
argued that the U.S. presence in the region promotes a "balance of 
the great powers."  Cheng emphasized China's support for U.S. efforts 
to fight the Taliban and terrorists, calling them a common challenge. 
 Nonetheless, he cautioned, "We have concerns if the United States 
uses the opportunity of fighting terrorists to enhance its military 
presence in the region."  The Ambassador reassured Cheng that the 
United States does not want a permanent military presence or bases in 
Central Asia.  Given President Obama's focus on Afghanistan and troop 
increases, he explained, Manas Transit Center -- and potentially 
other commercial transit centers for goods -- is very important. 
 
"KARIMOV NEEDS POLITICAL SUPPORT" 
 
8.  (S/NF) Cheng confided that he had "information" about the 
possibility of a new U.S. military transit center in Uzbekistan and 
called it a "delicate point."  Cheng expressed his belief that 
Karimov will agree to the proposal because "he needs political 
support and assistance from other countries due to Uzbekistan's 
difficulties, poor relations with Russia.  He is using the flag of 
anti-terrorism efforts to decrease criticism of his regime." 
 
NATO-SCO COOPERATION POSSIBLE 
 
9.  (S/NF) Replying to Cheng's assertion that "stabilization and 
reconstruction in Afghanistan will take a long time," the Ambassador 
asked if NATO-SCO consultations might be helpful.  Cheng highlighted 
the absence of an established NATO-SCO dialogue before expressing his 
personal viewpoint.  "If NATO wants to establish contact with the 
SCO, the host of the June 23 SCO Summit [Uzbekistan] can invite NATO 
to attend as a guest, which would increase understanding and 
cooperation."  He further suggested, as a first step, the United 
States recommend that NATO attend the meeting because of the event's 
anti-terrorism "content."  He argued, "The United States can attend 
the June 23 summit being hosted by Tashkent as Uzbekistan's guest in 
order to increase contact." 
 
10.  (S/NF) Again emphasizing the personal nature of this 
not-for-attribution advice, Cheng stated, "Russia supports it as far 
as I know.  China has not researched the issue, but Russia has ideas 
because of Afghanistan.  If the United States advances the 
suggestion, the Chinese government will actively consider it.  The 
United States must apply to Uzbekistan as the summit's host country. 
The Chinese government will be cautious, but agreement from Russia, 
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan would be good for the proposal.  The 
United States could attend as a guest of the host country." 
 
NO DIRECT CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
ASTANA 00000074  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
11.  (S) Cheng argued that the United States should attend the summit 
to "maintain stability and fight the Taliban and terrorists in 
Central Asia."  Cheng underlined the importance China attaches to 
Afghanistan and the defeat of the Taliban.  He also emphasized 
Chinese fear of the Taliban and Al-Qaida due to their "support of 
terrorists in Xinjiang."  Nonetheless, he asserted that China does 
not want "direct involvement in the fight because China's capacity to 
fight terrorists is less than the United States." 
 
CHINESE MEASURES TO SECURE THE PIPELINE 
 
12.  (S) Emphasizing China's large population, Cheng called 
preservation of security a big task, for which the Chinese capacity 
does not match that of the United States.  He especially underlined 
China's vulnerability to attacks on shipping and pipelines, which 
would strike at the heart of the Chinese economy.  According to 
Cheng, Chinese "measures" to secure the pipeline have included 
consultations between the "security departments" of China, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.  He told the Ambassador 
that China has helped to train security personnel and provide 
equipment and weapons.  He said that China annually supplies 
materials to Kazakhstan's Ministry of Interior and National Security 
Committee (KNB). 
 
PERSONAL, NOT OFFICIAL, CONVERSATION 
 
13.  (S) Concluding this meeting that took place in the Ambassador's 
officer, Cheng again requested that the Ambassador not quote him.  He 
underlined his concern about dissemination of his personal 
reflections, which he said he conveyed due to his strong personal 
relationship with the Ambassador. 
 
BIOGRAPHIC NOTES 
 
14.  (S) Cheng Guoping departs Astana on February 2 for his new 
assignment as Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of CIS 
countries.  He said he might travel to the United States on 
consultations.  In addition, he plans to visit the United States upon 
retirement.  His daughter currently studies at the University of 
Iowa. 
 
15.  (S) This was the fourth time the Ambassador received Cheng in 
his office, where Cheng preferred to meet because, he has told the 
Ambassador, he does not feel comfortable speaking freely in his own 
office.  Even so, Chen exhibits maximum caution, whispering his 
comments in Mandarin (he does not speak English or Russian) to his 
interpreter.  We suspect that Embassy Beijing will find him to be an 
interesting but reserved interlocutor. 
 
16.  (S) COMMENT:  Fear about China regularly appears in 
conversations and the press in Kazakhstan.  Some Kazakhstanis worry 
about Chinese control of natural resources and proposals to lease 
agricultural land.  Because Kazakhstanis are attuned to their 
geography as a resource-rich country with vast swaths of uninhabited 
land bordering the world's most populous nation, they convey anxiety 
that the Chinese will arrive "like ants to colonize."  Cheng's 
portrayal of Chinese concerns about Kazakhstan's other large neighbor 
gives another perspective to the power game, which Kazakhstan so 
adeptly plays.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

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10ASTANA52, KAZAKHSTAN: OVERFLIGHTS AND NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA52 2010-01-20 07:50 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2748
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #0052/01 0200750
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 200750Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7227
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2373
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1735
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2441
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1351
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1931
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1781
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2670
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2960
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000052 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, PM 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 01/20/2030 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR AF RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  OVERFLIGHTS AND NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
SHIPMENTS FULLY OPERATIONAL 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
REFTELS:  A.  09 ASTANA 2190 
          B.  09 ASTANA 2198 
      C.  09 ASTANA 2204 
          D.  09 ASTANA 2272 
          E.  ASTANA 0020 
 
 
1.  (S/NF) This is an action request (see para 8). 
 
2.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  Kazakhstan continues to be an important partner 
for the U.S. government mission to stabilize Afghanistan.  Under the 
2001 overflight agreement, the United States has completed more than 
8000 overflights.  In addition, the U.S. government has used the 2009 
Northern Distribution Network agreement to ship 6439  containers  to 
Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  These 
transits have occurred without any major incident despite occasional 
bureaucratic hiccups.  Post recommends expanding this successful 
partnership, including increasing local procurement, to support more 
efficient provision of military supplies in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom.  END SUMMARY. 
 
U.S. COMPLETES THOUSANDS OF OVERFLIGHTS AND SHIPMENTS IN 2009 
 
3.  (S/NF) Since implementation of the 2001 overflight agreement, 
more than 8000 overflights and 85 diverts have occurred without major 
incident, including over 1000 overflights in 2009.  Since the 
Kazakhstani government agreed to permit the transportation of 
commercial cargo via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) on 
December 30, 2008, 6439 containers have reached Afghanistan via 
Kazakhstan as of January 14. 
 
4.  (S/NF) U.S. government contacts and contractors have not reported 
any major problems with transportation through Kazakhstan along the 
NDN.  The transit agreement between the United States and Uzbekistan, 
which requires diplomatic notes for each shipment, initially retarded 
movement and led to limited backlogs.  Since the Uzbek government 
agreed to speed up the diplomatic note process, backlogs have been 
eliminated. 
 
NO PROBLEMS WITH SHIPMENTS IN COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS 
 
5.  (S/NF) On December 28, Post received an e-mail request for 
assistance from the TRANSCOM Liaison Officer in Tashkent, which 
asserted the Kazakhstani Customs Control Committee requested shipping 
documents and manifests -- standard procedure under Kazakhstani law 
and agreements for the commercial shipment of goods -- for four 
containers destined for Manas.  Post inquired whether the shippers 
had provided the documents, but received no reply.  Post has not 
received any complaints that Kazakhstani Customs have failed to 
process, in a timely fashion, shipments free of bureaucratic and 
clerical errors. 
 
6.  (S/NF) Although the State Department alerted Post via e-mail of 
overflight denials, Post also has traced these issues to clerical 
errors on the part of the U.S. government and its contractors.  On 
January 11, the Deputy Chairman of Kazakhstan's Civil Aviation 
Committee (CAC), Talgat Lastayev, assured Post of continued good 
cooperation and that the CAC has encountered no difficulties relating 
to air-transportation requests, including overflights. 
 
NDN AND OVERFLIGHT REQUESTS PENDING 
 
7.  (S/NF) The Kazakhstani government has repeatedly expressed its 
political will to support U.S. operations in Afghanistan through the 
opening of a U.S. transit center in Kazakhstan and under existing 
overflight and Northern Distribution Network agreements (ref A). 
However, efforts to expand these agreements to include north-south 
flight corridors and military and civilian wheeled vehicles, focused 
on the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicles (MATVs), 
 
ASTANA 00000052  002 OF 002 
 
 
are stalled due to terrorism and legislative concerns (refs B-E). 
Moreover, according to the Defense Logistics Agency, U.S. contractors 
currently are purchasing only eight products -- with six more 
identified -- in Kazakhstan, out of a list of thousands of items. 
The Kazakhstani government repeatedly has expressed its concern that 
Kazakhstan has exposed itself to the risk of terrorist attacks, but 
has realized very few of the promised benefits to the Kazakhstani 
economy
from local procurement.  Additionally, foreign ministry 
officials have mentioned suspicion that the United States secretly is 
expanding cooperation with Uzbekistan and opening a base there while 
ignoring President Nazarbayev's offer of a transit center in 
Kazakhstan. 
 
8.  (S/NF) COMMENT/ACTION REQUET:  Post recommends that the U.S. 
government provide, under cover of a diplomatic note, a list of 
products that the U.S. government currently procures in support of 
its forces in Afghanistan and that U.S. government contractors could 
potentially procure locally.  In addition, this diplomatic note 
explicitly should allow the Kazakhstani government to use one or more 
Kazakhstani entities to liaise with companies involved in OEF-related 
procurement transactions.  Post requests detailed information on the 
possibility of placing MATVs into containers and other potential 
responses to Kazakhstan's security concerns.  Post also recommends 
provision of additional security assistance, especially along 
Kazakhstan's southern border, which would help address concerns about 
terrorism.  High-level engagement also might help break the impasse 
on the outstanding NDN and overflight requests. 
 
HOAGLAND

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10ASTANA20, KAZAKHSTAN: NDN AND OVERFLIGHT ISSUES STILL UNRESOLVED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA20 2010-01-11 10:10 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4690
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #0020/01 0111010
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111010Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7163
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2321
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1683
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2389
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1307
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1878
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1728
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2666
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2956
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000020 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, PM, ISN 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 01/11/2030 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM PARM MARR MNUC KNNP IR AF RS
UZ, KZ 
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  NDN AND OVERFLIGHT ISSUES STILL UNRESOLVED 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
REF:  A. 09 ASTANA 2272 
      B. 09 ASTANA 2273 
  C. ASTANA 0002 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  During a January 11 meeting, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kairat Umarov told the Ambassador that the Kazakhstani 
government still is discussing U.S. requests to amend the 2001 
overflight and 2009 Northern Distribution Network (NDN) agreements 
(ref A).  He communicated his plan to present a draft overflight 
agreement in the near future.  Umarov also relayed concerns expressed 
by some Kazakhstani agencies regarding the surface transportation of 
wheeled armored vehicles for transporting troops (MATVs), concluding 
that permission is unlikely, but negotiations continue.  Umarov again 
pressed for specific information about the alleged sale of yellowcake 
to Iran (ref B).  The Ambassador responded to Kazakhstani concerns 
about the human-rights certification language (ref C).  END SUMMARY. 
 
INTERNAL DISCUSSION CONTINUE ON OVERFLIGHT 
 
2.  (S/NF) Arriving late to their January 11 meeting, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kairat Umarov told the Ambassador that he just concluded an 
interagency discussion of the U.S. request to add a north-south 
overflight path at which "some agencies expressed some specific 
issues."  Without elaborating on these questions, Umarov asserted 
that the Foreign Ministry is drafting an agreement, which will then 
be circulated within the Kazakhstani government for comment.  After 
collection of these responses, Umarov stated his plan to pass the 
draft agreement to the U.S. government for discussion.  He expressed 
interest in receiving a high-level military delegation at that stage 
in the process. 
 
LAND TRANSIT OF MATVS UNLIKELY 
 
3.  (S/NF) Umarov relayed the concern of "other agencies" that the 
surface transit of MATVs would increase Kazakhstan's susceptibility 
to terrorist acts.  Furthermore, even if the vehicles were placed in 
containers, intelligence leaks could reveal the contents, he said, 
thus negating the concealment effect of the crates or containers. 
Umarov also raised more technical (and what seemed to us extraneous) 
questions about the containers, including their potential size and 
weight and whether they would require special rail flatcars or even 
modifications to the rail tracks themselves.  Finally, Umarov 
underlined that no precedent existed to allow the land transportation 
of MATVs -- or troops -- through Kazakhstan's territory.  According 
to Umarov, the Kazakhstani government refused to allow the transit of 
Chinese equipment during a military exercise last year.  "We would 
need to work out a document to regulate the transit beforehand.  We 
cannot simply tell the United States 'yes' because we will have to 
explain why to the Chinese."  Terming a positive response "unlikely," 
he concluded, "Discussions continue, but already there were some 
negative responses."  The Ambassador underlined the importance of 
these requests in light of troop increases in Afghanistan. 
 
SPECIFIC INFORMATION NEEDED ON ALLEGED YELLOWCAKE NEGOTIATIONS 
 
4.  (S) Umarov relayed to the Ambassador that Kazakhstan's internal 
probe into alleged negotiations between a KazAtomProm subsidiary and 
Iran for the covert sale of yellowcake uranium to Iran is continuing 
but that additional, specific information would assist the 
government's investigation.  Recalling Senator Casey's opening 
remarks about Kazakhstan's uranium production during the December 15 
testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian 
Affairs George Krol, Umarov also requested a stronger statement from 
the United States on U.S.-Kazakhstan export-control and 
non-proliferation cooperation.  "When you leave these issues 
unattended, they spread around.  We do not proliferate," he asserted. 
 
ASTANA 00000020  002 OF 002 
 
 
 The Ambassador categorically denied a link between the yellowcake 
press report and Senator Casey's statement, which Umarov seemed to 
have implied. 
 &#x0
00A;HUMAN RIGHTS CERTIFICATION LANGUAGE CONTINUES TO ANNOY 
 
5.  (C) To address Umarov's December 31 concerns about U.S. 
Congressional human rights certification language, the Ambassador 
emphasized that the United States does not equate the human rights 
situations in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  He highlighted previous 
discussions with Congressional staffers who had indicated their 
efforts to remove the language, but that the conviction of 
human-rights activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis had killed this effort.  "It 
is true that no country is named in the legislation," he said, "but 
that does not mean that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are on the same 
level.  Every country is in a different place.  I encourage you to 
take more steps to address democracy and human rights issues, which 
will eventually lead to the removal of the certification process." 
 
6.  (C) To respond, Umarov handed a copy of the human rights 
certification language to Nurgali Arystanov, Counselor at the 
Americas Desk of the Foreign Ministry.  Arystanov focused his 
complaints on the legislation's exclusion of expanded international 
military education and training, which Uzbekistan receives, 
concluding that Uzbekistan now can obtain "defense articles" outside 
the scope of certification.  The Ambassador explained that the United 
States slowly and cautiously is working to normalize relations with 
Uzbekistan, while the bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan has long 
been and continues to be good.  [NOTE:  While walking the Ambassador 
out of the Foreign Ministry, Arystanov continued to obsess on fine 
details in the certification language.  The Ambassador again 
suggested that it is time to look at the bigger picture of the 
bilateral relationship.  END NOTE.] 
 
RELATIONSHIP POSITIVE ON THE WHOLE 
 
7.  (C) Umarov responded that he wanted "to bring it to your 
attention that we do not like the situation."  Regarding the overall 
relationship, Umarov relaxed a bit and asserted his generally 
positive assessment.  "It is sad that we have these issues.  I only 
want to point out the ones that could worsen the relationship.  On 
the whole, the relationship is working fine," he concluded. 
 
8.  (S) COMMENT:  We suspect that the "other agencies" Umarov refers 
to that are raising objections to the expansion of overflight and NDN 
are Kazakhstan's intelligence agencies, specifically the Committee 
for National Security (KNB).  While the KNB might have legitimate 
security concerns, we suspect they are possibly a pretext, and that 
the old-guard faction in the government currently has the upper hand. 
 This might explain, too, the continuing hypersensitivity about the 
Congressional certification language.  State Secretary-Foreign 
Minister Saudabayev's February 1-4 visit to Washington will be a key 
opportunity to air these issues frankly and to try to remove some of 
the current irritations.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2272, KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS NEW OVERFLIGHT AGREEMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2272 2009-12-31 05:32 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8741
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2660
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2953
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002272 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, PM 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 12/31/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR AF RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS NEW OVERFLIGHT AGREEMENT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
REFTEL:  ASTANA 2204 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  On December 30, the Ambassador and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov met again to discuss outstanding U.S. 
requests to amend the 2001 overflight and 2009 Northern Distribution 
Network (NDN) agreements (reftel).  Umarov told the Ambassador that 
Kazakhstani government agencies are still reviewing the U.S. request 
to add a north-south overflight route to the 2001 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on overflights in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  He added that they are now considering whether the July 
U.S.-Russia agreement on overflights might be adapted as a model for 
a new agreement to permit the north-south route.  Expressing his hope 
to provide an interagency response by early January, Umarov 
emphasized that moving quickly to resolution is his highest priority. 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN STILL WORRIED ABOUT LETHAL OVERFLIGHTS... 
 
2.  (S/NF) In his December 30 meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister 
Kairat Umarov, the Ambassador followed up on Umarov's December 22 
requests, by providing releasable information on the U.S. overflight 
and Northern Distribution Network (NDN) agreements with Russia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (reftel).  Umarov thanked the 
Ambassador for the information. Emphasizing the government of 
Kazakhstan's continued concern about lethal cargo on overflights, he 
questioned the Ambassador closely about the inclusion of "lethal 
cargo" in these U.S. agreements.  The Ambassador reiterated that the 
transportation of "hazardous cargo" is explicitly listed in the 
existing, ratified agreement, and that thousands of overflights have 
occurred without incident.  Umarov took the point, and did not raise 
further concerns about "lethal cargo." 
 
NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK:  WHEELED VEHICLES AND FEES 
 
3.  (S/NF) In relation to the Northern Distribution Network, MFA 
Americas Director Askar Tazhiyev asked about fees paid by the U.S. 
Government.  The Ambassador replied that the NDN operates purely as a 
commercial operation, noting that the commercial operators are 
responsible for paying whatever customs and transit fees might be 
required.  Tazhiyev also queried the Ambassador about U.S. plans for 
the surface transit of wheeled armored vehicles for transporting 
troops (MATVs), including whether they would enter Kazakhstan via 
Russia and/or Baku, and whether the United States had initiated 
discussions, and secured permission, to ship them through Uzbekistan. 
 Umarov explained that the MFA must be able to explain the 
implementation of this request in case questions arise during 
Kazakhstan's interagency consultation process.  Umarov and Tazhiyev 
appeared concerned the MATVs would stack up in Kazakhstan if 
Uzbekistan decided not to permit the vehicles to transit via the NDN. 
 
AGREEMENT MUST BE RATIFIED, BUT MFA WILL HELP TO EXPEDITE 
 
4.  (S/NF) Umarov told the Ambassador that Kazakhstan had already 
obtained the July U.S.-Russia agreement on overflights from Moscow, 
and will have a Kazakhstani interagency-approved draft agreement 
ready in early January.  Umarov asserted Kazakhstani legal experts 
have concluded definitively the necessity of a new agreement.  When 
the Ambassador reiterated this agreement's urgency to enhance 
Afghanistan's stability, Umarov promised that the MFA would do 
everything possible to accelerate the process.  The Ambassador 
reiterated his December 22 request that the agreement at least enter 
into force upon signature, but Umarov argued that Kazakhstani law 
requires that it must first be ratified by Parliament.  According to 
Umarov, the MFA had to "jump through a lot of hoops" to get the 2001 
overflight agreement ratified, and this year the MFA hopes "to do it 
right." 
 
"LET'S GET IT RIGHT, FROM THE BEGINNING" 
 
5.  (S/NF) Umarov recommended that the new agreement include a clause 
 
ASTANA 00002272  002 OF 002 
 
 
allowing future amendments without re-ratification, if legally 
possible.  Umarov said he intends to work this issue intensively, 
even over the Jan 1-4 New Year holiday.  He stated that the deeper 
his involvement, the more convinced he becomes that it is necessary 
to "handle the issues correctly, right from the beginning."  Umarov 
added that the new overfli
ght agreement could either take the form of 
an agreement or a memorandum of understanding from the Kazakhstani 
legal perspective. 
 
6.  (S/NF) COMMENT:  Umarov appeared satisfied by the answers to 
Kazakhstan's previous questions (reftel), and raised no new concerns. 
 Embassy Astana will continue to place highest priority on achieving 
our overflight and NDN goals, and will follow up with the MFA within 
the next week to respond to any additional questions that arise 
during Kazakhstan's inter-agency review.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA2204, KAZAKHSTAN: TERRORISM AND SECURITY CONCERNS INFLUENCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2204 2009-12-23 09:37 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3973
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #2204/01 3570937
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O 230937Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7069
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2283
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2347
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1275
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1841
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1691
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2641
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2936
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002204 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, PM 
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: 12/23/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR AF RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  TERRORISM AND SECURITY CONCERNS INFLUENCE 
DELIBERATION ON OVERFLIGHT AND NDN AMENDMENTS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
REFTELS:  A. STATE 128489 
  B. ASTANA 2000 
  C. ASTANA 2158 
  D. ASTANA 2198 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  On December 22, the Ambassador and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov met to discuss outstanding U.S. 
requests to amend the 2001 overflight and 2009 Northern Distribution 
Network (NDN) agreements (refs A, B).  Umarov told the Ambassador 
that 10 Kazakhstani government agencies are reviewing the U.S. 
request to add a north-south route to the 2001 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on overflights in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  He said he hoped to provide an initial response by December 
31.  Umarov noted that "times have changed since 2001," and 
Kazakhstani concerns that terrorists will seek to disrupt supply 
routes to Afghanistan have increased.  Umarov said some Kazakhstanis 
worry that the overflight and NDN will encourage terrorists to target 
Kazakhstan, which seeks U.S. military advice on fortifying its 
southern border.  He told the Ambassador Kazakhstan's leaders owe it 
to their people to consider thoroughly these agreements.  Umarov, an 
experienced and frank diplomat, suggested Kazakhstan might want to 
use the July U.S.-Russia agreement on overflights as a model for any 
new agreement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS A NEW AGREEMENT 
 
2.  (S/NF) Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov said that he had 
originally hoped to amend the original overflight agreement, but the 
MFA's Legal Department determined Kazakhstan must conclude a new 
agreement because the requested additions include a different route. 
Umarov did not specify language needed in the agreement, or whether 
the agreement could enter into force upon signature.  Umarov said 
several government agencies had asked about the July overflight 
agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation. 
Emphasizing that he still lacked firm instructions and was merely 
"thinking outside of the box" in an effort to expedite the process, 
Umarov suggested that Kazakhstan might agree to sign a document with 
the same text as the July U.S.-Russian Federation agreement. 
 
THAT WAS THEN, THIS IS NOW 
 
3.  (S/NF) Arguing "the times are different now than they were in 
2001," when the September 11 attack on the United States and 
instability in Kyrgyzstan dictated the need for immediate action, 
Umarov emphasized that many Kazakhstani government agencies are 
concerned about the transportation of lethal goods across 
Kazakhstan's territory.  According to Umarov, instability in 
Afghanistan is "bringing the Taliban closer," and Kazakhstan fears it 
will become a target for terrorists if it signs an agreement to 
facilitate the transportation of lethal goods. 
 
PARLIAMENT (AND OTHERS) MUST BE SATISFIED 
 
4.  (S/NF) Umarov quickly asserted that this does not mean that 
Kazakhstan will not agree to add the north-south overflight path. 
Rather, Kazakhstan's leaders must carefully scrutinize any agreement, 
and must have the support of the Kazakhstani people, he said. 
"Members of Parliament will be very inquisitive about an overflight 
agreement; they are much more sophisticated now than they were in 
2001," commented Umarov.  He queried, "What is the legal basis for 
this agreement and how will it be regulated?"  Umarov mentioned that 
other agencies might ask detailed questions about the potential 
response to various hypothetical disaster scenarios, including a 
crash or other incident along the route, which would require more 
detailed answers than the text in paragraph 5 of the 2001 agreement. 
Umarov promised to convey the Kazakhstani ministries' questions to 
the Ambassador as soon as possible. 
 
U.S.-RUSSIA AGREEMENT IRRITATES 
 
ASTANA 00002204  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
5.  (S/NF) When the Ambassador reiterated the importance of adding 
the new route to the overflight agreement, Umarov, looking 
uncharacteristically frustrated, responded that the MFA is trying to 
facilitate a speedy agreement.  He argued that parallel negotiations 
with Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation might have precluded this 
situation.  "No
w you are just putting us up against the wall," Umarov 
retorted.  When the Ambassador directly asked if the agreement with 
the Russian Federation created a political problem, Umarov denied 
Kazakhstani leaders oppose amending the 2001 agreement because of 
annoyance that the United States signed an agreement with Russia 
first.  However, his non-verbal behavior suggested otherwise.  The 
Ambassador pointed out that the United States and Kazakhstan, unlike 
the United States and the Russian Federation, already had an 
overflight MOU when the Russian agreement was signed, which seemed 
somewhat to mollify Umarov.  Further, the Ambassador explained to 
Umarov, off the record, the history of the U.S.-Russia agreement as a 
deliverable for the July 2009 Obama-Medvedev summit in Moscow. 
 
HAZARDOUS OR LETHAL? 
 
6.  (S/NF) Echoing Foreign Minister Saudabayev's comments on the 
overflight issue during Assistant Secretary for South and Central 
Asian Affairs Robert Blake's visit (ref D), Umarov reiterated that 
"the transit of lethal equipment is a particular problem for 
Kazakhstan."  The Ambassador pointed out that the 2001 overflight 
agreement specifies that cargo might include "hazardous materials." 
When Umarov countered that hazardous cargo does not necessarily imply 
lethal cargo, the Ambassador replied that both sides in 2001 likely 
understood that "hazardous materials" could imply "lethal." 
(COMMENT:  The MFA's Askar Tazhiyev raised the issue of lethal versus 
non-lethal cargo for the first time on November 24 when he called the 
Embassy to confirm that the overflight request pertained to both 
lethal and non-lethal cargo, stating that different kinds of cargo 
would raise different "technical issues."  The Embassy's diplomatic 
note requesting the addition of the new route, dated November 9, 
referred directly to the 2001 agreement, and did not specify the type 
of cargo.  END COMMENT.) 
 
BORDER SECURITY AND AN UNFULFILLED U.S. PROMISE 
 
7.  (S/NF) Returning to fears of terrorism, Umarov asserted that 
"Kazakhstan is very concerned about fortifying its southern borders." 
 He welcome more information-sharing on counter-terrorism, and said 
that a U.S. military survey team to advise on border security would 
be welcome.  The Ambassador replied he had recently met with the new 
Chairman of the National Security Committee (KNB) (ref C) and 
expressed U.S. willingness to move beyond information sharing to 
broader cooperation.  Umarov said that border fortification is a 
military issue, as well as a border-security and intelligence-sharing 
issue, and the military would be the most appropriate U.S. partner. 
Umarov said Deputy Minister of Defense General Bulat Sembinov has 
often raised, including with USCENTCOM Commander General David 
Petraeus, the long delays in the U.S. Huey-II program for Kazakhstan, 
which are negatively affecting Kazakhstan's ability to secure its 
border against terrorists.  Umarov noted that President Nazarbayev 
had recently criticized Kazakhstan's Security Council, emphasizing 
that Kazakhstan wants to avoid Kyrgyz instability from again creating 
problems in Kazakhstan, as happened in 1999, especially given the 
Taliban's focus on disrupting supply routes to Afghanistan. 
 
OVERFLIGHT AND NDN ARE SECURITY, NOT POLITICAL, ISSUES 
 
8.  (S/NF) The Ambassador also raised the question of the Embassy's 
October 20 dipnote on an amendment to the Northern Distribution 
Network (NDN) to allow the surface transit of wheeled armored 
vehicles for transporting troops (ref B).  Umarov said that 
Kazakhstan would prefer transportation of the vehicles inside 
containers, but "you never know what kind of information may leak 
out."  Therefore, Kazakhstan must prepare for anything, which is why 
lethal equipment is so problematic, he argued.  According to Umarov, 
 
ASTANA 00002204  003 OF 003 
 
 
the overflight and NDN issues are not political, but are perceived as 
security issues.  Umarov told the Ambassador, "I understand we must 
move as quickly as possible.  Please believe me, I am not sitting on 
these issues." 
 
NEXT STEPS:  COMPARING AGREEMENTS AND COMPILING ANSWERS 
 
9.  (S/NF) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry about ways to 
positively and quickly reach an agreement on overflight, Umarov 
asserted that Kazakhstan must first review the U.S. agreement with 
the Russian Federation.  He said he expected to receive the agreement 
from Moscow within days, and would immediately distribute it to the 
unspecified Kazakhstani ministries that had asked to see it.  [NOTE: 
In a later conversation the same day, Russian Ambassador Mikhail 
Bocharnikov professed ignorance about Kazakhstan's request for a copy 
of the U.S.-Russia overflight agreement and suggested Astana must be 
working directly with Moscow on this issue.  END NOTE.]  According to 
Umarov, the Russian Duma's ratification of this agreement might 
resolve many Kazakhstani concerns.  He reiterated that he hopes to 
receive interagency guidance on the new route by December 31.  Umarov 
also asked the Ambassador for information on the U.S. NDN and 
overflight agreements with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. 
The Ambassador said he would gather as much information as possible 
to help speed Kazakhstan's decision making, especially since Foreign 
Minister Saudabayev had told Assistant Secretary Blake that a 
north-south overflight route is doable, but first many questions must 
be answered in detail. 
 
10.  (S/NF) AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT:  Based on both Foreign Minister 
Saudabayev and Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Sarybai telling 
Assistant Secretary Blake that our requests are achievable, and based 
on President Nazarbayev's continued support for U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan, I believe that we will, eventually, succeed -- but it is 
going to take considerable work and probably more time than we would 
like.  Embassy Astana is working to collect as quickly as possible 
answers to all the questions the Kazakhstanis so far have posed.  We 
know from other sources that Kazakhstan is indeed concerned about its 
own security, especially the security of its southern border, and 
worries that a renewed international effort in Afghanistan could push 
terrorists into Central Asia.  We can usually rely on MFA Americas 
Director Tazhiyev to blurt out the truth, and his comment in this 
meeting might be telling -- that the United States not fulfilling its 
commitment on the Huey-II program is affecting Kazakhstan's ability 
to secure its border against terrorists.  Likewise, I do not doubt 
that some Kazakhstani noses are out of joint because the United 
States concluded a lethal overflight agreement with Russia before 
raising the same issue with Kazakhstan.  For at least a year, 
Kazakhstani officials have told me that they expect to be treated on 
par with Russia and do not appreciate being "treated as an 
afterthought," which they strongly believe happened in this case. 
Embassy Astana will continue to place highest priority on achieving 
our overflight and NDN goals; however, should this bog down for too 
long, a high-level visit to Astana
 might be warranted to seal a deal. 
 END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1478, KAZAKHSTAN: LAND-LOCKED OIL POWER WANTS TO IMPROVE NAVY,

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1478.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1478 2009-09-04 11:32 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8914
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
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DE RUEHTA #1478/01 2471132
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1968
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0927
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1457
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1351
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2461
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2776
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001478 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, P/M 
 
E.O. 12958: 09/04/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR RS AF KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  LAND-LOCKED OIL POWER WANTS TO IMPROVE NAVY, 
WELCOMES U.S. NAVCENT DEPUTY CDR REAR ADMIRAL CROPPER 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
REFTEL:  A) ASTANA 1450 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  On August 28, U.S. NAVCENT Deputy Commander Rear 
Admiral Thomas Cropper met General-Major Mazhitov, Deputy Director of 
Kazakhstan's Border Guard Service; Rear-Admiral Abikeyev, Chief of 
Kazakhstan's Border Guard Service Coast Guard Directorate; and 
Rear-Admiral Ratmir Komratov, Deputy Minister of Defense to discuss 
bilateral military cooperation.  This first high-level military visit 
to focus entirely on naval cooperation was important in urging a thaw 
in recent chilly relations between the U.S. military and its 
Kazakhstani Navy and Coast Guard partners, who have not been very 
cooperative over the last several months.  The U.S. NAVCENT Deputy 
Commander's visit also helped urge the Kazakhstani naval authorities 
to focus on peer-to-peer training, rather than on large-scale 
exercises and equipment.  Mazhitov and Komratov praised current 
cooperation and expressed interest in increasing bilateral activities 
to combat shared threats.  The Deputy Minster of Defense and Deputy 
Director of Kazakhstan's Border Guard Service asked the United States 
for assistance in improving command and control capability and 
training personnel, but said they did not want to purchase any U.S. 
equipment.  Komratov and Mazhitov also commented on regional issues, 
praising cooperation in the Caspian, especially with Russia.  Both 
interlocutors acknowledged similarities between the Caspian Sea and 
the Arabian Gulf that could make Kazakhstan's participation in a 
Combined Force event in Bahrain useful.  END SUMMARY. 
 
A GOOD FIRST STEP 
 
2.  (S/NF) U.S. NAVCENT Deputy Commander Cropper met Deputy Director 
of Kazakhstan's Border Guard Service Mazhitov and Coast Guard 
Directorate Chief Abikeyev on August 28 to discuss bilateral military 
cooperation.  Mazhitov welcomed Cropper warmly, saying that he hoped 
their first meeting would be "an impulse towards forward movement" in 
bilateral naval relations.  He said prospects for U.S.-Kazakhstani 
naval cooperation were "interesting," due to "our common threats of 
extremism, terrorism, and drug-trafficking."  Deputy Minister of 
Defense Komratov also thanked the United States, noting the U.S. 
government had refurbished a naval garrison in Aktau, and trained 
Kazakhstani students at U.S. naval institutes and through the Ship 
Rider program.  Komratov asked to expand existing training programs, 
and even send small groups of technicians, navigators and specialists 
-- and a few staff officers -- to study in the United States. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN'S NAVY WANTS INFORMATION -- BUT NOT EQUIPMENT 
 
3.  (S/NF) Deputy Director of the Border Guards Mazhitov said that as 
a result of his subordinates' very useful recent trip to the United 
States to visit the Coast Guard Station at Cape May and the 
Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) Academy at Fort Dix, he wanted to 
obtain more information on strategic development and specific types 
of equipment.  However, Mazhitov told Cropper several times that he 
was not interested in purchasing any U.S. naval equipment, noting he 
had observed that purchasing foreign equipment often had "negative 
consequences."  Komratov explained that Kazakhstan is currently 
building one ship in Uralsk -- to be completed next year -- and is 
satisfied with its equipment. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS TO IMPROVE CASPIAN MARITIME COOPERATION 
 
4.  (S/NF) Komratov agreed with Cropper that the Caspian Sea shares 
similarities with the Arabian Gulf, and said he would ask Minister 
Dzhaksybekov if Kazakhstan could participate in the Combined Maritime 
Forces (CMF) HQ in Bahrain.  Both Komratov and Mazhitov acknowledged 
the critical importance of the international maritime cooperation 
techniques that Kazakhstan could learn from participating with 26 
other nations.  Komratov and Mazhitov noted Kazakhstan's harmonious 
regional cooperation -- excellent relations with the Russian 
 
ASTANA 00001478  002 OF 002 
 
 
Federation -- but also good relations with Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan.  "With Iran, however," Mazhitov declared, "we have a 
common understanding, but uncertainty over the borders of the Caspian 
is a significant problem." 
 
DEPUTY MINISTER COMPARES STRUGGL
E AGAINST TERRORISM TO WWII 
 
5.  (S/NF) (COMMENT:  Kazakhstan has a small, new navy of 200 sailors 
and four ships whose purpose is to protect Kazakhstan's interests in 
the Caspian Sea.  This first high-level military visit to focus on 
naval cooperation was important in contributing to a thaw in recent 
chilly relations, especially with the KNB's newly established Coast 
Guard, which has not been very receptive to U.S. overtures of 
cooperation over the last several months.  At the Ambassador's 
reception, a relaxed Admiral Komratov told numerous anecdotes and 
toasted cooperation genially, saying, "Kazakhstan and the United 
States must cooperate, help one another, and share information today, 
as they did during the Great Patriotic War, to once again defeat 
common enemies, such as extremism and terrorism" (reftel).  Also 
present at this event were Border Guard officials, whose very 
attendance surprised us because they have not participated recently 
in Embassy events.  END COMMENT.) 
 
6.  (U)  USNAVCENT has cleared this cable. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1429, KAZAKHSTAN: WHY TO PAY SERIOUS ATTENTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1429 2009-08-25 04:36 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0197
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #1429/01 2370436
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 250436Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6085
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 7380
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1233
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 8372
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 0015
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2176
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0461
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1586
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0548
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0026
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1420
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1317
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2753
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2437
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 001429 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D, P, T, S/P, S/SRAP, SCA, P/M, EEB, DRL 
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP 
NSC FOR MICHAEL MCFAUL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET MARR SOCI KNNP KDEM AF
RS, KZ 
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  WHY TO PAY SERIOUS ATTENTION 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 1423 
     B. ASTANA 1422 
     C. ASTANA 1416 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
1.  (S/NF) During USCENTCOM CDR General David Petraeus' 
August 13 meetings in Astana, senior Kazakhstani officials 
made more clear than ever that President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
wants an enhanced relationship with the United States and is 
offering us a logistics/transit facility for U.S. and 
Coalition troops in Afghanistan that would supplement and 
back up the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan.  These 
officials told us that Washington's "reset" with Moscow has 
given Nazarbayev room to recalibrate Kazakhstan's 
relationship with the United States (reftels).  Kazakhstan, a 
country at peace with its neighbors and internally stable, 
strategically shares some of the longest borders in the world 
with both Russia and China.  It's Gross Domestic Product is 
larger than that of the other four countries of Central Asia 
combined, and a strong private sector and real middle class 
continue to grow.  Despite occasional contentious issues, the 
U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship is generally smooth and without 
drama.  Kazakhstan has established a strong record on issues 
of importance during the nearly two decades of its 
independence and continues on a long-term positive trajectory. 
 
2.  (C) Kazakhstan's fundamental achievements include: 
 
NON-PROLIFERATION:  At independence, Nazarbayev irrevocably 
relinquished Kazakhstan's nuclear status (the fourth largest 
arsenal in the world at that time), mostly because he was 
intimately aware of the massive human cost incurred because 
the Soviet Union had tested its nuclear weapons on 
Kazakhstan's soil.  Kazakhstan is now one our strongest 
non-proliferation partners in the world, despite occasional 
speed-bumps at the bureaucratic level. 
 
ECONOMICS:  Soon after independence, Nazarbayev made the 
fundamental decision to transition Kazakhstan from a Soviet 
to a Western economic model.  Before the global financial 
crisis, Kazakhstan's banking and financial sectors were 
judged to be equal to Central Europe's.  Even now during the 
crisis, the consensus of the International Financial 
Institutions and private Western bankers is that Kazakhstan 
has reacted responsibly and flexibly.  Unless there are 
further hidden land-mines to explode, Kazakhstan will emerge 
fundamentally intact from the current global financial 
crisis.  In about 2014-2015, when the oil starts to gush from 
Kazakhstan's North Caspian "elephant" fields, in which 
American corporations are heavily invested, Kazakhstan will 
experience stunning financial growth.  While natural 
resources continue to attract the lion's share of foreign 
investment, Kazakhstan seeks to diversify beyond the 
extractive sector, and is showing success in this policy. 
 
EDUCATION:  Soon after independence, Nazarbayev understood 
the only way to transition his new country into the broader 
world was to change fundamentally the psychology of 
Kazakhstan's next generation of leaders.  He chose 
strategically to do this by embracing Western education for 
his nation.  He established the Bolashak (Future) Program 
that has now provided thousands of young Kazakhstanis with 
international, mostly Western, university educations.  The 
results are strikingly apparent every day, both in government 
 
ASTANA 00001429  002 OF 004 
 
 
offices and in the private sector, where bright, globalized, 
young Kazakhstanis are incrementally setting the agenda for 
the future. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN WANTS AN ENHANCED BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
3.  (C) President-elect Obama's telephone call to Nazarbayev 
in November 2008 was hugely welcomed in Kazakhstan from the 
top down, as was Vice President Biden's April telephone call 
to personally invite Nazarbayev to the 2010 Nuclear Security 
Summit in Washington.  Whether or not we intended these calls 
as any kind of signal, Nazarbayev and the
 progressive element 
of his top leadership -- and even the general population -- 
interpreted the calls as a clear and meaningful signal of a 
new U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship, and warmly, 
enthusiastically welcomed them.  That's the power of the 
image of the United States and of President Obama himself. 
We would do well for our long-term interests -- including 
stability in Afghanistan -- to build on the power of that 
perception. 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
4.  (S/NF) One of the highest U.S. priorities is getting 
Afghanistan right.  As the August 12-15 visit to Astana by 
USCENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus made clear, 
Kazakhstan is eager to assist the United States and has 
across the board, from every senior official we have met, 
declared that U.S. policy on Afghanistan is "absolutely 
correct."  From late March onward, President Nazarbayev has 
indicated he is willing to act independently of Moscow, and 
has offered us a new transit/logistics facility to complement 
the U.S. Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan.  General 
Petraeus's visit was calculated to draw out exactly what 
Nazarbayev's offer might mean, and resulted in an oral 
agreement that a joint USCENTCOM-USTRANSCOM expert-level 
delegation would visit Kazakhstan soon to explore concrete 
"next steps."  This is a high-wire strategic decision for 
Kazakhstan and suggests that President Nazarbayev is willing 
to act independently from Moscow in the window-of-opportunity 
space he now has because of the U.S. effort to improve its 
relationship with Russia. 
 
RUSSIA 
 
5.  (C) An enhanced bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan 
would complement our new Russia policy, and would reinforce 
the clear message Vice President Biden recently delivered in 
Kyiv and Tbilisi.  Since shortly after the August 2008 
Russia-Georgia conflict, President Nazarbayev has 
increasingly signaled his desire to "recalibrate" his 
great-power relationships.  The Kazakhstani leadership has 
told us repeatedly it is pleased with President Obama's 
efforts to "reset" Washington's relations with Moscow, 
because that opens new space for Astana to cooperate with 
Washington.  Because of geography, history, language, 
economics, and culture, Russia will always necessarily be 
Kazakhstan's number-one strategic partner; but Nazarbayev 
seeks a higher-profile relationship with the United States. 
The key for us would be transparency with both Astana and 
Moscow.  At the same time, we should not underestimate 
Moscow's "Putinism," it's neo-imperial pressures -- and 
skullduggery -- in its self-proclaimed "sphere of privileged 
influence." 
 
 
ASTANA 00001429  003 OF 004 
 
 
DEMOCRACY 
 
6.  (C) U.S. interests are not coldly geostrategic:  we care 
deeply about democratic progress for our regional partners 
and for their citizens.  President Nazarbayev understands 
this, because he listened to the international community 
earlier this year and found a way to scuttle the overly 
restrictive Religion Law, which hard-liners around him had 
drafted and pushed through Parliament, by sending it to the 
Constitutional Council that declared it unconstitutional. 
This gave him the cover to allow it to die. 
 
7.  (C) Nazarbayev consistently promotes inter-ethnic harmony 
and general religious tolerance.  Civil society played a 
significant role in drafting the government's 100-plus-page 
human rights action plan.  Kazakhstan's Parliament, although 
wholly dominated by Nazarbayev's ruling party, Nur Otan, is 
nevertheless a real parliament with a broad spectrum of 
opinion among its members; it has a professional committee 
structure and holds hearings at which civil society testifies 
freely and even vociferously.  But Nazarbayev has a blind 
spot we have to acknowledge.  The two most recent events of 
concern -- the new Internet Law and the conviction of 
journalist Ramazan Ysergepov -- are intimately related to the 
cosmic feud Nazarbayev has with his ex-son-in-law, Rakhat 
Aliyev, currently exiled in Europe.  Nazarbayev is blinded to 
international opinion on issues that arise from his struggle 
with Aliyev -- thus the Internet Law and the Yesergepov case, 
both of which we believe are knee-jerk reactions to limit 
distribution of Aliyev's expose, "Godfather-in-Law."  In 
fact, the print media in Kazakhstan are remarkably free and 
stand head and shoulders above the print media in the other 
four countries of the region, promoting investigative 
reporting and regularly exposing corruption and other 
scandals. 
 
NAZARBAYEV WANTS RECIPROCAL PRESIDENTIAL VISITS 
 
8.  (C) Head-of-state visits among Eurasian leaders are a 
dime a dozen and not always especially productive, because 
they all know how to play each other.  Western visits, 
however, are of a different order of magnitude and can be 
used to drive forward goals and objectives -- i.e., produce 
deliverables, both for short-term interests and for long-term 
goals. 
 
9.  (C) On August 3, Nazarbayev's childhood friend and the 
current State Secretary of Kazakhstan (ostensibly the 
number-two position in lieu of a Vice President) and former 
Ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom, Kanat 
Saudabayev, explicitly asked the Ambassador if Nazarbayev 
could have a separate bilateral day in Washington, with an 
Oval Office meeting, when he attends the Nuclear Security 
Summit early in 2010.  We will point out to Saudabayev that a 
lot of leaders will be jostling for face time while we 
continue to explore this option with Washington. 
 
10.  (C) Ever since President Obama's election, Kazakhstan 
has made it clear it would eagerly and warmly welcome an 
Obama visit, even if simply an over-night in conjunction with 
a visit to a larger power in the greater region.  No sitting 
U.S. President has ever visited Central Asia.  An Obama visit 
to Kazakhstan would be an historic first and a powerful 
statement to all great-power and regional players.  Such a 
visit, in conjunction with, for example, an India visit 
 
ASTANA 00001429  004 OF 004 
 
 
(which would not directly poke either Moscow or Beijing in 
the eye), would further enhance our policy of knitting 
together South and Central Asia. 
 
11.  (C) Kazakhstan is rich, relatively progressive, and 
recalibrating its great-power relationships closer to the 
United States.  It would be in our long-term national 
interest to consider, and act on, this opening.  Such a rare 
window of opportunity does not stay open indefinitely. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1423, KAZAKHSTAN: USCENTCOM CDR GENERAL PETRAEUS’

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1423 2009-08-20 07:05 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6875
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #1423/01 2320705
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 200705Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6077
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 1859
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1227
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0888
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1929
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1414
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1311
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2747
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2431

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001423 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, P/M 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TO ALL POLADS COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR RS AF KG TI UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  USCENTCOM CDR GENERAL PETRAEUS' 
MEETING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL CHAIRMAN SULEYMENOV, AUGUST 13 
 
REF: ASTANA 1250 
 
Classified By:  Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  During an August 13 meeting in Astana, 
USCENTCOM CDR General Petraeus and Security Council 
Chairman Suleymenov discussed potential Kazakhstani 
noncombatant military and other assistance to support U.S. 
policy in Afghanistan, including the possibility of 
Kazakhstan hosting a logistics/transportation hub as a 
back-up to the Manas Transit Center.  Suleymenov said 
President Nazarbayev judges that U.S. Afghanistan policy is 
"absolutely correct" and wants quick decisions for what 
Kazakhstan will do to help support this policy.  General 
Petraeus suggested that a joint USCENTCOM-USTRANSCOM 
experts team might be able to arrive in Kazakhstan within a 
month to develop a detailed proposal for a 
logistics/transit hub.  The meeting was unusually frank, 
detail-oriented, and cordial.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) On August 13 in Astana, Security Council Chairman 
Kairbek Suleymenov welcomed USCENTCOM Commander General 
David Petraeus and underlined Kazakhstan's full intention 
to fulfill all of its commitments to the United States, 
which should stand, he said, as a good example for 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. 
 
3.  (S/NF) After providing a detailed read-out of U.S. 
policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as how the 
post-2006 strategy and approach in Iraq relates to the 
current AfPak strategy -- and after reprising his 
meetings earlier in the day with the Ministers of Defense 
and Foreign Affairs (septels) -- General Petraeus told 
Suleymenov he wanted to respond to President Nazarbayev's 
offer to the United States to locate a 
logistics/transportation hub for Afghanistan in Kazakhstan 
(reftel).  He noted he and Minister of Defense Adilbek 
Dzhaksybekov had already agreed that a team of U.S. experts 
would come to Kazakhstan to work on a concrete proposal. 
Petraeus suggested such collaboration would help replace 
the Great-Game mentality in the larger region with a model 
of broad partnership to counter terrorism, extremism, and 
narcotics. 
 
U.S. AF-PAK POLICY IS "ABSOLUTELY CORRECT" 
 
4.  (S/NF) Suleymenov responded that U.S. policy is 
"absolutely correct -- stability in Pakistan is required 
for stability in Afghanistan, and the answer cannot be 
solely military.  Our President tells the other Presidents 
in the region -- and I do not mean just in the immediate 
region -- that he supports the U.S. view.  Nazarbayev is 
very positive about the United States."  General Petraeus 
expressed appreciation for this support.  Suleymenov 
commented, "The critics of U.S. policy should be in your 
place!"  He reaffirmed that President Nazarbayev supports 
developing a logistics facility hub in Kazakhstan as a way 
to demonstrate concrete support for U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.  He urged that U.S. and Kazakhstani experts 
meet soonest to develop a concrete proposal. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
 
5.  (S/NF) Moving to a greater level of detail, Suleymenov 
said that after a year of debate, Kazakhstan has identified 
the staff officers who will go to the International 
Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul, and that 
this will happen soon.  About trainers and instructors for 
the Explosive Ordnance Destruction school in 
Mazar-i-Sharif, he said that this, too, will happen. 
However, Kazakhstan must follow its own standard 
procedures.  The next step is a "legal agreement" through 
the U.S. Embassy, which will be reported to the cabinet of 
ministers for approval.  After ascertaining the view of the 
government of Afghanistan, President Nazarbayev will then 
 
ASTANA 00001423  002 OF 002 
 
 
finalize this decision.  [NOTE:  The DATT, in the first 
instance, and the Ambassador will follow up to determine 
exactly what Suleymenov means by a "legal agreement."  We 
strongly prefer agreement by an exchange of diplomatic 
notes, rather than a document that would need Kazakhstani 
inter-agency approval and then ratification by the 
parliament, a process that could drag on for months.  END 
NOTE.] 
 
"OUR NEIGHBORS HAVE SENSITIVITIES, BUT WE MAKE OUR OWN 
DECISIONS" 
 
6.  (S) Suleymen
ov said he wanted to be certain that 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are fully informed 
about these possible developments, and suggested that they, 
too, might want to provide noncombatant personnel to 
Afghanistan.  General Petraeus noted these are policy 
decisions and that there has long been an understanding 
that Afghanistan's contiguous neighbors cannot provide 
troops, mainly because of "the neighbor to the west 
[i.e., Iran]," rather than their northern neighbor (i.e., 
Russia).  General Petraeus also noted his pending Kazbrig 
visit and suggested that as Kazakhstan increased its 
economic and political stature, it might consider the 
idea of offering Kazbrig for a UN mission to demonstrate 
Kazakhstan's regional, and in fact, global role. 
Suleymenov said others had suggested this and that he 
supports this as an issue for further discussion. 
 
7.  (S) Suleymenov became more precise about Kazakhstan's 
policy debate for military personnel, even if noncombatant, 
to deploy to Afghanistan.  He noted Kazakhstan had provided 
troops for the international coalition in Iraq.  "Iraq was 
far away, but Afghanistan is in our backyard and sensitive 
for our neighbors.  Our assistance inside Afghanistan will 
ultimately be a political decision.  When I report to 
President Nazarbayev, I'll need to tell him exactly what 
you are asking our neighbors to do, too."  Suleymenov said 
Kazakhstan is especially sensitive about President 
Karimov's views, since Uzbekistan borders Afghanistan and 
has very legitimate concerns about the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan:  "We would not want one wildfire to ignite a 
neighboring wildfire," i.e., that terrorists and extremists 
move from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Central Asia. 
 
8.  (S/NF) At the end of the meeting, Suleymenov urged that 
a team of U.S. military experts arrive in Kazakhstan 
soonest to develop, with Kazakhstani counterparts, a 
concrete proposal for a logistics/transportation hub that 
could be presented quickly to President Nazarbayev for his 
approval.  Suleymenov said, "We want these decisions sealed 
before we become chairman of the OSCE so that together we 
can present a common front."  He added, "We do not make 
promises to anyone that we cannot keep." 
 
9.  (C) COMMENT: Suleymenov is the equivalent of the U.S. 
National Security Adviser.  He is also considerably more 
powerful than the Minister of Defense, because the MOD is 
an implementing, not a policy-making, body.  In this 
meeting with General Petraeus, Suleymenov was more focused 
and more forthcoming about Kazakhstan's internal 
decision-making processes than we have seen him before. 
The meeting concluded cordially with a group photo.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
10.  (U) USCENTCOM has cleared this caQ 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1422, KAZAKHSTAN: USCENTCOM CDR PETRAEUS’ MEETING WITH FOREIGN

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1422 2009-08-20 06:33 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6828
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #1422/01 2320633
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 200633Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6075
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1857
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1225
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1927
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0886
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1412
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1309
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2429
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2745
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001422 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, P/M 
 
E.O. 12958: 08/20/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR OSCE RS AF KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  USCENTCOM CDR PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH FOREIGN 
MINISTER TAZHIN, AUGUST 13 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (A), (B), (D) 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  USCENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus met 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Marat Tazhin on August 13 to discuss 
U.S.-Kazakhstani military cooperation and request support for U.S. 
forces in Afghanistan.  Petraeus specifically requested the 
deployment of Kazakhstani staff officers to the International 
Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul and explosive 
ordnance disposal instructors for the training facility at 
Mazar-i-Sharif.  He also responded to President Nazarbayev's offer of 
a logistics facility in Kazakhstan.  The substantive hour-long 
meeting focused on Kazakhstan's concern that insecurity in 
Afghanistan poses a direct threat to Central Asia through the 
northward flow of Islamic militants and narcotics.  Tazhin asked 
Petraeus for his assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, 
described Kazakhstani plans to provide humanitarian and development 
assistance to Afghanistan, and urged that the United States procure 
goods from Kazakhstan as part of the U.S.-Kazakhstan agreement for 
the Northern Distribution Network that provides for the commercial 
transit of non-lethal supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan. 
Tazhin told Petraeus the improved U.S.-Russian relationship is 
helpful for Kazakhstan and makes it easier for Kazakhstan to 
cooperate with the United States on many issues, including 
Afghanistan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (S/NF) General Petraeus provided a comprehensive assessment of 
the situation and U.S. policy directions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
 He asked that Kazakhstan consider sending several staff officers to 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters in 
Kabul and instructors to the Explosive Ordnance Disposal training 
facility in Mazar-i-Sharif.  He emphasized that the personnel would 
serve in noncombatant roles.  Petraeus also told Tazhin that we 
welcomed President Nazarbayev's offer of a logistics/transportation 
hub in Kazakhstan because "we need additional capacity and a back-up 
to the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan."  Petraeus mentioned that 
in his earlier meeting with the Minister of Defense, he offered to 
send a team of logistics experts to assess opportunities and develop 
options, and the Minister accepted the offer.  Tazhin listened 
closely but responded, "These are questions for the Ministry of 
Defense to decide."  [COMMENT:  This was the proper diplomatic 
response, but, in fact, Tazhin will be deeply involved in deciding a 
response to these requests because President Nazarbayev will take 
into close consideration when deciding his response the 
"sensitivities" of Kazakhstan's Central Asian neighbors and Russia, 
as Security Council Chairman Suleymenov made explicit in a subsequent 
meeting (septel).  END COMMENT.]  General Petraeus also mentioned 
that technicians were working to get the Huey-II helicopters up and 
running by September 6 -- as soon as the parts clear customs. 
 
U.S. APPROACH TO AF-PAK "ABSOLUTELY CORRECT" 
 
3.  (C) Tazhin told Petraeus that Afghanistan poses a direct threat 
to Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia because of the northward 
flow of Islamic militants and narcotics.  Tazhin asked Petraeus -- 
for whom he professed respect for his role as a "decision-maker" who 
successfully resolved "a serious and tense situation" in Iraq -- to 
evaluate the current situation in Afghanistan.  In response to 
Petraeus' description of the current U.S. "integrated approach" to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Tazhin said this strategy is "absolutely 
correct."  Tazhin stated that the solution to instability in 
Afghanistan includes "more than just military solutions," noting he 
was concerned about what would happen when U.S. and coalition forces 
eventually leave Afghanistan. 
 
AFGHANISTAN TO BE OSCE PRIORITY 
 
4.  (C) Tazhin said encouraging stability and development in 
Afghanistan will be one of Kazakhstan's priorities during its 2010 
OSCE chairmanship.  Tazhin called the threat from extremist groups 
 
ASTANA 00001422  002 OF 002 
 
 
and narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan "not only possible, but 
real."  In view of this threat Tazhin said that, despite budgetary 
constraints, Kazakhstan was committed to suppor
ting regional OSCE 
institutions and the Almaty-based Central Asian Information and 
Coordinating Center (CARICC) to strengthen border protection. 
 
FREE EDUCATION FOR AFGHAN STUDENTS IN KAZAKHSTAN 
 
5.  (C) Tazhin also confirmed Kazakhstan would continue to support 
stabilizing and developing Afghanistan through technical and 
financial support, and is working to finalize its 2009-2011 
assistance plan for Afghanistan.  Tazhin said his government will 
initiate a program to provide free university and college education 
to 1,000 Afghan students -- primarily medical staff, agricultural 
specialists, and teachers.  Tazhin explicitly asked for U.S. 
transportation from Afghanistan to Kazakhstan for the students. 
Petraeus said we would need to consider this request, but pointed out 
that "an air transportation hub" -- such as the logistics facility 
President Nazarbayev has twice suggested -- might make such an 
arrangement more feasible.  Petraeus also noted that as the current 
global financial crisis abates, Kazakhstan might consider purchasing 
C-130Js and that these could also be used to help with the 
transportation needs. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN SUPPORTS THE NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK... 
 
6.  (C) Tazhin said Kazakhstan intended to continue to support U.S. 
military efforts in Afghanistan.  (NOTE:  Kazakhstan has provided 
critical support for the U.S. effort to stabilize and reconstruct 
Afghanistan, primarily by participating in the Northern Distribution 
Network (NDN), and through bilateral agreements from 2001 and 2002 
that allow U.S. military aircraft supporting Operation Enduring 
Freedom to transit Kazakhstani air space cost-free and to make 
emergency landings in Kazakhstan when conditions do not permit 
landing at Kyrgyzstan's Manas Air Base.  END NOTE.)  Tazhin also told 
Petraeus that his government hoped the United States would consider 
increasing procurement in Kazakhstan, and Petraeus replied that he 
recently signed a policy directive to buy locally where possible. 
 
... AND INQUIRES ABOUT U.S.-RUSSIAN AGREEMENTS 
 
7.  (C) Tazhin also asked Petraeus about the status of U.S.-Russian 
negotiations to allow the shipment of lethal goods through Russian 
territory.  Tazhin asked that the United States inform Kazakhstan if 
it is considering shipping lethal goods by road or rail.  He said he 
welcomed the improved U.S.-Russia relationship, which "is completely 
different from a year and a half ago."  He noted this more 
cooperative relationship is helpful for Kazakhstan and makes it 
easier for Kazakhstan to cooperate with the United States on many 
issues, including Afghanistan. 
 
8.  (U) USCENTCOM has cleared this cable. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

09ASTANA1416, KAZAKHSTAN: USCENTCOM CDR PETRAEUS’ MEETING WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1416 2009-08-19 04:18 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO5842
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTA #1416/01 2310418
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 190418Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6067
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 1854
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1222
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0883
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1924
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1409
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1306
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2742
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2426

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001416 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, P/M 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR OSCE AF KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  USCENTCOM CDR PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH 
DEFENSE MINISTER DZHAKSYBEKOV, AUGUST 13 
 
REF: ASTANA 1250 
 
Classified By:  Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4, (A), (B), (D) 
 
1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  During an August 13 meeting in Astana, 
USCENTCOM CDR General Petraeus and Minister of Defense 
Dzhaksybekov discussed: 
 
-- further Kazakhstani assistance in Afghanistan, including 
staff officers for ISAF HQ in Kabul, noncombatant trainers 
and instructors for the Explosive Ordnance Disposal school in 
Mazar-i-Sharif, and the setablishment of a 
logistics/transportation hub to provide further logistics 
capacity for the U.S. and Coalition military effort in 
Afghanistan (and as an alternative to the Manas Transit 
Center near Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, should that be needed in the 
future); 
 
-- Kazakhstan's policy decision to move away from conscripts 
toward a professional army that would include a 
non-commissioned officer corps and, eventually a military 
reserve system; 
 
-- the Huey-II program and the need for Kazakhstan to 
transition from Foreign Military Financing to Foreign 
Military Sales; and 
 
-- the possible development of a Kazakh naval force for the 
Caspian Sea. 
 
Dzhaksybekov suggested military intelligence sharing.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) USCENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus met with 
Minister of Defense Adilbek Dzhaksybekov on August 13 in 
Astana.  The minister excused himself for arriving late, 
explaining he had been on the telephone with President 
Nazarbayev who had asked Dzhaksybekov to pass his greetings 
to General Petraeus and who had instructed the minister to 
"discuss all questions in full detail in light of our 
strategic partnership."  The minister expressed appreciation 
for U.S. assistance in military education and training, 
noting this is important to change the psychology of 
Kazakhstan's military personnel.  After reviewing other areas 
of the bilateral military relationship, Dzhaksybekov 
commented, "I know there was lots of discussion and doubt 
about our desire to head OSCE in 2010, but it is a 
significant honor for us to be the first former Soviet state 
to achieve the OSCE chairmanship.  We intend for Kazakhstan 
to be seen as a positive example in the OSCE's security 
dimension."  General Petraeus responded that the OSCE 
chairmanship is indeed an honor and moves Kazakhstan from the 
regional to the world stage. 
 
3.  (C) Concluding a detailed briefing and analysis of U.S. 
policy directions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, General 
Petraeus said, "It is in our common interest to ensure that 
Afghanistan does not become again a safe-haven for 
transnational extremists."  He expressed appreciation for 
Kazakhstan's help in Afghanistan, including overflight and 
divert agreements and participation in the Northern 
Distribution Network (NDN) for the transit of non-lethal 
supplies to U.S. and Coalition troops in Afghanistan.  He 
told Dzhaksybekov he had recently signed a "Central Asia 
First" policy letter directing NDN contractors to purchase 
local goods, wherever possible, for U.S. troops. 
 
PERSONNEL FOR ISAF HQ AND MAZAR-I-SHARIF, AND A 
LOGISTICS/TRANSPORTATION HUB 
 
4.  (S) General Petraeus listed his requests for further 
cooperation in Afghanistan.  He asked that Kazakhstan detail 
staff officers to the International Security Assistance Force 
 
ASTANA 00001416  002 OF 003 
 
 
headquarters in Kabul and provide instructors/trainers for 
the Explosive Ordnance Disposal school at Mazar-i-Sharif, 
noting that in both cases Kazakhstani personnel would be in 
noncombatant roles.  Dzhaksybekov stated that they were 
studying these. 
 
5.  (S/NF) Responding to President Nazarbayev's recent offers 
of a logistics facility in Kazakhstan to assist the U.S. 
military in Afghanistan (reftel), General Petraeus said that 
the United States would like to have additional locations for 
a logistics facility and transportation hub as we increase 
our activity in Afghanistan.  He emphasized, "We have no 
desire for permanent military bases in the region, but we do 
appreciate your President's offer."  He proposed to send a 
technical team to Kazakhstan to make an assessment and to 
discuss location and other details.  Dzhaksybekov responded, 
"We'd like to create with you
 a detailed draft of an action 
plan to present to President Nazarbayev for his approval. 
But we know since this was his idea, he will support it, and 
we will, of course, do everything possible to fulfill it." 
(NOTE:  General Petraeus subsequently confirmed with 
USTRANSCOM that a joint USCENTCOM-USTRANSCOM survey team 
could arrive in Kazakhstan by the middle of September to 
begin working out a detailed proposal with the government of 
Kazakhstan.  END NOTE.) 
 
PROFESSIONAL ARMY VS. CONSCRIPTS 
 
6.  (C) Noting continuing U.S. assistance to KazBrig 
(Kazakhstan Brigade, the elite force being trained for 
International peace-keeping operations) and the Caspian 
Response Force, General Petraeus asked Dzhaksybekov if 
Kazakhstan is considering professionalizing its entire 
military and reducing its reliance on conscripts.  The 
minister acknowledged that this transition had been slowed 
because of the current global financial crisis as well as by 
leadership issues.  However, Dzhaksybekov said he has studied 
this question since becoming Defense Minister in June.  Some 
urged a return to the "old system," but "the decision has 
been made to follow this path" toward a professional army 
with a noncommissioned officer corps, although Kazakhstan 
will need significantly more equipment and support, he said. 
He added that, over time, he also wants to develop a military 
reservist system.  General Petraeus praised these policy 
directions. 
 
HUEY-II PROGRAM 
 
7.  (C) General Petraeus told Minister Dzhaksybekov he is 
aware of the need for the United States to keep its promise 
on the Huey-II helicopter program.  Since it is not likely it 
can ever be completed under the Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) program, he intends to recommend that the 
administration seek a special Congressional appropriation to 
finish the program.  In the meantime, a U.S. maintenance 
assistance team is currently in Kazakhstan to get the first 
two helicopters in the air by September 6.  Kazakhstan can 
help immediately by releasing the final shipment of parts 
that seems stuck in Customs.  In the longer term, especially 
as the current global financial crisis abates, Kazakhstan, 
because of its wealth and economic success, will need to 
transition from FMF to Foreign Military Sales.  Petraeus 
said, "I hope you'll seriously consider this new kind of 
partnership." 
 
KAZAKHSTAN'S NAVY 
 
8.  (C) General Petraeus acknowledged Kazakhstan's 
long-standing request to acquire a 1,000-ton naval ship from 
the United States for use in the Caspian.  He noted that he 
did not know of anything available at this time, but offered 
to continue to look.  Minister Dzhaksybekov told General 
Petraeus there is lots of discussion within the government of 
 
ASTANA 00001416  003 OF 003 
 
 
Kazakhstan how to develop its navy.  He said, "We must pay 
more attention to our ground forces, but for political 
reasons we also must look at the Caspian."  General Petraeus 
noted that if Kazakhstan makes a formal request, the United 
States would be pleased to provide an assessment as 
Kazakhstan considers enhancing its naval forces. 
 
INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 
 
9.  (S) After a further review of the situation in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, General Petraeus urged a broader 
partnership north of Afghanistan to move away from a 
Great-Game mentality to one that recognizes the utility of 
working together broadly on the common threats of terrorism, 
extremism, and narcotics.  Dzhaksybekov fully agreed. 
Presumably speaking about military intelligence, he said, "We 
are observing events closely.  I want to emphasize we want to 
develop or intelligence cooperation between our officers.  It 
would be important that we share information and analyses." 
 
10.  (U) CDR USCENTCOM General Petraeus cleared this cable. 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

08ASTANA2555, KAZAKHSTAN: NSA HADLEY LETTER TO SECURITY

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA2555 2008-12-29 04:53 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #2555 3640453
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 290453Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4219
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0551
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0454

S E C R E T ASTANA 002555 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/ES-CR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2033 
TAGS: OPDC KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  NSA HADLEY LETTER TO SECURITY 
COUNCIL SECRETARY SULEYMENOV DELIVERED 
 
REF: SES# 200819887 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (D), (F) 
 
1.  (S/NF) Ambassador hand-delivered to Kazakhstan's Security 
Council Secretary Kairbek Suleymenov on December 26 
referenced letter from Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs Stephen J. Hadley.  The Ambassador 
emphasized the U.S. desire to accelerate the pace of activity. 
 
2.  (S/NF) Suleymenov expressed his thanks for the letter, 
commenting "we have to coordinate our efforts."  He noted, 
"You will receive our specific reply within a month because 
this is a priority concern."  He added obliquely he had just 
met the day before with the "third party" on Semipalitinsk. 
HOAGLA ND

Wikileaks

07ASTANA447, KAZAKHSTAN: PARLIAMENTARIAN CLAIMS NUCLEAR DEVICE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASTANA447 2007-02-21 03:00 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0447 0520300
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 210300Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8501
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1376
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0010
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DTRA CT WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T ASTANA 000447 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN M'O.MARA, SCA/RA: A. CUMMINGS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017 
TAGS: MNUC PREL PTER KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PARLIAMENTARIAN CLAIMS NUCLEAR DEVICE 
"UNGUARDED" ON TEST RANGE 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Kevin Milas, reasons 1.4 (D) and (F). 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  A Kazakhstani parliamentarian created a 
short-lived controversy by alleging that there was an 
unexploded nuclear device lying unguarded on the "Azgir" test 
range in western Kazakhstan.  The new Deputy Minister of 
Energy and Mineral Resources threw fuel on the fire when he 
confused Azgir with the Semipalatinsk test range and referred 
to trilateral efforts with Russia and the U.S.  The 
Kazakhstani government acted quickly to set the record 
straight, with both the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issuing 
statements refuting the allegation and reaffirming 
Kazakhstan's status as a nuclear-free state.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) On February 14 in the lower house of the Kazakhstani 
parliament, Mazhilis member Tokhtar Aubakirov alleged that 
there was an unexploded nuclear device at the Azgir test site 
in western Kazakhstan.  (Azgir is just north of the Caspian 
Sea, on the border with Russia.)  Aubakirov, who was a 
cosmonaut during Soviet times, reportedly said that he had 
seen the 6-meter diameter object from space. He claimed it 
was a "nuclear device, just sitting outside" unguarded. 
Aubakirov made his comments during a hearing on an agreement 
with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization. 
 
3. (S) Channel 31 television reported that evening that in 
responding to Aubakirov's comments during the hearing, new 
Deputy Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Almasdam 
Satkaliyev referred to the trilateral agreement with Russia 
and the U.S. and said that the "kolba" would be removed. 
(Note: Since there are no ongoing CTR programs at Azgir, it 
appears that Satkaliyev confused Azgir with Semipalatinsk in 
eastern Kazakhstan, where work is underway to remove material 
left over from the Soviet nuclear program.  End note.) 
 
4. (SBU) On February 15, Channel 31 ran another story on 
Aubakirov's allegations.  The reporter stated that the object 
Aubakirov referred to in Azgir was actually a 12-meter 
diameter metallic sphere which had formerly been used for the 
production of artificial diamonds.  Channel 31 ran a picture 
of a structure matching that description.  (Note: According 
to the NTI website, the Azgir test site houses "a laboratory 
for the synthesis of superstrong materials, which includes 
the Yava-1M installation for producing artificial diamonds." 
End note.)  Satkaliyev -- presumably under the gun to correct 
what he had said the previous day -- was shown saying "There 
is a trilateral agreement between Kazakhstan, Russia, and the 
U.S. regarding the discovery of nuclear objects and their 
removal from the territory of Kazakhstan.  There is no 
nuclear warhead in the abandoned installation ...  MP 
Aubakirov's suspicions that for more than 10 years 
Kazakhstanis and the international community were misled are 
unfounded." 
 
5. (U) The MFA also issued a statement on February 19 
refuting Aubakirov's assertions, reaffirming that Kazakhstan 
possesses no nuclear weapons, and denying the existence of 
any fissile material at the Azgir test site. 
 
6. (SBU) Other than the two reports on Channel 31, the 
Kazakhstani press has so far not focused on the issue.  Post 
declined Channel 31's request to comment, given that the U.S. 
has no role in Azgir and the GOK had already debunked 
Aubakirov's claims. 
 
7. (S) Comment:  It is not clear why MP Aubakirov chose to 
make such a wild allegation during the hearing, but he is 
known for his grandstanding.  It was unfortunate that 
Satkaliyev raised the trilateral agreement rather than simply 
refuting Aubakirov's allegations.  Satkaliyev was appointed 
Deputy Minister on January 24 and has obviously not yet 
mastered all aspects of his brief.  At this point it appears 
that the press has not picked up on his "kolba" slip and 
asked about trilateral programs underway in Semipalatinsk. 
Should that happen, post will seek guidance from Washington. 
End comment. 
MILAS

Wikileaks

06ASTANA814, KAZAKHSTAN AGREES TO RECEIVE DETAINEES IN DECEMBER

WikiLeaks Link

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06ASTANA814.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASTANA814 2006-12-11 12:45 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0814/01 3451245
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY TEXT - WSC2141 - AD59CF1C - 555)
O 111245Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7917
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T ASTANA 000814 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/WCI (STAMILIO, MUBANGU), L/PM (A. HAINES), 
SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA), DOD/OGC (BEAVER), OUSD/DETAINEE POLICY 
(LIOTTA), NSC (CAMPONOVO) 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - TEXT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM PINS KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN AGREES TO RECEIVE DETAINEES IN DECEMBER 
 
REF: A. STATE 194431 
 
     B. ASTANA 502 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Deborah Mennuti, reasons 1.4 
(B) and (D). 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary:  The Kazakhstani government has agreed to 
accept the return of its citizens from Guantanamo in 
December, and wants the transfer to take place in Almaty 
rather than Astana as proposed by the U.S.  The MFA maintains 
that the KNB insists on receiving records of interrogations 
of the three individuals at Guantanamo, in addition to the 
summary reports already received.   End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Pol-Econ chief met with Ualikhan Saginkhanov, head 
of the Europe and Americas division of the MFA's Consular 
Department, on December 11 to discuss the Ref A message on 
transfer of Guantanamo detainees.  Saginkhanov presented a 
diplomatic note agreeing to receive the individuals during 
the December 10-17 timeframe. 
 
3. (S) Informal embassy translation of diplomatic note 
4-13-1-1-10017, dated December 11, 2006: 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States 
of America in the Republic of Kazakhstan and, in response to 
the Embassy's note No. 1180/06 of December 4, 2006, has the 
honor to report that the Kazakhstani side is ready to receive 
on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan A. B. 
Abykhanov, S.T. Arupov, and I.T. Batayev during the December 
10-17 timeframe at the Almaty airport. 
 
As a result of this, the Kazakhstani side requests the U.S. 
side to provide, no later than December 14, 2006, information 
about the date and time of arrival of the above-mentioned 
citizens. 
 
Representatives of the Consular Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as well as 
competent agencies of the Republic of Kazakhstan, will be 
present during the transfer of the above-named citizens of 
Kazakhstan. 
 
The individuals transferred by the American side will be 
documented and escorted to their place of residence, with 
subsequent registration and recording. 
 
With regard to the transfer of the above-named citizens of 
Kazakhstan "to the exclusive custody of the Government of 
Kazakhstan," as mentioned in the U.S. Embassy's note No. 
1180/06 of December 4, 2006, the Kazakhstani side kindly 
calls attention to the note of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. I-13-1-1/1921 of 
November 6, 2006, in which it was reported that "in 
accordance with national legislation, it would be possible to 
enter the transferred persons into appropriate national or 
international watch lists, restrict their travel outside the 
country, confiscate their passports or deny them permission 
to travel only in case of their prosecution for the 
commission of criminal acts, in accordance with the 
established procedures, and the imposition of preventive 
punishment restricting their constitutional rights, including 
freedom of movement." 
 
In addition, "in accordance with the legislation of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan a capable citizen of Kazakhstan should 
himself bear all responsibility for his actions and conduct, 
including criminal responsibility." 
 
Along with this, the Kazakhstani side repeats its request 
that the American side, in the shortest possible time frame, 
provide legalized and operative materials about the 
circumstances under which the above-named Kazakhstani 
citizens were detained in Afghanistan, testimony during 
questioning, and any other information confirming their 
involvement in terrorist activity. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
avails itself of the opportunity to renew to the U.S. Embassy 
the assurances of its highest consideration. 
 
End text of translation. 
 
4. (S/NF) Saginkhanov emphasized several times the importance 
of receiving detailed records from the interrogations at 
Guantanamo.  The KNB needed this information in order to 
 
fully understand the threat that the individuals might pose, 
he said.  He acknowledged that the U.S. had already provided 
a significant amount of information about the three 
individuals in question, but maintained that after detaining 
the three Kazakhstanis for so long U.S. authorities must have 
much more detailed records from numerous interrogations. 
Pol-econ chief promised to convey the urgency of the request 
to Washington but cautioned that additional documents might 
simply not exist.  Saginkhanov said that the Kazakhstani 
government considered it "imperative" that additional 
information be conveyed through intelligence channels either 
in advance of the transfer, or simultaneously.  "Kazakhstan 
is meeting the U.S. halfway on this," Saginkhanov said.  "If 
the U.S. declines to share additional information, it will be 
percei
ved very badly." 
 
5. (S/NF) Saginkhanov highlighted the fact that Kazakhstan 
wants the transfer to take place at the Almaty airport, 
rather than in Astana as proposed by the U.S.  (Note:  Post 
will modify the pending overflight request accordingly.  End 
note.)  He also requested that the U.S. provide two 3 cm x 4 
cm photos of each detainee upon arrival, to facilitate the 
immediate issuance of identity documents. 
 
6. (S/NF) Comment:  In the interest of sustaining good 
cooperation with Kazakhstan on the return of detainees, 
including the fourth Kazakhstani citizen who will presumably 
be returned in the future, post urges Washington agencies to 
give full consideration to the Kazakhstani request for 
interrogation records with a view toward maximum possible 
transparency.  If it is determined that no additional 
information can be shared, post requests advance warning in 
order to be equipped to resolve any conflicts that may arise 
during the transfer process.  End comment. 
ORDWAY

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