Category Archives: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

10ASTANA278, KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON U.S. VIEWS FOLLOWING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA278 2010-02-26 10:08 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0278 0571008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261008Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7562

UNCLAS ASTANA 000278 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN AND ISN/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP IR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON U.S. VIEWS FOLLOWING 
IRAN'S DECISION TO ENRICH URANIUM TO 20% 
 
REFTEL:  STATE 15979 
(SBU) PolOff delivered the talking points (reftel) on U.S. views 
following Iran's decision to enrich uranium to twenty percent via 
diplomatic note to Ontalap Onalbayev, Chief of the Middle East 
Division of the Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
HOAGLAND

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10ASTANA276, KAZAKHSTAN: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON DESIGNATION OF FOUR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA276 2010-02-26 10:01 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #0276 0571001
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261001Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7560

UNCLAS ASTANA 000276 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN, T, TREASURY, and NEA/IR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PARM EFIN MNUC KNNP IR KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON DESIGNATION OF FOUR 
ENTITIES AND ONE INDIVIDUAL RELATED TO IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY 
GUARD CORPS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 13382 
 
REFTEL:  STATE 15554 
(SBU) PolOff delivered the talking points (reftel) on the designation 
of four entities and one individual pursuant to Executive Order 13382 
via diplomatic note to Ontalap Onalbayev, Chief of the Middle East 
Division of the Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
HOAGLAND

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10AQNA272, KAZAKHSTAN: ZHOVTIS UNDERSTANDABLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT REFORM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10AQNA272 2010-02-26 09:09 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4118
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0272/02 0570909
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 260909Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7553
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2544
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1890
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2596
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1504
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RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1935
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2088
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 AQNA 000272 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  ZHOVTIS UNDERSTANDABLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT REFORM 
 
*********************** 
* Missing Section 001 * 
*********************** 
 
 
ASTANA 02260272  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
this," he continued.  Zhovtis asserted that he fully understands the 
motivations behind "the political war" Mukhtar Ablyazov launched 
against President Nazarbayev's powerful son-in-law Timur Kulibayev. 
"Maybe this is the way to get results," he said.  (NOTE:  Ablyazov, 
the ousted former chairman of Bank Turam Alem (BTA) in self-imposed 
exile in London, has publicly accused Kulibayev of receiving major 
kick-backs from the Chinese for oil contracts signed in 2003-2005 
(ref B).  END NOTE.) 
 
"RESPECT YOUR PRINCIPLES" 
 
5. (SBU) Zhovtis offered the following advice to the international 
community.  "Lose your illusions," he said.  "This system will not be 
reformed quickly."  Secondly, he urged Western countries to "respect 
yourself and your principles" and to criticize Kazakhstan openly when 
such criticism is deserved.  He underlined that he was not speaking 
about his case specifically, but about the Internet law, the privacy 
law, and the trial against former director of Kazatomprom Mukhtar 
Dzhakishev (ref C).  He asserted that a new generation of 
Kazakhstanis was growing up in a "culture of legal nihilism.  What 
you (the diplomatic community) do and say behind closed doors 
certainly plays a role," he asserted, "but regular people only know 
what they see in the media." 
 
LIFE IN THE COLONY 
 
6. (SBU) On his living conditions, Zhovtis said the penal colony is a 
mix "between Soviet army barracks and a young pioneer camp."  He said 
he sleeps in a large dormitory with 69 other convicts.  Everyone must 
get up at 6 am, go to bed at 9:30 pm, and have their meals at 
strictly appointed times.  Most convicts perform manual jobs outside 
the penal colony, except for Zhovtis and Kuchukov, who have been 
given jobs as warehouse keepers on the compound.  There are no 
computers on the compound, even in the administrative offices, but 
the administration allows visitors to bring newspapers for the 
convicts.  (NOTE:  The guards also let PolOff bring a large stack of 
U.S. magazines for Zhovtis, although they carefully flipped through 
each one.  END NOTE.)  According to Zhovtis, opposition newspapers 
"Respublika," "Svoboda Slova," and independent newspaper "Vzglyad" 
are readily available and widely read.  Zhovtis' wife, who was in 
Ust-Kamenogorsk at the same time as PolOff, and his lawyer Vitaliy 
Voronov are able to visit him fairly frequently.  Zhovtis seems to be 
well-regarded by the guards and penal colony administration. 
 
7. (SBU) COMMENT: Zhovtis seemed to be in generally good spirits, 
although he is, understandably, deeply disillusioned with 
Kazakhstan's legal system.  The fact that he would consider leaving 
Kazakhstan for good, albeit only if he is forced to apply for a 
pardon, is jarring news, and it would be a serious blow to 
Kazakhstan's civil society development.  Nevertheless, Zhovtis is 
still hopeful that the Supreme Court will likely issue a positive 
decision in his case.  His lawyer filed a motion for review on 
January 27, and the Supreme Court was supposed to decide by February 
27 whether to accept the case for review.  That review period was 
extended indefinitely, however, when the court requested further 
documentation from the lower courts.  If the Supreme Court does 
accept the case, it must issue a verdict within a month.  In the 
meantime, the Kazakhstani authorities seem eager to showcase their 
transparency and are open to letting the international community 
visit Zhovtis.  Though the approval process for this visit was 
sluggish (it took six weeks), that could change as other diplomatic 
missions apply for permission to visit.  We have requested permission 
for two Helsinki Commission staffers to visit Zhovtis when they are 
in Kazakhstan March 2-10.  European missions in Astana are also 
considering sending a representative within the next month.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA272, KAZAKHSTAN: ZHOVTIS UNDERSTANDABLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT REFORM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA272 2010-02-26 09:09 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4116
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0272/01 0570909
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 260909Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7552
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2543
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1889
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1934
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2087
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000272 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  ZHOVTIS UNDERSTANDABLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT REFORM 
 
REF: A) ASTANA 0109 
 B) ASTANA 0184 
 C) 09 ASTANA 2197 
 
ASTANA 00000272  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  PolOff visited internationally known human rights 
activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis at the minimum-security penal colony in 
Ust-Kamenogorsk on February 24.  Zhovtis summarized his view of the 
possibilities for the resolution of his case, including the Supreme 
Court, an amnesty, or parole.  He said he would consider applying for 
a Presidential pardon, but only as a last resort.  If he is forced to 
apply for a pardon, Zhovtis said he would leave Kazakhstan for good. 
He asserted to PolOff that Kazakhstan's political and legal system 
"has become unpredictable," and he believes that it must be 
"dismantled and rebuilt."  He urged the international community to 
"respect your principles" and publicly criticize Kazakhstan when 
necessary.  Zhovtis said life in the penal colony is akin to Soviet 
army barracks:  the convicts follow a strict daily schedule for rest 
and meal times but are allowed to interact somewhat freely with the 
outside world.  END SUMMARY. 
 
OPTIONS FOR RESOLUTION 
 
2. (SBU) PolOff visited human rights activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis on 
February 24 at the minimum-security penal colony outside 
Ust-Kamenogorsk.  During the two-hour meeting, which was carefully 
transcribed by two penal-colony officials present in the room, 
Zhovtis said that he sees four possible resolutions to his case.  One 
is for the Supreme Court to annul his four-year sentence without 
vacating the guilty verdict (ref A).  "This would be the easiest 
option," according to Zhovtis.  The second is for the government to 
grant a general amnesty in 2010 for crimes of lesser gravity, like 
the one for which Zhovtis was convicted.  (NOTE:  Minister of Justice 
Rashid Tusupbekov told the Ambassador on February 25 that he proposed 
to the government an amnesty in 2010, but indicated that the ultimate 
decision will be with the Presidential Administration and the 
parliament (septel).  END NOTE.)  The third option is to be paroled 
before his four-year sentence expires.  Zhovtis noted, however, that 
he would not be eligible for parole until early 2011, when Kazakhstan 
will no longer be Chairman of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  The fourth is to request a 
Presidential pardon, which would require Zhovtis to admit his legal 
guilt.  Zhovtis said that if the first three legal options fail and 
he is forced to request a pardon, he would leave Kazakhstan for good 
upon his release. 
 
OFFICIALS "BLINDLY" FOLLOW ORDERS 
 
3.  (SBU) Zhovtis maintained that he is considering emigrating from 
Kazakhstan because "the system has become unpredictable."  Instead of 
following established rules, he argued, officials "blindly" follow 
orders from their direct supervisors, even if that means breaking the 
law.  He cited his own case as an example.  Zhovtis and his 
co-inmate, journalist Toniyaz Kuchukov, who was convicted for a 
similar crime at the same time as Zhovtis, are the only two convicts 
at the penal colony not allowed to leave the premises or find work 
outside the colony.  Zhovtis alleged that the colony administrators 
told him they had "orders from Astana" to keep him "isolated."  "Any 
attempt to argue reason (with the administration) would backfire and 
lead to a clamp-down on the whole colony," Zhovtis maintained.  He 
said his request to see an outside dentist when he developed a 
serious toothache languished for three weeks.  "At one point, they 
brought a Soviet-era dental chair into the auditorium with the idea 
that I would undergo treatment there," he related, "but of course I 
refused."  The administration eventually agreed to let him see a 
dentist outside, "with two guards in tow."  "Logic does not apply 
here," he ruefully observed. 
 
"THE SYSTEM IS NOT WORKING" 
 
4.  (SBU) Zhovtis argued that the political and legal system "is not 
working at all."  "I have realized here (at the penal colony) that 
attempts at (political) reform are useless, the system needs to be 
completely dismantled and rebuilt."  Zhovtis confided that he is not 
sure what direction to take his NGO Human Rights Bureau after his 
release.  One of the NGO's main tasks is to lobby the government for 
legislative reform that would bring Kazakhstan's laws in line with 
international standards.  But, he said, if those laws are not 
followed, then reform attempts are "futile.  I am not sure how to fix 
 
 
*********************** 
* Missing Section 002 * 
***********************

Wikileaks

10ASTANA271, KAZAKHSTAN: WEEKLY SPOT-REPORT DIGEST, FEBRUARY 22-26

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA271 2010-02-26 08:10 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4058
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0271/01 0570810
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FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7549
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2540
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1886
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2592
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1500
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2726
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3016
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2727
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3017
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2082
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2353

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000271 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, ISN, EEB, INL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON EPET ENRG SOCI SENV KNNP KCOR
KZ 
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  WEEKLY SPOT-REPORT DIGEST, FEBRUARY 22-26 
 
ASTANA 00000271  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (SBU) This weekly cable disseminates spot reports based on 
Embassy conversations with contacts as well as reports from the 
Kazakhstani media.  Our goal is to draw attention to information 
that might not merit a full cable report or that will be developed 
later. 
 
MAJOR POLICY DEVELOPMENTS:  HOLBROOKE VISITS ASTANA 
 
2.  (U) February 23.  Local media reported that U.S. Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke 
visited Astana where he met with Kazakhstan's State 
Secretary/Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev.  During their meeting, 
the officials discussed cooperation between Kazakhstan and the 
United States, including issues related to bilateral and 
multilateral collaboration.  Saudabayev summarized Astana's 
priorities as OSCE Chairman, including the stabilization process in 
Afghanistan, which is one of its key priorities.  The two sides also 
discussed the agenda for the upcoming meeting of President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev with President Barack Obama during Nazarbayev's visit to 
the Global Nuclear Security Summit.  (COMMENT:  The press reports 
that seem to confirm an Obama-Nazarbayev meeting are premature.  END 
COMMENT). 
 
POLOFF VISITS HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ZHOVTIS 
 
3.  (SBU) February 24.  Poloff travelled to a penal colony outside 
Ust-Kamenogorsk to visit imprisoned human rights activist Evgeniy 
Zhovtis.  According to Poloff, he is in relatively good spirits and 
seems to be on good terms with the prison administration.  Zhovtis 
said that he sees four possible resolutions to his case:  1) the 
Supreme Court annuls the lower court's sentence without overturning 
its guilty verdict; 2) he is granted amnesty in March, May, or July; 
3) he is released before his four-year sentence expires (NOTE: 
Zhovtis is not technically eligible for parole until early 2011, 
when Kazakhstan will no longer be OSCE Chairman-in-Office.  END 
NOTE); 4) he requests a Presidential pardon.  Zhovtis told Poloff 
that if the first three legal options fail and he is forced to 
request a pardon as a last resort, he will leave Kazakhstan for good 
upon his release.  Zhovtis also said that he is eager for outside 
news and welcomes outside visitors.  The two-hour conversation was 
carefully transcribed by two prison officials who were present at 
the meeting. 
 
MINISTER OF JUSTICE DISCUSSES THE ZHOVTIS CASE 
 
4.  (SBU) February 25.  The Ambassador met with Minister of Justice 
Rashid Tusupbekov to discuss the possibility of an amnesty for 
crimes of lesser gravity (which would include Zhovtis).  Tusupbekov 
said he submitted his recommendation supporting an amnesty to 
Parliament and the Presidential Administration for consideration. 
The Ambassador thanked Tusupbekov for allowing PolOff to visit 
Zhovtis, and requested the Minister's support for the Embassy's 
request to allow two Helsinki Commission staffers to visit Zhovtis 
as well.  Tusupbekov also discussed Kazakhstan's legal reform 
strategy and ongoing bilateral cooperation on judicial matters. 
Tusupbekov expressed appreciation for U.S. government assistance, 
including the Judicial Education Program, and support of Kazakhstani 
efforts on counter-narcotics and counter-trafficking in persons. 
While underscoring his Ministry's commitment to continue to work 
closely with the United States, Tusupbekov also asserted that if a 
meeting between Presidents Obama and Nazarbayev takes place in 
April, it could "open up new opportunities for further 
cooperation." 
 
MAJOR MILESTONES: BN-350 DECOMMISSIONING PROGRAM 1/12TH COMPLETE 
 
5.  (SBU) February 19.  The deputy director of the National Nuclear 
 
ASTANA 00000271  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
Center of Kazakhstan told Department of Energy office director that 
the spent fuel shipment portion of the BN-350 decommissioning 
program "is now 1/12th complete."  Eleven shipments remain, each 
with five casks, all which will be stored at the Baikal-1 storage 
facility before the end of 2010.  Moreover, the 30th of 60 spent 
fuel casks was staged at the rail head in Aktau, marking the halfway &
#x000A;point of the spent fuel preparation activities.  Both Baikal-1 
storage and MAEK-Kazatomprom BN-350 reactor personnel plan held 
celebrations marking the event. 
 
DUPONT'S EXPANSION IN KAZAKHSTAN 
 
6.  (SBU) February 22.  Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) 
representatives met with Dupont to discuss possible areas of 
business expansion including the food processing and packaging, and 
construction sectors.  Dupont reports increased sales during the 
economic crisis of their safety products, primarily purchased by the 
extractive sectors.  Finally, as a result of their meeting requested 
by the Ministry of Trade at the November 2009 Investment Forum in 
New York, Dupont and the government are in talks regarding ways to 
increase presence of the company's Pioneer line of plant genetics. 
 
MFA SIMPLIFIES VISA REGIME 
 
7.  (U) February 22.  The Kazakhstan TV Channel and Commercial 
Television of Kazakhstan (KTK) reported that Kazakhstan's MFA has 
promised to simplify its visa procedure starting March 1.  Foreign 
diplomats and employees of international organizations will not need 
visas, just official MFA accreditation.  A new type of visa, called 
an "exit visa," will apply to foreigners who have lived in 
Kazakhstan for a long time and decide to go back home, or have lost 
their passports while in Kazakhstan, or have been deported.  Foreign 
missionaries arriving in Kazakhstan to promote religious ideas will 
have to apply a special "missionary visa." 
 
FROM THE WIRES IN KAZAKHSTAN:  A "RESPUBLIKA" BY ANY OTHER NAME 
 
8.  (U) February 23.  The editors of the opposition newspaper 
"Respublika" and related newspapers ("Golos Respubliki," "Respublica 
Business Review") held a press conference on February 22 to protest 
against what they see as pressure from the authorities on 
independent newspaper printers to stop printing or selling 
"Respublika" and any of its related papers.  The editors described 
several instances when independent printers declined to print their 
newspapers.  For example, the director of a printing house in 
Karaganda contracted by "Respublika" was summoned to the mayor's 
office, shortly after which he declined to print the newspaper. 
According to the editors, these incidents have intensified after a 
February 18 ruling by the Medeu Judicial Administration, which 
ordered all printing houses and other organizations to transfer any 
payments received from "Respublika" to a depository account of the 
Judicial Administration, to be turned over to BTA Bank as 
compensation for the newspaper's debt. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN'S PLANS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT REFORM 
 
9.  (SBU) On February 23, LegAtt and INL met with Alik Shpekbayev, 
Head of the Law Enforcement Section of the Presidential 
Administration, to discuss the government's plans for law 
enforcement reform.  Shpekbayev said the Presidential Administration 
is collecting, analyzing, and summarizing information on law 
enforcement systems in neighboring countries, especially Georgia, 
Armenia, the Baltic States, and the Russian Federation.  He asked 
for information about the law enforcement structure in the United 
States at all levels, including the jurisdiction of each agency and 
interaction and cooperation between agencies; the prison system, 
including alternative sentencing and how the United States manages a 
 
ASTANA 00000271  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
large prison population; basic and in-service training; crime 
statistics and how databases are maintained; performance criteria; 
and standards for determining the number of officers needed by a 
specific agency in a specific area.  When asked about the time frame 
for developing and implementing a reform plan, Shpekbayev said, "the 
sooner, the better."  INL said it would provide materials on the law 
enforcement structure in the United States and consider the 
possibility of study visits and IVLPs to the United States.  The 
Legal Attache offered to provide information on crime statistics and 
joint task forces in the United States and offered to facilitate 
study visits. 
 
FORMER DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE SENTENCED 
 
10.  (U) February 25.  Former Deputy Minister of Defense Kazhimurat 
Mayermanov was sentenced to 11 years in prison after being convicted 
of corruption, abuse of office, and bribe-taking, according to the 
Military Prosecutor's Office.  The court also convicted Israeli 
citizen Boris Sheinkman of fraud and bribery, sentenced him to 11 
years in prison, and confiscated his property.  In addition, the 
former acting commander of Kazakhstan's Rocket and Artillery Forces 
received a seven-year prison sentence on charges of abuse of office 
and was stripped of his military rank of colonel.  Mayermanov, who 
oversaw the Defense Ministry's research and development projects, 
was arrested on April 10, 2009, for allegedly signing unauthorized 
contracts worth $82 million with Sheinkman, who represented Israeli 
defense firms IMI and Soltam Systems.  Journalists were not allowed 
to attend Mayermanov's trial.  Partly as a result of this case, the 
Ministry of Defense has expressed a preference for using Foreign 
Military Sales channels rather than direct dialogue with 
Western/U.S. companies to procure systems such as C-130 aircraft. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA261, KAZAKHSTAN: CONOCOPHILLIPS ON OIL TRANSPORTATION,

WikiLeaks Link

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10ASTANA261.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA261 2010-02-23 09:03 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0790
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0261/01 0540903
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230903Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7535
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2530
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1876
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2582
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1490
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2074
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1921
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2343

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000261 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC, S/EEE, S/CIEA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET SOCI AJ TX KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  CONOCOPHILLIPS ON OIL TRANSPORTATION, 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE 
 
REF:  (A) 09 ASTANA 1774 
      (B) ASTANA 0061 
      (C) ASTANA 0198 
 
ASTANA 00000261  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On February 22, ConocoPhillips' John Dabbar 
called on the Ambassador to discuss relations between the Kashagan 
consortium and national oil company KazMunaiGas (KMG), expansion of 
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline, and the role of 
international oil companies (IOC) in the Kazakhstan Caspian 
Transportation System (KCTS).  Dabbar also discussed ConocoPhillips' 
plans in Turkmenistan, the impact of China's energy investments in 
Central Asia, and the investment climate in Kazakhstan.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
KMG TAKES CONTROL 
 
3.  (SBU) John Dabbar (please protect throughout) is the head of oil 
and gas transportation for ConocoPhillips Russia.  He was commercial 
director of the CPC pipeline in 1996, and currently serves on the 
Board of Directors of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
consortium.  He told the Ambassador that Conoco's biggest challenge 
in Kazakhstan in the near term is responding to KMG's "renewed 
interest in gaining control over Kazakhstan's oil export routes." 
 
LEARNING LESSONS FROM TRANSNEFT 
 
4.  (SBU) Dabbar said that KMG or one of its affiliates controls 
every transportation and storage option -- including railways, 
pipelines, storage tanks, and tanker fleets -- and takes advantage 
of every minor transaction to extract maximum value from the IOCs. 
In this manner, Dabbar said, the government can control the price 
and accessibility of oil export routes.  "TK (Timur Kulibayev, 
President Nazarbayev's billionaire son-in-law) figured this out 15 
years ago by watching Transneft's Sergei Yevlakhov operate," Dabbar 
said.  "Now Yevlakhov is suntanned and living large in Monaco."  He 
cited a short, privately-owned rail link in Aktau as a case in 
point, and said that exports via rail or ship from Aktau must 
transit this short rail line, which he said is owned by a small, 
private company.  "I assume TK has an interest in it," he said. 
Dabbar said that if something like this were to happen in the United 
States, Conoco could sue under open-access laws, but that is not 
possible in this region.  "In Russia," he said, "everybody in the 
Ministry of Energy needs a revenue stream and a lever, and sometimes 
they will pull that lever just to remind you that they can." 
 
DE FACTO VETO 
 
5.  (SBU) Dabbar also said that KMG Exploration and Production (KMG 
E&P) generally acts as a commercial equity partner when it votes on 
multi-year development plans, annual budgets, and individual 
contracts.  However, KMG E&P's parent company, national oil company 
KMG, acts as the government's authorized agent and effectively 
exercises veto power over these decisions.  Dabbar warned that this 
could become a "major issue" when the Kashagan consortium votes on 
plans to implement Phase II of the project. 
 
OPTIMISTIC ABOUT CPC EXPANSION 
 
6.  (SBU) Although Conoco is not a member of the CPC consortium, it 
owns 20% of Lukoil, which is a member.  Dabbar confirmed that the 
consortium approved expansion and said that he is more optimistic 
now than at any time during the past 15 years that capacity of the 
pipeline will be expanded.  Dabbar said that there is one additional 
"hold point" in October, when the consortium must vote to approve 
the construction budget, but he does not expect any further 
difficulties.  Dabbar said Conoco welcomes the additional capacity 
that CPC expansion will provide, since it would free up other 
transportation routes for oil from Kashagan and the N Block. 
 
KCTS REALITY CHECK 
 
ASTANA 00000261  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
 
7.  (SBU) On the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS), 
Dabbar said KMG is beginning to understand that the "sweetheart 
deal" they struck with a consortium of French companies is not going 
to play out they way they expected (ref A).  According to Dabbar, 
KMG expected to receive free engineering expertise and soft loans, 
but the French export credit agency has turned out to be as 
hard-nosed as any commercial bank and has asked for collateral in 
the form of shipper guarantees before it pr
ovides project financing. 
 According to Dabbar, "KMG is slowly beginning to understand that 
they must treat us as investors and partners, not just paying 
customers." 
 
LOYALTY PAYS 
 
8.  (SBU) Under KMG president Kairgeldy Kabyldin, Dabbar said, the 
government's position has shifted from allowing the IOCs to acquire 
a minority equity stake in KCTS to insisting on 100% state 
ownership.  Dabbar opined that Kabyldin has always been a strong and 
consistent advocate for government ownership of all oil 
transportation infrastructure on the territory of Kazakhstan.  "I 
have known Kabyldin for 15 years," he said, "since he was a 
mid-level manager at KazTransOil, and he has always been extremely 
loyal.  As a reward, he was named president of KMG and given a nice 
pension package."  Dabbar speculated that powerful members of the 
Mangistau oblast community -- including Vice Minister for Energy and 
Mineral Resources Lyazzat Kiinov -- have a vested interest in 
maintaining 100% state ownership of the $3 billion KCTS project, 
perhaps so they can benefit from investments in land and 
infrastructure. 
 
MAJOR STEP FORWARD 
 
9.  (SBU) Dabbar said that the IOCs took a "major step forward" in 
the last four to six weeks, when they were invited to act as 
technical advisors to KMG and the State Oil Company of the 
Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) for KCTS.  Previously, he said the IOCs 
were "stiff-armed" and shut out of the negotiations, and were told 
the project was strictly a government-to-government affair.  Now 
they have a legitimate reason to be at the table and will be 
involved in shaping the project.  Dabbar said the IOCs can draw upon 
previous feasibility studies and have some influence over the 
design, cost, timing, and sequencing of the project.  "This keeps us 
at the table," he said, "so that when negotiations over financing 
begin, we'll be right there, ready to engage." 
 
HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENT 
 
10.  (SBU) According to Dabbar, the IOCs are more concerned about 
health, safety, security, and environmental issues than they are 
about the cost of KCTS.  In particular, he noted that the Kashagan 
partners are concerned that Kazakhstan has not signed all of the 
protocols of the International Maritime Organization regarding 
oil-spill response.  He added that Kazakhstan is behind Russia and 
Azerbaijan in this regard.  Dabbar said that under ordinary 
circumstances, Conoco would devote resources and staff to clean up 
an oil spill if it affected a third country, but said this would be 
problematic if there were an oil spill in the Caspian Sea that 
drifted to Iran's northern coast. 
 
MOVING FORWARD IN TURKMENISTAN 
 
11.  (SBU) Conoco is moving forward with plans to develop Block 19 
in Turkmenistan's offshore zone, and will send an expatriate country 
manager to Ashgabad on March 1.  Dabbar said that Conoco remains 
interested in exploring Turkmenistan's onshore fields, but admitted 
that the government has made it clear that no onshore fields are on 
offer.  When asked about the likelihood of a trans-Caspian gas 
pipeline, Dabbar said that a "capital P" pipeline to bring gas from 
Turkmenistan's major fields such as Dauletebad would be a "political 
disaster" and would likely encounter resistance from Russia. 
However, he suggested that Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan could 
 
ASTANA 00000261  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
negotiate a project-specific agreement to construct a pipeline from 
one offshore block to another and would have better luck with Moscow 
if the pipeline connected new, rather than existing, fields. 
 
CHINESE INVESTMENTS GOOD FOR KASHAGAN 
 
12.  (SBU) Dabbar said that Chinese investments in oil 
transportation in Kazakhstan were "good for Kashagan" since they 
allow IOCs to sell oil directly to China, and also free up capacity 
for oil exports westward.  In particular, he said that the Eastern 
Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline will pull oil away from the 
Druzhba pipeline to Asia.  "Transneft wants more Kazakh oil to meet 
its annual quota of 15 million tons," he noted. 
 
ATYRAU-SAMARA AN OPTION 
 
13.  (SBU) When asked about the Atyrau-Samara oil pipeline, Dabbar 
said that Conoco considers that a viable export option, despite the 
lack of a quality bank.  He noted that the tariff on the pipeline is 
low and said it offers a competitive price to shipments by rail, 
even with the loss in quality.  "We're not happy about the lack of a 
quality guarantee," he observed, "but that's life.  It's not a 
condition precedent.  You can't always get everything you want." 
 
KAZAKHSTAN'S INVESTMENT CLIMATE 
 
14.  (SBU) Commenting on the changing investment climate in 
Kazakhstan, Dabbar cited an oil industry axiom:  "The deal never 
gets better from the moment you sign the contract.  It only gets 
worse."  He said that the government has carefully scrutinized the 
Kashagan production sharing agreement (PSA), which operates on a 
cost-recoverable basis.  He told the Ambassador that the government 
recently disallowed $4.5 billion out of a total of $5.3 billion in 
reimbursement claims.  Dabbar said the government claimed the 
consortium did not submit the requisite documents along with its 
claim, and said the government claimed that some costs were "more 
than they should have been" (ref B). 
 
15.  (SBU) Conoco is concerned about recent statements calling into 
question the tax stability clauses of existing PSAs (ref C), but 
Dabbar said he did not believe that Kazakhstan would unilaterally 
invalidate existing contracts.  He said it is more likely that the 
government will push to renegotiate the terms of contracts to 
increase tax and royalty revenue and limit cost recovery, for 
example.  "To be honest," he said, "PSAs are used more frequently in 
less stable and more hostile environments.  PSAs are for Burkina 
Faso, not Norway.  And Kazakhstan wants to be treated more like 
Norway." 
 
16.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Success in the oil business -- particularly in 
overseas environments -- requires patience, determination, and a 
commitment to long-term investments and personal relationships. 
Despite the obvious difficulties of doing business in Central Asia, 
ConocoPhillips understands what it takes to succeed in the region 
and remains optimistic about its ability to recover its sizeable 
investments in Kashagan and the N Block.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA257, KAZAKHSTAN: CHINESE LAND-LEASE DEAL STIRS UP CONTROVERSY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA257 2010-02-22 09:38 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9581
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0257/01 0530938
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220938Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7529
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2525
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1871
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2577
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2068
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1916
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2338

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000257 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAGR SOCI CH KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  CHINESE LAND-LEASE DEAL STIRS UP CONTROVERSY 
 
ASTANA 00000257  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
 
REFTELS:  A.  09 ASTANA 2168 
  B.  ASTANA 0072 
  C.  ASTANA 0119 
  D.  ASTANA 0184 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Despite a December 23, 2009, Interfax press 
report that President Nazarbayev instructed the prosecutors to 
punish those who disseminate information about the sale of land to 
foreigners, opposition leaders have continued to advocate against 
the transfer of land to China.  At a press conference in Almaty on 
January 13, Azat Party leaders Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and Bulat Abilov 
spoke out against any form of land transfer to foreign countries. 
Subsequently, on January 30, the Azat National Social Democratic 
Party (NSDP) and several other opposition parties held a 
government-sanctioned rally, attended by approximately 2,000 
protesters in Almaty, to protest against rumors that the Kazakhstani 
government is considering a request to rent land to China.  The 
January 30 protest followed a similar demonstration on December 11, 
2009, in front of the Chinese Consulate General in Almaty on the eve 
of Hu Jintao's visit to Astana to inaugurate the Kazakhstan-China 
pipeline (ref A).  The government has not initiated any actions 
against opposition leaders in relation to protests against land 
deals with China, but Kazakhstani media report that the authorities 
detained 13 Arman Public Association activists, as a result of their 
actions following the January 30 demonstration.  The China 
land-lease deal, rumored to possibly having been under consideration 
by the Kazakhstani Government, along with allegations that the 
President's son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, received kickbacks over 
energy deals with China, remain extremely sensitive issues in 
Kazakhstan (refs B-D).  The rumors of corruption are especially 
troubling to Kazakhstanis, who are acutely sensitive to 
densely-populated China's geographical proximity and growing 
economic influence.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CHINESE LAND DEAL SPARKS A PROTEST... 
 
3.  (SBU) President Nursultan Nazarbayev's announcement at a meeting 
of the Foreign Investors' Council on December 4, 2009, that China 
had requested one million hectares of land for the cultivation of 
agricultural crops triggered large demonstrations in Almaty on 
December 11, 2009, and January 30.  During the first rally, 
organized by a group of Kazakhstani intellectuals, the protesters 
tried to present a petition expressing their concerns.  Because no 
officials from the Chinese Consulate talked to the protesters or 
accepted their petition, the group announced their plan to mail the 
original to the Consulate, with a copy to the Presidential 
Administration.  During Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to 
Astana on December 12, 2009, according to Kazakhstan's Minister of 
Agriculture Akylbek Kurishbayev, bilateral talks did not address the 
question of China's leasing of land (ref A). 
 
...AND A QUICK RESPONSE FROM THE GOVERNMENT 
 
4.  (SBU) In apparent response to the public outcry against the 
China land-lease deal, local press reported on December 23, 2009, 
that President Nazarbayev instructed Kazakhstani prosecutors to 
punish dissemination of information about the sale of land to 
foreigners.  On December 30, 2009, the Prosecutor General's Office 
also issued a statement -- apparently to refute charges that the 
government had ever considered a land-lease deal -- that according 
to Kazakhstani law, land and other natural resources are 
state-owned, and cannot legally be transferred to foreign 
ownership. 
 
PROTESTS AGAINST ALLEGED CHINESE LAND-LEASE DEAL CONTINUE 
 
5.  (SBU) Reflecting widespread wariness and concern among the 
public about the growing influence of China on Kazakhstan, 
opposition leaders have continued to protest against the purported 
government plan to lease land to China.  At a January 13 press 
conference in Almaty, the leaders of the opposition Azat National 
 
ASTANA 00000257  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
Social Democratic Party (NSDP), Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and Bulat 
Abilov, stated their party's opposition to any form of land transfer 
to foreign countries.  Tuyakbay said government officials discussed 
the establishment of a joint venture with a Chinese company to lease 
land-plots to China.  "The situation is unclear and the sense of 
alarm in the public remains," Tuyakbay adde
d.  Government 
representatives have strenuously denied that any plan to lease land 
to China had been seriously considered, let alone approved. 
 
6.  (SBU) On January 30, several opposition parties co-organized a 
government-sanctioned rally, attended by approximately 2,000 
protesters in Almaty, protesting Kazakhstan renting land to China. 
The Azat Party led the protest, with support from the unregistered 
Alga and Communist Parties, and the Socialist Resistance and Talmas 
movements.  Participants held banners saying "Stop lawlessness," 
"Government should be brought to account," and "The future of the 
land is the future of the nation."  For two hours, opposition 
leaders, including Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and Bulat Abilov of Azat, 
Vladimir Kozlov of Alga, Amantay Akhetov of the Communist Party, 
Aynur Kurmanov of the Socialist Resistance and poet Mukhtar 
Shakhanov spoke against renting Kazakhstani land to China.  Some 
spoke against private land ownership and leasing any land to foreign 
entities.   The speakers lambasted the government for its practices, 
but no one criticized President Nazarbayev.  The police watched the 
peaceful rally, only intervening on one occasion -- to force a 
person holding a poster depicting a Chinese dragon on Kazakhstan's 
flag to fold it up. 
 
POLICE DETAIN 13 ACTIVISTS AFTER SANCTIONED RALLY 
 
7.  (SBU) After Azat organizers announced the end of the rally and 
asked participants to disperse, several members of the Arman Public 
Association refused to leave.  The group's leader, Yermek 
Narymbayev, and several of his supporters, loudly and harshly 
criticized President Nazarbayev's policies for approximately 30 
minutes.  Narymbayev accused Nazarbayev of selling most of 
Kazakhstan's oil fields to China, and of planning to sell 
Kazakhstani land to China.  Several dozen Arman supporters 
encircling the speakers chanted "Down with Nazarbayev."  The 
Embassy's Political Assistant personally observed the police 
cordoning off the Arman activists, forcing them out of the theater 
into a park nearby, and forcing Narymbayev into a police vehicle. 
After this incident, approximately 100 law enforcement officers 
blocked the street sidewalks.  According to Azzatyq Radio Liberty, 
the police arrested 13 Arman activists.  Narymbayev was reportedly 
tried and sentenced to 10 days of detention for organizing an 
unsanctioned protest. 
 
8.  (SBU) Vladimir Kozlov of Alga asserted that the National 
Security Committee (KNB) organized the incident as a provocation, in 
order to accuse the opposition of being unable to control a peaceful 
protest, and support the denial of future opposition rally requests. 
 (COMMENT:  Since authorities have not hesitated to deny the 
opposition permission for rallies, Kozlov's assertion does not 
appear credible.  Law enforcement's detention of 13 Arman movement 
protesters is also unsurprising, since Narymbayev and his supporters 
crossed the unwritten line against publicly attacking President 
Nazarbayev -- a long-standing taboo.  END COMMENT.) 
 
9.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The government has not initiated any actions 
against established opposition leaders in relation to the officially 
sanctioned January 30 protest against leasing land to China.  The 
detention of Arman activists following their denunciations of 
Nazarbayev after the rally, however, indicate how sensitive 
authorities are about this issue.  The China land-lease deal, and 
allegations that the President's son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, 
received kickbacks over energy deals with China, remain hot-button 
issues.  Rumors of corruption in relation to economic deals with 
China are especially incendiary in Kazakhstan, where many residents 
are acutely attuned to their vast, resource-rich country's 
geographic position, bordering one of the world's most populous and 
resource-hungry nations.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA255, KAZAKHSTAN: WEEKLY SPOT-REPORT DIGEST, FEBRUARY 16-19

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA255 2010-02-22 09:12 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9552
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0255/01 0530912
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220912Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7526
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2523
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2575
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1869
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1485
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2066
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1914
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2718
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3008

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000255 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON EPET ENRG SOCI SENV KCRM KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  WEEKLY SPOT-REPORT DIGEST, FEBRUARY 16-19 
 
ASTANA 00000255  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU) This is the first edition of a new weekly cable to 
disseminate spot reports based on Embassy conversations with 
interlocutors, as well as from the mass media.  Our goal is to draw 
attention to information that might not merit a full cable report. 
 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS - NAZARBAYEV TALKS SUMMIT IN MOSCOW 
 
2.  (U) Russian Central Asia analyst Arkadiy Dubnov told Deutsche 
Welle that during President Nazarbayev's Moscow visit the most 
important issue was the OSCE summit in Astana.  Dubnov predicted 
that Foreign Minister Lavrov will visit Kazakhstan on February 21-23 
to discuss the summit agenda and "other delicate issues." 
 
... AND KAZAKHSTAN JOINS MOSCOW-BACKED RAPID REACTION FORCE 
 
3.  (U) On February 17, the Associated Press reported Kazakhstan 
ratified an accord Wednesday committing it to a NATO-style 
rapid-reaction force drawn from the armies of former Soviet nations, 
the Kazakh presidential press office said in a statement.  The force 
will operate under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, a Russian-backed military bloc that also includes 
Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as members. 
Uzbekistan now remains the only organization member not to sign the 
rapid reaction force agreement. Uzbekistan, which regards itself as 
Central Asia's main military power broker, has traditionally been 
wary of Moscow's attempts to dominate security in the region.  The 
force's stated aim is to combat threats of terrorism, extremism and 
drug trafficking, as well as helping to deal with the aftermath of 
natural and man-made disasters. 
 
ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, CUSTOMS DESCRIBES NEW CODE 
 
4.  (SBU) On February 17, Customs Control Committee Chairman 
Kozykorpesh Karbuzov presented highlights of the new Customs Code 
for the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.  According 
to Karbuzov, the new Customs Code will come into force on July 1, 
and will reduce administrative barriers to trade.  Karbuzov thanked 
USAID for technical assistance in designing an "electronic single 
window."  Igor Tyen, Deputy Chairman of the Customs Control 
Committee, said that customs clearance is no longer required for 
goods traded among Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, or for foreign 
goods released for consumption inside Customs Union member states. 
Tyen also reported that, although the Custom Union does not cover 
export duties, the Customs Union's Special Agreement on Export 
Control would prevent the illegal export of goods from the territory 
of Customs Union member states. 
 
EBRD COMMENTS ON FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION 
 
5.  (SBU) The Ambassador had lunch on February 18 with Olivier 
Descamps and Michael Weinstein of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to discuss the economic and 
financial situation in Kazakhstan.  Descamps, who is based in London 
and oversees EBRD projects in Central Asia, Turkey, Eastern Europe, 
and the Caucasus, said the EBRD is deepening its relationship with 
Samruk-Kazyna, although it will not provide carte blanche for a 
long-term, state-driven approach to economic growth.  He also 
insisted that the economic crisis is not yet over in Kazakhstan, and 
said greater diversification of the economy is necessary to achieve 
sustained growth. 
 
JAILED KAZAKHSTANI RIGHTS ACTIVIST LAUNCHES BLOG 
 
6.  (U) Jailed Kazakh human rights defender Yevgeny Zhovtis has 
begun publishing a blog on the Internet, RFE/RL's Kazakh Service 
reported on February 17.  Zhovtis was the director of the 
Almaty-based Kazakh Bureau for Human Rights.  He is serving a 
four-year jail term in a labor camp in East Kazakhstan Oblast for 
his involvement in a deadly traffic accident last year.  His 
supporters and human rights organizations have criticized his 
sentence, which they say Kazakh authorities ordered in retaliation 
for Zhovtis's human rights activities.  His blog is blocked in 
Kazakhstan and only available via a proxy server. 
 
ASTANA 00000255  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
COURT REVERSES NEWSPAPER'S SUSPENSION FOR OUTSTANDING DEBT 
 
7.  (U) On February 16, the Medeu district court in Almaty reversed 
the February 8 co
urt administrator's order that suspended 
publication of the Respublika newspaper for failure to pay in full 
its outstanding debt of 60 million tenge to BTA bank.  The newspaper 
filed a counter-suit, arguing that only a judge can order a 
suspension, and the court agreed with the newspaper.  As reported 
previously, the same court ruled on September 9 that Respublika owed 
BTA bank 60 million tenge in damages for publishing an article that 
caused a debilitating run on the bank. 
 
FINANCIAL POLICE ACADEMY DIRECTOR "COMMITTED HARA-KIRI" 
 
8.  (SBU) More details have come out about the mysterious 
resignation of Director of the Financial Police Academy (FPA) 
General-Major Ramazan Tleukhan on February 1.  On February 18, 
sources in the FPA told the Embassy that Tleukhan resigned his 
position because an administrative employee was arrested for sexual 
assault, allegedly committed against a 17-year-old girl.  Although 
the employee was not high-placed and the crime was not connected to 
the FPA, Tleukhan's personal code of honor demanded that he step 
down.   The Embassy has had an excellent relationship with the FPA 
since 2003, and Tleukhan was one of INL's most reliable 
interlocutors.   The previous FPA Director left his position in 2007 
after a female cadet was tortured to death by other female cadets 
after being accused of theft.  A new FPA Director has not yet been 
appointed; INL had a productive initial meeting with the Acting 
Director of the FPA on February 17. 
 
HOAGLAND

Wikileaks

10ASTANA249, KAZAKHSTAN: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTS ON

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10ASTANA249.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA249 2010-02-22 05:52 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9268
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0249/01 0530552
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7504
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000249 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTS ON 
RECIPROCITY IN DOING BUSINESS 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 0247 
     B. ASTANA 0175 
     C. ASTANA 0049 
 
ASTANA 00000249  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  This is an action cable (see para 6). 
The Ambassador met Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov on 
February 19 to discuss a range of issues, including the 
Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABC), the visit of Special 
Representative Richard Holbrooke, tarmac access, FSN income 
taxes, the Presidential Entrepreneurship Summit, and the 
pending AES arbitration case.  Post reported separately on 
the ABC (ref A).  END SUMMARY. 
 
NO MORE SUNDAY VISITS 
 
2.  (SBU) Regarding the visit on February 21 of Special 
Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, 
Umarov told the Amabssador that Kazakhstan welcomed the 
visit, and would accommodate the delegation at a Sunday 
meeting with Saudabayev.  However, he put his hands down 
firmly on the table and said, "This is the last Sunday 
meeting we will accept.  We are not going to tolerate this 
any more.  In the future," he said, "Sunday meetings will be 
impossible to arrange." 
 
TARMAC ACCESS BASED ON RECIPROCITY 
 
3.  (SBU) The Ambassador informed Umarov that the Embassy has 
found it increasingly difficult to obtain permission for 
Embassy staff and vehicles to access the airport tarmac to 
meet arriving flights delivering classified pouches.  Umarov 
admitted that the MFA had "absolutely revised its norms" and 
procedures regarding tarmac access.  Reciprocity," he said, 
"is the key issue."  Umarov explained that if a country wants 
to increase the number of people who have access to a special 
zone at the airport, then it must be prepared to grant 
Kazakhstan the same level of access.  According to Umarov, 
all of the European countries have agreed to this principle. 
 
4.  (SBU) The Ambassador pushed back, noting that flights 
delivering classified pouches are a different issue than 
access to greet visiting dignitaries, and that strict 
reciprocity is not possible.  Umarov disagreed.  He said that 
Kazakhstan also sends diplomatic pouches with classified 
material, but has not complained to the United States about 
its inability to meet the shipment on the tarmac.  "We play 
by your rules, and we don,t complain," he said.  The 
Ambassador promised to research the issue further and Umarov 
agreed to revisit the issue later.  Umarov said that 
Kazakhstan must play fair with all countries represented in 
Kazakhstan, but indicated that if there are special 
circumstances or exceptions for Russia or China, for example, 
then he would be willing to ask the MFA,s Protocol 
Department to make a similar exception for the United States. 
 
FSN TAXES 
 
5.  (SBU) On the issue of local taxes, the Ambassador 
informed Umarov that local Embassy employees in Almaty 
continue to complain about being harassed by the Financial 
Police for not having paid their personal income taxes in 
full, on time.  Umarov admitted that he was not well informed 
about the specifics of the issue, but promised that the MFA 
would raise it with the Financial Police.  He also said that 
the MFA was working with the Ministry of Finance to schedule 
a meeting in Almaty for local Embassy employees to discuss 
the taxation issue. 
 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP SUMMIT 
 
6.  (SBU) Umarov brought up the Presidential Entrepreneurship 
Summit on April 26-27, and said that one of the three 
 
ASTANA 00000249  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
Kazakhstani delegates would like to deliver an address at the 
Summit, particularly if other delegations will be given an 
opportunity to speak (ref B).  The Ambassador promised to 
relay this request to Washington.  Umarov also said that the 
Embassy of Kazakhstan in Washington is actively engaged in 
promoting Kazakhstan,s role in the Summit, and is working 
with the U.S.-Kazakhstan Business Association to organize 
representational events during the week of the Summit. 
During an informal conversation on February 21, Umarov asked 
the Ambassador if it would be possible to substitute a 
leading female entrepreneur for one of the three males.  He 
said, "It doesn't seem right that you haven't included a 
woman."  ACTION REQUEST:  Please advise if it will be 
possible for a member of the Kazakshtani delegation to speak 
at the Entrepreneurship Summit, and if it would be possible 
to add or substitute an appropriate female entrepreneur for 
the Kazakhstani delegation.  END ACTION REQUEST. 
 
AES SENDING MI
XED SIGNALS 
 
7.  (SBU) Umarov told the Ambassador that the government of 
Kazakhstan has received "contradictory signals" from the U.S. 
energy company AES.  He said the government has "no 
understanding of where the company stands and what they 
want."  Umarov said the U.S. power company contacted the 
Embassy of Kazakhstan in Washington and asked for Ambassador 
Idrissov,s assistance to craft a compromise position to 
resolve an impasse that appears headed toward international 
arbitration (ref C).  Umarov said that AES informed Idrissov 
that the company would like to reach a compromise that would 
enable AES to remain in Kazakhstan for the long-term.  But he 
said that in Kazakhstan, the government has a different 
impression.  "We would like to continue to work with this 
company," he asserted.  "But there are many negative feelings 
about what they did and how they did it.  All we hear from 
AES are demands and criticism of our laws," he said.  (NOTE: 
One of the key issues for both sides is electricity tariffs. 
Kazakhstan also complains that AES has failed to meet its 
capital investment commitments.  END NOTE).  Umarov said the 
Ministry of Finance will "soon" present AES with its proposal 
for resolving the pending dispute.  "If AES signs it," he 
said, "then we can put this to rest and move on.  If they 
don,t" he warned, "then we will have to find a different 
solution." 
HOAGLAND

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10ASTANA248, KAZAKHSTAN: S/GWI PROJECT PROPOSALS

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10ASTANA248 2010-02-21 02:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8843
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0248/01 0520226
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210226Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7499
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2499
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1845
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2551
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1461
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2710
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3000
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2042
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1890
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ASTANA 000248 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPAO KWMN KTIP KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  S/GWI PROJECT PROPOSALS 
 
REF: A) 09 STATE 132094 
 B) STATE 12531 
 
ASTANA 00000248  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Post nominates three projects, in order of priority, for 
funding consideration under the small grants initiative of the 
Office of Global Women's Issues.  A brief summary and budget for 
each project follows below. 
 
PROJECT 1: GENDER ISSUES IN THE SPREAD OF HIV/AIDS 
 
A) NGO:  Central Asia Association of People Living with HIV 
 
B) Proposal summary: The sexual transmission of HIV has grown from 
1% at the beginning of the epidemic to 30% in 2009.  HIV is growing 
among wives of drug users and among sex workers.  Last year, the 
Central Asia Association of People Living with HIV (PLWH) initiated 
focus group discussions on gender issues of HIV/AIDS epidemic, with 
funding from the Eastern European and Central Asian Network of PLWH. 
These focus groups tried to identify the role of gender aspects of 
the epidemic and identified the need for other assessment to do more 
in-depth analysis of role of gender in the growing transmission of 
HIV among women.  An S/GWI grant to the Central Asia Association of 
People Living with HIV will help identify specifics and 
particularities of gender related issues of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 
the country and in Central Asia that are related to the region's 
socio-cultural environment.  This will help identify the role of 
gender stereotypes in the transmission of HIV and will help develop 
programs that address these stereotypes to prevent the spread of the 
epidemic.  The findings of this analysis will help develop materials 
that international projects and partners will use to focus HIV 
prevention programs on women that are vulnerable to HIV. 
 
C) Specific activities: 
 
Under this grant, the Central Asia Association of PLWH will: 
-- Conduct series of seminars to improve the capacity of 
representatives from AIDS service organizations and organizations of 
PLWH in using methodologies for gender studies in HIV/AIDS.  The 
organization will conduct two 3-day seminars in Shymkent and 
Ust-Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan, one in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and one 
in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, for approximately 15 to 20 participants from 
each region. 
-- A cross-cultural assessment on gender will be conducted by two 
experts from the All-Ukrainian Association of PLWH and one expert 
from Kazakhstan, who will travel to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan to meet with NGOs, governmental organizations and 
religious leaders to interview them about their opinion on gender 
inequality and how it affects the HIV epidemic (including the role 
of violence against women in the spread of HIV). Findings of the 
assessment will be used for future programming of educational and 
training materials for AIDS service organizations. 
 
D) Performance indicators: 
 
-- Number of people trained in gender and HIV 
-- Results of the cross-cultural study disseminated to main 
stakeholders 
 
E) Detailed budget: 
1. Two 3-day training sessions on methodologies for gender studies 
and gender issues of HIV/AIDS in Kazakhstan $18,000 each ($36,000) 
2. Round trip of two consultants from Ukraine ($1,000) 
3. Travel of the two Ukrainian consultants and one Kazakhstani 
consultant to Shymkent, Ust-Kamenogors, Aktobe and Kzyl-Orda 
($5,000) 
4. Honoraria and per diem for consultants ($17,000) 
5. Round trip to Dushanbe and to Bishkek for three consultants 
($1,500) 
6.  3-day training in Dushanbe ($10,000) 
7.  3-day training in Bishkek ($10,000) 
8.  Data analysis in Kiev by the consultant on-line with Kazakhstani 
consultant ($1,000) 
9.  Round trip by two consultants to present results and conduct 
consultative meetings in Almaty, Bishkek and Dushanbe ($8,000) 
10.  Costs of three round tables to present results ($3,000) 
11.  Printing of report and miscellaneous costs ($5,000) 
Total ($100,000) 
 
ASTANA 00000248  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
F) Project length: 12 months 
 
G) USAID Mission in Almaty will administer this project. 
 
PROPOSAL 2: VOCATIONAL TRAINING FOR VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE 
 
A) The INL section would manage the following project, which would 
be implemented by the Association of NGOs Against Trafficking in 
Persons in Central Asia (AATIPCA) and provide vocational training 
and reintegration for victims of trafficking-in-persons (TIP).  This 
project supplements current INL programs to en
courage government 
funding for TIP shelters and train shelter employees. 
 
Project duration: 18 months (Phase I - 2 months, Phase II - 16 
months) 
 
Estimated start date: September 2010 
 
Project coverage: Kazakhstan (with impact on Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan and other CIS countries through assistance to 
citizens of those countries trafficked into Kazakhstan) 
 
Total budget:  $100,000 (Phase I - $2,000; Phase II - $98,000) 
 
B) Problem Identification and Project Summary: 
 
Since the mid-1990s, Kazakhstan has come a long way in preventing 
human trafficking, protecting victims, and prosecuting traffickers. 
Trafficking in persons (TIP) is criminalized and the definition of 
TIP provided in the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children is used in 
national legislation. Kazakhstan also provides for direct or 
indirect protection for victims of trafficking within the law. 
 
Victims trafficked to Kazakhstan and Kazakhstanis trafficked abroad 
require a variety of services to be successfully reintegrated and 
protected from re-victimization and stigmatization.  To date, the 
vast majority of services available for TIP victims in Kazakhstan 
have been provided by NGOs.  Along with the basic needs of 
accommodation, food, clothing, and medical assistance, victims need 
support to learn sustainable life skills. 
 
In addition to professional skills learned in vocational training, 
victims will need psychological counseling and long-term support and 
protection.  Stigmatization of victims put them at a high risk of 
re-victimization and deviant behavior.  In order to protect the 
victims and to gradually change the public attitudes towards them, 
advocacy activities are needed. 
 
This project will provide assistance to victims of trafficking to 
master sustainable employment and life skills through vocational 
training courses and help them to find employment. The project would 
also advocate for the fair treatment of victims of trafficking and 
other violent crimes in Kazakhstan. 
 
Project Description 
 
The project will consist of four activities to be implemented in two 
phases. 
 
- During phase one (first and second month) activity one will be 
conducted. 
 
- During phase two (third through eighteenth month) activities two 
and three will be conducted. 
 
Specific Project Activities 
 
Activity 1 - Development of Guidelines 
 
AATIPCA will develop guidelines for providing vocational training to 
TIP victims.  The guidelines will be country and region specific and 
can serve as a handbook for any NGO rendering assistance to TIP 
victims.  The treatment of foreign victims in Kazakhstan will be 
included. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000248  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
Activity 2 - Vocational Training and Related Support 
 
Vocational training has rarely been a priority in assistance 
programs for victims of trafficking.  Food and lodging in permanent 
or temporary shelters, medical treatment, psychological counseling, 
and legal services have all been more common in the past.  However, 
NGOs have found that vocational training is a powerful tool for 
preventing re-victimization. 
 
Within the proposed project, AATIPCA will assist victims to select 
and take vocational training courses, and, when possible, assist 
them in finding employment.  Vocational training will be provided by 
specialized companies selected by NGOs.  Training will include but 
won't be limited to accounting, cooking and restaurant services, 
computer skills, carpentry, sewing, hairdressing, manicuring, and 
training in how to find employment and run a business. 
 
As necessary, AATIPCA will provide victims with temporary lodging 
and food during training, pay for transportation, and supply 
clothing, as many victims have no clothing when they escape. 
AATIPCA will also cover the costs of necessary medical treatment. 
 
The majority of vocational courses require textbooks, instruments, 
and special uniforms and certain courses require medical 
examinations before training.  AATIPCA will cover the costs for all 
such items related to training. 
 
Activity 3 - Victim Advocacy 
 
In order to strengthen victim protection mechanisms, AATIPCA will 
analyze victims' cases and advocate for necessary amendments in 
national legislation.   This activity will be in cooperation with 
NGOs in Kazakhstan and in neighboring countries from which victims 
originate, e.g. Uzbekistan. 
 
C) Performance measures 
 
To measure the performance, AATIPCA will track the number of victims 
assisted by the project and the percentage receiving employment. 
When possible, AATIPCA will collect feedback information from 
victims. 
 
AATIPCA expects that, during the project lifetime, not less than 45 
victims will successfully pass vocational training at each of the 9 
locations where the NGO members operate.  This estimate is based on 
similar projects conducted by individual NGOs. 
 
D) Recipient organization and its capacity 
 
The Association of NGOs Against Trafficking in Persons in Central 
Asia (AATIPCA) was formed in 2008 as a network of NGOs members and 
partners in Kazakhstan and neighboring countries which coordinate 
anti-TIP and related activities and develop assistance, advocacy, 
training and research standards. 
 
Currently, AATIPCA is made up of 11 members and 7 partners.  The 
member NGOs have been working to prevent TIP and assist victims 
since 2001.  AATIPCA members are experienced in direct assistance to 
victims of trafficking and other violent crimes (sexual assaults, 
kidnapping, etc.), including the provision of shelters, 
psychological counseling, and medical assistance.  Two operate 
permanent shelters for victims of trafficking and another operates 
temporary shelters on an as-needed basis and depending on 
availability of funds. NGO members have experience supporting 
victims. 
 
AATIPCA coordinates the activities of its members and partners, 
maintains cooperation with governmental agencies and Parliament, 
provides counseling and assistance, and holds awareness raising and 
analytical workshops and other events. 
 
Since May 2009, AATIPCA has provided assistance funded by the Almaty 
International Women's Club.  Food, medicines, and medical treatment 
are provided.  This project will be completed in April 2010, but 
AATIPCA is raising funds for further support of the basic needs of 
victims. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000248  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
E) Detailed budget 
 
- Development & printing of assistance guidelines  $2,000 
- Coordination of assistance activities & reporting $3,600 
- Administrative costs $2,130 
 
- Training courses $13,500 
 
- Textbooks and supplies $4,500 
 
- Support for victims (includes housing, food, clothing, 
medical)$64,370 
 
- Administrative costs for individual NGOs $9,900 
 
 
 
 
 
PROPOSAL 3: ASSISTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
A) NGO: Union of Crisis Centers 
 
B) Proposal summary: Domestic viole
nce remains a serious problem in 
Kazakhstan.  The police registered over 40,000 cases of domestic 
violence in 2009, and the Union of Crisis Centers received over 
20,000 calls on its crisis hot-line.  In December 2009, the 
government adopted a new law on prevention of domestic violence. 
The new legislation introduces new concepts and mechanisms for the 
prevention of domestic violence that the Kazakhstani authorities 
will be implementing for the first time.  With the grant from S/GWI, 
the Union of Crisis Centers proposes to pursue three objectives: A) 
develop a training module and conduct 16 trainings on the 
domestic-violence law for experts from the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor, and NGOs; B) 
organize a wide-reaching information campaign aimed at law 
enforcement officials across the country to raise their awareness of 
the problem of domestic violence; and C) provide legal and 
psychological assistance to 18,000 domestic violence victims and 
establish shelters in 8 existing crisis centers.  The Union of 
Crisis Centers is a well-established federation of NGOs working on 
domestic violence issues. 
 
C) Specific Activities: 
-- Develop a training module and conduct 16 trainings on the 
domestic-violence law for experts from the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor, and NGOs; 
-- Organize a wide-reaching information campaign aimed at law 
enforcement officials across the country to raise their awareness of 
the problem of domestic violence and their responsibilities under 
the new domestic-violence law; 
-- provide legal and psychological assistance to 18,000 domestic 
violence victims and establish shelters in 8 existing crisis 
centers. 
 
D) Indicators: 
-- Number of trainings conducted 
-- Number of victims assisted 
-- Number of people reached through information campaign 
 
E) Detailed budget: 
-- Coordinator's salary, book-keeper, taxes ($7,461) 
-- Hotline costs ($4,500) 
-- 16 trainings in regions, 25 trainees each ($53,200) 
-- Information campaign supplies (booklets, billboards, video clips 
in Russian and Kazakh) ($11,130) 
-- Organization of information campaign ($3,800) 
-- Support of activities of 8 crisis centers ($29,000) 
-- Round-table ($5,310) and supporting activities ($2,250) 
-- Subtotal ($151,001) 
-- Contribution from Union of Crisis Centers ($34,050) 
-- Contribution from the Ministry of Interior ($17,000) 
-- Total requested ($99,951) 
 
F) Project duration: 12 months 
 
E) Embassy Astana will administer this grant. 
 
ASTANA 00000248  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
HOAGLAND

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10ASTANA227, KAZAKHSTAN: SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE

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10ASTANA227 2010-02-18 00:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6364
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0227/01 0490032
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7451
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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1826
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2532
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RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
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RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
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RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2023
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2300

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ASTANA 000227 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE 
 
ASTANA 00000227  001.6 OF 006 
 
 
ZFR (CANCEL) ENTIRE MESSAGE 
 
 
ASTANA 00000227  002.6 OF 006 
 
 
ZFR (CANCEL) ENTIRE MESSAGE 
 
 
ASTANA 00000227  003.6 OF 006 
 
 
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ASTANA 00000227  006.6 OF 006 
 
 
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SPRATLEN

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10ASTANA225 2010-02-18 00:31 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6264
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0225/01 0490031
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2454
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1814
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2520
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1430
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2011
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1859
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RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2288

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ASTANA 000225 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE 
 
ASTANA 00000225  001.3 OF 006 
 
 
1.  (U) Sen...

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10ASTANA226, KAZAKHSTAN: SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE

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10ASTANA226 2010-02-18 00:31 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6345
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0226/01 0490031
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 180031Z FEB 10 ZFR
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7445
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2460
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1820
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2526
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1436
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2017
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1865
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
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RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2294

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ASTANA 000226 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE 
 
ASTANA 00000226  001.6 OF 006 
 
 
ZFR (CANCEL) ENTIRE MESSAGE 
 
 
ASTANA 00000226  002.6 OF 006 
 
 
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ASTANA 00000226  003.6 OF 006 
 
 
ZFR (CANCEL) ENTIRE MESSAGE 
 
 
ASTANA 00000226  004.6 OF 006 
 
 
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ASTANA 00000226  005.6 OF 006 
 
 
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ASTANA 00000226  006.6 OF 006 
 
 
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SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

10ASTANA198, KAZAKHSTAN: FIRST PRESIDENT OF KAZAKHOIL CALLS FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA198 2010-02-16 06:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4189
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0198/01 0470648
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 160648Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7415
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2452
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1812
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2518
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1428
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2009
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1857
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2280

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000198 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  FIRST PRESIDENT OF KAZAKHOIL CALLS FOR 
GREATER CONTROL OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 
 
ASTANA 00000198  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On February 10, Nurlan Balgimbayev -- former 
Prime Minister and first president of KazakhOil -- shared his 
strident opinions of the national oil company he helped to create, 
the degree of local content in oil and gas exploration and 
production, and the attitude and behavior of international oil 
companies operating in Kazakhstan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE SLOW, RIGID BUREAUCRACY OF KMG 
 
3.  (SBU) Balgimbayev, who served as Prime Minister from 1997-99 and 
president of KazakhOil, the predecessor to national oil company 
KazMunaiGas (KMG), from 1999-2002, remains one of President 
Nazarbayev's closest advisors on energy issues.  Meeting with Energy 
Officer alone in his private offices, Balgimbayev was surprisingly 
blunt in his criticism of KMG, its affiliates, and even the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR).  He called KMG "inflexible, 
bureaucratic, cumbersome, slow, and generally incapable" in its 
current form of managing Kazakhstan's natural resource wealth 
effectively.  Becoming more agitated as he spoke, Balgimbayev 
pointed at the stationery and office equipment on his desk and said, 
"I had to bring all this from home.  Otherwise, if I had to go 
through KMG, I wouldn't even have a pencil to write with!" 
 
LACK OF FIELD EXPERIENCE HINDERS DECISION MAKING 
 
4.  (SBU) Balgimbayev said that to obtain approval for procurement 
or personnel decisions, he has to go through 11 layers of KMG 
management, which he said takes up to three months.  According to 
Balgimbayev, KMG has become a large, unwieldy bureaucracy that 
cannot manage its many affiliates and daughter companies 
effectively.  In particular, he said that KMG owns many exploration 
and production projects that lack the independence and authority to 
operate efficiently.  He also criticized the management of KMG, its 
affiliates, and officials in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources (MEMR), who "have not worked their way up to the top. 
Some of them have never worked a day in the field," he exclaimed. 
Balgimbayev insisted that senior managers in KMG and MEMR must have 
at least five years of relevant practical experience. 
 
NOT A BANANA REPUBLIC 
 
5.  (SBU) Balgimbayev laid the blame for Kazakhstan's lack of 
qualified senior managers squarely at the feet of the international 
oil companies (IOC).  "Chevron has been in Kazakhstan for almost 20 
years," he said.  "Surely in that amount of time, they could have 
developed the skills and expertise of their local staff." 
Balgimbayev was visibly upset that there are no Kazakhstani citizens 
installed as managing directors of major oil and gas exploration and 
production projects in Kazakhstan.  Again, he blamed the IOCs. 
"Your companies are so arrogant," he said.  "They think they're 
working in a Banana Republic.  They think they're so big and 
powerful, so much better than us.  They have no confidence in 
Kazakhstan.  They think we're Africans." 
 
NAZARBAYEV CRITICIZES KMG, IOCS 
 
6.  (U) NOTE:  Balgimbayev's scathing remarks closely track with 
President Nazarbayev's strong, public criticism of KMG and the IOCs 
on January 22.  Nazarbayev told a Cabinet meeting that he was 
concerned that not enough qualified Kazakhstani petroleum engineers 
and project managers are working on the largest oil exploration and 
production projects in Kazakhstan.  "No matter how hard we try," 
said Nazarbayev, "we cannot find more than two or three specialists 
working at the top management levels.  There is not a single Kazakh 
(sic) citizen working as a top manager in either of the large 
foreign oil companies operating in Kazakhstan!" Nazarbayev 
continued.  "Why is this happening?," he asked.  "Why do the (IOCs) 
not train and develop managers from among their local staff?"  Then, 
addressing the Cabinet, he ordered, "You have to deal with it."  END 
NOTE. 
 
ASTANA 00000198  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
 
"WITHOUT TENGIZ, THERE WOULD BE NO CHEVRON" 
 
7.  (SBU) When asked if the attitude and approach of Western oil 
companies has changed during the past 20 years, Balgimbayev 
responded bluntly.  "Absolutely nothing has changed," he insisted. 
"Except that now, the President supports me."  Balgimbayev singled 
out ExxonMobil and Chevron for par
ticularly harsh criticism.  He 
recalled a meeting with ExxonMobil in 1992, when a low-level clerk 
approached the Kazakhstani delegation and threw down a packet of 
marketing materials -- in English, not Russian -- and said, "There. 
You can read all about us in that brochure."  He also alleged that 
Chevron is deliberately slowing development of Karachaganak in order 
to conserve resources for expansion of the Tengiz project.  He also 
said that Chevron and other IOCs bought Kazakhstan's most lucrative 
oil fields for a song.  "Chevron bought Tengiz for nothing - 
nothing!  And now it's worth a fortune.  Tengiz saved Chevron.  They 
had no reserves at the time.  Without Tengiz," he insisted, "there 
would be no Chevron." 
 
TAX STABILITY AND THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS 
 
8.  (SBU) Referring to the tax stability clauses in the oil 
exploration and production contracts for Tengiz, Kashagan, and 
Karachaganak, Balgimbayev said that change is inevitable, and that 
it is time to redress the balance.  "This is a new time, and a new 
day," he exclaimed.  "Companies that want to do business in 
Kazakhstan will have to obey our laws and play by our rules." 
Balgimbayev said that he hoped and expected that the government and 
the IOCs would be able to reach a negotiated settlement, but he 
warned that if push came to shove, "we always have one more bullet 
than they do, because this is our country." 
 
9.  (SBU) Balgimbayev insisted that Kazakhstan has a fundamental 
right to own at least a majority stake in the exploration and 
production of oil on its territory, and added that KMG was preparing 
to acquire a stake in Karachaganak.  "I don't just mean 10 or 15%," 
he said.  "I mean all of it." 
 
10.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Despite (or perhaps because of) his lack of a 
formal, top-level position within KMG, Balgimbayev remains a 
highly-influential advisor to President Nazarbayev on energy issues. 
 The timing and tenor of Nazarbayev's criticisms of KMG and the tax 
stability clauses of existing PSAs demonstrate that Balgimbayev 
still has the President's ear.  With oil prices remaining steady 
above $70/barrel, perhaps Nazarbayev has calculated that the time 
has come for even the most favored IOCs to play by Kazakhstan's 
rules, regardless of previously negotiated agreements.  It is 
unclear whether the government will take the dramatic and 
consequential step of dissolving the existing PSAs, but there is no 
doubt that Nazarbayev and his most trusted advisors are convinced 
that it is time for Kazakhstan to reassert its sovereign rights over 
its natural resources.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

10ASTANA187, KAZAKHSTAN: MFA PUSHES ABC GOALS AS SUMMIT PROSPECTS LOOK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA187 2010-02-16 02:17 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3939
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0187/01 0470217
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 160217Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7400
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2450
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1810
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2516
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1426
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2007
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1855
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2278

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000187 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  MFA PUSHES ABC GOALS AS SUMMIT PROSPECTS LOOK 
BRIGHTER AFTER FM VISIT 
 
ASTANA 00000187  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Over a working lunch on February 15, MFA 
Americas Director Askar Tazhiev told Charge that State 
Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev was very pleased with 
his February 1-4 visit to Washington and wants to get to work on 
what the MFA sees as growing U.S. support for the OSCE Summit.  On 
the Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABC), he fretted that the forum 
lacks the necessary high level coverage.  Charge urged MFA to work 
with member states to make the dialogue a success in its proposed 
form.  Tazhiev promised to assist with several lingering 
administrative issues.  END SUMMARY. 
 
TONE OF FM MEETINGS AUGURS WELL FOR THE SUMMIT AND A POSSIBLE 
PRESIDENTIAL BILATERAL 
 
3.  (SBU) MFA Director Tazhiev said State Secretary-Foreign Minister 
Saudabayev had been especially pleased with the tone of his 
Washington meetings during his February 1-4 visit.  According to 
Tazhiev, Saudabayev found the Secretary warm and receptive to 
Astana's ideas across the board.  Saudabayev was also pleased with 
preparations for the Global Nuclear Security Summit.  NSA Jones had 
made U.S. views very clear on what progress in Afghanistan would 
form the basis for a meeting with the President.  On the Summit, 
Tazhiev said it was clear that Afghanistan would be a key focus 
regardless of whatever other issues might be discussed.  Tazhiev 
also said that Saudabayev had found A/S Blake particularly warm, 
taking a strong personal interest in building the relationship.  On 
the Zhovtis case, there were few surprises and Tazhiev said that the 
embassy's request to visit the Ust-Kamenogorsk penal colony where 
the human rights activist is being held was nearly complete.   He 
expected resolution within a week. 
 
ABC SHOULD BE GRANDER 
 
4.  (SBU) Turning to the ABC scheduled for March 8-9, Tazhiev said 
Astana was ready to name its co-chairs once the United States 
provides information about its goals.  But he repeated what we have 
often heard:  Saudabayev still wants something more.  Looking to the 
Russia format and to past practice, he recounted the history of the 
joint commission during former President Clinton's presidency. 
According to Tazhiev, Saudabayev said this was the right formula for 
getting things done:  a broad policy forum with high-level backing 
and sufficient staff support to ensure progress on the agenda.  He 
said that the Annual Bilateral Consultations were a far cry from the 
past since they would take place at the level of Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kairat Umarov and A/S Blake.  He said Astana doubted that 
this forum carried the appropriate political heft to get things done 
in Astana, and urged Washington to hear that Astana still prefers a 
higher level forum.  Charge said the Bureau of South and Central 
Asian Affairs was committed to a successful dialogue across the 
board.  Washington was preparing for the Summit and we expect the 
bilateral consultations with Kazakhstan to be as successful as those 
with other Central Asian states. 
 
CENTCOM VISIT MAY CONFLICT WITH THE ABC 
 
5.  (SBU) Tazhiev welcomed the February 21 visit of SRAP Holbrooke, 
but said a meeting with President Nazarbayev was not possible.  He 
noted that CENTCOM General Patraeus would come to Astana March 9, 
but worried that this conflicted with the ABCs, yet another sign of 
the questionable importance of the forum.  Charge assured him that 
the Commander's visit would cover very specific issues, and said it 
was likely that the Ambassador would travel to Washington to 
participate in the broader forum. 
 
HELP ON MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
 
6.  (SBU) Charge left informal points on two lingering 
administrative issues:  first, the need for a meeting with Almaty 
tax authorities to assist locally-engaged staff, and second, 
lingering concerns over receipt of the diplomatic pouch.  Tazhiev 
 
ASTANA 00000187  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
promised to assist with both, particularly the taxation meeting. 
Charge assured him that many employees want to act in good faith and 
pay their personal income taxes on a timely basis, which is our 
policy and theirs, but conflicting information and extra pressure 
from the authorities have created needless anxiety and confusion. 
 
COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST 
 
7.  (SBU) The MFA view on the ABC is not new.  We have an 
opportunity to make the ABC forum a productive and successful forum, 
but engagement with the Kazakhstani government will be most 
effective if we propose our agenda and co-chairs in the coming days. 
 While Charge made clear that the current formula is the one to 
prepare for, we can expect a continued press for a higher level 
forum that mirrors the format of the U.S.-Russia dialogue.  Charge 
expressed the view that the ABC is a pragmatic and flexible format 
designed to address each country's situation.  It offers the best 
way forward to address many issues of mutual interest.  Keeping the 
Kazakhstanis positive and engaged will depend on our providing 
information soon about the agenda and our co-chairs.  Post requests 
Washington action soonest.  END COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

10ASTANA186, KAZAKHSTAN: OSCE HEAD TAKES ADVANTAGE OF

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA186 2010-02-12 10:10 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2424
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0186/01 0431010
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121010Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7396
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2446
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1806
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1422
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2512
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0666
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2003
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1851
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2274

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000186 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  OSCE HEAD TAKES ADVANTAGE OF 
"POSITIVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS" 
 
ASTANA 00000186  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public 
Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Ambassador Alexandre Keltchewsky, Head of 
the OSCE Center in Astana, told the Charge d'Affaires during 
a luncheon on February 1 that the OSCE and Kazakhstan have 
politely differed over words and perceptions, a tendency that 
he called  "positive misunderstandings." The dissonance has 
allowed the OSCE to take the government at its word, and 
raise issues it might not otherwise have been able to discuss 
publicly.  But, Kazakhstan sometimes uses the differences to 
slip past the hard work on its third dimension shortcomings. 
Keltchewsky cautioned that this was something member states 
needed to watch and counter.  Regarding the possibility of an 
OSCE Summit in 2010, Keltchewsky recommended a "wait and see" 
approach.  "Kazakhstan has something to sell," he said.  "We 
should bargain to make sure we get the best possible price 
for it."  END SUMMARY. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN'S STRONG PUSH FOR AN OSCE SUMMIT 
 
3.  (SBU) During a two-hour lunch at the residence of the 
Deputy Chief of Mission, the Head of the Center for the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 
Astana, Ambassador Alexandre Keltchewsky, commented on 
Kazakhstan's priorities as Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE in 
2010.  He said Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev's top 
priority is to convene a Summit of OSCE members, possibly in 
Vienna or Madrid.  Keltchewsky said that Spain has been very 
active in the OSCE and has expressed a willingness to host 
the Summit.  "Of course," he opined, "we have to be in favor 
of a Summit.  What else can we say?  But it must have 
substance and produce results."  Keltchewsky was reluctant to 
attach conditions to a Summit, but said that Kazakhstan must 
meet certain "pre-requisites" to justify the participation of 
heads of state.  He added, "The question is where, and when, 
to hold the Summit," noting that it could conceivably take 
place in 2011, although he acknowledged that would "deeply 
offend" the Kazakhstani government. 
 
4.  (SBU) Keltchewsky said that the idea of an informal 
Ministerial was suggested by OSCE Secretary General Mark 
Perren de Brishambo in Astana in October 2009.  Keltchewsky 
said that Saudabayev pressed hard for a firm commitment to a 
Summit in 2010, and Brishambo proposed holding an informal 
meeting with OSCE Foreign Ministers in the middle of 2010 as 
a compromise.  According to Keltchewsky, Saudabayev was 
visibly unhappy with this arrangement, but agreed to it in 
the end.  "Getting a Summit is (Saudabayev's) only task," 
said Keltchewsky.  "He is under orders from the top." 
Keltchewsky said he was not opposed to a Summit in principle, 
but recommended a "wait and see" approach. "Kazakhstan has 
something to sell," he said.  "We should not be victims here. 
 We should not allow Kazakhstan to play us.  We should 
bargain to make sure we get the best possible price for it." 
He said that a "jubilee Summit" to mark the 35th anniversary 
of the Helsinki Accords, the 20th anniversary of the Paris 
Declaration, and the 65th anniversary of the end of World War 
II was not sufficient justification to gather OSCE heads of 
state. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Keltchewsky admitted that previous gatherings -- 
such as the Istanbul Summit in 1999 -- have produced few 
tangible results, but he attributed that to international 
politics.  "The states are playing a game," he said.  "They 
agree to misunderstand their agreements."  He suggested that 
a Summit in 2010 could be similar, in that member states 
could speak positively about areas of common ground, while 
avoiding areas of disagreement. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000186  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
EAST AND WEST STILL DIVIDED 
 
6.  (SBU) In describing the relationship between East and 
West since the end of the Cold War, Keltchewsky said that in 
his opinion "there has been no -- or very little -- progress 
in the dialogue on security matters."  Citing Russian 
President Medvedev's proposed European security charter, 
Keltchewsky said that Russia "completely misunderstands the 
Western position on security issues."  He said Medvedev's 
proposal relies entirely on United Nations resolutions that 
are not legally binding, and focuses exclusively on "hard 
security" issues to prevent armed conflict, which Keltchewsky 
said were not as relevant today. 
 
LOST IN TRANSLATION 
 
7.  (SBU) According to Keltchewsky, the main priorities for 
the OSCE now are economic cooperation, the Human Dimension, 
and the rule of law -- not confict prevention.  He insisted 
that progress and reform in these areas could increase 
confidence among member states, even more than military 
cooperation.  "These are the issues we should discuss at a 
Summit," he said.  He suggested that there is a persistent 
cultural divide between East and West, and noted that the 
Russian translation of "Human Dimension" ("gumanitarnoe 
izmereniye") does not capture the true meaning of the term, 
and can lead to misunderstanding on the issues.  Rather than 
an emphasis on the inalienable human rights of the 
individual, for example, the Russian translation stresses the 
rights of a group of individuals who have been granted 
protection by the state.  "That is totally different from the 
Western concept," he insisted.  When asked if Kazakhstan's 
leadership understood the nuances, Keltchewsky said that 
Deputy Foreign Minister Konstantin Zhigalov did, "but he can 
only share 50% of it with the top.  He has to swallow the 
rest, because he knows they won't want to hear it." 
 
"POSITIVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS" OPEN A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
 
8.  (SBU) Turning to Kazakhstan, Keltchewsky said that the 
country is still best characterized as a newly independent 
state, not as an emerging democracy in a state of transition. 
 "Kazakhstan is the result of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, not an independence movement," he stated. 
Nevertheless, he said that the OSCE Center has had some 
success in Kazakhstan and has benefitted from a series of 
"positive misunderstandings" that have enabled the Center to 
work in areas, such as the Human Dimension, that the 
government might otherwise not have allowed.  For example, he 
told the Charge that a government-supported institute, the 
Institute of Parliaments, approached the Center asking for 
advice and support for a conference on the OSCE.  Keltchewsky 
understood that the institute simply wanted to promote 
Kazakhstan's role as Chairman-in-Office, but he agreed to 
provide support nevertheless, and was able to shift the 
agenda to focus on the Human Dimension, and invite several 
leaders from civil society. 
 
PRESIDENT FOR LIFE 
 
9.  (SBU) Commenting on the general state of democracy in 
Kazakhstan, Keltchewsky said that the situation is "even 
worse" now than it was one year ago.  He called President 
Nazarbayev a "good khoziyan" (boss, or master), gave 
Nazarbayev credit for his adroit handling of the large ethnic 
minority populations in Kazakhstan, and complimented 
Nazarbayev's proposed National Unity Doctrine.  He also 
suggested that Nazarbayev does not have 100% control over all 
of the factions vying for power in Kazakhstan, noting that 
the National Security Committee (KNB) and Ministry of 
 
ASTANA 00000186  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
Internal Affairs enjoy some degree of autonomy. Q(GQp Kazakhstan now that they 
are 
Chairman-in-Office," he insisted. 
GREENQ-Q~U~WQreens are good camouflage," not a legitimate opposition 
party.  He speculated that the Green PaQQA0e 
also claimed that the "St. Petersburg mafia -- including 
(Russian Prime Minister Vladimir) Putin -- is much more 
liberal than the other mafias in Russia," because of their 
exposure to the West, and their degrees in modern economics 
and law.  (NOTE:  Keltchewsky is a French career diplomat 
whose family emigrated from St. Petersburg; he served as 
France's Consul General in St. Petersburg from 1998-2002. 
END NOTE). 
 
DEMOCRACY AND ETHNICITY 
 
12.  (SBU) Keltchewsky told the Charge that he believes there 
is greater potential for political reform among the ethnic 
Russian population of Kazakhstan than among the ethnic Kazakh 
population.  He pointed out, for example, that most of the 
leaders of Kazakhstan's civil society organizations are 
ethnic Russians.  The Charge politely disagreed, noting that 
there are many outstanding think tank and NGO representatives 
of every ethnicity in Kazakhstan. Further, there is no ethnic 
Russian political movement, or community leader, and that it 
is likely that ethnic Russians with initiative, ambition, and 
skills gravitated to civil society because most of the 
leadership positions in government have been occupied by 
ethnic Kazakhs. 
 
13.  (SBU) Talk then turned to the 2009 census, the results 
of which were released on February 10.  According to the 
census, 63% of Kazakhstan's 16.2 million are ethnic Kazakhs, 
an increase of 26% since the 1999 census.  (NOTE:  According 
to the census, ethnic Russians comprise 23% of the 
population, Uzbeks 3%, Ukrainians 2%, Uigurs 1.4%, Tatars 
1.2%, Germans 1.1%, and other ethnic groups 4.5%.  END NOTE). 
 Keltchewsky said the percentage of ethnic Kazakhs was "a 
political figure," suggesting the data were manipulated for 
political purposes.  He also said that if the figures are 
correct, then nearly half of the ethnic German population has 
left Kazakhstan, "likely the most active and talented half." 
 
THE OSCE AND AFGHANISTAN 
 
13.  (SBU) When asked what the OSCE could realistically 
accomplish in Afghanistan, Keltchewsky admitted that the 
 
ASTANA 00000186  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
organization did not have an ambitous agenda.  "Kazakhstan is 
interested in Afghanistan," he said, "only because the United 
States is interested."  He noted that Kazakhstan has 
announced a program of bilateral economic and educational 
assistance, and suggested that Kazakhstan could contribute to 
efforts to stem drug trafficking, but opined that Kazakhstan 
"is in no position to contribute to the stabilization of the 
country." 
 
14.  (SBU) COMMENT:  A conversation with Ambassador 
Keltchewsky is never predictable, prosaic, or short.  He has 
a fascinating personal history, and valuable experience, in 
the region, but his comments frequently reflect his own 
personal, somewhat elitist views than those of the 
organization he represents.  His vision is understandably 
formed by his vantage point, a fact that is worth keeping in 
mind as Kazakhstan and the OSCE member states continue to 
shape the ambitous agenda the Chairman-in-Office has set for 
2010.  END COMMENT. 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

10ASTANA179, KAZAKHSTAN URGES U.S. SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL INITIATIVE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA179 2010-02-11 08:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1169
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0179 0420828
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 110828Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7388
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2441
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1801
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2507
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1417
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2696
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2986
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1998
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1846
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS ASTANA 000179 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN/WMDT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MNUC KNNP RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN URGES U.S. SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL INITIATIVE 
CONFERENCE 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 0037 
 (B) 08 ASTANA 1541 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 7. 
 
3.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) invited 
the Russian DCM and Political Officer to a meeting on February 9 to 
urge U.S. and Russia's support for Kazakhstan's proposal to host a 
Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) conference in 
Astana.  MFA plans to host the conference of experts and 
policy-makers on or around April 7 so it could serve as a 
"springboard" for the April 12-13 Global Nuclear Security Summit 
(GNSS).  While the MFA is working on the agenda and specific topics, 
Sadykov underlined that U.S. and Russian support were necessary 
before substantive planning could begin.  Sadykov also sought U.S. 
and Russia's support for Kazakhstan's bid to join the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (SBU) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Director of the 
Multilateral Cooperation Department, Barlybay Sadykov, invited for a 
meeting the Russian DCM and Political officer to further discuss 
Kazakhstan's proposal to hold a Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear 
Terrorism (GICNT) conference in Astana (ref A).  During the February 
9 meeting, Sadykov urged the U.S. and Russia, as GICNT co-chairs, to 
support the conference in principle and to "do so expeditiously to 
assure appropriate participation and representation of member 
states."  The Russian DCM and Political Officer told Sadykov that 
Kazakhstan's proposal is under consideration in Moscow and 
Washington. 
 
4.  (SBU) Sadykov said the Kazakhstanis intends to hold the 
conference before the Global Nuclear Security Summit (GNSS), "on or 
around April 7."  (NOTE: The MFA was initially flexible on the 
timing and amendable to holding the conference either before or 
after the GNSS (ref A).  END NOTE.)  He asserted that the conference 
could serve as "a springboard" for the GNSS.  While GNSS would 
address the issue of nuclear terrorism from the global perspective, 
he opined, the Astana conference could focus on regional 
cooperation.  Target participants would include "experts and 
political decision-makers" from agencies in capitals dealing with 
nuclear non-proliferation.  Sadykov said the agenda and specific 
topics should be ready within 10 days, but underlined that U.S. and 
Russian support were necessary before substantive planning could 
begin. 
 
5.  (SBU) Sadykov used this opportunity to seek U.S. and Russia's 
support for Kazakhstan's bid to join the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) (ref B).  He stressed that U.S. and Russia are 
"members of authority whose voices carry weight."  Sadykov allowed 
that the question of new members joining MTCR is "a nuanced, 
political question," but expressed hope that U.S. and Russia will 
support Kazakhstan "in the spirit of our strategic partnership." 
 
6.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post would appreciate the Department's 
expeditious response to Kazakhstan's proposal of hosting a GICNT 
conference in Astana on April 7.  We would also appreciate guidance 
on responding to Sadykov's request concerning the MTCR. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

10ASTANA175, KAZAKHSTAN’S DELEGATION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA175 2010-02-10 09:42 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0423
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0175/01 0410942
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100942Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7380
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2439
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1799
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2505
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1415
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1996
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1844
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2270

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000175 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC, S/P, R/PPR 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN'S DELEGATION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP SUMMIT 
 
REF:  (A) STATE 4423 
      (B) 09 ASTANA 2157 
      (C) 09 STATE 112495 
      (D) 09 ASTANA 2099 
 
ASTANA 00000175  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (U) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST:  See paragraph 5 for Action 
Request.  All three of Kazakhstan's approved nominees to the 
Presidential Entrepreneurship Summit have confirmed their 
participation in the Summit on April 26-27.  Post will continue to 
conduct representational and public diplomacy events to promote the 
goals of the Summit and to facilitate partnerships among business 
owners and other community leaders in support of entrepreneurship 
and economic opportunity in Kazakhstan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (SBU) Kazakhstan's delegation to the Presidential 
Entrepreneurship Summit will include: 
 
-- Nurlan Kapparov, a 39-year old multi-millionaire who got his 
start in the oil business and now runs a successful international 
corporation with interests in the energy, tourism, and construction 
sectors.  Kapparov is also Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the 
Jambyl Foundation, co-founder of the Harvard Club of Central Asia 
(HCCA), and co-founder of Kazakhstan's chapter of the Young 
Presidents Organization. 
 
-- Yerzhan Mandiyev, 37, president of AziaAvto, which assembles 
Niva, Skoda, and General Motors vehicles.  Mandiyev is an active 
promoter of entrepreneurial values and represents the interests of 
domestic entrepreneurs as a member of the management board of the 
Atameken Union of Entrepreneurs and the Presidential Council of 
Entrepreneurs. 
 
-- Raimbek Batalov, 39, founder and Chairman of Raimbek Group, a 
diversified food products company established in 1992.  In 2002, 
Batalov was elected Chairman of the Board of the Forum of 
Entrepreneurs, a position he continues to hold today.  Batalov has 
also been a member of the Presidential Council of Entrepreneurs 
since 2006. 
 
4.  (SBU) Kapparov and Batalov have valid U.S. visas and travel to 
the United States regularly on business.  Mandiyev has visited the 
United States previously on business, but does not currently have a 
valid U.S. visa.  The Consular Section has been apprised of the 
purpose of Mandiyev's visit to the United States, and has scheduled 
an interview for him on March 3. 
 
5.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Yerzhan Mandiyev has asked for USG 
assistance to arrange a meeting with representatives from General 
Motors (GM), which licenses vehicles sold by AziaAvto.  According to 
Mandiyev, the Cadillac vehicles his company assembles urgently need 
a Cadillac premium part.  He informed Econ Officer on February 3 
that AziaAvto reached agreement with GM through their European 
office in Budapest to produce Cadillac vehicles.  However, as a 
result of GM's reorganization, the Budapest office no longer 
recognizes the licensing arrangement, and AziaAvto cannot renew 
orders for parts from the United States.  Mandiyev has requested a 
meeting with GM executives in Washington, D.C. or Detroit during his 
visit to the United States for the Summit.  Post would appreciate 
guidance and recommendations from EEB and the Department of Commerce 
in particular.  END ACTION REQUEST. 
 
6.  (SBU) On February 25, the Ambassador will host an evening 
reception for all 12 of Kazakhstan's original nominees to the 
Presidential Entrepreneurship Summit (ref D).  In addition, the 
Ambassador has invited diplomats from the Middle East and Europe in 
order to highlight the connection between the Summit and the 
President's June 2009 Cairo speech.  Post will continue to host, 
facilitate, and promote public diplomacy events with entrepreneurs 
and community leaders as the date of the Summit approaches.  In 
 
ASTANA 00000175  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
addition, Post will continue to engage with potential partners, 
companies, foundations, philanthropists, NGOs, and leaders from 
educational institutions to generate commitments and forge 
partnerships that could be profiled at the Summit in USG officials, 
remarks, fact sheets and press releases. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

10ASTANA163, KAZAKHSTAN: NEW CURRENCY CORRIDOR FOR THE TENGE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA163 2010-02-09 07:50 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9563
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0163/01 0400750
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 090750Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7366
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2437
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1797
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2503
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1413
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1994
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1842
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2265

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000163 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/IFD/OMA 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA, USTR, AND OPIC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EFIN KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  NEW CURRENCY CORRIDOR FOR THE TENGE 
 
ASTANA 00000163  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (U) SUMMARY:  The National Bank of Kazakhstan introduced a new 
currency corridor on February 5.  On average, the exchange rate of 
the tenge will remain at 150 tenge to the dollar.  However, the 
National Bank said the tenge will now be allowed to float between 
127.5 and 165 to the dollar (plus 10% and minus 15%), in order to 
increase exchange rate flexibility.  The new currency corridor will 
remain in effect until March 2011. Analysts said that 
destabilization of the currency exchange market in Kazakhstan is 
very unlikely.  END SUMMARY. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN WEATHERS ECONOMIC CRISIS BETTER THAN OTHERS 
 
3.  (U) February 4 was the one-year anniversary of the National Bank 
of Kazakhstan's (NBK) devaluation of the tenge in 2009, when the 
currency was devalued by 26.4%.  Throughout the remainder of 2009, 
the NBK maintained an exchange rate of 150 to the dollar, plus or 
minus three percent.  In contrast, from the third quarter of 2008 to 
the first quarter of 2009, the nominal exchange rate of the Russian 
ruble decreased by 43.6%, the Ukrainian hryvna by 62.1%, the Latvian 
lat by 15.5%, and the Hungarian forint by 45.9%.  In addition, the 
NBK's 2009 Financial Stability Report noted that Kazakhstan's 
reserves declined significantly less than those of Russia, Ukraine, 
and Latvia.  From the beginning of 2008 to the first quarter of 
2009, Russia's international reserves fell by 31% , Latvia's by 33%, 
and Ukraine's 24%, while Kazakhstan's declined by only 14% .  In 
2009, real GDP in Russia contracted 10.9%, in Ukraine 17.8%, and in 
Latvia 18.7%, while in Kazakhstan, real GDP shrank by 2.2%. 
Meanwhile, the National Bank of Kazakhstan managed to replenish its 
gold and foreign currency reserves, which grew from $19.87 billion 
in December 2008 to $23.22 billion as of December 2009. 
 
NEW CURRENCY CORRIDOR FOR THE TENGE 
 
4.  (U) On December 30, 2009, the NBK officially declared it would 
widen the tenge-dollar exchange corridor from February 5, 2010 to 
March 20, 2011.  Thus, the tenge will be allowed to appreciate in 
value by 15% (127.5 to the dollar), or depreciate by 10% (165 to the 
dollar).  The Governor of the National Bank of Kazakhstan, Grigoriy 
Marchenko, said at a press conference on January 27 that the new 
corridor reflected his assessment that the tenge is more likely to 
appreciate than depreciate during this period.  Marchenko explained 
that the exchange rate would nevertheless be vulnerable to a number 
of factors, including export prices, the balance of payments, and 
exchange rates between the dollar and euro, the ruble and dollar, 
and the ruble and euro. 
 
TWO FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS DRIVE TENGE APPRECIATION 
 
5.  (U) According to an article in the "Business and Vlast" 
newspaper on January 22, two major factors are likely to contribute 
to further tenge appreciation:  rising export prices and an 
improving balance of payments.  The National Bank forecast assumes 
that oil prices will remain at current levels for the duration of 
2010, while prices for other major exports such as metals, coal, and 
wheat would remain high throughout 2010.  (NOTE:  In November 2009, 
copper prices increased by 6.2%, lead by 3%, zinc by 5.8%, and wheat 
by 16.6%, compared to October 2009.  END NOTE).  According to the 
NBK's 2009 Financial Stability Report, the balance of payments is 
unlikely to worsen due to declining world commodity prices.  The 
same report noted that Kazakhstan ended 2009 with an estimated 
balance of payment surplus of 2.1% of GDP, and the projected  a 
surplus of 0.7-1% in 2010.  Gold and currency reserves of the 
National Bank will continue to grow in 2010, albeit moderately, and, 
according to the NBK, will cover not less than six months of 
imported goods and services.  Sabit Khakimzhanov, an analyst with 
Halyk Finance, said in a company newsletter on January 25 that he 
expects an appreciation of the tenge in the short-term, while the 
NBK reaps the benefits of an undervalued currency. 
 
6.  (U) The National Bank began to adjust its exchange rate policy 
 
ASTANA 00000163  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
in 2009.  In November 2009, for example, the NBK announced plans to 
widen the currency corridor following news of a markedly improved 
balance of payment.  According to Halyk Finance's Khakimzhanov, the 
NBK purchased $2 billion in November 2009.  During the first three 
weeks of January, the NBK intervened in the
market daily as 
essentially the only seller of the tenge.  According to 
Khakimzhanov, the NBK was the only buyer of the dollar on 
Kazakhstan's currency markets in early January, purchasing $2.35 
billion from January 5-22. 
 
A "DANCE FLOOR", NOT A CORRIDOR 
 
7.  (SBU) The NBK's Deputy Director of the Department for Balance of 
Payments and Currency Regulation, Aigul Boranbayeva, told Econ 
Officer on January 25 that the new currency corridor will be more of 
a "dance floor" than a corridor.  She said that a variety of factors 
will have an unpredictable impact on the tenge exchange rate, 
including the new tariff regime of the Customs Union, debt 
restructuring negotiations with Alliance and BTA banks, and 
commodity prices.  As a result, she said, the National Bank decided 
to ease up on a strict currency band and allow the tenge to 
fluctuate more freely. 
 
LIMITS OF TENGE APPRECIATION 
 
8.  (SBU) Boranbayeva did not rule out the possibility of a sudden 
appreciation of the tenge, from 148 KTZ/USD, for example, to 127 
KTZ/USD.  However, according to Halyk's Khakimzhanov, a sharp 
appreciation so soon after the introduction of a new band would only 
increase market volatility, and force the NBK to intervene to 
stabilize the currency, which would draw down the country's foreign 
currency reserves. 
 
READ MY LIPS:  NO NEW DEVALUATION 
 
9.  (U) Marchenko said at a press conference on January 27 that 
there will not be a new devaluation of the tenge.  He joked that 
"conspiracy theories will continue, but the population trusts us 
more and more."  He added emphatically that "there will not be a new 
devaluation or a sharp appreciation of the tenge on February 5, 
2010." 
 
10.  (SBU) COMMENT:  A wide range of factors will affect the value 
of the tenge, including foreign trade volumes.  Approximately 37% of 
Kazakhstan's external trade is with Russia.  The Customs Union is 
expected to boost Kazakhstan's trade with Russia, and will 
consequently strengthen the tenge's tie to the Russian ruble.  For 
the National Bank, that has both risks and rewards.  Marchenko's top 
priority is ensuring a stable exchange rate within a flexible 
corridor.  As long as the Russian ruble is stable, or appreciates, 
the tenge will not come under intense pressure.  If, however, the 
ruble falls and the tenge does not follow, it will make Russian 
imports cheaper and Kazakhstani products less competitive.  At that 
point, Marchenko may come under political pressure to intervene. 
END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

10ASTANA162, KAZAKHSTAN: LABOR MARKET CONCERNS TAKE CENTER STAGE AT

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA162 2010-02-09 03:05 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO9377
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0162/01 0400305
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 090305Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7364
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2435
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1795
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2501
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1411
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1992
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1840
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2263

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000162 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ECON EINV ELAB SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  LABOR MARKET CONCERNS TAKE CENTER STAGE AT 
MAZHILIS ROUNDTABLE 
 
ASTANA 00000162  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Nur Otan National Democratic Party of 
Kazakhstan co-hosted a roundtable on January 19 at the lower house 
of parliament (Mazhilis) to discuss the legal definition of 
"self-employment" and how to implement policy mechanisms to address 
this discreet -- if not illegal -- form of entrepreneurship. 
Members of parliament were more concerned about the absence of 
quality vocational education and the inability of Kazakhstan to 
respond quickly to changes in the labor market.  END SUMMARY 
 
THE SELF-EMPLOYED IN KAZAKHSTAN 
 
3.  (SBU) The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, together with 
the Presidential Commission on Women's Issues and Family 
Demographics, commissioned a local research institute to study 
"self-employment" in Kazakhstan.  The research, funded by the United 
Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), studied a sample of 300 
self-employed people in the city and oblast of Almaty. 
 
4.  (SBU) There is no official definition of "self-employment" in 
Kazakhstan.  This roundtable recommended that parliament agree on a 
legal definition and amend legislation regulating employment, the 
tax code, and licensing to formalize this informal sector of the 
labor market.  Some parliamentarians defined self-employment as 
working without declaration of income while failing to pay taxes and 
failing to contribute to the national pension fund.  (NOTE: The IRS 
defines self-employment as carrying on a trade or business as a sole 
proprietor.  END NOTE). 
 
5.  (SBU) The roundtable initiated a legislative dialogue on 
understanding and classifying self-employment, in order to usher the 
more than one-third of the Kazakhstani labor force (an estimated 3 
million citizens) into the legal licensing framework.  Social 
advocates at the roundtable saw this discussion as an opportunity 
for the government to take a more active role in fighting poverty 
and advancing the rights of women and families.  However, the 
discourse quickly became adversarial, with parliamentarians viewing 
the integration of the informal sector as a long over-due task of 
legal compliance. 
 
SIMPLIFY, INCENTIVIZE AND STIMULATE 
 
6.  (SBU) The roundtable participants suggested that the government 
simplify the registration (patents) procedure for the self-employed; 
enhance microcredit possibilities; offer tax incentives for labor 
legitimacy; retool the manner in which unemployment benefits are 
distributed; and stimulate the creation of women-owned and 
youth-owned businesses through the provision of technical assistance 
in business planning, access to finance, and retail consulting 
services. 
 
7.  (SBU) The roundtable concluded with a recommendation to appeal 
to international organizations (UNIFEM, UNDP, and the ILO were 
identified) for assistance to support and protect the self-employed 
in Kazakhstan. 
 
8.  (SBU) Advocates for the self-employed promoted mainstream labor 
market integration and support for those who wish to become or 
remain self-employed.  However, members of parliament accused the 
self-employed of bankrupting the social welfare system, by straining 
the services of the state for medical attention and failing to 
contribute to the "greater good" of society. 
 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT:  THE RESULT OF POOR LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS? 
 
9.  (SBU) According to several deputies in attendance, 
self-employment is on the rise because of Kazakhstan's inability to 
teach and train individuals to meet the demands of the labor market. 
 Deputy Svetlana Ferkho, for example, opined that university 
students pursue the wrong course of study.  Pointing to East 
 
ASTANA 00000162  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
Kazakhstan oblast, where thousands of students study engineering and 
economics, she exclaimed, "Do we really need this many engineers and 
bean-counters?"  She further lamented that "a specialized diploma in 
Kazakhstan is fast becoming a route to unemployment."  Ferkho said 
that too many Kazakhstani students pursue international relations 
degrees and added tersely, "How many people do we really need with 
this type of degree?  We have a diplom
atic academy for international 
relations.  This field of study is strictly for diplomats, not for 
those entering the workforce."  (NOTE:  Another deputy echoed these 
comments and recommended students pursue jobs in high demand, such 
as pastry chefs and seamstresses.  END NOTE). 
 
10.  (SBU) The roundtable participants then discussed the ability of 
the Kazakhstani workforce to respond to the demands of the labor 
market.  Vladimir Nekhoroshev, Deputy Leader of Nur Otan, said that 
"no one in Kazakhstan effectively studies the demands of the labor 
market -- not the Ministry of Education, not the Ministry of 
Labor...  Kazakhstan requires a qualified cadre of specialists." 
His rhetorical questions resonated:  "How can we prepare students 
for jobs that are in high demand?  Even more important, how do we 
know what jobs in five to ten years will be in demand?" 
 
IS THE WORLD'S OLDEST PROFESSION CONSIDERED SELF-EMPLOYMENT? 
 
11.  (SBU) After initial constructive comments, Deputy Nekhoroshev 
proved to be a distraction.  Following a rant that official 
recognition of self-employment was "just a ploy to hide the true 
unemployment rate," he wondered if prostitutes would qualify as 
self-employed; and if so, "would 'ladies of the night' be given the 
same government support that this roundtable recommends?"  (NOTE: 
In December 2009 Nekhoroshev proposed a ban on advertisements of 
sexual services in the media and Internet.  He was unsuccessful in 
his bid, which garnered considerable media attention.  END NOTE). 
 
12.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The roundtable focused primarily on 
Kazakhstan's readiness to meet labor market demands, but did not 
address the more immediate and equally essential challenge of 
passing legislation to define and classify "self-employment." 
Development assistance to improve understanding of labor 
classification, labor market responsiveness, and the creation of a 
robust vocational education framework will likely be welcome at the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Protection and the Ministry of 
Education and Science.  These issues also touch on related issues of 
women's rights, rural development, and small business development, a 
niche for Kazakhstan NGOs.  END COMMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

10ASTANA158, KAZAKHSTAN: MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND AN NGO JOIN FORCES TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA158 2010-02-05 10:14 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO7474
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0158/01 0361014
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051014Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7357
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2429
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1789
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2495
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1405
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1986
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1834
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2258
RUEAWJL/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC 0072

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000158 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, G/TIP, SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ELAB SMIG SOCI KCRM KTIP UZ KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND AN NGO JOIN FORCES TO 
OFFER TIP VICTIM PROTECTION IN ASTANA 
 
ASTANA 00000158  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but Unclassified.  Not for public internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Prior to a February 3 press conference to 
discuss joint Kazakshtan-U.S. efforts to combat 
trafficking-in-persons (TIP), Charge and INL Officer visited the 
newly-opened, government-funded TIP shelter operated by local NGO 
Korgau-Astana.  The shelter differs greatly from the 
privately-funded Almaty TIP shelter that INL Officer visited in 
December 2009, although each shelter has its own strengths and 
weaknesses.  Victims need services in both of Kazakhstan's two major 
cities.  The Astana shelter offers a promising new avenue of 
cooperation between NGOs and the national government on anti-TIP 
efforts.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED SHELTERS 
 
3.  (SBU) The Astana shelter was opened in September 2009 by local 
NGO Korgau-Astana, with funding from a Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
three-year grant, which provides for both the development of a TIP 
shelter network and a pilot shelter in Astana.  The government plans 
to open similar shelters in other regions of Kazakhstan as soon as 
shelter standards are developed. 
 
4.  (U) INL Officer has met on several occasions with the Anna Ryl, 
the Director of Korgau-Astana Director, and the NGO's attorney Olga 
Ryl, who is also the Director of the NGO Pravo and Anna's mother. 
Korgau-Astana was the only applicant from Astana for the MOJ grant, 
though the tender was announced twice.  The first tender received 
applications from only two NGOs in Karaganda.  Korgau-Astana has 
strong connections in the government through Olga Ryl, a former 
police officer who worked in counter-narcotics divisions throughout 
most of her 30-year-career.  She helped draft the current 
counter-narcotics law and established the first government drug 
rehabilitation centers in Kazakhstan. 
 
5.  (SBU) The MOJ grant includes the development of standards for 
shelters for all victims of violence, including TIP victims, 
throughout Kazakhstan.  The government expects the Astana shelter to 
be a model facility and is pinning its hopes on Olga Ryl to help 
develop the necessary legal standards based on her experience 
drafting legislation for drug rehabilitation centers. 
 
6.  (SBU) Although pleased by the government's efforts overall, some 
local NGO representatives who asked not to be identified wondered 
how a newly-formed NGO was able to receive an MOJ grant, and doubted 
that Korgau-Astana has relevant TIP experience.  In fact, one NGO 
network with no previous members in Astana refused to accept 
Korgau-Astana's membership.  The president of that network and a 
member complained to INL Officer that the government does not 
appropriately vet grant applications and only looks for the cheapest 
alternatives with no consideration of an NGO's experience or the 
quality of the service for recipients. 
 
ASTANA TIP SHELTER 
 
7.  (SBU) The Astana shelter is a house located in a quiet, 
working-class residential section of Astana.  It has a modern 
kitchen, one bathroom, a large living room with a small office, two 
bedrooms with four beds each, and a bedroom for two.  The director, 
a psychologist, a social worker, an attorney, a victim advocate, an 
accountant, and two guards work in the shelter.  One additional 
employee answers the shelter's hotline. 
 
8.  (SBU) During its first five months, the shelter's hotline 
(telephone number +7 7172 509 509) received 112 phone calls, 43 of 
which involved trafficking in persons.  The Astana shelter has 
assisted 24 trafficking victims since its establishment; victims 
typically stay in the shelter for two to three months.  Victims have 
been sent to the shelter by the police and by churches, and some are 
identified through the shelter's hotline or found in the street by 
social workers. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000158  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
9.  (SBU) Shelter personnel also work to combat trafficking.  For 
example, during a victim's stay in the shelter, employees collect 
information about traffickers, pimps, and the locations of brothels. 
 Employees have identified 167 apartments used as brothels and 
determined that an individual pimp earns approximately $200,000 a &#x0
00A;year.  This information has been placed into a database, which the 
NGO plans to give to police officials.  However, the NGO is 
carefully looking for a trustworthy interlocutor among the police. 
The NGO has not yet revealed the location of the shelter even to 
local police and sends a driver to pick up victims identified by law 
enforcement authorities. 
 
AFTER THE NIGHTMARE, AN URGE TO LIVE 
 
10.  (SBU) At the time of the Charge's visit, two young women were 
in the shelter: 
 
-- A 17-year-old with a 5-day-old infant, who had lived in Astana 
with her grandmother until she turned 15.  Because of difficulties 
with her parents, she had lived with her grandmother.  After her 
grandmother's death, she briefly returned to her parents' house for 
a while.  She ran away from home and met a young man who turned out 
to be a pimp.  She worked for him for almost a year.  She reported 
that pimps used rented apartments and changed locations every three 
days.  She got pregnant at the age of 16, but was forced to work 
until her eighth month of pregnancy.  She went into premature labor 
because of the burden of five to seven clients a day at which point 
the boyfriend/pimp threw her out of the apartment.  A social worker 
found her in the street and took her to a hospital.  The pimp found 
her and attempted to discharge her, but the doctors kept her in the 
hospital.  The baby was born without observable health problems. 
 
-- A 21-year-old-girl from Shymkent was trafficked by her boyfriend 
while she was attending a university in Almaty.  The boyfriend was 
attending the same university, but worked as a pimp in the evening. 
He first sold her to his friends, but was later sold four times to 
different pimps.  During an armed altercation between pimps, she and 
another girl jumped out of a window to escape and broke her leg. 
When shelter personnel attempted to return her to her family in 
Shymkent, they refused to accept her because she had been a 
prostitute.  Her sisters refuse to speak to her and do not allow her 
to communicate with her parents. She is recovering at the shelter 
and plans to resume her education. 
 
11.  (SBU) Shelter personnel also shared the story of an Uzbek girl 
who escaped from the same brothel as the 21 year old victim.  She 
arrived at the shelter, desperately ill and emaciated; she weighed 
only 70 pounds.  Doctors believed that, had she not escaped, she 
would have succumbed to her illness.  At the age of 15 she was 
forced to marry a 30-year-old from her village.  Her uncle and his 
friends raped her and sold her to a pimp.  She was locked in 
apartments for two years until her escape.  The girl had been 
willing to risk escape because she feared that she would soon die 
anyway.  Shelter personnel found the girl's brother, who was willing 
to accept her.  However, the night before she was to leave the 
shelter, she used manicure scissors to destroy her new clothes in 
the hope that she would not have to leave the shelter.  She received 
psychological treatment before they attempted to send her home 
again. 
 
ALMATY TIP SHELTER OFFERS VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
 
12.  (SBU) Local NGO Rodnik has operated a TIP shelter in Almaty 
since 2005.  Originally, the shelter was funded through a USAID 
grant to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) which 
expired in March 2008.  The shelter has a director, a coordinator, a 
psychologist, and three social workers.  The shelter is in a 
one-bedroom apartment, but can accommodate as many as six victims. 
The shelter provides medical, psychological, legal assistance and 
vocational training to victims of trafficking.  Currently the 
shelter receives limited funding from the Embassy of the Netherlands 
through IOM to pay for utilities, food, and clothing.  Salaries are 
 
ASTANA 00000158  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
funded by a local government social program, which has to be 
approved annually. 
 
13.  (SBU) INL Officer and INL/AAE Desk Officer visited the Almaty 
shelter in December 2009.  At that time, there was one victim in the 
shelter who was to be reunited with her family.  The shelter had no 
additional security and was on the first floor of the building.  The 
neighbors were aware of the shelter's presence in the building and 
not only accepted, but protected it.    The presence of the shelter 
was only revealed to the neighbors after they had mistaken it for a 
brothel and called the police. 
 
14.  (SBU) Rodnik has made agreements with vocational training 
schools, such as cooking, hairdressing, and manicuring schools, to 
provide free training for victims.  Victims also make crafts, which 
the NGO hopes to begin selling to support the shelter. 
 
15.  (SBU) Because it is in the south, the Almaty shelter receives 
many victims from Uzbekistan and has connections through IOM with an 
NGO in Tashkent.  The NGO in Tashkent accepts victims who are 
deported or choose to return to Uzbekistan.  The NGO does not track 
victims after they have left the shelter, because many victims do 
not want to be reminded of what happened to them.  However, some 
victims do stay in touch with the NGO. 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ASTANA AND ALMATY 
 
16.  (SBU) There are many differences between the shelters in Astana 
and Almaty, including their age, location, funding streams and 
management philosophy.  For example, the location of the Almaty 
shelter is well known to local police while Korgau-Astana keeps its 
location hidden from law enforcement.  Korgau-Astana has plans to 
expand its serves, but at the moment provides primarily emergency 
assistance Korgau-Astana hopes to develop a two-tier shelter program 
in which victims are first housed in a secure shelter at on arrival 
and, when ready, move to a more open shelter that provides 
vocational training and rehabilitation.  Rodnik provides vocational 
training and rehabilitation in a single shelter.  Rodnik does not 
provide separate beds to its victims, but provides convertible 
furniture.  The director of the Almaty shelter believes that victims 
must be kept active and that providing separate beds would encourage 
victims to attempt to escape their problems by sleeping for long 
periods.  Both shelters rely heavily on international or government 
funding and cooperate closely with the U.S. government. 
 
PRESS CONFERENCE 
 
17.  (U) On February 3, the Charge invited senior officials from the 
Ministries of Justice and Interior and representatives from 
Korgau-Astana to participate in a press conference at the Embassy in 
recognition of National Freedom Day.  Speakers at the press 
conference discussed joint Kazakhstan-U.S. programs to combat 
trafficking-in-persons, protect victims, and prevent at-risk groups 
from being victimized by traffickers. 
 
18.  (U) In his remarks at the press conference, Vice-Minister of 
Justice Marat Bekatayev noted that that the Astana TIP Shelter was 
funded by the government as a pi
lot shelter, and said that a network 
of TIP shelters will be established throughout Kazakhstan in the 
future.  Sultan Kusetov, Chairman of the Ministry of Interior's 
Criminal Police Committee, reported that in 2009, police cracked 
down on TIP as they initiated 58 cases of human trafficking, 
including 20 cases of trafficking in persons, 16 cases of 
trafficking in minors, eight cases of kidnapping for the purpose of 
exploitation, seven cases of false imprisonment for the purpose of 
exploitation, and seven cases of forcing another into prostitution. 
The police also initiated 212 cases of pimping and maintaining 
brothels. 
 
19.  (SBU) COMMENT:  INL has worked closely with Kazakhstan to 
promote victim assistance through study trips to Italy and 
Vladivostok, Russia, where delegations examined the establishment 
 
ASTANA 00000158  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
and operation of government-funded shelters.  The Ministry of 
Justice's funding of the Korgau-Astana NGO is a direct result of 
that effort.  With a shelter established in Astana, INL plans to 
work with the government and shelter personnel to provide management 
training in shelter operation and legislation development.  Once 
similar shelters are opened throughout Kazakhstan, INL will provide 
regional training seminars.  Although some NGOs have doubts about 
Korgau-Astana, INL believes it fills an important need and 
represents a promising step towards more cooperation between the 
national government and NGOs in victim protection.  We will continue 
to encourage the anti-TIP NGOs to accept multiple models as 
effective and work together and learn from each other's experiences. 
 END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

10ASTANA154, KAZAKHSTAN: STATE TO REGULATE FUEL PRICES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA154 2010-02-04 08:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6005
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0154/01 0350832
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 040832Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7352
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2427
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1787
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2493
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1403
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1984
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1832
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2256

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000154 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/ESC, S/EEE, S/CIEA 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EPET SOCI KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  STATE TO REGULATE FUEL PRICES 
 
ASTANA 00000154  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Since independence, the government has attempted 
to manage gasoline prices through various means, including direct 
ownership of Kazakhstan's three refineries, crude export duties, 
bulk procurement, and state contracts that guarantee crude supplies 
to refineries.  The Ministry of Energy is preparing legislation on 
the regulation of fuel prices that will toughen rules for 
wholesalers.  Kazakhstan's decision to enter into a Customs Union 
with Russia and Belarus will likely bring gasoline prices in 
Kazakhstan closer to those in Russia.  END SUMMARY. 
 
COMPETITION PROTECTION AGENCY INVESTIGATES RETAILERS 
 
3.  (SBU) In November 2009, Kazakhstan experienced a shortage of 
gasoline and other fuels, followed by an abrupt rise in prices.  The 
Competition Protection Agency (CPA) accused distributors of fuels 
and lubricants affiliated with KazMunaiGas (KMG), PetroKazakhstan, 
and PetroKazakhstan Petroleum Resources of engaging in illegal trade 
practices.  The CPA also charged a number of companies with 
administrative violations, including KMG subsidiary KMG Onimderi, 
which allegedly sold fuel at retail prices under an unsanctioned 
coupon program. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN DEPENDENT ON RUSSIAN FUEL IMPORTS 
 
4.  (SBU) On October 8, 2009, Minister of Energy and Mineral 
Resources (MEMR) Sauat Mynbayev announced that "40% of the jet fuel 
and 30% of the high-octane gasoline on the domestic market are 
imported from Russia."  He said the government has two goals:  to 
keep gas prices steady and to satisfy market demand for gasoline, 
jet fuel and other petroleum products.  Mynbayev admitted that these 
goals can sometimes be at odds, since the price of fuel in Russia is 
as much as 40% higher than in Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstani suppliers 
naturally prefer to export petroleum products to Russia.  Mynbayev 
therefore proposed protecting the domestic market by restricting the 
price differential to less than 30%.  On November 16, 2009, he 
suggested adjusting the ratio of high-octane gasoline imports, and 
reducing imports of fuel oil and low-octane gasoline.  In order to 
increase administrative control over domestically-produced gasoline, 
MEMR now approves gasoline supply schedules in the regions, using an 
on-line database to monitor shipments. 
 
STATE TO ADOPT FUEL PRICE REGULATION LAW 
 
5.  (SBU) On January 21, CPA Deputy Chairman Boris Parsegov 
announced that MEMR is drafting a law on the regulation of fuel 
prices that is expected to be submitted to parliament in March. 
"The rules for wholesalers will be toughened," said Parsegov.  "That 
means that no organization can act as a wholesaler if it does not 
have the necessary infrastructure, such as oil storage facilities 
and access roads," Parsegov explained. 
 
INFLUENCE OF THE CUSTOMS UNION ON FUEL PRICES 
6.  (SBU) On November 17, 2009, Mynbayev said Kazakhstan must 
coordinate its fuel and lubricants prices with Russia once the 
Customs Union goes into effect.  "Since the borders will be open, 
the transportation of goods will be greatly simplified.  We will 
inevitably have correlated prices for oil products, whether we like 
it or not," he said.  "Even if the prices will not be exactly the 
same, they will still fluctuate within a certain range and influence 
each other.  This is an unavoidable result of establishing the 
Customs Union," he concluded. 
7.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The government is always under pressure to 
manage domestic fuel prices, particularly during harvest season.  On 
February 3, for example, Minister of Agriculture Akylbek Kurishbayev 
told the Senate that the state would purchase 336,000 tons of fuel 
at a fixed price for spring sowing and harvesting.  A new law to 
regulate fuel prices is therefore not unexpected.  It would have to 
take into account the new Customs Code that goes into effect on July 
1, and could lead to closer alignment of fuel prices in Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Belarus.  However, unless Kazakhstan modernizes its three 
 
ASTANA 00000154  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
refineries so that they can produce high-octane petroleum products 
to meet domestic demand, Kazakhstan will not be able to break its 
dependence on high-octane fuel products from Russia.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

10ASTANA134, KAZAKHSTAN: ENERGY OFFICER COMMUNITY POINT OF CONTACT

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10ASTANA134.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA134 2010-02-01 08:33 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2853
OO RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0134 0320833
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 010833Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7331
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2422
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1979
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1827
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2242

UNCLAS ASTANA 000134 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/IEC, S/EEE, S/CIEA 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA, USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  ENERGY OFFICER COMMUNITY POINT OF CONTACT 
 
REFTEL:  STATE 9572 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (U) U.S. Mission Kazakhstan applauds EEB's initiative to 
establish an interagency energy officer community and website to 
exchange information, facilitate policy discussions, and coordinate 
bilateral and multilateral energy priorities. 
 
3.  (SBU) We are fortunate to have several experienced officers 
whose portfolio includes energy.  Energy Officer and Deputy 
Political/Economic Section Chief Kevin Covert is primarily 
responsible for oil and gas, nuclear power, electricity, Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, coal, and renewable energy 
issues and will contribute to the Energy Portal.  He can be reached 
at 7 7172 70 2497, 7 777 222 7079, or covertkt@state.gov. 
 
4.  (SBU) Other officers with responsibility for energy issues 
include: 
 
-- Department of Energy (DOE) Director Laura Smiley (U.S.-Kazakhstan 
Energy Partnership, nuclear non-proliferation), who can be reached 
at smileyla@state.gov or 7 7172 70 2120; 
 
-- U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Senior Energy 
Policy Specialist Michael Trainor (regional electricity market), 
mtrainor@usaid.gov, or 7 727 250 7612, ext. 6343; 
 
-- Regional Environment, Science, Technology, and Health (ESTH) 
Officer Bruce Hudspeth (regional hydroelectric power, renewable 
energy, and climate change), hudspethbk@state.gov, or 7 7172 70 
2196; 
 
-- FSN Energy Specialist Kuralay Omarova (oil and gas, nuclear 
power, electricity, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 
coal, and renewable energy), OmarovaK@state.gov, or 7 7172 70 2144; 
 
-- FSN DOE Program Coordinator Leila Baimukhanova (U.S.-Kazakhstan 
Energy Partnership, nuclear non-proliferation), 
BaimukhanovaL@state.gov, or 7 7172 70 2351; 
 
-- FSN USAID Project Management Specialist Sergey Yelkin (regional 
electricity market), syelkin@usaid.gov, or 7-7272-507612, ext. 
6407. 
 
-- FSN ESTH Project Specialist Marzhan Srymova (regional 
hydroelectric power, renewable energy, and climate change), 
SrymovaM@state.gov, or 7 7172 70 2113. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

10ASTANA133, KAZAKHSTAN TO ASSOCIATE WITH COPENHAGEN ACCORD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA133 2010-02-01 06:54 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2814
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0133 0320654
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 010654Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7330
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2421
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1782
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2488
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1398
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2695
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2985
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1978
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1826
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS ASTANA 000133 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KGCC SENV KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN TO ASSOCIATE WITH COPENHAGEN ACCORD 
 
REFTEL:  STATE 7861 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2. (SBU) On January 27, the Embassy delivered reftel points on the 
Copenhagen Accords to Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs via 
diplomatic note.  The CDA then reiterated the U.S. position to 
Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov during a January 29 meeting. 
In a follow-up phone conversation on February 1, the MFA's America's 
Directorate confirmed that Kazakhstan had sent a letter that day to 
the offices of UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to formally 
associate with the Accord. 
 
SPRATLEN

Wikileaks

10ASTANA132, KAZAKHSTAN: GALA CELEBRATION MARKS 50 YEARS FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ASTANA132 2010-02-01 03:22 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO2652
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0132/01 0320322
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010322Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7328
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2419
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1780
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1396
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2486
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1976
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1824
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2240

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000132 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON EINV SOCI RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  GALA CELEBRATION MARKS 50 YEARS FOR 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY 
 
REF: 09 ASTANA 2157 
 
ASTANA 00000132  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public 
Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On January 27, the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry -- a state-sponsored business association that 
supports the development of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises -- held a lavish, gala celebration to mark its 
50th anniversary.  The presidents of the Russian, 
Belarusian, and German Chambers of Commerce were among more 
than 200 people in attendance and delivered letters of 
congratulation and pledges of support.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (SBU) The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan (the Chamber) celebrated its 50th 
anniversary on January 27 with an impressive -- if somewhat 
self-congratulatory -- show that included a star-studded 
cultural program, formal speeches and official letters, an 
employee awards ceremony, and a lavish, four-course meal 
and open bar.  More than 200 business leaders, diplomats, 
and government officials attended the affair, including the 
ambassadors of Russia, Germany, The Netherlands, India, 
Georgia, Ukraine, and the UAE, but the majority of the 
audience appeared to come from regional branches of the 
national organization.  No high-profile business leaders or 
senior government officials were in attendance. 
 
4.  (SBU) The Chamber was established in 1959 by a decree 
of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist 
Republic, and has been in operation ever since.  In 2005, 
it was officially registered as a non-governmental 
organization, and claims to represent the interests of more 
than 40,000 small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
Kazakhstan.  The Chamber has offices in each of 
Kazakhstan's 16 oblasts and its network of regional 
organizations represents the largest single business 
community in Kazakhstan.  More than 1500 organizations 
claim membership in the Chamber, which provides market data, trade 
mission support, quality assurance, and legal advice to its 
members.  It maintains partnerships with 72 foreign 
counterparts, particularly the Russian and Belarusian 
Chambers of Commerce.  It also established 10 regional 
courts of arbitration for the resolution of business 
disputes.  According to the president of the Chamber, 
Yerlan Kozhasbay, "one of our highest priorities is to 
present the interests of local businesses to foreign 
partners and investors.  It is important that they trust 
our businesses and understand Kazakhstani 
entrepreneurship." 
 
5.  (SBU) Kozhasbay clearly enjoyed being on center stage 
during the gala celebration, playing host with grace and 
charm.  A young, savvy, well-connected businessman with an 
MBA from Moscow State University, Kozhasbay 
worked at national railway company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy 
from 1997 until 2002 when he was implicated in 
embezzlement charges filed against former Minister of 
Transportation and Communications Ablay Murzakhmetov. 
Although he was identified by the General Procurator's 
Office as a "person of interest," charges against Kozhasbay 
were never filed.  The Chamber's Vice President, Serikzhan 
Mambetalin, appears to be in his late 30s, speaks fluent 
English, and completed an MBA at the Kazakhstan Institute 
of Management, Economics, and Strategic Research(KIMEP) in 
Almaty.  He himself provided the English translation during 
Kozhasbay's speech to the assembled dignitaries. 
 
6.  (SBU) The evening had a very strong Soviet style and 
structure, from cherubic children in formal attire singing 
in a choir, to pledges of fraternal fidelity from the 
Russian and Belarusian Chambers of Commerce, to the glitzy 
 
ASTANA 00000132  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
appearance of Roza Rymbayeva, a middle-age megastar from 
the 1970s, who sang ABBA's "The Winner Takes It All" to 
resounding applause.  Other performances throughout the 
evening, interspersed with speeches and awards, included a 
pas de deux from Swan Lake, a violin virtuoso, a dozen boys 
on the dombra, and sexy girls in short skirts playing sax 
and singing.  That last act got the crowd on the dance 
floor.  The emcees for the evening -- well-known television 
anchors of a popular entertainment program -- spoke both Russian 
and Kazakh, and kept the show moving at a brisk pace. 
 
7.  (SBU) A representatives from the Chamber read letters 
of congratulations from President Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
Senate President Kasymzhomart Tokayev, and Prime Minister 
Karim Masimov, while the presidents of the Russian, 
Belarusian, and German Chambers of Commerce read their 
letters aloud, barely audible above the buzz of casual 
conversation. 
 
8.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
has an impressive network, both in Kazakhstan 
and with its immediate neighbors, and Kozhasbay certainly 
knows how to throw a party.  Nevertheless, the overwhelming 
impression of this parastatal "private sector" association 
is that it has yet to fully shake its Soviet legacy.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
SPRATLEN

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