Monthly Archives: June 2008

08ASTANA1195, PAVLODAR – CIVIL SOCIETY SHOWS SIGNS OF INCREASED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1195 2008-06-30 12:06 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6349
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1195/01 1821206
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301206Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2675
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0536
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1917

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 001195 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM ECON KZ
SUBJECT: PAVLODAR - CIVIL SOCIETY SHOWS SIGNS OF INCREASED 
ACTIVITY 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Emboffs visited Pavlodar during June 4 to June 6 and 
met with the Akimat (local government administration), the 
ruling Nur Otan party, opposition political parties, a 
representative of the Central Election Commission, media, and 
NGOs.  Akimat officials were upbeat regarding both the 
political and economic situation, though they admitted that 
rising prices and the credit crunch resulting from the global 
financial crisis are having a negative economic impact.  Nur 
Otan dominates the local political scene and receives and 
tries to resolve citizens' complaints about corruption and 
socio-economic problems.   Opposition parties appear to be 
quite weak; however, civil society organizations are becoming 
increasingly active on a number of issues, and cooperate with 
the local authorities.  An evangelical pastor expressed 
concerns about proposed amendments to Kazakhstan's religion 
law.  An independent journalist told us that there is 
pressure to censor stories, but journalists can get away with 
publishing critical materials about the local government, so 
long as they balance this with more favorable pieces.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Akimat Officials Upbeat on Political and Economic Situation 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Emboffs visited Pavlodar during June 4 to June 6, 
conducting meetings there with the Akimat (local government 
administration), the ruling Nur Otan party, opposition 
parties, the media, and NGOs.  Pavlodar, located 120 
kilometers from the Russian border, is the capital of 
Pavlodar oblast (region) and the industrial center of 
northeast Kazakhstan.  Pavlodar is a multi-ethnic city, with 
70 ethnic groups represented, and an overall population of 
323,000.  While Russians and other Slavs used to make up 70 
percent of the city's population, that number has fallen in 
recent years to just 40 percent. 
 
3.  (SBU) Gulzhan Akhmetova, head of the Akimat's Internal 
Policy Department, told poloff that the political situation 
in the oblast is stable, with no inter-ethnic conflict.  She 
said the aim of local authorities is to preserve peace and 
public accord.  The Akimat maintains close contact with the 
more than 300 NGOs in Pavlodar oblast, under the umbrella 
"Civic Alliance" organization.  Akhmetova said that the 
Akimat also cooperates with the 17 ethnic cultural centers 
operating in Pavlodar, Nur Otan and other political parties, 
as well as religious groups.  The Religious Council of 
Pavlodar Oblast meets twice yearly, and representatives from 
all religious groups are invited to these meetings.  (Note: 
This last claim was later contradicted by a Protestant pastor 
we spoke with.  End Note.)   The Department of Internal 
Policy also has a special office dedicated to monitoring the 
media, as well as for explaining government policies through 
the media and raising public awareness about specific issues. 
 
4. (SBU) Sergey Statsenko, the head of the Akimat's 
Department of Entrepreneurship and Industrial Development, 
discussed with us the strategic goals for the oblast's 
economic development.  Currently, Pavlodar's main industries 
are coal extraction and metallurgy.  There are five 
large-scale projects being implemented in the oblast, 
including an aluminum processing plant and a tube-rolling 
mill.  Key exports include metallurgical products 
(ferrochrome and alumina), while key imports include 
equipment and spare parts.  One of the goals of the 
government is to increase the number of exporting companies. 
Another goal is to create a "food belt" around Pavlodar to 
produce dairy products and meat. 
 
5. (SBU) The official unemployment rate in Pavlodar is 6.6 
percent.  Statsenko noted that due to the domestic 
reverberations of the global financial crisis, commercial 
banks have been giving fewer loans to local enterprises. The 
credit crunch has affected small and medium enterprises most 
of all.   Regarding foreign business participation, Statsenko 
explained that the region was interested in joint ventures, 
not foreign loans.  They would like to obtain advanced 
technologies and develop "know how" and high value-added 
production.  Currently, there are no American businesses 
operating in the region. (Comment:  Akimat officials appeared 
to be suspicious of the motives for our visit.  They asked us 
repeatedly why we chose to come to Pavlodar, and with whom 
else we were meeting.  One Akimat official seemed to know 
exactly where we were going to be at all times.  End Comment.) 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
ASTANA 00001195  002 OF 004 
 
 
Nur Otan Dominates Political Scene 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Nur Otan -- President Nazarbayev's ruling party -- 
has 14 offices throughout Pavlodar oblast.  In the Pavlodar 
oblast maslikhat (legislature), all 32 representatives are 
Nur Otan members, and in the Pavlo
dar city maslikhat, 23 out 
of 25 members are from Nur Otan, while the remaining two are 
political independents.   Nur Otan representatives told us 
that the party's two main goals locally are enhancing 
cooperation with youth and fighting government corruption. 
According to Nur Otan, the political situation in the oblast 
is stable, but there are problems with rising food prices. 
As a result, real wages are not keeping up with inflation. 
To mitigate the problem with food prices, the party has 
approached commercial banks advocating for lower interest 
rates for local food producers. 
 
7. (SBU) Nur Otan maintained that some large local 
enterprises have joined their party at their own volition, 
including KazChrome, Access Komir, Pavlodar Oil Refinery, and 
Aluminum Kazakhstan.  They claimed that other political 
parties are not active in the region except during election 
periods.  Nur Otan told us they maintain close cooperation 
with NGOs and organize joint events with them, such as job 
fairs, public waste management hearings, and environmental 
campaigns.  Each Nur Otan office has an anti-corruption 
council that reviews corruption claims received from local 
citizens.  They also receive and review other complaints, 
with 45 percent of them socio-economic in nature, such as 
housing, employment, and social welfare problems.  Nur Otan 
also has telephone hotlines through which it receives 
anonymous complaints.   (Note:  Nur Otan claimed that they 
had "fixed" water sanitation problems in Mayskiy district --- 
the poorest district in the oblast -- but this claim was 
contradicted in our subsequent conve 
rsations with representatives of NGOs, opposition parties, 
and the media.  End Note.) 
 
8. (SBU) We arrived in Pavlodar on June 4, the "Day of State 
Symbols."  This holiday was marked in Pavlodar with rallies 
and speeches.  Nur Otan organized a youth rally on the main 
town square, blocking off traffic.  Young school children all 
wore Nur Otan tee shirts and caps.   (Note:  The opposition 
parties we spoke with compared this to the days of communism 
and the "young pioneers," and they complained that Nur Otan 
is exploiting children by using them to market Nur Otan.  End 
Note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Opposition Parties Allege Corruption and Harassment 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
9. (SBU) We held a round table discussion with local 
representatives of opposition parties -- the National Social 
Democratic Party (OSDP), Azat, and the unregistered Alga 
party -- at Alga's headquarters.  In contrast to the large 
and modern Nur Otan building, Alga's headquarters were 
located on the first floor of an apartment building outside 
the city center.  All the opposition representatives said 
they considered the parliamentary elections of August 2007 to 
be illegitimate.  They complained about pervasive corruption 
in both the akimat and maslikhat.  They told us that they 
have no access to the akimat and are not invited to 
participate in any political meetings or discussions.   They 
also alleged government harassment against their parties. 
The OSDP representative even claimed that he had been 
assaulted and prevented from attending an important 
opposition meeting in Almaty.   The OSDP representative 
claimed that OSDP has over 6,000 members in Pavlodar oblast, 
is recruiting new members, and is preparing for possible 
early parliamentary elections in the Fall of 2008.   Azat 
said they had 5,000-7,000 members and Alga claimed they had 
3,500 members in the oblast.  The Alga representative said 
Alga provides free legal advice for local residents, 
including protection of their interests in court.  The 
opposition parties claimed that unemployment in the oblast 
was actually close to 50 percent, and that the low figures 
given to us by government officials did not account for the 
involuntarily "self-employed," such as vendors in local 
bazaars. 
 
10. (SBU) Sansyzbay Akimbekov, the sole representative of the 
Central Electoral Commission (CEC) in Pavlodar, told us that 
all the opposition parties in the oblast are weak, and most 
did not have any representative offices in the individual 
districts of Pavlodar oblast.  He maintained that during the 
2007 parliamentary elections, the opposition parties were 
allotted sufficient broadcast media access, but did not use 
it effectively and did not have strong programs or agendas. 
 
ASTANA 00001195  003 OF 004 
 
 
Akimbekov further claimed that the opposition parties could 
not provide enough members to serve on local electoral 
committees, which is why political independents were found to 
represent them in the electoral committees.  He claimed that 
there were some violations during the August 2007 elections, 
but they were of minor significance in affecting the results. 
 Commenting on the overall situation in Pavlodar, Akimbekov 
said that the oblast has good prospects, and that living 
standards are rising.  He believes that Kazakhstan needs to 
have a law empowering local governments, so that decisions 
can be made from the bottom up.  Finally, he opined that 
civil society in Pavlodar is quite strong, and said that the 
local akimat and maslikhat consult with NGOs on a regular 
basis. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Evangelical Critical of Draft Religion Law 
------------------------------------------ 
 
11. (SBU) Ilya Chirikov is pastor of the Jesus Christ Church, 
an evangelical Protestant church which opened in Pavlodar in 
1993 and currently has about 400 members, more than a quarter 
of whom are ethnic Kazakhs.  Currently, there are 
approximately eight or nine Protestant churches in Pavlodar. 
 Pastor Chirikov told us he was extremely concerned about 
proposed amendments to Kazakhstan's religion law which are 
currently under consideration in parliament.   His church 
sent a letter protesting the proposed legislation to the 
Majilis (the lower house of Kazakhstan's parliament) as well 
as to the local maslikhat.  Chirikov complained that the 
legislation aims to divide religions into traditional (Muslim 
and Orthodox) and non-traditional groups, contains too many 
prohibitions, stipulates too many violations subject to 
fines, and includes ambiguous provisions that could be used 
to prosecute religious groups.  Chirikov claimed his church 
has been encountered problems with the city akimat.  For 
example, he said that when several young people from his 
church gathered on the river embankment to sing songs and to 
speak about God, the city akimat insisted they disperse. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
An Independent Journalist's Perspective 
--------------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) We also met with Alexander Baranov, a journalist 
with the weekly Gorodskaya Nedelya, an independent newspaper 
established 10 years ago which claims to have a circulation 
of 19,000-21,000 copies.  Regarding freedom of the press, 
Baranov
said there is pressure to censor stories, but 
journalists have learned how to get around it.  He can get 
away with publishing some critical materials about the local 
government, but this has to be balanced with more favorable 
pieces.  Baranov discussed a recent article of his which was 
highly critical of the mismanagement of water resources in 
the oblast's poor Mayskiy district.  He gave us a first-hand 
account of his visit to the district, including explaining to 
us the poor state of sanitation (e.g. lack of potable water), 
and the fact that the authorities were so angered by his 
attempts to speak to the local population that they took him 
in for questioning and tried to confiscate his camera. 
Baranov complained that there is a lack of qualified experts 
whom journalists can approach for commentary on salient 
issues.  He said that government officials would never make 
any critical comments, and sometimes NGOs were also afraid to 
comment on controversial issues, fearing a loss of government 
contracts.  He also complained that independent journalists 
have poor access to official information, especially to 
information from law enforcement authorities, and are not 
invited to press conferences or meetings at the akimat. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Civil Society Shows Signs of Increased Development 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
13. (SBU) Yelena Anatolieva, director of the Slavic Cultural 
Center, a community center which serves the local Russian 
speaking population, told us that inter-ethnic relations in 
Pavlodar were generally good.  However, some Russians still 
want to immigrate to Russia because they do not want to learn 
Kazakh, are concerned about local economic conditions, or 
want better opportunities for their children.  Part of 
Anatolievna's role is to advise and counsel Russians who are 
considering immigrating.  She works closely with the Russian 
Embassy in Astana and the Russian consulates in Almaty, 
Pavlodar, and Uralsk to facilitate the process.  She 
maintained that Russia's program to repatriate Russians from 
abroad is not yet very successful.  During the past year, 500 
people applied to immigrate in Pavlodar, but only 100 people 
actually completed the process. 
 
 
ASTANA 00001195  004 OF 004 
 
 
14. (SBU) We also participated in an interesting round table 
with several NGOs, including Delta Credit (a microfinance 
organization), Zhardem (HIV/AIDS prevention), the Pavlodar 
branch of the Kazakhstan Human Rights Bureau, the Criminal 
Reform and Monitoring Committee, and Ecom (an environmental 
protection organization).   All of these NGOs are part of the 
Civic Alliance, which is an umbrella NGO headed by Sergey 
Gulayev, one of only two independent members of the city 
maslikhat.  Zhardem's target population are drug addicts, 
prostitutes, and homeless people.  It is based in the city of 
Aksu, which has the highest HIV infection rate in Pavlodar 
oblast.  The main health problems in Pavlodar oblast include 
tuberculosis, drug addiction, cancer, and gastrointestinal 
diseases (due to poor water quality).  Obstacles encountered 
by this NGO including a lack of funding to hire a lawyer for 
its staff. 
 
15. (SBU) The Criminal Reform Monitoring Committee said the 
main issues that they are working on include prison reform, 
monitoring of prison conditions, and reform of the legal 
system.  Criminal suspects and their lawyers are often 
unaware of the right to a jury trial, they reported.  The 
Human Rights Bureau (HRB) provides legal advice to vulnerable 
groups, such as abused women, children, and adolescents.  The 
HRB told us that they have seen a sharp rise in the sexual 
abuse of children, particularly in schools.  Other areas that 
they work on include protection of mentally ill people and 
prison inmates.  When queried, HRB told us that they have not 
been asked for assistance by religious groups. 
 
16. (SBU) Ecom is one of three local NGOs focused on 
environmental protection.  Ecom maintained that the high 
incidence of diseases such as cancer in the local population 
is due to radiation exposure from the former Soviet nuclear 
test site at Semipalatinsk.  Other environmental problems 
include the polluted Irtysh river (resulting from upstream 
industrial facilities), the dumping of mercury and other 
industrial by-products in local lakes, and the use of gas 
flaring by the local oil refinery, which leads to toxic 
emissions.  Ecom claimed that a government monitoring agency 
had determined that a large proportion of parents whose 
children suffered from cerebral spastic infantile paralysis 
worked at the local aluminum plant.  These statistics, 
however, were classified, and the official who leaked this 
information was subsequently fired.  Ecom noted that NGOs do 
not carry out independent research because of limited funds; 
thus, they have to keep pressing local authorities to release 
relevant environmental information.  Ecom complained that 
despite their promises to hold environmental hearings on 
proposed industrial projects, local authorities hold only 
hearings where the outcome is already pre-determined. 
Furthermore, the oblast akimat's public environmental council 
is never convened. 
 
17. (SBU) Comment:  We were impressed with the high level of 
professionalism and dedication of these NGOs leaders.  All of 
them stressed the low level of awareness by the local 
population about the issues of human rights, environmental 
pollution, and human health.  All said that education and 
awareness of these issues needs to be raised in order to have 
a strong public dialogue.  Nevertheless, we came away with 
the impression that the influence of civil society is 
growing.  For instance, due to intervention by an NGO, the 
akimat decided to build an aluminum plant eight kilometers 
outside the city center, rather than closer to the center. 
Thus, positive steps are being made incrementally.  End 
Comment. 
ORDWAY

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08ASTANA1194, KAZAKHSTAN – PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV DISCUSSES MADRID

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1194 2008-06-30 11:12 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1194 1821112
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301112Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2674
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0535
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1916

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 001194 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2018 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM OSCE PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN - PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV DISCUSSES MADRID 
COMMITMENTS IN OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY ADDRESS 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Steven Fagin, Reasons 1.4. (b) and (d) 
 
1. (U) President Nazarbayev touched on Kazakhstan's Madrid 
commitments on democratic reform at the conclusion of his 
June 29 speech to the annual session of the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly, which is being held in Astana from 
June 29 to July 2.  This is the first time that Nazarbayev 
has publicly remarked on the commitments, which were 
incorporated into Foreign Minister Tazhin's address at the 
November 2007 Madrid OSCE ministerial meeting, where 
Kazakhstan was selected to be 2010 OSCE chairman. 
 
2. (U) While Nazarbayev shied away from using the term 
"Madrid commitments," he nevertheless went in turn through 
each of them, which entail amending Kazakhstan's electoral, 
political party, and media legislation by the end of 2008. 
Nazarbayev explained that "at the present moment," 
Kazakhstan's constitution "allows for the implementation of 
several very important (policies) in the further 
democratization of society."  The first, he said, is the 
establishment of a legal mechanism under which parliament 
would be composed of not less than two political parties. 
The second is the creation of "more favorable conditions" for 
the government's registration of political parties.  The 
third is the "perfection of procedural issues" in the 
electoral process.  The fourth, Narzarbayev explained, is the 
elimination of excessive bureaucratic barriers regulating 
media activity.  He concluded by saying that he hoped these 
proposals would be reviewed by parliament. 
 
3. (U) As he has done in other speeches, Nazarbayev did place 
several caveats on further democratic reforms, contending 
that Kazakhstan's "understanding of democratic processes" is 
based on both universal democratic principles and the 
"existence of national-cultural specifics in the mechanisms 
for implementing these principals."  Discussing political 
party registration, he said that parties must strictly accord 
to the constitution -- a likely reference to constitutional 
provisions prohibiting religious-based parties as well as the 
receipt by parties of foreign financing.  Discussing the 
elimination of barriers to media activity, Nazarabayev 
stressed that the government must still ensure that the media 
does not violate human rights, social and religious 
tolerance, or the public safety. 
 
4. (U) In an earlier part of the speech, Nazarbayev explained 
that as 2010 OSCE chairman, Kazakhstan intended to focus on 
vital security issues and on inter-cultural and 
inter-confessional dialogue.  Kazakhstan would support the 
OSCE's efforts to combat racism, intolerance, and 
discrimination, and its chairmanship would facilitate the 
resolution of problems in Central Asia as well as in 
Afghanistan, Nazarbayev added. 
 
5. (C) Comment:  Prime Minister Masimov, Foreign Minister 
Tazhin, State Secretary Saudabayev, and Presidential 
Administration head Kelimbetov, who were in the audience 
during the speech, were clearly elated that Nazarbayev 
discussed the Madrid commitments -- which they likely had 
personally pressed him to do.   As we have previously noted 
in our reporting, though much work remains, there is 
sufficient time for Kazakhstan to follow through on the 
commitments by year's end.  It is principally a matter of 
political will.  Following the address, Masimov told visiting 
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly CODEL Hastings that Nazarbayev's 
remarks are effectively an order to the bureaucracy to move 
forward.   Even the normally skeptical Ninel Fokina, head of 
the Almaty Helsinki Committee, told us that Nazarbayev's 
comments were a "welcome sign."  She seconded Masimov's 
assessment that based on Nazarbayev's words, the ministries 
will take action.  While Nazarbayev's proposals were 
ambiguous and minimalist, they nevertheless provide a strong 
basis for us and our like-minded partners to continue 
pressing for the legislative changes necessary to meet the 
full spirit of the commitments.  End Comment. 
 
6. (U) CODEL Hastings did not/not clear this cable. 
ORDWAY

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08ASTANA1164, KAZAKHSTAN – 2008 INVESTMENT DISPUTES REPORT UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1164 2008-06-23 06:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0694
OO RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1164/01 1750632
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230632Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2656
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0533

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001164 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EEB/IFD/OIA AND L/CID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KIDE CASC EINV OPIC PGOV KZ
 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN - 2008 INVESTMENT DISPUTES REPORT UPDATE 
 
REF: STATE 43784 
 
1. (SBU) This cable constitutes post's response to reftel.  The 
United States Government is aware of recent claims by two (2) United 
States persons against the Government of Kazakhstan (GOK).  Claimant 
B's dispute was fully resolved during the reporting period. 
 
2. (SBU) a.  Claimant A 
 
b.  1996 
 
c.  Although it has faced a number of regulatory issues, Claimant A 
has had two disputes that raise expropriation concerns. 
 
Claimant A's dispute on electricity deliveries with the state-owned 
power transmission monopoly (now known as KEGOC) and the Government 
of Kazakhstan (GOK) began in 1996.  Claimant A ultimately signed two 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with KEGOC and the GOK, outlining 
how the dispute would be resolved.  Claimant A, however, considered 
KEGOC to be in breach of some of the contracts arising from the 
MOUs.  KEGOC and the GOK submitted to the case to international 
arbitration.  Claimant A prevailed in a December 2007 ruling, and 
the Kazakhstani side paid it compensation, which appears to have 
resolved the matter. 
 
Claimant A also asserts that discriminatory regulatory actions by 
regional authorities amount to expropriation.  According to the 
Claimant, a regional government -- with the support of some 
officials in the central government -- has forced the Claimant to 
choose between lowering its rates (which would be politically 
expedient for the local authorities) or facing severe regulatory 
actions.  Claimant A maintains that this is an example of improper 
tactics to extract financial benefits from the Claimant.  Claimant A 
also complains of improper threats of criminal prosecution, which 
forced Claimant A's expatriate manager to depart Kazakhstan.   In 
April 2008, an Almaty Court ruled in favor of local regulatory 
authorities, levying a USD 148 million fine against Claimant A for 
alleged anti-trust violations in its electricity sales.   On May 30, 
2008, Claimant A publicly announced it had completed the sale of its 
ownership stake in a local power plant and coal mine to a 
Kazakhstani company, though it would continue to serve as manager 
and operator of the two facilities.   While the sale was reportedly 
very profitable for Claimant A, it appears to have been partly 
motivated by Claimant A's regulatory problems with Kazakhstani 
authorities. 
 
The USG is in regular contact with Claimant A and has on multiple 
occasions appealed to the Kazakhstani government in support of a 
just and fair resolution of the company's disputes with the 
authorities. 
 
3. (SBU) a.  Claimant B 
 
b.  2001 
 
c.  In July 2001, the Kazakhstan Ministry of State Revenue (MSR) 
performed an audit and determined that Claimant B, a subsidiary of a 
U.S. parent company, owed USD 29 million in taxes.  The assessment 
was based on MSR's finding that USD 100 million received by the 
Claimant from a customer as reimbursement for capital expenditures 
incurred by Claimant in modifying a barge rig was taxable income. 
(The customer was the operating consortium of the offshore Kashagan 
oil field.)  Claimant B challenged the decision in Astana City 
Court, which ruled in the Claimant's favor, holding that the 
reimbursements were not, in fact, taxable income.  Following an 
appeal by the MSR, Kazakhstan's Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
Claimant B in March 2002. 
 
The Kazakhstani tax authorities subsequently appealed the March 2002 
decision.  In May 2006, the Supreme Court reversed itself, ruling in 
favor of the Kazakhstani tax authorities.  Claimant B subsequently 
contacted the USG.  The USG's efforts to negotiate a final 
resolution with the Kazakhstani authorities in accordance with our 
bilateral tax treaty did not meet with success.   In April 2007, the 
Kazakhstani Supreme Court granted to Claimant B a Supervisory Panel 
Appeal.  In July 2007, the Supreme Court's Supervisory Panel ruled 
against Claimant B.  Claimant B subsequently appealed the interest 
assessed on the tax liability.  In February 2008, the Atryrau 
Economic Court ruled that the interest was payable only from October 
2005, not from the original 2001 tax assessment date.  In March 
2008, the Claimant publicly announced that, in accordance with this 
ruling, it had made a reduced tax payment, and that it now 
considered the tax dispute to be resolved.   Claimant B noted that 
it would receive a foreign tax credit for this payment against 
future payments which would otherwise be paid to the U.S. Treasury. 
 
 
4. (SBU) Claimant A:  AES Corp.; Claimant B: Parker Drilling, Inc. 
 
 
ASTANA 00001164  002 OF 002 
 
 
ORDWAY

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08ASTANA1158, SCENESETTER FOR CODEL HASTINGS’S VISIT TO KAZAKHSTAN FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1158 2008-06-20 05:16 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO3815
OO RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1158/01 1720516
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200516Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2644
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0530
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001158 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
H PLEASE PASS TO CODEL HASTINGS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON OSCE OVIP OTRA KZ
 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL HASTINGS'S VISIT TO KAZAKHSTAN FOR 
THE OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Your visit to Kazakhstan for the annual session of the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly comes at a particularly opportune time.  With 
its recent selection as 2010 OSCE chairman and thriving energy 
sector, Kazakhstan is showing increasing confidence on the 
international stage.  The country is rightly proud of its 
achievements:  a booming economy, largely harmonious multi-ethnic 
society, and rapidly expanding national capital.  You will see on 
arrival that the government is making preparations to celebrate 
Astana's 10th anniversary as Kazakhstan's capital on July 6 (which 
is also President Nazarbayev's 68th birthday) with gala festivities 
that will likely be attended by Russian President Medvedev and 
several other foreign heads of state. 
 
2. (SBU) Kazakhstan has proven to be a reliable security partner and 
a steady influence in a turbulent region.  The pace of democratic 
reform, however, has been slow, with political institutions, civil 
society, and the independent media still underdeveloped.  Our 
fundamental strategic objective is a secure, democratic, and 
prosperous Kazakhstan that embraces market competition and the rule 
of law; continues partnering with us on the global threats of 
terrorism, WMD proliferation, and narco-trafficking; and develops 
its energy resources in a manner that bolsters global energy 
security.  We would welcome your assistance in underlining to your 
Kazakhstani interlocutors the importance of: 
 
-- following through on the democratic reform commitments Kazakhstan 
made when selected to be 2010 OSCE chairman 
 
-- adhering to Kazakhstan's OSCE obligations regarding freedom of 
religion and freedom of the press 
 
-- continuing Kazakhstan's strong support for Coalition efforts in 
Afghanistan 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Strong Growth, But Short- and Long-Term Challenges 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
3. (SBU) Kazakhstan is the region's economic powerhouse, with an 
economy larger than that of all the other Central Asian states 
combined.  Economic growth averaged 9.2% a year during 2005-07, and 
the percentage of the population living below the subsistence level 
dropped from 28% in 2001 to under 10% at present.  The energy sector 
is the dominant earner, with oil exports accounting for roughly a 
third of GDP.  In the long term, Kazakhstan must focus on 
diversifying its economy, building up non-extractive industries, 
agriculture, and the service sector.  In the short term, Kazakhstan 
is facing duel challenges of rising inflation, propelled by soaring 
international prices on food and agricultural commodities, and 
reduced economic growth, a reflection of the domestic impact of the 
global financial crisis.  The government imposed a temporary ban on 
wheat exports in April to ensure adequate domestic supply and to 
keep prices down on bread.  As Kazakhstan annually produces much 
more wheat than it consumes, we anticipate the ban will be lifted as 
early as August, once the next harvest comes in. 
 
------------------------ 
An Emerging Energy Power 
------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) Kazakhstan exported just over 60 million tons of crude oil 
in 2007 and is expected to be one of the world's top ten oil 
producers soon after 2015.  The country also has significant natural 
gas reserves, but for now gas exports are relatively limited, in 
part because gas is being reinjected to maximize crude output.  U.S. 
companies have significant ownership shares in each of Kazakhstan's 
three major oil and gas projects:  Tengiz, Kashagan, and 
Karachaganak.  Tengiz (with 50% Chevron and 25% ExxonMobil stakes) 
recently inaugurated a second generation expansion which will 
increase its crude production from 400,000 barrels per day to 
540,000 later this year.  Kashagan (with 16.8% ExxonMobil and 8.4% 
ConocoPhilips stakes) is the largest oil field discovery since 
Alaska's North Slope and perhaps the world's most technically 
complex oil development project.  Kashagan is expected to commence 
production around 2012. 
 
5. (SBU) The Kazakhstanis recognize they do not have the capability 
to exploit their oil and gas resources on their own, especially 
given the complexity of Kazakhstan's oil and gas projects. 
Kazakhstan thus continues to welcome foreign investment in energy 
exploration and production, and both the Kazakhstani government and 
the international companies are committed to an enduring 
relationship.  That said, Kazakhstan has grown increasingly 
 
ASTANA 00001158  002 OF 003 
 
 
assertive in its energy sector in recent years, reexamining the 
terms of existing contracts, driving a harder bargain with 
prospective investors, and aggressively pursuing environmental and 
tax claims against internationa
l oil companies. 
 
6. (SBU) With major production increases on the horizon, Kazakhstan 
must develop additional transport routes to bring its oil and gas to 
market.  Our policy is to encourage Kazakhstan to seek diverse 
routes, which will ensure the country's independence from transport 
monopolists.  Currently, the bulk of Kazakhstan's crude oil is 
exported via Russia, including through the Transneft system and the 
independently-owned Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline. 
Near-term crude production increases are likely to flow by rail 
through Russia, by tanker across the Caspian Sea to Baku, and 
through the CPC pipeline, should an agreement be reached with Russia 
on CPC expansion.  We believe that a trans-Caspian oil pipeline must 
be built to handle later production growth; however, Kazakhstan is 
reluctant to openly pursue this option in the absence of an 
agreement on delimitation of the Caspian Sea among the five Caspian 
littoral states. 
 
--------------------------- 
Democratic Development Lags 
--------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) While the Kazakhstani government articulates a strategic 
vision of democracy, it has lagged on the implementation front. 
This in part reflects the political reality that President 
Nazarbayev remains extraordinarily popular, while the opposition is 
weak and fractured.  It also is a result of the government's 
resistance to competitive political processes.  In May 2007, 
significant amendments were adopted to Kazakhstan's constitution 
which were touted as strengthening parliament, but also removed 
terms limits on Nazarbayev.  In parliamentary elections held in 
August 2007, Nazarbayev's Nur Otan party officially received 88 
percent of the vote and took all the seats in parliament.  The OSCE 
election observation mission concluded that the elections did not 
meet OSCE standards. 
 
8. (SBU) When Kazakhstan was selected as 2010 OSCE chairman at the 
November 2007 OSCE Madrid ministerial meeting, Foreign Minister 
Tazhin publicly committed that his country would undertake several 
democratic reforms.  Specifically, he promised that by the end of 
2008, Kazakhstan would amend its election and media legislation 
taking into account the recommendations of the OSCE's Office of 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), as well as 
liberalize registration procedures for political parties and media 
outlets.  (Note:  Tazhin also promised that Kazakhstan would support 
the OSCE's "human dimension" and preserve ODIHR's mandate, including 
its critical role in election observation.  End Note.)  The 
government has thus far taken limited steps toward implementing its 
"Madrid commitments," including establishing working groups, with 
civil society and opposition participation, to discuss amendments to 
the election and media legislation.  Though much work remains, there 
is sufficient time for Kazakhstan to follow through by year's end -- 
and we have been repeatedly reassured by the government that it will 
do so.  We have made clear that reneging on the commitments would 
undermine Kazakhstan's effectiveness as future OSCE chair. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Concerns on the Media and Religion Fronts 
----------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) While Kazakhstan's diverse print media includes a plethora 
of newspapers sharply critical of the government and of President 
Nazarbayev personally, the broadcast media is almost exclusively in 
government hands and maintains a pro-government line, with little 
coverage of opposition parties.  The government apparently blocked 
several opposition websites in late 2007 for uploading recordings of 
embarrassing conversations between senior government officials. (The 
recordings were likely made by Nazarbayev's former son-in-law, 
Rakhat Aliyev, who was recently convicted in absentia of plotting a 
coup.)  Access has not been restored to all of these sites.  In 
April, the English- and Kazakh-language websites of Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) became inaccessible to customers of 
state-owned Kazakhtelecom.  We raised the RFE/RL issue with senior 
officials.  The government did not admit to actively blocking the 
RFE/RL websites, but they subsequently became accessible again in 
early June. 
 
10. (SBU) While Kazakhstan prides itself on its religious tolerance, 
so-called "non-traditional" religious groups -- such as evangelical 
Protestants, Jehovah's Witnesses, Hare Krishnas, and Scientologists 
-- have faced difficulties.  There has recently been a significant 
increase in negative media coverage of non-traditional religions 
which appears to have been orchestrated in part by the government. 
The Kazakhstani parliament is currently considering a package of 
 
ASTANA 00001158  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
amendments to the country's religion law which would assert greater 
government control over non-traditional groups.  While the latest 
draft text represents an improvement over the original version, it 
retains several problematic provisions, including ones that would 
create a distinction between large and small religious groups, 
limiting the rights of the latter.  At the urging of the U.S. and 
our OSCE partners, Kazakhstan submitted the legislation for ODIHR 
review.  We want to ensure that Kazakhstan takes into account 
ODIHR's recommendation in the final version -- as senior Kazakhstani 
officials have promised us they will do. 
 
-------------------- 
Afghanistan and Iraq 
-------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Kazakhstan is an important partner for Afghanistan's 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  To date, Kazakhstan has 
facilitated over 4000 cost-free overflights for U.S. military 
aircraft supporting OEF.  Kazakhstan is also providing Afghanistan 
with $2.88 million in assistance in 2008, which is being used for 
food and seed aid and to construct a hospital, school, and road. 
The Kazakhstanis are encouraging their private sector to seek out 
investment opportunities in Afghanistan, and have indicated that 
they want to make Afghanistan a focal point for their OSCE 
chairmanship.  In addition, Kazakhstan is the sole Central Asian 
country participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  Since 
August 2003, the Kazakhstanis have maintained a military engineering 
unit in Iraq which has disposed of over 4.5 million pieces of 
unexploded ordnance. 
 
----------------------------- 
Non-Proliferation Cooperation 
----------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) Non-proliferation cooperation has been a hallmark of our 
bilateral relationship since Kazakhstan became independent and 
agreed to give up the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the USSR. 
Our bilateral Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has 
facilitated the dismantlement of Kazakhstan's intercontinental 
ballistic missile launchers, closure of test tunnels and boreholes 
at the former Soviet nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk, and 
elimination of an anthrax weapons production facility.  Several 
critical CT
R programs are ongoing, including the effort to secure 
and store spent fuel from a closed plutonium production reactor, as 
well as a biological threat reduction program aimed at ensuring 
effective control of dangerous pathogens.  In December 2007, the 
U.S. and Kazakhstan agreed to extend our bilateral umbrella 
agreement for the CTR program for an additional seven years. 
However, the Kazakhstanis have not yet ratified the extension.  In 
the interim, we have faced difficulties in receiving the tax and 
customs exemptions necessary for us to continue uninterrupted 
implementation of the CTR program. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA1147, KAZAKHSTAN – EMBASSY INPUT FOR OSCE HUMAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1147 2008-06-18 06:29 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO1912
OO RUEHAST RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1147/01 1700629
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 180629Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2634
INFO RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001147 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM, SCA/CEN, AND DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM OSCE KDEM PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN - EMBASSY INPUT FOR OSCE HUMAN 
DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION MEETING 
 
REF: STATE 60838 
 
1. (U) This cable constitutes post's input on Kazakhstan 
democracy and human rights concerns for demarches in 
preparation of the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation 
Meeting (HDIM). 
 
Democracy and Political Rights 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) When Kazakkhstan was selected as 2010 OSCE chairman 
at the November 2007 OSCE Madrid ministerial, Foreign 
Minister Tazhin publicly committed that Kazakhstan would 
undertake several democratic reforms.  Specifically, Tazhin 
said that by the end of 2008, Kazakhstan would amend its 
election and media legislation taking into account ODIHR 
recommendations, as well as liberalize registration 
requirements for political parties and media outlets.  The 
government has thus far taken some steps toward implementing 
these commitments, including establishing working groups, 
with civil society and opposition participation, to discuss 
amendments to the election and media legislation.  Though 
much work remains, there is more than sufficient time for 
Kazakhstan to follow through by year's end -- and we have 
been repeatedly assured by the government that it will do so. 
 We should continue to stress that failure to implement its 
Madrid commitments would undermine Kazakhstan's effectiveness 
in its role as OSCE chairman. 
 
Freedom of the Press 
-------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) While Kazakhstan's diverse print media includes a 
plethora of newspapers sharply critical of the government and 
of President Nazarbayev personally, the broadcast media 
largely maintains a pro-government line, with very limited 
coverage of the political opposition.  The government 
apparently blocked several opposition web-sites in late 2007 
for uploading recordings of embarrassing conversations 
between senior government officials (which were likely made 
by Nazarbayev's former son-in-law, Rakhat Aliyev, who was 
recently convicted in absentia of plotting a coup).  Access 
has not been restored to all of these sites.  In April 2008, 
the English- and Kazakh-language web-sites of Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) became inaccessible to 
customers of Kazakhtelecom.  The government did not admit to 
actively blocking the RFE/RL sites, which became accessible 
again beginning in early June.  Journalists and editors 
remain subject to criminal penalties, including prison time, 
for libel, although criminal prosecutions are rare and no 
journalist has been jailed on libel charges in recent years. 
We expect that future amendments to Kazakhstan's media law 
(see above) will ease, though not eliminate, these criminal 
penalties. 
 
Freedom of Religion 
------------------- 
 
4. (SBU)  We remain concerned about a package of amendments 
to Kazakhstan's religion law under consideration in 
parliament which appear aimed at asserting greater government 
authority over so-called "non-traditional" religious groups, 
such as evangelical Protestants, Jehovah's Witnesses, Hare 
Krishnas, and Scientologists.  While the latest text 
represents an improvement over the original version, it 
retains a number of problematic provisions, including ones 
which would create a distinction between large and small 
religious groups, limiting the rights of the latter.  At the 
urging of the USG and our like-minded partners, the 
government submitted the original version to ODIHR for 
review.  ODIHR sent its comments to the Kazakhstanis on June 
10.  We have been reassured by senior officials that they 
will take into account ODIHR's recommendations in the final 
version of the amendments. 
 
5. (SBU) There has recently been a significant increase in 
negative media coverage of "non-traditional" religious groups 
which appears to have been orchestrated in part by the 
government, perhaps to lay the groundwork for the religion 
law amendments.  A long-running land dispute in Almaty oblast 
between local authorities and a Hare Krishna community 
remains unresolved; we should continue pressing for an 
equitable resolution. 
 
Trafficking in Persons 
---------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) We should commend Kazakhstan's progress in combating 
trafficking in persons, which resulted in Kazakhstan being 
 
ASTANA 00001147  002 OF 002 
 
 
upgraded from "Tier 2 Watchlist" to "Tier 2" in the 2008 
Trafficking in Persons Report.  Over the past year, 
Kazakhstan improved its efforts in convicting traffickers and 
sentencing them to prison time, in addressing official 
complicity in trafficking, and in assisting victims.  We want 
Kazakhstan to continue its forward movement on all fronts -- 
prosecution, protection, and prevention. 
 
Child Labor 
----------- 
 
7. (U) While Kazakhstani law prohibits the worst forms of 
child labor and the government is engaged in a number of 
efforts to combat it, NGOs report that ch
ild labor remains a 
serious problem, particularly in cotton and tobacco 
production, branches of agriculture in which large numbers of 
migrant workers from neighboring countries are employed. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA1121, TIMUR KULIBAYEV VISITS THE EMBASSY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1121 2008-06-16 11:39 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1121 1681139
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161139Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2609
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0529
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 001121 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN M. O'MARA, EEB 
DOE FOR EKIMOFF 
COMMERCE FOR HUEPER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EPET KZ
SUBJECT: TIMUR KULIBAYEV VISITS THE EMBASSY 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Timur Kulibayev, Chairman of KazEnergy 
Association and son-in-law of President Nazarbayev, met with 
the Ambassador on June 12 and toured the Embassy. During his 
conversation with the Ambassador, Kulibayev discussed changes 
at KazMunayGas, described relations with Russia as improving, 
stressed the importance of Trans-Caspian oil transportation, 
and expressed skepticism about Turkmenistan's intent to send 
gas westwards.  End Summary 
 
2. (C) During a June 12 tour of the Embassy with the 
Ambassador, Timur Kulibayev noted that he first brought new 
KazMunayGas Chairman Serik Burkitbayev in to the company 
(Note: Kulibayev was referring to Burkitbayev's tenure from 
2003-2007 as Director of the Kazakhstan Oil and Gas 
Institute, a KMG subsidiary) and called him a good manager. 
Kulibayev said that two different visions are in competition 
at KMG, but offered no details. 
 
3. (C) Kulibayev told the Ambassador that possibilities for 
cooperation with Russia have increased with the departure of 
Transneft's Semyen Vaynshtok, and he said that in principle 
he sees no reason to believe that CPC will not be expanded. 
Kulibayev indicated, however, that his focus is on the 
Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS).  He believes 
that there will be BTC expansion with a second parallel 
pipeline, but said the key development will be a pipeline up 
through Georgia to the Black Sea. 
 
4. (C) Kulibayev was skeptical about Turkmenistan.  According 
to Kulibayev, Turkmenistan's flirtations with trans-Caspian 
gas are intended only to achieve better deals with existing 
partners.  Moreover, Turkmenistan has already oversold, he 
said. 
 
5. (C) Domestically, Kulibayev criticized Kazakhstan for not 
developing new oil fields.  On changes to the tax code, he 
said Kazakhstan faces a conflict between providing the stable 
tax regimes guaranteed under PSAs and the desire to ensure 
equal conditions for all companies. Kulibayev would like 
KazEnergy to be more active, and sees a role for it in areas 
like developing regulations and environmental standards. 
(Note: On June 11, Prime Minister Masimov chaired a meeting 
of the Commission for Development of the Oil and Gas and 
Energy Industry.  The Commission agreed to consider proposals 
of KazEnergy on a new tax code.  Masimov ordered the creation 
of a working group to develop a new tax code and to review 
the KazEnergy proposals. On June 13, Prime Minister Masimov 
told the Ambassador that the GOK will not seek to renegotiate 
the contractual terms for Kashagan, Karachaganak, and Tengiz. 
The existing contracts will be sent to Parliament for 
ratification, ensuring the continued viability of their 
contractual tax stabilization clauses, regardless of changes 
in the tax code that will be applied to all other fields in 
Kazakhstan ). 
 
6. (C) Kulibayev attended a meeting between President 
Nazarbayev and Chevron CEO David O'Reilly the week before in 
Atyrau and told the Ambassador that an agreement has been 
reached on the sulfur issue.  The Ambassador mentioned a 
planned trip in July of Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy C. 
Boyden Gray and Coordinator for Eurasian Energy Diplomacy 
Steve Mann. Kulibayev said he would be happy to meet with 
them. 
 
7. (C) Comment: Kulibayev's discussion with the Ambassador 
demonstrates that he remains one of the most thoughtful and 
knowledgeable interlocutors on energy issues in Kazakhstan. 
The depth of his knowledge, and his recent participation in 
important meetings with the Prime Minister and the President, 
also indicate that he is still privy to the innermost 
dealings of Kazakhstan's energy sector, contrary to recent 
rumors that Nazarbayev had pushed him to the sidelines. End 
Comment 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA1111, KAZAKHSTAN: TIP REPORT DELIVED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1111 2008-06-13 11:56 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8638
OO RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #1111 1651156
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131156Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2606
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0488
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ASTANA 001111 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/CEN FOR O'MARA, G/TIP FOR HALL, INL/AAE FOR BALABANIAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KCRIM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TIP REPORT DELIVED 
 
REF: STATE 58370 
 
1.  (SBU) On June 4, Post delivered the annual Trafficking in 
Persons Report to Director of the Department of International Law of 
the Ministry of Justice Elvira Abilkhasimovna Azimova.  A copy of 
the Kazakhstan narrative and non-paper were provided.   The Ministry 
of Justice was complimented for being upgraded from Tier 2 Watch 
list to Tier 2 due to positive developments in investigations, 
prosecutions, and convictions of traffickers. Post recommended that 
Kazakhstan continue to improve conviction rates, ensure that 
traffickers serve sufficient time in prison, and provide assistance 
to victims of trafficking. 
 
2.  (SBU) Very pleased with the news, Azimova said that the GOK 
intends to work to further improve its TIP ranking by enhancing the 
victim assistance and protection components of the national anti-TIP 
action plan.  Azimova expressed thanks for the assistance that the 
USG had provided for law enforcement training and said she looked 
forward to future cooperation with the Embassy on victim assistance 
as well. Post informed Azimova that improving Kazakhstan's 
assistance to TIP victims would remain an Embassy priority and that 
the Embassy will support the Ministry's earlier request to learn 
more about how other countries have effectively provided victim 
assistance and what methods the GOK could use. 
 
3. (SBU) Azimova briefed Post on other positive developments since 
the submission of the last TIP Report. In particular, the Ministry 
of Culture and Information announced three grants to NGOs to produce 
and broadcast an anti-TIP video on national TV channels, to conduct 
information campaigns, and to establish a call center. The GOK also 
approved a one-year plan directing law enforcement agencies, the 
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, and 
others to conduct awareness campaigns for the general public. 
 
4. (SBU) Azimova also reported that the Ministry is working on how 
best to establish a trafficking shelter or fund existing shelters 
operated by NGOs.  In response to the Ministry's request to provide 
a building for the purpose of establishing a shelter, the Akim 
(governor) of Akmola oblast offered to provide land where a shelter 
could be constructed and the Akim of Almaty oblast suggested using 
an existing temporary residence center for oralmans as a shelter for 
victims of trafficking. (Note. Oralmans are ethnic Kazaks who 
immigrated to Kazakhstan from other countries. End Note.) Neither 
proposal is acceptable to the Ministry and it is now looking for 
other options. 
 
5. (SBU) The Ministry is also drafting a project proposal to seek 
funding for victim assistance from the national budget.  Azimova 
pointed out that the Ministry has had some difficulty developing the 
project proposal because of its lack of experience in this area and 
requested the Embassy's assistance in finding and hiring an expert 
to draft the proposal and an expert to analyze and suggest 
recommendations for the improvement of victim assistance and 
protection legislation. INL Astana will look for funds in its 
anti-TIP program to respond to the Ministry's request. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA1107, KAZAKHSTAN – CHANGES MADE TO RELIGION LAW

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ASTANA1107.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1107 2008-06-12 11:44 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1107/01 1641144
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121144Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2596
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0524
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1914

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 001107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN - CHANGES MADE TO RELIGION LAW 
AMENDMENTS, GOK PROMISES TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ODIHR 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
REF: (A) ASTANA 767 (B) STATE 52046 (C) ASTANA 411 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Steven Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) The Mazhilis passed on first reading a revised text of 
amendments to Kazakhstan's religion law.  Some of the most 
problematic provisions were removed from this latest version, 
though at the same time, new provisions were added which 
raise concerns.  The amendments must go through a second 
Mazhilis reading before being sent to the Senate for its 
consideration.  ODIHR finalized its analysis of the original 
version, forwarded it to the government, and offered to send 
experts to Kazakhstan to discuss ODIHR's conclusions. 
Presidential Administration head Kelimbetov, Senate Chairman 
Tokayev, and Mazhilis Speaker separately reassured the 
Ambassador that Kazakhstan will take into account ODIHR's 
recommendations in the final version of the legislation.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
PROBLEMATIC PROVISIONS REMOVED, BUT OTHERS ADDED 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2. (SBU) On June 11, the Mazhilis (i.e., the lower house of 
Kazakhstan's parliament) heard and passed on first reading a 
revised text of amendments to Kazakhstan's religion law.  If 
passed without changes at a second Mazhilis reading, the 
legislation will move to the Senate for consideration.  The 
revised text on the whole appears to represent an improvement 
over the original legislation introduced into the Mazhilis in 
May (see ref A).   In response to criticism from NGOs and 
concerns raised by the international community, including by 
us, the Mazhilis removed from the new version provisions that 
would have banned foreign and anonymous religious donations, 
required the use of cash registers to account for donations, 
and placed quotas on foreign missionaries.  In addition, 
other problematic provisions have been softened:  minors 
would need only oral, rather than written, parental 
permission to attend religious events, and religious 
organizations requesting national status would need to be 
registered in only five, rather than seven, of Kazakhstan's 
14 oblasts (regions). 
 
3. (SBU) While the above-noted problematic provisions were 
removed, new provisions were added which raise concerns.  For 
example, in the revised text, the minimum number of members 
that a religious organization needs to register with local 
authorities has been raised from ten to fifty.  (Note:  This 
provision is of particular importance, as groups with too few 
members to register would be prohibited from leasing space 
for religious meetings and from publishing religious 
materials.  End Note.)   The revised draft also (1) gives 
additional powers to the Minister of Justice's Religious 
Issues Committee (the body responsible for registering 
religious groups), making the Committee the coordinator for 
all activities of foreign religious organizations; (2) 
expands the grounds for suspension of and denial of 
registration to religious organizations; and (3) adds a 
requirement that all religious organizations submit an annual 
report of their activities to the government. 
 
4. (SBU) Mazhilis member Kamal Burkhanov, head of the special 
working group responsible for drafting the religion law 
amendments, stressed to us that the significant changes to 
the original draft are a direct result of consultations with 
civil society, religious leaders, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and the Procurator General's office.  Some NGO 
leaders, however, remain highly skeptical of the parliament's 
intentions.  Almaty Helsinki Committee head Ninel Fokina and 
International Bureau for Human Rights head Yevgeny Zhovtis 
told us on June 5 that the most contentious provisions in the 
original draft were likely red herrings meant to give 
supporters of the legislation bargaining leverage. Zhovtis 
characterized the process as a carefully orchestrated 
"political game," where the government gives the impression 
of responding to NGO criticism while pushing through its own 
agenda. 
 
5. (SBU) Eugenia Benigni, Human Dimension Officer at the 
OSCE's Almaty office, confirmed to us on June 11 that ODIHR 
finalized its analysis of the original draft of the 
legislation and passed it to Kazakhstan's OSCE mission in 
Vienna on June 10.  According to Benigni, ODIHR offered to 
send experts to Kazakhstan on or about June 24 to discuss 
ODIHR's conclusions. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
REASSURANCES FROM THE GOVERNMENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Per ref B demarche instructions, the Ambassador yet 
again raised USG concerns about the religion law amendments 
in separate June 11 meetings with Presidential Administration 
head Kairat Kelimbetov and Senate Chairman Kasym-Zhomart 
Tokayev, and in a June 12 meeting with Mazhilis Speaker Aslan 
Musin.  All three assured the Ambassador that Kazakhstan 
would take into
 account ODIHR's recommendations in the final 
version of the legislation.   Tokayev stressed that the 
legislation was a response to concerns among the broad public 
about "non-traditional" religious groups.  He explained that 
he nevertheless had his own concerns about the Mazhilis' 
draft and indicated that the Senate would likely make 
amendments to the text.  He expected the legislation to reach 
the Senate by mid-June, but said there was a strong 
possibility the Senate would not take any action on it until 
after the summer recess. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7. (C) There appears to be little doubt that Kazakhstan will 
adopt a package of religion law amendments later this year, 
aimed principally at asserting greater government control 
over "non-traditional" religious groups.   Senate Chairman 
Tokayev is correct in noting that there are, in fact, serious 
concerns among the general public about "non-traditional" 
religious groups and their alleged pernicious influence on 
Kazakhstani society.  However, the government itself may have 
played a large role in feeding these fears:  recent negative 
media coverage about evangelical Protestants, Jehovah's 
Witnesses, Hare Krishnas, and others appears to have been 
orchestrated in part by the authorities (see ref C).  The 
fact that the Mazhilis removed from the latest draft of the 
amendments a number of provisions about which international 
community raised specific concerns is, in any event, a 
positive sign.  Our goal now should be to work with 
like-minded missions in Astana and Vienna to get the 
Kazakhstanis to heed ODIHR's recommendations.  End Comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA1084, KAZAKHSTAN RATIFIES UN CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1084 2008-06-11 09:51 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO6348
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #1084 1630951
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110951Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2572
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0479
RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ASTANA 001084 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, G, G/TIP, SCA/CAN, SCA/RA, DRL, PRM 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM SOCI KCRM PGOV KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN RATIFIES UN CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL 
ORGANIZED CRIME 
 
1. On June 4, President Nazarbayev signed legislation ratifying the 
2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and three 
additional protocols against the production of firearms, their 
parts, components, and ammunition; against human trafficking, 
especially of women and children; and against smuggling migrants by 
land, sea, and air.  The legislation had been approved by Parliament 
in May. 
2. Comment: Even though most of the provisions of the Protocol 
against human trafficking were incorporated in 2006 amendments to 
Kazakhstan's anti-trafficking legislation, it is likely that the 
Protocol's ratification will result in further changes to the penal 
code  strengthing the laws against human trafficking. End Comment. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA1076, KAZAKHSTAN STILL CONSIDERING IAEA BOG SEAT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1076 2008-06-10 06:58 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1076 1620658
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 100658Z JUN 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2567
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0057

S E C R E T ASTANA 001076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/RA ARIEL STUKALIN AND IO/T HEATHER VON BEHREN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2033 
TAGS: KNNP IAEA PREL AORC KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN STILL CONSIDERING IAEA BOG SEAT 
 
REF: A. STATE 57703 B. ASTANA 1016 C. ASTANA 0988 
 
Classified By: DCM KEVIN MILAS FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
(S) Sergey Savelyev, MFA Section for International Security 
Director, told Poloff on June 9 that Kazakhstan has not yet 
made a decision as to whether it will pursue the open MESA 
seat on the IAEA Board of Governors. According to Savelyev, 
the MFA has sent instructions to its diplomatic mission in 
Vienna to investigate the procedures for candidacy.  He also 
said that it will take several weeks for relevant agencies to 
review the issue and he asked Poloff when the deadline for 
application will be.  Poloff responded that he did not know 
the answer but would find out.  Finally, Savelyev noted that 
while the MFA is likely ready to endorse the idea in order to 
support the U.S., other agencies do not see any practical 
value for Kazakhstan to pursue a BOG seat. 
ORDWAY

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08ASTANA1075, KAZAKHSTAN: JCIC-DIP-08-003 RESPONSE DELIVERED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1075 2008-06-10 05:08 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1075 1620508
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 100508Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2566
INFO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0027
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1536
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0110
RHMFISS/DTRA CT WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

S E C R E T ASTANA 001075 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VSI/SI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2018 
TAGS: PARM KACT START JCIC KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: JCIC-DIP-08-003 RESPONSE DELIVERED 
 
REF: STATE 61291 
 
Classified By: POL-ECON CHIEF STEVE FAGIN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
(S) Poloff delivered reftel information to Sergey Savelyev, 
MFA International Security Section Director, on June 9. 
Savelyev had no substantive comment but promised to share the 
information with relevant colleagues at the Ministry of 
Defense. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA1074, KAZAKHSTAN: JCIC-DIP-08-002 DELIVERED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1074 2008-06-10 05:01 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1074 1620501
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 100501Z JUN 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2565
INFO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0026
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1535
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0109
RHMFISS/DTRA CT WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

S E C R E T ASTANA 001074 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VSI/SI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2018 
TAGS: PARM KACT START JCIC KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: JCIC-DIP-08-002 DELIVERED 
 
REF: STATE 59143 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF STEVE FAGIN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
Poloff delivered reftel information to Sergey Savelyev, MFA 
International Security Section Director, on June 9.  Savelyev 
had no substantive comment but promised to share the 
information with relevant colleagues at the Ministry of 
Defense. 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA1073, KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, May 4-17, 2008

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1073 2008-06-09 13:41 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4535
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1073/01 1611341
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091341Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2563
INFO RUCPCIM/CIMS NTDB WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0522
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2171
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0402
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0507

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001073 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (O'MARA) 
DEPT PASS TO OPIC - BALLINGER 
DEPT PASS TO TDA FOR STEIN, EXIM FOR GLAZER 
DEPT PASS TO AID - EE-PHILLIPS/RUSHING 
TREASURY FOR OASIA/VELTRI 
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/MAC/MLONDON, 4201/BISNIS 
USDOC FOR 6110/ITA/TD/BI/RHALPERN 
ANKARA FOR CFC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET EFIN KTDB KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC AND ENERGY UPDATE, May 4-17, 2008 
 
1.  Summary:  This information is drawn primarily from the 
Kazakhstani local press, and has not been verified for accuracy. 
 
-- Atameken Opposes Export Duties on Metals 
-- New Shareholders in Lariba Bank 
-- New Prospects for Economic Cooperation with Tajikistan 
-- Jordanian Investment on the Caspian Sea Coast 
-- Delegations from Lithuania and Japan Discuss Energy 
-- Eurasian Natural Resources Purchases Foreign Stakes 
-- Economic and Energy Statistics 
 
Atameken Opposes Export Duties on Metals 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2.  Kazakhstan's Atamaken chamber of commerce issued a statement in 
opposition to the government's plans to impose export duties on 
metals.  Atamaken argues that export duties will in effect be a 
barrier to the promotion of Kazakhstani goods in foreign markets, as 
well as impact efforts both to form a regional customs union and to 
enter the WTO.  The statement notes that such duties could seriously 
impede the development of so-called breakthrough projects in the 
metallurgical sector, which are largely export-oriented. 
(Interfax-Kazakhstan, May 15) 
 
New Shareholders in Lariba Bank 
------------------------------- 
 
3.  The son of Financial Police head Sarybay Kalmurzaev and the son 
of Tourism and Sport Minister Temirkhan Dosmukhambetov respectively 
acquired 39.82 percent and 10.18 percent stakes in Lariba Bank. 
Respublika newspaper estimates the two stakes cost at least $7 
million.  Lariba Bank began operations in Kazakhstan in 1994. 
(Respublika newspaper, May 2) 
 
New Prospects for Economic Cooperation with Tajikistan 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
4.  Tajik President Rakhmon's recent visit to Astana resulted in 
plans for economic cooperation during 2008-10 which include a $100 
million Kazakhstani commitment to create a joint investment fund for 
projects in various sectors of the Tajik economy, such as 
electricity, agriculture, and mining.  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, May 
13) 
 
Jordanian Investment on the Caspian Sea Coast 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  Development of the Kenderly resort zone on 1,700 hectares of 
land in Mangistau oblast will be primarily funded by Jordanian 
investors.  In addition to hotel construction, the foreign investors 
will be responsible for building the necessary roads and water 
supply systems.  The project's estimated cost is $2.3 billion, with 
about 330,000 tourists expected annually once the resort zone is 
completed.   According to a representative of the Mangistau 
Investment Company, which is also a partner in the project, the 
Kenderly resort zone will be a pioneer project for the Caspian 
region.  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, May 7) 
 
Delegations from Lithuania and Japan Discuss Energy 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
6.  At a meeting in Astana with Lithuanian Prime Minister Kirkilas, 
President Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstani companies would supply 
fuel for a new nuclear power plant to be built in Lithuania. 
Kirkilas invited Kazakhstani companies to take part in building a 
liquefied natural gas terminal in Lithuania.  (Kazakhstan Today, May 
13) 
 
7.  Energy Minister Mynbaev and Japan's Parliamentary Secretary for 
Economy, Trade, and Industry Kanae Yamamoto signed a memorandum to 
enhance the strategic partnership of the two countries in the area 
of civil nuclear power.  Yamamoto said that uranium mining at 
Western Mynkuduk, the first uranium deposit in Kazakhstan developed 
with investment from a Japanese company, will commence in June.  A 
second joint project, the Kharasan deposit, will be inaugurated 
later.  (Reuters, May 5) 
 
 
ASTANA 00001073  002 OF 002 
 
 
Eurasian Natural Resources Purchases Foreign Stakes 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8.  Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC) is buying a 50 
percent stake in Xinjiang Tuoli Taihang Ferro-Alloy Co. Ltd, a major 
ferrochrome producer in China with annual production capacity of 
120,000 tons, for $14.5 million.  Approximately 70 percent of the 
chrome used by the Chinese company is supplied by ENRC.  ENRC also 
announced the acquisition of a 50 percent interest in Brazil's Bahia 
Mineracao Limitada (BML), which is exploring iron ore deposits in 
Bahia State, for $300 million.  By 2012, BML's field is expected to 
produce 20 million tons of ore per year.  (Panorama ne
wspaper, May 
9) 
 
Economic and Energy Statistics 
------------------------------ 
 
9.  April-on-April inflation from 2007 to 2008 was 19.1 percent, 
which is the highest year-on-year inflation rate in recent years. 
The month-on-month inflation rate from March to April 2008 was 0.9 
percent, as compared to 0.6 percent from February to March.  The 
month-on-month price increase is attributed principally to increases 
in prices on food products (1.0 percent), non-food products (0.8 
products), and paid services (0.7 percent).  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, 
May 4) 
 
10.  According to the National Statistics Agency, Kazakhstan's 
industrial production rose 3.5 percent on a year-on-year basis for 
the January-April 2008 period.  Year-on-year growth in mining was 
6.3 percent, and in utilities (electricity, gas, and water) was 7.9 
percent.  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, May 13) 
 
11.  The National Statistics Agency also reported that crude oil 
production increased 6.6 percent year-on-year during January-April 
2008, totaling 19.32 million tons for that period.  Gas condensate 
production rose 4.7 percent to 4.34 million tons.  Natural gas 
production grew 15.6 percent to 11.477 billion cubic meters. 
Kazakhstan extracted 37.76 million tons of coal during 
January-April, a 19.7 increase year-on-year.  (Interfax-Kazakhstan, 
May 16) 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA1072, KAZAKHSTAN: ALMATY NOTES, MAY 27 – JUNE 6, 2008

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1072 2008-06-09 13:01 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1072/01 1611301
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091301Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2561
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1912
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8283
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8165
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7328
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2363
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1533

UNCLAS ASTANA 001072 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: ALMATY NOTES, MAY 27 - JUNE 6, 2008 
 
 
1.  The "Almaty Notes" series is intended to maintain focus on 
developments in civil society, the media, and the opposition in 
Kazakhstan's "southern capital" following the move of the Embassy to 
Astana. 
 
Hunger Strike Against Property Seizures 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  On June 2, eleven Almaty residents who had been on a hunger 
strike for two weeks held a press briefing for journalists.  The 
residents are protesting an attempt to demolish their houses and 
seize their land.   They allege that the Almaty municipal 
administration and a local court are biased in favor of a private 
construction company, City Service Invest Stroy (CSIS), which plans 
to build commercial buildings on a valuable 7.3 hectare land plot 
after evicting 264 local residents.  The majority of the residents 
refused to accept the meager compensation they were offered in 
return.  Every time the residents have tried to arrange protests 
against the seizure, their actions have been disrupted by law 
enforcement agencies.  Some of the residents allege that President 
Nazarbayev's nephew, Kayrat Satypaldy, has a financial interest in 
CSIS, which is the reason the municipal administration, courts, and 
law enforcement agencies have supported the company. 
 
3.  A group of opposition activists, including Petr Svoik and 
Marzhan Aspandiyarova from the Azat party, Amirbek Togusov from the 
National Social Democratic Party (OSDP), and Aynur Kurmanov from the 
Socialist Resistance movement, attended the press briefing and 
called on the residents to continue their protest actions.  Svoik 
seconded the residents' claim that someone very influential must be 
behind the construction company.  He said that the residents have 
created a precedent by standing up for their rights, and the 
authorities now fear that other people will do the same thing.  This 
was the reason that the authorities have pushed back so hard.   The 
residents reassured the oppositionists that they would continue 
their fight.  They also plan to address a complaint to the OSCE's 
Almaty office.  A police officer observed the press conference, but 
did not interfere. 
 
Rally in Support of Self-Styled Activist 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.  On May 31, the day of commemoration for the victims of Stalinist 
repression, opposition activists organized a rally in Almaty in 
support of Nurlan Alimbekov.  Alimbekov, a self-styled human rights 
activist, was detained in August 2007 in Shymkent on charges of 
inciting inter-ethnic and inter-religious hatred through 
disseminating offensive emails.  He is currently being held in the 
Almaty pre-trial detention center awaiting his third psychiatric 
evaluation.  Participants in the sanctioned rally included relatives 
and friends of Alimbekov, as well as representatives of the leading 
opposition parties -- Azat, OSDP, and the Communist Party.  One 
protestor, Takhirzhan Akmetov, threatened to cut off his own finger 
and send it to President Nazarbayev if Alimbekov is not released. 
He was subsequently called in by the police for questioning. 
 
5.  Nurlan Alimbekov, born in 1964, is a graduate of Yekaterinburg 
State University.  He worked for the Ministry of Information and 
later was a researcher at the Academy of Sciences and a lecturer at 
several universities in South Kazakhstan oblast.  Before his arrest 
last year, Alimbekov, who purportedly published some articles in the 
opposition press, was unknown to the wider public.  He has 
maintained his innocence and claims the case against him was 
fabricated. 
 
Attempt to Seize Property of Agafe Church 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6.  Local authorities in the Karasay district of Almaty oblast are 
reportedly trying to seize the Agafe Evangelical Christian Church's 
land and building.  A district prosecutor has filed a motion asking 
a local court to rule that the transfer of this property to the 
church was illegal.  In 1997, a local official authorized the 
transfer of both the land and the building, which had previously 
been used for cultural events, to the Agafe church for free. 
According to a church representative, the church parish and 
missionaries from South Korea repaired the building.  Some 
unidentified individuals now want to seize this lucrative property, 
including the two-story building and 1309 square-meter land plot, 
the church representative claimed.  The district prosecutor alleges 
that the transfer was an illegal, unauthorized privatization. 
 
Opposition Journalist Bapi Accused of Slander 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  A driver of one of the cars which reportedly surveilled 
opposition journalist Yermurat Bapi has filed a lawsuit against Bapi 
accusing him of slander, Bapi told Inkar internet radio in a June 5 
interview.  Bapi previously provided the license plate numbers of 
the cars to the Almaty office of the National Security Committee 
(KNB), and the KNB responded claiming they had identified th
e 
drivers.  Bapi suggested that the KNB made the driver file the 
lawsuit. 
 
Incident Involving Uzbek Refugees 
--------------------------------- 
 
8.  On May 29, the Almaty police detained three Uzbek refugees, 
Zhobir Aslonov, Yelmurat Khamzayev, and Khamid Makhmudov, while they 
were leaving the UNHCR office in Almaty.  Six police officers in 
civilian clothes handcuffed the refugees, put them in a car, and 
took them to a police station.  Two other refugees managed to flee 
the scene. 
 
9.  The detained refugees allege that they were questioned by the 
police and KNB officers in a rude manner and were threatened with 
deportation.  According to refugee Yelmurat Khamzayev, when he 
produced a refugee certificate issued by the UNHCR office, one of 
the officers told him: "You can use it as toilet paper as it has no 
value."  Khamzayev was ultimately allowed to call his wife and 
managed to tell her about the detention.  An hour later, a UNHCR 
representative and Denis Dzhivaga from the Human Rights Bureau NGO 
arrived at the police station.  The refugees were released shortly 
thereafter on instructions from the prosecutor's office. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA1065, KAZAKHSTAN – PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV REFUTES RUMORS OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1065 2008-06-09 11:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO4422
OO RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1065 1611128
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 091128Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2560
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0521

UNCLAS ASTANA 001065 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KZ
 
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN - PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV REFUTES RUMORS OF 
IMPENDING RESIGNATION 
 
 
1. (SBU) Rumors have been swirling around Astana in recent weeks 
that President Nazarbayev will announce his resignation on July 6 -- 
Nazarbayev's 68th birthday and the day the country will officially 
celebrate Astana's 10th anniversary as Kazakhstan's capital.  (Note: 
 Several heads of state, including Russian President Medvedev and 
Turkish President Gul are expected to be in attendance for the 10th 
anniversary celebration.  End Note.)  Rumor-mongers claim Nazarbayev 
would name Astana mayor Imangali Tasmagambetov as his successor. 
 
2. (SBU) Nazarbayev appears to have deliberately refuted the 
resignation rumors in June 6 remarks to the press in Atyrau, 
following a meeting there with Kazakhstan's Foreign Investors' 
Council.  Nazarbayev told journalists that he "does not intend to 
depart," but rather that he will stay "as long as the people have 
confidence in him" and support him at the ballot box.  He pointedly 
added that any talk of a successor is "idle speculation." 
Nazarbayev also expressed opposition to renaming Astana "Nursultan" 
in his honor -- a proposal recently put forth by Majilis member Sat 
Tokpakbayev (who is also a former defense minister). 
 
3. (SBU) Comment:  The origins of the resignation rumors remain 
unclear.  In any event, we give them no credence.  Given 
Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE chairmanship -- which will provide the 
country with its most significant international leadership role to 
date -- and Nazarbayev's many ambitious plans for Kazakhstan's 
further development, at present there is no reason to believe 
Nazarbayev would consider resigning prior to the completion of his 
current term in office in January 2013.  End Comment. 
 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA1027, KAZAKHSTAN WILL ATTEND FOURTH MEETING OF GLOBAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1027 2008-06-03 11:04 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1027 1551104
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031104Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2523

UNCLAS ASTANA 001027 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL PTER KGIC KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN WILL ATTEND FOURTH MEETING OF GLOBAL 
INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
 
REF: A. STATE 57695 B. STATE 57146 
 
1. Sergey Savelyev, Head of the MFA's International Security 
Section, told Poloff on June 3 that Kazakhstan will attend 
the fourth meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism.  Kazakhstan's delegation will be led by Deputy 
Foreign Minister Nurlan Danenov.  Savelyev will also 
participate. 
 
2. Savelyev also informed Poloff that the Kazakhstanis are 
willing to make a presentation at the meeting on their June 6 
"Atom Anti-Terror" event.  He asked for a follow-up meeting 
early next week with Poloff to discuss the details of the 
presentation. 
ORDWAY

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08ASTANA1022, CODEL RAHALL DISCUSSES ENERGY, SECURITY, DEMOCRACY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1022 2008-06-02 09:47 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Astana

VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1022/01 1540947
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 020947Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2516
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0516
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0023

S E C R E T ASTANA 001022 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN M. O'MARA, H 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: CODEL RAHALL DISCUSSES ENERGY, SECURITY, DEMOCRACY 
WITH KAZAKHSTANI LEADERSHIP 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Codel Rahall traveled to Astana on May 28 for 
meetings with President Nazarbayev, Prime Minister Masimov, 
Foreign Minister Tazhin, State Secretary Saudabayev, and 
members of both houses of Parliament.  The delegation's 
Kazakhstani interlocutors praised U.S. - Kazakhstan 
relations. President Nazarbayev and Foreign Minister Tazhin 
both said that the U.S. should stay the course in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Tazhin and Saudabayev told the delegation that 
Kazakhstan is making progress on democracy but conditions in 
the region must be considered when assessing the pace of 
development.  Codel Rahall consisted of Representatives Nick 
Rahall (D-West Virginia); Darrell Issa (R-California); Jack 
Kingston (R-Georgia); Ray LaHood (R-Illinois); Charles 
Melancon (D-Louisiana); and John Linder (R-Georgia).  End 
Summary 
 
Nazarbayev Addresses War on Terror, Iran, World View of U.S. 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) President Nazarbayev begin his meeting with the 
delegation by praising U.S. - Kazakhstan relations. 
Responding to Representative Rahall's thanks for Kazakhstan's 
contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Nazarbayev said that 
the U.S. is moving in the right direction in both countries 
and that each conflict affects Kazakhstan. The U.S. must 
finish what it started in Iraq, he said.  If there is a 
retreat, he added, terrorist attacks will increase. 
Nazarbayev said, however, that it is "funny" to hear 
President Bush say that democracy is being established in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  After the coalition leaves, the 
countries will be Islamic countries which are hopefully "at 
least as good as Pakistan." He also told the delegation that 
Kazakhstan's more religious-minded southern neighbors, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, are susceptible to more radical 
positions. 
 
3. (C) According to Nazarbayev, if force is used against Iran 
it will cause chaos and an increase of terrorism, a view 
which he said many leaders of Moslem countries share.  He 
told President Ahmadinejad last year that Iran should abandon 
its nuclear program in exchange for an end to the embargo and 
the opportunity to create a peaceful nuclear program. 
Ahmadinejad replied that Iran's current program is peaceful, 
and that the United States will accuse Iran regardless of its 
intentions. Nazarbayev said that he also met at that time 
with Ayatollah Khamenei, and believes that Ahmadinejad was 
only reflecting the views of the Ayatollah. Nazarbayev opined 
that Saddam Hussein, while "not a good guy," at least helped 
to achieve balance in the region.  Now, the Shias are 
increasing their power and Iran is a threat to the other Gulf 
states. 
 
4. (C) Nazarbayev told the delegation that western oil 
companies are in Kazakhstan and are flourishing. He would now 
like to see western companies become more involved in 
Kazakhstan's economic diversification and the development of 
the services sector.  Nazarbayev expressed displeasure with 
the pace of progress at Kashagan.  He noted problems with oil 
transportation and said that Kazakhstan is now developing 
options across the Caspian and to China. 
 
5. (C) Nazarbayev informed the delegation that Kazakhstan 
does not have any major unsettled issues with the United 
States.  He did request the delegation's assistance with 
Jackson - Vanik, saying that Kazakhstan is the second best 
country in the world for Jews to live.  He also asked why the 
U.S. has not endorsed Kazakhstan's WTO candidacy, instead 
grouping it with "bad" countries. Finally, Nazarbayev 
reminisced that in Soviet times people believed that the U.S. 
was fair and good.  Now, he said, the mood has changed.  The 
U.S. needs to demonstrate its moral potential with  "good 
acts," and not just military acts. 
 
Codel Rahall Discusses Energy, Security. Democracy with 
Kazakhstani Leaders 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5. (C) In a meeting with Prime Minister Masimov, 
Representative Rahall asked for an explanation of the 
situation with AES.  Masimov promised a just and fair 
solution, guaranteeing that the issue will be reviewed in 
accordance with the law and with the input of independent 
U.S. experts.   Masimov predicted that oil prices have not 
yet peaked and will continue to rise through the Beijing 
Olympics.  He believes that prices will rise to $155 a 
barrel.  The continued rise will create consumption issues in 
emerging markets such as India and China, leading to a 
 
reduction of prices next year. 
 
6. (C) Asked by Representative Issa about Kazakhstan's 
capital flow, Masimov answered that until last August, 
Kazakhstan had good access to global capital.  That time, he 
said, will not return in the near future.  The number one 
issue for Kazakhstan currently, according to Masimov, is 
risk.  Previously, Kazakhstan's banks were viewed as too big 
to fail.  Now, world banks are closely assessing the risks of 
Kazakhstani banks. 
 
7.
(C) Masimov said interest in Kazakhstan's hydrocarbons and 
agriculture sectors remains strong.  Agriculture in 
Kazakhstan is very attractive because of rising food prices. 
Prices for land are also one-tenth those in Europe, said 
Masimov.  He added that Kazakhstan has attracted interest 
from GMO companies, but has not yet determined its position 
on the issue.  In other sectors, however, attracting capital 
is more complicated, he said. 
 
8. (C) State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev told the delegation 
that there are no major problems between the U.S. and 
Kazakhstan.  The support of the U.S. for Kazakhstan's bid to 
chair the OSCE in 2010 is a vote of confidence from the U.S. 
and recognition that Kazakhstan is moving towards true 
democracy.  There may be issues on the pace of democratic 
development in Kazakhstan, said Saudabayev, but others must 
remember that Kazakhstan has to take into consideration 
domestic and regional realities.  Saudabayev also questioned 
why "hotheads" in the U.S. Congress criticize Kazakhstan 
undeservedly. With each criticism, he warned, "some 
neighbors" tell President Nazarbayev that Kazakhstan should 
not bother with the United States. 
 
9. (S) On the OSCE, Saudabayev called the chairmanship not 
only a big honor but also a great responsibility.  Kazakhstan 
does not want some OSCE members states to feel like 
second-class citizens and wants to heighten the 
organization's focus on Central Asia, including Afghanistan. 
Saudabayev called Kazakhstan's commitment to Iraq and 
Afghanistan proof of the strength of U.S. - Kazakhstan 
relations.  As another example of partnership, Saudabayev 
pointed to the "active cooperation" of the secret services of 
the two countries. 
 
10. (C) The delegation asked Foreign Minister Tazhin how the 
U.S. can help Kazakhstan. Tazhin responded that the U.S. 
should lift Jackson - Vanik restrictions.  Representative 
Lahood asked Tazhin what the U.S. and its allies should do in 
Iraq.  Tazhin said that "if we begin the process, then we 
must be responsible for the results." To leave Iraq, he said, 
will create serious and dangerous consequences.  Looking at 
Central Asia, Tazhin said that change in the region cannot be 
"artificially forced." According to Tazhin, the U.S. should 
consider this when developing its policy for the region. 
 
11. (C) Nurbakh Rustemov, Chairman of the Mazhilis Committee 
for International Affairs, asked the delegation for U.S. 
support for Senate Speaker Tokayev's candidacy for Deputy 
Chairman of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, assistance with 
Jackson - Vanik, and help with efforts to integrate Central 
Asia and to establish a free trade zone.  Asked by 
Representative Rahall about the stability of the investment 
climate, Rustemov promised that there will not be deviations 
from existing agreements. 
 
12. (U) This cable has not been cleared by Codel Rahall 
ORDWAY

Wikileaks

08ASTANA1021, EXBS KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR’S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE (MAY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASTANA1021 2008-06-02 09:24 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO8569
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #1021/01 1540924
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020924Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2513
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0106
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC 0048
RUCQAAA/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0474
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 8280
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 8161
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0047
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2359
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 7325
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0456

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001021 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC YWONG, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN, SROBINSON 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC-AMT LSPRINGER 
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE DFISCHER 
DEPT FOR SCA/RA JSPILSBURY 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN MO'MARA 
CBP/INA FOR KCHAISSON AND RWATT 
USDOE/NNSA CWALKER, TPERRY AND EDESCHLER 
DOC FOR DCREED 
USCG FOR SHABETIMICHAEL 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT, BISHKEK, BAKU, DUSHANBE AND ASHGABAT FOR EXBS 
ADVISORS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: EXBS KAZAKHSTAN ADVISOR'S MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE (MAY 
2008) 
 
I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS: 
 
1. Kazakhstan will conduct an operational-tactical exercise 
"Atom-Antiterror- 2008" in Almaty on June 6 under the auspices of 
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.  This exercise is 
targeted to improve interaction between state bodies in order to 
prevent and localize a possible terrorist threat against the Nuclear 
Physics Institute in Alatau.  Fifteen Kazakhstani government 
agencies will participate, including representatives from the 
security services and law enforcement. 
 
2. There has been a change of leadership in the Kazakhstani Border 
Guard Services of the National Security Committee. 
Lieutenant-General Bolat Seitkazynovich Zakiyev, the Director of the 
Border Guard Service and the Deputy Chairman of the National 
Security Committee has retired along with Major-General Khussain 
Berkaliev, First Deputy Director of the Border Guards Service. 
 
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS CONDUCTED 
 
1. On May 6, the EXBS program manager met with Lieutenant-General 
Bolat Seitkazynovich Zakiyev, the Director of the Border Guard 
Service, along with Colonel Bizhanov, Deputy Head of the Border 
Control Department, Colonel Tanalinov, Head of the Engineer 
Division, and Lt. Colonel Islamov, Deputy Head of the Engineer 
Division. The officials of the Border Guard Service were briefed on 
EXBS efforts in Kazakhstan aimed at providing needed equipment and 
training.  During the meeting the Border Guard Service officials 
informed EXBS of Kazakhstan's need for additional modular shelters 
to house a new field engineering battalion at the Sary Agash border 
crossing in Southern Kazakhstan.  This new field engineering 
battalion is to build a green border defense barrier between 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  The Border Guards are planning to 
install search and target land radars in the south-west Kazakhstan 
regions bordering Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
 
2. On May 12, there was a special Country Team meeting held in 
Astana.  During this meeting a roundtable discussion was held with a 
student delegation led by Ambassador Laura Kennedy from the National 
War College.  The delegation was conducting the international travel 
portion of its "Field Studies in National Security" program. During 
this meeting the EXBS Advisor provided an overview of the EXBS 
program and the Second Line of Defense program in Kazakhstan. 
 
3. On May 13, the EXBS Advisor participated in a meeting on the 
International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) for FY 2009. EXBS, 
in coordination with the Office of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement (INL), proposed a country specific visit by mid-level 
managers from the Customs and Border Guard Services.  The Customs 
Control Department nominees included Mr. Kaisar Malgazhdarov, Head 
of the Northern Kazakhstan region, Mr. Abilklan Manabayev, Senior 
Specialist in Almaty, and Mr. Daulet Saduakasov, Head of the Eastern 
Kazakhstan region.  The Border Guard nominees include Colonel Aidar 
Kapizov, Depurty Head of the Division of Border Guard Cooperation, 
Colonel Darkhan Oralbayev, Commander of the military base 2094, and 
Major Aidar Balgabayev, Head of the Border Guard Division of the 
Kostaniskaya oblast. 
 
4. On May 23, EXBS participated in a meeting between various U.S. 
Embassy donor offices and representatives of the Border Guard 
Service lead by Major-General Mazhitov.  During the meeting the 
 
ASTANA 00001021  002 OF 003 
 
 
Border Guard Service outlined their needs for the FY09.  These 
include search and target designation radars, portable shelters, 
ground sensor radiobarriers, and training for the Border Guards in 
the southern Kazakhstan region. 
 
B. TRAINING DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
1.       None. 
 
C. EQUIPMENT DELIVERED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
1.  None &#x
000A; 
D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT STATUS UPDATE 
 
1.  The U.S. Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense (SLD) 
program in Kazakhstan is approaching its next major milestone with 
the installation of radiation portal monitors at the Phase One sites 
along the southern border.  Acceptance testing of this equipment 
will be conducted beginning on June 19 and will continue until all 
sites are tested.  A SLD training team from the Pacific Northwest 
National laboratory will conduct a training needs assessment at 
these sites approximately two weeks following acceptance testing, 
beginning approximately mid July. 
 
2. The Republic of Kazakhstan's facility construction at the Sypatai 
Batyr crossing will not be complete in time for SLD to complete 
installation of equipment during Phase One of this project. SLD will 
defer installation of this equipment until this construction is 
complete. 
 
3. The EXBS program manager is conducting market research on the 
proposed acquisition of modular shelters, surveillance automated 
ground sensor systems, and vehicles.  Also, the Regional Procurement 
Support Office in Frankfurt, Germany, has been contacted and 
provided a copy of the Statement of Work for the acquisition of four 
Rapiscan Model627DV X-ray machines. 
 
E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT CONTROLS, NONPROLIFERATION, OR 
RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
 
1.  On May 22, the EXBS Advisor informed the Department of Energy's 
Second Line of Defense management of a letter from the Kazakhstan 
Ministry of Finance stating that all material imported under the CTR 
Umbrella Agreement will be subject to customs duties and taxes as 
stipulated by law until completion of inter-government procedures 
necessary for the Amendment to the Agreement to take effect.  This 
means that until the CTR agreement is ratified, the Second Line of 
Defense can no longer import anything into Kazakhstan without paying 
duty.  Therefore the EXBS team assisted the SLD in the 
transportation and storage of a shipment of 18 handheld 
radiation-monitors (MKC-A03-1) and Thorium-232 calibration filters 
(MKC-A03-1) in a bonded warehouse pending the ratification of the 
CTR Umbrella Agreement. 
 
F. CASPIAN SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
1. The EXBS teams in Baku and Astana continue to coordinate 
activities related to preparation for the SAFE Boat Operations 
Course to be conducted in Bautino, Kazakhstan from July 7 to August 
1, 2008. 
 
 
 
ASTANA 00001021  003 OF 003 
 
 
III. RED FLAG ISSUES. 
 
1. None 
 
 
 
ORDWAY

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